



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

### Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

### About Google Book Search


Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

Per 3977 c. 62.  
3rd ser 25-26











THE  
BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST,  
AND  
LITERARY MAGAZINE.

---

"MAGNA EST VERITAS, ET PREVALEBIT."

---



LONDON:  
HOULSTON AND SONS,  
65, PATERNOSTER ROW.

---

MDCCLXXI.

LONDON  
J. AND W. RIDER, PRINTERS,  
BARTHOLOMEW CLOSE.

## PREFACE.

THE directors of a public company are called upon, as a matter of course, to prepare a synopsis of the state of their affairs, and to make a few remarks in their report upon its management in the past, its condition at present, and the prospect of the future. It has become customary in much the same way for the Conductors of this serial to lay before their readers a few observations by way of Preface to the several successive volumes they have been privileged to add to the literature of research, culture, improvement, and free discussion. On this occasion, considering that those who are best qualified to speak about the purpose, plan, difficulties, and progress of this work, have, in the body of this volume, given an epitome of the history of this literary venture during the *twenty-one* years in which it has now held its place among serials, the responsible Conductors might well have refrained from any merely prefatory observations. This they would readily have consented to do, were it not that they have little other opportunity of holding specific intercourse with the reader than such as is afforded to them by these half-yearly recurrences of greeting and explanation, of which they are unwilling to lose even a single one. For where the pressure of the hand may not be felt, nor the play of the light of friendship in the eye be seen, words are the only medium through which the mind can find access to mind in a direct form; and the Conductors wish at all times to treat with loving confidence those for whom they labour, and through whom their labour, if it is to be effective at all, must produce the desired results—the promotion of a love of faithful investigation, the exercise of critical thought, and the culture of dispassionate reflectiveness on all matters of interest in regard to life, thought, motives, and events.

It is never to be forgotten in the perusal of these volumes that its Conductors cater for those who are supposed to have a high sense of the value of truth attained by the efforts of reason, and of the culture by which the intellectual and moral nature is quickened and refined—those who feel the nobleness of thought. The Conductors certainly desire to aid in the task of popular elevation, but they cannot condescend to court popular favour at the expense of truth, freedom, or the moral integrity of the critical faculties. They seek the countenance and support, and earnestly ask the aid of all those who *think*, and desire that men should learn to think truly and thoroughly—to create, in short, a reasoned and reasonable public opinion. To that their labours tend, in that they hope they may end. The subjoined review of their efforts in this behalf they now present to the favourable consideration of the reader.

The *Leading Articles*, if less varied, are of higher mark, we believe, even than usual; they indicate a living energy of mind, a broad unconventional force, a rare and notable fertility of suggestiveness. For compass, accuracy, and explicit conciseness, there can be few readers who will not acknowledge the excellence and the informingness of the papers on Deity; and hackneyed as political questions are, there is in the series of papers on Government not a little of originality and worth. The *Debates*, being, as they are, in

great part the contributions of our widely scattered constituency of subscribers, may be regarded as a strong body of public opinion upon the several themes discussed, and as evidences of the culture and endeavour which we have succeeded in drawing round us in sympathizing helpfulness with our aim to give boldness and precision to inquiry, and superinduce that consistent and uniform motion of mind which actually becomes rest. For their friendly co-operation in our purpose, and their help in our difficult task, we, in the name of our readers, thank them, and congratulate them on the variousness, the vigour, and the value they have added to this volume. It contains no fewer than fifty-two articles devoted to the consideration of seven debates on highly important subjects, the fulness, variety, spirit, education, and usefulness of which a fair perusal will amply confirm; while we may confidently aver that the impartiality, charity, aptness, and acuteness they display make them good exemplars of honest critical discussion.

In addition to these *The Topic* has, as usual, afforded an opportunity for the consideration of matters of more passing interest, having closer connection with the stir of the times, in condensed jottings of reasoned thought regarding them.

In "*Toiling Upward*" the biographer of Dr. J. A. Langford has composed a companion prize to our recent memoir of Thomas Cooper. *The Essayist* has dealt with the higher literature and philosophy in a gratifying spirit, and with much ability. *The Reviewer* has fulfilled his function by giving us choice matter from various sources, accompanied with good reasons for approving of certain books, and that sort of living interest in bookmakers and their readers which induces sympathetic approval because it produces that friendly considerativeness which arises from knowledge of aims, achievements, and obstacles.

*Our Collegiate Course*—though press of matter has somewhat curtailed the space allotted to it—presents a hopeful appearance of usefulness and interest, and by its explanatory fulness seems to add to the delight of poetry the charms of associative beauty. *The Societies' Section* is improved, and gives promise of still further adaptation to the purposes of progress, and the extension of material aid in the acquisition of intellectual power. Our *Inquirers'* columns continue to be useful and beneficial in the intercommunication between the reader in difficulty and the reader whose information can supply what is wanted. The *Literary Notes* possess informing value, and are a *multum in parvo* of intelligence on books and their authors, and the projects and achievements of men of letters.

Truth is the perfection of reason, and the discovery of truth is, among men, the result of *reasoning*. In this magazine we seek to bring into co-operative discursive activity the powers of the readers and the contributors, to examine and to learn, to consider and to test. We exercise no jurisdiction over opinion, and we engage in no special *propaganda*. Our desire is to excite thought and to train intellect; we believe that these, rightly employed, cannot greatly err in those searches and researches on which the possibility of attaining truth has been made to depend. Let us all more earnestly strive to fulfil our part in the co-operative corporation of truth-seekers, and progress and benefit are sure.



# THE BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST.

---

## *The Philosophy of Politics.*

---

### REPRESENTATIVE OR PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT.

"Truth scarce ever yet carried it by vote anywhere at its first appearance; new opinions are always suspected, and usually opposed, without any other reason but because they are not already common. But truth, like gold, is not the less so for being newly brought out of the mine. It is trial and examination must give it price, and not any antique fashion; and though it be not current by the public stamp, yet it may, for all that, be as old as nature, and as certainly not less genuine."—JOHN LOCKE.

POLITICS is that department of science which concerns itself with communities existing under Government. Civic life is conditioned by the constitution of the human mind, or the properties of human nature, and the character of the circumstances in which our life-lot is cast. The chief end of Government is, as Mr. James Mill has defined it, "to increase to the utmost the pleasures, and diminish to the utmost the pains, which men derive from each other" as fellow-citizens, who require to live, labour, act, and suffer together; or, as our pleasures and our pains arise from our being persons and having property, we may briefly regard Government as the whole of the agencies by which life and property are protected in common; that is, by which any portion of society is made a commonwealth. The legislative experience of mankind is, that human passions require regulation and control, that properly balanced and associated feeling is essential to well-being, that virtue is the safeguard of civilization. The excellence and stability of any social polity, therefore, depends on its power of exciting, sustaining, and energising civil virtue. Virtue in politics is proportioned self-restraint; that is, a yielding of so much of one's own desire, wishes, and indulgence, as may be requisite to secure and maintain, in the

highest degree possible, a habit, in others, of conceding and acting upon, a similar settled form of controlled gratification.

"Most speculative politicians of the present day consider a representative government of some description as the best ideal type of government." Mr. James Mill says—"In the grand discovery of modern times, the system of representation, the solution of all the difficulties, both practical and speculative" [which concern the question of the best form of government], "will perhaps be found." Representation is the power of choosing those persons who shall, in name and on behalf of the community, deliberate and determine upon the best available means, at any time and in any given circumstances, for increasing, preserving, and protecting the well-being of the largest possible number of those who form the members of the civic society, with whose prosperity the Government is entrusted, in accordance with the will of the body of the people, shown either by approval or by acquiescence. The essence of representative government is, "that the whole people, or some numerous portion of them," [shall and do] "exercise, through deputies periodically elected by themselves" [in due form and under proper safeguards], "the ultimate controlling power which, in every constitution, must reside somewhere. This ultimate power they must possess in all its completeness. They must be masters whenever they please of all the operations of Government."

"For power can neither see, worke, or devise,  
Without the people's hands, hearts, wit, and eyes."

The object of a representative legislator is not to do the work, but to direct and control the working of Government: to determine the ends to which the executive shall turn their efforts, and on the successful achievement of which the community should insist. Administration is the duty of the statesman; deliberation, of the legislator. "When it is necessary or important to secure hearing and consideration to many conflicting opinions, a deliberative body is indispensable." Parliament is the deliberating judgment and the determining will of the people. It is not, or at least ought not to be, a congress of opinions, a battle-field of interests, a duel of parties, a political debating club, a magazine of talk on the popular topics of the day, a purveyor of matter for news-sheets, or a meeting for the airing of crotchets and the promulgation of amateur lectures, on topics connected immediately or remotely with the principles of political economy, the theories of jurisprudence, the proper regulation of diplomacy, the forms of financial operations, the laws that determine the rise, progress, decline, and fall of nations, or the personal encounters of noted men in regard to party tactics, wit, policy, or popularity. Its duty is to determine what are the great permanent interests of the community, in what way these may be best subserved, and what rulers or kind of rulers shall be intrusted with the conduct of affairs.

A well-grounded idea concerning the main purpose of Parliament will fix and settle a good many conflicting opinions for us. It is with the desire of adding in some measure to the political education of those who may be called upon to give diligent heed to the purposes, principles, and practical selection of the legislative assemblies of the future, that we devote these thoughts to a philosophy of representation. It ought to be a matter of high importance that the greatest possible amount of intelligence should be brought to bear upon the means by which the commonwealth may be made most effective in the diffusion and preservation of human happiness. Happiness depends upon the largest and freest use of all the powers of which each individual is the possessor. Freedom is in this way a measure of happiness. Subjective freedom is liberty of thought, feeling, and aspiration; objective freedom is liberty of person, property, powers, and privileges, in subordination to the law of giving to each, in his condition and circumstances, the same rights as are claimed by us. Individuality is the highest form of human life, and sociality is the noblest mode of civic life. Individuality is the concrete completeness, unity, and harmony of each separate person in himself; sociality is the independence, organic oneness, constitutional compactness, and co-operative sympathy of each commonwealth within itself. Freedom within limits is the condition of true individuality and of perfect sociability.

The greatest possible amount of freedom is attainable only when each individual is made the constitutional guardian of his own person, property, character, usefulness, and privileges, and has accorded to him the means of maintaining and protecting these in the highest degree consistent with the similar rights of others. Hence arise the difficulties of arranging, on any definite principles, the best type of representative government.

A very prevalent doctrine is that taxation implies representation. This, as a mere money gauge, cannot be accepted as a philosophical maxim; for it would follow thence that as each one is taxed in some measure and manner, each has an indefeasible right to the suffrage. But can we justly grant a universal right of precisely the same value, on account of a fact which varies so much in proportional amount? If we deal rightly in this matter we must grant a cumulative vote, and make a property qualification the supreme matter in legislation. It is said, again, that representation is a natural right, due to the fact that each person exists and has a lien on the community, as the community has a lien on him. This would lead to universal suffrage, and would make numbers supreme, while what is wanted is a deliberative assembly, not a mass of delegates; legislation, not confiscation.

The great difficulty of the problem is to get a good and efficient Parliament, in consistency alike with duty and with right. Deliberative thought, in the honesty as well as earnestness of which all men may have confidence, is what is sought. A mere representation of numbers would set at the mercy of the least deliberative the indi-

vidual freedom and personal rights of all those who had acquired by inheritance, industry, or ingenuity, anything more than a bare subsistence; as it is not probable that the class which is most numerous would be less selfish, opportunity being given, than any other class. It has been almost universally decided that a legislative body, chosen solely and sheerly by universal suffrage, would not form a good set of trustees with whom to lodge the guardianship of the commonwealth, and hence a great many schemes have been devised to secure a due balance of distributive justice. The personal right to the suffrage is metaphysically good as to origin, but it does not appear to be practically good as to validity. It might be granted safely if the pre-condition were fulfilled that the elector should acquire fitness for his duty before it was regarded as a right; for personality as a right demands the culture of individuality as a duty.

In our critique of the means for procuring and securing a truly philosophical basis for parliamentary representation, as a means of providing a thoroughly competent deliberative assembly, we have seen that neither the personal theory nor the taxation theory provides exactly what is required, and we believe that equally strong objections can be urged concerning many other popular theories of representative legislation.

A few of these we shall pass under review briefly. It may perhaps be regarded as a maxim in practical politics, "that men will, in the majority of cases, prefer their own interest to that of others, when the two are placed in competition;" and hence it becomes a necessity of a good representative system that the interests of those who are entrusted with the supreme direction of civic affairs should be made, as far as possible, identical with the general good of the entire community. It has been deduced from this by a certain class of politicians that this will be best accomplished by the representation of interests. These thinkers hold the opinion that great advantage would accrue to the country at large by the presence in the representative assembly of the largest possible number of those men who were most thoroughly identified with the specific interests of the country, and so were naturally the representative men of their several interests. Interests in this sense being employed to signify the chief concerns, advantages, benefits, or stakes in society, felt, possessed, or exercised by them in their several positions. Thus the balance of interests would secure the operation of selfish interest against selfish interest, and engage the caution of each against the acquisitiveness and appetite for aggrandisement felt by every other.

John S. Mill has correctly stated that "a man's interest consists of whatever he takes interest in. Everybody has as many different interests as he has feelings, likings, or dislikings, either of a selfish or of a better kind. It cannot be said that any of these, taken by itself, constitutes 'his interest;' he is a good or a bad man according as he prefers one class of his interests to another." It is pretty certain that those interests which are peculiar to a man's

self, or those in which he takes a peculiar pleasure, are those which the habits of his mind dispose him to dwell most upon, and to lay most stress upon. It follows from this that the representation of interests would come, in the event, to be the maintenance of the specific differences between persons or classes; would, in fact, result in the main force of legislation being applied to the conservancy of particular privileges, rather than the extension and protection of the advantages which constitute the common good. It is true that James Mill affirms that "the community cannot have an interest opposite to its interests;" "the community within itself, and with respect to itself, can have no sinister interest;" but J. S. Mill is right in remarking that "though the community as a whole can have (as the terms imply) no other interest than its collective interest, any or every individual in it may;" and hence the danger that the representation of interests would most probably result in legislation for specific, not for public interests. On this ground we affirm that this form of representation appears likely to result in government under the greatest possible amount of friction, and therefore to be a scheme for reducing the advantage to be derived from government to the minimum; while it does not seem to provide an effective guarantee against a coalition of interests, nor to afford any ready means for accommodating the members of the representative assembly to the shifting interests of men arising from change of circumstances, opinions, and parties. It is true that, theoretically, it professes and promises to make the Parliament a mirror of the nation by giving a place to all the interests of men proportioned to their importance in the commonwealth. Interests, however, are urgent, not from their importance only, but also by their intensity; they are both quantitative and qualitative; and, as circumstances change, either may act as the overweight on which insistence on reform (or alteration) may depend. This fact heightens the difficulty of representing interests, and increases the pertinence of the objection made to making selfishness the one single item in human nature which is to be recognised as giving a right to representation. Such a balancing of evil by evil, instead of combining good with good, is a wretched policy. The Comtean Altruism (or otherishness) is put forth in opposition to the Hobbesian Egoism (or selfishness), on the ground that it seems impossible to extract from self-interest just and impartial, that is, honest and disinterested, government, and satisfactory legislation. Locke justly remarks on this subject:—"Matters that are recommended to our thoughts by any of our passions take possession of our minds with a kind of authority, and will not be kept out or dislodged; but, as if the passion that rules were, for the time, the sheriff of the place and came with all the posse [*comitatus*, or whole force of the county], the understanding is taken and seized with the object it introduces, as if it had a legal right to be alone considered there"\* To those who know how frequently—

\* "Conduct of the Understanding," par. 45.

"One master-passion in the breast  
Like Aaron's serpent swallows up the rest,"

it seems peculiarly dangerous to advocate the collecting together and aggregating of the interests of men by a system of representation which appears to legitimate interest as the one thing to be sought after by those who are brought together to legislate for the general benefit of the whole nation. While it must be admitted as a fact, that Interest is apt to hold with a severe grip the will of most men, it may well be doubted whether it is wise or right to give it free scope and full encouragement by giving, as a prize to its activity and intensity, the power to enact those laws for others which shall most surely minister to its own advantage. This is to bribe selfishness into preternatural intensity, and so to stimulate its activity.

There is a form of putting this same idea which at first sight appears to be more just and equitable—that is the theory of representation which advocates that Parliament should be made the representative of classes. It has been concisely and expressively put by Sir Hugh Cairns in these terms:—"It is the principle of the English constitution that Parliament should be a mirror, a representation of every class: not according to heads, not according to numbers, but according to everything which gives weight and importance in the world without; so that the various classes of this country may be heard, and their views expressed fairly in the House of Commons, without the possibility of any one class outnumbering or reducing to silence all the other classes in the kingdom." The theory, thus put, sounds fairly, and has a certain sort of justification. But when we look more narrowly into the terms we find that it differs but slightly from the plan previously mentioned. A class here means a rank or order of persons ranged under some common denomination, because they exhibit certain common characteristics or somewhat similar peculiarities. Now the nature of a class will be determined by its interests, and it will manifest itself chiefly as the advocate and defender of those privileges, powers, and rights which confer those advantages upon it through which it exists as a class. The representation of classes would lead to the organization of interests, and the setting up of these most invidiously one against the other.

Men engaged in public life almost invariably decry "party politics," and yet party has come to be an almost inevitable condition of civic activity. Every man is expected to link himself to some party, and to bind himself to act as the interests of that party determine in regard to all matters pertaining to representation, whether parliamentary or civic. This forms a great evil in social life: making men one-sided and imperfect, destroying many of the tender and beneficial sympathies of human intercourse, and introducing conflict and contention into men's hearts and hearths. Abstractly, no condemnation that can be passed on party, partizan-

## THE PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICS.

ship, &c., is voted to be too severe, but concretely and in practice most men feel it necessary to accept of party as an inevitable fact in life, and to throw in his lot with one or other of the active organisations by which parties consolidate themselves. Though the essence of partizanship is a passionate attachment founded on an abstract idea come to by reasoning, but persistently pursued by habit and the desire to preserve one's consistency; yet few of the most remarkable men for strength of mind and honesty of purpose concur on all points with the aims and schemes of their party. But they find that, in the long run, if they desire to see their principles written on the statute-book and powerful among the people, they must either allow themselves to be carried along with their party, or abate their ambition.

The prevailing reason for this power of party is, that in practice we seldom have the choice of our means, seldom even of our ends. While we merely reason and think, we can discriminate and determine with some degree of candour and moderation, but when we act, we must go in for success, and this without much consideration about delicacy of achievement or sentimentality about the method in which the day is gained. In politics, as in love and war, all is thought to be fair—the attainment of the end sanctifies the means, and success blots out every stain. But, in truth, partizanship is class-interest intensified by mutual sympathy and effort; it joins egotism and self-interest with class-claims and associative *esprit*, and it brings into action a similar mutuality of aspiration to that which animates an army when brought into the field to prove its courage and its prowess by its success, while it unfortunately frequently also excites the rage of personal spleen against individual opponents, such as is unknown in any other warfare than in politics and the contests of sects. In the agitation of great far-reaching principles, partizanship has a large true field of operation, but when it degenerates into paltry contention over every change in Beadledom and Bumbledom, or into squabbles in civic councils and on poor-law boards about the “mint, anise, and cummin” of ordinary life, to the neglect of the weightier matters of the law, it is absurd, and becomes prolific of evil.

It is urged on behalf of this theory that the nation is, in fact, an organized community, of which classes are not only the recognised but the essential parts. “The several classes of the community” is not a mere phrase employed for convenience' sake, but a pertinent expression of a fact in social life. It is quite correct to assert that men become assorted, graded, and classified into orders or ranks rising above each other in social estimation and prestige, as well as privilege; yet though in actual life the personal position of each member of society may be easily enough fixed in a practical and rough-handed way, yet if we were compelled to define and express the specific characteristics and qualifications requisite to constitute membership in any given class, it would be found exceedingly difficult to manage. Even if this were done, however,

the representation of classes would not be brought much nearer to a practical solution. There would still be the difficulty of allocating among the classes a fit proportion of power and influence, while in reality the very basis of the proportions were shifting, changing, and unsteady. In social life the members of the community are constantly passing from one class to another—gaining or losing, as the case may be, and this it is in vain to attempt to stay, for transition is vitality. Besides, such a plan would reduce representation to delegation, which is quite a different thing.

Mere commissioners or delegates from the several orders or classes, would be too much bound to act, as they had been deputed to do, or for the doing of which they had been entrusted with parliamentary powers. This has been the uniform result of votes by delegation; free discussion is a mere play of fireworks, discretion is arrested, and supremacy comes at last to be attained only by a stubborn resistance to any change, or to be destroyed only by coalitions which originate in intrigue, and often end in the smaller number, by factious use of their voting power; becoming, in reality, a special tribunate, who, swaying from side to side as their special interests are affected, secure for themselves a considerable monopoly of power. This would occur as the natural result of making politics merely a balancing of the interests of one class, or coalition of classes, against the interests of any other class or set of classes. This is, in fact, to set the interests of classes above the public good, and against this the very name of a Commonwealth forms a sufficient argument.

There is still another form in which the theory of representation appears to offer tangible securities for proper, just, and equitable parliamentary government. "Government by party" has acquired a character almost amounting to sacredness among us. Our social organization has almost formed itself upon the supposition that progress by antagonism is the highest ideal of statesmanship.

Against party as a vigorous and effective mode of conducting the advocacy of great principles, as an effective agency for securing consideration for each side in a controversy, we have nothing to say; it is the form in which opinion is transmuted into power; but against party as a means of carrying on a civil war of classes and interests, we have to object the embitterment of social intercourse, and the annoyance it occasions in the exercise of the undoubted rights of citizenship. The inquisition of party is its shame, if not its condemnation: while its bitterness is intensified by the fact that a party, even more so than a corporation, has no conscience. Some means certainly require to be taken to amend the envy, malice, and uncharitableness of party contests for parliamentary representation, and all earnest politicians are in search of some assuagement of the war-tactics of party. To this, among other things, we owe the theory of representation based upon the cry "Measures, not men," which is, that Parliament should be a mirror, or representative of opinions. Upon the opinions of men their ultimate welfare depends, and hence it is important that just principles should have free scope to operate



in the affairs of Government. All statesmanly measures depend upon principles. Principles are inductions from experience, or deductions from accepted truths, and are the gains of reasoning. They therefore depend on thought, on thought devoted to the apportioning of things, so as to make them tend, in the greatest possible degree, to the common good.

Measures are the practical proposals by which it is sought to effect the well-being of the community. The measures proposed for the effecting of an end may be diverse, and yet not such as to be capable of being put in direct antagonism in such a manner as the exigencies of party require. "Diversity, it is said, implies error; truth is one and admits of no degrees." "This principle," as Lord Macaulay has observed, "holds good only in abstract reasonings," and is inapplicable to remedial measures, political proposals, and social ameliorations. All political problems are intricate and involved, because the number of things to be guarded against, as well as those sought to be gained, require to be kept in view. A solution may be sought, either by restraint or constraint, persuasion or dissuasion. Sir G. C. Lewis thinks, "the politician has in general a wide discretion, and a choice of numerous courses," . . . "a wide field for the exercise of practical sagacity and inventive resource;" and that "it is in weighing and comparing these alternative courses,—in recommending one for adoption,—in attacking one which has been preferred by others, or in defending one which has been condemned by others, that deliberative oratory consists. If the debates of a deliberative assembly upon any legislative or other practical question are examined, it will be found that they invariably consist in the comparison of alternative courses, and in the preference or rejection of some of them."

From this point of view it seems plain that, though the legislative problem to be solved may be advantageously determined by the electors, the calling upon them to determine on the plan, scheme, arrangement, contrivance, mode, means, or adaptation by which the end is to be accomplished, is to require them to undertake the functions of deliberation, and to determine the very matter which a representative legislature is called together to consider, namely, by which, of a number of alternatives, any given legislative problem may be best solved, giving due weight to the state of the law at the time, the habits, customs, humours, character, opinions, and other circumstances of the community over which the enactment prescribed is to have force. The cry of "Measures, not men," therefore, where it is not fallacious, carries us back to the former idea that "Government by party" is best, or must lead us forward to the thought, Government ought to be the mirror of opinion. The fallacy of the proposal that "measures, not men," should decide the kind of representative selected, is that either it ignores Parliament as a deliberative body, and reduces it merely to an assembly of delegates, or it leads to the deceptive notion that measures must be opposed in spirit because they are diverse in form.

It is, however, the right of the nation to initiate the problem, it is the task of the statesman to deliberate and decide upon the means of solving aright the desire of the people.

In the actual management or arrangement of the affairs of a nation, there is usually so great a number of principles in operation, the poise and counterpoise of circumstance and event, the concurrence or counteraction of interests, and so great an intermixture of design and accident, that careful deliberation and the diligent scrutiny of the best minds are required to see that assumptions and realities are not confounded, and to provide, by the judicious investigation of actuality and the skilful interpretation of theory, the best political resource possible in each exigency of the state. The determination of the *measures* belongs to legislation, the determination of the *men* belongs to representation.

But is not the representation of opinion a most desirable requisite in a properly organized Parliament? Most assuredly it is. Representation is, in reality, the organization of opinion, and legislation is the art and science of making opinion effective towards the ends aimed at in government. Opinion is a very "sovereign mistress of effects," but though she merits the characterization of Shakspeare, she is not quite what Byron calls her, "an omnipotence." The field of opinion is indemonstrable thought. It covers a large portion of the sphere of practical statesmanship. It sadly requires organization. The press, it is said, not only diffuses but confuses it. Opinion is usually applied to the subject of belief, the matter or proposition to which the mind has given its assent. Over men's opinions it is well known that a man's inclinations exert great power. Interests, prejudices, associations, ideas, sectarian predispositions and party spirit have each a powerful influence over not only the formation, but the realization of opinion. However, an opinion ought to signify a distinct preference for some principle to which the mind has given mature consideration, although for that principle it has not been able to discover any infallible and indubitable proof, such as would amount to definite demonstration. Opinion implies debatability, everything debatable requires and should receive due deliberation, and therefore the representation of opinions would imply that free, impartial, and unfettered debate, should be engaged in by those chosen to be the representatives of the several opinions entertained by those who elect the deliberative assembly of the notables, to whom the decision of such matters has been assigned. But opinions are discreet, while representation must be concrete: so that a balance of opinions would require to be made before a choice of a representative could be undertaken. This throws us back upon interest, party, or measures, or it throws us forward to a further form, the representation of intelligence.

Intelligence ought to be the formative agency in regard to opinion, but we know for a fact that interest and education have a much larger share than anything else in the formation of the opinions of men in general. Besides, opinions are much less frequently

now-a-days formed by than for men. The machinery for the manufacture and spread of opinion through the press is now very complete. Men can so easily buy their opinions ready made, that it is almost waste of time to be at the trouble of forming them. This is a growing evil; an evil which the press diligently fosters by its claim to be the fourth estate. For how many people is it really true that a few leading journalists supply opinions periodically, which are accepted and employed as their own, on the same principle as they use the milk they take in their tea or coffee, as an article ordered, bought, and paid for, therefore justly theirs. But to talk of the representation of opinions come to on these terms and in such a way, is to ask the selection or election of an oligarchy of political men of letters, and would end, in the ultimate, in a government by journalists. Opinions are really valuable when they are entertained and felt, not when they are only accepted and maintained; and they can only be properly felt the value of when they have been thought out after mature consideration of all the circumstances and conditions of each case. Opinion, as the result of thought, is valuable; but opinion accepted through faith in a journalist is, for representative purposes, quite worthless.

Do we object, then, to the representation of intelligence? Nay! we heartily approve of it, provided it be the intelligence of the elector. Let political education be proceeded with to the utmost; but see that it is education—thought led out, not instruction—opinion dictated. Intelligence is beneficial, whether interest, class, party, opinion, or person is to be the ground of representation. Intelligent choice is always better than unintelligent choice; but mere intelligence, as intelligence, has no special claim to representation which could not be equally properly asserted as the right of morality, industry, property, &c. Human beings are so intimately knit together in a community, that every quality and characteristic of those who are to have the choice of the members of the legislative assembly is important, and the higher these can be raised, so much the better, in general, for the class of representatives likely to be chosen. If intelligence alone were the characteristic required in Parliament, perhaps it might have a casting force in the settlement of who should be the electors of the representatives of the people. But the best possible Parliament is that in which the highest human characteristics are all fairly and proportionately found; for "Power hath no long being but in worth." But even the best possible Parliament would not fulfil the requirements of philosophical politics unless the modes, forces, numbers, and qualifications of the electors are wisely settled. J. A. Froude has very pertinently said on this subject:—

"No one seriously supposes that popular suffrage gives us a wiser Parliament than we used to have. Under the rotten borough system Parliament was notoriously a far better school of statesmanship than it is or ever can be where the merits of candidates have first to be recognised by constituencies.

The rotten borough system fell, not because it was bad in itself, but because it was abused to maintain injustice—to enrich the aristocracy and the landowners at the expense of the people. We do not look for a higher morality in the classes whom we have admitted to power; we expect them only to be sharp enough to understand their own concerns. We insist that each interest shall be represented, and we anticipate from the equipoise the utmost attainable amount of justice.”—*Fraser's Magazine*, Dec., 1870.

It appears in all discussions regarding Parliamentary representation, not only that in that form of legislation we have found the crown and top of governmental perfection, but also that the representative system so embodied is the one only type of legislative superintendence now possible. We venture to suggest that a proper consideration of the purpose aimed at in representative legislation may lead us to see some means of improving representation in itself, and also Parliamentary representation as its highest and ultimate form. And the object in view in the composition of this paper as a contribution to the philosophy of politics is to suggest a graded representation such as would, in our opinion, secure a higher and better form of legislature than the common form of Parliament admits.

It has been seen by the reader that there are in all the proposals for regulating representation a proportion of truth as well as an alloy of error. We have expressed in as brief a form as we could the considerations advanced in favour of and against the various *measures* of representation proposed, and we now desire to gain the attention of our readers to a few observations on the philosophy of representation which shall lead us to indicate a possible advancement in legislative activity, which may combine a good many of the best suggestions made, and yet eliminate a good many of the objections taken to them individually.

Should any one care to charge the writer with presumption in venturing to imagine that any proposal he can make could be such as might improve the time-honoured institutions of our ancestors, he shall not feel careful to answer in that matter. J. S. Mill has asserted that “to inquire into the best form of government in the abstract (as it is called) is not a chimerical, but a highly practical employment of scientific intellect; and to introduce into any country the best institutions which, in the existing state of that country, are capable of, in any tolerable degree, fulfilling the conditions, is one of the most rational objects to which practical effort can address itself.” Fortified by such a statement, we may endeavour to suggest, even in the face of a protest against the writer's likelihood of success.

Legislation is the organization of opinion; but opinion in its earliest form is only the suggestion of some mind which has been arrested by a thought, and has given it such consideration as a single mind is able. Thereafter agitation fans the intellect of others into reflection on it and discussion of it. When debate has

tested the arguments for and against it, the suggestion has made good its right to the general consideration of those who are interested in the matter in regard to the best means of effecting what is desired. Men plead for it, advocate it, ask legislation on it, and ultimately attain what they require—in so far as it is practical.

Parliament has hitherto been too much employed upon the preliminary stages of the initiation and the discussion of opinion—not fairly fitted by popular debate for legislative decision. Crotchets are persistently pressed upon the notice of the legislature and forced into debate, often interfering with the progress of public business, and damaging most seriously the general good of the community. On this account every session is overburdened with abortive schemes for accomplishing objects which, however good in themselves, have not been ripened by discussion for legislation that can be effective by being acceptable. This arises, we believe, from a misconception of both people and parliament of the conditions of representative government. Representative legislation gives the force of law to those opinions which have acquired an active power over the minds of men. It does not make, but it enacts laws. Its condition is, let that be law which the people wishes and wills. The senator who strives to run his own idea into a law by pressing it on the House of Commons, and forcing or quirking it through the House of Lords, may have his name associated with the bill, but will most probably only add to the number of still-born acts or effete measures; for—

“The laws live only where the law doth breed  
Obedience to the works it binds us to.”

Force cannot bind a free people when opinion does not sanction the decree which the law-makers may issue. Legislation is *public* opinion legalized.

If we consider this aright, then we shall see that the sifting, testing, agitation, debating, and consideration of opinions ought only, or at least mainly, to engage the attention of the national legislature when they have acquired such an ascendancy in the minds of the people as to be matters of national concern: have, in short, attained the legislable state, Parliament ought to be the one ruling power and final depository of decision after due argumentation on such subjects as come before it, as having a *prima facie* claim to national consideration in consequence of the general acceptance of it as a conviction by those who are concerned in regard to it; in other words, Parliament ought to be an aristocracy of thinkers trained to consider all questions from a national point of view; proved to be possessed of energy of mind and excellence of character, and empowered to decide as a final and ultimate tribunal on the matters proposed, suggested, advanced, or desired by the people, and to sanction in name and on behalf of the community

whatever was found after due deliberation most likely to conduce to the general good. It is the duty of the country to fix, determine, and propose the ends of legislation; and it is the duty of the representative legislation to devise the means, arrange the mode, and put into a practical form the processes by which the required end may be most fully and effectively accomplished.

If the doctrine is accepted that public opinion is the initiator and determiner of legislation, it should follow as a consequence that it is the interest of a community to encourage, develop, and maintain the greatest possible amount of activity, originality, reflectiveness, and intelligence on civilization and the means of bringing its blessings more closely homewards to the multitudes. This the diffusion of the press may secure for us: but we require, beside the freedom of the press, to provide the agitation of new suggestions, and to induce the proper discussion of them. Irresponsible debate, however, seldom results in considerate discussion; and hence it is desirable, for the proper sifting of opinion, that legal and proper means should be afforded for bringing every suggestion made under the distinct investigation of some body corporate, whose duty it should be to examine them; so that, having passed the ordeal of considerate discussion, it might take its place among those proposals on which legislation might be desirable. In addition, therefore, to a free press as the organ of suggestive, reflective, and aggressive thought, we suggest the legal incorporation and nationalization of the main interests in civic and social life. If a representative form were bestowed on chambers of commerce; sheriffs of counties and convenors of boroughs; agricultural associations; associations of science, literature, and art; educational boards; trades unions; road trustees; trustees on charities, &c., professional incorporations, as lawyers, physicians, clergymen, teachers, &c., whose duty it should be to filter and arrange opinion, and who should be charged with the oversight and regulation of all practical propositions regarding possible legislation, we should have a complete and economical system of testing and sifting opinions, and also a series of assemblies of first resort for all proposals affecting other interests than those which are purely national. As each number of each of these associative institutes for the considerate discussion of matters affecting specific interests in the nation would have a vote in regard to that interest which he had a proper right to represent, this would at once secure the representation of interests and opinions, but would also provide in reality an unobjectionable cumulative vote: for one person might be member of such a number of these legalized associations as he might have claims to regard in as being informed on and interested in the matters brought before them. In this way, too, we might provide for the representation of minorities; for we might empower the statutory and legal meetings of such associations to appoint—if the majority in favour of a matter did not exceed two-thirds of the entire number of voters present—three members in behalf of the majority and two on behalf of the minority

to plead the matter in the presence of the legislative Parliament in the form of petitioners for and petitioners against the proposal brought under the notice of the Houses—of course at the bar of the representative assembly.

Our philosophy of a representative legislature would, in short, lead to a Radical and yet a Conservative reform of our Parliamentary institutions. It would, as a preliminary, organize the right of petition and economize the duty of the national assembly. If our proposal should commend itself to the consideration of thinkers, it might be summarized thus:—

The *Crown* should be officially executive in all national affairs, and the source of honour.

The *Cabinet* should be administrative of all the decrees of the Crown and the determinations of the people: maintainers of the common weal at home and abroad.

The *House of Lords* should possess a judicative power as to *what* had been decided—as (1) the conservators of what *is*; and (2) interpreters of what has been decided, their functions being mainly judicial.

The *House of Commons* should be the grand jury of the nation, to consider and adjudicate upon the claims of the Crown as charged with executive functions, and therefore demanding counsel, supplies, and support: on the Conservative policy of the nobles as representatives of the order and honours of the Commonwealth; and on the innovative policy of the people as the suggestors of fresh legislation for the security and progress of the several interests of the community as advocated by those minor incorporations charged with the investigation and consideration of specific proposals for the promotion of the national welfare.

According to our proposal a double universal suffrage would be possible—a vote, under whatever conditions may be requisite, for a member of Parliament; and a vote in one or other, at least, of these associations for the preliminary consideration of the plausibility of opinions which would then be legalized, with due rights and under proper regulations. Parties having claims to admission into several of these would virtually obtain a cumulative vote, and the representation of interests would be secured by the legalization of these corporations as representatives of opinion. These would also in effect render unnecessary, in most instances, royal commissions and special committees of investigation, as they would in general bring up in their resolutions argued or reasoned suggestions, to which the proofs, tested by discussion, relied on would be appended: while the permission accorded to any large minority to bring forward its views under the ablest advocacy would secure the rights of the smaller number from being overpowered and set aside.

Parliament freed from all the toil of agitation, and having only to deal with substantive proposals, would have a higher and nobler rôle in the community. Localism would have fair and considerate

treatment, centralism would be avoided, the widest possible provision would be made for experiment and experience. Opinion would be thoroughly represented, and yet the State would be protected from unwise innovations by the final power of decision lodged in the Parliamentary legislature. Parliament would then deal, not with the raw material of opinion, but with opinion tested, sifted, reasonable and reasoned, brought before it in definite form and with distinct attestation of the power it has obtained over the popular mind, and the amount of responsible representative intellect which had subscribed to the principles involved in the proposals. Representation would become a complete and perfect form of life, rising from the Board of Guardians, the School Board, and the Burghal Vestry; from the Road Trust and the County Rate Commissioners; from the social, statistical, and scientific societies; from the incorporated interests of the Universities; the Inns of Court and the Surgeons' Hall; from the Chamber of Commerce, the Stock Exchange, and the trades union to the people's Parliament—to whom the sway of all imperial interests and concerns is entrusted. Through all these again the administrative influence could be passed to the great economy of agencies and costs, and yet with much increase of effectiveness. Thus there could be conjoined the most efficient and thorough local self-government and the most complete legislative control; and the circulation of opinion would, like that of the blood in the human body, take its course through the body corporate in such a fashion as to make all England thrill and act with oneness of pulse and life, so that citizenship would be compacted into true civilization.

---

"PROTEUS; OR, WE ARE HERE AND NOT HERE."—"A large and handsome box like a huge sentry-box, on wheels, and raised from the floor, so that the spectators could see under and over and all around it, is wheeled on to the platform. On being opened, it appeared to be well lighted from the top by an ordinary railway carriage lamp, and, of course, seemed to be perfectly empty. The assistant being now invited to enter the box, the door is closed and locked, and after a few minutes have elapsed is re-opened, when a skeleton appeared to be standing in the very place where the living being had been formerly observed. Again the door is closed, and next time it is opened the skeleton has vanished, and the assistant walks out of the box with a carpet bag. . . . This illusion is produced by two plain silvered mirrors folding into the sides of the box, and when open forming together an angle of 45°. The mirrors when open, reflect the two sides of the box, and, as already explained, they appear behind the mirrors, and cause the spectator to suppose that he is looking at an empty box. In the angle formed by the mirrors the skeleton is concealed, and brought out when required, and in the same place the assistant and lecturer are alternately hidden. Thus a box can be constructed in which the most elaborate tricks of the Davenport brothers may be performed."—J. H. PEPPER.



## Religion.

---

### IS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE SCRIPTURES TO WARRANT BELIEF IN THE GODHEAD OF JESUS CHRIST?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"The controversies, practical and speculative, which are agitating the religious thought of our own country, and of all Christendom, are so numerous, so vast, and so intricate, that it is hardly possible to determine with any confidence what are the topics which have the most urgent claim on attention. . . . This, this is the real issue of the fight,—Is Christendom to believe in Christ any longer or no? It is a battle in which everything is to be lost or won. It is not a theory of ecclesiastical polity which is in danger, it is not a theological system, it is not a creed, it is not the Old Testament or the New, but the claim of Christ himself to be the Son of God and the Saviour of mankind. . . . It is a controversy, not for theologians merely, but for every man who has seen the face of Christ, and can bear personal testimony to His power and glory. . . . Christ is the Prince, and Christ is the Saviour of the human race. . . . God manifest in the flesh."—*Christ and the Controversies of Christendom*," by R. W. Dale, M.A.

THE question, What do the Scriptures warrant us to believe? must at all times be of importance, specially so when the inquiry relates to so fundamental a doctrine as that of "the Godhead of Jesus Christ." We desire to approach this important subject with the deepest attention, and, in doing so, to consider, first, some Scriptures that positively assert that Christ is God. The apostle John commences his Gospel in these terms, "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God" (John i. 1). In ver. 14 of the same chapter we have proof that by "the Word," John denotes a Being who had not always been human or a partaker of flesh, as he in this verse speaks of "the Word" being "made flesh," showing that He was "the Word" before He was made flesh. Will our opponents maintain that no being was ever made flesh after having had an existence without flesh, and thus give a positive contradiction to the Scriptures? If they admit that *some* being has been made flesh who existed before he was made flesh, can they show that this being was not Jesus Christ? and if they admit that the person spoken of in John i. 1 is Jesus Christ, how can they avoid the admission that Jesus Christ is God? In Rom. ix. 5 we have this positive affirmation concerning Christ,—"*Who is over all, God blessed for ever.*" In Acts xx we have an account of the farewell taken by Paul of the elders of 1871.

the Church at Ephesus. In ver. 28 of that chapter we have the declaration of the inspired apostle that *God* has purchased His Church with His own blood. Now the purchase or redemption of the Church is continually in the Scriptures ascribed to Jesus Christ and His blood (Rom. iii. 24, 25; Ephes. i. 7; Heb. ix. 12; 1 Pet. i. 18, 19). Then as it is Jesus Christ who purchased the Church, and as He who purchased the Church with His own blood is God, it follows that Jesus Christ is *God*. In the first chapter of his epistle to the Hebrews, Paul bears to the Godhead of Christ such a testimony as cannot be refuted. In this sublime chapter Paul first declares that the Son of God—by which expression, “the Son of God,” Jesus Christ is evidently designed, as will appear from reference to 1 John v. 5, 20—is the brightness of God’s glory and the express image of His person. But is any mere creature—however glorious—the *brightness* of God’s glory, the *express image* of His person? Are not frailty and liability to change essential qualities of all creatures? Were not devils once holy angels? How then can any mere creature be the *express image* of God when he is not possessed of God’s essential immutability and holiness? It follows that He who is the express image of God is Himself God, therefore Jesus Christ is God. After this, Paul declares that God said of His Son, “Let all the angels of God worship Him.” The Scriptures repeatedly declare that God is a jealous God, and that He stringently forbids and severely punishes idolatry. And would a God who is jealous of His honour, and who vigorously forbids and severely punishes idolatry, either command or allow any of His creatures to give to any other mere creature the worship which is due only to God? He of whom God said, “Let all the angels of God worship Him,” must be God, therefore Jesus Christ is God. Yet further, Paul quotes Psa. xlv. 6, and declares that this language is addressed by God to His Son. Here God says to His Son, “Thy throne, O *God*, is for ever and ever.” Here God himself declares that His Son is *God*, therefore all who dispute that position oppose the very words of God. In 1 John v. 20 we have another positive assertion that Jesus Christ is “the true *God*,” and in Phil. ii. 6 we read of Jesus Christ, “who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God.” Now, as Christ was “in the form of God,” must He not be God? If this be disputed, then it follows that though Christ is said in the next two verses to take upon Himself “the form of a servant,” and to be “found in fashion as a man,” we are not to understand that He was really either a servant or a man. But when Christ is said to have taken upon Him “the form of a servant,” it signifies that He was really a servant—not that He resembled a servant without actually being one; and when He is said to have been “found in fashion as a man,” it signifies that He was really a man—which our opponents will admit that He was—not that He resembled a man without actually being one; in a similar manner therefore, when He is said to be “in the form of God,” it signifies that He was really

God, not that He merely resembled God, without being actually God; and therefore He "thought it no robbery to be equal with God." To declare Himself to be equal with God was no robbery of God's glory, as Satan and our first parents attempted to rob Him. Isaiah ix. 6 clearly shows that some child who was as yet to be born would be "the Mighty God," and we believe that the prophecy contained in this and the following verse is so discriminating, distinct, and perspicuous, and so fully in agreement with the rest of the Scripture testimony concerning Jesus Christ, that every unprejudiced mind will admit that it refers to *Him*. Therefore Jesus Christ is "the Mighty God." When Christ after His resurrection revealed Himself to Thomas, that disciple said unto Him, "My Lord and my God" (John xx. 28). Was Thomas mistaken or deceived when he addressed Christ as his *God*? Are our new lights who deny "the Godhead of Jesus Christ" more perfectly acquainted with the real character of Jesus Christ than one of the twelve apostles was? Will any of them have the boldness to avow that they are? They must either maintain that an apostle knew not Christ's real character, or admit that Jesus Christ is God. In 1 Tim. iii. 16, Paul declares that "*God* was manifest in the flesh." What is further said in the same verse of Him who was manifest in the flesh, accords with the Scripture testimony concerning none but Jesus Christ; as that He was "seen of angels," as Christ was at His birth; after His temptations by Satan, when they ministered unto Him; in His agony in Gethsemane, when an angel ministered unto Him; at His resurrection, when they rolled the stone from the sepulchre; and at His ascension, when they attended Him to heaven in triumph. As also that He was "preached unto the Gentiles," as we know Christ was and still is. And further, that He was "believed on in the world," as Christ was and still is, and that He was "received up into glory," as Christ was at His ascension. If then, as we believe, this scripture refers to Jesus Christ, it follows that Jesus Christ is God.

The scriptures which we have quoted sufficiently and irrefutably prove the Godhead of Jesus Christ, and no further testimony is really necessary for the establishment of that important doctrine.

But our quiver is not yet exhausted.

Secondly. We desire to bring before our readers some scriptures which, by declaring Christ to have performed such acts as none but God can perform, and to possess a dignity which none but God partakes of, clearly show that Jesus Christ is God. Col. i. 16, 17, ascribes to Jesus Christ both creative and preserving power, as well as priority and pre-eminence above all. This scripture unqualifiedly asserts that *by* Christ as well as *for* Christ were all things created. But who besides God can create? Can a mere creature bring into existence so much as a grain of dust, or a particle of vapour? He cannot even destroy one particle of matter. While man makes an almost boundless variety of articles, all the

materials with which he works were created for him. And for the pleasure and use of what mere creature are all things created? What mere creature is "before all things"? and by what mere creature do all things consist? John i. 3 establishes the same fact that all things were made by Christ, but "He that built all things is God" (Heb. iii. 4). "In the beginning *God* created the heaven and the earth" (Gen. i. 1). "So *God* created man in *His* own image" (Gen. i. 27). Therefore Jesus Christ is God. In Heb. i. 3, Paul tells us that Christ upholds all things by the word of His power. Then His word is that of omnipotence, for what short of omnipotence can uphold all things? But whose word has in it the power of omnipotence, save the word of *God*? Then Christ is God.

Thirdly. We will show that some other doctrines of Scripture necessarily have involved in them the doctrine of "the Godhead of Jesus Christ," that the Godhead of Christ cannot be denied without at the same time denying these doctrines, and that as they are the doctrines of the Bible, the Godhead of Jesus Christ is necessarily so likewise.

1. The doctrine of a Trinity of Persons in the Godhead is a Scripture doctrine. But if Christ be not God, it necessarily follows that there is no Trinity of Persons in the Godhead. We cannot establish the doctrine of the Trinity without at the same time establishing the Godhead of Jesus Christ. This we believe our opponents will admit. 1 John v. 7 very plainly declares the existence of three persons in the Godhead. But the doctrine does not rest alone on this disputed text. After the lower animals were created, God said, "Let *us* make man in *our* image, after *our* likeness" (Gen. i. 26). With whom was God here speaking? Not with angels. We never read of their being concerned in the creation of man. And, indeed, the manner of speaking in the words above quoted is such as to denote that the persons spoken to were on a perfect equality with the Speaker. The style of those words is not that of an address to inferiors. Doubtless in the words quoted the divine Three held consultation among themselves respecting the formation of man. Besides, if in the words quoted God was conferring with creatures, then it follows that man was created in the likeness of God and of creatures conjointly. But the testimony of Scripture is, "So God created man in *His* own image, in the *image of God* created He him" (Gen. i. 27). Again, when the tower of Babel had been built, the Lord said, "Let *us* go down, and there confound their language" (Gen. xi. 7). With whom was the Lord here speaking? Was He uniting either men or angels with Himself in the work of confounding the language of the Babel-builders? Certainly not. But the Father, Son, and Spirit consulted about doing it; and as concerning the creation of man, so here, the style of the words is such as denotes an equality in the persons spoken to with Him who speaks. In corroboration of this view we may remark that the word translated "Maker" in Job xxxv. 14, the

word translated "Him" in Psalm cxlix. 2, and the word translated "Creator" in Eccles. xii. 1, are each of them in the original in the plural number, as is acknowledged in his writings by Philo the Jew. Yet further, the ordinance of baptism is commanded to be administered "in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost" (Mat. xxviii. 19). Baptizing *in the name* of these three persons signifies baptizing by their authority, and that the baptized profess their faith in each person. As, then, each of these persons is invoked in the ordinance of baptism, and it is administered by the authority of each, these three persons are equally God, for as a part of divinely instituted worship, baptism would never have been commanded to be administered in the name of a mere creature, which it would be if the Son were not God. Therefore He is God. Again, in 2 Cor. xiii. 14 we have a prayer of Paul for those to whom he was writing, in which he prays to the Lord Jesus Christ, and begs His grace to be bestowed on the Corinthians. If then Jesus Christ had not been God, Paul would have prayed to a mere creature, and thus have been guilty of idolatry; but Paul's prayer is a proof of the deity of Jesus Christ.

There are yet other *scriptural* arguments in favour of the doctrine that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are equally God. It is usual to speak of the Father as the first person in the Trinity, of the Son as the second person, and of the Holy Ghost as the third person. Yet this form of expression is never met with in the Bible; and as if it were to show that the Father was not before the Son, nor the Son nor the Holy Ghost after the Father, when these three persons are in the Scriptures spoken of connectedly, sometimes the Father is placed first, as in Mat. xxviii. 19; at another time the Son is placed first, as in 2 Cor. xiii. 14; and at another time the Holy Ghost is placed first, as in Col. ii. 2.

Again, amongst the various precepts given to the Israelites in the wilderness was this: "Ye shall not tempt the Lord your God, as ye tempted Him in Massah" (Deut. vi. 16). By tempting the Lord, Moses evidently refers to the children of Israel tempting God by murmuring against Him because they were without water, or lacked food other than manna (Exod. xviii. 7; Num. xx. 2, 3, 13; Num. xxi. 5). Now, in 1 Cor. x., Paul enumerates the sins of the Israelites in the wilderness, and amongst them he mentions their tempting *Christ*, for which they were destroyed of serpents (Num. xxi. 6). It was *God* that the Israelites murmured against, it was *God* that they tempted; and as, according to the inspired Apostle Paul, when the Israelites tempted God they tempted Christ, it follows that Christ must be God.

We believe we have now shown that the doctrine of a Trinity of persons in the Godhead is the doctrine of Scripture; that this doctrine necessarily involves the doctrine of "the Godhead of Jesus Christ," that the doctrine of the Godhead of Christ cannot be denied without at the same time denying the doctrine of the Trinity, and that as the doctrine of three equal persons in the

Godhead is the doctrine of the Bible, that of the Godhead of Jesus Christ is necessarily so likewise.

2. The doctrine that sinners are saved from guilt and perdition by Jesus Christ is a Scripture doctrine. But if Christ were not God, not a single soul could be saved, either by Him or in any other way. The Scriptures declare that by the deeds of the law, or by a man's own obedience to the law of God, no flesh shall be justified (Rom. iii. 20; Gal. ii. 16, iii. 11). Therefore all men must either stand eternally condemned, or be justified through the imputation to them of the righteousness of another. But whose righteousness can be sufficient to justify the guilty? The law of God demands perfect and perpetual obedience from all God's creatures, and if Christ were only a creature, however much higher and greater than all other creatures, His own perpetual and perfect obedience to the law of God would be necessary for the justification of His own person, and He would have no righteousness to impute to another. It is because the righteousness of Christ is "the righteousness of God" (2 Cor. v. 21) that it possesses merit for the justification of the guilty; and if Christ were not God, His sufferings and death would have no atoning efficacy, and His obedience would have no justifying virtue. But Jesus Christ by His blood and righteousness does save from guilt and from hell. Here are Scripture proofs of it (Matt. i. 21; Acts v. 31, xiii. 38, 39; Eph. i. 7). We believe that these texts show that the doctrine of salvation by Jesus Christ is the doctrine of Scripture, that this doctrine necessarily involves the doctrine of the Godhead of Christ, that the doctrine of the Godhead of Christ cannot be denied without at the same time denying the doctrine of salvation by Christ, and that as the doctrine of salvation by Christ is the doctrine of the Bible, that of the Godhead of Jesus Christ is necessarily so likewise.

Fourthly. It is not difficult to prove that if Christ were not God He could not be a good man. He is either the true God or a bad man, for He accepted the worship of men; He did not forbid their worship of Him, nor did He rebuke or censure them for it (Matt. xv. 25; Matt. xx. 20; xxviii. 9, 17). When the inhabitants of Lystra would have done sacrifice to Paul and Barnabas, those godly men forbade it, and declared themselves to be but men (Acts xiv. 13-15). When John in the Isle of Patmos was attended by an angel, who made glorious revelations unto him, we find that on two occasions John fell at his feet to worship Him (Rev. xix. 10; xxii. 8). But on each occasion the angel bade him not to do it, and directed him to worship God, thus showing that God only is to be worshipped. When Cornelius worshipped Peter, that apostle would not accept the worship of Cornelius (Acts x. 25, 26). Thus we see that both angels and good men have ever refused to accept from their fellow-creatures that worship which is due only to God. But if Christ were not God, He aided and abetted idolatry by accepting the worship which is due to God alone, and upon that hypothesis was guilty of a crime similar to that of Herod, against

whose sin God manifested His displeasure in so marked a manner (Acts xii. 22, 23). We believe that when one put to Jesus Christ the question, "Good Master, what shall I do that I may inherit eternal life?" (Mark x. 17), and Christ replied to him by another question, "Why callest thou me good? there is none good"—that is, essentially so—"but one, that is God," He intended to point out to the inquirer the great inappropriateness of calling Christ good, while he denied His deity, as the Jews generally did, and that unless He were entitled to be regarded as God He was not entitled to be called good, neither essentially good, as God only is, nor good as man, seeing that He not only accepted worship from men, but also made Himself to be God; and therefore, had He not been Deity, He would have been a blasphemer, as the Jews charged Him with being, for making Himself God (John x. 33). *Jesus Christ therefore is either God or a blasphemer*, and we believe that our opponents will find it to be an everlasting task to extricate themselves from this dilemma. S. 8.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"The Christianity of sects, of the pulpit, of society, is ephemeral. . . . It will pass off and be forgot. . . . That pure ideal religion—which Jesus saw on the mount of His vision, and lived out in the lowly life of a Galilean peasant; which transforms His cross into an emblem of all that is holiest on earth; which makes sacred the ground He trod, and is dearest to the best of men, most true to what is truest in them—cannot pass away."—*Theodore Parker*.

CANT is, of all things, the most common phenomenon of human speech; and the religious life of England has a whole vocabulary of cant pressed into its own service. No phrase has been more frequent in pulpits and papers, sermons and speeches, of late years than the following—"Our common Christianity"! It is a taking and a telling collocation of words; but is it anything more? Voltaire is said to have wittily and wickedly affirmed, in reference to Reid's famous Philosophical Cant,—*"Common sense is the least common thing in the world."* Much the same might be said of this cant of the churches. What is our common Christianity? Is it the Christianity of social life? If so, a sorry Christianity it is. Is it the Christianity of men's individual lives? then is it not common but peculiar. Is it the Christianity of the Church? that is much more an ideal than a real thing. Is it the Christianity of the Saviour, the Christianity of Christ? that is the true and real exemplar of the highest, noblest, holiest form of human life.

The reader may be at first inclined to hesitate to admit that so many forms of Christianity exist, or co-exist, and be anxious to regard the writer as making a poor attempt at a witticism borrowed or imitated from Oliver Wendell Holmes' *"Autocrat of the Breakfast Table."* In self-defence I may quote the passage, which runs as follows:—

"It is not easy, at the best, for two persons talking together to make the most of each other's thoughts, there are so many of them.

[The company looked as if they wanted an explanation].

"When John and Thomas, for instance, are talking together, it is natural enough that among the six there should be more or less confusion and misapprehension. . . . I think, I said, I can make it plain to Benjamin Franklin here, that there are at least six personalities distinctly to be recognised as taking part in that dialogue between John and Thomas.

- |                  |  |
|------------------|--|
|                  | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The real John ; known only to his Maker.</li> <li>2. John's ideal John ; never the real one, and often very unlike him.</li> </ol> |
| "Three Johns.    | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3. Thomas's ideal John ; never the real John, nor John's John, but often very unlike either.</li> </ol>                               |
|                  | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The real Thomas.</li> <li>2. Thomas's ideal Thomas.</li> <li>3. John's ideal Thomas.</li> </ol>                                    |
| "Three Thomases. |  |

"Only one of the three Johns is taxed ; only one can be weighed on a platform balance ; but the other two are just as important in the conversation. Let us suppose the real John to be old, dull, and ill-looking. But as the higher Powers have not conferred on men the gift of seeing themselves in the true light, John very possibly conceives himself to be youthful, witty, and fascinating, and talks from the point of view of this ideal. Thomas, again, believes him to be an artful rogue, we will say ; therefore he is, so far as Thomas's attitude in the conversation is concerned, an artful rogue, though really simple and stupid. The same conditions apply to the three Thomases. It follows that, until a man can be found who knows himself as his Maker knows him, or who sees himself as others see him, there must be at least six persons engaged in every dialogue between two. Of these the least important, philosophically speaking, is the one that we have called the real person. No wonder two disputants often get angry, when there are six of them talking and listening all at the same time."

I may now admit that I gathered the idea from a passage in the "Essays of Theodore Parker," in one of which, entitled, "A Lesson for the Day"—to which we may subsequently refer,—I found some observations which suggested the idea ; and I was led to speak of it from considering how great a shock went through the whole camp—Conformist and Nonconformist—of "our common Christianity" at the Communion in Westminster Abbey of the Revisers of the Bible, because a Unitarian was admitted to take part in it.

What an outrage to admit to the table of the Lord one who denied the express divinity of Jesus ! Some shuddered at the terrible proceeding, and seemed disappointed that the fearful thunderings of the Almighty's wrath did not visit the crew of the communionists ; some strove to set it down to their own great charity that they did not treat the offender as a heathen man and a publican, while others, having put their hand to the plough, turned back from sharing in the good work, because *Anathema Maranatha* was not pronounced officially and *ex cathedra* upon the



traitor to the articles of the Church's creed, that "Jesus, the Son begotten from everlasting of the Father, is the very and eternal God, of one substance with the Father, and consists of two whole and perfect natures, that is to say, the Godhead and Manhood, joined together in one person, never to be divided, whereof is one Christ, Very God and Very Man." What a newspaper warfare arose upon the topic, and how was the whole lexicography of holy cant ransacked to find terms of condemnation strong enough to employ in thanking God that the users were not as other men are, doubters of the One Triune, and of reprobation of those who think that the holy mysteries of faith must not contradict the God-given reason of the creature who is to worship God with a reasonable service.

We object as much to the cant of religion as to any other form of it; and we therefore object to the phraseology of the unctuously orthodox, when they claim such and such doctrines to be essential to "our common Christianity," and then pronounce all, who do not hold these doctrines, beyond the pale of Christian fellowship. The doctrine of the Trinity, like all the other doctrines of Scripture, is to be tested by Scripture read in the light of reason. To some we know the very idea of submitting such a subject for discussion will be thought to be next door to rank blasphemy. But these are the very parties who listen on Sundays to long tirades against the low-minded Unitarian, the grovelling disciples of Strauss, Renan, and Channing, accompanied with remarks meant to be received as arguments to prove the perfect and express divinity of the Lord Jesus Christ. These remarks are argumentative, no doubt, and appear abundantly conclusive to those who only hear them and do not know what may be said against them, nor are acquainted with the arguments which may be plied and employed on the opposite side. Here the arguments will be set side by side, and the thoughtful may have an opportunity of reaching to the truth through a line of marshalled arguments.

I call the reader's attention first to the fact that the opening words of the Scriptures proclaim the real unity and essential indivisibility of God—the Creator. "In the beginning God"—not the gods—"created the heavens and the earth," and that the very first words which are written in the Decalogue, and that by the finger of God himself, are a negation of the claim to "Godhead" set up on behalf of Jesus Christ: "Thou shalt have no *other* gods before *Me*." "*I* the Lord thy God *am* a jealous God." Those, therefore, who believe in "the Godhead of Jesus Christ," must reconcile their faith in that dogma with the express injunction and command of Him who has said—I *am the* Lord; that is *My* name; and *My* glory will I not give to *another* (Isa. xlii. 8). And may we not properly call upon the advocates of the affirmative of this doctrine to remember by whom it was said, "It is written—Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and Him *only* shalt thou serve" (Matt. iv. 10). When the divine Father claims, and Jesus himself disclaims, worship, who

are they who shall affirm that doctrine, in the face of the declaration, "God is not a man that He should lie;" and the assertion of the Saviour—"I am the way, the truth, and the life"? Verily there be some who profess to be wise above what is written, and they are of them.

"Hear, O Israel; the Lord our God is *one* Lord" (Dent. vi. 4). "I am the Lord thy God, the Holy *One* of Israel, thy Saviour" (Isa. xliii. 3). "Before *Me* there was no god found, neither shall there be after *Me*." "*I*, even *I*, am the Lord; and *beside Me* there is no Saviour" (10 and 11). "Thus saith the Lord your Redeemer, the Holy *One* of Israel" (14). "*I* am the Lord, your Holy *One*, the Creator of Israel, your King" (15). "And Jesus answered him: The first of all the commandments is, Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is *one* Lord" (Mark xii. 29). "There is none other God but *one*" (1 Cor. viii. 4). "To us there is but *one* God, the Father" (6). "*One* God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in you all" (Eph. iv. 6). "For there is *one* God, and *one* mediator between God and man, the *man* Christ Jesus" (1 Tim. ii. 5). "Now a mediator is not a mediator of *one*, but God is *one*" (Gal. iii. 20). "Have we not all *one* Father? hath not *one* God created us?" (Mal. ii. 10). In these quotations—and these are but a sample of those which might be laid before the reader—we have an express assertion of the essential, true, real, and indubitable *Unity* of the Deity, made on the authority and command of God himself, of Jesus Christ, and of the holy apostles. If there are any higher authorities to appeal to on a matter of faith, perhaps our opponents will inform us; meanwhile, it seems these quoted authorities warrant us in denying that there is sufficient evidence in the Scriptures for that article of faith which affirms the Godhead of Jesus Christ. Those who teach men so, teach them to violate the first principles of Christian worship—teach them to give their worship to the universal brother, not the common Father, of the human race; and they still bring the old railing accusation against him—He maketh himself equal to God!

But Jesus, in opposition to the tenets of the Trinitarians, always carefully and explicitly asserted the oneness and incomparability of God: He earnestly inculcated and practised the worship of God as *one* and indivisible, and He never asserted any claim to divinity in the sense of Godhead. His oneness with the Father was the oneness of harmony of purpose. He spoke of Himself, in His nature, as the Son of Man; when He referred to His disposition He regarded Himself as the Son of God. Because the Spirit or disposition of God dwelt in Him, He felt Himself strong to do signs and wonders, but He neither disclaimed humanity nor claimed divinity.

Of His human nature and His partakership in all its physical frailties we have evidence in plenty. It is the most holy idyllic life of which history contains a record; but it is only that, if we look at it as a human life.

Here is a summary of the nature and results of that holy, pure, benign, and harmonious life :—

"Many years ago, when all nations were in a state of deep moral and religious degradation ; when the world lay exhausted and sick with long warfare ; at such a time, in a little corner of the world, of a people once pious but then corrupted to the heart, of a nation well known but only to be justly and universally hated, there was born a man ; a right true man. He had no advantage of birth, for he was descended from the poorest of the people ; none of education, for he was brought up in a little village, whose inhabitants were wicked to a proverb ; and so little had schools and colleges to do for him, that his townsmen wondered how he had learned to read. He had no advantage of aid or instruction from the great and the wise ; but grew up and passed his life, mainly, with fishers, and others of like occupation—the most illiterate of men. This was a true man ; such as had never been seen before. None such has risen since his time. He was so true that he could tolerate nothing false ; so pure and holy, that he, and perhaps he alone of all men, was justified in calling others by their proper names, even when that proper name was Blind Guide, Fool, Hypocrite, Child of the Devil. He found men forgetful of God. They seemed to fancy He was dead. They lived as if there had once been a God, who had grown old and deceased. They had mistaken also as to the nature of man. They saw he had a body ; they forgot he is a soul, and has a soul's rights and a soul's duties.

"This true man saw through their sad state, and comforting his fellows he said, Poor brother man, you are deceived. God is still alive. His earth is under your feet. His heaven is over your head. He takes care of the sparrows. Justice, and wisdom, and mercy, and goodness, and virtue, and religion, are not superannuated and ready to perish. They are young as hunger and thirst, which shall be as fresh in the last man as they were in the first. God has never withdrawn from the universe, but He is now present and active in this spot, as ever on Sinai, and still guides and inspires all who will open their hearts to admit Him there. Poor sinful brother, said he to fallen man, you have become a fool, an hypocrite, deceiving and deceived. You live as if there were no God ; no soul. Rise up and be a man, thou child of God ! Cast off these cumbrous things of old. Let conscience be your lawgiver ; reason your oracle ; nature your temple ; holiness your high-priest ; and a divine life your offering. If you would be saved, love God with your whole heart, and man as yourself. Wait not for the kingdom of God ; but make it within you by a divine life. Call no man master. Call none father, save the Infinite Spirit. Be one with Him ; think His thoughts ; feel His feelings, and live His will. Fear not ; I have overcome the world, and you shall do yet greater things ; I and the Father will dwell with you for ever. Thus he spoke the word which men had longed to hear spoken, and others had vainly essayed to utter. While the great and gifted asked in derision, 'Art thou greater than our father Jacob?' multitudes of the poor in spirit heard Him ; their hearts throbbed with the mighty pulsations of His heart. Before this man had seen five-and-thirty summers, He was put to death by such men as thought old things were new enough, and false things sufficiently true, and like owls and bats shriek fearfully when morning comes, because their day is the night, and their power, like the spectres of fable, vanishes as the cock-

crowding ushers the morning in. Scarce had this divine youth begun to spread forth his brightness; men had seen but the twilight of his reason and inspiration; the full noon must have come at a later period of life, when experience and long contemplation had matured the divine gifts, never before nor since so prodigally bestowed, nor used so faithfully. But his doctrine was ripe, though he was young. The truth he received at first hand from God required no age to render it mature. So he perished.\*

We have made the preceding quotation not because the exigencies of debate call upon us to give forth any definite view of the nature of the Saviour. Our duty is not to advance any opinion, but to negative that of our opponents. We disdain, however, to fight on unfair terms, and we therefore give our negativists the opportunity of controverting the form of thought which the above extract sets before us so beautifully,—that Jesus was the Son of God, specially revealed by the Father to be Grace and Truth, and to enable us to behold His glory as of the only begotten of the Father.

In the opening argument of this paper we advanced Scripture proof of the oneness of God, and of the indefensibility of holding any other to be God. In the second part we advance the opinion that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, but not "God the Son," as the phrase runs in the cant of modern theology. And we have laid before the reader a view of the divinely human life of the Lord. But we now proceed, in the third place, to show proof for the opinion more directly opposed to our opponents, namely, that Jesus Christ is not God, though God was "*in* Christ."

Our first proof is that Jesus Christ always spoke of God as His Father. One test-passage may be sufficient to settle this matter, for it is perhaps the most solemn utterance of Jesus on the subject. It occurs in John's Gospel, xx. 17. The risen Jesus says to Mary, "I ascend to my Father and to your Father, and to my God and your God." Here He distinctly separates between Himself and the Father, God.

Again He says, "I can of *mine own self* do nothing. I seek not mine own will, but the will of the Father who *hath sent me*" (John v. 30). And he avers, "My Father is greater than I" (John xiv. 28). And this is in accordance with the teaching of Paul: "The head of every man is Christ, and the head of Christ is God" (1 Cor. xi. 3). On this account it is that we believe in "the only true God our Saviour" (Jude, 25), who "anointed Jesus of Nazareth" (Acts x. 38), "*a man* approved of God by miracles and wonders and signs" (Acts xi. 22), so that we are reconciled to God by the death of His Son (Rom. v. 10). "For Christ hath also once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that *He* might bring us to God" (1 Pet. iii. 18).

Our opponents may quote in reply to us the saying of Paul to the Colossians (ii. 9), "In Him (*i. e.*, Jesus Christ) dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily," but we ask our readers to turn

\* Abridged from "Essays by Theodore Parker."

to the same epistle to see that "It pleased the Father that in Him should all fulness dwell" (i. 19); and also to notice that the same apostle calls upon us, if their interpretation is right, to be gods also; for in Ephes. iii. 19 he calls on us "to know the love of Christ," that we "might be filled with all the fulness of God." It seems plain therefore—

I. That the Scriptures declare it to be idolatry to believe anything of Him than that which He has revealed—"I, even I, am He, and there is no God with me," Deut. xxxii. 39; and that we are called upon to confess, "Thou art God alone," Ps. lxxxvi. 10.

II. That Jesus Christ disclaimed divinity for Himself—insisted on and practised the worship of "the only true God" (John xvii. 3), and so gave His own authority for disbelieving in His Godhead.

III. That the apostles always regarded Him as the Son of God, not as God.

IV. That Jesus Christ was born, lived, spoke, acted, felt, suffered, and died as "a man approved of God," Acts ii. 22, so that however "great is the mystery of godliness, *who* was manifested in the flesh,"—for so 1 Tim. iii. 16 should be translated—we have no just ground for saying that the Scriptures afford sufficient evidence for believing in the Godhead of Christ.

One word more, and we have done. No creed can be more trustworthy than the word of God, and no inference that man can deduce from doubtful passages of "Holy Writ" can be allowed to overturn the plain and palpable declarations of "God the Father, and of Jesus Christ whom He hath sent." C. S. L.

## UGHT THE AUTHORIZED VERSION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES TO BE REVISED BY A ROYAL COMMISSION?

### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

A **FREE** Bible is the boast of Protestantism and of progress. Liberty to read the Bible, and to understand it in such a way as his intelligence makes clear in the light of vital faith and an honest conscience. Our clergy and divines criticise and comment on the Scriptures, freely expounding its doctrines and explaining its precepts; but they claim no exclusive right in the study and perusal of God's word. It comes to us as the truth of God for man's salvation; and truth ought to bear looking at. Well, we claim the right to look at the word of God as it is, in the purest and most trustworthy form; we desire to have a free Bible, but especially a Bible free from known errors. Truth requires neither concealment nor deception, lying or equivocation, and it is the earnest opponent of expediency. God cannot approve of dishonesty or

cheating in His name. If His word is translatable into truth we have a right to have that translation furnished to us, with the highest possible guarantees of genuineness. Hence we argue, Let us have a thoroughly certain and decisive selection of a text—as far as scholarship can attain to it; a correct and trustworthy translation of that text, as pure and unadulterated as honest men, under the eye of God and man, can make it; and that in other words means, let us have a revision of the Scriptures undertaken and completed by a Royal Commission. It is a fact that a general and widespread opinion is entertained that the version of Scripture “appointed to be read in churches” is neither the best text nor the best translation that could be had. It is, besides, a prevalent belief in the churches that the word of God challenges inquiry, while it exacts belief. These two notions cannot safely co-exist. To be suspected is the most disastrous of all conditions for the word of life to be in. How are suspicion and faith to be reconciled or to be made unitedly possible? Surely it is unwise to admit (and sometimes found teaching and interpretation upon) re-translations of the text of Scripture, and hold to the old and unsound form of words; and it is especially unwise, we think, that this or any other formal or formidable cause for suspicion, should be allowed to continue in regard to that book, which in the Authorised Version tells us to “abstain from all appearance of evil” (1 Thess. v. 22), or in the proper translation, “avoid every form of evil.” Here we are retaining the reality of evil to avoid the appearance of evil, and we are advocating a double form of evil too—for not only is the text from which our version has been formed greatly corrupted; but it is also in many places inaccurately represented in our language.

I proceed to prove the former of these charges:—“The Sacred volume has been subject to the same dangers as other books, and has suffered from them. This could not have been prevented but by a perpetual miracle, and it has not been characteristic of the Divine polity to work miracles except on great and befitting occasion. We need not be surprised, therefore, at finding here and there additions, which have evidently been made by later writers or officious copyists. The numbers in various parts of the Old Testament, especially in the Books of Chronicles, must have been tampered with. It is not credible that in the original copies, as they were left by the writers, it was stated that ‘fifty thousand and threescore and ten men’ were smitten at Bethshemesh for looking into the ark (1 Sam. vi. 19); or that David ‘prepared for the house of the Lord an hundred thousand talents of gold, and a thousand thousand talents of silver’ (1 Chron. xxii. 14), equal in value, as some reckon, to upwards of nine hundred millions of pounds sterling; or that Jehoshaphat had a standing army of 1,160,000 men, ‘besides those whom the king put in the fenced cities throughout all Judah.’ (2 Chron. xvii. 14—19). Either by some inexcusable blundering, or through the indulgence of a mis-

chievous vanity, the numbers have been inflated. In some instances Josephus, the Jewish historian (himself much given to exaggeration), supplies the means of correction. He says that *seventy* men — leaving out the 'fifty thousand' — were 'struck with lightning' at Bethshemesh. He brings down David's offering to ten thousand talents of gold and a hundred thousand talents of silver. In other cases, the restoration of the right reading is at present hopeless. We are required to believe, as the text now stands, that the population of Judah in Jehoshaphat's time, amounted to 1,700 persons per square mile, and that 'five hundred thousand men' fell in a battle between Abijah and Jeroboam (2 Chron. xiii. 17). These must be mistakes."\*

Very many instances of this same sort of error have been collected and brought before Bible readers in Bishop Colenso's various critical works ; and a large proportion of these are not defended by the apologists of our version, but are admitted and explained away. I quote a substantiation from another source :—A writer in "The Journal of Sacred Literature," January, 1854, has given some remarkable illustrations of the imperfections of the Hebrew text of Scripture. Taking the present Hebrew text as the standard, he has compared it with the text and collations of manuscripts made by the celebrated Kennicott. He found that the letter *aleph* was mistaken for four other letters no less than forty-three times in the Book of Genesis ; and for other three letters forty-seven times in Exodus. The letter *vau* seems peculiarly subject to be mistaken for *yod*. There are in Genesis one hundred and four mistakes in this letter alone. A further comparison shows that in the Book of Exodus eighteen hundred and sixty-three words have been omitted by the several copyists. A striking illustration of the error in translation that a mistake in copying a letter gives rise to, may be seen by a comparison of 2 Kings xx. 13 and Isaiah xxxix. 2. The places are parallel. In Kings we read : "And Hezekiah *hearkened unto them*," In Isaiah : "And Hezekiah *was glad of them*." The latter is, no doubt, the true reading ; but the difference in Hebrew consists in a single letter. The transcriber has simply written the letter *ain* for *eth*."

Hereafter follows our proof concerning the New Testament :—

"The English Authorised Version, equally with the Lutheran translation, is based upon the editions of the Greek text which Erasmus in 1516, and Robert Stephens in 1550, had founded upon manuscripts written after the tenth century. Whether those Greek copies, out of which Erasmus and Stephens prepared their editions, were altogether reliable, that is, whether they exhibited as far as possible the Apostolic text, has long been matter of earnest discussion with the learned. . . . The learned have

\* From a Paper entitled "Thoughts on Inspiration," by the Rev. J. M. Crump, D.D., Acadian College, Nova Scotia, contained in the Baptist's Magazine, June, 1866.

been and are very much divided in opinion as to which readings represent the word of God most exactly; but one thing has been admitted by most who understand the matter, and it is that the oldest documents must come nearer to the original text than those that are later." A "comparison of the current English text with the most ancient authorities is fitted to draw attention to the degree in which these last confirm it, as well as the frequency with which they deviate from it."

The above extracts are taken from the Preface by Dr. Constantine Tischendorf to the thousandth volume of the Tauchnitz edition of English books—the New Testament.

To this evidence I append jottings from books on the subject, in which specific corrections are noted in several books of the Authorized Version:—

In Matt. vi. 13, the concluding sentence of the Lord's Prayer, "For thine is the kingdom, the power, and the glory," is not genuine. Matt. xix. 17—For "why callest thou me good?" we should read, "Why askest thou me concerning that which is good?" Mark iii. 29—For "eternal damnation," read "eternal sin." Mark xvi. 9—20 is wanting in many of the best MSS.

Luke xvi. 9—For "when ye fail," read "when it (the mammon) fails." Luke xvii. 36.—"Two shall be in the field," &c., is probably an interpolation.

John v. 3, 4.—"Waiting for the moving of the water, for an angel went down," &c. This explanation is probably a marginal gloss, and should therefore be expunged from the text. John xvii. 11.—For "keep through thy own name those whom thou hast given me," we should probably read, "Keep them in thy name *which* (name) thou hast given me;" and so in verse 12, read "I kept them in thy name *which* thou gavest me." John xvii. 21.—In the clause "that they also may be one in us," omit the word "one."

Acts iii. 20.—For "before preached," read "before appointed." Acts viii. 37 should probably be omitted. Acts ix. 5, 6—Omit "It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks. And he, trembling and astonished, said, Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?" This passage is probably interpolated, in a slightly altered form, from the parallel passages in Acts xxii. 10, and xxvi. 14. Acts xviii. 5.—For "was pressed in spirit," read "was earnestly occupied in [preaching] the Word." Acts xx. 28—Here the MSS. vary between "the flock of God" and "the flock of the Lord."

Rom. v. 1.—For "we have," some copies read "let us have peace with God." Rom. viii. 1—Omit the words "who walk not after the flesh but after the spirit," which words are an interpolation from verse 4.

1 Cor. vi. 20—Omit the concluding words. The whole verse will be, "For ye are bought with a price, therefore glorify God in your body."

1 Tim. iii. 16—Instead of "God was manifest in the flesh,"



read, probably, "He who was made manifest in the flesh." 1 Tim. vi. 19—For "eternal life," read "that which is truly life."

1 Peter ii. 2—Read "that ye may grow thereby unto salvation." 1 Peter iii. 16—For "Sanctify the Lord God," read, "Sanctify the Lord Christ in your hearts." 1 Peter v. 10—Read "Shall make you perfect, stablish, strengthen, settle you." It is a promise, not a prayer.

Perhaps we had better now turn to the consideration of some of the opinions of our opponents:—

S. S., like a great many more of the textualists, stands up for the ordinary reading of 2 Tim. iii. 16; but there are a few instructive facts which may be stated concerning the comparative renderings of the text: our ordinary English Authorized Version is, "All Scripture (is) given by inspiration of God, (and) is profitable for doctrine," &c. This is countenanced by the rendering of—(1) The Version of the *Dutch Reformed Church*; (2) The *Italian* version of Diodati; (3) The *French* version of Martin; and (4) The Latin translation of Beza. But on the other side, owing to the omission of *kai* (and), therefore also of the supplied verb *is*, we have an opposite rendering, viz., "All Scripture divinely inspired is profitable for doctrine," &c. This reading is supported by—(1) The ancient Syriac (or Peshito); (2) the two Arabic versions; (3) the Vulgate (ancient Latin version); (4) by Luther's German version; (5) by the common Spanish version; (6) by Calmet's translation; and (7) it was followed by Clement of Alexandria, by Origen, Tertullian, and the majority of the early Fathers. An unprejudiced person will easily determine on which side is the preponderating evidence. Theopneustic writings are profitable; but it certainly is not correct to say that "all writing is theopneustic and profitable."

S. S. himself, however highly profitable he may believe his writings to be (and as they not unfrequently are) cannot imagine that they are given by inspiration of God; and it is beyond doubt that he cannot believe that the paper of H. K. to which he objects is a portion of that sort of "all writing or scripture which is given by inspiration of God;" for if it were so, H. K. might pertinently ask, Wherefore contendest thou against the Almighty?

M. N. thinks that, as we have so many helps to Bible reading, we ought not to have a revision. But, however fortunate M. N. may be in possessing a library of Biblical literature, he should recollect how many are not so highly favoured—even in a country where Scripture helps are so numerous and so cheap as they are in England. M. N. should recollect, too, that not only the books are required, but the ability to comprehend and apply them, and the habit of using them. But we may well ask M. N. why, if the topics on which the Scriptures treat are so all-important as they are generally believed to be, he can consent that any impediment should be thrown in the way of understanding them which can possibly be avoided? Is not "Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make His paths straight," a command from heaven? and will he willingly treat

such a command as a trifle? To revise the Scriptures is but making the path of truth plainer. In M. N.'s estimate of the difficulty and expense which would result from the adoption of a revised issue of the Scriptures, has he not forgotten the object of Scripture, the importance of that object, and a pertinent question once put in the olden time,—“What shall it profit a man if he should gain the whole world and lose his own soul?” Would M. N. peril the loss of souls by his money-saving argument?

I do not see any good reason for the very tenacious form of Bible conservatism in which our opponents indulge. If we have exposition of the Scripture oftentimes on Sunday and week-days, and if at each of these occasions we require the word read to be explained that it may profit our souls, it could scarcely fail to be a good thing for the Christian comfort of many that all obstacles to a clear understanding should be removed. When in the gospels it is narrated that Jesus opened the eyes of the blind man, so that he saw men as trees walking, it is not said that Jesus left him so. He gave him perfect sight. We only seek pure vision of the word of God. A translation is only a sort of mental spectacle to see the truth by. Nobody looks on it as a privilege to have spectacles which mislead and deceive, neither should we wish a translation that does so: so we should desire a revision of our Authorized Version.

But how? you ask. I say, most decidedly by a Royal Commission. We get Royal Commissions to look after the best and surest lighthouses round our coasts; ought we not, then, to have a Royal Commission to provide for us a proper and safe version of that word which is to be to our spirits as a lighthouse guiding through the darkness and tempests of life, to the safe, sure, and eternal havens?

An argument here occurs to us very pertinent to the times we live in. Quite recently the school boards in many of the most populous places in England have been elected. The loudest element in the debate was, Shall the Scriptures be read in our schools? A pretty general opinion seemed to prevail among the contending parties that, if read at all, it must be read without comment, as it is published without notes. If this is in any way a common decision, it must be of unspeakable importance that, interpretation being interdicted, the Bible should be made as far as possible self-interpreting, by having all passages which are known to be confusing, to be erroneous, or to be faulty, made plain and clear. Surely it never can have been more important than in such circumstances to have a pure and perfect guide to a pure and perfect way of life. Surely those who value the word of Jehovah as above all price must feel themselves justified in calling upon the Parliament of Great Britain and the Queen in Council to appoint a Royal Commission, to put into the hands of every child in the land whose greatness is due to the Bible, a copy of the Scriptures so revised and made plain, that he who runs may read, and reading, may understand, and showing the way of salvation so plainly that the wayfaring man, though a fool, cannot err therein.

T. E. E.

## NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

AN eager logical ingenuity, on being exercised upon words, may easily and plausibly elicit from the terms of the question assigned to us for discussion, a great variety of differing topics on which writers may descant or debate. We might hinge the discussion, for instance, upon this peculiar turn of the phraseology—ought we not to lay aside the Authorized Version of the Scriptures as worn out and misleading, and betake ourselves to the task of a bran-new translation from a fresh text—or in briefer phrase, ought we to revise or retranslate? and if we are to revise, ought we to take the Authorized Version as our standard, or ought we to prefer the original text as the matter to be revised? These various questions are quite as much involved in the terms of this debate as is that to which H. K. has devoted the large proportion of his opening paper. We believe that H. K. has succeeded in directing the discussion away from the specific point involved, which refers primarily to the manner in which the revision ought to be gone about.

I am led to the opinion that this is the point of view intended from the force of the following facts:—the necessity of the revision of the Authorized Version was debated in this magazine in the early part of 1857, and it is not usual to renew a debate previously carried on, without a change of form, aspect, or terms.

It had been proposed in the British Parliament that a Royal Commission should be issued for the revision of the Authorized Version of the Scriptures, and this indicated the point of view from which the debate originated; and there had arisen a revision committee of the Convocation, who were preparing an actual revision about the form, constitution, members, and duties, of which there were considerable doubts and discussions. These statements seem to me to bear out the idea that the question of revision was regarded as a foregone conclusion, and that the matter of the present controversy was limited to the very grave and serious consideration, Ought the management of this affair to be handed over to a Royal Commission, or ought the Church—the proper custodian of God's word—to retain the matter in its own hands?

As to revision and its necessity the most exaggerated notions are entertained by some people on this topic. Some declaim at random regarding thousands of misreadings, corruptions, and mistranslations, and innumerable interpolations and mistakes, as if salvation were perilled by the state of things.

There is really no ground for these assertions. Constantine Tischendorf, who is one of the ablest of the decipherers of the old MSS., and has most diligently searched into this topic, says of the Authorized Version, "This translation of the New Testament has not only become an object of great reverence, but *has deserved to be such.*" As a matter of fact, the variations of the texts are, so scholars say, on points of quite minor importance; they do not, in any appreciable degree, alter the general tenor or the ordinary doc-

trines, for what is gained on one hand by a revision is lost on the other, so far as regards sectarian differences. A very few notes, a slight addition to the marginal references commonly used, and a bringing into uniformity the spelling of proper names, would serve all useful purposes, and make the authorized version a very perfect and exact transcript into our language of the very meaning of the inspired writers. Numerous variations, such as those of "on" for "upon," "in" for "into," "to" instead of "unto," and *vice versa*, can scarcely deserve serious consideration, and by far the larger proportion of the variations among the MSS., we are assured by learned and trustworthy men, consist of these and similar differences or divergencies. It seems to us, therefore, of very little importance indeed whether we have a revision or not.

It must be recollected, besides, that every variation in the MS. does not constitute an error. None know the very original text of the apostles, and hence none know precisely what is the right and proper text. That which we might feel disposed to accept, they might be the very first to negative, had we access to their veritable writings. Scholars, as such, have no special guidance concerning the *ipsissima verba* of the apostles, and hence scholarship will not do for a court of final appeal regarding the orthodoxy of readings. They have no specific means of knowing what is the mind of the Spirit, and the Church would not be justified in resting or risking her doctrines on the mere scholarship of any set of men. The word of God has been placed under the guardianship of the Church; to it has been committed the faith once delivered to the saints. Under that guardianship it ought to be retained: kings and popes have been compelled to give a free and readable Bible to the people; and we are not likely to resign to the hands of scholars that which has been wrenched from the wielders of the world's power. I therefore hold that, in a matter which affects "the whole household of the faith," that the Church should retain its own peculiar treasures, and ought not to hand over its management to secular rulers or their commissioners.

"Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's," is one of the express commands of our Saviour, who said distinctly "My kingdom is not of this world." Dare we, as professing Christians, give to any Government the right to supply the Church of Christ with an authorized version of the word of Christ—the gospel of God? To the Church has been entrusted the preservation and publication of the life-giving oracles of the Most High; and any version of the Scriptures which can satisfy the conscience of the Church, must be the work of the Church and not of a Royal Commission, the members of which might be "aliens from the commonwealth of Israel." The state in our land is not a theocracy, and its officials do not hold the seals of office from the Lord of glory; they are only managers of the temporalities of human life; they have, and ought to have, officially, no lordship over God's heritage. In matters temporal we are indeed to be

subject to the powers that be, but in matters eternal we have a higher and more blessed citizenship, and are members of a diviner commonwealth. Under Jesus Christ, whose Spirit has been promised for guidance in all things that belong to the kingdom of heaven, there is little likelihood of any thoughtful and sincere seeker greatly erring, whatever be the version from which he may read. He gives His truth to them that ask in faith, nothing doubting.

It is, we affirm, an unwarrantable encroachment on the kingdom of Christ, to propose to put into the hands of any Royal Commission the revision of the word of God. It was to His apostles that Jesus gave His divine commission to "go" and to "teach all nations," especially "teaching them to observe all things whatsoever He had commanded them;" and giving besides His gracious promise, "Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." From this we see that it is the office of the Church, not of the State, to teach God's law. This is further shown in the Pentecostal revelation. It was God's own Spirit which gave and guided the utterance of the apostles in the many languages they spoke. To this same spirit must we look in anything that relates to the revelation of the divine will: and it is wholly within the Church that any dealing with the Holy Scriptures should take place. We have the assurance given us that holy men of old spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, and that same Spirit who originally gave the form of sound speech, which cannot be condemned, will also preserve sound doctrine among His true and faithful followers. To the care of the churches has been committed the law and the testimony; to them God has delegated the transmission and interpretation of the same, and they will be unfaithful to themselves and to God if they resign their functions to any Royal Commission whatever.

I do think it becomes the Church, in the present crisis, to consider her way wisely. So cautious and so learned a man as the Archbishop of York has hesitated to accede to a revision until all else has been tried and has failed. He proposes to alter in the quiet and calm way that living things change. He will show the form and manner in which the authorized text and version may be read, so as to yield the truth of the faith. He will show the express amount of the alterations requiring to be made in the present version, but he refuses to make trivial changes, or to incorporate the changes made in the text. He thinks that process of critical assimilation ought to go on as it does in living bodies, so that healthy absorption should at last bring all that is vitally correct and fitting into the Authorized Version.

If there is to be a revision—and I suppose there must be—let it be done gradually, tentatively, carefully, but let it be done by the churches. Let the household of the Lord look upon the endeavours made, bring the text and the translation into harmony, let them welcome the best form of sound words they can secure, but do not give to the State the power of prescribing the Scripture to be used and exercising a tyranny over the consciences of men. M. C. L. H.

## Education.

---

### SHOULD THE BIBLE BE READ IN SCHOOLS WITHOUT COMMENT OR EXPLANATION?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

IF books ought to be valued for their authorship, for their worth, for their influence, and for their informing power, what book can compare with the Bible?—

"This lamp, from off the everlasting throne  
Mercy took down; and, in the night of time,  
Stands casting on the dark her gracious bow,  
And evermore beseeching men with tears  
And earnest sighs to hear, believe, and live."

God reveals His will in the Scriptures. God makes Himself known in the Bible, and has given in it a record of man's destiny, duty, the law of life, and the nature of our social relationships; and He has above all given it that we may know Him as the only true God and Jesus Christ whom He has sent.

This is saving knowledge. This is the chief and special knowledge man requires. It is that which makes him know God and his relation to God. The Bible is *the* guide of life. It alone can instruct and conduct us safely through the dangers and the difficulties of a sin-filled world. It is the true educator, because it is the book written for the education of the world, by Him who knows not only the world, and circumstances, and human nature best, but has prescribed the course of duty and the end of life. There are low aims of education—aims to educate men to be more useful and profitable machinery; but these we deprecate. We hold that man made in the image of God should be trained to gain and retain that image. This being our view of the proper end of education—

"We can but place ourselves in firm resistance to the theory which urges, as the final cause of education, the mere preparation of men for particular positions in society. Bring them up, it is said, for what they are to be; teach them the parts they are to perform. Where this destination is certain, the discipline may be so directed. It ought not, nevertheless, to stop at that point. But how is this to be foretold? Still it is at best a low, unworthy view. We say, Educate man as man, for what he is, for what he can only be, as accountable and immortal man. Incline your instructions to his probable pursuits and duties on earth. Give not, however, to these your stress. They are comparatively little matters. Chiefly awake the moral sense. Draw out the soul. Enthroned the con-

science. Leave out of your consideration for a while every idea of earthly circumstance, condition, lot. Eternity must be your mark. Here is the man. He is only great in his intellectual and moral nature. He stands before you with all his awful capacities. Educate him! Your process must answer to him! Your purpose must answer to him! Teach him aright, and every incidental relation and function of earth will be included; but that being shall be seen unfolded in his unearthly greatness, and travelling on in the way everlasting!"\*

We cannot regard education as only an instrument for promoting the machinery of life and increasing the material wealth of nations. We recognise the political economy of an educated people as valuable, but not as valuable in and for itself alone. The sudden influx of zeal into the hearts of merchants and manufacturers, of statesmen and utilitarians, has an ominous look. It is a this-world state of things that has caused the outcry and the agitation. But the question is not one of this world only. It concerns the manhood of man, and because it does so, it is essential that the Bible, the chart of life, should be *taught*—taught, I say, not tolerated; but above all not politely neglected. And if in every other case you examine in, comment on, and give explanations of, the contents of the books read and studied, what is it but a mere glozing of the matter to say that the Bible, being merely read, is taught in schools? Shall we inaugurate a huge State-hypocrisy, and while professing that the Bible is the religious charter of the country, it is to be read, not understood? Is the power of reading and spelling really so valuable; is the accomplishment of writing and cyphering so very advantageous, that we shall put these instruments into the hand of men without guide or safeguard; nay, by placing a national *veto* upon the teaching of Scripture, justify infidelity, and carelessness of God and goodness?

"Whatever is worth doing is worth doing well." If the Bible is worthy of being read, it is worthy of being worthily read. We call it the Book of God to the ears of children, but to the hearts of children we treat it with disrespect and despite. What is the Bible, that it should be thus visibly slighted? a child cannot but ask; and no sophistry can deceive it regarding the nature of the book, and men's aims concerning the non-explanation of it. If it is beyond human comprehension, why teach it? if it is within human comprehension, why not explain it, as is done with other books? What a weariness is an uncomprehended task-book! what a dreary, distasteful toil is the perusal of a book which is said to be all-important to the life of man, which one cannot comprehend and dare not inquire about. It is a book of history, philosophy, poetry, morals, and religion; it involves chronology, geography, botany, natural history, ethnology, antiquities, and the manners

\* E. W. Hamilton, LL.D., D.D., on "The Institutions of Popular Education," p. 66.

and customs of foreign lands and olden times. It has difficulties as to authorship, notwithstanding its inspiration. Moses writes in one style and Isaiah in another; Joshua and Ezekiel, even David and Solomon, much more Job and Samuel, differ in manner and matter. The Gospels and the Epistles have other variations; and the Old Testament has relation to the New Testament, on which curiosity may well be excited.

The Bible was composed by many authors, under divine supervision, book by book, age after age, comprising a space of fifteen centuries, in different states of society, in various languages, in almost every form of composition; and it treats of matters in whole, as well as in their relations, most difficult. It treats of thoughts essentially sublime in language at once of majesty and simplicity, and its allusions, allegories, phraseology, and incidents, refer to matters which demand explanation. If, then, we refrain from explanation, shall it be said we do our duty? Shall we not rather be making the Bible a stumbling-block and a rock of offence? Had we not better leave the children at school Bibleless, than give them it merely to disgust and tire them? If we want them to heed it, we must help them to read it with intelligence and understanding. How can we face the command to "Search the Scriptures"? and how can we affirm the ineffable importance of the holy volume, if we "clasp it with a clasp" against being commented on?

We may be told that by reading it we show our appreciation of its value, and by leaving it uncommented on we show our sense of its supreme importance; and that if we make known the facts of its contents, the book will gradually unfold its truths to the young mind. I have serious doubts of the efficacy of dechristianized teaching. A great thinker has ably said—

"Man investigates nature; man investigates himself. Man rises from both to the Author of both, and inquires the nature and attributes of God. Confine him to each of these, as matter of direct experimental inquiry and observation, and see what progress he will make towards that wisdom which tells him his duties and his destinies. I speak of the mass of mankind, of the average man; for it is with such our educational measures have to deal. Place your pupil, then, in front of the vast edifice of nature. Bid him enter its doors and survey its chambers; it is the glory of our age that he is enabled, to such extent, to do so. Show him the marvels of the structure, teach him how to classify all the varieties of this wonderful museum; but show him, teach him, nothing more. Can it be questioned that the conclusion will forcibly strike him, that so much design must have a designer; that a care so constant betokens a presiding Providence; that if such a being exist, He is doubtless one to whom subjection is rightfully due? Can it be questioned? Brethren, it can be questioned, and that in no petulant spirit, but in melancholy conviction. . . . Let the experience of all ages, nations, and tongues, answer the question. And



then, above all, what is it your deductions have established? The being, the power, and the skill of God. Convictions awful indeed, but cold and repelling! Convictions that never yet won the heart of man; and yet the heart is the sole empire in which God will condescend to reign. . . . But come, bring your pupil, your gospel-deprived pupil, from the outward to the inward world; set him to explore his own heart, and to find his duties and his hopes there! Unfold to him all the variety of his powers and his affections; show him the just prerogatives of his reason, the due subjection of the inferior nature. Much will you have done, and yet little. Much will you have furnished to perplex, but no light at all towards a solution! A nature so sublime, so debased, with such occasional perceptions of good, such perpetual tendencies to evil, how shall he know whither to turn in this chaos? Above all, how shall he know the right, when there is that within him which perpetually urges him to love the wrong? Can the judgment be trusted when the passions are ever ready to betray it? What is the reason of most men but a special pleader to the passions, a hired advocate ready to justify whatever they have predetermined? A fixed standard, independent of these variations, we must have; that standard is, and is only, in the Gospel of Jesus. You would tell your pupil why man is evil, and yet the mysterious child of eternal hopes? Cast aside your pompous pretences of an education independent of the gospel; place before the immortal being for whom you are prescribing, a page of the story of paradise for the one, the death and victory over death of the Saviour for the other; and one lesson will have taught him more than years of ineffective inquiry.\*

These observations seem to me to make it imperative on professing Christians to impart genuine Christian instruction from, and by, and through the Bible.

But what saith the Scripture? "That the soul be without knowledge it is not good" (Prov. xix. 2), therefore "Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it" (Prov. xxii. 6). Do we fulfil this precept by training children at school to an unreasoning, uninquiring, incurious and unapplying perusal of its pages? We say "whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved" (Rom. x. 13). But can we forget that the following verse asks "How shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe in Him of whom they have not heard?" That men might hear of Him, Jesus said, "Go, *teach* all nations;" and He has specially said, "Suffer the little children to come unto me, and *forbid them not*" (Mark x. 14). If then we hinder and absolutely forbid the explanation of the word of God which leadeth to Christ, ought we not to remember the words that have been spoken,

\* "Sermons" by Professor William Aroher Butler, M.A.; Christ the Treasury of Wisdom and Knowledge, in Series First, pp. 310-312.

"Whoso shall offend one of these little ones, it were better that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depth of the sea!" "Woe unto that man by whom the offence cometh!"

An open Bible freely read and honestly explained in its sacred, not its sectarian teaching, is the demand we make. An unexplained Bible is a mockery of God, and a snare to man.

Edward Irving has well said on this matter,—

"The world of books is wide as the world of man's thoughts and fancies and feelings, full of poisons as well as of food and medicine; whatever hath been felt of good and ill hath been written, and the evil hath its blazoning to the eye as well as the good, its rich garnish and savoury odour to the base appetites of the mind, and needeth not to be sought, but is presented before the face of all the people, cheapened down to their poverty, and pressed upon them with all assiduity. Wherefore, like putting a blind man into a wood where poisons grow as plentifully as fruits, and leaving him there to feed his body, is it to introduce our people to this chaos of right and wrong, of truth and falsehood, of religion and irreligion, of blessedness and misery, of heaven and hell, without having cultivated in them any principles by which to know the evil from the good, and to distinguish the wholesome from the unwholesome."

C. P.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE Bible is the book of the Church, not of the State. The doctrines of the Bible are the matter of the teaching of the Church, and the Sabbath school is the agency of the Church for the bringing up of the young in the nurture and admonition of the Lord. In the doctrines of Christianity it is the duty and the privilege of the Church to teach all nations what is to be believed concerning God, and the duty He demands from His children. The explanatory teaching of the Scriptures is a Christian duty, and does not lie within the province of the State. It is highly proper that the Bible, as a history of the Providence of God over nations, and a record of the doings of God among the inhabitants of the earth, should be read in schools. It is the very soul of history. But it is a dangerous thing to give the explanation of the Bible into the hands of the State. That is a right which the Church must reserve to herself. "My kingdom is not of this world," Christ said, and the interpretation of the tenets of Christ ought not to be committed to the State. The Church must preserve within herself, and for all her people, "the liberty wherewith Christ maketh His people free." To her has been committed word and doctrine, and she must not resign her God-given rights to the mere Cæsarism of the world. Hence in State-supported schools the Bible, if read at all, should be read without comment or explanation.

The State is an agency for civil government, and it has only a right to exercise lordship in regard to civil concerns. It has the law, not the gospel, in its power. The training it seeks to impart is

utilitarian, not sectarian, has to do with earthly duties not heavenly destinies. It has it in its power to insist on the ability to read and to write, that the persons under its rule may know, or at least have the ability to know, the nature, purpose, and method of the intentions of the State; and may make such returns, and communicate such information, as the State requires; but we do not think it has the right to interpret to its own ends the teaching of the Bible. There it trenches on sacred ground, the convictions of men, which the State has no right to predestinate or give proclivities to. The State may permit the reading of the Bible in its schools, in order that the minds of the pupils in these schools may be prepared with the material facts upon which the principles of the Church are built, and on which the doctrines of the preacher depend, because by so doing he economises labour, and knits the interests of the State to the honesty of the Church; but if it should venture to enforce explanation, then that is introducing the State as a Church into the school, and it is a violation of that freedom of conscience which the Church demands, claims, maintains, and has a right to.

The State is bound to be impartial in its action. It has no right to violate the freedom of conscience, and freedom of conscience cannot co-exist with a State which teaches religion. All States in which or by which religion has been taught by State agency, have tended towards making the Church a mere piece of the machinery of statecraft, and have become tyrannous. A State education, in which the doctrines of Christianity were taught by State agents, would soon result in acts of uniformity in reality, if not in name. A State examiner could scarcely avoid an inclination towards the State religion, or that which the State has sanctioned in his appointment; and he could as little avoid a disinclination towards the religion adverse to his own and the State's. The impartiality of the State could not be secured; and the impartiality of sects cannot be secured, and therefore we must, from all State schools, reduce the State in its relation to religion to a minimum of influence, and the sects to a minimum likewise, so that while the Scriptures are acknowledged by State and sect alike to be the guide and guardian of life, there shall no interpretation be given by the State nor permitted to the sect. The book shall be sacred in the school from being applied to special State or sectarian purposes.

The perusal of the Bible in the school by giving to each sect the groundwork of faith, and by impressing on the memory and intellect the text of the sacred story, would supply the foundation upon which the interpretation of the tenets of Christianity would be built. This is a distinct and definite mark where we can stop. If, however, we permit comment and explanation, we lose all definiteness; where does legitimate and impartial comment and explanation end? We can neither describe nor prescribe non-sectarian teaching in the Scriptures. Therefore we must proscribe the teaching of its doctrines as a part of the duty of the State altogether.

By the reading of the Bible in schools we assert a great fact. "The Bible alone is the religion of Protestants." Our Authorized Version is issued without note or comment. By the reading of the Bible in school we attain a great good. Children are brought to know its contents, and are therefore ready to receive instruction in its doctrines, and it is quite as easy to separate the actual teaching of the facts of the Bible from its doctrinal teaching as it is to detach the teaching of theoretical geometry from the teaching of practical mathematics, or the facts from the philosophy of history.

But perhaps some may say, All this about Bible teaching is apart from Bible teaching. What saith the Scriptures? They give us line upon line, precept upon precept, for our guidance. In the Jewish synagogue the law was read, not expounded. It was considered that the word of God had been revealed so plainly that "he who runs may read, and reading may understand," what great things God had done for His people. In the days of the theocracy among the Jews the reading of the law and the prophets formed the public and State contribution to the education of the people. The Scriptures affirm their own sufficiency as a guide and a government. Is it not to make the work of God of none effect by our traditions, to maintain that in school the word of the Lord requires explanation and comment? Is the habit of disquisition not rather overdone, and the habit of inquisition too little attended to? The Scriptures are given to be read and thought on, and each man's duty is to make Scripture its own interpreter.

And may we not pertinently ask why sectarianism should have place in schools at all? The school surely, above all places, ought to be kept free from the disputes of sects. The practical morality of Christianity is the great matter to get into the minds of children. If the words of Christ can be relied upon—and surely none of those who seek to explain and comment upon the Bible in school can entertain a doubt of that—the practice of the morality which He inculcated is the best training for the ultimate knowledge of doctrine. Jesus said, "My doctrine is not mine, but His that sent Me. If any man will do His will he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself" (John vii. 16, 17).

Facts as they are recorded in Scripture, and doctrines as they are related in the Bible, are the good seed of the word, which must be sown in the hearts of those who are afterwards to be rooted and grounded in the faith. These were effective without note, comment, or explanation in the olden time, why not now? The law of Moses, when read, affected the people, as it was read in their ears; the words of Jesus produced effects when spoken, the discourses of the apostles, and their epistles, were quick and powerful when spoken or read. To those who doubt the efficiency of Scripture read without comment or explanation, we say, "Ye do greatly err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God" (Matt. xxii. 29).

S. L. C.

## The Essayist.

---

### BERKELEY'S THEORY OF VISION.

AMONG the numerous works of Bishop Berkeley, his "Essay towards a new Theory of Vision" occupies a prominent place. At the age of twenty-five, and only two years after he had become a fellow of Trinity College, Dublin, he gave to the world what he announced as a satisfactory solution of a difficulty which had always beset the science of optics, and of which various unsatisfactory solutions had been already offered. That difficulty arose, he believed, from the confusion constantly made between the two senses of sight and touch; and he thought that a philosophical discrimination made between what is strictly owing to each would easily remove it. With that view he published his essay, and twenty-six years afterwards a vindication of it, "showing the universal presence and providence of the Deity, vindicated and explained." Although some of his other writings,—and notably his treatise concerning the "Principles of Human Knowledge," in which he attempted to counteract the materialistic tendencies of the day by denying the existence of the material world—excited much opposition, it may be said that the truth of his theory of vision is now all but universally admitted. Adam Smith, author of the "Wealth of Nations," has characterized it as "one of the finest examples of philosophical analysis that is to be found either in our own or any other language;" and a careful study of it will satisfy us that this estimate of it is not too high. There are, indeed, objectors to the doctrine, some of whom have attempted to controvert it with considerable skill, but, we think, only with the result of showing that its author's position is impregnable.

The theory briefly is, that our sense of sight does not give us immediately any perception of the distance, magnitude, and figure of objects, but that these are obtained by the sense of touch; that intuitively we only see coloured appearances, which are felt as inward sensations; and that what we do see is only a sign by which we recognise what we do not see, but which we formerly knew by the sense of touch. And these signs, as arbitrary in their connection with what we have touched as words are with what they represent, are produced by the laws of association.

Let us now see what can be said in support of it; but in order to examine it we must first make the experiment for ourselves; and with that view it is necessary in thought to divest ourselves as far as possible of all the knowledge we possess by the sense of touch, and to imagine ourselves an intellectual being, conscious

only of the faculty of sight. It may be said that this is very difficult; it certainly is, but it is not quite impossible; and unless we can do this we are not in a position to understand the theory, still less to criticise it. In daily life our knowledge is so largely obtained by the combined use of both sight and touch that we can hardly be said to be conscious of what is provided for us by each separately; yet it is obvious that as they are distinct senses their products must necessarily be also distinct, and these can be discriminated with a little care and thought. It may be observed here how rigidly Berkeley has confined himself to the pure facts of seeing, justly observing that the arguments advanced by previous writers in regard to vision have been usually such as blind men could apprehend; while in reality it is a matter of which they can take no cognizance, because if the theory is of any value whatever it must be founded on facts, and as these facts are the acts of seeing, it follows that persons deprived of sight are destitute of the only means of entering into the question.

Let us then consider the facts in consciousness as made known to us by sight alone, in the meantime clearly leaving out of consideration all ideas of touch, and strictly confining ourselves to sight. For that purpose we shall suppose our common father Adam as having been that moment created, with all the parts of his bodily frame perfect, but their several uses as yet quite unknown to him. He is, we shall suppose, placed standing upright on a greensward in the Garden of Eden, in presence of a scene gorgeous with the colours of an Eastern clime. The flowers of every shape and hue contrast with the verdure of the grassy carpet. In the distance a river rolls majestically along, and over the summits of the trees which line its banks rise in stately grandeur a chain of lofty hills, whose peaks are lost in the fleecy clouds stretching upwards to the empyrean. He is then possessed of sight and touch, though as yet he knows it not. He is then an Ego, a personality, a mind, but necessarily nothing more, and even this not consciously to himself. He can then be conscious of only two distinct sensations, sound and sight. The birds no doubt are melodiously warbling around him, the wind is gently swaying the branches of the trees backwards and forwards, and there is a confused noise as the river rolls along. But as such a being probably nay, we might almost say certainly, could not clearly distinguish between the two sensations, and also for the sake of greater simplicity, we shall imagine that a universal stillness reigns over all, and that he is still unconscious of the sense of hearing. Evidently, then, such a mind could be conscious only of sight and colours. He would be aware of the existence of certain hues, green, blue, scarlet, yellow, white; but that is all. He could not then know that these colours were not a part of himself, but on the contrary he would suppose them to be in his mind, and that they were a part of himself. No distinction is as yet possible. Gradually this sensation is somewhat altered. He notices that these colours

sometimes change their relative position. One conceals another, and some are blended together. Dark rain-clouds take the place of the Cirri in the blue ether above him, and dark objects, which he afterwards knows to be animals, move round about him, and keep a portion of the colours ever changing. He simply knows that these different colours are existent, but he does not know where. They seem to him to be all equally near, all on the same plane. He simply knows that this is of one shade, that of another, a third of a yet different complexion, and that there is a manifest variety, but this is all. Still all this seems to be merely a part of himself, for as yet an opposite opinion is impossible. But soon one of these dark objects moving about comes into contact with him, and instantaneously he is conscious of a new sensation. It is something quite different from his previous experience, and he felt nothing like it when any of the two colours came together. It is what is afterwards known to him as touch. Instinctively two objects on each side of him rise, and meet together on the side where the moving thing touched him, as if to push it away; and at the same time, without well knowing how, he finds himself moving backwards and away from that object. New thoughts stir within him, and his attention is forcibly called to these new phenomena. To his delight he finds the two objects on either side of him, which he now calls his hands, are under his control, and that he can move them about as he chooses. He places them together, and the novel sensation is again experienced which he calls touch. He stoops down and places his hands on the green object beneath him, but the sensation is different from that which he feels when he puts his two hands together. It is, so to speak, only the half of the other, only of half the same intensity. He continues these experiments, and he soon finds that these double sensations are confined to the objects attached to his hands, and which he now calls his body. During all this time he is still conscious of seeing these various colours; but when moving his hand about he happens to place it on a particular spot near the top of his body, and to his amazement he finds that all these colours have vanished, and that he cannot see at all. Removing his hand, he finds he can see as well as before, and then he becomes aware that his sight is localised, and that he can see what is around him only by means of the two little objects he calls his eyes. Then for the first time he becomes aware that these colours are not part of himself, but external to him. And continuing his investigations by walking about and touching these various objects, he learns that some are nearer to him than others, that they are not on the same plane, and that some are so far away that he can neither walk to them nor touch them. Thus by the sense of touch and by experience he recognises the outness of objects, and it is only by a lengthened experience, by a series of judgments formed upon the data provided for him by touch, that

he knows the relative distance of objects, and calculates what that distance is.

Such, then, is an illustrative case drawn from the facts of consciousness, and we think an examination of it will show its correctness. It may be said that the whole thing is unreal, and that we cannot place ourselves in such a position, that we cannot unlearn what we have learnt from infancy. True, for a man without the faculty of touch would be altogether out of place in the present state of existence. But although we cannot actualize such a state, we can divest ourselves of the faculty of touch in imagination, and theorize such a being; and only by doing so can we examine the question.

As to the first position, that distance is itself invisible and is a line turned endwise to the eye, its truth will be at once admitted. This can easily be verified by looking at two points, one near at hand and the other at a distance, without looking at any intermediate objects; and it will be seen that the one appears as near the eye as the other. To obviate the difficulty of looking at the one point without looking at intermediate objects it is only needful to look through a small tube. It can be shown by watching the light fleecy clouds floating along in a clear sky, where there are evidently different masses of them, but we have no idea which is the nearer. Or again, on a winter evening, when the moon is shining brightly and some dark clouds are floating near, we have no idea by merely looking at them whether the moon or the clouds are the nearest, although we do know when we see the clouds pass along and for a few minutes conceal the moon from view.

But more than this is required. This is not the point for which Berkeley contended, for he assumed this as requiring little or no proof. This can only refer to the relative distances of various objects to the percipient being. The question is, Does the eye of itself, and without any assistance from touch, tell us that these objects are at any distance whatever from us? He did not mean to say that he believed his own hand, or the house in which he lived, was not external to him. No sane man could doubt that. But he said that his hand or his house was not immediately perceived by his sight to be external to him, and that his sight could only tell him that by the assistance of touch. That this is truly the case, we have already shown in our analysis of consciousness. We then saw that the mind—for it is not the eye which sees, that is only the instrument or means by which the mind sees—could only be conscious of an internal feeling, and that pure sight has no means of distinguishing the internal feeling from its cause, and it can only suppose that the feeling is its own cause. The purely percipient being would be conscious of various colours existing, but until the mind knows that colours are independent of it, and it of them, and this knowledge can only be obtained by touch, it is impossible that it could think otherwise than that these colours are a part of itself. It may be thought that sight could be able



of itself to find out that it is only through the eye that the mind sees, by noticing that the eyelids close of themselves and shut out the view. Yet even this is touch, although very slight, and consequently the objection falls to the ground. But waiving this, the mind could have no means of knowing that it is not a covering suddenly drawn over the objects before it, or that these objects have not the power of changing their colours, and becoming quite black. Or again, it may be asked, Could not the eye localize itself by finding out its focus? i.e., on looking at anything, say this line, we are conscious of seeing only one word at a time distinctly, and having to run the eye along the whole line so as to bring the focus on each word in order to read it. It might find this out. But even although unaided sight could find out that it is localised in the eye, it could not, without further assistance, tell that there is anything more than an inward sensation felt.

It may be mentioned here that in speaking of distance or outness there are clearly two ideas comprehended in these terms, viz., distance or outness of one object from another, and also the outness of these objects from the eye of the beholder. That one object is seen to be external to another is not disputed by Berkeley, nor do we think that it can be. Colours are indisputably the objects of sight; and as points can be seen, so also can a series of points, hence divisions between colours are seen. And if one colour is seen not to be another colour, but distinct from it, they are seen to be external to one another. It is on the other kind of outness,—that objects are not seen to be external to the eye itself,—that Berkeley takes his stand. He not only says that the eye cannot tell whether one object is at a greater outness from it than another, but that it cannot say that any object is out from it. This should be observed, because Reid and Stewart have supposed that it is the former position that is in dispute, and they have gone no further than to affirm that the eye cannot judge of the *relative* outness of objects from itself. In this they evidently affirm much less than their master did, for he clearly held that no outness from the eye is immediately seen. And it was to this position that his arguments were mainly directed; and in proving this he has proved the former, inasmuch as the greater involves the less.

It has been charged against Berkeley that he has left this position—the outness of objects from the eye of the beholder—almost destitute of proof, although we think the charge unfounded; and to supply this defect, if it is such, Professor Ferrier offers a very ingenious proof. He says that sight alone does not enable us to affirm that an object is external to itself, because it cannot see itself, and it cannot see that one thing is external to what it does not see. We recognise different colours to be external to one another, because we see them all. But we cannot contrast a known thing with what is unknown. We cannot compare the visible with the invisible, and therefore until we can localise both the object and the mind which sees—until we can see both the colour of the

object and the colour of the mind, we are not entitled to say that the one is external to the other. This reasoning is quite conclusive; but we think we have already proved it in our analysis of consciousness, when we saw that, to pure sight, external objects seem merely a feeling in the mind, and consequently are not felt to be external to it.

Another statement of Prof. Ferrier's may also be noticed here, when he supposes a seeing intelligence without the faculty of touch, merely an eye provided with a due complement of objects, as clouds, rivers, woods, and mountains. He says "it is obvious that the seer must pronounce itself or its organ to be precisely commensurate in extent with the things seen. It may either suppose the diameter of the landscape to be conformed to the size of its diameter, or it may suppose its diameter conformed to the size of the landscape," (*Remains*, vol. ii. p. 358.) What we take exception to is, that such a seer could form such a judgment, for he can then be conscious of only one thing, the internal sensation. In stating that the seer pronounces itself commensurate in extent with the object seen, it is implied that two things are already known to it, itself and something else, one internal and the other external. But we maintain that until touch really is exercised, neither internality nor externality can be known to the mind. We have spoken of the objects of the mind, but these can only be known to it by sight as colours, not as objects. It is not conscious that there is anything *out* of itself until it learns this by touch; and till then these colours appear to it merely modifications of itself, and therefore it can have no conception of outness.

The theory is strongly supported by the instances which have occurred of persons who were born blind, or nearly so, and who were couched and afterwards able to see. The most striking case is that of the young man couched by Cheselden, who has given us an account of his patient's sensations immediately after the operation. The patient was as nearly as possible quite blind previously to it, being only able to distinguish light from darkness. "When he first saw," says Cheselden, "he was so far from making any judgment about distances, that he thought all objects whatever touched his eyes (as he expressed it), as what he felt did his skin." Here plainly is a sensation experienced as if everything external to him were a part of himself. Of course if such an idea had been presented to him he would have repudiated it, because by that time he was perfectly familiar with the nature of external matter by the sense of touch; and the latter sense corrected the mistake of the former. But it is equally clear that if he had not possessed the sense of touch, he would not have been able to say that these objects did *not* touch his eyes, and he would therefore have fancied that they were a part of himself. Though he knew objects by touch perfectly well it was a considerable time before he could recognise them by sight alone. An amusing instance of this is given. "Having often forgot which was the cat and which was the dog, he was

ashamed to ask ; but catching the cat (which he knew by feeling), he was observed to look at her steadfastly, and then setting her down, say, 'So, puss! I shall know you another time.'" Another case equally striking is recorded by Mr. Nunnely. After the boy was couched he had the same impression as the other one had, that everything touched his eyes ; and so strong was this impression, that although he could feel that the objects were not touching him, he yet held up his hand before his eyes for fear of their coming into contact with anything, and so being injured by it.

In both these cases it was a long time, in one case a whole year, before they had fully learnt the facts of seeing, showing us that our recognition of distance is not intuitional and immediate, but that it is a process of gradual acquirement. In short, it shows us that seeing is a language which can be interpreted only by touch, that the latter is the key to the former, that the thoughts given to us in one must be translated into the other, and that unless we had the gift of touch the language of sight would be to us a sealed book.

The truth of the theory is further supported by the fact that we never see the same thing exactly in the same way twice. This seems very paradoxical, yet a little reflection will show that it is sober reality. For instance, in looking at the sun we are apt to suppose it a very small thing indeed, and far less than our earth. Yet in truth it is about ninety millions of miles away from us, and its diameter is about a hundred times more than that of our earth. Now it is evident that if we could in any way diminish the distance between it and our earth, the nearer we came to it the larger would it appear, so that as seen by us it would be continually changing in size. Or to vary the illustration, let us take a spectacle lens, which is not a great deal larger than the retina of our eye. and while standing on the top of a hill let us look at the landscape lying below us. Through this the landscape, although many miles in extent, will be plainly seen. Further, to employ Adam Smith's beautiful illustration, if we could conceive a fairy hand and a fairy pencil to come between our eyes and the glass, that the pencil could delineate on that little glass the outline of these extensive lawns and woods, rivers and mountains. Now this picture, microscopic as it is, is really what we see ; and suppose we were to leave our standpoint and visit that landscape, walking through these lawns and woods, by the banks of the rivers, and at the base of the mountains with this fairy picture in our hand, how disproportioned would the size of these two be ! Yet what we see in both cases is the same. We know that these woods and mountains have not increased in size since we looked at them on the opposite hill. It is only that the representations of them in the eye are different, and we can obtain a true knowledge of their size by locomotion and touch. In that fairy picture we saw a little speck at the base of one of these mountains, but we could not tell what it was, until, on a nearer approach, we found it to be a little cottage. The first representation had no resemblance to the second, yet both

were caused by precisely the same object. And when we wish to examine an object thoroughly, so as really to know it, we are not satisfied with one sight of it, but we look at it again and again. If it is a monument we walk round and round it, and look at it from all possible angles. If it is a picture we examine it from various distances and in different lights; and we do all this because we see it differently each time, for if we saw it only in one way there could be no possible need for looking at it more than once. All this shows our dependence upon touch as much as sight in our knowledge of objects. It in no way shows that our sight is fallacious, but merely that it has limited powers; and that our sight is of itself unable to give us our knowledge of distant objects, and consequently unable to tell us what their distance is. Sight and touch indeed work harmoniously together, and go lovingly hand in hand. They are both the servants of man, and do him valuable service. The one supplements what the other has left wanting, and both are needful for the full enjoyment of his nature.

If thus we have proved that distance is itself invisible, that outness is not immediately seen, it follows that our perception of trinal extension is acquired, i. e., that while we can see length and breadth we cannot see thickness. The latter is involved in the former, and is a corollary from that proposition. We have found that we cannot see magnitude, that our sight in itself can only tell us that certain objects have length and breadth, but it cannot tell us what that length and breadth is. And since we cannot see distance we cannot see the thickness of an object. Nor consequently can pure sight tell us that any one object is nearer us than another, for every one seems equally near. Thus our visual perception of trinal extension, of outness and magnitude, is acquired, and is not originally known by us. The question then comes, how we have acquired this visual perception, for clearly enough we all have it now. We are all now quite able to perceive the outness and the thickness of objects without touching them. The answer is, by means of visual language. We are possessed of the sense of touch, and it is this which gives us our real knowledge of distance. Then when we see any object, this visible perception, by the law of association, calls up in our minds our tangible perceptions of that object, and we thus by means of them both obtain a true knowledge of it. Visible perception is nothing more than a sign, which we at once recognise as indicative of outness; and so by means of that sign we recognise the distance and outness of objects as easily as if we had walked up to them and touched them. It is analogous to our spoken language. The word *man*, or *homo*, is simply a sign which calls up to us the conception of a human being. These signs in no sense resemble a human being, yet we have by experience learned to associate the one with the other, and so when the sign is presented to our minds we instinctively think of what is signified. If we are unacquainted with the Greek language, for example, the word *άνθρωπος*

can convey no meaning whatever to our minds, but if we have learned it we know that the word is equivalent to *homo*, or man, and it equally readily calls up to our minds the conception of a human being. And as it is with spoken so is it with visual language. There is no necessary connection between the two, but by dint of long practice we are quite familiar with that visual language, and can read it at once. A picture is visual language, a series of signs presented to the eye. If we touch a landscape painting we can feel only a plane surface; but when we look at it we at once recognise the signs which perspective and other rules have enabled the painter to express, and we see that these hills which form the background are at a distance from the figures in the foreground, and can judge of the relative distance. But unless we were familiar with the tangible distance of these objects, or ones similar to them, these signs could convey no meaning to us; but from our tactual experience it is a language with which we are well acquainted, and we read it without difficulty. It is a divine language with which our allwise Creator has made the whole race of men acquainted, one which makes the whole world kin, and is one more of those connecting links which binds earth to heaven, which unites man to his Creator, the finite and the created to the Infinite and the Absolute.

R. D. JR.

PSALM XXIII.—“There is no inspired title to this psalm, and none is needed, for it records no special event, and needs no other key than that which every Christian may find in his own bosom. It is David’s *Heavenly Pastoral*—a surpassing ode, which none of the daughters of music can excel. The clarion of war here gives place to the pipe of peace, and he who so lately bewailed the woes of the Shepherd tunelessly rehearses the joys of the flock. Sitting under a spreading tree, with his flock around him, like Bunyan’s shepherd boy in the Valley of Humiliation, we picture David singing this unrivalled pastoral with a heart as full of gladness as it could hold; or, if the psalm be the product of his after years, we are sure that his soul returned in contemplation to the lonely water-brooks which rippled among the pastures of the wilderness, where in early days he had been wont to dwell. This is the pearl of psalms, whose soft and pure radiance delights every eye; a pearl of which Helicon need not be ashamed, though Jordan claims it. Of this delightful song it may be affirmed that its piety and its poetry are equal—its sweetness and its spirituality unsurpassed.

“It has been well said that what the nightingale is among birds, that is this divine ode among the Psalms, for it has sung sweetly in the ear of many a mourner in his night of weeping, and has bidden him hope for a morning of joy. I will venture to compare it also to the lark, which sings as it mounts, and mounts as it sings, until it is out of sight—and even then it is not out of hearing. Note the last words of the psalm—‘I will dwell in the house of the Lord for ever;’ these are celestial notes, more fitted for the eternal mansions than for these dwelling-places below the clouds. Oh that we may enter into the spirit of the psalm as we read it, and then we shall experience the days of heaven upon the earth!”—*Rev. C. H. Spurgeon.*



frequently made concerning the woes of genius and the wrongs of eminent men because prosperity did not shine on them and wealth and honours were not granted to them. This lachrymosity is generally misplaced; the man whose spirit is fixed on doing his duty is not brought to this mind by a calculation of the averages of the consistency of life's wealth with life's well-doing. Life is with him a reality, and the claims of life—as a constant progress in self-improvement—are recognised by him as veritable things which must be, however life's accidents of appreciation and remuneration may go in this—

“Good world, where it is dangerous to be good.”

We do not select the biographies which hold a place in this series only from those upon whom fortune, fame, and recognition have waited, and have brought with them the gifts which society lavishes on those it finds or fancies to be worshipful—we gladly accept, as additions to the successes of the lives we desire to make known, the progress in worldly ease, prosperity, enjoyment, and regard of those whom we admire for true desert; but it is not our main purpose to fling incense before the popular idols of men who have their reward in the success they have gained in the eye of society. We look at the *toil* more than at the reward; and at the *direction* rather than the productiveness of the efforts made. It is the *character* which selects the purpose, collects the materials, and perfects the labours of a life of progress, of self-developing effort, and of noble aspiration, that we rejoice to register and chronicle.

“He that is crown'd with that supernal crown  
Is lord and sovereign of himself and fate.”

There is, in our opinion, but one true dignity—worthiness of life. Our earliest sympathies were given to the martyrs and heroes of old; but experience has taught us to know how often heroism is found in the workshop, the factory, the field, the warehouse, and the street, working the common work of life; and how frequently the martyr's zeal is exercised in humble homes and huts where poor men live.

Nearly a quarter of a century ago our attention was directed to some sweet and pleasing verses, which seemed to us to have the very essence of a heart's life in them, pure and fragrant as a lily's white leaf; and, on hearing that their author was a Birmingham working man of great promise and power, we took an interest in reading all of his that we could find in “Howitt's Journal,” “The Truth Seeker,” “Cooper's Journal,” &c.; and we remember the special interest we felt in being told that he was the topic of a paper by the author of the “History of Priestcraft,” which we had read with sympathy, arising from experiences and efforts not dissimilar to those which were there noted in “the pursuit of knowledge under difficulties.”

Since then, the writer of this sketch has seen the object of it, and conversed with him occasionally, though no special intimacy

subsists between us. It is necessary to say this in case the tenor of this memoir should be mistaken. It is not the set eulogy of a special intimate, but a transcript of the jottings of several years' inquiry among friends, passing critiques on his works as they came to hand, and of the general impression made on the writer's mind by the whole of these in union, in so far as an idea could be formed by one who does not move in the same circles as the author of a "Century of Birmingham Life"—whose biography we desire to include among this series of papers as an instance of toiling upward.

John Alfred Langford was born in Crawley's Court, Deritend, Birmingham, 12th September, 1823. He was the fourth of a family of six sons—two of whom only survived infancy—of John Langford, a working man of Welsh extraction, though born at Brampton Brian, near Kington, in Herefordshire, on the borders of Wales; and Harriet Eaton his wife, daughter of a baker in Birmingham. The capital of the midland counties was in the early part of the century a favourite place of immigration for those who were desirous of pressing forward in the ranks of life. The enterprise, activity, and variety of pursuits abounding within it gave it great charms for those who wished to strive, endeavour, and work. It had great attractions for the more ambitious of the Cymry; so much so that there was a distinct Welsh end in Birmingham and a St. David's Society. John Langford, with the keen perseverance of his race, though working under Mr. Gameson—afterwards a member of the Town Council—cherished the ambition of being a master himself, and with settled persistency attained his aim. He entered Birmingham in the year of Waterloo, and in 1828 he realized the passionate desire of his spirit by setting up in business for himself in Bradford Street. Next year John Alfred Langford's name was entered as a scholar upon the roll-book of Mr. Reynolds's academy, Brixhall Street, near the chapel in Deritend, where he studied the initiatory elements known as "the three Rs."

He had, however, been taught his earlier lessons at home; for his mother, at a very early period of her married life, had been deprived, by a stroke of paralysis following on a serious illness, of the use of her left side; and, being somewhat of an invalid, found few joys more endearing than to sit with her boys beside her while they read their daily lessons and repeated such tasks as she apportioned to them. In their early mental development much was due to this earnest and painstaking mother, whose helpfulness, despite her helplessness, imparted pure tastes and intellectual activity to her children.

The chairmaker's son, aged six, chubby and long ringletted, took his place in class with a fair share of preliminary preparation; and made somewhat more than the usual progress, notwithstanding his fondness for play, soldiering, flag-flying, democratic shouting and bonnet-throwing—these latter being exercises in which school-boys found high delight in the days of agitation preceding the passing of the Reform Bill of 1832: when boys, like their elders, dreamt that life's pleasures would at length come out of the enact-



ments of Parliament. As a boy, he thought he got more sound thrashing than he deserved, and as a man he acknowledges that more sound learning was offered him than he took advantage of. His school curriculum, however, was short—at the age of ten he was withdrawn from the scholastic pursuit of “reading, writing, and arithmetic both vulgar and decimal,” to the industrial practice of “caning” and “rushing” in the cabinet-making factory of which his father was master. The court in Bradford Street in which John Langford resided had gradually lost its garden-greenery, and been transformed into a timber-yard; all the shopping had been filled with furniture or been converted into work places. In these he had several men, some women, and, including his own sons, a few boys, employed with as much constancy as the drunkenness of the workmen would allow. J. A. Langford was set to work in the women’s department, and for some years lived in an atmosphere of femininity which—as was the wont, at least, of early factory labour life—was not much graced by feminine delicacy or modest reticence on themes unmeet for boyish thought. If people more frequently reflected on sin’s weed-like speed of ripening in the young, they would not sow the seed of it in workshop and in factory, at street-corners and in drunkeries, a-field or afloat. How often

“Evil is wrought by want of thought  
As well as by want of heart.”

Even at school J. A. Langford had a good style of reading and a taste for elocution. He frequently appeared as a reciter at the examinations, and at the Easter and Whitsuntide meetings of the Wesleyan Sunday school which he attended. His habit of reading aloud to his mother while at school undoubtedly aided him in this, as well as brought him into communion with higher minds and other thoughts than those with which boys usually delight themselves. This good habit of reading aloud is practised too little, but it has many advantages; it accustoms the ear to the sound of the tongue, and gives the ideas a double chance of entrance into the mind at the same time that the intellect is stimulated by sympathy and the social feelings. In days such as ours, in which readings, lectures, public speaking, &c. are so popular and so valuable as a means of instruction and improvement, this is an art which requires much more attention than it receives.

After leaving school, life fell into flatness and routine; work during the day, play when it could be got, and an hour or two of reading to his mother in her dulness and loneliness, for circumstances took the father much from home; and when at home he did not so greatly add to the family happiness as he might and should. Time went on thus till he was about thirteen. Then he felt a great impulse, a fever of fervour, which, however foolish in itself, had good results. This he owed to his uncle Richard, after whom his elder brother was named, who lived in Knighton, in Radnorshire, a parish through which Offa’s dyke passes. This Welsh

uncle paid the Langfords a visit in 1836, and in his love for the boys, took them a good deal out with him. One night he took them to the theatre—then under the lesseeship of Mr. Armistead. The first play of the evening was "The Wonder," and truly John Alfred Langford found himself in wonderland. The after-piece was "The Turnpike Gate," and on this night he passed through an ever-memorable turnpike gate in his life-career. The enchantments of painting, poetry, statuary, and emotional life were brought within his ken, and the magic touch of vitality was given to the creative imagination.

"For ill can poetry express .  
 Full many a tone of thought sublime,  
 And painting, mute and motionless,  
 Steals but a glance from time.  
 But by the mighty actor wrought,  
 Illusion's perfect triumphs come,  
 Verse ceases to be airy thought,  
 And sculpture to be dumb."

By night he dreamed of the play, by day he babbled of it, and fascination at length became passion. The youth was "stage-struck." "He would be an actor" has been an oft-repeated incident in the life of the lettered. He bought the play, read and re-created "the brief eventful history" into which Mrs. Centlivre has put so much spirit, plot, and brilliant though occasionally coarse dialogue. One of the shop-women beside whom he worked felt an interest in the enthusiasm of the boy, and told him the plots of some of the plays she had seen, and stimulated his already over-freighted mind by sketches of "Hamlet," "Othello," "Macbeth," "Richard III.," "The Revenge," "New Way to Pay Old Debts," &c., unloosing into the boy's soul the ideas of Young, Massinger, Shakspeare, and others of those who shadow the realities of life upon the soul, and bring into the vision of the mind the motives and the aims of men—

"Where every changing scene the actors change,  
 And new, strange plots bring scenes as new and strange."

He became a constant purchaser, as often as his means enabled him, of Cumberland's edition of the British dramas. But the greed of his desire for more of those glimpses into the mystery of life and mind, plot and passion, far exceeded the scant supply of pocket-money to which he had acquired a prescriptive right. That amounted to sixpence per week. Hitherto it had been almost enough; now it was miserably inadequate and straitening. As trade was busy, John Langford's *employés* were allowed to work overtime. John Alfred prevailed upon one of the women to connive at the encouragement of his theatrical tastes by taking out work to be done as if by herself, but which she permitted him to do. For this she received the payment, and transferred it to the purse of the

play-hungering youth. By this means, at the rate of from fourpence-halfpenny to sixpence for the making of the cane-seat of a chair he was able to add a shilling or so occasionally to his available pocket-money. So he procured books, and, even after the extra toil by which they were attained, he devoted himself to read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest their contents, committing to memory the chief soliloquies of the chief characters in the dramas of Shakspeare, and transfusing his young spirit with the

"Lofty sense  
Creative fancy and inspection keen,  
Through the deep windings of the human heart,"

of England's boast, Warwickshire's and the world's pride.

The theatre became to him a passion and a paradise, and he not unfrequently gave himself up to "the joy of the gods," in the Olympian heights of the wonderlands of stage-struck youths. These were the days in which W. C. Macready passioned forth the best productions of the modern drama, and gave present life and being to the creations of the immortal son of Stratford; when Charles Kean, emulous of an actor's fame, devoted studious years to perfect his conceptions of the heroes created for the Globe and Blackfriars, and Miss Helen Faucit was beginning to exercise that mystery of genius which makes the heart feel as if "wandering in enchanted ground" the slave and subject of the spells she threw over the spirit—when "sitting at a play" was almost "a liberal education." To Langford it was the occasion of literary ambition and poetical awakening.

On attaining the age of thirteen, J. A. Langford was duly bound to his father, who honoured the occasion by the gift of a silver watch to his son-apprentice; and by an extension of his pocket-money to eighteen-pence a week. In the winter thereafter his father took him with him on an out to his native country. On the way they passed through Ludlow, and the poetic susceptibilities of the boy were thrilled by the sight of the rock-crowning, historic, and romantic ruin of Ludlow Castle—containing traceably yet, though floorless and roofless, the hall in which "Comus," upwards of two centuries previously, had been first performed, and had the opportunity of declaiming to his father some of the choicest passages of that purest and holiest of the dramatic compositions of England. On the farther journey through Leintwardine towards Knighton, amidst the pelting of the pitiless showers, he kept up his own courage and his father's astonished interest by repeating snatches of the supreme poet's finest recitative passages. They entered Knighton in the chill of night; and, amid the gloom of oil-lighted street-lamps, reached their destination. Here they were welcome, and made rambling excursions to all "the places of interest in the neighbourhood," enjoying the delights of rural scenes and rustic life amazingly; but especially charmed with the weird, wild, eerie wonders of witchery, ghosts, dreaming, and diablerie he heard o'

nights when the families assembled in the kitchen and "jokes went round and careless chat." This fortnight in Radnorshire did much to quicken and intensify the imaginative activity of the town-bred boy; while it supplied him with the pleasure of capping all their stories and over-topping the whole circle of story-tellers by vivid reproduction, intermingled with recited snatches of the plot of M. G. Lewis's "Castle Spectre."

On returning to Birmingham and hard work, after this agreeable "out," his taste for the theatre increased, and his taste for the workshop decreased. He fell a victim to stage fever, and aspired to fret and fume his little hour upon the boards. Having conned several of the "leading characters" in which he had seen the "stars" of the first magnitude perform, he addressed an epistle to Macready, the manager of Covent Garden, asking an engagement in his company, should his father consent to the cancelling of the indenture which was hardly two years old. Macready wrote a reply—such as he had frequently to send to aspirants after histrionic honours. It counselled good conduct, obedience, devotion to his trade, the forgetting of the "characters" he had studied, but which his education could not enable him to understand, and concluded with the forcible words, "Trouble me with no more of your letters." This letter was put by mischance in the hands of Langford the elder, who opened it, read it slowly, then, with a look but not a word, he, handing it to its proper owner, walked off to the shop. The agony was poignant, but it resulted in good. It applied the spur to a willing and able mind, and produced a right resolve. "If education," he said, "is requisite to understand these characters, then that education I shall get"—and hence the boy that was scorned as an actor, rightly enough, has grown to be the author of a dramatic performance not unworthy of the modern stage—"The King and the Commons"—of which more anon.

Resolve was instantly followed by act. Next week Langford was enrolled as a member of "The Mechanics' Institute." Education was his want, and he gave every energy to the attainment of that on which success depended. He became one of its most successful, noted, and devoted students; for he wrought with will, purpose, and persistency. The conductor of the educational classes in the Birmingham Mechanics' Institute was Mr. Daniel Wright. He was an excellent and effective teacher, and has had among his pupils not a few who revere his memory as that of a friend or a father. He died suddenly in 1839; J. A. Langford, in an "In Memoriam," has thus given a glimpse of his teacher:—

— "He prepared no sterile feast,  
Nor the dry bones of knowledge gave,  
But served a banquet rich and brave,  
And learning in bright robes he drest;  
And gave to all, his richest, best.  
And deftly mingling gay and grave,  
He taught with earnest care and manners suave,

Not facts alone, but what gives life  
 To facts, he taught. His gracious mind  
 The teacher with the friend combined.  
 With wisdom's ripest maxims rife  
 He sought to fit us for the strife;  
 The cares we in the world should find,  
 With purpose strong and manliness refined,"

Five years were given to student toil; all, at least, of these five years which the daily-bread work of life permitted to be so employed. In summer his hours of labour were from 6 a.m. till 7 p.m., and in winter from 7 a.m. till 8 p.m.; yet he was wont to spend long hours in study, not only sitting up late, but even in the early morning would he—

"Like some young amorist, with glowing eyes  
 Bursting the lazy bonds of sleep that bound him,"

gladden his young spirit with the joy of mind. During studious years—

"Those hours which make the mind, if they  
 Unmake the body"—

he pursued a course of education which embraced English grammar, elocution, and mathematics—including in this, arithmetic, algebra, and geometry; Latin, French, and German; while he read everything that he could get in poetry, history, metaphysics, &c. in the great greed of his acquisitive zeal. In grammar and mathematics he took prizes, and in all made satisfactory progress. Nor was his reading confined to English merely. He perused the chief classics in French and German, read many of the Roman classics in the original, and Milton's Latin treatises, &c.; of Greek authors, he read and studied the best translations, and he delighted himself with versifying favourite snatches of French and German poetry. Of many of the most valuable works in English philosophical and historical literature he wrote copious analyses and abstracts, so making himself master of their spirit and meaning. An example of the fulness, care, and accuracy with which these essences of books were taken is to be seen in a series of papers in the *Church of the Saviour* magazine, to which we shall again refer.

Under this strain of effort J. A. Langford became thin, gaunt, wan, and "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." He seemed to be overburning the lamp of life, and the anxiety of his friends being excited, he took a health-trip to the Isle of Man—seeing then, first, in his nineteenth year, the great busy, billowy mass of waters—the sea. He was accompanied on this occasion by a friend named John Kendrick, between whom and himself he has drawn the following contrast in his "Lamp of Life:"—

"He was a calm unpassioned soul,  
 A wild enthusiast youth was I;

He leaned to reason's mild control,  
 To fairy-land my dreams would fly.  
 He followed science proudly stern,  
 The muses were my chief delight :  
 From Euclid's pages he would learn,  
 While I from some 'Arabian Nights.' "

Among Langford's fellow-students at the Mechanics' Institute, besides John Kendrick, was George Jacob Holyoake, then engaged in the Eagle Foundry, Broad Street, Birmingham, but diligently cultivating those powers which were afterwards to make him an influence in society as an author, controversialist, lecturer, publisher, and head and chief of the sect of the Secularists,—a man in whom the people had faith as a thinker and an administrator. One of the men who at this time, too, exercised, by the might of sympathy, an elevating power over Langford's mind was Charles Reece Pemberton, author of "The Autobiography of Pel Verjuice;" he was an actor, public lecturer, dramatic poet, and Shaksperian; his "Life and Literary Remains" have been edited by John Fowler, his epitaph was written by W. J. Fox; Ebenezer Elliot wrote verses on his death, and G. J. Holyoake has composed a fine eulogium on his character. Pemberton died in 1840.

Another influence began early to affect Langford's poetic nature—love. At the same age as Shakspeare, and like Shakspeare, too, neglecting the rule of policy in wedlock,—

"Then let thy love be younger than thyself,"

he married in 1842, while still an apprentice, Anne Swinton, a kind-hearted, sympathetic, and excellent young woman, who wrought in his father's workshop, and who, attracting his special attention while under the emotional excitement produced by the perusal of Burns, Byron, Spenser, and Shakspeare, had become the embodying presence which realized for him the ideals of the poets:—

"Like a beam of sunlight across my life she came,  
 And all its gloomy places flashed into joyous flame;  
 In my heart love nestled, and built his rosy bowers,  
 And barren wildernesses grew bright with sunny flowers:  
 Life wore a sweeter aspect, the hours flew clad in light,  
 Time wore a golden swiftness, my heart a new delight."

Anne Swinton was taken to his father's house as Mrs. Langford, and the double family got on—while his minority lasted—on good terms. During this period two children, one a boy and the other a girl, blessed the union. On attaining his majority and his freedom, J. A. Langford, as a journeyman earning a guinea a week, set up house, neatly furnished and homelike, for himself, his wife, and his two children, in Bradford Place, Bradford Street, Birmingham.

(To be continued.)

## Our Collegiate Course.

---

### A LOVER'S COMPLAINT.

BY WILLIAM SHAKSPERE.

AMONG the minor poems of William Shakspeare, "A Lover's Complaint" stands pre-eminent in beauty. F. T. Palgrave remarks on it:—"The form of this poem has some resemblance to that of Chaucer's shorter pieces; such as 'The Complaint of the Black Knight;' but in its power and concentration it is probably alone in our language as a lyrical elegy. . . . It is such a song as might have come from the old Æolian or Ionic poets—Simonides, or Sappho, or Erinna. Passion is a law to itself, all for love, and this world well lost, if not the next also, were never painted with a more sad and musical intensity." \* It is at once singularly poetical and pictorial. Malone justly wondered that it had not attracted the attention of some great painter, so picturesque is the scene it animates and impassions. It can only be on account of the overwhelming splendour of his dramatic poems, that a poem of such terse realistic power and skilful grace of expression can have been consigned to an oblivion so complete as that which has overtaken this poem among the readers and critics of the supremest of the "Makkers" of Elizabeth's age. It is a masterpiece of seeing and of representing as the seen, that which only genius of the noblest order can place before the heart and eyes,—living emotion and emotioned life.

This beautiful—nay, most exquisite narrative poem, consisting of forty-seven stanzas of seven lines each, was first printed as an appendix to that enigma of literature entered at Stationers' Hall, May 2, 1609, by Thomas Thorpe, stationer, a Warwickshire man, as "A Booke called Shakspeare's Sonnets," and published during that same year in two separate editions, bearing this title,—*"Shakspeare's Sonnets. Never before imprinted. At London by G. Eld, and are to be sold by William Apsley, 1609,"* in one edition; and in the other in place of William Apsley, we have "John Wright, dwelling at Christchurch Gate." The whole work consists of 40 leaves; of which the Sonnets occupy from A to K 1 *recto*, where the word *finis* occurs, and then without note or advertisement, on K 1 *verso*, occurs "A Lover's Complaint," by William Shakspeare, which extends to L 2 *recto*, where *finis* again appears. So without any specific information concerning the time of its composition, or the manner of its acquisition, it came into the world duly authenticated as to its parentage, but bearing no attestation of the place or period of its birth. These may be matters of conjecture, but the worth and excellence of the poem may be easily tested by every one who can admire "exquisite feelings felicitously expressed." It is most probably, we think, one of the earliest essays of Shakspeare's genius, a rhyme of his wooing-time.

---

\* "Songs and Sonnets by William Shakspeare," p. 248.

It is not a little singular that differences of opinion in regard to the meaning of this poem are almost as numerous as those concerning the Sonnets. Charles Knight thinks that "the form of it entirely prevents any attempt to consider it autobiographical." But Gerald Massey says, "A fixed belief of mine is that the youth and the 'fickle maid' of 'The Lover's Complaint' are none other than William Shakspeare and Anne Hathaway. In this poem the poet is, I think, making fun of their own early troubles. There is a pleasant exaggeration throughout, both in his description of her, and her description of him. The humour is very *awkward*. . . I entertain not the slightest doubt that we have here the most lifelike portrait of Shakspeare extant, drawn by himself, under the freest, happiest condition for insuring a true likeness—that is, whilst humorously pretending to look at himself through the eyes of Anne Hathaway under circumstances the most sentimental. A more perfect or beautiful portrait was never finished. The frolic life looks out of the eyes, the red is ripe on the cheek, the maiden manhood soft on the chin, the breath moist on the lip that has the glow of the garnet, the bonny smile that gilded the desert so bewitchingly. . . The poem is founded on a circumstance which preceded the marriage of the poet and Anne Hathaway; the 'Lover' being one who hath wept away a jewel in her tears, and who is described as older than her sweetheart. His own gifts and graces are purposely made the most of, in humouring the necessities of poor Anne's case,—the helplessness of his own. Those things which she points to in extenuation, also serve him for excuse; as if he said, being so handsome and so clever, how can I help being so beloved and run after? You see it is not my fault. This smiling mood has given free play to his pencil, and the poem brings us nearer to the radiant personal humour of the man, I believe, than all his plays."\*

Henry Brown's interpretation of "this beautiful though quaint poem" takes us farther afield into the regions of historic romance. "A dejected maiden piteously laments that her lover has captivated other hearts beside her own. The poem has all the marks of being an early production, though the poet may have revised it when adding it to his sonnet MSS. 'The fickle maid full pale,' in whom, in spite of advancing age, 'some beauty peeped through lattice of reared age,' and who wished to be thought still young, having a hand 'whose white weighs down the airy scale of praise,' seems to be no other than Queen Elizabeth placed as a foil to the almost fabulous beauty (probably a portrait of her lover Leicester) who is described in the May morn of life. The events to which it appears to refer may have deferred its publication until after the Queen's death. . . The virgin queen wished to remain in 'single blessedness,' or she would probably have chosen that handsome young nobleman, who was her especial favourite, for a husband; and Dudley, upon his part, would have equally rejoiced in the alliance. Elizabeth is known to have received numerous gifts from her courtiers, especially from Leicester. The maiden of the poem accepted from her lover rich gifts. The Earl's horsemanship was such, that immediately after the Queen's accession she appointed him to the distinguished office of Master of the Horse. This pre-eminence is extolled in several stanzas. Sir R. Naunton says of Leicester, 'He was a very goodly person, and singularly well-featured, and all his youth well favoured and of a sweet aspect.' A perusal of the poem will enable the reader to discover many

\* "Shakspeare's Sonnets and his Private Friends," pp. 498—501.



covert allusions to the Court scandal of the period, and Leicester's intrigues. It is worthy of remark, however, that the difference between the youth of this poem and that of the sonnets, is that the first described is of male beauty only; the latter portrays the united beauty of the sexes, the male predominant. Sexual female loveliness is contrasted with the diviner paradisiacal beauty of man, to whom is offered intellectual homage.\*

For our own part we have been unable, after careful study, to find any singular revelations of recondite political or personal allusions. It reads to us simply as a splendid setting of one of those sad winter tales, which, in a rustic company, are popular, affect the heart to compassionate sympathy, and excite as much good feeling sorrow as to the scholar does—

"Ariadne passioning  
For Theseus' perjury and unjust flight."

Doubtlessly there are personal experiences, and matters derived from observation, included in the verses; for imagination and fancy—

"Set us up a glass  
Where we may see the inmost parts of us."

Personal portraiture, either of Court or of Stratford, breach of the sweet humanities of love, however, we do not think gives piquancy or poignancy to "The Lover's Complaint." It seems to us of "imagination all compact," without any ulterior reference. An overture to the "Twelfth Night," "A Winter's Tale," "The Merchant of Venice," &c. A special instance of Lysander's oft-quoted saying,—

"Ah me! for aught that ever I could read,  
Could ever hear, by tale or history,  
The course of true love never did run smooth," &c.  
"*A Midsummer Night's Dream*," i., 1.

An idea repeated in "Venus and Adonis," stanzas 92-3:—

"Sorrow on love hereafter shall attend,  
It shall be waited on with jealousy,  
Find sweet beginning but unsavoury end ;  
\* \* \* \* \*

It shall be fickle, false, and full of fraud,  
Bud and be blasted in a breathing while,  
The bottom poisoned, and the top o'erstrawed  
With sweets that shall the truest sight beguile."

If we give "sweet observance" to the choice diction of the poem, and to the terse vigour of its sentiments, we shall see in it no "brainsickly" apology for individual sins, but a nobly strong proclamation of the depth of sorrow which rightly o'erfloods the heart when "the soul's fair temple is defaced" by vice in man or woman.

We choose this poem for our studies in literature, because it seems to us that it has been too much overlooked among the "riches fineless" which

---

\* "The Sonnets of Shakspeare solved," by Henry Brown, p. 14.  
1871. F

are the issues of the poet's brain. We esteem it as a poem which possesses all the best characteristics of Shakespeare's minor pieces—picturesqueness, pliancy, expressive attunement of phrase of speech to phase of feeling, the sculpture, as it were, of enthroned thought; whereas the drama is emotionised, vitalized, and realized in all the activity of plotful eventfulness. It is but a medallion when compared to "Venus and Adonis" or "Lucrece;" it is not metaphysically subtle, as many of the sonnets seem to be; nor has it the heart-ha-te and hurry of his mightier dramas; but it possesses, notwithstanding, distinct claims to study as a miniature model by a matchless hand of one of the great moments of human experience. And yet let me remark how simply, yet effectively, the whole is placed upon the stage of imagination's theatre. Only by chance he sees what he describes so well, and overhears what he rehearses so marvellously. To an old man the confession is fully yet *trusfully* made. But though soothing has been promised to her "suffering ecstacy," the poem closes without any being given. Oh the wise silence of the poet! No words can quench such passion, and such passion felt and not repented of can win no comfort. It is most wonderfully completed by its (apparent) incompleteness.

From off a hill, whose concave womb re-worded  
A plaintful story from a sistingering vale,  
My spirits to attend this double voice accorded,  
And down I laid, to list the sad-tuned tale;  
Ere long espied a fickle maid full pale,  
Tearing of papers, breaking rings atwain,

5

At a short distance from a rising ground, whose hollow caverns gave forth as an echo a doleful tale from a neighbouring dell, my inclination led me to give heed to this repeated sound, and I reclined to hearken to the sorrowful story; in a short time I observed an irresolute damsel, very white of countenance, engaged in reading letters, crushing rings into pieces, and

(1) *Re-worded*, re-echoed. As in the lines by Lucretius,—

"Sex etiam, aut septem, loca vidi reddere voces."

Six even, or seven places have I known to *throw back sounds* [upon the ear]. Not as in Hamlet's "I the matter will re-word," i. e., repeat or rehearse.

(2) *Sistingering*, neighbouring, near, proximate, contiguous.

(3) *Double voice*, echo.

(4) *Laid*. So in the original. Modern editors usually print *lay*, which is more correct as English in the present day. The idiomatic grammar of the author, however, ought to be preserved. *Lay* is properly a transitive verb, and governs the objective, her (understood *myself*).

(5) Perhaps we might here read "Ere long *I spied*," &c. *Fickle*, Anglo-Saxon *ficol*, inconstant, subject to change, as in "*Lear*,"—

"A slave, whose easy borrowed pride  
Dwells in the fickle grace of her he follows."—ii. 4.

(6) *Atwain*, in two; the Anglo-Saxon prefix *a* signifies in, on, to, or at.

Storming her world with sorrow's wind and rain.

setting into commotion her whole internal nature with sorrowful sighing and tears of poignant grief.

(7) *Storming* (German, *sturm*), agitating. *World*, microcosm, as in "Lear," iii., 1,—

"Strives in his *little world* of man to outscorn  
The to and fro conflicting wind and rain."

The belief, current in ancient times, that the world, or cosmos, was animated, or had a soul, led to the notion that the parts and members of organic beings must have their counterparts in the members of the cosmos. The natural philosophers of the sixteenth century considered the world as a human organism on the large scale, and man as a world, or cosmos, in miniature; hence they called man a *microcosm* (Greek, little world), and the universe itself the *macrocosm* (great world). As Goethe ("Faust," ii., 6) says,—

"Der Mensch, die Kleine Narrenwelt,  
Gewöhnlich für ein Ganzes hält."

"Man, the little world of his soul  
Is apt to figure as a whole."

"Würd'ihn Herrn Microcosmus nennen."

"Him, we Sir Microcosmus name."

The *microcosm*, in the strict language of the theosophists, is a term denoting man, the spirit.

Here is one of the poet's pet trinkets of fancy:—

With him sighs and tears, poor fancy's followers, are "sorrow's wind and rain."

"The wind thy sighs."—"Romeo and Juliet," Act iii., sc. 5.

"We cannot call her winds and waters, sighs and tears."  
"Antony and Cleopatra."

"Where are my tears? Rain, rain, to lay this wind."  
"Troilus and Cressida."

"Give not a windy night a rainy morrow."—Sonnet 90. (i. e., give not a night of sighs a morning of tears).

:"The sun not yet thy sighs from heaven cleave."  
"Romeo and Juliet," Act ii., sc. 3.

## The Reviewer.

---

*Faith and Philosophy: Essays on some Tendencies of the Day.* By  
REV. I. GREGORY SMITH, M.A. London: Longmans, Green,  
& Co.

FAITH and Philosophy—are they friends or foes, helps or hindrances, contradictories or counterparts? this is a question having large issues and important bearings, and one with which the book before us deals ably. It belongs to the Conservative school of theology, and is a statement of the possibilities of having a *reasonable* faith in Christianity along with, yea, inclusive of, a *reasoned* philosophy. We have no hesitation in commending it as a book of superior worth in defence of the orthodox in religion. It is temperate, cautious, serious, and wise, using few subtleties of thought, but presenting with great distinctness a philosophic exposition of the chief articles in the faith of the Church in their relation to the principal schools of thought prevalent at the present time—Scepticism, Rationalism, Romanism, Newmanism, Athleticism, Emotionalism, Intellectualism, Positivism, and Puseyism, are each considered with calm, urbane, learned, and careful appraisal of the merit in all, the faults in each. We know nothing of the author privately, but we infer from his writings that he is a sort of mildly Puseyitic follower of George Herbert, Augustus Hare, and John Keble,—aristocratical like the first, thoughtfully humble like the second, and seriously imaginative and piously enthusiastic like the third,—a little of all, not too much of either.

The following particulars of the author we derive from public sources:—Isaac Gregory Smith studied at Trinity College, Oxford, 1844—1848; at Lent term in 1846 he was, for “his sufficiency in the Latin language,” as proved by examination, declared Hertford or University scholar, tenable for one year,—an honour which four years before that had been held by Goldwin Smith, and two years previously by John Connington; at Lent Term 1847 he gained, after competition, and in succession to John Connington and Goldwin Smith by one interval, the Ireland scholarship, tenable for four years, and instituted for “the promotion of classical learning and taste;” in 1848 he took his degree at the Michaelmas Term, in the second class, in company with Alexander Grant, now Principal of the University of Edinburgh, and George W. Cox, author of “*Tales of Ancient Greece*,” &c.; he was subsequently chosen Fellow of the King’s Hall and College of Brasenose on the original foundation, which owes its origin to William Smith, Bishop of Lincoln, 1509. In the patronage of this college is the rectorship of Tedstone Delamere, in Herefordshire, and we presume that he holds his benefice

from his college, in succession to its former holder, Rev. Edward H. Cradock, also formerly a Fellow in the same college. That he is no supine onlooker at the occurrences of the day we gather from the fact that he has issued as pamphlets, "Anarchy, an Appeal to English Churchmen;" "Education or Instruction: a Letter to the Right Hon. W. C. Forster, M.P., Vice-president of the Committee of Council on Education;" "The Conscience Clause—Can it be Justified?" We are acquainted with, and have used for educational purposes, his "Epitome of the Life of our Blessed Saviour," which is brief, comprehensive, and plain; and we have been inexpressibly charmed with a little volume which bears the following dedication:—"To my little daughter, in memory of her brother, for whom, with her, it is written, this tale of a brother and sister is lovingly inscribed." Under these words there lies a tragedy of the heart and hearth which appeals to the spirit of one who has watched for months the hovering of the angel of death over a dearly beloved and precious child. This volume bears the title of "The Silver Bells: an Allegory;" is beautifully illustrated by Arthur Hopkins in a somewhat pre-Raphaelitic style; and is written in a sort of delicious, dreamy, cadenced prose that is singularly effective in suggesting, "I dreamed a dream, and behold!" The tenderness of heart, the purity of conception, the ingenuity of the interest, and the depth of meaning despite the simplicity of the composition, suggest to us that the Rev. Isaac Gregory Smith, though once a college prizewinner, is now a parish-worthy and a home-bond, while the book more particularly before us displays a variety of talents and of culture such as inclines us to give him a most special introduction to our readers.

The book under review consists of ten essays which have "appeared in various forms during the last ten years," probably in some of the Church of England magazines, though we plead guilty to not having seen them or noted them until they came to us, commended by one of the notable among modern thinkers, in this revised and republished form. Not only do we think their re-issue justified by their merits, but we feel bound to express our thankfulness to the contributor to these columns who directed our attention to them, as "ingenious, thoughtful, intelligent, and able contributions to the controversies of the times."

In the *British Controversialist* the reviewer estimates the ability of books in their respective schools of thought. He explains the aim and gist of the author, and tells what may be expected to be found in the pages of the work under criticism. He does not gauge the express and certain accuracy of the opinions advocated. This book is worthy of being read by thoughtful minds of whatever opinions. The topics are—"Modern Scepticism and some of its Fallacies;" "Fallacies of Progress, or Sketches of the Early Church;" "The Revision of the Prayer Book;" "The Roman Question, or Church and State;" "Dr. Newman and the English Church;" "The School of Prof. (Canon) Kingsley;" "Wesleyan Tendencies within the Church;" "Swedenborgian Tendencies

within the Church;" "George Herbert, Representative of the English Church;" "Positivism." We regret that we have only space for the following samples:—

"Those who observe the connection of cause and effect are prepared to see, as the inevitable consequence of advancing civilisation, less of ready acquiescence in received truths, more of inquisitive research into the reasons for believing. . . . Faith and Reason are spoken of, not for the first time, as in direct if not violent opposition, as antagonistic to each other. . . . Accordingly, a presumption is raised that in this scientific age reason will demolish what faith has constructed in the past. There is a great fallacy, and more than one, in such a mode of reasoning. Reason and Faith are, indeed, distinct actions of the mind, but, far from being contradictory, they are invariably co-existent and inseparably connected. The act of assent by which the mind embraces any statement proposed for its acceptance is indeed posterior in time to the act of reasoning; but it necessarily pre-supposes the preliminary process to have been performed more or less correctly. Belief, it matters not whether of spiritual mysteries or of the most trivial matters in daily life, there cannot be, except in consequence of reasons sufficient to approve themselves, whether rightly or not, to the judgment which pronounces on them. These reasons may be derived from many sources,—from the senses, from intuition, from authority, or from more than one of these sources; the chain of argument which connects the first and last link in the process may be concise or lengthy, direct or tortuous, compactly welded or insecure and inconsecutive, logically sound or full of flaws; but some reasons for belief, and those of sufficient weight to turn the scale of judgment, there are and must be in every instance. . . . This co-operation of reason and faith is not only invariable, but incessant and continual; for belief is the attitude into which the mind falls naturally, the only position in which it can be at rest. . . . Supposing the reasoning faculties to be sound, and to have all necessary information at command, they attain the truth with the regularity of a machine; unless, as happens too often, they have some extraneous hindrance, some interference from the motive element in human nature, perverting the judgment. All error is the growth either of imperfect knowledge, of imperfect ratiocination, or of some obliquity in the moral nature. Belief will be right or wrong, just as the reasonings on which it depends are good or bad; but, plainly, far from being in any case incompatible with reason, it is not the antithesis of reason, but its necessary sequence and result. . . . As the revelation of the true relations, inaugurated by itself, between man and the Deity, it is unaffected by the onward march of time. (*On Modern Scepticism, and some of its Fallacies.*) . . . Each nation and each century in turn is made subservient to the workings of Providence. The Jew, stern and stubborn, and with a moral sense disciplined for the work, is the first to receive the new teaching, that through his retentive nature it may lay a hold on the world which shall never be shaken off. Next, the supple Greek lends all his multifarious resources of thought and language to express, interpret, and illustrate it, that its 'sound may go into all lands.' Then the Roman, the conqueror of the world, unconsciously obeys the behest of a higher power while ministering to the Church those excellences in which he is pre-eminent, of orderly obedience to law, of systematic policy and organisation, that 'the ends of the world' may be subjected to

its 'word.' The sturdy Teuton, again, brings with him the intense consciousness of individual responsibility. Here is progress. But it is the growth of a huge primeval tree, branching out freely on every side, which is too firmly rooted in the earth to swerve from its centre. That legitimate development which keeps the analogies of faith is gradual and insensible. Error betrays itself by announcing itself to the world as something new. (*Fallacies of Progress.*) . . . As the traveller along the Via Appia crosses the arid plain, spanned at broken intervals by the colossal stride of the gaunt aqueduct of Appius Claudius, and catches his first sight of the huge dome of St. Peter's rising clear and full against the brilliant sky, he begins already to feel the strange fascination which Rome exercises over all who approach her. This feeling is one which grows upon him every day. In exploring the piazzas and narrow, tortuous streets, he lights at every turn on some fountain or obelisk, the relic of classical or mediæval times. Again and again he revisits the 'finest Christian temple in the world,' and while treading its imperishable mosaic floor, and breathing its soft, fragrant atmosphere, feels himself each time more and more impressed with the sense of its vastness and magnificence. When he gazes from the Pincian Hill, or the Pope's Terrace, to take a last look at the innumerable cupolas and obelisks bathed in the soft violet hues of an Italian evening, he feels how hard it is to leave such a city, and how impossible it is to break the many ties which bind him to it."—(*The Roman Question.*)

"It was an age fertile in great men. Spenser was writing his 'Faery Queene' just about the time of George Herbert's birth. Raleigh's brilliant but erratic career reached its unhappy close while Herbert was public orator at Cambridge. While holding that office, and dividing his time between the Court and the University, Herbert must have had frequent opportunities of seeing and hearing on the stage the marvellous creations of Shakspeare's genius, then in all the freshness of their first appearance. More exactly coeval with Herbert was Milton, with a galaxy of stars in the poetic firmament of lesser magnitude and feebler lustre, of whom only a few scattered rays penetrate to us through the intervening mist of years, Daniel, Quarles, Wither, Drummond, Sandys, Suckling, and others. In theology there were Usher, Chillingworth, Hammond, Andrewes, Sanderson, and Hall, a strong array; in philosophy, Hobbes and Selden; in jurisprudence, Coke and Hale; in political life, the Cecils, and many other truly sagacious statesmen; and last in our enumeration, but foremost in philosophy, in law, and in affairs of state, Lord Chancellor Bacon. We may add to the list Burton, whose 'Anatomy of Melancholy' is no bad sample of the quaint and miscellaneous erudition then in repute. But the drama was the distinguishing glory of those days. Then flourished, in the words of Southey, a race of dramatic writers, 'which no age and no country has ever equalled,'—Ben Jonson, the founder of the English 'Comedy of Manners,' and, inferior only to him, in Hallam's judgment, Massinger; with Beaumont and Fletcher, Ford and Shirley. Such were Herbert's contemporaries; some of them, as Bacon, Andrewes, Sanderson, his intimate personal friends; as were also Lord Pembroke, his kinsman, one of the chief actors in the important work of colonising Virginia, and governing the rising colony; Donne, Cotton, Ferrar, and Sir Henry Wotton, all men of no common ability, highly cultivated, and of still more uncommon moral excellence. Certainly it was a rich soil, prolific of a healthy and luxuriant vegetation, the age in which George Herbert found himself."—(*George Herbert.*)

Our readers will notice in these quotations a quiet elegance of style, a full mind, a readily suggestive imagination, and a mastery of plain yet pleasing diction, scholarly in its simplicity, and poetic in its close-fitting expressiveness. There gleams through the nervous Saxon of the phraseology the fine aroma of classical culture and imaginative grace. To an earnestness of religious faith truly admirable the author adds a philosophy of considerable excellence and breadth. As an expositor of the faith of the Church in the presence of the philosophy of science and the arts of the world, he will be found to be a valuable guide. His book ought to be read by both parties,—by the orthodox for the strengthening of their faith and their power of defending it; by the heterodox to know against what they have to contend in one who holds a reasoned philosophy and a reasonable faith.

## The Societies' Section.

### DUTY.

#### A NEW YEAR'S ADDRESS.

It is of the highest importance to have, in one's mind, some brief compendious summary term as a watchword for life's crises. Pith, expressiveness, and pertinence; plainness, vigour, and suggestiveness, ought to characterize this mnemonic for the soul's steadfastness and worth, this call to high and hopeful being, to keep the heart from evil, "and guard the way of life from all offence."

It is difficult to choose a word which goes deep enough into the very hidden places of the spirit, which reaches far enough and ranges wide enough among the constant interests of humanity—a word which may at once guide, encourage, warn, and inspire; the sound of which, when it starts into utterance in the heart, shall stir and stimulate. I have sought for a life-word of power and meaning, of elevating and quickening import—sought it with the diligence of desire and the

eagerness of a passionate yearning, yea, trembling, of heart to gain and give "a word in season," which should point to and speak of that which is most within us, as well as—

"Of a dim splendour ever on before."

I can find no word which will express the same thing as in my thoughts I wish to utter at this change of time, than one which is somewhat hackneyed by the world's use of it—one with force, fervency, and faith in it, demanding strength and wisdom inwardly, and kindliness and love outwardly; one that is manly enough to excite the unconquerable energies of aspiration, and yet godly enough to work together for good and glory during the entire extent of being, in time, and throughout eternity.

That word is Duty! a word which links together into oneness the whole faculties of man, and



conjoins in harmony the ending and the unending life of man. Duty is the witherless amaranthine flower whose seeds are heaven-sown, whose fruits, though earth-grown, have relish, and give delight even in "the eternal city." Duty is life's husbandry perfected, the taskwork given us by the Master Mind to do. Wordsworth was wrong when he invoked duty as the—

"Stern daughter of the voice of God."

Duty is the outgrowth of the loving heart, the service of the worshipful spirit, the ministration of the soul true to its nature, its destiny, and its Creator. Duty is character made manifest as it was intended to be developed; it is the top and crown, the very glory of human nature—spiritualized manliness. I hold that that man only is man-like who realizes the idea for which he was made, and who makes it his life-work to unfold and employ in their highest uses the entire sum of his being—physical frame, moral power, intellectual capacity, spiritual sentience, social influence, and conscious selfhood; who feels, thinks, acts, exemplifies what nature, conscience, and religion tell him he ought; and who collects, ingathers, and assimilates, then shows and out-works in his own personal endeavours, moral goodness, spiritual holiness, mental truth, the whole splendour of the beauty of human life in its manliest and divinest efflorescence—Duty.

Duty is moral obligation realized, not right-doing only, but right-being. "Let him that would move the world first move himself," move himself rightly, and keep moving so. If this were done by all, then all possible joy would accrue to human life; for it is the eternal law of the Most High that the path of duty is that of happiness. Duty is

loving submission to the conditions of life, unhesitating obedience to the supreme dictates of the Supreme, and willing fulfilment of the behests of the Former and Maker of us all. It requires no long-drawn-out metaphysical distinctions about form and matter, nature and origin, end and test, to comprehend a plain and brief term like this. We want only a ready, practical, and efficient idea of it, and that we can easily get. ONE who is Wisdom has written it in words brilliant and clear, as if heaven's sunlight were condensed into them, and has crowded the whole of moral philosophy into one sentence, radiant with the glow of Omniscience, with no sickly, puny, speculative hair-splitting and wire-drawing in it, but a going right to the point with the directness of a sun-ray.

"As ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them."

*Do* is the central heart of the precept—*do*! do not intend or pretend, but do. *Do*, in divine practical sympathy, going out of yourselves in activity conditioned in this way, that as your desires and wishes, aspirations and yearnings, feelings and thoughts, would, in like circumstances, incline you to seek to attain; "as ye would that men should do to you," were you in their place, "do ye even so" in like manner "to them." Divine union of extremes and possibilizing of impossibilities! by this, selfishness is transfigured into sublimely impartial love; and even the impure desires of a sinful spirit are made pure as the raiment of Christ when it "became shining, exceeding white as snow, such as no fuller on earth can white them." Thus self-denial is transformed into self-elevation; and so is it possible, even in losing one's life, to save it. "Measure for measure" in the most glorious of senses this; for it constitutes a man's sense of rights of

which he is generally most tenacious, the measure of his duties, makes giving gain, loss profit, and changes labour and care into rest and prayer; taking up our crosses into the acquiring of our crown. Let this sunshine into our inmost hearts, and so wither and blast all the evil that strives for our undoing, quicken all the good in our nature, that we may—

"Feel the immortal impulse from within,  
Which makes the coming life cry  
always, On!"

Obligation implies not only an obliger, but a law—a law which indicates the obliger's will, and not only makes known, but establishes the duty of the obligee, and the right of all those who are similarly circumstanced. Such a law must be *moral*, i. e., regulative of the manners, habits, and ways of men. If the law is imperative the duty is imperious, not as us only, but *concerning us*. Duty is our safeguard as well as our taskmaster. If we each do our duty we shall injure none, and if each performs his duty to us we cannot be wronged. The maximum of dutifulness produces the minimum of danger, and the minimum of dutifulness conduces to the maximum of danger. Hence law is obligatory, and duty imperious; they claim rule in us that they may exert power for us:—

"Straight is the path of duty,  
Curved is the line of beauty;  
Walk in the *first*, and thou shalt see  
The *second* ever following thee."

Beauty is right form, truth right thought, duty right conduct; and all follow the law of righteousness; that so the spirit of man may attain unto "the beauty of holiness,"—the pure individuality of a nature whose thoughts, feelings, desires, aspirations, acts, and aims are harmonized

and unified, not simply related, but truly correlated, each holding its due place in the life of the individual, that is, each adhering to, and being active in, the sphere of duty to self, to others, and to God.

Duty is doing what is *due*—to *ourselves* as existences, with powers and faculties, frames and spirits; to *others* as holding *relations* with us, as co-existences acting harmoniously with us, or resistances pressing upon our being, and repressing our self-indulgence; or higher still, as the *Ens*, whose being enables us to exist or stand forth in individuality. Individuality is character, marked being, specific nature, personality. To be a person, one must become all that is possible in the circumstances he is in, and with the nature he has got. Duty to one's self, therefore, implies before all things the full and thorough culture, development, and use of all our endowments, with a generous, self-ennobling end. But duty demands, also, that by no interference, neglect, selfishness, or supineness of ours, shall the personality of others, as moral and immortal creatures, be lessened or obscured. While no less for ourselves and others, the great dutifulness of worship should arise from a sense of thankfulness for the endowments given, and the personality imparted by the all-maintaining Sire—likeness to whom is the true perfection of a soul,—

"For the right use of which  
Men are and ought to be accountable."

A creature's first duty is to be what God made him, for his next duty is to do what God ordained he should; hence man should be worshipfully and intelligently moral. Self-improvement, justice, and benevolence and holiness, form the trine of duty, by observing which—

"The universal people of the world  
May grow more great and happy  
every day,  
Mightier, wiser, humbler too, to-  
wards God."

To such duty let us now, this year, dedicate ourselves, and "may the very God of peace sanctify us wholly; and may our whole spirit, and soul, and body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ," the great Exemplar of duty.

*A Glimpse of "the Clapham Sect" at Home.*—Those who are familiar with the wicked wit of Sydney Smith, will remember his reference to "the patent Christianity of Clapham;" and in Sir James Stephen's inimitable essay, the worthies of the Clapham sect are portrayed with such fidelity and power, that we feel their presence, and they are as familiar to us as the faces of to-day. Let us look in upon them one summer's eve fifty years ago. We are in the house of Henry Thornton, the wealthy banker, and for many years the independent representative of the faithful constituency of Southwark. The guests assemble in such numbers that it might almost be a gathering of the clan. They have disported on the spacious lawn, beneath the shadow of venerable elms, until the evening warns them inside, and they are in the oval saloon, projected and decorated, in his brief leisure, by William Pitt, and filled, to every available inch, with a well-selected library. Take notice of the company, for men of mark are here. There is HENRY THORNTON himself, lord of the innocent and happy revels, with open brow and searching eye; with a mind subtle to perceive and bright to harmonize the varied aspects of a question; with a tranquil soul and a calm, judicial, persevering wisdom,

which, if it never rose into heroism, was always ready to counsel and sustain the impulses of the heroism of others. That slight, agile, restless little man with a crowd about him, whose rich voice rolls like music on charmed listeners, as if he were a harper who played upon all harps at his pleasure; can that be the apostle of the brotherhood? By what process of compression did the great soul of WILBERFORCE get into a frame so slender? It is the old tale of the genius and the fisherman revived. He is fairly abandoned to-night to the current of his own joyous fancies; now contributing to the stream of earnest talk which murmurs through the room, and now rippling into a merry laugh, light-hearted as a sportive child. There may be seen the burly form, and heard the sonorous voice of WILLIAM SMITH, the active member for Norwich, separated from the rest in theological beliefs, but linked with them in all human charities; who at threescore and ten could say that he had no remembrance of an illness; and that, though the head of a numerous family, not a funeral had ever started from his door. Yonder, with an absent air, as if awakened from some dear dream of prophecy, sits GRANVILLE SHARP, that man of chivalrous goodness; stern to indignation against every form of wrong-doing, gentle to tenderness towards the individual wrong-doer. . . . . The author of many publications, the patron of many societies, the exposé of many abuses, there was underlying the earnest purpose of his life a festive humour which made the world happy to him, and which gladdened the circle of his home. His leisure was divided, when he was not called to the council of Clapham, between his barge, his pencil, and his harp, the latter of which he averred was after the pre-

cise pattern of David's; and strollers through the Temple Gardens in the early morning might often hear his voice, though broken by age, singing to it, as in a strange land, and by the river of the modern Babylon, one of the songs of Zion. In his later years the study of prophecy absorbed him, and we smile at the kindly aberrations which devised portable woollacks to save the lives at once of exposed soldiers in the Peninsula, and of starving artisans at home; which thought that in King Alfred's law of frankpledge there was a remedy for all the sorrows of Sierra Leone, and which mourned over the degeneracy of statesmen, because Charles Fox, whom he saw at the Foreign Office, had never so much as heard of Daniel's "little-horn." Approaching with a halfimpatient look, as if he longed to be breathing the fresh air in some glen of Needwood Chase, comes THOMAS GIBBORNE, the sworn friend of nature, to whom she whispered all her secrets of bird, and stream, and tree, and who loved her with a pure love, less only than that which he felt for the souls in his homely parish to whom he ministered the word of life. There in a group, eagerly conversing together, are the lamented BOWDLER, and the elder STEPHEN,—CHARLES GRANT, at that time the reputed autocrat of that Leadenhall Street whose glory has so recently departed, and JOHN, LORD TEIGNMOUTH, whose quiet, gentlemanly face one could better imagine in the chair of the Bible Society than ruling in viceregal pomp over the vast empire of India. Summoned up from Cambridge to the gathering there is ISAAC MILNES, "of lofty stature, vast girth, and superincumbent wig," charged, perhaps, with some message of affection from good old John Venn, who then lay quietly waiting until his change should come; and

CHARLES SIMON, redeemed from all affectations, as he is kindled by the reading of a letter which has just reached him from the far East, and which bears the signature of Henry Martyn. Are we mistaken, or did we discover in the crowd, lighted up with a fine benignity, the countenance of the accomplished MACKINTOSH? And surely there flitted by us, with characteristic haste, that active, working, marvelously expressive face which could answer to no other name than that of HENRY BROUGHAM. There is just one more figure in the corner upon whom we must for a moment linger; and as we pass towards him that we may get a nearer vision, look at that group of three ingenious youths, drinking in the rich flow of soul with feelings of mingled shyness and pride. Can you tell their fortunes? The interpreting years would show them to you—the one dying beloved and honoured as the Professor of Modern History at Cambridge (THOMAS ARNOLD), the second living, as the active and eloquent Bishop of Oxford (SAMUEL WILBERFORCE), and the third the future historian of his country, and one of her most renowned and most lamented sons (THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY). What was the secret of ZACHARY MACAULAY's power? Just this,—the consecration of every energy to the one purpose upon which his life was offered as a living sacrifice—the sweeping from the face of the earth of the wrong and shame of slavery. For this cause he laboured without weariness, and wrote with force and vigour. For this cause he suffered slander patiently, made light of fame and fortune, wasted health, and died poor. His friends marked this self-devotion, and respected it. They bowed in homage to the majesty of goodness. They regarded him almost as a being of superior order,

while so deep was his humility, and so close his fellowship with God, that it became easy to imagine that he dwelt habitually in the presence of the shining ones, and that the glory of the mount upon which his footsteps often lingered shone about him as he sojourned among men.

Such were the men who, as leaders of the "Clapham Sect," as it was called, drew down the wonder of the worldly, and provoked the scoffing of the proud. [From a lecture on "Macaulay," delivered in the Town Hall of Galt, Ontario, U.S., by W. MORLEY FURSHON, 1st Nov., 1870.]

*Glasgow University Dialectic Society.*—A joint meeting of this society and the Glasgow Academical Club Literary Institute was held within the University buildings on 23rd December. There was a large attendance, and Mr. George P. Gould, President of the Dialectic Society, occupied the chair. "*Should Great Britain interfere to prevent the territorial disintegration of France?*" formed the subject of a keen and prolonged debate. Mr. Robert Kirke (Dialectic), in moving the affirmative, delivered an eloquent speech, arguing for British intervention on the ground of justice and moral obligation as well as on that of political expediency. In proposing a negative amendment, Mr. J. A. Spens (Academical) made an able response, in the course of which he insisted that there were only certain conceivable conditions under which this country would be warranted in interfering, but denied that these or any of them have hitherto been met. Mr. W. Robertson Herkless (Dialectic) addressed the meeting as seconder of the affirmative, and Mr. John Howie (Dialectic) of the opposite side; while amongst the gentlemen who subse-

quently took part in the discussion were Messrs. C. S. Dickson, M.A.; J. MacCann, B. O. Costello, A. Cross, T. O. Hedderwick, W. O. Stewart, J. Hart, and others. With characteristic emphasis, the difference of sentiment which prevailed in the meeting was manifested during the evening, which was highly interesting.

*Castle Cary Young Men's Society.*

—The committee of the Castle Cary Young Men's Society present to their fellow-members and their friends the third Annual Report.

The number of new members admitted during the year was thirty-seven; the number on the roll is eighty.

During the year forty-five meetings have been held, with an average attendance of eighty-one (including non-members).

Public lectures have been given under the auspices of the society by the Rev. Canon Meade, Dr. Coombe, J. O. Buckmaster, Esq., and Serj. Elliot.

The committee cannot but feel thankful that the society has been so far successful, but they think it their duty again to ask their fellow-members to assist them in increasing the strength and usefulness of the society by every means in their power. The value of the society as an educational agency ought not to be lost sight of.

Men of thought! be up and stirring  
Night and day:

Sow the seed—withdraw the curtain—

Clear the way!

The following are the subjects of the lectures, essays, and debates of the past year:—

Astronomy; British Queens; Character,—How it is formed and what it is worth; Christmas Sentiments; Christopher Columbus;

Dean Swift.—Is his character worthy of admiration? Earthquakes and Volcanoes; Edgar Allan Poe; Education Question (three meetings); Elocution; Galvanism; Geology; Government Scheme for Promoting Technical Education by means of evening classes; Hymns and Hymn writers; India and the Hindoos; Industry and Idleness; Mahomet,

Life of; Natural History of Man: Old England's Sons of the Soil; Oliver Cromwell; Perseverance and its Results; Reynolds's Newspaper, —Ought it to be placed in the Society's Reading Room? Shakspeare's Life and Writings; Steam Engine and Printing Press; Toil and Folly of Dishonesty; Upward,—a Motto for Young Men; Ventilation.

## The Inquirer.

### QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

917. A paper recently published in the *Leisure Hour*, entitled "Recollections of St. Helena," contains the following words:—"Here also could be seen the clever but mysterious Dr. B——y, who in full dress stood somewhat taller than his own sword; whose voice was like the voice of no one else; while the women stared, men shook their heads—in fact, whose sex throughout a long life remained a riddle, till death at last revealed—the woman." Will some gentleman give some particulars of the Dr. B——y above referred to, what she was, what position she occupied, and any other known incidents of her life?—S. S.

918. I would feel much favoured if you or any of the contributors of the *Controversialist* would kindly inform one who lives in a part of the globe which is not over-burdened with literature, whether there is any obtainable work, article, or poem, upon the power or influence of music. If so, the name of the author and publisher, and at what price, &c.—MAORI, *Dunedin*.

919. I wish to form an acquaintance with the French language, so as to be able to read, write, and translate it, and shall esteem it a

great favour if you or any of your numerous correspondents would inform me in an early number of your Magazine what are the best books to commence a course of self-instruction, including a French and English dictionary. Ollendorff's Method of acquiring French in six months has been recommended to me. Kindly say what is the status of this work?—A. B. W.

920. I have an edition of "Bunyan's Works," edited by George Offer; can you give me any information concerning him?—C. E. C.

921. Are the papers read at the Social Science Congress at Newcastle to be procured in published form? where? and at what price?—J. F. B.

922. Which English historian gives the fullest and best account of the immigration of Huguenot refugees into this country, and of their influence upon it? (I already know of Mr. Smiles's work.)—J. F. B.

923. Will some gentleman kindly say what are the precise privileges which a silk gown confers on a legal practitioner?—S. S.

924. The writer of the preface to "The Liberty and Necessity of Hobbes" speaks of "the excellent but borrowed Caryl upon Job." What ground is there for impugning

the originality of the commentary of Oliver Cromwell's Chaplain in Scotland?—H. S.

925. Who is meant by him whom Harry the Eighth named in merriment his "Vicar of Hell," as mentioned in Milton's "Annapætica"?—H. S.

926. Milton says Paul "thought it no defilement to insert into Holy Scripture the sentences of three Greek poets, and one of them a tragedian." Who were these? and where are these quotations to be found?—H. S.

927. Has any reader found Giles's "Literal Translations of the Classics" a sufficient help for self-instruction?—L. M. C.

928. What is the distinct matter involved in what is called "the Westminster Scandal"?—T. L.

929. 1. What is the peculiar nature of *Boute Rims*?

2. What is the law or custom of Tanistry?

#### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

918. "Mæpri" may be referred in the meantime to Collins's "Ode to the Passions," Dryden's "Song for St. Cecilia's Day," 1687, and his "Alexander's Feast;" Richard Crasshaw's "Music's Dual," from the Latin of Strada; and John Ford's adaptation of the same subject in his contention between a Bird and a Musician in "A Lover's Melancholy," Act i., sq. 1.

920. George Offer was born on Tower Hill, where his father was a bookseller; a business which he subsequently followed in the same premises. He was educated in Islington, at an academy kept by Rev. T. Thomas, of Devonshire Square (Baptist) Chapel. He became an excellent scholar, and was especially distinguished for his penmanship. He had two great studies, that of the Bible and of the writings of Bunyan. Of the former he had the richest and rarest collection of editions anywhere to be found in Britain; many of them full of the annotations of the Bibliophilist. Of the latter he possessed, it is believed, a unique collection for completeness and variety. He wrote an entire copy of the New Testament in shorthand, so minute that the naked eye cannot perceive any single character, and he produced a portrait of Shakspeare in penmanship entirely composed of quotations from his plays. Besides his edition of "Bunyan's Works," he wrote "The Life of William Tyndale," and he left in MS. a "History of the Great Bible," in four volumes, with many fac-similes drawn by himself. He was latterly a Commissioner of Income-tax, and of the Board of Works. He died at Grove House, Hackney, 4th August 1864, and was buried in Abney Park Cemetery.—R. M. A.

### Literary Notes.

In Mr. Halliwell's forthcoming work on "The Early English Stage," many pleasant matters will be made known, e.g., that Shakspeare's company visited Bristol in 1597, the year of his purchase of New Place. His recent discoveries

will materially alter the tenor of accepted Shakspeare biography.

"An Answer to the Arguments of Hume, Lecky, &c., against Miracles," from the pen of Alfred R. Wallace, has been republished.

Ashworth's "Strange Tales" are

to be issued in a large type illustrated edition.

Wyclif's "Homilies and Prose Works," by Thomas Arnold, in three volumes, is in the press.

J. A. Froude's metaphysical fable, "The Cat's Pilgrimage," has been reissued, after twenty years, illustrated by J. B., wife of Professor H. Blackburn, of Glasgow.

The "Anglo-Saxon Gospel of St. Mark," elaborately edited by Mr. Skent, is nearly ready.

"Acoustics," by the late Professor Donkin, is being edited by B. Price.

Following up Dr. Ingleby's able book, W. Rann Kennedy, Fellow of Pembroke College, has issued "Cambridge University and College Reform."

A new annotated edition of "The Paston Letters" (1422-1509), in four volumes, edited by James Gairdner, is announced.

A fac-simile text of the first printed English New Testament, superintended at Cologne and Worms, by William Tyndale, assisted by William Roy, a Franciscan Friar, 1525, is just issued, by Mr. E. Arber.

"Dramatists of the Present Day," is the topic of a series of papers in *The Athenæum*.

A collection of Poetical Pieces of the age of Elizabeth and James has been found among the Hopkinson MSS. at Eshton Hall.

A uniform cheap edition of the works of John S. Mill, it is said, will soon be undertaken. It is also reported that Mr. Mill is engaged on an Autobiography.

Charles Knight has issued a "Crown History of England."

William White's "Life of Swedenborg," third edition, in one volume, is nearly ready.

A new, uniform, and complete edition of D'Aubigne's "History of the Reformation," with an introduction and illustrations, is in preparation by O. Griffin and Co.

The Glasgow St. Andrew's Society offered two prizes (£10 and £5) for the best essays on George Buchanan, as a scholar, author, and politician—these were gained by A. McCallum and John Struthers, students at Glasgow University.

Rev. A. B. Grosart, Blackburn, who has just issued a full, valuable, and interesting edition of "The Works of Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke," has in contemplation a complete edition of "The poems of Sir Philip Sidney," and he will speedily issue a detailed statement of "The Fuller Worthies Library," on which, to the joy of Bibliophiles, he employs himself diligently, delightedly, and delightfully.

"A Life of Admiral Lord Keith" is in preparation by the author of "The Keith Family," James Napier, of Stonehaven. Interesting correspondence between Napoleon I., the Government, and the Admiral, is promised.

A complete edition of the "Works of Allan Cunningham" is arranged for with his son.

Thomas Doubleday, poet, novelist, dramatist, politician, historian, biographer, &c., one of the contributors to the *British Controversialist*, died 18th Dec.

"Memoirs of Lord Brougham" (autobiographic) in three volumes, are promised by Messrs. Blackwood.



## Modern Metaphysicians.

---

WILLIAM HONYMAN GILLESPIE, F.E.S., F.R.G.S., &c.

### THE METAPHYSIC OF THEISM.

"The mind alone beholds God the eternal."—*Plato*.

"The life of God is thought."—*Aristotle*.

"The thought of Deity is a proof of Deity."—*W. J. Fox*.

"God contains all possible and conceivable perfection—the perfection of being, which is self-subsistence, conditioned only by itself; the perfection of power, all-mightiness; of mind, all-knowingness; of conscience, all-righteousness; of affection, all-lovingness; and the perfection of that innermost element, which in finite man is personality; all-holiness—faithfulness to Himself."—*Theodore Parker*.

"The Being of God constitutes the fundamental point of all religion. To the doctrine of human immortality and future retribution, *Theism* is a necessary preliminary. The Christian faith does not lay, but it builds on, this foundation—*There is a God*."—*William H. Gillespie*.

THE Metaphysic of Theism possesses such intense and perennial interest for man, that a library of philosophical thought has been accumulated around the speculations which it suggests and discusses. Man's yearning to know (or at least to know about) the absolutely perfect, the independently enduring, the ultimate and the infinite source of life, wisdom, and nature, has been unresting and insatiable. Along the whole course of the river of Time, monuments of this longing of the soul are to be found. Attempts to realize in thought the mystery of mysteries, the essence of existence, belong to all ages, lands, and tongues. "Seekers after God" have appeared under various forms, and few there are who have not felt in the inmost consciousness of their hearts a longing for and towards Deity.

God, as the highest and most sublime generalization of existence and power, the ultimate conception of the conservative force of the universe of being, not a metaphysical abstraction, but a personal potency, everlasting and perfect, the almighty original and source of being and well-being, the one permanent substance and reality of all phenomena, is in very truth the Ineffable, because no term of human speech can hold in sum-total the entire and perfect whole of meaning which men must think when they raise their thoughts to God. As a mere name, we may define *God* (and words of similar import) by several roundabout expressions, but God "is indefinable because He is infinite, and the infinite is that which cannot be

defined." We cannot "*comprehend* the infinite," but we can "*apprehend* the possibility of the infinite," and feel the necessity of it: and though we cannot conceive God as He is, in the entirety of His individuality, yet we can so far form an *idea* of God as to think of and reason about Him, to feel our need of Him, for the gratification of our affections, as well as for the satisfaction of our reason. As Hobbes has put it, we "can know *that* God is, though not *what* He is." Still Cudworth cogently argues, "It does not at all follow, because God is incomprehensible to our finite and narrow understandings, that He is utterly inconceivable by them, so that they cannot frame any idea of Him at all, and He may therefore be concluded to be a non-entity."

The two facts that *theology*, as the philosophy of divine existences, has always formed an element in the speculations of man; and *religion*, as an abstract of the character and claims of the Deity, has exercised a greater or less sway over every race of human beings, prove that the belief in a veritable divinity is possible to man, and therefore afford indubitable evidence that though God is unimaginable, He is not incogitable, as an intelligent, free, perfect, and eternal Spirit. I am aware that it is authoritatively stated in the Scriptures that "the world by wisdom knew not God" (1 Cor. i. 21); but to a contradiction of this affirmation of St. Paul's, I have not committed myself. I have not undertaken to show that men *knew* God. My assertion only goes thus far, that they thought about God, and philosophized regarding Him;—found in Him that which transcended the physical sense-shadowed world, and which, reaching beyond and piercing through the phenomena of physics, constituted a *metaphysic*—a "*Metaphysic of Theism*."

*Theism* is belief in a primal mind—the life, being, force, and substance of reality—creating, causing, and sustaining all the forms and phenomena of the changeable and the transitory, the inmost unity of real being, whence all else is and issues.

*Theism* is a *genus*, of which Monotheism, Pantheism, and Polytheism are species; and of each of these latter there are varieties. In pantheistic thought, God is, in one form, identified with nature, which constitutes *Physico-theism*; and in another, nature is absorbed in or identified with God, resulting in *Theo-coosmism*. It is of course only on account of the prevalence of polytheism in various forms, from the *ditheism*—or belief that there are two divine principles, one of good and another of evil—of the Persians, to the rudest idolatries of savage tribes, or the poetical theogonies of Greece and Rome, that we require at times to employ the term *monotheism*. The word *tritheist*, though sometimes used, has no defined meaning different from Trinitarian.

*Atheism* is the want of belief in a God—*unbelief*. *Antitheism* is *disbelief* in a God. The former is doubt or scepticism; the latter is dogmatism; the one affirms that the existence of God is *unproved*, while the other holds that it is *disproved*. The atheist does not affirm, he denies. He does not attempt to prove a nega-

tive, he holds that to be impossible. The antitheist affirms the impossibility of the being of a God, and advocates, as Shelley at one time did, "the necessity of atheism." However little difference there may be in the practical life of these two, the species of thought in each is distinct, and requires to be noted here.

A farther distinction has also to be mentioned. "The words *Deist* and *Theist* are, strictly speaking, perhaps synonymous, but yet it is generally to be observed that the former is used in a *bad* and the latter in a *good* sense. Custom has appropriated the term *deist* to the enemies of revelation, and of Christianity in particular; while the word *theist* is considered applicable to all who believe in one God." This has, so far as philosophy is concerned, been perhaps more definitely put by Kant—"He who acknowledges only a transcendental (or speculative) theology, is termed a *deist*; but he who admits in addition to this a natural (or historic) theology, is termed a *theist*." The one recognises a *cause*, the other an *author* of the universe of things: the former a God, the latter a living God. The positivist is not, or at least needs not be, a theoretical atheist. "He will not take the trouble to deny, nor will he attempt to disprove, the existence of a God. He argues only that such a thing is not proved, and therefore to us, and for all practical purposes, non-existent. He insists that a thing must be demonstrated for certain before he can receive it."

*Theism* need not be a philosophy or a religion; it may be but an instinct or a feeling, a sense of subjugation to the magnificent power by which the universe is; a consciousness of an irresistible energy in nature which seems to annihilate the very self-will of the soul while one is under its influence; or it may be such an outgoing of personality in the thinker as shall throw him back in recoil to a sense of impotence, of conditioned being, and so occasion the idea of an absolute personality to which his will must be subject. In its early stages of progress the mind can feel farther than it can see, and see farther than it can know. In the inscrutable workings of phenomena without, and in the mysterious operations of thought within him, man finds cause for anxiety, hope, and fear, and a consciousness of *dependence* seizes upon him, and a vision of an independent One arises within him as the perfection of existence. In this, religion lies latent like the oak in the acorn. Religion is philosophy *felt* in the spirit, and philosophy in its ultimate is religion comprehended: then the transcendent gains the ascendant, and metaphysic strives to bring our reason, our faith, and our experience into a unity of thought which we can accept as truth.

A "Metaphysic of Theism," therefore, is an essential of human thought in its cultured state. So soon as the alphabet of sense is learned the mind presses on in its eagerness to escape from the dull and delightless state of nescience to that of science, and it observes the harmony, beauty, order, and designing power which is manifested in all animate and inanimate nature. Reason stirs within man. In the living world of living men he finds exercise at once for his

sympathies and his faculties, and in his own race he discovers the moral meaning of the universe. Taken merely as a phenomenal being, man is the enigma of existence, an inexplicable mystery; considered as the creation of a purposeful God, man learns to know the sublimity, the hopes, the anxieties, the fears, the capabilities of his nature, and can regard himself as rich in rights, a centre of consequents, a seminizer of history, a personal power in the midst of the "shadow-fight of things and qualities," a being spiritually conscious of causation, and therefore sensible of the magistracy of a Divine Being, omnipresent and absolute, the *Theos* or One stable and indestructible Essence of the universe, who, while He transcends all thought and eludes all experience, is the supremely efficient One to whom reason does grudgeless homage. This may be called, perhaps it is, transcendentalism.

It is a difficult task to translate transcendentalism into common sense. There are affinities in the soul as elective as are those which operate among chemical atoms, and we can only assimilate and apprehend what nature has made us able to seize. We may become masters of the verbiage of metaphysic, and may even know some of its express results, but to receive into our minds the diviner soul of subtle speculations we must possess a portion of that ethereality of genius which both cognises and recognises with delicate precision the forms of thought as they arise in the envisaging mind. This necessity it is that makes the most felicitous suggestions of the—

"Energic reason and a shaping mind"

unpopular with the mass; and occasions, even among the thoughtful and the educated, a distaste for those fine intellectual abstractions in which the metaphysician almost necessarily deals. As, however, the faith of an age ultimately depends on the labours of the philosophical thinker, it is very requisite that there should be some attempt made to mediate between the seeker after abstruse and formal truth and the inquirer after a sound faith or a reasonable knowledge. It is not without a consciousness of the difficulty of the task, nor yet without a sense of its importance if accomplished, that we give a good deal of effort to bring from the high regions of metaphysical research occasional reports of the best thinkers and their best thoughts.

In our present paper, while endeavouring to give a compend of the main thoughts of the chief speculators on "The Metaphysic of Theism," we shall as usual intersperse such historical or biographical details as may somewhat relieve the tedium, while it does not impair the instructiveness, of our outline of the course of abstract philosophical thinking on that important and difficult theme.

We have chosen for the thinker to whose views we shall now call our readers' special attention, William Honyman Gillespie, Esq., of Torbanehill, in the parish of Bathgate, in Scotland—an

estate famous among the *causes célèbres* of the northern kingdom, as the territory in regard to which a keen and lengthy litigation occurred which stirred the House of Lords and brought into collision the most noted men of science, while it formed the occasion of quite a crowd of articles and pamphlets. It is not on this lawsuit, however, remarkable though it is, that we are about to discourse. It is about the well-known work of the owner of the property from the products of which paraffin and naphtha are distilled, that we desire to speak at present. For it is not a little singular that while his estate supplies physical light to the people, the owner thereof contributes no small share of mental light in regard to many of the problems on which the thoughts of men are engaged. From him we have just received the *fifth* edition of a work which for nearly half a century has held a high place among the speculative treatises of the most logical, if not the most philosophical country on the earth, Scotland; one which has had a reputation far beyond the narrow boundaries of the author's native land—"The Argument, *a priori* for the Being and the Attributes of the Absolute One and the First Cause of all things"—God.

This metaphysical treatise—of which the first edition appeared, we believe, in the autumn of 1833—took its rise, we believe, in a recoil from Hume's "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion," coupled with an idea of the insufficiency of Dr. Samuel Clarke's "Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God." It was brought rapidly into notice, not only by being extensively though not always favourably reviewed, but from being made, in 1837, the basis of a controversy of much cogency and most elaborate form, in a keen encounter of dialectical skill between an unknown but able advocate of atheistical opinions and the author. A work which drew from Sir William Hamilton the admission that it was "among the very ablest specimens of speculative philosophy," and won from Lord Brougham the character of being "a valuable addition to the science of natural theology," which has stood (if it has not withstood) the storms of controversy even until now, and has been spoken of by the Archbishop of York as a book which contains "a course of severe reasoning, as strict, indeed, as that of Euclid," ought to have peculiar claims on the thoughtful reader. After having briefly noted the course of speculation which has been devoted to this topic, we shall proceed to give an idea of this work, and to supply some account of the life of its author.

*Theism*, as a name given to the whole contents of a theoretic knowledge of the Divine Being, a reasoned and reasonable knowledge of God as the highest cause of all things, the One chief and primal Being in the entire order of existence, involves at least three distinct topics of thought, all of which must be duly evolved before we can be said to possess a thorough-going theory of the divine and eternal One who is in and over all—(1) The *nature* of man's conception (or rather *idea*) of God—under what form does Deity envisage Himself in human thought; (2) The *origin* of man's

idea of a Divine Being; (3) The *actuality* of the existence of the Deity.

It appears to us that before any proper progress in regard to the consideration of the ultimate and absolute in thought can be made, we must form some notion of that idea of the Being beyond whom, as the Divine cause, the human mind will consent to seek no farther—that which issues as the loftiest reach of its most daring attempts to attain to the utmost boundary of being cognoscible by thought—must be had. To be investigated it must be known as a possessed idea, however inadequate it may be, as that which may stand for the supreme cause, the primordial efficiency, or the ultimate reason of existences and events. That into which one seeks a living insight, must be regarded as a reality capable of being made the object of reasonable research. Yet, if we accept the evidence of Sir William Hamilton—"From Xenophanes to Leibnitz, the infinite, the absolute, the unconditioned, formed the highest principle of speculation; but from the dawn of philosophy in the school of Elea until the rise of the Kantian philosophy, no serious attempt was made to investigate the *nature* and *origin* of this notion (or these notions) as a psychological phenomenon."<sup>\*</sup> To Kant we owe the earliest endeavour made to ascertain the genesis and determine the domain of the notions which emerge on a clear and definite survey of the human consciousness. This, Kant accomplished, after a certain fashion, in the second book of his renowned "Critique of Pure Reason;" and, in doing so, recalled men to a sense of the incongruity of discussing about terms concerning the notions expressed by which they had not agreed. This brought into prominence the fact that alike in theology and philosophy there were those who affirmed—with a certain amount of truth in each assertion, although so opposite—i. That man can form no positive idea of the Infinite, in whom all the possibilities of being inhere. ii. That man can form a positive idea of the Infinite, who is the complex all of reality. The former is to a certain extent true if it is meant that the idea should be "adequate and representative," and the latter is also right if it is allowed to interpolate, "however inadequate and rude."

"Every kind of human knowledge has unanswerable questions at its end." "It is not the law of human knowledge that we come to a final clearance of all that is obscure;" and it is a fact that not only are there "limits of religious thought," but of all kinds of thought. Supposing, however, we should admit, as Hamilton and Mansel aver we must, that "the mind can conceive, and consequently can know, only the limited and the conditionally limited;" we may say with De Morgan that "we can know something about infinity, as about mind, matter, causation, &c. Infinity, like other things, has its attributes, deniable and undeniable; for in all matters we have learned to say that we do not know what things *are*, we only know something *about them*; that is, we have subjects

<sup>\*</sup>"Discussions," *Philosophy of the Conditioned*, p. 15.

with attributes, and therefore propositions which can be affirmed or denied." Hamilton has obviously been misled by the difference between *conceivable* as imageable to consciousness and envisageable in consciousness. That which is unimageable is not unimaginable; and man's idea of God as the supremest perfection, while it may be unimageable to the mind, is not unimaginable to the consciousness and even the conscience of men. This fact both Calderwood and Young assert definitely as true of human consciousness in opposition to Hamilton and Mansel; and there can be no doubt that men have some idea, however faint and inadequate, of a first cause of things which may be called God.

But if man has an idea of God—if Deity is to him at once comprehensible as a necessity of reason, and incomprehensible in the fulness of His nature, it is a pertinent query, How does this idea originate? In what manner did man get hold of it or it get hold of man? This is, of course, a very different inquiry from that which was undertaken when philosophers investigated the *nature* of our idea of God. It is the mission of metaphysic to interpret thought not only in its nature, but in its origin and its results. Most people suppose that it is an easy task to tell off at once the source from which man has derived his idea of the Deity. It arises, they will say, from a psychological instinct, from a survey of history, from an acquaintance with the facts of science, from the revelations of the Scriptures, from logical excogitations or from theological inferences. Whether any, many, or all of these constitute the starting-point for man's acceptance of a God as the primary article in his creed, is a fair topic of inquiry, and has been made the occasion of a large amount of speculative thinking, as it could scarcely fail to do; for any idea of God includes the conception of cause, and brings us into the presence of the *crux* of metaphysic, causality—a question which underlies and moulds all the speculations alike of theists or of atheists.

Some affirm that our idea of God is an original, inborn intuition of our spirits—so inwoven in the constitution of our nature as to be ineradicable, so intimately and immediately suggested in the very make of our minds that we can have no consciousness of self without having also and simultaneously the presence of God present upon our souls. Others assert that the idea of God is a generalization from the upgathering of experience and observation elicited by the perception of purpose and end, will and law regulating and over-mastering thought, matter, and events.

A third class of thinkers is of opinion that though the idea of the specific personality of God as the self-existent fountain and cause of all being, does not arise within men at once and intuitively as an innate form of thought, yet it originates naturally and necessarily from the germs of ideas latent in the mind so soon as these are touched into vitality by the experiencing and the realizing of the evolution of thought in man's own nature. That the belief of the

intellect comes in succession to the action of the feelings which acknowledge the influences

"That reach through nature, moulding men."

That on the excitement of knowledge there follows the idea of a living presence who is the essence of all else that is; a form arising from the sense of desirables and visibles, the inner secret of secrets, the highest metaphysical ultimate of thought, the substance and reality of being. These theorists regard the idea of God as occasioned, not caused by experience; that it grows naturally and normally out of thought as a result.

Besides these different opinions on the origin of our idea of a cause of all causation other than Himself, which may be considered as subjective and metaphysical, we may notice two other methods of accounting for the possession by humanity of the idea of divinity. One is that we owe it as a dogmatic revelation to the Scriptures, and the other that it has grown up in the mind as a myth which can be conveniently used as an abbreviated generalization of the mystery and might of nature. Regarding these we may remark (1) that revelation is neither transference nor origination, and that the capacity of apprehending the idea of God must either have pre-existed or been communicated, and hence the proposed solution is wide of the mark; (2) that a myth must arise in the mind, even though it is suggested *by* nature; and hence the myth theory is only a shadow of an explanation, as it tells us nothing concerning the uprise in the inmost recesses of the soul of this myth of mystery. Both suggest an accident of impulsion rather than a causative evolution, and do not touch the origin of the idea in the mind.

Revelation implies, as a latent idea, a revealer. It is a message which can only effectively operate on a mind capable of realizing a sender. That the idea of a God revealed darts into and beams upon the soul like the light of joy is possible only because it comes to us in a receptive state, and adds testimony to the truth of consciousness. It fills up the form of our ideative capacity, and the soul knows and realizes the presence of Deity. It has been said "Fear first made gods"—that man feels the august power of outward nature when it thunders, blasts, strikes, and destroys; when it glows, beautifies, fertilizes, and enlivens; and hence he becomes apprehensive of danger and desirous of expressing gratitude. But this necessitates that man should have an idea of power and of benevolence as a personal *something*; and as he cannot consent to have his fears excited or his gratitude raised for an unknown One, man must seek to see the might-wielder in His relations to himself. Either as revealer or as myth, therefore, it is God in His *relations* rather than in His being, man desires to know: for it is only in consequence of His being that His relations are of any importance, either practical or speculative, to the human race. The fulness of the awful mystery of eternal selfhood may be immeasurably beyond the vastest reach of our thought, but its relation to us gives urgency to our desire to know His nature and reality.



Beyond these two queries about nature and origin there issues still farther a third topic for speculation—Is there an objective reality, a veritable and ever-existing God, an all-potent, living, personal intelligence beyond and out of ourselves corresponding to the idea of Deity which exists or grows within us?

It might be true that a specific, personal, supreme One could be thought of by us, and yet there might be no ground in reality for our idea of an eternal living being whose infinite perfection transcends the grasp of conception. "The facts," as Lord Brougham has remarked, "*might*, when we come to examine them, disprove" (or at least not accord with and support) the conclusions drawn *a priori*." On what ground of reason do we believe that there is a real correspondent to this loftiest ideal of the soul? Is the idea of God an illusion constructed, like the rainbow, out of the realities of existence, but not itself one; or is it a shadowy envisaging and embodiment of a reality, like the reflection of the sun in a dewdrop? Why do we believe in the existence of a supernal, all-pervading personality, over whom space, time, and cause have no influence, but whose influence is worked through these upon us? Is God an actuality? Here plainly is a subject for thought of most essential import to our race. Not only is the idea the most ineffable, but the probation of its truth is an interest of the most unspeakably transcendent sort. To know that God is an essential truth of being as well as of thought, holds in its consequences of the highest pith and moment—consequences the full rush of which is apt to overwhelm the spirit, and to give faith a predominance over philosophy. But faith ought to trust only in the trustworthy, and therefore it seeks the aid of metaphysic to report upon the arguments available to it in regard to the being of a God.

*Proof* is argumentation which leaves no room for doubt or opposition; verification, showing that a given assertion is trustworthy or deserving of belief; not only the bringing forward of evidence but of satisfactory grounds for accepting what has been affirmed as unexceptionably true. It is the positing of certain fixed bases and firm resting ground for trust; the laying down of tested thought. Ideas require not only to be gained but verified. Ideas are either innate, or acquired, or developed from the forms of the thinking mind, and their accuracy is tested or their trustworthiness verified by comparison of experiences, or by the investigation of thought step by step and process by process, till the little known is shown to depend in its ultimate on the well-known, to be but an explicit statement of what is implicit in something which is indubitable. The methods of reasoning adopted to prove the existence of God are of two sorts, in a large measure the duplicates and tallies of each other—*a priori* and *a posteriori* :—

"The one lays down some previous, self-evident principles; and in the next place descends to the several consequences that may be deduced from them; the other begins with a view of the phenomena themselves, traces them up to their original, and by develop-

ing the properties of these phenomena, arrives at the knowledge of the cause."\*

"*A priori* reasonings are reasonings which conclude the reality of certain existences from notions and convictions shown to be inseparable from our intellectual nature, as distinguished from conclusions obtained by the aid of experience and analogy. Whether the human reason is competent to effect this vast and momentous transit from relative and subjective classification to objective and absolute reality; has in all ages been a matter of disputation."†

"As opposed to *à posteriori*, the argument *à priori* neglects as much as possible the special facts of a case, and deals with its outlines only. Hence the conclusion is generally applicable more widely than to the case in hand, which tends to enlarge our wisdom, and leads us to use the phrase Must be instead of Is. In reasoning *à priori* we assume fewer data than in *à posteriori*, which very thing makes the former method difficult; indeed it often inspires alarm by the ambitiousness and sweep of the inference.

. . . Beyond the sphere of exact science such reasoning is only probable, or establishes a *provisional* opinion; nevertheless it is, as such, often of indispensable value, as indicating whether much or little positive and *à posteriori* proof is needed for a conclusion."‡

"If there are any truths which the mind possesses; whether consciously or unconsciously, before and independent of experience, they may be called *à priori* truths, as belonging to it *prior* to all that it acquires from the world around. On the other hand, truths which are acquired by observation and experience are called *à posteriori* truths, because they come to the mind *after* it has become acquainted with external facts. How far *à priori* truths or ideas are possible, is the great *campus philosophorum*, the great controverted question of mental philosophy."§

For not only may it be argued, as Gassendi does, that though we ordinarily give a higher amount of consideration to arguments *propter quid* or *à priori* than to those drawn *quia* or *à posteriori* because the former proceeds from universals to particulars, from causes to effects, &c., while the latter proceed in quite a contrary way; yet, as a fact, we never give credence to a demonstration *à priori* without having presupposed in it a reference to an argument *à posteriori*, by which it may be proved. The great argument originating in the necessities of human thought must fit into and have its counterpart in an actual suggestion from and a survey of the revelations of experience. Both are co-efficients in the solution, or at least in the verification, which shows that the solution proposed is satisfactory. Thus it may be affirmed that in the belief of

\* Archbishop King's "Inquiry concerning the Origin of Evil," Preface, p. 9.

† Prof. W. A. Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," p. 43.

‡ Francis W. Newman's "Miscellanies," p. 35.

§ Archbishop Thomson's "Laws of Thought," p. 62.

one Supreme Original Mind as the author and source of the eternal scheme of the universe, the necessary forms of human thought supply the warp, and experience, as the woof working in the loom of life, produces in the web of consciousness the faith in Deity—a faith to which we must either assent or affirm the logical possibility that our whole nature is fallacious, an affirmation which A. H. Hallam pronounces to be “the very lunacy of scepticism.” The perfect, all-prevailing, logically unassailable “Demonstration of the existence of God” will most probably, therefore, be the one in which every possible tissue of thought and experience shall be shown in the issue to co-operate in the inworking within, as well as by, the inmost fibres of the consciousness, of a belief in one Creator—God, which W. H. Gillespie aptly calls “the sole root-doctrine of theism.”

That able writer, whose keenly dialectic argument has given occasion to this paper on “The Metaphysic of Theism,” has, as was to be expected, pronounced upon this mode of demonstrating the being of God, a very distinct opinion of the superiority of the form which he has adopted in the following terms:—“Suffice it to say at this present (time), that there is evidently a fast-growing disposition on the part of theologians to desert the mere *a posteriori* way, and come over to the dialectical domain, where the *a priori* method is regnant. None know so well how unfit the *a posteriori* argument is for the exigencies of these days in which we live as do those who have tried to use the method in encounters with skilful atheists.” \*

As we are at present merely considering the main elements and questions of a metaphysic of theism, we do not here require to offer any special estimate of Mr. Gillespie's own management of the argument (for that an opportunity will recur); and we are now explaining that two methods of proof prevail, each advancing claims to preference of which we say, without dogmatic decision on the special merits—each good, both better.

Our opinion of the matter as a metaphysical question is, that if there is spun into the fibres and woven into the texture of man's nature, that which suggests and renders inevitable, in all ordinary cases, an *a priori* and necessary sense of Deity, the pertinence of that fact when proved, as a ground of faith, will as a matter of evidence be greatly enhanced, if in the regions of experience, among the things daily obvious to our senses there shall be shown to exist a good and genuine basis for an *a posteriori* generalization leading to the holding of this same faith, filling the forms of intelligence up with the results of experience—as the sea fits itself into the sinuities of the shore and the caverns of the coast—making sense and science one as they “utter forth” God “and fill the soul with praise.”

\* “The argument *a priori* for the Being and the Attributes of the Absolute One and First Cause,” by Wm. H. Gillespie, Esq. Fifth Edition, Preface, xix.

To bring the truths of reason and the truths of nature, like lock and key, to guard unitedly the highest doctrine, "the immediate jewel" of the soul, the fatherhood of Deity, is surely better than to have the key alone or the lock alone. If all things are doubles, sun and shadow, sea and land, seed and root, lock and key, ought not the two modes of argument, *a priori* and *a posteriori*, to be as inseparably employed in a metaphysic of theism as thought and word are used in argument? never forgetting meanwhile that in this matter metaphysic and religion have two different functions to perform—the one declares, the other demonstrates, the being of God. The former reveals God as one only spiritual, supreme, eternal and holy, though invisible; but the latter has left to it the task of proving the existence and attributes of the Deity as acceptable to reason as well as receivable by faith—of showing to reason that faith in God is philosophically as well as morally right, in

"That master-light, the secret truth of things,  
Which is the shadow of the Infinite God."

We have interjected this remark here to call attention to the fact that there may be differences of opinion about the methods of reasoning to be employed in the philosophical or controversial exposition of what may be regarded as the fundamental doctrines of religion, without there being any doubt concerning, or scepticism regarding, the truths themselves. The evidences of religion must be submitted to the evidence-judging faculties, so that this belief in God, which out-tops all other ideas in dignity and worth, though it may be argued about in different ways, and different estimates may be formed as to the best form of argumentation, yet this conflict of opinion concerning methods of proof has no bearing whatever upon the qualitative and quantitative evidence producible on behalf of a belief in the being of—

"That God who ever lives and loves,"

whose existence and relationship to us, revelation asserts, but of which it leaves the demonstration to a "Metaphysic of Theism."

However we may see fit to settle the disputable point regarding the logical value of the different arguments adducible in favour of a belief in the existence of Deity, such as—Do they fulfil the requirements of thorough-going logic? Are they satisfactory, conclusive, and decisive? Are they effective and convincing, singly or cumulatively? What precise point does each reach, and what given proposition do they each or all warrant us to hold as a veritable truth of reason, of which there can be no rational doubt, beyond which there can be no farther movement of mind? These are questions of weight, for here it is that controversialists join issue; and it is of the utmost importance that in the outset we should consider (1) what we *can* prove, (2) what we *must* prove, (3) the *means* by which our proof may be effectively brought out

and argued, (4) the *forms* our proof should assume, (5) the *end* in view in the adopting of our line of proof. But besides this we should hold in consciousness (1) what may be *assumed*, (2) what *may* be disproved, (3) what *effect* our line of argument may have, (4) the *relation* between our own powers and those of our opponents, as well as (5) the exact effectiveness of our method of proof in the circumstances of contest. On these several elements we cannot now make remark; for we must hasten on to supply the reader with a concise outline of the methods and results of the speculations of some of the more important of those "seekers after God" who have on this topic—

"Felt the thews of Anakim,  
The pulses of a Titan's heart,"

strained to the utmost in their wrestle with the mighty argument, to master which they gave the eager efforts of their earnest souls. Our indications—for they can be little more—of some of the theses of the thinkers, will enable the student to estimate with greater exactitude the place in metaphysical literature that should be given to this "argument *a priori*"—the most ambitious and thorough-going attempt which has yet been made in our country to provide a demonstration of the existence of God so clear, irresistible, plain, and strong, as to set misunderstanding, evasion, or contradiction at defiance, and to compel the capitulation and surrender of the reason and conscience of every thoughtful reader. After a glimpse at the course of speculation which the History of the Metaphysic of Theism shows, we shall explain the position, epitomize the contents, and estimate the philosophical value of its theory and results, interspersing as we may a few of those biographical details which enhance interest, increase curiosity, and lend to the faculties not thoroughly accustomed to "abstruse research" resting-places by the wayside on their journey.

It has been told in a previous series of papers on "European Philosophy" how the earliest thinkers, standing in awe at the threefold mystery of self, nature, and causation, sought in the love of wisdom to receive into their spirits some knowledge of these enigmas of being—to discover some truths regarding them which should be absolute and trustworthy, truths which should be such to all orders of intelligence, eternal necessities of thought. What is the Origin of *all* that I can feel and know? What is the Purpose of all, what is its true Nature? In one word, what is the *Cause* of being? This question starts—The Metaphysic of Theism. Theism as a philosophical not a theological topic of inquiry. Many were the wandering, wondering tentatives of the human spirit to find a thought that would yield rest; and vague and wavering as the shadow of the sun in a wind-swept lake were the endeavours made to envisage Deity. Orpheus and Hesiod are called theologists by Aristotle and Cicero; Homer represents God as ruling mankind, and bringing by His will good and evil upon men; Xenophanes

sang, "There is one God among gods and men the greatest; unlike to mortals in outward shape, unlike in mind and thought; He sways all things by thought and will;" Parmenides affirmed that, "Thought and that for which thought exists are one; for thou wilt not find thought apart from being in which thought is involved; Zeno asserted that, "God is a sphere," the perfect and complete encircler, enfolder, and comprehender of all, whose real substance was thought, permanent and immutable, who by His wisdom governs all things without effort. The Eleatics threw forth upon nature their own intelligent, active sense of life, and universalised that, as the Ionians had done with matter, and the Pythagoreans had done with harmonies. Hence the Eleatics have had the repute of having first philosophized about God as a living cause; for though Anaxagoras taught the existence of a regulating mind, Plato complains that he made no use of his theory in the explanation of power and thought. Empedocles seems to have formed some idea of a world-arranging First Cause, though he does not appear to have thought of that as uninvolved in matter. Socrates, according to Plato, had formed exceedingly lofty conceptions of an Infinite Thinker, to whose behests subordinate powers did homage; and Plato himself may be credited with being the first heathen philosopher who had attained to a lofty ideal of Cause and Providence, resulting in a comparatively pure Theism, which brought before the mind a Being of Infinitely Perfect Nature, whose ideas constituted the forms and laws of things. Aristotle regarded the Life of God as thought, and His thoughts constitute the final causes of things. Other heathen philosophers, with more or less distinctness, investigated the evidences for a Deity, and their researches seem to go thus far, at least, that the order and constitution of the world suggest a Deity to thought; that the investigations of these philosophers constitute a body of evidence that some idea of God is essential to progress in thought; and that the idea of God appears to be requisite to the excitement and satisfaction of the wisest and most active of men. The Metaphysic of Theism brings, as it were, before us the testimony of the most intelligent and logically consistent thinkers that they could find no stand-point for philosophic thought unless the idea of God was accepted as a true one, and that however inadequate the idea formed of Him might be, it bound together and conditioned all other thoughts, aspirations, and hopes.

It can scarcely be doubted that these philosophizings of the most notable thinkers of Greece and Rome, resulting as they did in a general admission of the *possibility* of an unconditioned being, a God, as distinct from gods, was a propædæutic to the acceptance of the gospel. St. Paul builds upon it his "Apology for Christianity." Metaphysic ploughed the soil into which the apostles went forth to sow the good seed of the word. Then for a while acceptance silenced philosophizing. Thought is not only quick, but living; and Neo-Platonism arose to combine philosophy and Christianity, and to

fuse into one: the conceptions of the reason and the acceptances of faith. Faith was declared to be the substance of truth, and all the efforts of the discursive faculty to seek a substance on which reason could rest as well as the soul could rely. The thinker's own capacity for receiving was made the measure of verity, and the impressions of faith were received, not as the signs, but as the proofs of realities. So faith degenerated into creed, and the substantial form of thought was for a time lost sight of.

Doctrine had become dogmatic, and the heart-life was leaving these reasonless maxims, and catchwords, not watchwords, which formed the residuum of the Christianity which had been sent forth to teach. Received took the place of perceived and conceived thought, and regeneration was necessary. Oriental mysticism, Platonic gnosticism, heathen sensualism, eclecticism, and scholasticism severally acted and reacted on Christian doctrine to convert it into dogmatic, creed-bound thought, a set or form of legalized God-given and Church approved ready-made opinions for humanity. Reason and faith were placed in antagonism to each other—an antagonism quite unwarranted by their relationship—and councils multiplied creeds to curb the soul in its aim to comprehend the conditions of truth and the convictions of Christians, so as to bring into harmony theory and theology. Against the coercion exercised by the ecclesiastical authorities over the free and independent efforts of the human reason, to know as well as to acknowledge Christian truth, there was a constant revolt, till faith began to be looked on as a tyranny, and infidelity appeared to be an exodus to freedom. Thought claimed to be "the heir of all the ages," the Church insisted it should give all that inheritance to her, and receive instead the gift of grace and salvation. A collision between authority and reason became imminent; but at length rationalism, rather than rationality, crept into the Church. The schools of philosophy were entirely in the hands of the ecclesiastical power. Mental coercion, unthinking receptivity, were favoured by the Church. The Church counselled her disciples to become *theodidacti*,—God's teachers rather than disputers regarding things divine. Amidst the constant declaimers against and disclaimers of the exercise of reason concerning God and His ways with man, speculations about the Divine Being, His nature and His attributes, of great subtlety and power—most elaborate specimens of that exercise of reason which had been so sedulously denounced, became common in the Church. Such, for instance, were the theories of Godhood promulgated by John Scotus, Anselm, Abelard, and Aquinas.

John Scotus maintained that existence is apparent and real; the former is manifested in time and space under circumstances; the latter is the true cause and source of the former. It is the essence of being. Sense perceives the one, reason the other. But sense brings her impressions before the reason, who elicits ideas from them, and beholds the realities of which these sense-impressions are the signs and marks. Through the senses we reach ideas, through

ideas we learn to perceive God,—God at once simple in His own Being, multiple in the being He bestows. The supreme reason exhibits to us God as God in real being, and yet also as God in all apparent being, that is, in man and nature. He, however, as the Creator, alone truly is; all things else, as His creatures, do but *appear*—they are perishable, but He is everduring.

Anselm's "Monologion" and "Proeligion" contain a twofold demonstration of the existence of the Deity,—the former being inductive or *à posteriori*, the latter deductive or *à priori*; this is the more original, if that is the more stirring and striking of his treatises. In its most compendious form the argument may be stated thus: He who denies the reality of a Deity, conceives, nevertheless, an idea of a Being more perfect than any (among all) that exists; hence he affirms that he, the inferior who exists and thinks, can form in thought a Being greater than any existence; and so gives being to an idea more perfect than that which the entire infinity of things can show, so that He is more perfect, imperfect though he is, than the perfectest. He can imagine God, though God did not, could not form him. The less thus conceiving, and so, in reality, creating the greatest; for thought is living and real.

Abelard's was a mind distinguished for its keen and exhaustless researchfulness. In his introduction to Christian theology he sought to assimilate, identify, and reconcile revelation and reason, and so to give a reasonable theory of revealed truth. Hence he affirmed that the cognition of God as the supremely perfect and the absolutely independent Being, is evidence of His existence, though not of His nature. That what we called cognition in regard to things, was recognition in regard to ideas; and that God, though incomprehensible to the heathen, who had not His revelation of Himself, was yet so potently in all and through all, that an apprehension of His Being was a necessity of conscious thought. "The sword of Aristotle" completely cuts through the cobweb of doubt, and the invisible things of God—even His eternal power and Godhead—are clearly seen, being understood by (or through) the things that He made and man knows.

Thomas Aquinas, the prince of mediæval schoolmen and divines, in the first book of his "Sum of Theology," treats of the divine Being, His existence, attributes, and providence. Taking the human mind as the mirror of life—its power of conception and of generalization being the shadow of creative power, he rises to the idea of a pure divine existence, in whose being are the primordial seeds and first principles of all existing things—the forms into which matter passed at the will of the Deity. Thus did he make a pious theism the connecting link between sense, science, and Scripture.

Mind and nature were to him instruments of suggestion, recalling by pre-ordained association the invisible and recondite truths of the intelligible universe. On one side, as it were, was the human mind, and on the other was the Divine one; between these there rose up the world of nature, which sense observed and reason inter-



preted, so seeing, as through a glass darkly, the Deity as the object of holy contemplation and soul-rapt worship; and binding together into a unity triune, physics, metaphysic, and theology.

These great thinkers of the patristic age may be considered as types of the evidences for Deity produced in scholastic times. As a revolt from these the "Theologia Mystica" of Gerson may be named. Logic is not truth, but the pathway to it. Truth is experience, but the most certain experience of man is intuition. He feels the presence of God in his soul; Deity is as palpable to thought as nature is to sense, and is as distinctly known as the hand of a friend clasped in our own is felt. Sterile science is not requisite to seek this supreme Sovereign of the soul. He is the soul's inmost friend, and man's highest state is to draw close even to identification with Him. Dante too had sublime and rapturous views of Deity. God is one, the universe is one; it is one thought of God. In God all things are, as in their first cause; but in Him perfection is actual, in things only possible. All the possible perfections of all things pre-existed in Him, foreseen in glory infinite as is—

"The love which moves the sun and whirls the stars."

Many other great thinkers strove to lift their minds up to the supernal mystery of spiritual selfhood, subsisting in underived eternity of being, and casting forth creation from His mighty hand in the magnificent majesty of sovereign singleness of will and power, moved thereto by the infinite love of His nature for goodness, beauty, truth, and holiness, and so becoming the All-ordering One, who is law, life, and love to the universe; but we have not space to review in detail the various forms of speculative thought in which man strove to mirror to himself the deific energy in all the plenitude of infinite personality. The hard, cold logic of the creedists, the stern tyrants of the soul who held the sway of the world, forbade the contemplation of such themes in any other light than that which took Rome as the centre of radiance, and through any other medium than that of dogma fixed in the frigid formalities of ecclesiastical speech. For a while it seemed as if—

"Truth's deathless voice had paused among mankind."

But the irrepressible soul of humanity could not endure this captivity of its holiest powers. The Reformation broke the thralldom of the soul, and again the spirit glowed and gloried in the sunshine of devout contemplations, directed to the search after God as the solace of man's hopes, and the subject of man's noblest speculations. Thought's sense of power once roused, reason exerted her right to think on all topics and in all forms, and sought to fulfil and realize the aspirations of the higher life to "know the only true God" as well as "Jesus Christ whom He had sent." With it there arose a new and nobler metaphysic of theism, to which in our next the reader's notice shall be drawn.

## Religion.

---

### IS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE SCRIPTURES TO WARRANT BELIEF IN THE GODHEAD OF JESUS CHRIST?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE divinity of Jesus Christ is one of those grave and oft debated questions in our Christian theology which has called forth a prodigious amount of literature, which began to be produced almost before the earlier witnesses for and exponents of the gospel of Christ had passed away from earth. No question, saving only two others, amongst those which have presented themselves for solution to the Christian Church at large, can bear any comparison with this. These are the doctrines of justification by faith alone, and of election or predestination. In importance, however, the question, "Is Christ God, or only a created being?" must take precedence of all, even of those indicated. Having once ascertained, on what he conceives to be full and satisfactory evidence, that the Scriptures are inspired, and that they have not been tampered with materially through the lapse of ages, the believer in them is drawn, almost as certainly as the magnetic needle is to the pole, to the consideration of the position occupied by that august Being who is therein declared to be both the Son of God and the Son of man. We are accustomed to speak of this subject as a mysterious one; to an extent it is granted that it is so, for "who can by searching find out God?" It is also rightly named a mystery, taking the word in the sense in which we have it often used in the Scriptures, meaning "a revealed secret"—something which no human skill or human research could ever have discovered.

As I proceed I shall avoid, as far as possible, making quotations from the works of those who have written upon this momentous theme, and endeavour to give, in brief, such a representation of some portions of the New Testament evidence on the point, as may, I hope, bring conviction to the mind of the impartial reader that the truth lies on this side. I limit myself to the New Testament, because, in that, having some acquaintance with the original language, I am not obliged to depend entirely upon the critical and explanatory labours of other men, as would be the case were I to discuss the Old Testament. Nor do I pretend to have it in my power to produce a complete summary of the arguments which might be drawn from that division of the Scriptures under considera-

tion, from which may be established as on an irremovable basis the grand doctrine of the divinity of Christ—this is, His co-equality and co-eternity with the Father of all. Many passages of importance must be passed by; still I believe the passages adduced hereafter sufficiently prove that this doctrine is revealed in the Bible. Before entering upon the scriptural argument there are two considerations I must hint at which the inquirer on the subject needs to bear in mind. Firstly, that although it has been always a favourite taunt with the reasoners on the adverse side, that on this important point the testimony of Scripture is so dubious as to allow of a great latitude of opinion with regard to the nature of the Son of God, we should, for very obvious reasons, expect to find the reverse the case; on a matter of this kind a divine revelation would scarcely disguise the truth. Coming, therefore, with the assured belief that if God has spoken to man, He has not failed to make known, amongst other things, who and what He is, in whose hands have been especially placed the redemption of man. And secondly, it is also obvious to the Bible student, that over and above the numerous passages which, in terms more or less direct, do certainly appear to attribute to Jesus Christ all the attributes of God, the offices which He is represented as holding, and the work which is ascribed to Him, furnish a strong though secondary evidence that a Being above the highest man or angel—in fact, one altogether divine—could alone fulfil them.

A vain attempt has been made by some unscrupulous Unitarian critics to show that the first two chapters of Matthew's Gospel are spurious. They are to be found, as we have them substantially, in the most ancient MSS., and can no more be rejected than the rest of the book. In ver. 1 of chap. i. we have at the very outset announced to us the peculiar designations given to Him whose dispensation and whose history are especially unfolded to us in the subsequent pages. Both have a deep significance which might not strike us at a cursory glance, seeing that "Jesus" means one who saves, and "Christ" simply one who is anointed, or dedicated by anointing, to some high office. But the first is in its Greek form, *Ἰησοῦς*, the equivalent of the Hebrew word Joshua, for which it is substituted in Heb. iv. 8. Not necessarily a divine name, it is true, yet what does it represent? Compounded of two words, meaning "Jehovah" and "saviour," as applied to Joshua, it was symbolical of the work he did for Israel, conquering their enemies the Canaanites, and saving them from temporal trouble. Joshua did this through God's strength, and might indeed say, "Jehovah is my Saviour," saving Israel by the power given to him by another. Of the glorious Person before us in this verse it might be read as giving His name in a different form; He is a Jehovah-Saviour; a Deliverer, not through the communication of strength at second-hand, but in His own might. This is shown by the contrast in ver. 21, "*He himself* shall save His people," the Greek *αυτος* rendering the emphasis very marked. Our Lord's second name, "Christ," we

find to be the same thing as the Hebrew "Messiah," meaning also "anointed," either literally or figuratively. To the anointing of Christ there are various references made in the Psalms: by the name of Messiah He is only alluded to once, in Dan. ix. 25, 26. The ancient Jewish kings, and the priests also, were anointed with oil as a typical observance, and they were sometimes called "anointed," or "set apart." By none, however, was the title of the "Messiah" ever claimed, and from age to age the Hebrew nation had looked anxiously for a long-promised Deliverer, who was to be known expressly by this title. Divinity, however, cannot perhaps be regarded as proved from this name borne by Jesus. The third appellation, which follows in ver. 23, and which is made significant as a fulfilment of a prophecy of the olden time, is that of "Emmanuel," *God with us*. Not "the representative of God," as some would try to dilute the meaning of the verse to suit their creed; the three simple Hebrew words, "with," "us," "God," which form the compound name, admit of no misinterpretation. God, always present through His spiritual nature, is there spoken of as being with man in an actual bodily presence, entering into new relations with him. In Matt. ii. 11, we have the first of a number of instances which might be cited, wherein worship is offered to Christ. The Greek verb *προσκυνῶ*, which occurs here and elsewhere, means literally to "prostrate one's self before," in the mode customary amongst Orientals. That it is applied both to civil and official reverence done to any one, and also to religious worship, is very clear. The connection even will not always show which is intended. Too much stress must not, therefore, be laid upon the instances wherein Christ was thus "worshipped," since the individuals by whom the act was performed may not have recognised His divinity in so doing. But there seems something remarkable in the fact that these Magi from afar, themselves doubtless of high rank, should have fallen before an unconscious infant in the deepest reverence. Was it not because they knew by some revelation which they had received that this "King of the Jews," though so named, and of Hebrew birth, hid behind His childish lineaments the glories of that God who fills heaven and earth?

In the incidents recorded as attendant upon the public baptism of Christ, at which, besides the application of the symbolic water, in a supernatural manner the Spirit of God descended upon Him, signifying thereby His high consecration to His work upon earth. Amongst these two are especially to be noted John, though placed before the older prophets in point of dignity, acknowledges himself unworthy even to unloose the shoes of Him whose coming he was to announce; and the evangelist John adds farther that the Baptist declared of Him (John i. 30) that He preceded His forerunner, obviously meaning, not in dignity merely, but in actual existence. A heavenly voice also, as recorded by all the evangelists, bore an express testimony to the fact that this Jesus was "the Son of God;" and also that He was "beloved." In Matt. x. we find that our

Lord, in sending forth His disciples on an evangelizing journey, gives them a charge, from the terms of which it is obvious that it had a meaning extending beyond, and touching also His future disciples. Even at this early period of gospel history, He assumes that the whole Church or body of His believing followers is closely identified with Him. They are to be hated for His "name's sake," and their faith in Him is so far to free them from anxiety, that when at the judgment bar of man they, relying upon Him, shall be enabled to speak through the Spirit of the Father (ver. 20), thus presenting to our view the three-one God. In ver. 33 it is declared that "whosoever shall deny Me before men, him will I also deny before My Father which is in heaven;" that is to say, the denial of Christ is equivalent to the rejection of God, and all mankind must stand or fall in Him, which would be impossible to suppose in the case of any creature, however high in dignity. Moreover, by this statement the divine attribute of omnipotence is attributed to Christ—every instance of confession or denial which occurs upon the earth is known to Him, or the passage loses all its force. When at Cæsarea Philippi, Christ, in converse with His disciples, asks of them what was the common report about Him. Appealing next to them for their own belief, Peter at once replies with his usual warmth, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God" (Matt. xvi. 16). That this acknowledgment of Peter's was of no small importance is proved by the following words (ver. 18), where Christ declares that "upon this rock" the Church should rest,—on the assured confidence that He was neither man nor angel, but God's Son, and possessed of those divine powers which would overcome all resistance on the part of Satan. Not long after this, in the scene of the transfiguration, we have a repetition of the announcement which was made at the baptism of Christ. Here, while He is encompassed by the glories of the invisible world, and beside Him stand two of those who had for centuries dwelt in the heavenly land, the voice of God again declares that Jesus Christ is His Son, and calls especial attention to Him.

From the mouths of the demonized persons, in more than one recorded instance, proceed acknowledgments which are equivalent to a recognition of Christ's divinity. The Gadarene, impelled by the demons within him, cries out, "What have I to do with Thee, Jesus, thou Son of the most high God?" (Mark v. 7). Without hesitation, and without attempting any appeal to God himself, in all cases the demons admit Christ's absolute authority over them. When called to work a miracle in the presence of the Pharisees and scribes, Christ precludes this by declaring to the palsied man that his sins were forgiven. This awakens the hostility of the onlookers, who exclaim that in God's hand it lies to pardon transgression, and in His only. So far they spoke an indubitable truth, which our Lord does not convert, but proceeds to show that to effect a miraculous cure was as utterly beyond the power of man as it was to forgive sin. (See Luke v. 17—25.) Indirectly, therefore, He

owns that He is God. And if to this it should be objected that the successors of Christ exercised supernatural and miraculous powers, the reply is that in such instances Christ's disciples acted in His name; even where an audible announcement was not made, the real fact was that through Him alone did they perform "signs and wonders." Nor do we discover that the right to forgive sins was at all claimed by those who had derived their knowledge of truth from the primitive fountain; nay, it was in a manner repudiated by the apostles, when in their discourses they repeatedly referred to God alone as the source of forgiveness. Our Lord's manner of dealing with the penitent woman (Luke vii. 37—50) implies not only that in His words, "Thy sins are forgiven," He was announcing Himself as the granter of pardon—a meaning which was apprehended by his audience—but more than this is suggested. Taken in connection with the love manifested on her part, it is clear that He who forgave did so because He read the heart of the penitent; and remitted the life-sin because, being committed against Himself, He alone could do this. From Mark ii. 8, Luke vi. 8, and other passages, we have corroborative testimony of one of the circumstances just named, that the secret thoughts and wishes of mankind were fully exposed to Christ's view. Towards the close of His ministry on earth Christ gives in a partly parabolic form a foreshadowing of the final judgment, when He should with infallible correctness award to each member of the human race that unalterable destiny which would be the result of the life he had spent on earth. To this also reference is made in other parts of the New Testament, and in the Apocalypse it is again and again asserted that Christ, as the Supreme, shall sum up the world's history at the consummation of all things. His jurisdiction extends over the shadowy realms of hades and of death (Rev. i. 18); the books in which are written the names of those who have not worshipped the beast (Rev. xiii. 8), and by the records of which the dead are to be judged, are said to be those of the "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world." So terrific is His appearance upon His throne, that by a strong figure, even inanimate objects are represented as fleeing before Him, and at His command the awful penalty of the second death is inflicted upon transgressors (Rev. xx. 11—15).

Of the four Gospels, that written by the evangelist John most fully reveals to us the divine nature of the Redeemer of men. The facts of the other Gospels are here endorsed and strengthened by important *addenda*, which bring out clearly the whole history of Messiah. Therefore, on a variety of ingenious pleas, some have endeavoured to set aside or to tone down the emphatic utterances of the beloved disciple; though even the modern infidel will hardly venture to entirely denounce the book as an imposture. The Unitarian, honest in his measure, endeavours by ingenuities of translation to give a different turn to those verses which contain most noteworthy and convincing statements relative to the divinity

of Christ. But the first four verses alone give us such a view of Christ as one with the Father, that from this the doctrines regarding the God-man, which I believe to be scriptural, might be deduced and rested upon indubitably, if words have any meaning; though, as we know, other testimony is not lacking. No textual criticism has set aside or suggested any valid alteration in the Greek of the passage, which stands as a mighty oceanic rock, round which roll and rage the waves of time, its base unapproachable, and an irremovable support for the visible structure. That very able writer, Samuel Sharpe, in his translation of this Gospel, interprets the "Word" here to be the voice of God; so he renders ver. 2,—“All things were made by it, and without it was not anything made whatever.” But the tenor of the opening shows that a Being is described, not a “word” merely, either spoken or written. As it is by the words of men that we come to know men, so through the agency of the Son does the Father condescend to reveal Himself to His creatures. “From the language here used, it is clear that Jesus Christ himself, who was before all things and who created all things, is Himself no part of that creation. Whatever existed before creation must have been eternal; and, as the Author of being to all that is, His own being could not be derivative. Jesus was the Word of God before He became man, and this Word clothed Himself in human flesh; nor can self-subsistence, eternity, and deity be possibly ascribed to His human soul.” Pursuing the same mode of rendering, the author named in the succeeding verses expresses the Greek *per* by a neuter; and thus ver. 10 stands, “It was in the world, and the world was made through it, and the world knew it not.” How absurd to speak of light as acting the creative part *per se*, and still more strange to say that it “gave power to become children of God” to those who believed! This image represents to us in another manner how utterly dependent for all natural and spiritual light we are upon Him who is the very essence of light. The introduction to the narrative closes with ver. 18, where, conjoined with the oft-repeated statement that God cannot be seen by mortal eye, we have the fact distinctly enunciated that by the closest though inexplicable connection the Son and the Father are one, and that by the Son only can we know or approach the Father. In support of this, various passages might be quoted; as where, addressing the Ephesians, Paul asks for them that they might know the love of Christ, which passeth knowledge, that ye might be filled with all the fulness of God” (Ephes. iii. 19). Evidently he believed that in thus gaining such a knowledge of the love of Christ as was attainable in this life, they were forming a close union with the Father also; through Him, the Son, they could be “filled with the fulness of God,” but only because Christ was God. The sublime opening of the Epistle to the Hebrews also exhibits Christ to us as the only and the divine Mediator; “heir of all things;” the “brightness of the Father’s glory,” or perhaps the “radiation,” the visible reflection thereof, and also “the

express image of His person"—the Greek being *χαράκτῆρ*, and preferably rendered the "impress of His substance." Comparing Him with angels, the apostle shows that He is infinitely worthy. His dignity coming by inheritance, their honour being derived. Knowing no beginning, He has also no limitation; the duration of His throne is "for ever and ever;" angels were formed by Him, and are sent forth by Him at His pleasure. They approach not the presence of God without signs of profound reverence, while the Son of God is at the right hand of the Father in human form; and not only there, but He is seated there, denoting His equality and His eternal right to that place.

From a misconception of Col. i. 16, where Christ is called the "firstborn of every creature," and of Rev. iii. 14, "the beginning of the creation of God," it has been argued that the Son of God is only the very first of all created beings, separated from others by a vast interval. The true meaning of the verses does not support this; by the first-named it is evident that we ought to understand, if we follow the Greek, that Christ is the *source* or *origin* of every creature, which gives a totally different idea; in the second, Christ is said to be the *head*, the prince of the universe. He is also the centre, so to speak, around which the whole system of created beings revolves. By Him all things consist, *i. e.*, they "hold together"—the life which He gave He continually sustains; and when it has lapsed by His permission, He can resuscitate it. As God-man, Christ is the grand reconciler of both earthly and heavenly things (Ephes. i. 10); they are all *for* as well as *by* Him (Heb. iii. 10). And again in the Apocalypse is Christ set forth in the visions of Patmos as the possessor of all power, the Alpha and Omega, by whom in "the fulness of time" shall all things be made new.

Repeatedly, in the book just quoted, we have represented to us both men and angels in the act of paying divine honours to Jesus Christ, while there are instances of prayer addressed to Him, as by Stephen and by Paul. In a remarkable passage in the Acts (chap. xxvi. 28) the Ephesian elders are enjoined to watch over the church of God, "which He hath purchased with His own blood;" and though some MSS. read *Κυριος* instead of *Θεος*, all the weight of evidence is in favour of the word "God" in this place. I will only add that constantly in the epistles we have associated in the same sentence, and occupying obviously the same position in the thought of the writer, God the Father, and Christ Jesus our Lord; and, to make one more quotation, Peter, in his second epistle, speaking of those who have "obtained faith," explains that it is "through the righteousness of God and our Saviour Jesus Christ," which, however, should rather be rendered "of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ,"—an emphatic deliverance on the subject. Most heartily, therefore, do I support what is the almost universal belief of the Christian Church, both Roman Catholic and Protestant.—J. R. S. C.



## NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"It is good for us at times to be shaken out of the dull routine of traditionary teaching, and be taught to see that all is not so positive and certain in these matters as some have asserted,—should be taught to inquire and read and think for ourselves, as reasoning men, and not submit ourselves blindly to the yoke of authority."—*The Right Rev. Dr. Coleman.*

THE scholastic theologians were notoriously inclined to spin the cobwebs of their own minds out into creeds for the acceptance of mankind, and the evil inheritance of their tendency to convert every topic of thought into a spider-like trap for the spirits of men, threaded and cross-threaded with logical forms, and woven into formularies is left. They degraded the Church into schools, and trained men to be logic-choppers rather than preachers of righteousness. Subtlety may be all very well, but the syllogistic subtlety which taught and enforced theologic logic by the thumbscrew and the rack, the fagot, the dungeon, and the block, could not be so effectively resisted as to keep it from degenerating into cunningly devised snares. On this account the scholastic theology has come to be looked upon as a set of carefully assorted mind-traps, whose conclusions snap at once upon the incautious thinker, who has been walking unwarily into the inviting premises of the angelic doctors of the schools and the seraphic masters of sentences, whose main object seems to have been to get hold of inquirers expressly for the purpose of inquisitorial conviction, that they who were caught might, like the seraph, "mount and burn"—mount the pile, and burn in the flames lighted by holy hands; and even when they did not succeed in this, yet—

"Made life itself a death before its time."

One of the cobwebs of scholasticism this doctrine of the Trinity surely is! What mortal, not a mere word-monger and creed-bound pedant, can profess to understand it? But then it is one of the profound mysteries of the faith which cannot be fathomed, and we all know that—

"A God that's understood's no God at all,"

or something like that; I am not quite sure that I have just caught the rhythm of the epigram. This is one of the incomprehensibilities of "the faith once delivered to the saints," and which when so delivered was so plain that he who ran might read, and reading understand,—so clear that even a little child might know it. Corrupted sadly it must now be indeed, seeing that, so far as the plain words of Scripture go, we must explain and understand them each in a non-natural sense before we can bring them to correspond with our creeds. I confess I am not one of the orthodox who swallow confessions, creeds, and articles, like so many mental pills for the soul's health. I approve of the simplicity of—

"The gospel of the golden rule,  
The new commandment given to men ;"

but I am not a supporter of the subtleties and intricate logically elaborated school divinity ; in truth, I am rather given myself to—

"Thinking the deed, and not the creed,  
Would help us in our utmost need ;"

and I have a lurking liking for that latitude of faith which accepts the gospel, as, of itself, without creed, interpretation sufficient—

"To build the universal Church,  
Lofty as is the love of God,  
And ample as the wants of man."

We have not here to do with the whole of the Trinitarian controversy. In fact, we have only to do with a third part of it. We are only to inquire if there is sufficient evidence in the Scriptures to warrant our belief in the Godhead of Jesus Christ. This will show at once the fallacy of the reasoning employed by S. S., when he says that "the doctrine of a Trinity of persons in the Godhead is a Scripture doctrine ; but if Christ is not God, there is no Trinity—therefore Christ is proved to possess Godhead" (p. 20). On this we remark (1) that the major premiss here laid down is the very matter in dispute ; for if it is shown that "God is one," it is not only made plain that there is no Trinity of persons, but it is also shown that Jesus Christ is not God ; or if He is, then He is God alone, as the Swedenborgians teach, and beside Him there is none else. (2) S. S. assumes in his premiss what he professes to bring out in his conclusion—that Jesus is one of the persons of the Godhead or Trinity ; but it may be admitted that there are three persons in the Trinity, while it may be denied that Jesus is one of them. There might be a Trinity without Christ, and therefore the existence of a Trinity would not prove the divinity of Christ.

Here, too, as if to defend fallacy by weakness, S. S. quotes 1 John v. 7, which, however, he admits is a disputed one. But he does not give any indication of its disputability. The reader may get an idea of that from these facts :—(1) The words are not to be found in any of the ancient MSS. of the New Testament. Adam Clarke says that in 113 MSS., extant in his time, the passage was found in one only, so that its authenticity had at the highest only one-113th of a chance of being right. (2) Luther did not admit the passage into his translation, and it was marked doubtful in the Bibles of the time of Henry VIII. on to James I. (3) It is given as of doubtful authority in several editions of our Authorized Version. (4) Dr. Pye Smith, an orthodox Trinitarian, believes that they were originally a marginal gloss interpolated into the Latin Vulgate, to support scholastic theologians in their formularies ; and (5) that scarcely any informed person quotes it now as of any authority. Even granting it to be authentic and indisputable,

however, it would not serve the argument of S. S. and his co-adjutors; for it merely affirms that there are three Witnesses in heaven, and that Their witnessing is unanimous—that They all three agree in what They testify, not in what They *are*. The argument of the apostle is not regarding the Unity or Trinity of the Godhead, but the trustworthiness of the testimony adduced that Jesus Christ brought salvation to the world, and offered it to men. He speaks of unanimity of testimony, not of nature.

The proneness of men to mystify themselves and others in matters of faith is very much to be regretted. There would not be so many sects in the Church if there were not so many crafts in danger. After having manufactured or accepted a creed which requires a great deal of explanation, and the very name of comprehending which seems as if it were a testimony to one's superiority, it is humiliating to be led to confess that we had first made the quagmire over which we propose to construct a railway carrying passengers, warranted with all safety, to the station beyond the quagmire. For instance, S. S. (p. 19) proposes, by showing that the Scriptures declare Christ to have performed such acts as none but God can perform, to prove that Christ is God. How much of this quagmire is made by ourselves? We first adjudicate and determine upon what God alone can perform; next we limit the power of God to personal action, and deny Him the use of an agent; then we fix upon certain acts done by Jesus Christ as such as none but God can perform, and we have completed our nice little railway over our self-made quagmire. Now, before we began, the quagmire was safe walking ground, and could easily give passage even to a railway by our reflecting that Jesus, as the agent of God, could do any works which God chose to commission Him to perform.

The subsequent reasons of S. S. are all tinged with the assumption that his creed is alone correct. "God created the heaven and the earth," we admit, for "by the word of His power were the heavens made," and the earth is the work of His hand, and all things were made by Him. This S. S. brings forward as a proof that Jesus Christ is God. We have actually no ground for connecting the creative word of God with Jesus Christ at all. It is a mere scholastic play upon words. *Logos* is a word, and *Logos* is reason. God in His reason, and for a reason, created all things by His word. This word proceeded from Him, and so became the son of His lips, and Jesus called Himself the Son of God, the bearer of the word or message of God, and thus two things perfectly distinct by logical legerdemain were brought to be thought of as one. So *ratio* is reason, and *oratio* is speech. God spoke the decision of His everlasting reason, and the universe appeared. Jesus came to reason men to renewal of life in righteousness by speaking words of truth; and here again scholastic subtlety overcame plain common sense—and what was worse, God's own truth—and plain things became confounded, and men began to think that

when it was said, The Word was God, Jesus was meant by the Word. This is dialectical science, not divine Scripture; the stupidity of the schools, not the wisdom of God and the power of God for man's salvation.

The Bible does not trouble us about the divine procession of the Son from the Father, and the generation of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son. God is in Scripture spoken of as power, intelligence, and love; and power speaks forth its love and intelligence into a universe, but in this we have no puzzles concerning *Personæ* and *Hypostases*, *Substantia* and *Ousia*. These are creed-made difficulties; man-made snares; not Bible matters at all. Why should we not believe Jesus when He says, "I can of Mine own self do nothing; I seek not Mine own will, but the will of the Father who sent Me" (John v. 30)? When he says that this is life eternal, that they (His disciples, men) might know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent (John xvii. 3)? When He asserts, "I ascend unto My Father and your Father, and to My God and your God" (John xx. 17)? Will S. S. persist in declaring that Jesus is the way, the *truth*, and the life, and yet deny His truth in these sayings, or will he consent to think of Deity "as the God of our Lord Jesus Christ" (Eph. i. 17), as the word of God affirms He is? I think that God is wiser than schoolmen, and Christ is more trustworthy than creeds, and that the Bible is a safer guide to truth than articles of faith, and all "three are one" in affirming that Jesus Christ is not God, or a partaker of the God-head.

S. T. C., JUNE.

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

"Unto the Son he saith, Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever."—*The Lord*.

"I and my Father are one."—*Christ*.

"I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last."—*Christ*.

"Every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord."—*Paul*.

"God was manifest in the *flesh*, justified in the Spirit, seen of angels, preached unto the Gentiles, believed on in the world, received up into glory."—*Paul*.

"Jesus Christ (He is Lord of all)."—*Peter*.

"Worthy is the Lamb that was slain to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory, and blessing."—*Song of the Angels*.

As we write, the festival of Christmas is passing away, and the new year enters upon the stage of uncertainties. Yet the beautiful and joyful language of Isaiah, the evangelical prophet of the Most High God and His Son Jesus Christ, who is "Lord of lords and King of kings," still lingers on our memories and re-echoes with double force and significance that "unto us a Child is born, unto us a Son is given, and the government shall be upon His shoulder: and His name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, The Mighty God, The Everlasting Father, The Prince of Peace."

Could anything be plainer or more expressive than the above prophecy in its teaching, that there is to be, or has been, a child born who is the *mighty God*; *ergo*, God incarnate.

Let us for the sake of argument suppose the child of Isaiah's theme, and looked upon as the hope of Israel and Saviour of mankind, is not Jesus Christ. This matters little, for, as an argument, the fact remains the same. For it is a convincing as well as a conclusive proof against the theory that it is impossible to have a unity—a one Lord—if we have more than one person in the Godhead. We agree with C. S. L. in the fact which he has Scripturally set forth, that "the Lord our God is one Lord," at the same time the Scriptures also teach that a child is to be born who is none other than the "mighty God;" consequently *Man* as well as *God*. From the above quotations we have God the Father and God incarnate revealed to us; and also in them Scripture authority to acknowledge only *one* Lord; if therefore we believe that the Holy Ghost is God, our rule of faith must of necessity be a Unity in a Trinity, or at the very least a two in one. Thus the arguments of C. S. L., which are based on the above theory, fall to the ground. Nor is this the only proof that can be brought forward in support of the view that it is possible to have Unity in Trinity; to have three in one; yet not *three* Gods, but *one* God. Man himself is a Trinity, he has a body, a soul, and a spirit (1 Thess. v. 23). The body is the material *man*. The soul, the animal nature, common to all animals, the animal *man*. The spirit, the higher nature, the spiritual *man*. Yet we do not say *three* men, but *one* man. The terms spirit and soul are frequently used in Scripture in place of man (Gen. xii. 15; Matt. xxvi. 41). Again, equal proportions of the two aeriform fluids, hydrogen and oxygen, form the *third*, water. This is a chemical illustration showing the possibility of two forming the third, and the third embodying the other two, or in other words, *two* being, as it were, lost in *one*. Yet each has its own proper and distinct work and place in the vast machinery which sustains our globe.

We will now proceed to prove that the child of Isaiah's prophecy is no other than the child Christ Jesus,—"*Immanuel, God with us.*" We could not give a more appropriate definition of the subject, aim, and object of Isaiah's work than by quoting the comprehensible, yea, rather incomprehensible words of the apostle Paul, "*Christ is all and in all.*" What fathomless words! higher than human thought can grasp or comprehend; infinite in their meaning; boundless in their vocabulary. Yet we are accused of being idolators if we assert that the Scriptures teach that Jesus Christ is God as well as man. But "to the law and to the testimony; if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them," (Isa. viii. 20), for the Lord hath said unto the Son, "*Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever,*" (Heb. i. 8). Isaiah is very explicit in his prophetic description of the child, so much so that his identification with Jesus Christ will be unmistakably seen if

we compare Scripture with Scripture. Isaiah, after proclaiming the glorious tidings "that unto us a child is born" in the ninth chapter of his book, says in the seventh verse, that the child is to sit "upon the throne of David, and upon his kingdom to order it." If we refer to Isaiah vii. 13, 14, we read that Isaiah gives an exhortation or encouragement to faith, "Hear ye now, O House of David, Is it a small thing for you to weary men, but will ye weary my God also? Therefore the Lord himself shall give you a sign; Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel." From the above we gather that the child is to be of the House of David, born of a virgin, and to be called Immanuel, each of which has been fulfilled in the person of Jesus Christ, therefore, *de facto*, "the mighty God; the everlasting Father"—the child of Isaiah's vision. St. Matthew, in his account of the birth of Jesus, says, "Now all this was done that it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet, saying, Behold, a virgin shall be with child, and shall bring forth a son, and they shall call his name Immanuel, which being interpreted is, God with us." St. Luke, also speaking of the son born of the virgin Mary, says, "Thou shalt call his name Jesus; He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the Highest; and the Lord God shall give unto Him the throne of His father David."

*Prima facie* we agree with many of the arguments of C. S. L., but differ in his elucidations of the same, and the doctrines deduced from them. We have *not*, in fact it is not necessary in proving a case, to explain how it is, or to make it congruous to reason, which C. S. L. has very kindly referred to us, as a standard whereby the doctrine is to be tried. The doctrine of Unity in Trinity is no doubt a mystery, but because *it is*, we have no grounds for saying it is a fallacy! A thing being a mystery does not make it less a fact. Can C. S. L. explain where instinct ends and reason begins? Yet this being a mystery does not disprove the fact that they are both distinct!

Reason is not only mutable, but fallible. It is impossible for it to be a Catholic standard, inasmuch as it is unequal in its distribution of gifts. A peasant may not be able to give you a reason how we know the earth to be a globe? or how is it explained that the earth travels round the sun? To him it might be anything but reasonable to suppose the earth to be a globe, and more especially so as regards the latter question. He might with *his* reasoning powers consistently maintain as a fact that the sun went round the earth: did he not see it every day rise at morn and set at even? Yet an astronomer, whose reasoning capabilities are larger and more enlightened, could refute the reasonings of the peasant. Thus C. S. L., treating the doctrine of Unity in Trinity as a mystery and unreasonable, believes it an infallible proof that it is impossible for Jesus Christ to be God; and has made emphasis of the fact that the Scriptures expressly teach that God is the *one* Creator, only one to be worshipped, and the only Saviour. "I

am the Lord thy God, the Holy One of Israel, thy Saviour." As regards the last, C. S. L. inconsistently calls Jesus Christ "the Saviour" (p. 26). The text from Isaiah (xlili. 3) is quoted with many others in support of the doctrine that God the Father is one Lord, and the argument C. S. L. deduces from this is that there is only one person in the Godhead. We Trinitarians agree that the Godhead is a unity, and that the Creator is *one* Lord, but we also emphatically maintain that Holy Writ expressly teaches that there is more than one person in the Godhead. We think that Isaiah is the last book from which C. S. L. could have culled an argument to support his Unitarian theory. True, the words, "I am the Lord thy God, the Holy One of Israel, thy Saviour," originally might have referred to God as being the Defender and Saviour of the Jews in time of battle and fearful calamity. Yet in its prophetic interpretation it has a far wider and higher meaning, which is fulfilled in the person of Jesus Christ, the Alpha and Omega of Isaiah's sublime theme, "the mighty God," and Saviour not only of the Jews and the house of Israel, but the Saviour of all kindreds and tribes, in short, the whole world. The Lord "saw that there was no man, and wondered that there was no intercessor: therefore His arm brought salvation unto Him" (Isa. lix. 16). God himself became our Redeemer, and said, "There is no God else beside Me; a just God and a Saviour; there is none else (Isa. xlv. 21). From this we deduce that the Saviour is more than man, yea, the Lord. If then Jesus Christ is the Saviour of mankind, it necessarily follows, He must be more than man,—for God, who knows all things from the beginning, and, we might add to the end, saw there was no man who could be an intercessor or Saviour,—and no other than God. Therefore "God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life;" and "in due time Christ died for the ungodly." Thus "God commendeth His love towards us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us" (Rom. v. 6, 8). Of Jesus, says St. Peter, "give all the prophets witness, that through His name whosoever believeth in Him shall receive remission of sins" (Acts x. 43). And "neither is there salvation in any other: for there is none other name under heaven given among men whereby we must be saved" (iv. 12). Consequently by the infallible word of God Jesus Christ is none other than God the Saviour referred to by Isaiah.

C. S. L., as regards the teaching of Scripture, and more especially as it relates to any particular book and the general opinion of the writer, quotes only part of the truth, *not* the whole truth. Thus C. S. L. quotes 1 Tim. ii. 5: "For there is *one* God, and one mediator between God and man, the *man* Christ Jesus," placing the emphasis on the word "*man* Christ Jesus." Whereas St. Paul in the same epistle no less than *six* times emphatically states that Christ is God, by addressing Him as follows, "Christ Jesus our Lord." The same apostle, writing to the Romans, is even more

explicit and definite in his declaration that Christ is divine, for he says Christ "is over all, *God* blessed for ever" (ix. 5).

Again, C. S. L. quotes "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth" as a negative to the claim of Godhead, as it relates to Jesus Christ. This is only *half* the truth. In the *same* chapter are these words: "God said, *Let us* make man in *our* image." If we compare this with St. John's statement that "the *Word* was God" and "was in the beginning *with* God; all things were made by Him; and *without* Him was not anything made that was made;" clearly proves that there were more than *one* person, though a unity, in the work of creation. And we maintain in conclusion that that person *with* God was no other than Jesus Christ, "for by Him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities or powers: all things were created by Him, and for Him" (Col. i. 16). And this, says the apostle, "because it pleased the Father that in Him should all fulness dwell."

Thus *have we* trusted no creed, neither selected any doubtful passage from Holy Writ, but rather the opposite, for we have compared Scripture with Scripture. Yet our verdict is entirely different to C. S. L.'s. Who has erred? For the "plain and palpable declarations of God the Father," the Saviour and His apostles assert that Jesus Christ is Divine, and "Lord of all."

GEORGIUS D. E.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

"*In medias res.*"—HORACE.

S. S. seems to be a sincere sectarian and a strict scripturalist, but sectarian sincerity is not always favourable to the attainment of the truth; and that a strict holding by the letter of Scripture is not always conducive to the acquisition of the wholesome truth of the word is made known to us in the assertion of St. Paul, "the letter killeth." The narrowness of the vision of Scripture teaching to which S. S. has attained may be noted at once on reading his paper. But perhaps this may be best seen by our obeying the scriptural injunction, "the last shall be first." He believes that his opponents "will find it to be an everlasting task to extricate themselves from this dilemma"—"Jesus Christ is either God or a blasphemer." We do not think this dilemma so very startling. We have seen it put even in a stronger form as a trilemma; and as it is brief, besides that it shows one way out of S. S.'s inextricable maze, we shall quote—"Christ (1) either deceived mankind by conscious fraud; or (2) He was Himself deluded and deceived; or (3) He was divine. There is no getting out of this trilemma. It is inexorable" (*Colloquia Peripatetica*, p. 107). Here it seems there is a way of escape from the dilemma of S. S. We *may* see it seems that Jesus was Himself deluded and deceived. But may we not also say that Jesus Christ has been misrepresented and maligned, not by the Jews only, but by a great portion of modern Christendom,



by the assertion that He made Himself, spoke of Himself as, God, when He only said, "I am the Son of God" (John x. 36)!

We have shown, in the preceding paragraph, that the prince and leader of the arguments of S. S. has made a signal failure; might it not be possible to go through his entire host, and bring them to confusion? For instance, take his reference to John i. 1, 14, "The Word" is God's efficient power. He spoke, and the universe was created; He commanded, and it stood fast. Assuredly this creating Word was God, without whom nothing was made. This Word was made flesh in the human race, and of that race Jesus was one; so that He dwelt among us in His glory, the glory *as* of the only begotten of the Father; for He was the second Adam, in whom all are made alive. The only begotten of the Father is not here Christ, but Adam at his creation, with the glory *as* of whom Christ appeared among men—the glory of innocence, purity, truth, peace, and love.

It is a great pity to see large doctrinal points rested on texts which are given up by all scholars as corrupt or mistranslated. Into this error S. S. grievously falls in his reference to Rom. ix. 5 and 1 John v. 7; the latter is universally given up, and the interpretation foisted upon the former has been generally abandoned. "God blessed for ever" is a phrase of praise used by Paul to express his thankfulness for Jesus, who is over all, or above all, superior to all the children of Israel, because He visited His people and brought them nigh again to God through godliness.

Is S. S. quite sure that in Acts xx. 28 his meaning is the only possible one? did not God make "of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth"? Is not all blood, then, "His own"? And if Jesus is "*the Son of God*," can He be other than God's own blood? As regards Heb. i. we may ask S. S. if the express of a being is that being himself. If so, photography has much to answer for. But in this chapter we should observe that God spoke by His Son; and a son is not surely the father's self, however like he may be. This son is "appointed heir;" he is not the possessor, and heirs do not generally appoint themselves. He sits down on the right hand of the Majesty on high; that is, if S. S. is right, he sits at his own right hand. This said Son, who is said by S. S. to be said by St. Paul to be God, is spoken of by Paul as "*being made* so much better than the angels." It is true Paul represents God as saying, "Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever," quoting from Psa. xlv. 6, where the word translated "God" means "mighty one," as it is the same word that is used regarding Moses, Exod. vii. 1,—"*See, I have made thee a god to Pharaoh*,"—a use of the word this of which Jesus takes advantage for His own defence, John x. 33—38, to which the reader may turn, and he will then see that the word God has been applied to many inferior beings, as *judges* in Exod. xxi. 6 and xxii. 8.

If, therefore, S. S. is content to make Scripture its own interpreter, he must consent to this, that the letter of Scripture, though seemingly in his favour, has its whole spirit turned against him, unless

the claims a mere word-victory; but even then, while it may be conceded to him that he has proved from the letter of Scripture that Jesus Christ is God, he must take it with all its consequences, such as that Moses, Solomon, and the judges of Israel were gods too; so that his Trinity will expand into a multiplicity as great as that of Brahm.

But supposing it granted that this chapter did bear out the character S. S. gives it, it is still open to us to inquire whether Paul or Jesus knew best. Now Jesus said, Why callest thou Me good? there is none good but *one*, that is God; evidently implying that He was not that one God, a saying quite in accordance with His character who affirmed, "My Father is *greater* than I." The creeds say He is co-equal with the Father, and they of course are far more worthy of belief than Jesus himself! A passage on page 19 ought really to be read more than once for its curious reasoning. We shall quote with an italic or two, to call attention to the points requiring note. "Isa. ix. 6 clearly shows that *some* child, who was as yet to be born, would be the 'Mighty God;' and *we believe* that the prophecy contained in this and the following verse is so discriminating, distinct, and perspicuous, and so fully in agreement with the rest of the Scripture testimony concerning Jesus Christ, that every unprejudiced mind will admit that it refers to *Him*. Therefore Jesus Christ is the Mighty God."

It is worth while to note the series of inconclusive conclusions:—  
 (1) "*some* child" is by force of the belief of S. S. transformed into "the Mighty God," not of the prophecy, for there it means prince, judge, or some such powerful office-bearer, but of S. S.'s creed;  
 (2) S. S. claims by implication that his is an "unprejudiced mind," whose beliefs therefore are certainties, which contains the further assumption that all the beliefs of "every unprejudiced mind" are certainties;  
 (3) "we believe," "therefore," which requires for proof all that S. S. believes is accurate and indisputable: S. S. believes that some child spoken of as the Mighty God is Jesus Christ; therefore Jesus Christ is the Mighty God!

If we must, as S. S. says, "either maintain that an apostle knew not Christ's real character, or admit that Jesus is God," though we do not see the necessity, we certainly shall think ourself safest to admit that an apostle knew not Christ's real character. Perhaps Judas would exemplify the fact; perhaps even the apostle Peter would plead guilty to such an ignorance as S. S. thinks impossible. And we do this all the more readily because if we did not lay that possibility to the charge of an apostle, we should require to suppose that it was possible for Jesus Christ not to know His own real character; for Jesus speaks of His Father as "the only true God" (John xvii. 3), and in His instructions to His disciples to pray He taught them to say "Our Father," to speak of Him as One—"Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done," &c. Had He been God in the sense S. S. speaks of, could He have said "*My* kingdom is not of this world," as He did?

S. S. is found relying for his argument again on a mistranslation of 1 Tim. iii. 16, where the word "God" should properly be *solu*. But perhaps S. S. would say, as a learned Irish divine once said, "*Without controversy* great is the mystery of godliness," as St. Paul affirms in 1 Tim. iii. 16; and it must be a much greater mystery with "*controversy*." The words "without controversy" really mean undoubtedly, by universal consent, confessedly; but they gave our Irish divine an opportunity of stating how little controversy was relished in the Scriptures—as he interpreted them. Not a little was the same divine startled when he was told that God himself had sanctioned controversy, as He had recognised "the controversy of Zion" (Isa. xxxiv. 8); and had Himself a controversy with His people (Micah vi. 2). But to return to the passage, though we agreed with S. S. that "God" was "manifest in the flesh," that would not prove that Jesus Christ is God, but that He was an evidence or witness of God.

Like S. S., "our quiver is not yet exhausted;" but we begin to feel some sympathy for our readers, if we should chance to find any. We humbly hope that any who do read will not blame us entirely for the dulness inflicted on them. Though sorely tempted I will not quote Pope, "the antichrist of wit." Need I ask if this question would ever have been proposed for discussion had it been admitted that a Trinity existed in the Godhead? Then why does S. S. postulate as a Scripture doctrine the Trinity? He might as well set to prove the Trinity by saying names are the signs of ideas; ideas are the results of impressions made on the mind by objects. Now many names acknowledge and bear testimony to the existence of the Trinity. There is Trinity Square, Dublin; Trinity College, Cambridge; Trinity Church almost everywhere. Could all these signs of and allusions to the Trinity originate without any reality on which they are founded, and to which they refer? We may illustrate this thus:—an English village is called a hamlet; one of the plays of Shakspeare is "Hamlet;" it refers to a prince of Denmark, so that we cannot doubt but that every hamlet in England bears witness at once to the popularity of Hamlet, but also to the real existence of Hamlet the royal Dane, who ought to have been sovereign of the Danes.

Let me ask, in farther prosecution of our theme, if it is not a very suspicious thing when the advocates of a theory find themselves compelled to make use of a "form of expression" which "is never met with in the Bible." To such a distressing and suspicious condition S. S. is reduced confessedly (p. 21). Surely the vocabulary of inspiration—that is, the very language of Deity—ought to have been sufficient to express "the mystery of godliness, God manifest in the flesh." But we find that it is not so. The doctrine of the Trinity introduces us to language which is superior in its expressiveness to that in which God saw fit to reveal the whole truth necessary to salvation. Being a believer in the infinite wisdom of God, I cannot accept a doctrine which is not plainly revealed in the

word of God, in the language of God ; I cannot therefore admit that "there is sufficient evidence in Scripture to warrant belief in the Godhead of Christ." I am not, however, a doubter of the inspiration of Scripture ; nor the divineness—not divinity—of the character of Jesus. I am, besides, really a lover of sincere belief and earnest gospel faith. On this account I greatly regret that the exigencies of controversy have led me to write what may to some appear an attack on S. S. I have really no personal aim in the matter. I only know S. S. as a frequent and able contributor to this Magazine. I war not against him, but his opinion. I. A.

**SHAKSPERE AND THE BIBLE.**—"Poets are deeply indebted to Scripture. As a literary stimulus it is invaluable. Were it possible to remove from their works the passages supplied by Holy Writ, we should find many ugly blanks. More void spaces would present themselves than is commonly supposed. The greatest of all bards illustrates this. Shakspeare owes much to the sacred oracles. It would be easy to collect a considerable number of parallel passages in his writings and the Book. The famous words 'All the world's a stage' reminds us of the apostles' language: 'We are made a spectacle to men and angels;' 'the fashion (that is, the scenery) of the world passeth away.' The magnificent eulogy of that 'mercy' which 'is not strained,' but 'blesseth him that gives and him that takes,' reminds us of the promise, 'Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy;' and the declaration, 'It is more blessed to give than to receive.' Hamlet's recoil from suicide, because of that 'something after death,' has its counterpart in the assertion of St. Paul, 'The sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law. 'Measure for measure' is based on the Saviour's words, 'With what measure you mete, it shall be measured to you again.'" —*The Appeal.*

**"BIBLE."**—We have been asked how early the word *Bible* occurs in English, and whether it then meant the whole book of the Old and New Testaments, as it does now. We have not come across the word in Anglo-Saxon; and the first instance we know in early English is that referred to by Herbert Coleridge in his Glossarial Index, 'Hail seint dominik with yi lang staffe . . . you barist a bok on yi back; ic wen hit is a *bible*.' This passage occurs in the fourth standard of the curious Satire on the Monks and People of Kildare, contained in the Harleian MS. 913, p. 7, and printed in 'Reliquiæ Antiquæ,' vol. ii., 174, and the Philological Society's 'Early English Poems,' p. 153. The date of the MS. is about 1260 A.D., and the Bible referred to is evidently one of the big MSS. of both Testaments well known to Michael of Kildare. But the word is seldom used in early English—'holy writ,' 'the writ,' the name of the prophet or apostle cited being given instead. Ælfric uses *gecythas* for Testament: 'seo Ealde Gecyðansa,' the Old Testament (Homilies ii. 70), 'on ðære Niwan Gecyðansse,' in the New Testament (*ib.* 399).—*Athenæum.*

## Politics.

### UGHT WAR ORGANIZATION TO GET THE CHIEF ATTENTION OF OUR NEXT PARLIAMENT?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

ARMY organization is the question of the day. "The inexorable logic of facts" has brought us face to face with the problem of how to make warfare effective. If we cannot attain a solution of this problem by legislative wisdom, we shall most likely require to learn it by dire practice. When one's neighbour's house is burning it behoves us to take care lest the fire spread. The German doctrine of force, which for long has been looked on as a whim of Carlyle, has, in the legislative world, got into something the same prominence as among scientific men the doctrines of force have got; and men cannot but ask regarding it Lord Lytton's pertinent question, "What can we do with it?"

An army is only valuable if efficient, and only efficient when thoroughly equipped, properly trained, well officered, and under such control as to make it work the will of those who maintain it, and to crush and destroy all opposition offered to its doing so. The methodic study of the science of success in strategics and in struggles is the business of those who control the incorporated force of a nation. To knit into compact cohesiveness and link together into a continuous and uninterrupted system the whole scheme of soldierly defence, from the issue of the supreme command of the sovereign to the execution of the meanest act by the soldier, are requisites of war.

An army must be able to pursue the aim given to it with the unhesitating persistency and the inevitable progress of a necessity. It must be as perfect in its aim and as inexorable in its accomplishment of it as fate. It is the concentrated passion and will of a people embodied, though latent and inflexible, though only let slip on occasion. An army is a constituent element of national life, and a distinct portion of the police and policy of Europe. It must be equal to the emergencies that may arise; it must be strong enough to awe others, and to possess confidence in itself; numerous enough to be detailed wheresoever need is felt for its efforts, and yet so drilled as to operate with decision and valour what is given it to do, as a part of a collective whole, on the efficiency of each part of which the effectiveness of the whole depends; and yet it must be reparative in its power, and have arrangements for recuperation. It must be will-less in its willingness, each individual abjuring

feeling, thought, inquiry, and reason, under the all-important instinct of obedience, and in the genuine faith that generals inspire. How to have such an army at all times in trim for action and service has, as we have said, become the question of the day, and therefore war organization requires the chief attention of Parliament so soon as it shall meet.

One great and all-absorbing question has been brought with great prominence before the minds of all men by the fierce European contest which took the nations by surprise,—In what way may an army of the most effective sort be maintained in our present state of civilization? This question we cannot really afford to shut our eyes to. Its consideration is imperative. All that men hold dear is perilled on the reply to it. It may be regarded as certain that the whole topic will be laid for consideration before the Parliament by the Queen. It would be a base thing to attempt to ignore it, and we cannot afford to postpone the deliberations requisite concerning it to any other subject whatever. Security is the true essential in national existence, and all reforms are valueless unless there is precaution taken against the overthrow of the State and its concerns. How suddenly states may topple and war may open upon men, we have seen in this year of terrible disaster. We must secure such an organization of our army and navy as shall make them invincible as defensive forces, formidable as offensive ones, if put to the necessity of taking active measures for checking the aggressive proclivities of scheming, political reconstructors of the map of Europe.

Among the subjects of discussion that must arise there stand foremost in importance, Shall we adopt the Prussian form of enforced military service? Shall we confiscate to the State for a stated number of years the life and labour of each citizen, and compel into the field of strife every grade of citizen, whatever his rank and station, whatever his worth or his responsibilities; or shall we continue our system of recruiting, of enlistment, and of paid professional soldiery? Shall we organize our forces now on the old plan of taking unskilled labour and training it into effectiveness at vast expense, or shall we compel the attainment by each, of the requisite skill and drill of a soldier in addition to his training as a member of the social community? Shall we substitute civic for professional armies?

This is a grave question in itself, raising the debate on standing armies, and the maintenance of the costly and demoralizing regiments of rascals which so many of our soldiers prove themselves to be in the various towns where they are established; or the spreading of the immoralities of war among all the citizens, and making them all conversant with camp life, habits, and usages, with the barbarities and social savagery of war. Shall we buy or be soldiers, and shall war alone be that in which division of labour is considered undesirable or impracticable?

This is a topic on which party strife is sure to run high; the Conservatives have already, in *Blackwood's Magazine*, and through

the voice of Earl Derby, shown themselves hostile to citizen armies; and while the Liberals do not seem to have decided on any definite policy, it is known that the more advanced Liberals have long agitated for the abolition of standing armies, and the aggregation of the citizens into armies of defence. Our present volunteer system is a sort of compromise between the system, being in a great measure citizen soldiery under conservative control. Already, however, the system galls, is felt to want permanency, and to be defective in the prime element of disciplined impassivity which can be insisted on when dealing either with recruits or conscripts. Military men declare it to be an imposing sham, and they insist that the sham shall cease, and a real army be created. The militia is almost equally voted an expensive organization of rascaldom, which neither fear nor love can bring into serviceability, and which would be sure to fail in the hour of need. Our army proper is only able to gain recruits from the semi-criminal classes, unless in periods of industrial distress; and then, as soon as trade revives, discontent supervenes. Each branch of the service grumbles and is grumbled at, and therefore war organisation is an essential question for our Parliament to consider.

Another serious defect, said to be peculiar to our war forces, is—division of control and of authority, and a want of central headship. Army and navy have different superiors, and it is sometimes difficult to secure their co-operation. Then the commissariat departments are not under the control of the chiefs of the forces, and there is here, too, a possibility of lapse of co-operative union. There is even complaint of an autocratic irresponsibility in the head commander of the war forces which impedes ministerial determinations, and makes administration difficult. There can be no doubt that all the powers of war ought to be moveable by one will, to one end, when the end has been sanctioned by the people, and that all that is to be done should be done as if by one man, so that the concentration of every energy of war might be possible, and there should be no opening for the shirking or evading of due responsibility. A knitting together of this ravelled skein of powers and counter-powers is requisite, and must form a matter for early consideration. While heads of departments are debating on the measure which may be taken, the hour of safety may pass, and all after labours may be nullified. The disorganization felt in our previous war ought to teach us now the need of reorganization, and this can only be efficiently put right by the attention of Parliament being devoted to it.

That one dominant head, responsible to Parliament, should hold in his own hands the united leashes of the several branches of the civic and warlike forces which are capable of being worked together to the successful issue of a successful war is quite indispensable, and we doubt if the autocracy of the Horse Guards is likely to be much longer tolerated by Parliament. Parliament, in fact, is highly likely to insist that, when it determines to—

"Ory havoo, and let slip the dogs of war,"

one leash-master, under its control, shall be entrusted with the simultaneous management of army and navy, commissariat and stores, surgery and medicine, post office and telegraph, pay and place, on whom will be laid the duty of success.

The position of France, the successes of Prussia, the projects of Russia, the complications at Rome, the fresh relations necessary with Spain, the condition of Ireland, the claims of the colonies of the empire, and the difficulties with America, call loudly for a reconsideration of our organizations in regard to war. Diplomacy is never so successful as when intelligence and justice are accompanied by power. If Parliament proposes to secure and maintain peace and prosperity, it must so legislate as to place the entire force of the empire in a properly efficient state, and then act wisely with a sense of power.

Besides all this there is the party of peace to be considered. War interferes with commerce, interrupts trade, spreads among the population great want and woe. Looking at this one side of the question, many of the sanguine spirits of the age advocate the principles of non-intervention and the abolition of war. They think that we should look on at the fights of Europe as the spectators in a gladiatorial show, and let them, if they choose, fight on in internecine strife, without hindrance or interference of ours. They cry out non-aggression, and they think no cause so vital to humanity can arise as to justify the terrible disasters of war, except that of actual invasion, to which they do not look forward with much apprehension, if we—

"Let not rights  
Be wrested from us to our own reproach,  
But granted."

They affirm that the principles of justice are firmer than those of selfishness, and that if we truly and duly seek to do right and justice before and among the nations of the earth, there can be nought to fear. In this belief they—

"Pray  
That all mankind may make one brotherhood,  
And love and serve each other; that all wars  
And feuds die out of nations."

But these are opposed by men who believe that there are horrors greater than those of warfare, and that a slow degeneracy into selfishness would be far worse for man than any onset of battle.

They do not wish our rulers to be rash in their onrush into tented fields. They think the advice which Shakspeare puts into the mouth of Polonius is good, sound, and English to the core:—"Be ware of entrance to a quarrel; but, being in, bear't, that the opposer may be 'ware of thee." They know that the free and fearless discussion of events and circumstances, politics and policies, cannot



be carried on by Parliament and by the press without exasperation and excitement, tending to war; that our commercial relations cannot extend to all the corners of the earth without risk of misunderstandings; and that nations are not able to co-exist with different policies and principles without a liability to overstrain in their relations, and a resistless rupture as the consequence.

We have the political economists and the purchase system to settle about. Service or purchase, which shall win the day? Are captaincies and colonelcies to be investments of cash or courage? Are we to have promotion by merit or money? From what we have said about the debates possible in the present time, and matters which are being forced upon our immediate attention, we seem to have no alternative before us but to give the chief attention in Parliament to our war organization, set our house in order, being for "defence, not defiance," *nunquam non paratus*.

"AYE READY."

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

Is there was a party in the days of old, as we are told, who cried "Peace! peace! when there was no peace," there is in these modern days a pretty large party who are ever ready to cry War! war! when there is no war, and no great need for exciting rumours of war, except the serving of personal, special, or party purposes. During a great part of a year this party has been very busy with the cry, Be ready! arm! arm!

This is not only an evil but an ominous cry; a cry which means agitation of the war spirit, stirring up of hate and strife; suspicious and irritating observations, a carping criticism of the doings and conditions of other nations; heavy taxation spent on useless stores, and much disquiet in trade and distrust among neighbours. It is an unwise cry; for everybody knows that preparation for fighting seldom stops till quarrels have arisen—either through the indisposition of some other power to see these armaments going on in threatening and increasing array, compelling them too to make similar expensive arrangements; or through the idea that these things being ready, it is as well to use them, and to engage in a war which shall give the opportunity of showing our capacity for keeping our hand in action to the consternation of our compere. It is neither wise nor safe to be led into temptation, and it is fool-hardy to rush rashly into it.

To make it the chief object of the attention of Parliament to extend, revise, reform, and re-arrange our war organization would be unwise, because,—

1. War ought to be the *dernier ressort*, the *ultimatum* of nations, not their chief concern. To make it so is to subvert society, as the present Continental war too plainly shows.

2. Our Government has been chosen for its abhorrence to war,

and is specially pledged to minimize war expenditure, to maintain national neutrality and non-intervention, and to reform the abuses of former war Governments, by setting the finances of the kingdom on a sure basis.

3. We are more concerned for the organization of peace than of war.

4. War is an evil so vast and so complicated that no parliament is justified in making war, or, by expending its main consideration on war, in provoking a breach of the peace of Europe.

5. War is costly, and ought to be kept on low regimen. It is apt to flare into destructiveness just because it has the opportunity.

6. While the errors, terrors, and horrors of war are highly to be deprecated, its after fruits are scarcely less dreadful than its frightful train of suffering, ruin, death, widowhood, and orphanage. It extends burdens which impede progress, and keeps the freedom of men and of industry heavily bound and fettered. This may be shown by quotation of the following statement of what war costs:—

“At a recent meeting of the National Reform Union, at Manchester, Mr. William Stokes presented the following suggestive table, showing that the industry, trade, and manufactures of Great Britain are more shackled and burdened by needless taxation than those of any other nation.

NATIONAL AMOUNT				NATIONAL AMOUNT			
DEBT. PER HEAD.				DEBT. PER HEAD.			
	£	s.	d.		£	s.	d.
Ducal Hesse.....	228,916	...0	5 4	Brunswick .....	1,707,707	...5	10 5
Sweden .....	4,114,880	...1	0 0	Bavaria .....	29,669,267	...6	3 5
Norway .....	1,854,157	...1	10 0	Baden .....	9,256,798	...6	9 6
Chili, S. America..	2,933,405	...1	15 0	Austria.....	268,965,064	...7	5 3
Prussia (1864) ....	42,123,064	...1	15 6	Denmark .....	14,862,465	...8	18 9
Turkey .....	69,142,270	...1	19 1	Italy .....	211,563,258	...1	8 3
Oldenburg .....	621,586	...2	1 2	Portugal .....	42,930,472	...9	17 4
Electoral Hesse ..	1,445,892	...2	9 6	Spain .....	163,927,471	...10	4 6
Brazil .....	30,762,289	...3	1 3	Greece .....	14,080,000	...12	18 3
Hanover .....	6,423,956	...3	3 6	France .....	566,640,057	...14	18 9
Russia .....	274,544,773	...3	14 1	Hanburgh .....	4,222,897	...16	16 5
Wurtemberg .....	7,033,911	...3	19 6	United States ..	579,840,891	...18	18 9
Saxony .....	9,120,049	...4	4 10	Holland .....	81,790,799	...21	17 10
Belgium .....	25,070,021	...5	0 7	Great Britain ...	797,031,650	...26	10 0

Of all forces, war force is the vilest and most mischievous. It is bullying organized. Now we do not want the chief action of a British Parliament to be engaged on the perfection of British instruments of pain, wretchedness, woe, and death; a huge artificial monster worse than the flying dragon of early romance—an incorporated physical plague and moral pestilence. To spend the time of a great political assembly of a great professedly Christian nation in war organization would surely be a crime of a most heinous nature against the very first principles of statesmanship and government. The chief end of statecraft is not to carry on war, but to pursue peace and prosperity. The most sedulous endeavours of our Parliament should be devoted to the re-arrangement and perfecting of the principles of diplomacy and of international relations; the promotion of human happiness throughout

the earth as far as possible, but especially the improvement of all home interests. There is no likelihood at all of our being involved in war if we do justly, and abstain from intermeddling and provocation. Few provocations are more galling than boasting and great armaments, and there is no surer way of securing ultimate defeat than keeping up such a war expenditure as cripples industry, and renders it impossible, when the hour of danger comes, to gain a taxation capable of bearing the additional strain of actual war.

We have adopted as our motto in regard to warfare, "Defence, not defiance." To devote all the energies of our Legislature, or even the chief part of them, to the organization of our army and navy, would be in reality to enter into actions which could only be construed into defiance, or misconstrued into fear. Our best defences are justice and reason, doing as we would be done by, and by reluctance to enter into war proving that we seek to follow righteousness and peace. Those who indulge in vapouring and cries for preparation for whatever may befall, are not only the enemies of their own country, but the enemies of the world; and those especially who, for professional purposes, excite the angry passions of men to the point of profuse and rash expenditure are not honourable men, but traitors to their Queen and country, the Government, and the progress and order of the world. They are the adders of civilization, not the harbingers of Christianization. Our Parliament will be wise if they stop their ears to the voice of these advisers, "charm they never so wisely." Let a fair measure of attention be given to the protective agencies requisite for defence, but let there be no attempt yielded to, which seeks to entice to the raising of a force equal to aggressive purposes. The cost in life, limb, prosperity, social happiness, makes military glory a dear-bought bauble, even when won at the cheapest.

I am quite of opinion that war organization ought not to engage the chief attention of our next parliamentary session. Our Parliament ought to make for the ways that make for peace. The main efforts of our Parliament should be devoted to bringing about a right understanding among the neighbouring nations regarding the proper purposes of life. Their aim should be to determine upon fixed principles of government such as would secure the concurrence of the nations, and by the reform of our diplomacy put an end to that selfish desire for overreaching our neighbours, which has made diplomacy almost synonymous with duplicity. It is more than time that the nations should imitate Othello, but with a willing spirit, in saying,—

"Farewell the neighing steed, and the shrill trump,  
The spirit-stirring drum, the ear-piercing fife,  
The royal banner, and all quality,  
Pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war;  
And O, you mortal engines, whose rude throats  
The immortal Jove's dread clamours counterfeit,  
Farewell!"

War does not convince, and questions which arise between nations are never really settled by war, but are only held *in retentis*, until the force of the vanquished gives him likelihood of reversing the decision in the previous contest. War is the most costly of all modes of settling disputes, and the least satisfactory.

We entirely and utterly condemn an agitation in behalf of war. This agitation bodes no good to civilization, no benefit to man. War is the scourge of society—it concentrates in itself more evils than all the ten plagues of Egypt combined, and it brings the chief of its woes on the poor, the classes who labour and toil in the peaceful crafts of life. We ought not to permit ourselves to be overwhelmed by fear; but we should strive ourselves to be scrupulously and resolutely just, and insist on our rulers being so in all matters of public concernment. Neither ought we to be silly enough to allow ourselves to be lashed into fury by the harangues and instigations of those who have the chief personal interest in national embroilments. Still less should we give way to the coward's great sin, and sign bravado and boasting, petulance and arrogance. A word to the wise is said to be sufficient. Let us hope that wise words may be spoken by many. Perhaps one or two may not be amiss here as words of warning.

#### I. Beware of the professional interest.

It is usual, in almost all things except those which belong to the military profession, to be suspicious of any proposals which emanate from those who have a direct and special interest in the adoption of the proposal. What, for instance, would we say of the medical profession if it were to keep up an incessant turmoil in social life about the need of being constantly prepared with a full set of prepared hospitals, well stocked "with all appliances and means to boot," for the immediate and imminent dangers and risks involved in all manner of diseases upon the face of the earth, to the possibility of invasions from which we might at any time be liable; to keep a well-paid, thoroughly organized, well-instructed, and much-honoured staff of official operators, dispensers, consulting physicians, and a large rank and file of practitioners, whose business it would be to make believe that an invasion of several diseases had come, and who should drill themselves constantly, and be drilled to go through the manœuvres which would be requisite when these diseases did—if ever they would—arrive; to pay those who thus held aloof from us these diseases dire and horrors inexplicable against which they formed a prepared phalanx, and to engage in a regular renewal of all our surgical instruments and hospital arrangements, without regard to costs, whenever a new theory of any of these diseases appeared, or any hypothetical danger of infection, contagions or what not, was or could be anyhow originated. We should certainly think they wished to carve their own ease, and pay out of the hard-won earnings of the large class of fools who believed them, and who became the victims of their agitation.

What is this else than professional agitators of the military

classes ask us to do?—to exhaust the energies of the country by a constant draught on them for a war establishment, such that, should war break out, "the reserve force" of the sinews of war—money—is exhausted and overdrained. Military advisers, when they propose methods of military aggrandisement, and project an increased expenditure upon military men and their pet purposes, ought to be looked upon with the same suspicion as we look on interested parties who give advice tending to the advancement of their own interests. Over these, as having a large number of representatives in Parliament, we ought to keep a specially careful watch. Why should a receiver of military pay, and a holder of military office, be treated otherwise than as a Government contractor, who might use his legislative interest for personal or professional ends?

## II. Beware of the propertied interests.

The moneyed interests, as the lenders of cash to Governments embarrassed by war, have always an interest in the embroilments of nations, because this affords a field for usury. Money is an unpatriotic member of the social commonwealth. It goes where the highest per-centage is given, and it would take up a Russian loan at once, though the money were to be used against this very country, if it promised a good bonus and per-centage.

The traditions of the landed classes, again, are, all in favour of war establishments in peace times, because it places at the disposal of Government an immense crushing force, the influence of which is overwhelming by the silent sense of power to agitations for change and reform; while they, as the members of the class to whom its management is confided, receive the chief benefit, while they pay but a small proportionate part of the costs. It gratifies their antagonism to the trading classes, who are rising in influence, that they can burden, impede, and disturb commerce; while they fancy that a poor class of servants is best for them, they dislike the means which trade affords for increasing the wages and the independence of the poor. Let us not be the dupes of the moneyed and propertied classes, that they may dip their hands deep into the capital of the country by the unnecessary expenditure of money in war costs in the period of peace.

## III. Let us beware of party politicians.

Party politicians are as a rule as unscrupulous as gamblers as to the means by which their ends are gained. Success is their idol, and success with them means a share in the produce of the Imperial Treasury, which is, in other words, the results of the heavy taxation laid upon the people of the country. The politicians of party delight, if they cannot manage to get into power themselves, to force those in power to act on their designs, and so to give them either a share in the spoil, or an example to plead when power becomes theirs. We must hold our Parliament to good principle, and not make it easy to work them round to the purposes of partisans.

It has become a very common cry with a party that our present army is inefficient, and our navy almost worthless. They agitate

for the Prussianizing of our army, and the expenditure of large sums on our navy. These agitators are like the daughters of the horseleech, crying Give! give! and like the grave, they cannot be satisfied. We must, by opposing a stout resistance to this set of designing agitators, support the Government in their policy of peace, retrenchment, and reform. We must insist on the endeavour to adopt higher principles of life and government than force or fraud. We must oppose the retrograde and degrading popularizing of war. We must object to that huge engine of despotism—an army—being fattened like a vampire on the living civilization of our age. It is not an age of warfare and force, but of mutual love and peace that we seek; and therefore we affirm that the organization of war ought not to engage the best attention of Parliament in the ensuing session.

F. T. F.

## History.

### WERE THE CRUSADES BENEFICIAL TO SOCIAL PROGRESS?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

"The Crusades were a universal sifting and shaking up of the chaotic elements of society. To contemporaries they may have appeared as the French revolution did to persons now living, an aimless tempest of human passions. In such cases we observe nothing at first but the eddying of hosts, the shock of arms, the clouds of arms and garments rolled in blood. But when the uproar has ceased and the clouds have rolled away, a new world is disclosed, and we find that many time-honoured abuses, old institutions, and inveterate prejudices have passed away for ever."—*J. D. Nourse.*

THE Crusades are, perhaps, the most important series of wars which have ever taken place. They had noble objects in view, they were conducted by able men, they were supported generously by men of the lower ranks with their lives, of the middle ranks with their money, and by the higher classes with high spirit and self-sacrifice. I doubt if the history of the Crusades is now so eagerly read as it was before the era of the great Napoleon—the only wars which can compare with the Crusades in their zeal, enthusiasm, and picturesque dash, though not in high principle. I have looked over most of the standard works on the subject, and I am inclined to lay before the reader a very brief and able epitome of these wars, which appears to me very impartial, while it supports the affirmative on the whole:—

"The Crusades form a conspicuous feature in the political activity of the Christian nations during the Middle Ages. The great religious move-

ment that induced Christian Europe to rush to the East had by no means the expected results. *The object in view was not obtained; yet its consequences became numerous and beneficial. The Crusades will sternly remain in history an example of the devotion and mighty efforts of which men are capable when united by a common faith and religious ideas.* Pope Gregory VII. was the first who conceived the project of a Crusade, realized afterwards by his friend, Urban II. The Seljukian Turks occupied Egypt, Syria, and Africa; Palestine and Jerusalem continued, nevertheless, to attract Christian pilgrims. Peter the Hermit, on his return from this pilgrimage, complained in terms full of wrath of the grievances which the Christians suffered from the Turks. Urban II. fixed on this enthusiast to commence the execution of the great design. Peter received the mission of preaching the Crusade, and he excited the enthusiasm of the whole Christian world. He led 80,000 men under his banners, and they began their march towards the East; this disorderly mass wasted down, and what remained was cut to pieces. But a new host followed, led by illustrious commanders, with Godfrey of Bouillon at their head. They twice defeated the Turks; and at length reached Jerusalem, which in 1099 they took by storm, and with savage fury massacred the whole of its inhabitants. Godfrey was hailed king of Jerusalem, and the feudal system was transplanted to Asia. Many of the powerful knights founded feudal principalities at Edessa, Antioch, Tripoli, Tyre, Galilee, &c.: the rights of all were regulated by the *Assises of Jerusalem*, one of the most curious remains of feudal law. The Asiatic churches were apparently on the point of being reformed, and Christianity ready to assume its legitimate ascendancy over the East.

"Those brilliant hopes, however, were not to be realized. Jerusalem soon became so feeble that monks, taking special vows of devotion, were embodied for its defence; hence arose the military orders of the Knights Templars and Hospitaliers, and, soon after, the Teutonic order from the German pilgrims. Godfrey only reigned one year. His successors, during about half a century, were incessantly harassed by the Mohammedans; their position at last had become desperate, when St. Bernard preached a new Crusade in 1147. This time Louis VII. of France and Conrad III. of Germany took their departure at the head of a numerous army; but both monarchs, after many disasters, returned with shame to their dominions. The petty Christian sovereignty of Jerusalem went on lingering until it was overturned by the great Saladin in 1188. The successes of the illustrious Sultan alarmed Europe. A third Crusade was prepared in France, England, and Germany, and the armies of each were headed by their respective celebrated sovereigns, Philip Augustus, Richard I., and Frederick Barbarossa. The Emperor of Germany died in Asia, and his army mouldered to nothing. The kings of France and England were more successful; but they soon quarrelled, and the former returned to his country. Richard alone sustained the contest, and defeated Saladin at Acalon; but his army being reduced by famine and fatigue, he was forced to escape from Palestine with a single ship.

"A fourth Crusade was fitted out in 1202 under Baldwin, Count of Flanders, but it failed in its object. Constantinople, embroiled by civil war and revolution, was besieged and taken by the Crusaders, and Baldwin elected Emperor. The principal leaders shared the imperial dominions. The Venetians got the island of Candia. The Emperor Alexius founded a

new sovereignty in Asia, which he termed the Empire of Trebizond. A fifth Crusade, in 1218, had for its object to lay waste Egypt; but partial success and ultimate ruin was the issue of this expedition. The events of the Holy Land were always followed in Europe with an ardent sympathy. In 1202 upwards of 80,000 youths of different countries left their parents in order to betake themselves to the Holy Land. Cold, famine, disease, and captivity became the fate of all; none ever returned home. The Mohammedans soon recovered all; the religious zeal for the Crusades was no more; and, moreover, the Christian princes who were in Syria, or who came there with European troops, were divided by internal dissensions. Only two more attempts were made by St. Louis; they both failed, both attended with unheard-of misfortunes, which did not shake the constancy of the holy king; and the Holy Land was finally lost. The last expedition of St. Louis, in which he died, was against Tunis (1270). In the meantime Prince Edward of England was equally unfortunate. The Christians continued to possess a few cities in Syria, and the nominal crown of Jerusalem came to the Anjous of Sicily.

"Such was the conclusion of those Crusades, during which two millions of Europeans were buried in the East. The Crusades, although failing, as stated, in their main end, were nevertheless *abundantly fertile of varied results*. One of the objects of the Popes was, no doubt, to spend and exhaust, in a distant land, the turbulent energy of the military population of Europe, which threatened the progress of civilization. In this they fully succeeded; and also to enable the different races of Europe to know each other better, and to banish all mutual hostility by uniting in one same devotion to the Christian faith. Another great consequence of the Crusades was the change of territorial property, the sale of the estates of the nobles, and their division among a number of smaller proprietors. Hence the feudal aristocracy was weakened, and the lower classes began to acquire weight, along with a spirit of independence. Many towns purchased also their immunities, and ever afterwards were governed by their own municipal laws. The Church gained also by taking a good share in the spoils of the nobility."—R. L. De Vericour's "*Historical Analysis of Christian Civilization*," pp. 156—159.

It will be seen from De Vericour's account that, while there were faults in the conduct of the Crusades, their results and influences were beneficial. The internal organization of European society was well settled; the moral influence of the Church was enhanced, the value of the people was acknowledged, convents gave sanctity to female virtue, commerce was increased, and commodities formerly unknown in Europe were introduced, a Christian aristocracy arose, and a general improvement in religious feeling took place.

The Crusades, as may be seen in the foregoing extracts, revealed to man the might of a sentiment, the power of an idea, the binding force of a high purpose, the value of mind in warfare. It was the animation of men with one single heartily felt, enthusiastic aspiration, which congregated the immense multitudes who crowded to the Crusades, which banded them together with a tighter band than brotherhood, which compacted them into irresistible assailants, made them as if one soul stirred them all. The Crusades



were a triumph of principle. They set men's minds into a path of thought, and they linked the pride of numbers and the force of arms with the progress of civilization and Christianity. Hence we affirm that "the Crusades have been beneficial to social progress."

E. R. D. H.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

I VERY much question if readers, in general, do not greatly mistake the importance of the issues involved in the present controversy. It has been a staple, they may perhaps say, of debating societies for a century; our interest was exhausted in it long ago; it has now no influence upon man's thoughts and actions, and besides, it is one of those insoluble problems on which you may discuss for ever and not come to a definite conclusion. This sounds plausible enough, but is it not fallacious? Does the fact that it has borne debate for more than a century not give evidence that it is possessed of an interest which has not been found altogether—

"Weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable"?

Is it correct to say that any matter which has profoundly stirred the souls of men ever loses its effects on the spirits, and gets the current of its force so turned awry as to pass off into forceless non-importance? Or is it quite like thinkers to decide on questions as insoluble, and so close up discussion upon them, while discussion alone is able to prove their solvability or insolubility? Besides, we should remember that "to master a tough controversy, to understand the precise point at issue, may be a good exercise of mind, even where we cannot decide the issue, or when its decision is of no great importance."\* Discussion is rife with suggestions: suggestions come like the rays of the morning star—as heralds of a coming greater light. I do not think we ought to dash away in disdain the opportunity of reconsidering this question; for there are principles underlying it which require attention.

Let me instance one. Is it right that one nation or collection of nations should seek by force to compel acceptance for its faith among those who do not feel any need for it? This is a question which arises in the consideration of the Crusades, but which has far wider issues. It gives us, whatever the reply may be, a clue to guide us in the estimation of the wars of the Mohammedans in Europe, the religious wars of Central Europe, the proposals for a series of propagandist wars by the French Republic of 1793, the conduct of the French empire in regard to Rome and Italy, and of the Russian aggressions upon Turkey.

Again, it might be asked, Ought an army to be moved by a faith, or should it be a mere hired instrument of destruction,

\* *Blackwood's Magazine*, November, 1870, p. 632.

submissively obedient to its generals and the Government it serves? These matters I do not at present intend to discuss; I mention them chiefly to show that there are in the controversy deeper issues than appear on the surface. I proceed now to make some remarks more within my own range, and more closely related to the discussion as it has begun.

The wars of the Crusades are frequently spoken of as if they had had their inspiring commencement in religious enthusiasm, the chivalry of charity for those who were oppressed and persecuted. "In the first Crusade," says Schlegel, "religious feeling and enthusiasm was the great spring of action." He speaks of them as "the chivalrous and defensive wars of Christian nations against the unbelievers." This religious character assigned to them is very often referred to as justifying these wars, and sanctifying the slaughters which had been committed; but though in an historical account this may be allowed due weight, in saying what is possible in their favour, in the present debate it is the most distinct condemnation that could have been uttered. It is "not beneficial to social progress" to glorify religious wars, to gild fanaticism with the glory of piety, and bring before the eyes of men, as worthy of admiration, the crowding hosts of Walter the Penniless carrying their vices through Bulgaria; the rabble of Peter the Hermit coursing like a plague of locusts over Hungary; the wretched followers who under Godeschalc ended their career at Belgrade; or the refuse of the Western nations pouring forth in armed bands to massacre the Jews, that they might assert their devotion to the Christian faith. These were the inaugural proceedings of the Crusaders. It would lead too far at present to pass the whole of their course under review.

Crusade after crusade was preached up by the flagitious court of Rome, and from the chair of St. Peter went forth the agitation which drained the treasuries of kings, exhausted the wealth of nobles, and brought the pressure of taxation like a band of iron down on the defenceless people. It encouraged extortion upon extortion, that it might have hordes of minions brought under its control; and it weakened the might of kings not only by the abstraction of their wealth, but by the destruction of their best subjects. The crosier allied itself with the sword against the crown and the crowd; and the Pope sought lordship for himself at the expense of countless rivers of blood and masses of treasure. It is to my mind a very disastrous thing to social progress that those who represent themselves as the successors or disciples of "Christ, the Prince of Peace," whether Roman Pontiff, German Emperor, British Parliament, or United States Congress, should advocate war against others on religious grounds, and fan the hatred of peoples by the flutulent watchwords of sects. But still more do I regard it as expressly disastrous to social progress for ecclesiastical powers to intrigue and plot amongst and against political states and their sovereigns—cloaking its selfish aims under holy pretences. The

Crusades, as historic witnesses of such things, ought to be condemned by every person who loves his fellow-men.

The foregoing paragraphs may indicate to the reader some grounds for decrying the Crusades. But it may be urged that I am rather pressing points of my own than controverting what has been said on the debate by my predecessors, against whom I should engage in conflict. I hasten to take my side in the fray, and I first intend to parry the first thrust made by "Samuel." I do not see how the Crusades—which are wars—"could foster union, harmony, and peace among the turbulent nations of Western Europe" (p. 291); and this for the following reasons:—(1) the Crusades gave full sway and swing to European turbulence; (2) they set the sovereigns of the states, the leaders of the armies, the soldiery of the hosts, in opposition to each other; (3) they aroused feuds and contests, as well as encouraged and fomented broils which frequently led to home quarrels, duels, raids, forays, and even wars; while they opened the way to intrigue and bloodshed, faithlessness and crime. The legends of the Crusades in too many instances show this unhappy state of things, and history amply corroborates on a larger scale the tales of the hearth in Western Europe. I subjoin in a note a single historical instance.\*

\* "Henry VI. detained in his prisons Richard Cœur de Lion, when, on his return from the Crusade, after having been shipwrecked on the coast of Istria, he was seized, as he traversed Germany in the disguise of a pilgrim, by Leopold, Duke of Austria, in 1192. Richard, who was the hero of the age, who had humbled Tamer and Philip Augustus; who, in a short space of time, had conquered the island of Cyprus, and had bestowed that kingdom on the unfortunate Lusignan; who had vanquished Saladin in a pitched battle, and had dispersed the innumerable armies of the East; who had inspired such terror into the infidels, that his name alone was long the signal of affright; who had remained, after the return of all the other sovereigns from the Crusade, and had alone commanded the Christian host; and who had signed the treaty, in virtue of which the pilgrims were allowed to accomplish their long journey to the Holy Sepulchre—Richard was really dear to all the crosses. They pardoned the vices and the ferocity which were inseparable from the manners of the age. They reproached him not with the odious massacre of all the prisoners he had captured from Saladin; and, in short, they seemed to think that so much valour might dispense with all other virtues. Himself a royal poet and knight, he united in his own person all the brilliant qualities of the age. He was a bad son, a bad husband, a bad brother, a bad king; but he was the most valiant and intrepid warrior in the army. His companions in arms loved him with a kind of idolatry. . . . Henry VI. carefully concealed the fact of his having detained the King of England as a prisoner, lest he should incur the excommunication of the Crusaders. Bloncel, who had been shipwrecked with him on the coast of Istria, and who had sought him in all the fortresses of Germany, sang beneath the tower in which he was confined, a *serenade* which he and Richard had composed in common. Scarcely had he finished the first stanza when Richard commenced the

I am not prepared altogether to deny that "the Crusades called forth noble feelings" (p. 291); but the noble feelings were, I believe, called forth on wrong grounds, led to wrong objects, and turned to base uses.

I am quite opposed to the idea that "the Crusade decreased sacerdotalism and superstition" (p. 293.) Most of them were undertaken at the instigation of the priesthood; and many of those who partook in the toils and dangers of these wars did so because, stimulated by superstitious beliefs in the efficacy of penances, the value of works of supererogation, the greater sacredness of vows taken to the church than duty due to God. &c.

I do not deny that the Crusades induced men to co-operate for an *idea*, which L. A. seems to imagine was an advantage. But this altogether depends upon the kind of idea: a man who acts upon a wrong idea is wrong, and the more conscientiously he acts upon it, the farther wrong he goes. That it was possible, or that it is possible to make men true Christians by force is a mistaken idea, which has bred pestilential influences over all the world; and especially reacted on Europe so as to make the Inquisition possible; for men who had seen their brethren go to make others accept of a faith at the point of the sword, by siege and escalade, could not properly object to the efficacy as applied to themselves of the prison, the rack, and the stake.

If L. A. has read the history of the Crusades in any trustworthy form, he would certainly never have said that they had purified war from selfishness and worldliness. Were not earthly as well as heavenly bribes held out by the Popes to urge men to engage in the Crusades?

I commend the perusal of the following lines to those who think as they read:—

"I must declare such wars the fruit  
Of idle courage or mistaken zeal;  
Sometimes of rapine and religious rage,  
To every mischief prompt. . . .  
. . . . Sure I am 'tis madness,  
Inhuman madness, thus from half the world  
To drain its blood and treasure, to neglect  
Each art of peace, each care of government:  
And all for what? By spreading desolation,  
Rapine, and slaughter o'er the other half,  
To gain a conquest we can never hold.  
I venerate this land. Those sacred hills,  
Those vales, those cities, trod by saints and prophets,  
By God himself, the scenes of heavenly wonders,

---

second. Blondel, having discovered his master, carried into England the tidings of his captivity, and engaged his brother to treat for his ransom."—"*Historical View of the Literature of the South of Europe*," by J. C. L. Simonde de Simondî, Vol. I., chap. iv., Bohn's Ed., pp. 114—116.

Inspire me with a certain awful joy.  
 But the same God, my Friend, pervades, sustains,  
 Surrounds, and fills this universal frame;  
 And every land, where spreads His vital presence,  
 His all-enlivening breath, to me is holy.  
 Excuse me, Sheald, if I go too far;  
 I meant alone to say, I think these wars  
 A kind of persecution. And when that—  
 That most absurd and cruel of all vices  
 Is once begun, where shall it find an end?  
 Each in his turn or has or claims a right  
 To wield its dagger, to return its furies,  
 And first or last they fall upon ourselves."

*Thomson's "Edward and Eleonora."*

R. L. B.

## Education.

### SHOULD THE BIBLE BE READ IN SCHOOLS WITHOUT COMMENT OR EXPLANATION?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

SINCE the investment of Paris the policy of the French has been to raise the siege by simultaneously attacking the besieging army by a relieving force and by a sortie from the beleaguered city. They have not been able to carry out these tactics; but the position of those who maintain the affirmative of this question is similar to what the position of the Prussian army around Paris would be if the French were to succeed in carrying out their plan of operations. There are those who maintain that the Bible should not be read at all in the State-supported schools, whilst at the same time others maintain that the Bible should not only be read in these schools, but also be commented upon and explained. Thus we, who contend for the Bible being read in the Government schools without comment or explanation, are exposed to attack both from the front and from the rear; and therefore, to meet this twofold attack, we must organize a double line of defence. It is very probable, if even the Prussians around Paris were assailed both by a vigorous sortie from the beleaguered city, and at the same moment by the army of Chanzy, Bourbaki, or Faidherbe, that they would still be able to maintain their position; and we believe, although we are thus subjected to attack from two distinct hostile forces, that our position is so strong as to enable us to stand our ground. We will now submit two theses for consideration, and will then bring forward a few thoughts upon the subject, by way of fortifying each line of defence. I. The duty of the State with regard to education is to provide for those it undertakes to instruct such teaching as

would tend to make them good citizens in that position in life which they may be called upon to fill. II. The duty of the State with regard to education is to act impartially towards the various religious denominations; and whilst it teaches the children to respect religion, and to look upon the Bible as the source from which all religious denominations profess to derive their distinguishing doctrines, it should not instil into their minds the special tenets of any particular sect. Before proceeding further we would observe that we think this question has probably been suggested by the discussions connected with the Education Act of last session, and that it doubtless refers to Bible-reading in the State-supported elementary schools. The openers of the debate have evidently taken this view of the question, and our remarks upon the subject are to be considered as specially applying to Bible-reading in these State-supported elementary schools.

I. The duty of the State with regard to education is to provide for those it undertakes to instruct such teaching as would tend to make them good citizens in that position in life which they may be called upon to fill. The aim of the State in education should be not merely to make shrewd, learned, clever men, but to make thoroughly good citizens—not merely to cultivate the intellectual powers, but also to train the moral nature—not merely to make sharp men of business, not merely to make keen-witted, sharp-eyed, active men, who are continually looking after "No. 1," but also to make dutiful children, obedient servants, and law-observing subjects. The Bible contains the best code of morals, based upon the surest foundation, and the minds of children should be early, frequently, and regularly directed to its maxims and teaching. The law affords a strong argument for avoiding that which is sinful; and the spirit of the gospel yields the strongest influence which has ever been exerted in drawing the human mind to that which is right. Morality, as well as intellectual ability, is needed to make good citizens. A respect for the religion taught in the Bible is a powerful moralizing influence; and this respect would be excited by the daily reading of the Bible in the State-supported schools. The children should be taught that as secular instruction and scholastic tuition cannot be separated from the reading of the Bible, so life in the world cannot be separated from an observance of moral duties and a respect for religious truth with credit to the man, safety to his country, or advantage to his own real interests. There are hundreds of parents in this country who would never think of teaching their children to read the Bible, or of sending them to a Sunday school, or a place set apart for the worship of God. If these children were not taught to read the Bible in the day school, they would probably grow up without reading the Bible at all, and the number of such children would be greatest in just that class which would be most affected by a Government system of education; and therefore we think it behoves the Government to see to it that none of those for whom

it provides instruction grow up without being taught to read and venerate the Bible. The first three paragraphs of C. P.'s article may be adduced by us in support of our first thesis; we have great pleasure in referring to these three paragraphs approvingly, and most heartily commend them to the re-perusal and careful consideration of our readers, but we feel obliged to dissent from the views of C. P. when he advocates the explanation of the Bible in the State-supported schools.\* We must confess, however, that we would rather have the Bible commented upon and explained in the Government schools than that it should not be read at all. Although a staunch Dissenter, we would rather the children should be taught to read the Bible and to learn the Church of England catechism, than that Bible-reading should be wholly excluded from the day school. We believe those words of Bacon to be true, in which the philosopher, as quoted by Dr. Ingleby in the *British Controversialist* for October, 1870, says that "truth will sooner come out from error than from confusion." Every Sunday school teacher, who has had much experience in teaching all classes of children, must have observed the vast difference between those children, taking them as a class, who have been taught to read the Bible daily, and those who have not been accustomed to read it at all. As a teacher in a Dissenting Sunday school, we would rather have for our scholars those who were taught to read the Bible daily, and to listen to the comments of even an Episcopalian tutor, than those who were not taught to read the Bible at all. But we believe that the right course lies between the two extremes, and therefore we now proceed to the second point in our argument.

II. The duty of the State with regard to education is to act impartially towards the various religious denominations; and whilst it teaches the children to respect religion, and to look upon the Bible as the source from which all religious denominations profess to derive their distinguishing doctrines, it should not instil into their minds the special tenets of any particular sect. In all its multifarious concerns impartiality is the one universal duty of the State. Law should treat all alike, and should not grant exclusive privileges to one class at the expense of another class. The Government should not favour the rich at the expense of the poor, the agriculturist at the expense of the trader, the noble at the expense of the peasant, or the Episcopalian at the expense of the Non-conformist; neither should it allow the power of doing so to the subordinate agents employed to carry out its projects.

If we permit the schoolmaster to comment upon and explain the Bible when it is read by his pupils, it would be practically impossible to draw a "hard and fast line," and say, You may comment and

\* We would here point out parenthetically, for perspicuity's sake, that, in the *British Controversialist* for January, by some unaccountable oversight, the article of C. P., which supports the negative of this question, is headed "Affirmative Article," and S. L. C.'s contribution, taking the affirmative, is headed "Negative Article."

explain so far and no farther. It would be impracticable to give the right of explaining and to withhold the right of proselytizing. Suppose it to be decided that the Bible shall be read and also explained in all State-supported schools, then in a district where the Baptists had a majority upon the school-board, a schoolmaster would be appointed who would teach the children of Episcopalians parents that when Christ commissioned His disciples to baptize, He intended them to dip believing Christians into the water; in a district where Episcopalians had a majority upon the school-board, a tutor would be appointed who would teach his pupils that the sprinkling of infants was Christian baptism. Thus the State system of education would stir up strife, and step out of its proper bounds. There would be an open feud amongst the electors as to which sect should return the largest number of representatives to the school-board, and there would be strife in the meetings of the school-board to decide upon the denomination from which the schoolmaster should be chosen. The various sects will always be eager for the work of proselytizing, and rightly so; it is within their natural sphere of operations; each should contend for the spread of those doctrines which he believes to be true, but this work of proselytizing must not be carried on by the *employés* of Government in their official capacity. To prevent this proselytizing on the part of the Government schoolmasters, the Bible must be read in the State schools without comment or explanation.

The business of State education is not so much to fill the minds of children with opinions ready cut and dried, as to furnish them with a well-assorted storehouse of facts, as a foundation upon which, and accurate methods of reasoning as the instrument by which, correct opinions may be formed. No teacher of an elementary school would think of giving to his pupils the details of the controversy amongst historians respecting the character of Mary, Queen of Scots, or the accuracy of Macaulay's estimate of William III., and he would not think of impressing upon the children's minds his own personal views upon such disputed points; he would merely supply facts upon which an opinion on the subject might be based. So the Government schoolmaster must not expound to the children the difference between Arminianism and Calvinism, and he must not impress his personal views of Christian doctrine upon the minds of his scholars; he is merely to supply the record of eternal verities, as contained in the words of the inspired penmen. This he will do by causing the Bible to be read in his school without comment or explanation.

C. P. exclaims, "What a weariness is an uncomprehended task-book!" In reply to this remark we would observe that comments upon a lesson are still more wearisome when the explanation given is not understood, and it is surprising how little the ordinary class of children comprehend the explanations of Christian doctrine which may be given them. An illustration of this fact is afforded by the case of *Ronayne v. Meade*, recently brought before Lord



Chancellor O'Hagan, in the Irish Court of Chancery. The children had been brought up as Roman Catholics, and it is well known that Roman Catholics are specially keen and successful in impressing their doctrines upon the minds of the young. When these two children became the object of this suit between their maternal aunt and their father, Lord Chancellor O'Hagan, himself a Roman Catholic, privately examined the children as to their acquaintance with, and attachment to, Roman Catholic doctrine; but he could not find in them any decided convictions on controverted points, and, we quote the words of a leading article in the *Daily News*, "Their notions concerning transubstantiation were only nebulous, the invocation of saints was but a habit, and purgatory they had not much thought of." We believe that probably nine-tenths of the Government schoolmasters would make the Bible more wearisome by commenting upon it, and explaining it to their scholars, than by causing it to be read without comment or explanation. C. P. argues that to read the Bible without comment or explanation would be to "treat it with disrespect and despite;" but this does not necessarily follow, for if each secular subject be studied twice or three times a week, whilst the Bible is read every day, if the principle be laid down that whatever circumstances may arise to set aside the study of certain subjects, nothing shall be permitted to set aside the reading of the Bible, then the Bible will be manifestly treated as a subject of special importance. C. P. refers to the difficulties as to authorship of the various books of the Bible, &c., but what teacher would think of entering upon such subjects in an elementary school?

Men congregate in communities to form states for the sake of civil order and civil prosperity; men band themselves together in church union for the sake of religious order and spiritual prosperity. It is the province of the Government of each individual state to look after the material, political, social, and moral condition of its subjects; to provide help for the utterly helpless, refuge for the hopelessly destitute, restraint for the uncontrollable maniac, punishment for the law-breaker, instruction in civil affairs for the untaught children; and it is chiefly because of its bearing upon the moral and social prosperity of the nation that the Bible should be read in State-supported schools. It is the province of each church to make provision for the religious wants of the people; to make arrangements for carrying out religious order, union, and communion; to propagate its own views of Christian doctrine; to interpret the spiritual meaning of God's word, and to expound to children the truths of the Bible. The province of the Church should not be invaded by the State, and we therefore maintain that the Bible should be read in schools without comment or explanation.

SAMUEL.

## NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

I CANNOT avoid marvelling that in a country like this the success of sects should be more eagerly sought than the progress of Christianity. It seems exceedingly strange to me that those who profess to be believers in Christ and Christianity should consider it possible in any way to separate intellectual, moral, civil, and religious life by boundaries of time and space, and propose to train the intellect secularly in school apart from any sanctifying influence; while certainly, if Jesus our Saviour ever had any view more constantly before His eyes than another, it was that man's whole nature should from the earliest years of infancy be consecrated to God.

I take His own example, and He came we know for an example, that we should follow His steps. We read that "when He was twelve years old" He was "found in the temple, sitting in the midst of the doctors [*i. e.*, *didaskalton*, teachers], both hearing [or listening to them] and asking them questions. And all that heard Him were astonished at His understanding and answers." Here we have not Jesus regarding religious education as a thing unsuitable for children, or in schools, but giving His example that instruction ought to be gladly received and highly prized, and that in the schools the teaching of the law and the prophets ought to be engaged in as a study.

It is very well known that no education is now thought to be worth anything unless it is explanatory. Now either the gospel is so plain that no explanation is required—and if it is, why are sects so numerous?—or it requires explanation like the lessons learned in and from other books. On what ground then can any one object to the giving of such explanation as is necessary to make the reading of the Bible level to the comprehension of children, and such comment as may make its application to life and conduct felt? If it is desired to make the Bible a mere symbol—a sort of sacred book of peculiar value, which one may not dare to comprehend; or to degrade it to a mere form, then I can see the reason for making it law to read the Scriptures without note or comment. The former is superstition, the latter is viler style hypocrisy. How can the mind of a child be brought to consider that book holy on Sundays which it treats with most irreverence on week days? and how will love of God's law be cultured in those who are systematically taught to look on it as not only a Sunday book, but a tiresome and dull weekly routine? That that should be tabooed on week days which is brought into prominence "*in exercise*" on Sundays, will form but a poor preparation in the puzzled mind of a child to give heed to the understanding of God's law, and attention to the gospel of God's love.

Does not there lie at the root of all this jealousy of comment and explanation a severe condemnation of our Christian civilization? Why should we esteem schoolmasters as rascals above all others? If we do not, why do we think he will do otherwise than right? why do we suppose that he will not refrain from proselytizing? If we do not, why do we suppose that he will act dishonestly in the matter of religious teaching? If we do not, why do we restrain him only on the Bible, and give him the whole range of history, civil and sacred, poetry, physics, and philosophy, to inculcate doctrines and dogmas about? Is this the charitable view we would like to have taken of our own action in our sphere of duty? would we like to be publicly condemned as unprincipled and untrustworthy without trial and contrary to facts? If we do suppose that schoolmasters are rascals, who would persistently proselytize against law, conscience, and common sense? why do we form such a notion? Is it not simply because we feel that we are so woundily sectarian that we would commit almost any sin to secure a sectarian success? We are jealous of the schoolmaster because we know our own wickedness, not because we know his. We have, however, a divine injunction against judging unrighteous judgment, and doing evil that good may come.

We protest against the implication which underlies the prohibition of Bible explanations in schools, that the schoolmasters would in all probability betray the trust as an uncharitable, unrighteous judgment, and against the training up of children to formalism in religion—for formal Bible-reading is the very root of formal religion—as a doing of evil that good may come. S. L. C. holds that the State and the Church are differing agencies, but he has given us no means of knowing how the activity of children is to be employed so as to separate and distinguish in its daily life Church-life and State duty. Sunday sanctimoniousness and week-day unceremoniousness will scarcely enable a child to fulfil the proper duties of life. The State has most certainly a claim to teach such a morality as it shall insist upon among its members. Does S. L. C. think it would be better to have morality separated from religion, that religion be made a matter of common, every-day life in teaching and practice? On what grounds could the schoolmaster inculcate moral duties? Not on scriptural grounds, for that would be trenching on the prerogative of the Church. Well, then, he must teach secularism; and though the Bible is a handbook in the school, he must guard against applying its precepts to human life. What will be the effect of such teaching but to bring up children to regard religion as an organized hypocrisy, and the Bible a mere sham, to be read but not regarded? If this is to train up a child in the way he should go, that when he is old he may not depart from it, I have read both the Bible and the human heart after a wrong fashion.

E. E. C.

## The Essayist.

—  
IN MEMORIAM 1870.

"Dust and ashes."

It has been a dull, dark, dreary, dismal year! Death's shafts have fallen thick, heavy, and fast in it. The stir of terrible strife has almost glutted the grave, and made the death-roll of the year a sadly overburdened calendar of woe. It is a list by far too lengthy for rehearsal:—

"Here are the wise, the generous, and the brave;  
The just, the good, the worthless, the profane;  
The downright clown, and perfectly well bred;  
The fool, the churl, the scoundrel, and the mean;  
The supple statesman and the patriot stern,  
The wrecks of nations and the spoils of time."

In this year of havoc, the usual slow corrosion of time has been superseded by a fate almost too mighty for mortal resistance. The passions and interests of men collapsed into war, and the destructive thunderclouds of policy and pride burst over the centres of Christian civilization, spreading among mankind terror, dismay, ruin, revolution, and death; and, even while we write, these thunderclouds are unspent, and the carnival of death goes on. Nor does war monopolize all the victims or sacrifices; disaster, accident, mismanagement, selfishness, greed, crime, and the gaunt spectre of starvation add to the normal victories of disease and death, till the soul shudders at the grim and ghastly gloom of the records it is called upon to read, and memory itself staggers at the thought of the numberless crowds who have received marching orders to the stateless grave; and whom—

"The all-beholding sun shall see no more  
In all his course."

It is a sad task to sit among the ashes of the year, and with inverted torch endeavour to read "the frail memorials" which here and there mark the dear dust of those whom the world loved, valued, cherished, and laments. It is not our duty, we are thankful to say, to seek among the huge burial-fields of battle and of siege, for those whom we are to recall to the memory of the hearts of men. Our task is grief-ful enough, though we have but to cast the eye of sorrow along the grave-mounds and sepulchres, which have entombed the "serene creators of immortal things," although themselves but mortal, who have added to the thoughts of our race by their writings.

Death is severance. How many deaths, then, do men really die? To many hopes, joys, aspirations, pleasant places, powers, desires, persons, must we all die, even while we are alive! Time, if it is an

ever-given living, is also an ever-constant dying. The living present is with us but a moment, and life comes to us just as the sand-grains in the hour-glass.

"Blest who, on virtue's life relying,  
Dies to vice; thus lives through dying."

So it is with the feelings and emotions, experiences and activities of the mind; nor is it really otherwise with the animated frame than with the animating power which dwells and delights in it. Sir John Davies has very truly said,—

"Our bodies, every footstep that they make,  
March towards death, until at last they die;  
Whether we work, or play, or sleep, or wake,  
Our life doth pass, and with time's wings doth fly."

"Death is of force o'er man," and during one short year makes mighty changes in the relationships of mortal life. Of those departed never to return how long the record is! Let us, though not denying that—

"Dead men's claims are speedily forgotten,"

endeavour here to call to memory some of those who have pronounced "life's prologue," and are gone to have their parts cast for the ever-evolving drama of eternity.

From the ranks alike of war and letters—from the making as well as the writing of history, General Sir De Lacy Evans, after a varied and brilliant career (for the "distinguished services" in which the House of Commons, of which he had long been a member, voted him the nation's thanks), was called away on 3rd January, after having spent in the fight of life 82 years. On the 10th, John Tidd Pratt, the jurist, often the working man's friend as Registrar of Friendly Societies, and Certifier of the Rules of Savings Banks, as well as in the advocacy of many social reforms, died aged 72. The distinguished scholar and author, Dr. Rowland Williams, whose case as a heretic disturbed the Church and law courts, in consequence of his partnership in "The Essays and Reviews," to which he contributed the second paper, on Bunsen's "Biblical Researches," died on the 14th. He was a writer of rare power and acumen. His "Prophets of Judah and Israel," translated afresh and illustrated, is full of evidence of scholarly attainments; his "Rational Godliness" contains very "advanced views;" his "Owen Glendower," a drama, shows poetic talent, and strong strange conceptive ingenuity, though it lacks unity and livingness. The vicar of Broadchalke, Wilts, was a man of singular gifts and acquirements, and in his 52 years' lease of life did much to stir and strain, perhaps even to disturb the inquiring spirit. On the 18th, at the age of 78, Mr. Samuel Bailey, who had, as a metaphysical, ethical, political, and critical writer, been for half a century a power among thinkers as an advocate for freedom in the pursuit of truth, the formation and publication of opinions, an exponent of philosophical

radicalism, an opponent of the Berkeleyan metaphysic and of the old logic, and a promoter of free trade and a reformed currency, succumbed to "the opposeless will." Of his life and works, "the most copious account which he had seen," he said, appeared in the *British Controversialist*, in a "paper which gave him much satisfaction." He had the magnanimity to leave by will £50,000, to be applied to the benefit of his native town, where he had been chairman of the bank since 1831, that town which, by refusing to have him for a representative in Parliament, endorsed the proverb that "a prophet is not without honour, save in his own country, and among his own people." On the 21st, Alexander Herzen, a Russian journalist, politician, and novelist, whose "Stories half told" have much merit, but whose consistent struggles for the liberty of the press in his native land, and its recovery from functionarism, do him much more honour—died an exile's death in Paris before he had passed middle life; so truly do "we pass our years as a tale that is told."

February took from us a ripe, able, and experienced journalist, James Pagan, who had begun literary life early, and had gained the top round of the professional ladder by dint of perseverance and steady endeavour to advance; while he headed the newspaper press of Glasgow, and had been offered the best bribes London was able to give, he devoted himself to the local history of his adopted city and its institutions. He was genial, eager to encourage talent, and trained a host of the best journalists of the time. The Rev. Charles Townshend, a poet and a literary man, of the early era of Scott, Byron, Rogers, Wordsworth, among whose set he moved with great brilliancy, and memories of whom he retained and related with great relish and attraction, died at an advanced age—as did also George Hogarth, the father-in-law of Charles Dickens, a musical critic and historian, who deserted the prospects of Scotch law for the opera stall and the *littérateur's* reputation. On the closing day of February passed away the Bishop of Mauritius, who had acquired considerable reputation as a popular preacher at Havant, in Hampshire, as the Rev. T. Goodwin Hatchard, before his appointment to that insular see. His "German Tree," a moral tale; was favourably received about twenty years ago as a fair indication of a talent for teaching by parable good Christian truth.

Sir Henry Light, K.C.B., Governor of British Guiana, and Commander-in-chief of that possession, who had acquired some reputation for his "Narrative of Travels in Egypt," and works of a similar nature, died on 3rd March, aged 88; his wife, Charlotte, having preceded him on the way to dusty death on the 2nd. "They were lovely in their lives, and in death they were not divided."

"Ballot" Berkeley (the Hon. Francis H. Fitzhardinge, fourth son of the Earl of Berkeley), whose happy combination of wit and argument, satire and good sense, annually secured the attention of the House of Commons to the discussion of the ballot as a safeguard in elections, since George Grote relinquished political life as an M.P.,

died 10th March, aged 74. Two days later, at the early age of 44, after a lingering and painful illness, one of the young and eager-hearted adventurers in Literature and the Drama, who made mirth for thousands, went home in sadness.

With the suddenness of a *coup d'état*, to those who know not of its coming, death fell upon Count C. F. Montalembert on the 13th of March, before he had attained his 60th year, though he was found thoroughly prepared and expectant. His name is written not only in the political and historical annals of France, but in the records of the Church. He was an essayist in defence of progress and freedom within the pale of Catholicity—as an essayist so brilliant and sparkling as to be the Macaulay of France; as an historian he was perhaps more fervid than accurate, and his “Monks of the West,” if graphic and intense, is based on an ideal of a Christian commonwealth far too narrow for the widened thoughts of our era; he was a sincere, earnest Catholic believer, and yet a bold parliamentary orator in favour of freedom; he was of that passionate yet intellectual nature that makes effective public speakers, in which emotion and thought in their collision strike forth the fire-flashes of eloquence, which at once lighten up a subject and inflame partisanship. He lived in strange and stormy times, a very tragedy of soul was his “darkened and baffled career;” but he kept that soul pure and unsoiled by sordidness or selfishness against Pope, emperor, clique, and mob. He held it as a maxim—not of lip but of life—that “freedom in the sphere of religion, even more than that of politics is the condition of truth.” He passed, after an earnest, eager, ardent, enthusiastic, varied, useful, manly, painfully suffering existence, into the eternity which he had long looked in the face with God’s faith in his heart,—

“Wearing the white flower of a blameless life,”

and few are the men over whose chequered career in the stirring and stormy affairs of France such a noble eulogium might be pronounced, as over him who did his duty, even from out of the heart’s cave of despair, as “a stern task of soul.”

Joseph Payne, on 29th March, aged 72, expired. His goodness of heart, eager desire for religious progress among the people, unselfish devotion to philanthropic schemes, and readiness to make himself useful and agreeable to the poor and the ignorant, as well as the versatility of his talent, gave him claim to memorial in our hearts; for he who seeks to minister to man’s noble necessities, Culture, and to his physical wants—Charity, has won for himself “the favour of God and of man.”

In the obituary of April we remember no names very notable to us. The Rev. John Eden Auckland, Bishop of Bath and Wells, as the editor of “The Life and Correspondence of the First Lord Auckland;” Wm. J. Maxwell, well known in philanthropic circles for his efforts to promote the welfare of men; Wm. H. Blaauw, an English antiquarian of considerable note, in whose “History of the Barons’ War, the rise of parliamentary institutions under Simon de Montford is traced and described with care and skill; and Daniel

Maclise, an illustrator of literature and history with his pencil, in a style and with a prodigality of artistic ingenuity which have seldom been rivalled; to whom we owe many revelations of the invisible creations of our great authors made visible to his seeing eye, may perhaps be noted as deserving of mention in our rapid survey of the losses to letters the year has brought.

On the 5th day of May, a genial, excellent, loved, and lovable physician, Sir J. Y. Simpson, Bart., died. He had many claims on the regard of his age. He was a notable example of a self-made man—a man of genius, sympathy, and skill in letters; a man especially who grudged no care to alleviate the afflictions of literary men, whose generosity was hearty and sensible, and whose vigour and zeal made him a man of mark among his compeers in medical practice. His name is an honoured one in many hearts, and is written imperishably, not only in history, but, we believe, in the book of another life.

In the Dean of Rochester—Rev. Thomas Dale—a preacher, a poet, and a scholar of quiet disposition but true celebrity, passed over to the majority on the 14th, at the age of seventy-two. The calm, solemn earnestness with which he spoke the words of truth and beauty, into which he interpreted the blessed news of the gospel, produced a thrilling effect upon his hearers; even when read, they appeal to the taste, judgment, and soul, so transparently they work into the spirit with the certainty of God's sunlight. His renderings of the tragedies of Sophocles are much and justly admired; while among sacred poets his name is revered as a household word for the grand imaginative insight into Holy Writ with which he has illumined the page of inspiration. His efforts as Professor of English Literature in the University of London proved his possession of a skilled intellect, a sympathetic nature, and an exquisitely cultured critical accuracy of judgment. Thinking of his demise, can one fail to recollect the fine turn he has given to affection's grief in his own sweet verses (of which we quote but two) on "Consolation?"—

"The loved, but not the lost,  
Oh no! they have not ceased to be,  
Nor live alone in memory;  
'Tis we who still are tossed  
O'er life's wild sea—'tis we who die:  
They only live whose life is immortality.

"The spirit was but born,  
The soul unfettered, when they fled  
From earth, the living, *not* the dead;  
Then wherefore should we mourn?  
*We*, the wave-driven, the tempest-tossed,  
When shall we be with them, the loved, but not the lost?"

Cyrus Redding, long honourably and intimately connected with the periodical press of London, a man known in all literary circles



and noted for the variousness of his powers, the multitude of his intimacies, the breadth of his sympathy, and the strength of his friendships, one of the most voluminous writers—in volumes, pamphlets, periodicals, and newspapers—that England probably ever had, expired on 21st May, aged eighty-five, after sixty years of active authorship, and literary copartnerships innumerable.

To be “a fellow of infinite jest and a most excellent fancy” is no suretyship against the time and place “of skulls, and epitaphs, and worms;” nor, as Shakspeare has taught us, need even the humorist fear the oncome of the end. The stainless good Falstaff of our century, the man who purified wit from the contaminations which are prone to adhere to it, and made the most exquisite mirth, as innocent as a child’s soul and as clean as a lily’s leaf, who guided the merriest men in the most modest way, and distilled from every joke the least perceptible grain or atom of scurrility, and tenderly controlled the band of brisk-thoughted friends who furnished for upwards of quarter of a century the fun of a nation—Mark Lemon, on the 23rd May, passed from the stage of time beyond—

“That curtain of obdurate woof, whose folds  
Continually do stir, but never rise.”

He had a merry eye and a laughing lip, a feeling heart and a spirit of fine mould: he had a love for children and a reverence for the purity of life which made him a favourite in his bright stories of the young and the innocent. He gave to the stage more play than years of life had been granted to him, and all are stamped with the humour of a happy heart; he composed brief tales for holiday times which smile into the soul; and he wrote novels in which the atmosphere is quite free from the murk and the sensational emotionalism which have been attractive while they were stirring and startling in their plot-interest. “The Enchanted Doll” has made its way into thousands of family circles with delight, and in his “Loved at Last” has not attained the credit of exciting the greed of the million to possess it, it has commended itself to many as a home novel one can enjoy and confess to having enjoyed and it is not very easy for a reader of much curiosity to obey the injunction contained in the title of his story, “Wait till the end.” In “Prose and Verse” a miscellany of good things is garnered. He did not look upon life as a jest; he illustrated Shakspeare’s Falstaff, after he had made him fulfil his resolution to “purge and live cleanly,” and Shakspeare himself could scarcely have imagined “a merrier man within the limits of becoming mirth” than Mark Lemon. He has done much who has made innocent mirth possible to more than a generation of his fellow-men; and “he died tearing God” with hope in his spirit.

On June’s eighth day, bright, brilliant, and beautiful though it was, a gloom fell upon England like an eclipse of a heart’s joy, and 1871.

on the morrow the gloom darkened into death. Charles Dickens had gone as usual to the work of his life at Gad's Hill,—

"With heart as gentle for distress  
As resolute with wise true thoughts to bind  
The happiest to the unhappiest of mankind ;"

and he had been led to think of "the resurrection and the life," and of "flocks of brightness darting into the sternest marble corners," warming "the stone tombs of centuries" in a happy and solemn train of thought. He had gone to unriddle for the gratification of humanity "The Mystery of Edwin Drood," but even then there was stealing upon him the strongest mystery in the mysterious universe of mind, the Hand that smites into dust and nothingness the aims and schemes, the glory and the power of man. The spirit that span so many fine threads of parabolic fiction, and festooned together fancy and faith, was stricken from its sheathing environment, and summoned to pass into the presence of One whose government admits of no Circumlocution Office veneering. Pathos and humour and fancy and kindly glee, which could move thousands of hearts to freshness of feeling and brightness of spirit were now to be withdrawn, and the story of a life was to be rehearsed in the unadorned language of truth to one who knows and sees the minutest motives of the life's last act.

Did there rise upon the eye of his soul in that moment of passage, when the creative spirit, touched by the angel of death, dropped from its nerveless grasp the newly dipped pen, ready to write down the bright fancy of the instant just passed,—when thought was failing, and the chill fell upon his heart like an ice-drop,—did the spirit recall from the palimpsest records of memory—

"An angel speaking to a group of shepherds in a field; some travellers, with eyes uplifted, following a star; a baby in a manger; a child in a spacious temple talking with grave men; a solemn figure, with a mild and beautiful face, raising a dead girl by the hand; again, near a city gate, calling back the son of a widow on his bier to life; a crowd of people looking through the opened roof of a chamber where He sits, and letting down a sick person on a bed with ropes; the same, in a tempest, walking on the water to a ship; again, on the sea-shore, teaching a great multitude; again, with a child upon His knee, and other children round; again, restoring sight to the blind, speech to the dumb, hearing to the deaf, health to the sick, strength to the lame, knowledge to the ignorant; again, dying upon a cross, watched by armed soldiers, a thick darkness coming on, the earth beginning to shake, and only one voice heard, 'Forgive them; for they know not what they do.'"

If so, while his own pen ceased its task, did he hear another voice saying, "Write, Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord from

\* From "A Christmas Tree," No. 31 of "Reprinted Pieces," issued along with "American Notes," by Charles Dickens. 1868.

henceforth: Yea, saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their labours; and their works do follow them"? "Write, Blessed are they which are called unto the marriage supper of the Lamb"? (Rev. xiv. 13; xix. 9). Vain questions! The mystery of death is inscrutable. In the hush of the study, where the "lean fellow" has done his work so quietly, those words of his perhaps rose into semi-conscious utterance,—"*Heaven is just, and such things teach us impressively that there is a brighter world than this, and that the passage to it is speedy. God's will be done!*" And yet, "oh! it is hard to take to heart the lesson that such deaths should teach; but let no one reject it, for it is one that all should learn, and it is a mighty universal truth." We all sit constantly under the shadow of death, and every passing moment whispers, "Be ye also ready: for in such a day and in such an hour as ye know not the Son of man cometh." As the tree falleth, so must it lie, for death—

"Strate up the story of our days."

Two members of the medical profession of great reputation and ability, although accustomed to wrestle with disease and death, succumbed to the inevitable, and departed,—Professor James Syme, one of the rarest experimental surgeons of the age, who carried the skill of science and the art of thorough intelligence into the curative process of operative surgery; and Sir James Clarke, Physician in Ordinary to her Majesty, one of the most thoughtful and considerate of the students of the laws of health. Both contributed largely to professional literature, and took active interest in the progress of medical reform.

Among the losses of the year in statesmanship there falls to be noted the demise of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, George William Villiers, fourth Earl of Clarendon. He has been admitted by friends and foes alike to have possessed natural abilities, aptitude for business, conciliatory manners, and a profound acquaintance with the politics of his age. He was early devoted to the professional pursuit of statesmanship, and he bore a large share in the party movements of the day, as well as in the achievements of civil life. His death was mourned with great depth of feeling, and the sadness was not lessened by the idea that in this direful year the reins should have been snatched out of the hands of one who knew the position of affairs; for men have always many sighs for the might have been.

In July, newspaper literature recorded among its losses the names of Murdo Young, aged eighty, who had done much to develop the daily history of our times for more than half a century in the management of the *Sun*; and Mr. John Williams, aged eighty-two, who had held for a long time a high position on the Welsh press: but we have no note of any special celebrity in letters to whom July brought the hour of the end.

On 24th August Dr. C. Schwartz died: he was an earnest

philanthropist, an enthusiastic labourer in the cause of Christ, both as the Messiah of Israel and the Saviour of man. His assiduous endeavours to bring in "the scattered nation" to the fulness of the Gentiles, and to bring his fellow Hebrews to a knowledge of the faith, together with the anxieties of the charities which he superintended, brought him, in all probability, at an earlier date than he otherwise might to the bed of death. But he had done a good work by the press and in the pulpit, in almsdeeds and in stirring endeavours, and he died in the full assurance of faith that he would be a partaker of the sure mercies which the Lord had promised to those who labour in His vineyard under the captaincy of His Son.

September came laden with the tidings of the capsize of *The Captain* in the wildly tossing waves of the Bay of Biscay, bearing down, at one fell swoop, to the gravelless depths of the sea many of the choice scions of Britain's noble families; and bringing despair into the hearts and homes of those who had trusted that it would be Albion's iron bulwark against any foreign foe who might invasion threaten.

The excessive suddenness of the disaster sent a shock through the heart of England, because it proved how truly the grandest triumphs alike of constructive and destructive genius is abortive against the might of nature and its Ruler's power; and how constantly the greed of the grave seeks gratification. Oh insatiate Death! even while deep-mouthed slaughter wades deep in blood new spilled, thou strikest the children of duty into the sea, as relentlessly—

"As if diseases, massacres, and poison,  
Famine and war were not thy caterers."

We crave a word of private sorrow for a hand-clasped friend, whose untimely end, brought on by his own hand, quenched at mid-day a light of thought. An able journalist, whose verve and worth had raised him from the desk of a provincial journal to the chair of a metropolitan one, established a reputation in the western world as a man of skill and mind, and who in all his vicissitudes from a stockbroker's office in boyhood to a recognised position among the journalists of America, kept safe and sound in heart and brain till a severe sunstroke deprived him of self-control, and James Watson Finlay passed on a Sabbath morning in August to a suicide's death in a mad search for surcease of sorrow, pain, and struggle; despite heaven's "command 'gainst self-slaughter."

At the ripe old age of 87, on August's closing day, Bolton Corney, one of the most thorough students of the archæology of literature Britain possessed, faded like a long-continued inter-dream into life. As the editor of "Thomson's Season," Goldsmith's "Poetical Works," Locke's "Conduct of the Understanding," as a multifarious contributor to general literature, not only in many periodicals, but in his "New Curiosities," as an expositor alike of the Bayeux tapestry and the life and works of Shakspeare,

and as a voluminous contributor to "Notes and Queries," he is worthy of remembrance. "Idly-busy," he spent the latest years of his life in lettered sense and learned interests, and death came to him "in the soft guise of gentle sleep."

Acute brain disease, which came on with unexpected suddenness and severity, kept Prof. William A. Miller from attending the "Parliament of Science" at Liverpool, and on the last day of September this learned and excellent chemist, this zealous devotee to physical science, whose name is written indelibly in the history of British progress, left the scene of his expected delights for a higher region of intellectual life.

On the 6th October an eminent young chemist, Augustus Mattheisson, under the pressure of a wrung soul, rushed—

"Out of life's history  
Into death's mystery,"

goaded on to this sad mad act by a keen sense of the world's injurious haste to take up an ill report.

After an illness of four days the genial and erudite Andrew Scott, Professor of Oriental Languages in the University of Aberdeen, died on 10th October. He was a man of varied powers and attainments, of singularly amiable though somewhat eccentric character, of wide repute, no less for the learning he possessed than for the kindness of spirit he displayed and the ability with which he taught.

On the 20th October an ingenious critic of English literature (of which he had held a professorship as a colleague of Hamilton and Wilson), an excellent lawyer, an able sheriff, an accurate German translator (of Schiller's "Wallenstein"), a versatile writer of verses, a contributor to the "Encyclopædia Britannica," the *Edinburgh Review*, and *Blackwood's Magazine*, a humorist and philosopher, George Moir, died, just on the eve of his taking a hopeful journey to London to be among books, with friends and at leisure, so little do we know the vanity of plans, the fleetness of life, and the hour of the power of the destroyer,—ought we not rather to say of God's vintage hour?

Of "truths touched slightly by the fingers of fiction" Captain Fred. Chamier, R.N., was a masterly recorder. The buoyancy, variedness, life, and brilliancy of the sea reproduced themselves in the heart when he was the narrator of moving incidents. Nature, observation, and humour characterize the "Life of a Sailor," "Ben Brace," "Jack Adams," "Tom Bowline," and "The Arethusa," or we have much forgotten the impressions made on a boy's mind by these spirited products of the passion for sea-stories. His description of the events of the Revolution in Paris in 1848 struck us on perusal as singularly vivid and graphic. At the age of 72, on 29th October, he suffered the last earthly change, and "cast anchor at Gravesend," to use a nautical synonym for "died and was buried."

Two names connected with theological scholarship rise to our memory as among those who in November "slept the sleep that knows no waking" here,—the Rev. J. B. Barker, Professor of Exegetical Theology in Spring Hill College, Birmingham, a skilled and judicious instructor, whose great tact and sound judgment won, as it deserved, the confidence of the Nonconformist community and whose kindliness of heart gained him the love of all his students. He was a man of large acquirements and gifted mind, zealously holy in heart, sedulously intent in so performing the duties of his office as to provide pastors for the churches possessed of the characters of Timothy and Titus, if he could but rarely gain for them an aspirant after the vital devotion of Paul. He grew to be the object of venerating respect to a large circle of officiating pastors who knew his worth, his learning, and his generous jealousy for the reputation of those who had followed the course of study through which he led them as the servant of the heavenly Teacher. He died, aged 72, on the 23rd; and on the 26th the Ven. William Hale, Archdeacon of London, died at the age of 76. His "History of the Jews," "Annotations on the Gospels," "The Sick Man's Guide," and a number of works contributed to the publications of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, give evidence of his intelligently devotional character; his interest in antiquarianism appears in two works contributed to the publications of the Camden Society, and his memory as an educator will be cherished by the readers of his account of the Charterhouse, of which he was Master. Not without night-watch by his couch was his departure to the sweet future where sin nor death are found.

Man cannot live a life that shall endure, yet he may so dutifully perform what lies before him that—

"Elaborate stone in sculpture's matchless forms"

may fade to dust sooner than the memory of his labours. M. Pierre Jannet, among the noble deaths which have occurred in Paris in this year of bitter trial, may claim notice from us here. In the midst of the anxiety and care involved in the voluntarily undertaken duty of providing for the supplying of daily bread gratuitously to the children attending the public schools in the *arrondissement* of Paris in which he dwelt, the editor of "Rabelais and Villon," and of some of the prettiest of the classics which the Parisian press has produced, died—a soldier of Christian charity stricken down in the fight by "the viewless hand" in one of the early days of December, at the age of 60.

Karel Jaromir Erben, a poet and historian of Bohemia, highly spoken of as a student of folk-lore, and editor of the popular works of John Huss, the Reformer, also expired early in December.

A more special grief now requires mention—the death of Thomas Doubleday, the cheeriest angling songster who ever paced through Coquetdale, the most classical sonneteer of this age, a playwright who attained stage triumphs, the historian of the finance of Eng-

land, the biographer of Sir Robert Peel, the revolutionizer of the "Theory of Population," the defender of "Mundane Moral Government," the expositor of *Bentley's Theory* as "Matter for the Materialist," who brought modern politics to the "Touchstone"—a stubborn but honest defender of the people's rights against the great dominant parties in the State, a novelist who could make even the *Eve* of St. Mark remarkable, and so thorough a believer in the maxim that—

"Time's glory is  
To unmask falsehood and bring truth to light,"

that even on the borders of fourscore he interested himself in this serial, aided its conductors, and contributed to its pages, while he treated with the affectionate fondness of a father the most copious contributor to its contents. With some characteristics of the fine gentlemanly Quakerhood in which he was brought up, he conjoined a humour and a blithesomeness which made his steps springy, and denoted elasticity of heart, as has been said of him. He was a gentleman of Heaven's making, though of the State's spoiling. We give the sad farewell of the heart to him, but not to his memory. In his own words,—

"Is not the life well spent  
Which loves the lot that kindly Nature weaves  
For all inheriting or adorning earth?  
Which throws light pleasure over true content,  
Blossoms with fruitage, flowers as well as leaves,  
And sweetens wisdom with a taste of mirth?"

Out of the chambers of memory there arise pictures of death-scenes in this dismal year which our pen may not touch upon. It is as if Death's Carnival were being held, so sad and gloomy are the annals of the year. Only these few have we selected out of the great darkness of the past year, to cast over them a sun-ray of remembrance:—

"For who to dumb forgetfulness a prey  
This pleasing anxious being ever resigned,  
Left the warm precincts of the cheerful day,  
Nor cast one longing, lingering look behind,"

to anticipate the life's verdict which the world would pronounce on them. This is natural. It is wiser, however, to look forward to the assize of eternity, and to bethink us of its judgment. It is well for us that we may look hopefully. *OWN* has come to give us faith, hope, and love; on Calvary's brow His soul was made an offering for sin, and that cross of suffering has become the most precious symbol of humanity since He died thereon that we might live; for—

"Then hope immortal raised man's brow sublime,  
And from Him shrunk the conquerors death and time."

## The Reviewer.

---

*Introductory Addresses: delivered at the opening of the University of Glasgow. Session 1870-71. Edinburgh & London: William Blackwood & Sons.*

IN a small apartment in the University of Glasgow, granted to him by the college authorities, James Watt slowly and laboriously wrought out his great conception of a workable steam-engine. The giant Steam, like Frankenstein, has taken revenge, as it were, against the creator of the possibilities of its being, and has ousted the university built on the lands of Blackfriars in 1456, and compelled its removal from the banks of the once famous Molindena Burn in the east to the lands of Gilmore Hill on the banks of the song-renowned Kelvin in the west. To us, born right close to the chimes of the college bell, and long resident within the shadow of its antique frontage; to us, who peered with childish affright up its gloomy staircases when the great horror of dissecting-room murders lay like a dark bar across its courts, who played the merry games of boyhood in high jinks in the very precincts of the professorial mansions, and took part in the studies and assemblies, the controversies and even the riots of the place; the change, albeit for the better, is fraught with saddening feelings, because it involves the passing away—for a railway station and all its manifold life—of those “halls and class-rooms, dingy and narrow” though they were, in which so many illustrious men—Reid, Smith, Sandford, Ramsay, &c.—have taught; and of those old quadrangles along which so many “successive generations of students, eager with the hopes, the energies, and the honourable ambitions of youth,” have paced in the glow of enthusiasm to engage in those “labours whose chief aim is to mature, discipline, and strengthen the soul and intellect of man.” We feel that a landmark of the mental history of a nation has been removed, and we confess to a shudder of emotion at the idea that the echoes should be awaked by the engine’s shrill whistle where the voices of Burke, Campbell, Brougham, Derby, and Macaulay have been heard.

Not that we do not rejoice at that magnificent pile in which Glasgow University is (to be) housed at an expense of a third of a million. That we do heartily, and look upon it as an omen of good that in a city to commerce much devote learning should possess a dwelling-place so honourable and commodious. But it is difficult to transmigrate the souls of old institutions, their associations and *glamourie*, to new edifices, and to preserve the conscious continuity of history between the past and the present. And though we are sundered now from the presence of the smoke-grimed effigy of Zachary Boyd, in the shadow of which we listened when a mere



boy to Sir D. Keyte Sandford, who communicated to Scotland that enthusiasm for Greek scholarship to which Professor Lushington has imparted elegance and accuracy, we take delight in everything which brings up associations of the olden time when Ramsay and Lushington, Buchanan and Fleming, Thomson and Nichol, Reid and Macfarlane, were powerful as spells over the young spirit.

Nor is it all a dream; for as we read the pages of this volume there steals forth from its page the very image, and there arise upon the ear the very tones of him who "thought in Greek"—our noble, kindly, intellectual, and sympathetic teacher, glory-crowned in the song of Tennyson, but hallowed to our and to many a one's heart by deeds of kindness, words of interest, stirrings of the spirit, and elevations of the soul. Long years have elapsed since we have seen the keen glance, the chiselled features, the flowing auburn locks, and the lithe figure, "in sober gownd yclad" of Edward Law Lushington; yet the pulses of gratitude quicken in my frame when I remember the days of his kindness and the exquisite suavity of his manner of doing good. If he was profound in Grecian lore, he was notable for sympathy much more; and I welcome the occasion which has here brought my mind again in contact with his. Even when plodding through the routine of the class it was not unusual with him to drop words of high meaning and intensity of reach; and though not given to much speech, what he said was weighty with the priceless treasure of thought. He was no mere worker among vocables, but a deep student of human nature; and much good he thus diffused, even on those who passed through his class having little Latin, and learning less Greek. An entire generation of Scottish scholars owe debt unpayable to the philosophic mind who managed the Greek class in Glasgow University.

The addresses here collected are "A General Introductory Address" delivered by Professor Lushington—we presume as the oldest member of the Senate; an address on "the Claim of Theology to a place among the Sciences," delivered by the Rev. John Caird, D.D., Dean of the Faculty of Divinity; one on Scottish Law, and Law Studies and Statutes, by Professor Berry, and another on Medicine as a Study, by Professor Young, Deans respectively of the faculties of Law and Physic. All the addresses are admirable and appropriate. Yet not only from our admiring love of the speaker, but also on account of the intrinsic value of the address and the general bearing of his subject—Culture, its objects and results—on all minds, we shall devote the larger portion of our space to a notice of the address of Professor Lushington.

Occasionally on perusing the speech we have been impressed with the sententious pith he can impart to a closely packed idea, that reminded one of the days of old. For example,—"*Self-sacrifice is the title by which man takes possession of his destined inheritance;*" and this fine allusion to the explorations and dis-

coveries in the East—"The long buried re-orient dawn has smitten Memnon's statue, charming it once more into speech."

We quote from this eloquent and thoughtful address a few remarks on natural science, mental philosophy, and philology, which we feel certain will bear out what we have advanced on the merits of the speech:—

"A university seeks to meet the needs of all, and aid each one in pursuing the path to knowledge and usefulness for which he has been best fitted by nature, or to which he has been called by circumstances; in some, to kindle and keep alive the hope that in times to come your names also may be mentioned with those whom to name is to honour. . . . In the city of Watt, it may well appear superfluous to dwell upon the benefits secured and the triumphs achieved by physical science, and the manifold arts which it renders possible. . . . The outer world with all its marvels is not the sole nor the highest field for human interest and speculation. Earth, ocean, air, their manifold elements, are one after one opening fresh realms of wonder to our view. Is the mind which observes and draws forth their secrets, the intellect which controls and wields them as its servants, to be shut out from inquiry—proscribed as unfathomable to the plummet of thought? Such a doctrine would be at once cowardly, shallow, and presumptuous. What is nearer to man than man? and what can he care to know if his own nature, with all its yearnings and aspirations, is to remain for ever unknown? . . . Let us then courageously but modestly strive to advance in the search after absolute truth, refusing to admit that the limited nature of man's understanding condemns it to impotence, or precludes him from ever pushing the barrier farther and farther away from him. Let us hope that as the great names of Kant and Fichte, and other heroes in the highest sphere of thought become more and more known and endeared to us, a country which still numbers among its thinkers pupils and friends of Hamilton and Ferrier may not, in our time at least, slacken the sinews of its intellectual prowess.

"The symbol and foremost instrument of thought, so essentially incorporated with it that we seek in vain to imagine how one could exist without the other, is language; and closely allied to the study of man's spiritual nature is the study of this its most subtle and delicate manifestation. The more we feel that our race is one, instinct with like passions, hopes, and fears—a brotherhood of pilgrims whose paths, though separate, converge and point alike to the same crowning height, the more shall we prize the power which enables us to read the thoughts and acts of long-vanished generations that have helped us onward to all we now possess of worth or excellence. . . . Surely it is a rich privilege to study the records of great nations that have been, and may well assist us towards entering better into what is more than superficial in the contents of our own time. It may enable us, if a man of high genius should arise among ourselves whose foresight and patriotism may guide the course of centuries, to see him more truly as he is, in contemplating the champions of like mould who were his forerunners, 'to know his likeness to the wise below, his kindred with the great of old.' In poetry, in oratory, in history no less than in statesmanship and heroism, unsurpassed models are presented to us in Greek and Roman literature, whose distinctive grandeur we must learn to appreciate if we would estimate aright the genius which, in similar regions,

has illumined more recent nations. Look at the highest instance in epic and the drama,—what can, in many ways, be more unlike than Homer and Milton; what more perfect than either? Homer swift-flashing in radiance of strength; Milton stern in august majesty, clothed with thunder. Yet we feel we have a right in many essential points to look at and class them together, and every one who has studied both will have found his admiration of either confirmed and deepened by the contrast, which will show how each, as the truest and most living type of his own time, is, for that very reason, true and living to all time. Compare, again, *Æschylus* or *Sophocles* with *Shakspeare*, and what first strikes you is the wide range of difference; but looking more closely again, you will perceive in all alike the poetic depth and subtlety that can take and hold abashed the soul, thrilled with the revelation of tragic grandeur and awfulness. Some of the greatest modern poets—I will only instance *Dante* and *Milton*—have quaffed deepest at the springs of earlier inspiration; nor did this limit or fetter their own rich fertility of strength. The imaginative wealth of one nation is not, indeed, reissued, but becomes fruitful, and multiplies the wealth of another. The largest nature can take in most of external influences, and, shaping them into something new, express its own originality and creative power even more vividly than if it had never opened to such influences."

Dr. Caird's address is finished and well reasoned, worthy of the occasion and of the reputation of one of the best preachers in Scotland; Professor Berry's, though going into minute details, is able and informing, and Professor Young's, dealing as it does with the *rationale* of medical study, has wide references. The work is handsomely got up, and well deserves perusal and preservation.

*Spare Moments.* January, 1871. London: Larner & Blackbourn.

We have before us the first number of a shilling magazine bearing this title, which will sufficiently indicate its object. The proprietors are amateur writers, and this, their first production, does them considerable credit. The whole of the contents are readable, while the articles entitled "Slums" and "Electrified" are particularly good and well worthy of perusal. The proprietors propose to issue their next number in April. In wishing them success in their laudable undertaking we would suggest the advisability of having a little less sentiment and a little more strong food in their "*Spare Moments*."

---

## The Inquirer.

### QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

930. What is gavelkind?—H. F. E.

931. A friend of mine told me he had read a splendid series of lectures or articles, I forget which, on the Philosophy of Ancient History, in Egypt, Phœnicia, Persia, Greece, and Rome, but he could not tell me the author's name. Could any of your correspondents favour me with information regarding these or other similar articles?—PHILOSOPHUS.

932. Sir H. L. Bulwer says in "Historical Characters," that a "celebrated society did exist in ancient Greece," "which sanctioned robbery if not detected, and allowed parents to kill their children if sickly." What community is here referred to?—SAMUEL.

933. A passage in Bulwer's "Historical Characters" leads us to infer that Edmund Burke resided at Beaconsfield, which place has since given a name to the title conferred upon the wife of the Right Hon. Benjamin Disraeli. Is this inference correct?—SAMUEL.

934. Was the Resumption Bill passed in 1700 for resuming as national property the Crown lands granted by William III. to his favourites, carried out in action? Macaulay records the passing of the bill, but at this stage of his work he was removed by death, and his history says nothing on the important subject of the carrying out of this bill.—SAMUEL.

935. Who and what is J. M. Cramp, D.D., author of a "Baptist History"?—SAMUEL.

936. The writer of the valuable article on Thomas Hobbes, in this Magazine, attributes the freedom of our press to the writings of Milton.

He says (p. 401), "It was only under 'the liberty of unlicensed printing,' gained for England by the splendid rhetoric of the *Areopagitica* of that John Milton [the italics are mine] whom Hobbes contemptuously mentions as 'an English independent,' that 'Leviathan' could have been published." Is this correct? If so, Macaulay is wrong, for in his "History of England" (chap. xxi.) he attributes the liberty of the press to a far meaner cause. Macaulay speaks of the conference between the Lords and Commons in 1695, and of the paper delivered to the Peers by Clarke, the manager for the Commons. The objections to the renewal of the Licensing Act contained in this paper will all, he says, "be found to relate to matters of detail. On the great question of principle, on the question whether the liberty of unlicensed printing be, on the whole, a blessing or a curse to society, not a word is said. The licensing Act is condemned, not as a thing essentially evil, but on account of the petty grievances, the exactions, the jobs, the commercial restrictions, the domiciliary visits, which were incidental to it." Macaulay next details some of these "petty grievances," and then says, "Such were the arguments which did what Milton's *Areopagitica* had failed to do." Will some reader of this Magazine tell me whether Mr. Neil or Lord Macaulay is correct?—GEORGIUS.

937. Will any of your numerous readers give me some information as to the origin of Mutual Improvement Societies? In opening the autumnal session of the M. I. S. in this place, it devolved upon me as president to deliver an inaugural

address. I searched the vols. of the *British Controversialist* from 1850 to the present time, in order to ascertain the date of the formation of the earliest society, but met with nothing satisfactory. In the reports of societies, which I carefully examined, none seemed to date farther back than 1843, when one was formed at Busholm Road, Manchester. Since the commencement of your periodical, M. I. S. have multiplied rapidly. I shall be glad to receive, through the columns of your periodical, any information that your correspondents are able to furnish.—W. O.

#### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

926. The quotations referred to by H. S. may be found in Acts xvii. 28, Titus i. 12, and 1 Cor. xv. 33. The quotation in Acts xvii. 28 was inserted into Holy Scripture not by Paul, but by Luke, who wrote "The Acts of the Apostles." In chap. xvii. of that book Luke relates Paul's address to the Athenians, and mentions Paul's express statement that the words which he quoted were from the Greek poets. They are a quotation from the poet Aratus. The words in 1 Cor. xv. 33, "Evil communications corrupt good manners," are quoted from the poet Menander; and those in Titus i. 12, respecting the Cretians, are quoted from the poet Epimenides.—S. S.

In reply we make the following extract regarding the point referred to by H. S.:—

"Three quotations of *Greek poetry* have been found in the New Testament, all by the apostle Paul:—

"Acts xvii. 28: *τοῦτόν καὶ γένος ἐμὸν* [for we are also his offspring], (the former half of an hexameter,) by Aratus, a native of Tarsus, B.C. 270; found also with a little variation (*ἰσσοῦ γὰρ*) [for we are thy

offspring] in Cleantes, a poet of Troas, B.C. 300.

"1 Cor. xv. 33: *φθίρουσιν ἡθὴν χρηστὴν ὁμιλίαν κακὰ* [evil communications corrupt good manners], from Menander, an Athenian comic poet, about B.C. 320. (The measure is iambic trimeter.

"Titus i. 12, *Κρήτες δὲ ψεύσται, κακὰ θηρία, γαστέρες ἀργαί* [the Cretians are alway liar, evil beasts, slow bellies], (a complete hexameter,) by Epimenides, the Cretan bard (see ver. 5), about B.C. 600."—From "*Handbook to the Grammar of the Greek Testament*" (issued by the Religious Tract Society), edited by Rev. S. G. Green, of Rusdon College, p. 388.—E. M. A.

929. Tanistry is another form of succession, by which the oldest and worthiest of the blood or race became heir. It was a sort of combination of the hereditary principle and the electory. It avoided the evils alike of inheritance by birth and election by vote. The preference was given to birth when the clan was satisfied of the worthiness of the nearest in succession.—T. U.

929 & 930. The two queries put by H. F. E., bearing the foregoing numbers, may be answered by the following extract from a work recently published by Messrs. Longman & Co., entitled "Irish Lord Chancellors from the Earliest Times to the Reign of Queen-Victoria," by Roderick O'Flanagan:—

"It is most probable the ancient Brehon code underwent revision when Christianity introduced new modes of procedure and a kindlier feeling amongst the Irish. Indeed, the 'Annals of the Four Masters' record this fact, and the *Seanchus Mor* was sometimes called *Cais Phadraig*—Patrik Law or Tribute. We must not dwell too long upon these ancient laws, now in the course of translation and publica-

tion. The most noticeable feature was the compensation for murder and other offences by the *Eric*, which is forbidden in Holy Writ,—“You shall not take money of him that is guilty of blood, but he shall die forthwith.” This law of *Eric* kept its place in the Brehon code long after Ireland was rescued from paganism.

“By the law of Taniatry the eldest son succeeded to the chieftainship on the death of his father, unless labouring under some bodily or mental infirmity, or crime. The eldest son being thus presumptive heir, was called *tanaiste*, or second in rank, and had a separate establishment as such.

“Landed property was equally divided amongst the males by the ancient Celtic law, called *gavelkind*, gavelkind. If there was no male issue, females were allowed an estate for life. The tanaist always obtained the mansion-house with his portion, having to sustain the dignity of the family.

“The state of society being patriarchal and pastoral, the land belonging to each sept was held in common, every member having a right of pasturage, and his share of the tillage-land commensurate with the number of his cattle. The tribe being, so to speak, one family, the claim of each individual was subordinate to the general interest of the tribe. Thus the demesne lands were assigned to the chief, next to the tanaist or chief elect, the Brehons or judges, the bards or doctors. Although tributes or rents were payable, and metals—gold and silver—existed from an early period, cattle was the usual equivalent, instead of coin in Ireland, as in other nations of antiquity. Cattle constituted the medium of exchange and barter in England as late as the eleventh century. Selden mentions that ‘pounds and shillings were

not abundant in England in 1004, but paid in track and cattle.’

“A peculiar custom among the ancient Irish was fosterage. Every member of the nobility was bound by law to send his sons to foster—brought up with one of the family of his tribe. There was a regular fosterage fee, payable while the child was with his foster-parents. There was a doctor’s fee, proportionate to the rank of the patient and nature of the malady. No fees were payable unless a cure were effected. The dress of the ladies was regulated by their rank, and its value was described by that of so many cows.

“The progress of colonization throughout Ireland, the establishment of circuits, and the extension of English language and laws, caused the Brehon code to fall into disuse about the year 1600.”—R. M. A.

980. Gavelkind is an old British law of succession, according to which the youngest son inherited the homestead, and the eldest son became the armiger or heriot, and other members of the family received their several shares. Blackstone, Coke, Stephens, &c., describe in detail the nature of the inheritance. It is most probably a Celtic custom, though something like it exists among the Teutons. — T. U.

981. I do not know, of course, precisely what papers or articles “Philosophus” refers to. William MacCall’s “Agents of Civilization,” ten lectures, contains a very able philosophy of history; there are also in Professor F. W. Newman’s miscellanies, seven “Lectures on the Chief Forms of Ancient Nations,” also very able. Samuel Eliot, of Trinity College, Hartford, U.S., in his “Liberty of Rome,” supplies many good observations on the same subject; but Miller’s “Philosophy of History,” and

Hegel's Lectures on the same topic, are most authoritative.—R. M. A.

936. The simple quotation of three dates might, so far as the special matter in hand is concerned, be held to settle this question, viz.—

Milton's "Areopagitica" was published in 1644.

Hobbes' "Leviathan," 1652.

The Conference between the Lords and Commons occurred 1695.

But as the question raised is of great importance, it may not be amiss to make a few more references and remarks on "The Liberty of the Press," its progress and its benefits.

#### SUBJECTS SUITABLE FOR DEBATE.

Does Newman's "Grammar of Assent" deserve assent?

Is Britain dependent for its security on the mercy of Nations?

Ought Britain to have recognised the Second Empire?

Has Napoleonic Imperialism benefited France?

Is Free Labour or Protected Labour most in accordance with the principles of Political Economy?

Is a Free Church incompatible with State Endowment?

Does Fanaticism flourish more under Coercion than under Freedom?

Would Economy of Land Transfer destroy Absenteeism?

Ought there to be Free Trade in Land?

Are small or large properties more beneficial in a Country?

Are Roman Catholic Countries relatively more moral than Protestant ones?

Has *Altruism* or *Egoism* the higher power in Social Life?

Did France lose or gain by the Empire of Napoleon III.?

Do Shakspeare's Sonnets reveal his inner life?

Is Dr. Newman's "Apologia" sufficient?

Is Priesthood in the Church of Rome Spiritual Suicide?

Is Imagination as requisite in Science as in Poetry?

Is there likely to be a complete triumph of Moral Good over Evil?

Is Modern Civilization the result of Religious Culture?

Was the Franco-Prussian War inevitable?

Has France merited a Downfall?

Is Christianity a possible form of Civil Life?

Is Character framed by Circumstances?

### Literary Notes.

**NEW BOOKS.**—During the past year, if the figures of the *Publishers' Circular* are correct, there have been published 3,377 new books, 1,279 new editions, and 426 importations from America. Theology, sermons, and Biblical works have been the most numerous, comprising a total of 811 books, of which 548 were new, 208 were new editions, and 55 were importations. Juvenile works

and tales stand next with 686. Education figures for 568. We have had 200 new novels. Political and Social Economy and Trade and Commerce together stand lowest, and can only make up 119 between them, and of these 16 are importations, and 26 are new editions. But it is interesting to know that there are more educational works than last year, and fewer works of

fiction. Of all books which go to second editions, the highest proportion is among the works of fiction.

Immediately after the delivery of his "Lectures on Plato" at the Royal Institution, it is rumoured that Principal Jowett's great work on Plato, including life, works, criticisms, &c., will appear.

Thomas Furnell, author of "Literature and its Professors," is credited by rumour with being the author of the *Athenæum's* "Sketches of Living Dramatists."

According to the *Printers' Register* there are at the present time 110 daily newspapers in Great Britain and Ireland distributed as follows:—London, 20; provinces, 57; Wales, 2; Scotland, 11; Ireland, 19; Channel Islands, 1: total 110. Of this number 61 are published at 1d., and 34 at ½d. each.

Ueberweg's "System of Logic, and History of Logical Doctrine," translated by M. Lindsay, is nearly ready.

The miscellaneous and posthumous works of the late T. H. Buckle will occupy three volumes.

Professor D. Masson promises Vol. II. of his elaborate "Life of Milton" *shortly*.

An address by Oliver W. Holmes on "Mechanism in Thought and Morals" is in the press.

John Morley, biographer of Edmund Burke, editor of the *Fortnightly Review*, will issue "Critical Miscellanies" soon.

The "Ely Lectures" on the Evidences of Christianity, by Albert Barnes, born 1798, who died 7th January, have just been published.

Of Pope's "Correspondence," hitherto an enigma of letters, Vol. I. will be issued in Elwin's edition of Pope's works this month.

For the centenary of Sir Walter

Scott a great number of biographies, estimates, &c. are in preparation.

W. Krigar has issued a German translation of Dante; a Preface has been contributed by Dr. Karl Witte.

A Society of Biblical Archaeology has been established.

A History of Scotland from the battle of Flodden, 1513, to the Revolution of 1688, by A. Falconer, now in the press, has been submitted to the testing process by having its two introductory chapters issued in *Fraser's Magazine*.

John Dunning MacLeod has published Part VIII. of his "Dictionary of Political Economy."

Of Dr. Karl Pranth's "History of Logic in the West," commenced in 1855, vol. IV. has been issued. Of Ockhamism and its controversies accompanying and originated by it in the early part of the sixteenth century, it contains an interesting account.

Dean Alford, born 1810, poet, scholar, theologian, and critic, died 12th January.

A novel by Jane Austen entitled "Lady Susan," left in MS. at her death in 1817, is along with some sketches now to be published.

Thomas Mayo, M.D. (born 1790), author of "Elements of the Pathology of the Mind" and other physico-psychological works, died 18th January.

Mrs. Edward Thomas, dramatist, author of "The Wife's Tragedy," &c., died 7th Jan.

Prof. B. Teu Brink is revising his "Studies in Chaucer" for publication by the Chaucer Society.

Prof. Seeley's *Life*, with preface and introduction, is nearly ready.

Herbert Spencer's *Works* have been translated into Russian.



## The Philosophy of Politics.

---

### THE ELECTORAL SUFFRAGE.

"We should endeavour to set before ourselves the ideal conception of a perfect representative government, however distant, not to say doubtful, may be the hope of actually obtaining it; to the intent that whatever is now done may, if possible, be in the direction of what is best, and may bring the actual fact nearer [to], and not farther off from the standard of right, at however great a distance it may still remain from that standard."

—*John Stuart Mill.*

"The grand difficulty in politics will, for a long time, be how best to conciliate the two great elements on which good government depends; to combine the greatest amount of the advantage to be derived from the independent judgment of a specially instructed few with the greatest degree of the security for rectitude of purpose derived from rendering those few responsible to the many."—*T. P. Thompson.*

PRACTICAL politics is seldom philosophical. Passion has hitherto almost entirely ruled in this sphere of activity, although in it, assuredly, dispassionate inquiry and considerate thoughtfulness are essentials to proper and enduring order and progress. Partisanship has in most cases embattled the hosts in hate rather than invited them to temperate debate. But the passions are not the proper umpires of the welfare of States. The power of party is the weakness of the commonwealth, so long as men are ignorant of the principles of politics and their bearing upon the policy of nations. The present series of papers do not proceed from the pen of a partisan, but of a speculator. They are preceptorial only, as suggestions towards improvements in practice. They are independent attempts to solve thoughtfully the questions involved in good government; and though the writer has attentively read all the works within his reach upon the matters investigated, he has applied his own mind earnestly to the elucidation of the principles of politics in a philosophical manner; that is, as a reasoned whole, consistent in theory, harmonized with history, and applicable to legislation as guiding influences. If public opinion is to become the guardian and governor of nations, it is of prime importance that it should be at least reasonable—if possible, correct—in the foundations on which it rests, and the decisions to which it comes.

Members of commonwealths have *duties* as well as *rights* and responsibilities proportionate to their franchises. In all matters of intellectual activity man's paramount duty is the pursuit of truth; the search for truth is philosophy; and philosophical politics

consist of an endeavour to attain to those truths in regard to government which may most reasonably be expected to result in the permanent order and progressive improvement of the whole people, interested in civilization; and the polity by which it may be secured and promoted. The politics of party are therefore by implication excluded from the aims of the thinker, and the partisanship of politics ought also to be laid aside by the reader. Speculations of such a sort ought not to be confronted with any query, as, How will that harmonize with the views or tend to further the interests of any great party—Liberal or Conservative—in the State? They ought only to be exposed to the test of fair and honest reasoning, whose premises have been gained by painstaking and thorough induction, and whose processes have been pursued with consistent and persistent impartiality from the elementary and accepted premises to the ultimate conclusions into which these may, by properly guarded deduction, be developed.

To close up a philosophical discussion on politics by a reference to the effect of its results upon parties would be not only unjust, but impolitic; for that would be to determine upon the value of a course of reasoning by an appeal to embodied passion, and to foreclose the application of calm thought by the postulate that clamorous passion is a safer guide than circumspect speculation. Let thought be pursued from premiss to consequence with distinct and impartial logical accuracy, and it will seldom fail to convince the thoughtful either of the essential truth or the essential falseness of the philosophy which has been presented. If the former conviction arise, truth should be adopted, whatever party may oppose; and if the latter, a new survey may be undertaken with greater likelihood of success, because that portion of the sea of speculation has been sounded and mapped.

Philosophy ought to be sworn to no party. Its duty should consist in—

“Evolving

The *principle* of thought from root to air;”

and it ought to follow the leading of right observation and logical inference, whithersoever they tend. The thinker is the pioneer of the practical statesman. He tests the thought that seems so fair, and tells off the results of his exploratory course; the speculative politician ought, therefore, to be free from the interfering bondage of party, and should not be called on to subscribe to its *shibboleths*.

Politics is the science of the relations of human beings in a state or commonwealth. Each member of the corporate body which constitutes a state is interested in the relations possible in his or her condition, and the securing of the most advantageous *status* as a component part of the state. The scientific thinker ought to lay aside passion and party interest and privilege, when he seeks to determine the best regulations possible in a state, for the proper adjustment of the relations of those who are or are to be its mem-

bers, so that as far as is consistent with the security and progress of the whole body each individual may possess and exercise the power of personal development in harmony with and auxiliary to the rise and progress of the commonwealth. It ought to be to him who engages in speculative politics a matter of honour to dismiss the interests and sympathies which are excited in the active contests of statesmanship, and to confine the attention of his mind to the considerations arising from the relations of persons, not the relations of parties. Only so can he supply a philosophy as distinguished from a theory of politics: a theory is but a view or exposition, but it need not necessarily be either reasoned or reasonable; any series of speculations, however, to be philosophical, must be both—besides being as far as possible true, impartial, and well founded.

In our preceding papers on "Representation" we reached the ideas that "legislation is the organization of opinion" in its *process*, and has for its *end* the legalization of public opinion as law or policy; and several proposals were submitted to our readers on the means of improving the organization of public opinion, having it tested and attested, and so brought before the supreme legislative bodies and the executive in a more mature and perfect condition than is now customary. But in neither of these papers was that fact brought prominently into view to which we now desire to give emphasis; namely, that in representation two distinct elements are implied and employed—(1) opinion, (2) will,—which two do together constitute intelligent determination, and have as their issue, law. Opinion is considerate thought expended on the ends to be desired in civilized life, and law is will enforced, founded on opinion formed,—the intelligent will of the nation legalized by its representatives in a practical, effective, and compulsory form, so that intelligent and loyal obedience may be rendered to it. Hitherto those two elements have not been sufficiently distinguished in representative government, and hence Parliament, in its endeavour to organize opinion, has been degraded into a National Debating Society, instead of being a Court of Ultimate Judgment on the proposals of parties and the doings of State officials. In the earlier periods of our history this distinction did not require such analytic severance as the interests of our age irresistibly demand. The economy of legislation now imperatively requires that the organization of public opinion should be such as to enable the legislators to see the precise aim of each suggestion, to perceive the exact incidence of each proposal, and to have before them, in the most determinate form, all the elements on which a proper decision should depend. The proposals made to Parliament must always, in their origin, be the suggestions of specialists; all the preliminary discussions regarding them, therefore, would be best conducted by those who belonged to the same class; and as a general rule, those matters only which had secured the favourable regard of those best informed on and most interested in the matter should be

brought up before the ultimate deciding authority. Such a "division of labour" in the organization and consideration of opinion would greatly simplify the representative system in regard to the extension of the franchise, and the conditions which ought to govern the possession and exercise of the electoral suffrage—the topic which we shall now proceed to consider in relation to its object, aims, and methods—in theory and in practice.

As a preliminary to the more serious matter of our paper, we may here make an observation on the term *suffrage*. The Latin word *suffrago* signifies the upper portion of the hind leg of a horse—the ham or hock,—a part of the animal without which progress would be impossible; political progress being regarded as equally impossible without the assent and consent of men; the approbation of those entitled to a voice in political matters was called *suffragium*, and to support with one's vote and interest was expressed by the verb *suffragor*. From these words we derive that term in politics which signifies "the right possessed by a citizen in a state where representative government exists, to vote in the election of a member of the legislative body to which political progress is entrusted." The same meaning of helpfulness towards progress, appears in the ecclesiastical derivation from the same words—*Suffragan*,—applied to the person by whose aid the work of a bishop, incapacitated from attending to business himself, is carried on in his name, with his sanction, and by his authority, so securing the proper progress of affairs in the diocese. The aid given to progress by the possession of the good opinion or favour of others is indicated in such phrases as "he has gained by the suffrages of all competent critics a title to be held an authority on the subject of his treatise." As the term is employed in politics, it signifies the right to vote, with the sanction of the state, under conditions determined by it, and as a duty towards it.

The *suffrage* is the agency by which the co-operative energies of the state are brought into working order. It is the means placed by the community in the hands of its members that they may severally indicate what they think should be the general ends pursued by the society, and what purposes should be kept in view by those who are entrusted with the arrangement and employment of the means placed at their disposal for the conservancy of the welfare of the State in general, and the individuals of which it consists in the other. In other words, it is the specific delegation of the individual will of each elector to representatives who are to hold and have, exercise and employ, that will, in trust for the voters, in the management and administration of public affairs in such a manner as most fully, economically, wisely, and honestly to fulfil the intentions of those who confide the effective rulership of the commonwealth to their care. This delegation of the nation's will is in general guided by the opinions entertained by the electors, who, of course, seek as representatives those who most nearly coincide with them in their views, professed or confessed; for so

it is thought that the opinions entertained by the electors may most surely prevail. The delegation, however, is of political power in the first place, and is only in a secondary sense a delegation of political principle; for the legislator chosen professes his principles as an inducement to the delegation to him of the power which, in the commonwealth, a representative holds and exercises. Opinion regulates and influences the delegation of the elector's will, and inclines him to contribute his rillet of will to the reservoir of popular power, which, by its force, propels the representative into Parliament. But the representative, as a member of a deliberative assembly, has greater opportunities for forming a correct or revising an incorrect opinion, and hence he must be left free to discharge his deliberative and legislative functions in an upright and honest form; open and subject to persuasion, as the elector himself would be, as to means and fitness of season and circumstance; always provided he remains true in the main to those opinions by which he had declared he would guide his conduct and regulate his public duty; or seeing good cause for altering these opinions—which formed the grounds on which the vote of his constituents had been given,—willingly resigns his position to those who conferred it on him for other purposes and on a different understanding. It is not as the delegate of certain opinions that a representative should be chosen and accredited, but as one who, holding political opinions and sentiments with which his constituents sympathize, may justly be supposed to do all in his power to attain the ends to which such opinions tend; still he should be sent to employ his own intelligence to the specific manner in which their will may be best brought effectually to accomplish the success desired.

The *suffrage* has been, for the most part, in times past, looked upon as a means of organizing the *people*; and hence the advocates of an extension of the franchise have been compelled to consider the individuals into whose hands the suffrage might, could, or should be advantageously placed, so as at once to secure order and insure progress. To do this in some determinate way, speculative politicians of liberal tendencies, favourable to a wide diffusion of the suffrage, have been under the necessity of employing as a postulate some form of assertion which conservative thinkers have had little difficulty in disposing of; such, for example, as the political aphorism of the late Toulmin Smith, in his "Local Self-Government," that "every man *knows* best how to manage his own affairs; and it is his right and duty so to manage them,"—a statement certainly which common experience does not confirm. Men in general know the purposes they aim at, *what* they want; it is exactly in the adoption of proper means to attain these ends that they fail, that is, in the how to do it. The majority of political questions turn upon points in regard to which most people are imperfectly acquainted, and relate to measures upon which those only who have given special attention to the considerations they involve can give a proper, because an intelligent judgment.

Another axiom of popular politics is almost equally erroneous, in any sense of the terms applicable to civilized communities, and it is only in such a sense that it can have any importance to us at present,—that “all men are by nature free and equal.” This is an abstract proposition to which no importance would be attached unless for the corollary deduced from it that all men have an equal right to a voice or a vote in the election of a representative or a government. The abstract proposition is in itself untenable without qualification either in the definition of the terms or in their relation to actual politics. The existence of idiots, differences of idiosyncrasy, &c., invalidate the ascription of equality; history invalidates the assumption of freedom; criminality, accident, and incident, in actual life affect its applicability in its totality,—not to speak of the *sex* question. Even this, however, might be granted to the full, and yet the inefficacy of the axiom, as a political one of any value, might be impeached by the consideration that though that freedom and equality might fit him for self-preservation in that primitive state, they did not qualify him for exercising power over others, as a partner in legislative acts, which he would become as a possessor of a vote. The remarks of John S. Mill on this topic are pertinent and important:—

“It is the fact that one person is not as good as another; and it is reversing all the rules of rational conduct to attempt to raise a political fabric on a supposition which is at variance with fact. Putting aside for the present the consideration of moral worth, of which, though more important even than intellectual, it is not so easy to find an available test; a person who cannot read is not as good for the purpose of human life as one who can. A person who can read, but cannot write or calculate, is not as good as a person who can do both. A person who can read, write, and calculate, but who knows nothing of the properties of natural objects, or of other places and countries, or of the human beings who have lived before him, or of the ideas, opinions, and practices of his fellow-creatures generally, is not so good as a person who knows these things. A person who has not, either by reading or conversation, made himself acquainted with the wisest thoughts of the wisest men, and with the great examples of a beneficent and virtuous life, is not so good as one who is familiar with these. A person who has even filled himself with this various knowledge, but has not digested it,—who could give no clear and coherent account of it, and has never exercised his own mind, or derived an original thought from his own observation, experience, or reasoning, is not so good for any human purpose as one who has.”\*

It is impossible, with justice, from the mere abstract statement of the revolutionary doctrine of “liberty, equality, and fraternity,” to deduce the equal right to equal suffrages of man with man in a fixed and settled state of social polity; nor even, were that premise accepted, would it be possible in accordance with right reason to affirm that each *individual* ought to possess the right, equally with

\* “Dissertations and Discussions,” vol. iii., “Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform,” p. 19.

every other, to a share in the legislative action of the country by an equal vote; and that for the simple reason that legislation is the organization of opinion, while government is the organization of men, under opinions legalized as law; and so long as the range and value of one man's opinion are greater than those of another, so long shall it be unwise to stamp all individuals into an average, and swamp intelligence in universal suffrage, pure and simple. Even though it were a fact that the individual interests of all men were equal, and all their wishes in their own behalf equally keen, it would not follow that an equal value should be attached to the voice of each individual. One man, or class of men, may be in favour of precipitate and passionate action, under the stimulant of strong impulse, and narrow thought, while others, more skilled in legislative affairs, may see and acknowledge the need of creating or correcting the opinions which should prevail. The former would be apt to choose men chiefly remarkable for glibness of tongue and adroitness of thought, while the latter would seek men of tested intelligence and attested worth. Now "what is wanted is a representation, not of men's differences of interest, but of the differences in their intellectual points of view;" and the office of the suffrage is not only to give political expression to the social powers prevalent in society, but to the intelligent opinions existing in and affecting the community. This has been as generally acknowledged that it has of late excited a large amount of speculative thought.

"The most direct way" (according to J. S. Mill) "of effecting this [equalization of interest and intelligence] would be to establish plurality of votes in favour of those who could afford a reasonable presumption of superior knowledge and cultivation. If every ordinary unskilled labourer had one vote, a skilled labourer, whose occupation requires an exercised mind, and a knowledge of some of the laws of external nature, ought to have two. A foreman or superintendent of labour, whose occupation requires something more of general culture, and some moral as well as intellectual qualities, should perhaps have three. A farmer, manufacturer, or trader, who requires a still larger range of ideas and knowledge, and the power of guiding and attending to a great number of various operations at once, should have three or four. A member of any profession requiring a long, accurate, and systematic mental cultivation,—a lawyer, a physician or surgeon, a clergyman of any denomination, a literary man, an artist, a public functionary (or at all events, a member of every intellectual profession, at the threshold of which there is a satisfactory examination test), ought to have five or six. A graduate of any university, or a person freely elected a member of any learned society, is entitled to at least as many. A certificate of having passed through a complete course of instruction at any place of education publicly recognised as one where the higher branches of knowledge are taught should confer a plurality of votes; and there ought to be an organization of voluntary examinations throughout the country (agreeably to the precedent set by the middle-class examinations so wisely and virtuously instituted by the University of Oxford) at which any person whatever might present himself, and obtain, from impartial examiners, a certificate of his possessing the acquirements which would

entitle him to any number of votes up to the largest allowed to one individual.”\*

The recognition of the distinction above stated between opinion and will as elements in legislation might help us out of the dilemma in practical politics into which such forms of advocacy lead us. We may consent to the saying that “all law must spring from the people, and be administered by the people,” if it is thereby meant that all law should originate in and issue from the will of the people, and should be administered so as to effect and carry out this will of the people, as thoroughly as may be, in consonance with the opinions of the people. It is a peculiarity of the times in which we live that the voice of the people—of the many as contradistinguished from the few—is not only growing deeper and stronger, but is also growing more influential, and is being much more readily deferred to. There is no more singular phenomenon in modern history than the development of the principle in politics, that government over the people should not only be exercised for the people, but regulated by the people. What is known as the million or the mass is now brought within the possibility of citizenship, are called upon to entertain a political faith, to consider political questions, to associate for political purposes, and labour for the attainment of political ends.

The course of history has been progressive, if not orderly, in this political enfranchisement. The serf has been gradually transmuted into the labourer; labourers were formerly regarded as a disorganized mob, but they have of late been taken into council as the people, and it is not impossible that they may yet attain to the rank of freemen, in so far as that word signifies the exercise of a self-determined influence upon those who govern, by a properly arranged suffrage, which will enable them at least to protect themselves, if not to direct the course of government. The instinct of self-preservation shall be so far acknowledged as to recognise man's will in regard to his personal existence and interests as a protective, while some means may be found to gauge and estimate the intelligent opinions of men in reference to the exercise of such directive influence as may lead to the accomplishment of the ends of the citizens by the best possible means within reach of human thought at the time and in the circumstances. Then the profane vulgar may be held to have rights as well as duties, and claims as well as responsibilities, be considered as shareholders in the community, whose duties shall be as far respected as their services are given to the promotion of the purposes and progress of the state. The freedom of citizenship is now held to imply the possible right to electoral privilege, if not the actual enjoyment of the suffrage.

The electoral suffrage appears, upon analysis, to be a delegation of the will of the voters to be employed, by the representative

\* “Dissertations and Discussions,” vol. iii., “Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform,” p. 21.



chosen, for the promotion of certain ends indicated in the opinions to which, as a candidate, he expressed his adhesion or proclivity, and they, as electors, consented to by their votes. It seems, therefore, a possible thing to found, upon this analysis, a philosophy of the suffrage which might yield a more perfect basis for statecraft than has yet—so far as we know—been attained or suggested. This may be briefly described as follows:—

By legitimatising and arranging such agencies as may be required for the organization of opinion, according to the specific interests of the special classes of society; as, for instance—I. *Property* (1) in land, (2) money, (3) goods, (4) intelligence, (5) industry, &c. II. *Status*—(1) civic, (2) ecclesiastic, (3) administrative, (4) military, (5) educational, &c. III. *Intelligence*—(1) social, (2) moral, (3) scientific, (4) commercial, (5) diplomatic, &c. We might create a series of representative institutions whose duty it would be to consider, debate, deliberate upon, and mature all suggestions made regarding these particular interests as preliminaries to their being taken up, for ultimate decision, by the Legislature as the supreme and final determining power. Each of these organizations would have its electors, who would be admitted upon an electoral qualification, which would be equivalent to an educational, a property, or a class franchise, as the case might be; and would thus harmonize with the views of those who believe in the need for some restriction on the right to influence opinion in its process towards law; while it would equally well combine with the proposals made for the representation of classes and interests. As, besides, many persons would, from their combination of qualifications, have the suffrage right conferred upon them in several sections of this organization, the plan suggested would provide an equivalent to the popular suggestion for a plurality of votes; for this would then only be utilizing to the utmost the capacity of those who could form or had formed opinions on the species of topic to be brought under notice. Were such an organization of opinions legalized, a large portion of the political activity of the nation, which is now, comparatively speaking, wasted in ephemeral agitations and spasmodic endeavours to stir the public mind, would find beneficial occupation in congenial associative effort; while the high court of Parliament would be freed, in a large measure, from the need of discussing crotchets, and coming to divisions on crude and visionary proposals, which have not worked their way into the public sympathy by previous debate, or gained the favour of the thoughtful upon the topics to which they refer.

This would leave the Parliament, as the embodied and representative intelligent will of the country, free to devote its energies to the higher questions of polity, and greatly conduce to safe, sound, and considerate legislation and administration. But it would do more. It would enable the country to reorganize its representative institutions in such a way as to unite the entire will of the community in themselves, and so infuse into them the complete strength

of the nation. The agitation for the extension of the franchise, so far as it is yet unmet, might then be grudgelessly and safely yielded to, for by the multiplication of safeguards rash innovations and inconsiderate opinions would become of less importance as motive powers at an election. Each person would then be enabled, by the suffrage, to become the conservator of his or her own interest in the state as a shareholder in the community; and yet the community be safe from the dire evils which an unregulated democracy are said to threaten, if mere numbers were to be made supreme. For while, by universal suffrage, the representative House would be chosen by the will of the people, it would be by the intelligence of the cultured and influential classes that it would be *guided*—if not regulated—in consequence of the provision that would be made for the organization of public opinion on all questions relating to finance, administration, and legislation.

Upon the principles here suggested, too, we could secure most fully another matter dear to the heart of many of the most thoughtful and earnest speculative politicians—"the representation of minorities," and this in several ways. For while by equal and universal suffrage the power of self-protection, so far as a vote could secure it, would be granted as a right to each, the representation of classes and interests, granted by the legalized organization of opinion, would in effect be a representation of almost every possible minority in some form or other—especially as this organization of opinion would admit of a plurality of voting co-extensive with the influence and intelligence of each person who had acquired any available and appraisable distinction beyond being a mere entity in the state. Again, it might be required in all elections in which universal suffrage was allowed, that the successful candidate must poll at least two-thirds of the whole number of votes given at the election. In universal suffrage, we suppose the only qualification to be civic existence—that is, existence free from disabilities in a civic sense incurred by non-productiveness, burdensomeness, or criminality, and in this regard sex should not be regarded as a civic disability. Such a provision as that suggested would, for the most part, secure the due rights of even a recalcitrant minority.

Such a suffrage—or rather, such a variety and cumulation of suffrages as might be thus arranged, would afford representation to all the interests and opinions of the entire population of the country, and would provide besides for the thorough political education of the people, by bringing before them continually the principles of politics, and making them watchful over the practical adherence of their representatives to the conditions of their election. By securing the habitual willingness of the people to give heed to the concerns of the state, a prudent self-restraint, a mutual give and take, would probably be cultivated, and precipitate and passionate change cease to be advocated. Then, again, a school of politics would be established in the centres of organization, in which, by the discussion and advocacy of opinion, statesmen might be trained, and the

high qualities requisite for able and honest government could be cultured, while engaged in enlightening and maturing public opinion, and endeavouring to frame the schemes proposed into suitable legislative form. Intelligent choice would also be greatly facilitated by the publicity attained by those who had thus engaged in the practical study of the art of statesmanship. Publicity would inspire energy and excite activity in the politician, and it would afford to the elector the opportunity of rewarding honest ability, by entrusting his rights to the care of men tried and known.

It is often said that the object of an election is, by an appeal to the voice of the nation, to gain a trustworthy indication of the opinion of the country on the questions of importance pressing for legislative settlement. As a means of summing up the opinion of the community correctly, it is probable that our usual form of election is nearly as ineffective or defective as can well be. It comes, in fact, to be, even as regards opinion, an exceedingly delusive test. At present the contest generally lies between parties more or less opposed to each other. In such electoral districts as have two members allotted to them for election—if they are chosen of opposite parties, as is often the case, these districts virtually disfranchise themselves, and count for nothing in a legislative sense. In those who choose three, unless they are all chosen from the same party, there is a real disfranchisement of two-thirds of the constituency, inasmuch as their suffrages are rendered non-effective. Again, in localities in which one member is elected, each party is, in truth, bidding against the other, and aiming at the disfranchisement of the other, thus practically reducing the governing and legislating power to the *minimum* in every way. In the election the minority is deleted from power; by the election, all those who have voted for the members who constitute the minority are also virtually denuded of parliamentary influence; for the real governing and legislating is regulated by the effective majority—a majority which is brought together often in a very haphazard manner, so far as the actual representation of a real public opinion is concerned. This occurs because we have not instituted a definite policy in elections. It is not a fixed principle in our politics, that opinions, interests, classes, intelligence, or property is the basis of candidature. In some localities one, in other places another, of these specific elements is made predominant; in others still, various combinations of these. Hence the effective majority may really be an indefinite resulting quantity, collected together on different principles of choice.

This incongruity of principles as to elections not only defeats the main and chief intent of "an appeal to the country," as it is called, by indefinitizing the actual result; it also complicates the exercise of the suffrages to the individual elector. The candidates offered for his acceptance may base their claims on grounds which do not appear to him to justify selection; which afford no opportunity of joining in the issue presented to the country; or which make the real question to be determined by the election a mere subsidiary

matter,—which may, in fact, be a contest between “rival houses,” rival politicians of the same party, or the mere nominees of rival law-agents engaged in “jobbing” the election. Unless there is some general unanimity on the qualifications of candidates, and the principles on which the suffrages of the electors are claimed, not only will individual electors be hampered in their choice, but their choice itself may require to be made on a side issue altogether; while the State, which sought a decision on one matter, must be content to take it on one quite different. A “ventilation” of the question of the exercise of the suffrage which may help to clarify men’s views on the aims, purposes, and results of elections, may not be useless in its effects, though it may not be accepted in its entirety as a speculation in politics.

“A philosophy of politics” should aid us in determining the principle on which representative institutions should be rested; and should therefore exert an effect upon the nature of the basis on which the electoral suffrage ought to be placed. If we could simplify this matter by making the Parliament an embodiment of the national will, while we provided for the expression, discussion, maturization, and proper representation of public opinion prior to its being laid before Parliament for legislative or administrative acceptance and adoption, we might greatly increase the effectiveness and popularize the nature of our House of Commons.

Such an adjustment of the question would largely tend to the political education of the people; but still more would it tend to produce and multiply trained politicians and cultured statesmen; and this it would do, not only because it would open up to those anxious to acquire skill in statecraft, gymnasia for the attainment and exercise of intellectual exposition, and inducements to the study and popularization of the topics to which legislation refer; but also because it would lead to the competition of a higher order of intellects for the suffrages of their fellow-citizens.

Besides this, such an arrangement for the organization of political opinion would make it possible to utilize and bring into effective operation all agitation of the popular mind, all the energy expended in petitioning, memorializing, deputations, &c.; while it would provide an agency which might supersede royal commissions, committees of inquiry, courts of investigation, &c., as well as place within reach of the supreme Legislature a trustworthy and properly elaborated statistic—or science of political statics,—such as might be an interpreter and a guide in council and in practice.

With these general views on the philosophy of the suffrage we must close our present prelection, and in our next we shall consider the suffrage in its practical utility, and the modes by which it may be regulated and applied so as to insure the higher aims of representative government.

---

APPENDIX TO ARTICLE ON  
 "REPRESENTATIVE OR PARLIAMENTARY  
 GOVERNMENT,"

(In our January issue, pp. 1—16.)

IN the January number of the *Edinburgh Review* a very interesting and able paper on "The Business of the House of Commons" has appeared. It is based on "Reports of the Select Committees on the Public and Private Business of the House of Commons, 1837, 1848, 1854, 1861." It possesses great value, not only from its source, but from its facts; and it should be read by all who are interested in practical politics, for the reliable information it contains on the circumstances, manner, style, and amount of the work performed in our great legislative assembly. Our object in noticing it here and now is to direct attention to the corroboration of the views contained in our papers on "Representative Government," as to the need of some economy of legislative function by some organic method of maturing and filtering, arranging and specializing opinion, so as to fit it for legislative manipulation.

Those who peruse the article attentively will see that the evils of indefinite purpose and undefined opinion, of degrading the Legislature to a debating society, an agitation agency, and an arena for oratorical display, are fully admitted and seriously deplored; and that while certain palliatives and minor improvements are suggested, no systematic mode of avoiding the evils is mooted. Our paper at least suggests a plan which is thorough-going, and seems simple. We quote a few passages from the *Edinburgh Review* article:—

"The House of Commons may be regarded from two separate points of view, and as fulfilling the duties of two different and distinct positions. It may be called, on the one hand, a deliberative, and on the other a legislative assembly. Under the first aspect it performs functions varied in their character and degree of importance. At one time it debates and decides upon matters of national, of European, even of world-wide interest; pronounces upon the policy of a ministry, and expresses, by its vote, the tendency of public opinion in the nation which it represents. At another moment it entertains questions of individual grievance, constitutes itself the bar before which slighted merit or unappreciated talent may plead their cause, and acts as a mighty and far-reaching court of appeal, to which every person who feels himself aggrieved, without legal remedy against the aggressor, may fly for succour and sympathy" (p. 57).

"But it is in its legislative capacity that grave and serious complaints must be advanced against it. In a country containing such vast and complicated interests as our own the work of legislation can never stand still. Subjects after subjects crop up, one upon the other, requiring legislative action; the enactment of new laws is no less necessary year by year than the alteration and amendment of existing statutes; and it is with regard

to its legislative capacity—its ability to dispose of these subjects promptly and wisely—that our parliamentary machinery has become sadly out of gear” (p. 58).

After an analysis of ten years’ legislation, it proceeds:—

“But the real criterion of the legislative capacity of the House of Commons is not so much the number of bills which have been passed, with or without discussion, during any given year, as the number which have been introduced and withdrawn for lack of time, and the quantity of subjects upon which legislation has been generally and frequently admitted to be necessary, and has yet been again and again postponed from session to session” (p. 60).

It next surveys the amount of legislation suggested, proposed, and attempted; and thereafter remarks:—

“Six hundred and fifty-eight gentlemen form much too large and unwieldy a body for the prompt and satisfactory transaction of business under the most favourable circumstances. But six hundred and fifty-eight gentlemen permitted to talk without restraint or limitation upon every subject which comes before them, become a body so unfit for the transaction of business, that it is really wonderful how they ever transact any business at all. And the problem still remains to be worked out, whether, without depriving the House of Commons of any of its dignity and efficiency as a deliberative assembly, the talking power of its members may not be so guided or restrained as to improve its capacity for those legislative functions with which it is entrusted by the nation. The talkers of the House may be divided into several classes. First, there are the official members, who are obliged to talk, and who must of necessity occupy a portion of the time of the House in explaining and developing the measures which they have to introduce and defend, and in opposing the crude projects and objectionable proposals which are not unfrequently introduced by others. Then, secondly, there are the leading members of the Opposition, the ex-ministers, and a few other men, whose age and experience entitle them to be heard upon any subject of general importance. Next we may reckon as a third class certain men who, having been returned by some particular interest, or having some special knowledge of a particular subject, speak only when that subject is under discussion, or the interests of those whom they represent are directly affected” (p. 62).

After mentioning several other classes of talkers, it next provides statistics of House of Commons talk, and says:—

“Whether or when the House of Commons will come to the determination, or will be forced by the public opinion of the country, to put some restraint upon its own talking power, is a question which time alone can decide” (p. 66).

It then goes on to affirm that the desultoriness of the topics brought forward, and the talkativeness of the debates “has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished.” It describes and criticises the appointment and management of the times and seasons allotted respectively to public legislation introduced by

Government, and to independent members initiating measures or bringing business before the House. It records the improvements, very slight indeed, introduced into the arrangements of the House in 1837 and 1848. In the latter year two proposals were made—the adoption of *la cloture*, from the French, i. e., the power of closing debates by the proposal of “the previous question,” and the limitation of the length of time allowed to the speech-makers,—but were not adopted. In 1854 another attempt was made to facilitate business by endeavouring to discover ways and means to increase the efficient and satisfactory despatch of business, but it had scant results. In 1864 a similar inquiry was instituted, almost as fruitlessly. The proposals most favourably viewed in the article are *la cloture*, and limitation to twenty minutes, the lessening of opportunities of debate, the diminishing of the rights of independent members, the increasing of the powers of committee. These are evidently and confessedly only palliatives. What is required is the systematic organization of public opinion, so that all questions shall have been fully and authoritatively discussed before they are brought forward as topics for legislative consideration.

The closing remarks of the article are, we think, valuable :—

“To all these and to any other remedies which may be proposed there will doubtless be many objections raised and maintained. ‘Interference with the freedom of debate’ will be held before our eyes as a terrible bugbear. We shall be told that we seek to limit the power of the independent portion of the House of Commons, and to fetter the free action of the representatives of the people. Solemn warnings will be given us against increasing the tyranny of a majority, and invading the sacred rights of a minority. Moreover, we shall be laughed to scorn as the proposers of alterations to which the House of Commons will never consent, and which would involve a departure from the first principles of the British Constitution. Well, be it so. The British Constitution has lasted for many a long year, the longer and the stronger, probably, from its susceptibility of continuous improvement and its adaptability to the ever-altering requirements of succeeding ages. At the present moment the evils which we have pointed out in the legislative system of the House of Commons are great and prominent. If no remedy be applied they will become more and more intolerable. It is for Parliament to determine whether a remedy can be found, or whether it is better that the country should suffer and the course of useful legislation be forever impeded, rather than that the much-abused freedom of speech among legislators should be curtailed, and tradition invaded and disregarded in any particular. Sooner or later the change must come, for after all common sense is a characteristic of Englishmen, and common sense will not for ever endure to see good measures postponed again and again, and perhaps finally deteriorated in their passage into law, merely because the House of Commons lacks the moral courage to exercise some legitimate restraint upon its own members, and chooses that the time of the country should be wasted, and defects in the law remain unaltered, sooner than exert itself to that self-reform which the voice of public opinion and the dictates of ordinary intelligence have long declared to be imperatively necessary” (p. 89).

## Religion.

---

### IS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE SCRIPTURES TO WARRANT BELIEF IN THE GODHEAD OF JESUS CHRIST?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

It is astonishing how ready even those who live in glass houses are to throw stones at their opponents, forgetting that this leads their opponents to take up a "*tu quoque*" line of argument; and thus many a pane of glass gets broken in the superstructure which they themselves have raised. C. S. L. commences his article by throwing stones at the "cant of religion," and in so doing outrageously caricatures those who condemned the admission of a Unitarian to the communion in Westminster Abbey. Where can C. S. L. find those who "seemed disappointed that the fearful thunderings of the Almighty's wrath did not visit the crew of the communionists"? Such language is a gross exaggeration of the sentiments expressed by those who opposed Dean Stanley's latitudinarianism. C. S. L. objects to the canting "phraseology of the unctuously orthodox when they claim such and such doctrines to be essential to 'our common Christianity,' and then pronounce all who do not hold these doctrines beyond the pale of Christian fellowship;" and we also "object" to having our views misrepresented, exaggerated, and caricatured, as C. S. L. has done concerning the administration of the sacrament to the revisers of the Bible. We think it would not be difficult to show that there can be no real union or communion at the ordinance of the Lord's table when those who partake of the bread and the wine differ so widely in their estimate of Him whose person and work the sacrament is designed to commemorate; but that topic scarcely comes within the range of the present debate.

S. T. C., jun., says that "the scholastic theologians were notoriously inclined to spin the cobwebs of their own minds out into creeds;" and we maintain that sceptical rationalists are very prone to take up the heterodox doubtings of their minds, and to manufacture from them a dogmatic negation of Scripture truths. S. T. C., jun., says, "One of the cobwebs of scholasticism this doctrine of the Trinity surely is;" but we maintain that a denial of the doctrine of the Trinity springs from sceptical reasonings and rationalistic doubts. S. T. C., jun., exclaims against the "subtleties," intricate logic, and mystifications of "school



divinity;" but these are surely equalled, if not surpassed, by the subtleties of German neologians, the intricate logic of French sceptical critics, and the mystifications of English latitudinarians, who hide, the doctrines they believe in, under a multitude of words without special meaning, so that their utterances may be conformable to all the conflicting tenets of the various sects of Christendom. J. A. speaks of "the narrowness of the vision of Scripture teaching to which S. S. has attained," and then subsequently opposes some of S. S.'s arguments by merely suggesting a conjectural possibility that the words of Scripture might bear a different interpretation from that which S. S. attaches to them. But there can be no doubt that vision, however narrow its sphere, is more reliable than a mere suggestion of hypothetical possibilities. The man who squints cannot justly consider his visual organs to be better than those of his short-sighted neighbour.

We do not, however, lay any special stress upon the above line of argument, but as our opponents indulged in such a strain, we took it up to show them how easily their own weapons might be used against them. The terms of the question before us presuppose an admission of the veracity and authority of the Scriptures, and therefore the discussion becomes one of Biblical interpretation. We are glad that it is so, for we are thus restrained from drifting into a debate on the inspiration of the Bible, and have each to draw our conclusions, in common, from one received collection of premises. S. S., J. K., S. C., and "Georgius D. E." have each handled the subject with considerable ability, and we will now proceed to draw a few additional arguments from "the law and the testimony." In Phil. iii. 21 we read that Christ "is able to subdue all things unto Himself;" and such power, which is absolute omnipotence, could not exist in any one who was not really and truly God. In Matt. xxviii. 18 we read that Jesus said, "All power is given unto Me in heaven and in earth;" and this declaration is confirmed in Matt. xi. 27 and John xvii. 2. But would God give *all* power to a mere man? No; "power belongeth unto God" (Psa. lxxiii. 11), and God will not bestow His omnipotence upon any created being; all power is centred in God, and in God alone, for He "will not give His glory to another" (Isa. xlii. 8); and therefore if all power were given unto Christ, Christ must be God. In John xvii. 5 Jesus says, "And now, O Father, glorify Thou Me with Thine own self, with the glory which I had with Thee before the world was." How did Jesus possess a glory with God "before the world was"? Was it as a man? No; it was as "the Word" which "was God" (John i.) that Jesus had a glory with God before the world. Can our opponents maintain that Jesus had a glory with God before the world was, according to His own declaration, without admitting His Godhead? In Phil. ii. 5-11 Paul speaks of Christ Jesus. How could Jesus be "*equal* with God" without actually being God? The Jews quite well understood that Christ maintained that He was unqualifiedly God

(John x. 33). We read that Christ Jesus "took upon Him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men;" from which we learn that Christ was not necessarily a servant, as every mere man is, although He, "being in the form of God," "took upon Him the form of a servant;" and that though "made in the likeness of men," He had an existence "in the form of God" before He "was made in the likeness of men." In Isa. xlv. 22, 23, we read, "I am God, and there is none else. I have sworn by Myself, the word is gone out of My mouth in righteousness, and shall not return, That unto Me every knee shall bow, every tongue shall swear;" and in Phil. ii. 10 we are told that "at the name of Jesus every knee should bow." Here we have a striking parallelism in these two declarations; that which is affirmed of God is also spoken of Jesus, and thus we are led to conclude that Jesus Christ is God.

Jesus repeatedly spoke of God as His Father, and on one occasion, when He had been thus speaking, "Philip saith unto Him, Lord, show us the Father, and it sufficeth us. Jesus saith unto him, Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known Me, Philip? *he that hath seen Me hath seen the Father*" (John xiv. 8, 9). How could this assertion be true if Jesus were not really and truly God? In Matt. xviii. 20 we learn that Jesus said, "For where two or three are gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them." This was equivalent to a distinct declaration that He would be present in many different places at one and the same time, and surely all will admit that none could do that but God.

The leading argument of C. S. L. (pp. 25, 26) applies to Tritheism, but not to Trinitarianism. We would inform C. S. L. that Trinitarians do not believe in the existence of three Gods; we believe as firmly as he does that there is but one God. With regard to one passage brought forward by C. S. L.—viz., "Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God is one Lord" (Deut. vi. 4),—we remember reading in a work by a Hebrew scholar, which we have not now at hand for reference and verbatim quotation, that the word translated "the Lord" is in the original the plural form of a substantive, thus declaring plurality as well as oneness. This passage, therefore, in the original points to a plurality of personalities in the one God, as well as to the unity of the Trinity.

S. T. C., jun., speaking of the doctrine of the Trinity, says, "What mortal, not a mere wordsmonger and creed-bound pedant, can profess to understand it?" We frankly confess that Trinitarianism is a doctrine which we cannot fully understand. How can we expect a finite mind to comprehend an infinite being? But our inability to understand how three distinct Persons co-exist in one God does not prevent us from believing it. There are many things in nature which experience brings before the mind, but which at the same time the intellect cannot comprehend; nevertheless the mind believes in the reality of the facts attested by experience. The type in philosophy knows that a mental being

and a corporeal being co-exist in the same man, but how the mind is acted upon by impressions made upon the physical organs the most accomplished philosopher cannot thoroughly understand. Experience, however, proves that the mind is thus acted upon, and therefore even the philosopher believes it, although he cannot discern the nature of the process by which corporeal sensations produce mental conceptions. The Scriptures appeal to faith, which is "the evidence of things not seen" (Heb. xi. 1). When Jesus had been speaking to Martha of the resurrection, He said to her, "Believest thou this?" not understandest thou this? (John xi. 26; see also John xiv. 10). Jesus enjoined the people to "believe," not to understand "the gospel" (Mark i. 15). There are many things clearly and explicitly stated in the Scriptures which reason cannot comprehend; but that faith which stands not "in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God" (1 Cor. ii. 5), will believe the declarations of the Bible, although reason cannot comprehend them.

The articles of S. T. C., jun., and of J. A., chiefly consist of elaborate criticisms upon the article of S. S.; and although S. S. is doubtless well able to defend himself, we will now devote a few paragraphs to criticising the critics. S. T. C., jun., says, "We have not here to do with the whole of the Trinitarian controversy; in fact, we have only to do with a third part of it. . . . This will show at once the fallacy of the reasoning employed by S. S., when he says that 'the doctrine of a Trinity of persons in the Godhead is a Scripture doctrine; but if Christ is not God, there is no Trinity, therefore Christ is proved to possess Godhead.'\*" This argument only needs to be stated in order to make apparent its absurdity; for it is equivalent to saying that because a part does not include the whole, therefore the whole does not include the part. S. T. C., jun., then remarks that "it may be admitted that there are three Persons in the Trinity, while it may be denied that Jesus is one of them. There might be a Trinity without Christ, and therefore the existence of a Trinity would not prove the divinity of Christ." This is a glaring example of wild criticism and random argument, for it wholly rests upon a very weak "may be;" and we venture to assert that no one ever has, or ever can seriously maintain that the Scriptures teach the doctrine of the Trinity without at the same time maintaining the divinity of Christ.

In referring to 1 John v. 7, S. T. C., jun., observes, "Adam Clarke says that in 113 MSS. extant in his time the passage was found in one only, so that its authenticity had at the highest only one-113th chance of being right." But this does not necessarily follow, for we must consider that it is far more probable that many

\* We would here just remark that S. T. C., jun.'s quotation from S. S.'s article is substantially correct, but, although included within quotation marks, it is not literally correct.

of the early Christians, in transcribing the Scriptures, might unintentionally omit a sentence, than that one should deliberately add to the Scriptures words of his own. Also, though we cannot now quote authority, yet, if our memory does not greatly deceive us, it is a fact that MSS. have been discovered since Clarke's time, more ancient than those then extant, which do contain this disputed passage. S. T. C., jun., asserts that "the Word" in John i. signifies the speech of God. But John, in speaking of "the Word," evidently refers to a person, and not to a mere verbal expression; and in Rev. xix. 13 Christ is called "the Word of God," being "clothed with a vesture dipped in blood," and having the name written upon His vesture, "King of kings, and Lord of lords." Again, John says, "All things were made by Him" (the Word); "and without Him was not anything made that was made;" and Paul declares that "by Him" (Christ) "were all things created" (Col. i. 16). Thus Christ is "the Word;" and as "the Word was God," therefore Christ must also be God.

S. T. C., jun., asks, "Why should we not believe Jesus when He says, 'I can of Mine own self do nothing; I seek not Mine own will, but the will of the Father who sent Me'" (John v. 30)?" We reply, We do believe it. Jesus was here speaking as a man, for He was truly a man, as well as God. As a man He could do nothing of Himself, but as God "all power" was given unto Him. Many of Christ's words can only be understood as the voice of man, and much of the language of Jesus can only be understood as the voice of God; we, therefore, are thus confirmed in our belief in the divinity of Christ. We would in return ask S. T. C., jun., Why should we not believe Jesus when He says, "I and My Father are one" (John x. 30), and when He says, "I lay down My life, that I might take it again. No man taketh it from Me, but I lay it down of Myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again" (John x. 18), which no mere created being could truthfully say of himself?

Many of the preceding arguments are applicable to the criticisms of J. A., and we would have enlarged still farther upon the subject, but the time at our disposal, and the space usually occupied by the contributions to these debates, are both pretty well exhausted, therefore we must now bring our article to a conclusion. We think that we have succeeded in giving some substantial reasons for maintaining that the Scriptures do warrant a belief in the Godhead of Christ.

SAMUEL.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

DIFFERENCE is the opposite of identity. As the Scriptures declare that there is but one God, if we find that the Scriptures affirm the non-identity of Jesus Christ with God, we shall have good reason for concluding that Jesus Christ is not possessed of the Godhead, or the God-being; although he may be possessed of Godhood,

or the God-disposition. I proceed to quote a few passages from Scripture to bring before the reader the Biblical fact that Jesus Christ is therein affirmed to be different from, that is, non-identical with God.

It is, of course, understood by everybody that *and* is the English conjunction of copulation, or the joining together by addition different terms as the signs of different ideas or things. Remembering this, when we read Titus ii. 13, "the great God *and* our Saviour Jesus Christ;" Jude 4, "the only Lord God, *and* our Saviour Jesus Christ;" 2 Pet. i. 1, "the righteousness of God *and* our Saviour Jesus Christ;" Ephes. v. 5, "inheritance in the kingdom of Christ *and* of God;" Col. i. 2, "God our Father *and* the Lord Jesus Christ;" 2 Thess. i. 1, 2, "God our Father *and* the Lord Jesus Christ," and 12, "our God *and* the Lord Jesus Christ," &c., &c., we are speaking of beings which being separate are brought together in *our minds*, not made co-existent in reality by our mere coupling of the terms together.

If this argument is good for anything, it is good to refute the common notion of the perfect identity of Jesus Christ with God, which must be sustained by Him if He is God; and will thus disprove the second line of argument employed by S. S., p. 19. I shall not pursue this argument farther, but leave it to the judgment of the reader, and pass on to another matter.

In Deut. xviii. 15 we have a prophecy in these terms:—"The Lord thy God will raise up unto thee a Prophet from the midst of thee, of thy brethren, like unto Me; unto Him ye shall hearken." This prophecy is applied to Jesus Christ by Peter under the direct inspiration of God promised by Jesus (Mark xiii. 11), in the address which he delivered after the curing of the lame man (Acts iii. 22), and by Stephen, the protomartyr, prior to his being stoned (Acts vii. 37).

In this prophecy two points are essential: (1) God would raise Him up of their brethren, that is, He would be a man; (2) He would be like unto Moses, that is, would not be God, which certainly Moses was not, though God said, "I have made thee a god to Pharaoh," meaning a representative of God; so came Jesus Christ as a representative of the Deity. The witness of two such persons as these, one an apostle—the *first* apostle, and the other a martyr—the *first* martyr, is surely far more to be depended on than the evidence produced by J. R. S. C. (p. 101), namely, the devils, who held dominion in the Gadarene. The witnessing of devils to a Scripture truth is surely not quite to be depended upon.

I would call attention to the fact that the quotation of John i. 1, "the Word was God," would only bear the argument S. S. puts upon it if it were convertible into "God was the Word;" but it is nowhere asserted that God was Jesus Christ. If it were so said, then it might be affirmed that there is no Trinity of Persons in the Godhead, which would not suit the argument of S. S. in p. 20. One or other of these, therefore, S. S. must resign; for an argu-

ment cannot be solidly logical which depends on contradictory affirmations. This may be better understood if we quote another Scripture assertion (John iv. 24), "God is a Spirit," and convert it into "a Spirit is God;" then, asserting that S. S. is "a spirit," should endeavour to infer his Godhead, not Godhood. So again, "God is love" (1 John iv. 16) will not hold true if we say "love is God." As little can it be argued from "the Word was God" that "God was the Word." This is independent of the criticism possible in the phrase, "the Word was *with* God;" for that which is *with* us is not ourselves. This brings us again to a consideration of our starting principle—difference is the opposite of identity; hence the Godhead of Jesus Christ is not sufficiently borne witness to in the passages quoted, to say the least that we may.

J. R. S. C. states that "of the four Gospels that were written by the evangelists, John most fully reveals to us the divine nature of the Redeemer of men" (p. 102). But the noting of this characteristic of St. John's Gospel ought to have suggested to the mind of J. R. S. C. that this was one of the points which made the bringing forward of the authority of the fourth Gospel in this discussion prominently unwise. He cannot but have heard that the Platonism of John's Gospel is one of the grounds for doubting the authenticity and genuineness of that Gospel as a product of the directly apostolic age. From a large body of evidences collected in Dr. Edward Burton's "Lectures on the Heresies of the Apostolic Age," at any rate, it is evident that the term *Logos*, as the Word was adopted into Christianity as bearing reference to "the divine word" of Plato, by St. John, in accommodation to the current popular language of that time. If J. R. S. C. and our readers will turn to Dr. Burton's seventh lecture, perusing it and the accompanying notes, they will see grounds for believing that St. John adopted the term *Logos* from the Platonic philosophy, or ancient tradition derived therefrom; and that the *Logos* of St. John is not the simple Messiah of the synoptic Gospels might be abundantly manifest to any one who should attentively peruse the Scriptures unbiassed by creed. We commend to the attention of those interested in the question the idea here merely suggested.

The theory of emanations has existed in every form of mythology and fable,—Egyptian, Greek, Roman, Indian, and Chinese. It represents this whole frame of things—material or corporeal, intellectual, moral, and spiritual—as processes from one divine mind, as manifestations of the power, wisdom, and goodness of God. St. John harmonizes and combines this old idea with the doctrines of Christ, and employs the very language of the theory in his—if it is his—celebrated introductory verse, in which Jesus Christ is represented as the power of God and the wisdom of God—goodness being God. If there is any truth in this suggestion and its grounds, J. R. S. C. will easily perceive that he is rather defending the inspiration of Plato than asserting the divinity of Jesus Christ.

The fact is, we think, that the religious and moral foundations of

the world had clean faded and gone—that the civilization of the world, naturally grand as it was, grew side by side with the degradation in moral and spiritual things of the race, and that Jesus Christ came as the moral regenerator of the human race, to reconstitute and reconstruct the civilization of home in the hearts of men. With the Jews He succeeded as their Messiah, endowed to accomplish that with all-fitting power; but John—or his representative—eager to bring in the heathen nations to the Christian fold, exhibited him as the *Logos* of their philosophy, and so sought to conciliate the philosophy of the age with the religion of his Master. In this way, probably, the Christian faith became encumbered with the doctrine of the Trinity, and the idea of the Godhead of Jesus was incorporated with the creed of the Church. But there is certainly not sufficient evidence in the Scriptures to warrant belief in it as a dogma. That there is not I put now on a basis of proof which is palpable to everybody—a statement of fact, viz., from the earliest ages of the Church there have been controversies in the Church regarding it. This would not have occurred had it been so clearly revealed as to warrant belief. To warrant belief is not merely to permit or allow or favour, but to compel and necessitate as a certainty. I do not object to believing that Jesus is God, if so it seems to the believer that the Scriptures teach, but I object to that being laid down as an article of Church doctrine which the Scriptures evidently leave as a matter of doubt, and free to the consideration of the mind of each reader. It is unwise and unsafe to overstrain texts to the detriment and injury of the unity of the household of faith. We ought to distinguish between religion and superstition, as we ought to separate philosophy from sophistry; and in the same manner we ought to hold as distinct faith in Christ and the creeds of Christendom: if we did so, Christianity would influence human life more, and distract society and the Church less.

G. P. S.

## UGHT THE AUTHORIZED VERSION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES TO BE REVISED BY A ROYAL COM- MISSION?

### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—VI.

If we try to bring the fruits of the earth to their greatest fertility; if we endeavour to induce in the flowers of the earth their loveliest hues and patterns; if we make it an object of great moment to comprehend the mechanism of the heavens, and the course and the causes of the changes in the universe, why should we think it wrong to give diligence and loving care to purge every error from, to add every perfection to, to bring the clearest light to bear upon the translation of the Scriptures?

Who in search of the perfectly picturesque would adhere to spectacles in which speck and spots mottled the vision of the landscape, and depreciate change by saying, Oh, I can allow for and calculate for that? What botanist prefers a microscope which is known and noted for its errors? What astronomer clings to telescopes in which flaws are found? What shopkeepers prefer sovereigns known and discovered on test to be alloyed? or what purchaser of a new suit makes choice of a garment mingled with shoddy? If no one in his senses prefers any of these, which refer merely to things material, secular, and comparatively worthless, how inconsistent are those who object to these, and yet cling to the present version of the Scriptures and deprecate revision! It is inconceivable that any sane person would so prefer a blurred, blotted, and ill got-up copy of a favourite author, because it would give greater exercise to his ingenuity, demand more care to make out its meaning, involve a larger amount of faith as to the signification, connection, and coherence of passages, than if a good and excellent copy could be got equally easily and cheaply he would not have it or take a gift of it. It is true that we read in Scripture about seeing "through a glass darkly," but we never supposed that this was spoken of as a blessing. Yet the writers in the negative of this question appear to think that this is a privilege rather than a deprivation. We have it on divine authority "that men love darkness rather than light," for a specific reason. Can it be that our anti-revisionists have thought of this and taken their position consciously—we shall not say conscientiously?

I entirely agree with the revisionists, and give my reason in Goethe's two death-words, which ought to be our life-words, "more light;" and with the advocates of a revision by royal commission because it would be fully, freely, and impartially discussed, it would not require to be accepted as a favour, or by grace, but could be made authoritative, and so have uniformity of use as the standard Scriptures.

I am not scholar enough myself to give any opinion on special mistranslations, but I beg to lay before the reader the evidence of a scholar known to them:—

"Professor Jowett ('Essays and Reviews,' seventh edition, p. 352) remarks on certain mistranslations of the New Testament in the Authorized Version, which, in point of fact, do involve serious doctrinal questions, and which thus might furnish a concise reply to Dr. John Cumming and others who oppose a revision of that version on the ground that no mistranslation therein is of doctrinal import. As might be expected, these passages are few. Professor Jowett at the page indicated cites only five, viz., Phil. ii. 6, Rom. iii. 25, Rom. xv. 6, 1 Tim. iii. 16, and 1 John v. 7. Besides these there are some others. Now I propose to furnish your readers with a statement of each of these cases of mistranslation, together with such a translation of each passage as is generally, if not unanimously, accepted by our leading scholars. Many of these are not authors; so that I have relied for some translations on private information.



On the bearing of these new and correct translations on the doctrines supposed to be upheld by the old and incorrect versions, I shall offer no remarks. All I undertake to do is to furnish your readers with the facts. I will now deal with the first case on the list, viz., Phil. ii. 6. Here the Authorized Version reads, 'Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus: who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God: *but* made Himself of no reputation,' &c. I have italicized the 'but' to call attention to the obvious halt. 'But' is a conjunction introductory to an antithesis; whereas here the sentence it begins is independent of that which precedes it. No Englishman would write so. He would say, 'Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God, *and* made Himself of no reputation,' &c.

"Or, more freely, 'was not tenacious of His equality with God,' &c.

"The second case on the list is that of Rom. iii. 25. The Authorized Version reads, 'Christ Jesus: whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in His blood, to declare His righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God.' The correct rendering of this passage is as follows:—'Christ Jesus: whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in His blood to declare His righteousness, owing to His passing over the former sins of *men*, through the forbearance of God.' [That is, 'to declare His righteousness,' which might perhaps have been impeached, owing to His omitting to punish men for their past sins. Compare Acts xvii. 30.] In the above versions the words in italics are not in the original text.

"The next in order is in Rom. xv. 6. The Authorized Version has, 'That ye may with one mind and one mouth glorify God, even the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.' Read beyond question, 'That ye may with one mind *and* with one mouth glorify the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.' (The word in italics is not expressed in the Greek text.) The remaining cases on our list are not strictly speaking 'mistranslations,' but translations of adulterated passages, the one containing the disingenuous alteration of a word, the other an interpolation of some length, viz., 1 Tim. iii. 16 and 1 John v. 7. In the first of these cases the Authorized Version reads, 'And without controversy great is the mystery of godliness: God was manifest in the flesh,' &c. The Greek text from which this version was made reads, ΘΣ, the abbreviation of ΘΕΟΣ, God. Now, 'all the churches for the first four or five hundred years, and the authors of all the ancient versions, Jerome as well as the rest' (says Sir Isaac Newton), read ΟΣ, i. e., *which*. The cross on the O was added by some Greek commentator in order to turn "which" into "God." Read, 'And indisputably great is the mystery of godliness which was manifested in the flesh,' &c. The remaining case is that commonly referred to as 'the three heavenly witnesses,' which deserves a note to itself. Besides this, there are other well-known cases of interpolation, such as the geography of Mount Sinai, in Gal. iv. 25 (see Dr. Bentley's Epistle, annexed to Malala's Chronicle, p. 96), and the account of the angelic movement of the Pool of Bethesda, in John v. 4 (see Trench on the Miracles *in loco*). But these interpolations can hardly be said to affect Christian doctrine.

"I have now explained four of the five cases cited by Professor Jowett. The conclusion I have drawn is that there *are* cases of mistranslation in the Authorized Version on which our conceptions of fundamental doctrines

more or less depend; and this fact, taken along with another, that there are thousands of gross mistakes therein not affecting doctrine, is to me a sufficient reason why a revision of that version should be performed as soon as practicable; and besides this reason derived from mistranslations, I feel that if we receive the Bible as the standard of our faith, we cannot be too exacting in our efforts to make the vernacular translation a thoroughly trustworthy representative of the original text. There yet remains another case of alleged interpolation to be explained, viz., that of 'the heavenly witnesses,' in 1 John v. 7, 8. The Authorized Version reads, 'This is He that came by water and blood, even Jesus Christ; not by water only, but by water and blood. And it is the Spirit that beareth witness, because the Spirit is truth. For there are three that bear record IN HEAVEN, THE FATHER, THE WORD, AND THE HOLY GHOST: AND THESE THREE ARE ONE. AND THERE ARE THREE THAT BEAR WITNESS IN EARTH, the spirit, and the water, and the blood: and these three agree in one.' It is generally allowed that Porson, in his letters to Travis, has proved that the passage which is here printed in capitals is an interpolation, probably of a Latin writer of the fifth century. . . . The facts of the case lie in a nutshell. The suspected passage is found in one Greek MS. only, and that is of the *fifteenth* century; nor is it contained in any Latin MS. before the *ninth* century. It is not in any of the ancient versions, nor is it cited by any Greek ecclesiastical writer. Of the Latin fathers, it is first cited by Vigilius Tapsenais, who wrote in the fifth century. The words in *tra*, i.e., in the earth, are, however, found in one Latin version. Whether they occur in any Greek MS. I cannot now ascertain."

The foregoing passages appeared in a local magazine bearing the title *The Church of the Saviour Teachers' Association Magazine*, in the year 1861, under the heading, "Important Mistranslations in the Authorized Version of the New Testament," and they bear the initials "C. M. I.," which are known in the locality to be the signature of Clement Mansfield Ingleby, LL.D., one of the contributors to this serial, of whose life and works an account was given not very long ago. On the subject of the necessity of a revision I think this—added to the other evidence laid before the reader in previous articles by previous contributors—should be held as adequate evidence.

On the other point, which some seem to think is the more immediate topic of debate, I should say there is really no possible question as to which is the better plan for accomplishing the object. I mention one which seems to have escaped the able writers who have preceded me in this debate. It is this. No revision of the Scriptures could be produced at so cheap a rate as to become universally available unless it could be authorized. If it had to creep into acceptance it would require to be produced at a price which would to a large extent be prohibitive, and by being so would defeat the very purpose for which it was intended, the instruction of the people in the truth as it is in Jesus.

This is, of course, a commercial argument; but in this commercial age, commercial arguments cannot be overlooked. But there are moral arguments producible as well. Any revision

brought out by any church, church committee, or any other merely ecclesiastical body, would fail to secure acceptance: (1) the jealousies of sects omitted or scantily represented would be hooked against it; and (2) because the element of lay scholarship will not allow itself to be ignored. The clergy are not now the *clerisy* or learned class, and with their spirits enswathed in creeds and orthodoxes—of all sorts of different shades and shapes—they cannot command the confidence of the people. Besides all this, a “diamond cut diamond” contest between scholars in favour of their creeds is not what is wanted; we want the undefiled signification of the best text of the Bible.

By a royal commission all jealousies and contests for supremacy of creed and sect might be got rid of, laymen could be introduced, discussion could be invited, and after due investigation, due authorization could be given. Thus all commercial, moral, and religious objections might be overcome or reduced to their least influence for evil. On this account I favour the revision by a royal commission, and I hope, though I have not nominally controverted any specific writer, that I have said something to the point.

E. C. G.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—VI.

CAUTION is more needed in dealing with anything religious than with anything secular. Errors in the former are far more grievous in their results and irremediable in their character than in the latter. People ought to be particularly careful not to do anything to unsettle the faith of others; nor would they be likely to do so if they knew how difficult it is for many not to get onty, but to hold fast their integrity in their faith. Almost all the writers on the affirmative of this question have dealt in exaggerations not only of the number, but of the importance of the various readings, renderings, and translations possible in regard to the Scriptures. It is exceedingly unfair to alarm people who are not competent to the task of comprehending the nature of the statement by rough and ready statements like these; for every scholar knows that, terrific as the fact may look in its statistical aspect, in its literary or its theological aspect it loses a great deal of the magnitude it derives from being put in figures.

A few words may set the minds of some readers at rest by exhibiting the fallacy of the figures employed by those who, like H. K. and his collaborators, advocate the revision of the Bible on account of the mistake and corruption they assert it contains.

If I make the following statement, statistical and startling, I only refer to a fact, and therefore I, in one sense of the term, tell the truth; but because I so state it as to make it capable of causing a false suggestion I may be said to depart from the truth.

The number of different readings in the different translations

(of the New Testament *alone*) collected by Dr. Mill, the learned critic who first engaged in such researches in England nearly two centuries ago, amount to 30,000; and it is given as the opinion of eminent Biblical scholars that since the publication of his edition of the New Testament nearly 150,000 have been *added* to the list by the industry and exertions of those unwearied successors who have collected and collated MSS. in great numbers and with much care.

Such a statement gives rise to horrible suspicions. What trust can be reposed on a work in which such errors, differences, and mistakes can be discovered? And this is in the New Testament alone; what then must be the total of error contained in the whole Scriptures, seeing that scholars are so much more numerous who are adepts in Greek than in Hebrew?

When looked at more closely, however, the extraordinary affair quite fails to support the superstructure of despairing doubt raised on it. For the fact is this, that in this enumeration of errors (so called) or various readings, every difference, however small, from the received text is counted—the addition or omission of any letter or word, every instance of the use of one word for another, or of a difference in the spelling of the same word; and every instance of the transposition of words in a sentence, however trivial or insignificant, is jotted, and numbered, and quoted *against* the received text. Now a large number of these are contradictory of each other, and so go for nothing; a larger number possesses no authority from nearness to the apostolic age, or from the history of the version or transcription; and a larger number still are of the most trivial sort, making no difference in the signification; while many of them are by the rules of grammar easily able to be shown to be errors of the transcriber. After a full comparison of these multitudes of various readings it can be asserted safely that not a tithe of them have any effect upon the contents of the text; while fewer even of those which affect the text make any important or even decided change in the signification in fact or doctrine of the common recension. When the positive evidence for its correctness is taken, and the negative grounds are properly investigated, many of the various readings revert to lexicographical differences, and have no influence on the subject-matter worth notice. The cry for revision on these grounds may therefore be set aside as resting on a fallacy.

Equally fallacious is the desire for a Royal Commission. Royalty is a misleading phrase. There is no royal road to the comprehension of the Scriptures. Learning and faith are the two agents; these a Royal Commission cannot impart; nor can they be brought together by the State. Royal Commissions are indefinite, shilly-shally things, and usually create more stir than allay strife. Who would care a straw for a Bible by Act of Parliament?

N. R. G.

## Education.

---

### SHOULD THE BIBLE BE READ IN SCHOOLS WITHOUT COMMENT OR EXPLANATION?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

WE may reasonably view the question now being debated as containing in itself *two* inquiries, viz., Should the Bible be read in schools? and if the Bible should be read there, should it be read without comment or explanation? We shall consider these inquiries separately, and to each of them we reply in the affirmative, for the subjoined reasons.

I. The Bible should be read in schools. There are two reasons why it should be read there. First, it is a book written under divine inspiration, and is in this important feature of its character *unique*. We are not here called upon to adduce proofs of the authenticity and divine inspiration of the Scriptures. They are so numerous, so well known, and so incontrovertible, that we shall here simply remark that the book which *alone* bears such proofs of its being the fruit of divine inspiration, has such claims on the attention of *all* as no other book can justly pretend to. *Therefore* it ought to be read in schools as being a revelation from God to His creatures.

Secondly, the Bible has a further claim on the attention of *all*, from the vast and incomparable importance of the subjects of which it treats. 1. It contains the law given by God to all His creatures. It is of great importance that the young should themselves read what this law commands and what it prohibits, and to insure their doing so they should read it at school. If by so doing they are led to practise the morality which this law of God enjoins, that will be a great blessing both to themselves, to the nation at large, and to the other nations of the earth with which England now holds and is likely still to hold such various and important relations. 2. The Bible reveals the very important fact of man's accountability for his actions to the God who made him, and it is of the highest importance that this truth should be early and deeply impressed on the minds of our youth. When the profanity in which multitudes of the young have been allowed to grow up is reflected on, surely this will be admitted. 3. The Bible contains very striking narrations of the way in which God has dealt with both nations and individuals—how signally He has punished pride, oppression, covetousness, deceit, falsehood, injustice, and other crimes—how retributive His justice has often shown itself to be—how He has caused both nations and individuals to reap the fruit of their own evil

deeds, recompensed their way upon their own head, made the crafty to suffer what they had prepared for others, punished the oppressor, and defended and blessed the oppressed. Surely it is desirable that all the youth of the land should themselves read the relation of these things which is given in the Bible. 4. The Bible teaches us the truth respecting the real condition of mankind in the sight of God, as also respecting the way of salvation, and what must be done for and in men to fit them for heaven; and is it not desirable—by causing the Bible to be read in schools—to secure that the youth of England shall not grow up in ignorance of these important contents of the Bible? 5. The Bible teaches us what will be the future and eternal state of mankind, apportioned to them at the universal judgment, according as they are righteous or wicked; and should it not be deemed imperative for youth at school to be made acquainted with these important facts, by their being caused to read the Book which reveals them?

II. The Bible should be read in schools *without comment or explanation*. Teaching religious doctrines is no part of the province of Government. The proper office of Government is to enforce order, to defend the weak from the oppression of the strong, to punish crime, &c. Besides, if it be contended that religious doctrines are to be taught in State-aided or rate-supported schools, who—in the present divided state of the nation as to religious belief—is to decide *what* religious doctrines are to be taught? And whatever religious doctrines might be taught in schools which are aided by the State, or by a local rate, an injustice would be perpetrated towards those who do not believe in such doctrines, they having in one form or another to contribute for the teaching of doctrines which they believe to be erroneous. The uneasiness felt by the more enlightened portion of the community to be free from all mental trammels, is certain to occasion a large amount of irritation and discontent to be felt by sectarianism having any favour shown it in schools aided by the State or by a local rate, and such favour would give just cause for dissatisfaction. Let those who advocate the Bible being explained by the teachers of such schools ask themselves whether they would feel at ease if they were compelled to contribute for the purpose of having their own children indoctrinated with tenets that they believe to be untrue. Then let them reflect what are likely to be the feelings of others in such a case. An anxiety to have their own religious views taught in schools aided by the State, or by a local rate, would, on the part of any who feel it, betoken a desire to force their own belief on the community, and to use the contributions of others for the effecting of that desire which, to say the least, would not manifest any great scrupulousness as to the means to be employed to accomplish a desired end. Again, by the abolition of compulsory Church rates Parliament has already recognised the injustice of taxing any part of the community for the support of religious doctrines or practices, in the correctness of which they do not believe. The evident tendency of the times is

towards placing all religious denominations on an equality. The English Church Establishment is doubtless destined to follow ere long in the wake of the Irish Church. Even some of the dignitaries of that Church see that event "looming in the distance," and have forewarned their clergy of its probability. Therefore to sanction sectarian teaching in schools aided by the State, or by local rates—whether that teaching be of the doctrines of the Established Church, of the doctrines of any other denomination, or whether it be left to each schoolmaster to teach his own religious belief—would be a retrograde step, and would clash with the general spirit and letter of recent legislation.

E. E. C. writes as follows:—"How can the mind of a child be brought to consider that Book holy on Sundays which it treats with most irreverence on week days? and how will love of God's law be cultured in those who are systematically taught to look on it as not only a Sunday book, but a tiresome and dull weekly routine? That that should be tabooed on week days which is brought into prominence in *excerpts* on Sundays, will form but a poor preparation in the puzzled mind of a child to give heed to the understanding of God's law, and attention to the gospel of God's love." We cannot see how the obliging of children to read the Bible daily can be construed to signify a treating of that Book with irreverence. It strikes us that the children in schools being obliged to read the Bible daily would show a regard or reverence for the Book, and would be calculated to impress the minds of the children with the thought that the Bible is worthy of greater respect than other books. Neither can we at all see how the *daily, constant* use of the Bible can be with any propriety called a *tabooing* of that sacred Book. We thought that *tabooing*, signified *interdicting* or *prohibiting*.

How *the constant use* of the Bible, and *the prohibiting* or *forbidding the use* of it, can be the same thing we are quite at a loss to understand. E. E. C. asks, "Why should we esteem schoolmasters as rascals above all others? If we do not, why do we think he will do otherwise than right? Why do we suppose that he will not refrain from proselytizing? If we do not, why do we suppose that he will act dishonestly in the matter of religious teaching?" We do not esteem schoolmasters as rascals above all others. On the contrary, we take it for granted that in commenting on or explaining the Bible they would do so in accordance with their own views, and we maintain that they would not act honestly unless they did so. Were we occupying the position of a schoolmaster, with liberty to explain the Bible, we should certainly do so in accordance with our own views. How could we conscientiously do otherwise? We do not object to the Bible being commented on or explained in schools aided by the State or by a local rate because we suppose that schoolmasters would act dishonestly, but because we conclude that they would act honestly, and put such a construction on the words of the Bible as they conscientiously believe to be the correct one.

E. E. C. writes again, "We protest against the implication which underlies the prohibition of Bible explanations in schools, that the schoolmasters would in all probability betray the trust as an uncharitable, unrighteous judgment." But if the commenting on or explaining the Bible be not prohibited in schools, the schoolmasters would not betray any trust in explaining it; they would be only acting in an allowable and lawful manner. If it be said that schoolmasters might be allowed to comment on or explain the Bible, yet be prohibited from advancing any sectarian views, we ask, Is there not a large portion of the Bible which cannot be explained without opposing the views of some sect, and favouring the views of some other sect? And would not such Biblical explanations be justly denominated sectarian teaching? The injustice of levying contributions from all, for the teaching of doctrines which are believed only by some, as well as that of violating freedom of conscience both in the children and in their parents, may be easily avoided by providing that the Bible shall be read in schools without comment or explanation, and this we maintain should be the case. S. S.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

"Masters and teachers of various kinds may discipline and instruct the mind so that it shall be more or less ready and apt to seek a knowledge of virtue and truth, and to recognise them in proportion as they present themselves. And the teaching which thus unfolds the faculties of the pupil, as well as that which communicates to him opinions and beliefs, is education. This education is highly important to our moral being; for it especially fits us for that perpetual progress which is our highest moral duty, and which includes all other duties. . . . Duty is the way to happiness; but the identification of happiness with duty on merely philosophical grounds is a line of thought and reasoning full of difficulty; and this difficulty is removed only by religious education."—*William Whewell*.

"TRAIN up a child in the way he should go: and when he is old, he will not depart from it," is, I believe, an authoritative statement of the law and the results of education. If, then, we train up a child to the mere formalism of reading the Bible, how are we to expect him to depart from his formalism, and betake himself to the study of the sacred volume, as the word of God, precious not for the life's guidance only, but for the soul's salvation?

Is it not a divinely inspired question—"Understandest thou what thou readest?" And is the reply not divinely sanctioned—"How can I, except some man should guide me?" If these things are so, how can we be doing rightly in urging that "the Bible should be read in schools without note or comment?" The Bible is a book which, more than all others, it is requisite that men should "understand;" yet this is the very book which we expressly desire that children shall be debarred from the chance of understanding, and distinctly lay our plans that he shall grow up in the habitual practice of reading without understanding, and without seeking to



understand it. Is it possible that anything can be more contrary to the instructions of the divine Teacher than this? He denounces a woe against those who are "hearers" but not "doers" of His word; but we legalize the process of hearing the word without heed; reading it without inquiry or investigation, and using it without care for the great end of its being given. I cannot understand how the plain teaching of Scripture can be ignored, and sectarianism so get the better of Christianity as to lead men to such subterfuges and "refuges of lies," as to think that they can serve God acceptably by this virtual declaration that a formal regard to this divine Book is all that is necessary.

If, as is the universal complaint of the pulpit of the country, and, alas! the general experience—might we not indeed say the common fault?—of common men, that formalism is the besetting sin of our age and country, can we expect to cure it by carefully culturing the population to peruse the Scriptures without thought of their meaning or anxiety as to their contents. We know very well on inspired authority that "the letter killeth," but it is only the letter—the killing letter—that we propose to make available in schools. We are commanded to "quench not the Spirit," for "the Spirit giveth life." Yet we not only quench the spirit of inquiry in the child, but also resist the Spirit of God in its striving in the heart of the child to know and learn the truth which He has revealed in His word. Nay, more, we countermand the behest of the Most High to be "instant in season and out of season," in making known the marvellous riches of the grace of the God of comfort and salvation. "Samuel" believes in the Bible as the best of books, but he claims the Christian freedom of closing this best of books from being explained, commented on, or applied. He will grant to Butler's "Spelling Book," and Mrs. Markham's "History of England," what he will not permit to the book of God—that book which, if not comprehended, lays an eternal weight of woe upon the human soul.

I almost hesitate to believe even their own words, who advocate the perusal of the Bible "without note or comment;" it seems so unlike those who know that the message addressed to man in the Scriptures is not to be postponed to anything else—"Seek ye first the kingdom of God, and His righteousness;" and who have the fact in their memory that it was an approved characteristic of Timothy—"From a child thou hast known the scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation." The word, observe is *known*, not *read*, and it certainly does not imply that his knowledge was attained by reading without note or comment. If the command of Jesus himself is, "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear," surely it is not right in us by law to enact that he who hath ears to hear shall not hear. This favourite and oft-repeated saying of the Teacher sent from God, which refers to the hidden truth of His teaching, shows distinctly that He did not desire His words merely to enter the ear, or touch only upon the eye, but that He was anxious that

each one who was able should be willing, and being willing should have opportunity to know the meaning of His words; but by our vain traditions we seek to make the word of God of none effect by the commandments of men. Is it right for professing Christians thus to strain at a gnat and swallow a camel?

Why should we not have an education at once thoroughly Christian, and yet free from polemics and sectarianism? Are the matters in which we differ more and more important than those on which we agree? Are we wise in introducing polemics into schools? Is it essential that school teaching should be sectarian? Every person who has acquired a right to the *status* of a teacher must know the difference between explaining the Scriptures and commenting on them in regard to the morality they teach; and every such person must be aware that to attempt to make children sectarian polemics is an unwise act as a teacher, is a sin as a Christian, and is a crime against the prosperity of the country. It could scarcely be a difficult thing to lay down a code of general rules in regard to the spirit and aim of the explanations and comments the directors of a school required,—if need be inhibition might be employed; and few teachers would be found who would traverse these orders and contravene these instructions. It is, I believe, a much easier matter to get people to act fully up to instructions given, than to transgress them by passing beyond them. Unless schoolmasters are either fools or knaves (as E. E. C. remarks), there could be very little fear of their overstepping the modesty of their commission; and if they are either, their overstepping would not much signify, but then they ought not to have such an office.

"Samuel" seems to think that in State-supported schools alone the Bible should be excluded; I, on the contrary, believe that in them the teaching of Scripture truth is especially required. In fact, is it not just because people have been too regardless of holding fast the form of sound words which cannot be condemned, by neglecting them in the practice of their own lives and as to their children's welfare, that State-supported schools have become a necessity? Had the Christianity of the people been true and firmer, would they have left their children untaught and untrained until they become a torture to the spirit of statesmen? If this is not far amiss, is it not just those who must go to the State-supported schools who most require Bible training? The children of the upper and middle classes have some opportunity of home training which may serve them in lieu of that Scripture lessoning which school may provide, but the poor have few facilities of such a sort. It surely becomes us to pause lest we put "a stumblingblock or an occasion to fall" in the way of our children. Let the light of God's truth shine into their minds, that their path may be like "the path of the just, which shineth more and more unto the perfect day." Do not surround their path in life with artificial darkness. God gave the light, let not sect make darkness.

S. L. C. affirms that "the Bible is the book of the Church, not of

the State." I, on the contrary, assert that it is the book of human life—life here and life hereafter. It is the book on which depends all law, statecraft, and church order. It is the source and fountain of morality, and has now such a hold on the world that it cannot be ignored. On its morality almost every state is based, and it is entitled to a hearing in every state, and from the children of any state it ought not to be withheld. Against any explanations which any teacher can give in the midst of the multifarious duties devolving on him in an inspected school, the Church is surely able to defend itself in the Sunday school and from the pulpit, even were any infringement of the province of the Church in the advocacy of creeds attempted.

But is not the whole argument about Church and State one about quite a bygone condition of things? Has not the State now so widened its boundaries that almost every person who is a member of any Church is also a constituent in the State? Hence the Church and the State are no longer in the same antagonism as they were in olden times, and we are fighting the battles of the present day under the old watchwords, which have lost their signification, and count ourselves wise in so doing.

Has any State really the right to forbid and prohibit the *understanding* of the word of God? It is a serious question. Is not God's word to have free course and be glorified? Do we not pray that our Father's will may be done, and that His kingdom may come? and then with singular inconsistency we prohibit the comprehension of the very charter of God's kingdom in the soul of man. We know well that the language of Scripture is peculiar in many of its forms, that the contents of Scripture involve much collateral information on geography, history, chronology, habits of life, forms of society, &c., essential not only to the proper knowledge of the Scriptures, but also to preserve the mind from grievous misapprehension of the nature of what it teaches. We know also how inveterately rooted in the mind misconceptions tend to become, when no opportunity is given for gaining correctness or attaining proper views. To all these avenues of information we purposely close the minds of children when we decree that the Bible shall be read without comment or explanation in schools—that is, we do our best to habituate the mind to unreasoning, thoughtless, and uninquiring perusal of that Book which more than all requires to be known and read of all men with prayer and care. Do we not wrong the soul of the child and dishonour God by such a proposal?

G. H. W.

---

## Politics.

### OUGHT WAR ORGANIZATION TO GET THE CHIEF ATTENTION OF OUR NEXT PARLIAMENT?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"Despond not, Britain! Should this sacred hold  
 Of freedom, still inviolate, be assailed,  
 The high, unblenching spirit which prevailed  
 In ancient days is neither dead nor cold.  
 Men are still in thee of heroic mould—  
 Men whom thy grand old sea-kings would have hailed  
 As worthy peers, invulnerably mailed,  
 Because, by duty's sternest law controlled.  
 Thou yet wilt rise and send abroad thy voice  
 Among the nations battling for the right,  
 In the unruined armour of thy youth;  
 And the oppressed shall hear it and rejoice;  
 For on thy side is the resistless might  
 Of freedom, justice, and eternal truth!"—*J. D. Burns.*

To be invincible we must be prepared for every exigency and emergency. If prevention is better than cure in ordinary diseases, it must be much more so in the case of the epidemic of war. Peace is most probable and possible when we are able to adopt the language of preparation, and defy threat, surprise, attack, or battled host. I admire the spirit, common sense, and suggestiveness of "Aye Ready" in his able paper, which proves that it is an inevitable necessity in the state of our times and of parties, that the consideration of our war organization must receive the chief attention of our Parliament, and can be postponed to no other matter whatever.

In the *Gentleman's Annual*, a paper entitled "The Story of the War" closes in these terms, which unmistakably proves that army reform, if postponed, will be postponed unwisely:—"The war has deposed a Pope, and completed the unity of Italy. It has given to Spain a king of the house of Savoy. It has converted North and South Germany into an empire, and placed an imperial crown upon the head of a Hohenzollern. It has extinguished, perhaps for a time only, perhaps for ever, the dynasty of the Bonapartes, and revived republicanism—of the unique sort distinguished as French republicanism is—in Europe. It has reopened the Eastern question, freshened up old theories of the dominion of race, and renewed among civilized nations the practice of seizing territory as the prize

of successful warfare. How it will affect the future of Austria, whose frontier yet limits the length and breadth of the new German empire, and what influence it will have on North-western France, the debatable land of Gauls and Teutons, it is impossible now to foretell. The war of 1870 is the end of much and the beginning of much more in Europe. It is a fresh starting-point in history."

For this "fresh starting-point in history" we must be prepared. We must be able to take and keep the start. It must be an age, if not of war, yet of watchful wariness. The polity of Europe must be revised; every nation is unsettled, not only in its internal arrangements, but in its external relations. Germany has pushed itself forward within a century and a half from an electorate to an empire. France, which held the succession of the empires of Charlemagne and Napoleon, has been degraded from its lofty position, and is now feeling the heel of the sovereign of the Germanic empire on its neck. Austria has been humbled, Denmark has been partitioned, Spain has been linked to Southern Europe by its close relations with enfranchised Italy. The Papedom is expunged from the catalogue of civil powers. Greece and Turkey are in chronic disaffection, and Russia is anxious for the disintegration of the territories of the Sultan. Sweden and Norway are almost reduced to being satellites of Russia. Portugal, Belgium, Holland, and Denmark hold a precarious existence, and Switzerland is in the centre of jeopardies. America is desirous of coping with the nationalities of the Old World, and claims a share in the umpireship of the sea. The polity of Europe is a caldron of hell-broth in the shape of unsettled questions, all having danger of war lurking in their discussion; and their discussion is written down among the inevitabilities of history. The controversies they involve can neither be staved off nor shelved, and most of them involve "blood and iron." A policy of pusillanimity will not aid us to shirk our responsibilities, one of isolation will not protect us, one of non-intervention will not benefit us. The fates are "fixed with adamant rigour by the ancient elemental powers," as Carlyle says; and it is only as we "ascertain these conditions, and valiantly conform to them," that we can be safe. In the settlement of the polity of Europe, in the resetting of the system of the western nations of the Old World, there can be doubt but power will have a large influence. The force a nation can muster will measure its weight in the vote. Settled these questions must be, with us or without us: if without us, then to our detriment and disadvantage; if with us, then in proportion to the might we wield shall be the place assigned us in the management of the inevitable transition. Therefore it behoves us strenuously to set the whole mind of the country to work, to bring out of the discussion the most perfect and efficient system of war organization.

This is not a question of party politics, but of national life or national insignificance. Europe must be reconstituted, and Prussia will claim the highest consideration in the proposed readjustment

of it. If we are prepared to yield this, we are prepared to yield all; for Prussia will follow humiliation with humiliation, and heap despite upon despite, and will assert a right to dictate to the nations of the entire Continent. Bismarckism is imperialism of the genuine Caesarian sort. He aims at replacing the revolutionary insurgency of 1789 with an imperial despotism; and accepting the idea due to the great thinkers of the republic of a united Western Europe, he will endeavour to consolidate a Germanic empire, of which we must consent to be parts, and to which we must consent to be parties. Unless we are prepared to sink into such an abyss of insignificance, we must rouse ourselves to be able to cope with the political Jesuit of the empire, if not in subtlety, yet in military force. The task to which we have to set our face is to reorganize, re-equip, extend, enlarge, give elasticity to our army, and concentrate the whole of our defensive forces into a machine-like workability which shall enable us to defy the opposition of any host that may be mustered against us by land or sea, at home or abroad.

F. T. F. has not risen to the height of the great argument. His generalities about war, though perhaps very fair as commonplace platitudes on the subject, have no relation to the real question at issue. War is unfortunately a fact. For war men have a greed of spirit, and this fact statesmen must face and prepare for. However well known it may be that ruin and woe, slaughter and impoverishment, are certain wherever war is adventured, as each declarant flatters himself that he may be the winner of the day in the affray, men rush into war with ungovernable delight, and a wild glee which seems as if the tiger-thirst for blood grew into an unquenchable insanity at times, and made the calamity of war a necessity of existence. Such strange things must have place in the calculations of those who hold the reins of power. No theoretical demonstrations of the inevitable evils of war will delete from the heart of man the wild actual war-spirit which quivers with the very greed of an instinct at the thought of an onset. Civilization's masterpiece may be peace, but we appear to be a long way off F. T. F.'s millennium, when war shall be no more. It is dreadful to think of, even as shipwrecks, earthquakes, explosions, &c., are fearful to contemplate; but even, like these, war has its place among the circumstances of existence, and that nation would be foolish which ignored war as a possibility always within hail.

We may safely assert that war is a fact—a dreadful fact, seen as we see it by telegraphy and daily intelligence; more dreadful far seen as it has been among the embattled hosts,—most dreadful as felt by the sufferers in frame and spirit on the field and by the fireside. It must be recognized, even as hunger and thirst; and statesmen must provide for it, and nations must prepare for it. The developments of it have been so very dreadful recently, that we, more than ever, must feel the absolute necessity of giving our chief attention to it. Now or never is the time. If we are taken unawares once, we shall not have the chance offered to us again to set ourselves

right. It is a fearful game, but it is most fearful to those who are skillless and self-trustful, who are careless or full of hardihood. The only true courage is to be, as the opener on this side of the question signs himself, "Aye Ready." No nation is now safe which is not officially and sympathetically ready with—

"Hearts resolved and hands prepared,  
The blessings they enjoy to guard."

It may be admitted that war is quite as terrible as Dr. Channing, in his eloquent oration on war, declares it is, or as the Peace Society believes it is; but we cannot ignore the facts of existence, and F. T. F. must grant that war is a fact,—for is not history, in every other page, the record of war, its causes and its consequences?

In a recent number of the *Saturday Review* (January 28th) it was truly said, "Friends and enemies concur in requiring from the Minister [of War] some feasible scheme of military organization," and it also speaks of this as "the most urgent of practical subjects." The war literature of our times corroborates this view of the matter. Newspapers, magazines, lectures, conversations, and correspondence,—every one of these gives evidence that war is the prevailing topic of thought.

In these horrible times we seek security; and we know that only by the most careful attention possible can our war organization be made such as to make this island invincible. It will not suffice to rest upon what we are,—still less on what we were. We have seen in the closing half of last year, and in the intensely trying opening of the present, how the gallantest nation of Europe, jealous of its laurels, flung itself into a contest, with splendid self-confidence in its power and skill; and we have read daily the narrative of the defeat of the one side and of the victory on the other, as the well-fed, well-equipped, highly trained, and thoroughly organized legions of the Germans poured forth in invulnerable might over the territory of France, deluging it with blood, laying its fortresses in the dust, laying under requisition the fairest provinces, and compelling capitulation everywhere.

Advocates for national security are not open to the accusation preferred by F. T. F., that they are deserting the safeguard cry of "Defence, not defiance." We seek "defence" for ourselves, and we seek to set danger at "defiance;" but we advocate no steps to defy our neighbours, or defy them. We do not, however, think it wise to conciliate their mercy or cultivate their contempt. We want to be assured that this England never shall be trodden by the proud foot of a conqueror. To accomplish this we must have our naval armaments brought to the highest degree of perfection, and increased to the largest possible amount. We must have our shore reserves in constant trustworthy condition, our regular army prepared for any emergency at any moment, and our militia and volunteers in the fullest efficiency. Every element of our armed forces ought to be linked like chain armour into a flexible and serviceable

unity—organized into pliant invulnerability like the hide of a rhinoceros, or the scales on a crocodile. The whole must be perfected into compact energy and mobile force,—certain as a steam-engine in its processes, whether stationary or locomotive; and over all, and through all, there must run the entire mind of one or more of the master spirits who know only duty, and who live to preserve the national life of a worthy land.

Peace is best secured by making successful war on the part of our enemy an impossibility. A "rush on the bank," when it is in perfect solvency, does no harm to it; so an attempt at war, made on a perfectly organized armament, need not alarm those who have provided it. Make the nation war-proof, and then we may sit each one under his own vine and fig tree, with the assurance that none can make us afraid. Safety is a great hero-maker; and were Britain armed for all consequences, and knew herself to be so, she could speak to the world effectively in favour of peace. True non-intervention requires that we should be able to stand in quiet independence and unconcern, let the threats of our neighbours be never so violent.

It may be thought that we have military glory enough if history "has writ our annals true;" but time changes all things, and war, is it what it was? We must be stirring with the times, and out-do and outstrip all others in preparedness. Hence the nation should cry aloud and spare not, "Organize, organize, organize." Give us an efficient war organization, and we shall not vote you inefficient supplies. F. T. F., and all who think with him, may rest assured that peace is the pleasure which power procures for those who are best prepared to claim it with a high hand.

F. T. F. makes great objection to the costliness of war preparation; but has he duly estimated, on the other hand, the expensiveness of defeat for want of preparation? It cannot but be true that our war organization, if reformed, will make a large additional charge necessary; but to such a nation as ours what price could pay for an invaded country and the consequences? We have not only to calculate the price to be paid for self-preservation, but also to estimate, in some measure, what would be the cost of failure to preserve our coasts intact, and our land free from invasion. The insurer grumbles at the tax paid on his premises so long as his houses and warehouses are untouched by the flames, but when they are so touched how gladly he avails himself of compensation, and congratulates himself on his foresight! Our war organization is really our National Defence Insurance Association. It is the anti-conquest provision we make to secure what we have from loss, and it must be remembered that the losses sustained in war are irremediable. Life, happiness, comfort, commerce, trade, internal improvements, and state conveniences, when once lost are not able to be brought into form and being again. We ought not, therefore, to grudge the insurance-money on which peace depends, if war organization can secure it.



I shall not attempt to draw the harrowing picture which might be drawn of the possibilities of horror to which this country would be brought if it were successfully invaded and overrun, but I am safe in saying, that did it occur it would be more costly than any war tax likely to be levied. We say, if the safety can be gained, let it be secured at once, cost what it may. If our financiers wish to put our war organization on a proper footing, they might readily do so by graduating the income tax, by remitting public burdens of taxation, if public duty in the shape of drill were undertaken and performed. What money tax would France not have paid willingly had she foreseen the cost of the present war? How thankful must the Germans be now that they so attended to the duty of rightly arranging their war organization, seeing that thereby they have escaped the terrible fate which would have befallen them had they been prostrated before the imperial master of France, who dashed his "mailed glove" in challenge at their king? Let us lay this phase of the matter to heart, and we shall strengthen the hands of the administration to put affairs to rights! I hope that these observations may be thought of some value in the consideration of the present question, and will incline the reader to think favourably of the affirmative. R. R. M.

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

PREPARATION is the best preventative. To be ready for and equal to any turn of affairs is safety. To foresee, foreknow, and guard against any coup that may be tried is statesmanly and wise conduct. If war is a necessity, a condition, or an unavoidable concomitant of civilization, we must take our share of it, or take means to keep out of it. Known weakness is a temptation to others to inflict war on us, and sometimes acts as a temptation to endeavour by bullyism to deceive the enemy who threatens. While we think a great mistake has been made by those who have proclaimed to the four winds of heaven the defenceless state of their native land, we by no means believe that safety should be sought by the ostrich-like stupidity of shutting our eyes to facts.

Facts are stubborn things—especially so when they take the form of an invading army; and the duty of the guardians of a country like this ought to be to know facts and their meaning. More particularly it is the duty of a Government to see that there is no laxness on their part inviting attack, and no means left by them unused to make one, if attempted, turn out unluckily for the aggressor.

F. T. F. writes as if all those who spoke in the affirmative were lovers of and advocates for war. Nothing could be more palpably wrong. We do not admire theft or garotte robbery when we seek to increase the efficiency of our police force, nor do we necessarily adore war because we ask the best attention to be given to the improvement of our war organization.

A defensive force is only real when it is capable of effecting its object. If in the day of trial it fails, all the outlay of the past as well as of the present is wasted. It is not a defensive force at all so long as anything can be done to make it more efficient—over-efficient it cannot well be. We only want the defence of the nation to be certain, and the security of the country to be felt to be inviolable. We want to prevent war, by showing that war against us would be unprofitable because unsuccessful.

Another mistake under which F. T. F. writes is, that we who take the affirmative desire a large increase of forces, involving a large increase of taxation. This is not the case. The question is about war organization, not army extension. Our affirmation is that the defensive armaments of the nation might be organized to better purpose, made more efficient, more readily mobilized and practically useful, if it were bound together into a united defence; and we desire to bring about such a reorganization of the war appliances of the nation that it shall be linked together into sinuous power like the work of a great State department should be—able to direct the entire energies to one object, and to achieve it.

We have an army and a navy, and we have several reserve forces; we have commissariat stores, and we have dockyards and arsenals, we have forts and fortifications, and we have agencies for the pay, the locomotion, the inspection, and the command of these. It is averred by some and believed by many that these several services are under divided headship, that the officials of some departments are at loggerheads with others, that they have no systematic co-operative unity, that circumlocution and red tape are more efficient in the neutralization than in the auxiliarization of each other's efforts. If this is a correct estimate of affairs, it is obvious that it cannot too soon be put an end to by an organization which shall impart the pliancy and co-adaptation of machinery to the whole total of our armaments, and all that concerns their use in any circumstances. There ought to be an unrelenting, unrelenting investigation, inspection, co-operative exertion, and supervision kept up constantly, so that all should be able to be put into immediate order, set at once to work, and kept in continual activity, and that not by merely sham reviews and sham parades, but by actual work of a nature to try their power, coherence, simultaneous efficacy, and perfect reliability, from the last recruit to the chief officer.

F. T. F. advocates attention to home politics. We have no objection to that, very far from it, but we contend that because security is the condition of a happy commonwealth, the wisest mode of making home politics an advantage is to set the organization of the national armaments in proper order. This is the reason why this topic ought to receive the chief attention.

Have we not seen how fatally ineffective are armaments on paper, bound with red tape, and served by an unwieldy and immobilized commissariat? Have we not seen how a splendid race of born soldiers fell into strange collapse, and endured a defeat,

certainly undeserved by them, because a chaos of disorganization held the place of a true and fixed regularity of co-operation, and unity of action had not been insisted on and practised? Have we not seen how splendid are the operations of a combined and thoroughly organized army where no solution of continuity from first step to last is connived at or permitted? We must avoid the former error, and learn from the latter success; and hence we ought to secure the best attention of the present Parliament by every available means to the thorough, the efficient reorganization of the entire war force of our country, so that safety and honour may still abide on our beloved shores.

It is the opinion of the celebrated Karl Blind, a German politician of known authority on these matters, that "England has not been and is not in a position to enter into a gigantic war;" that our people, though the bravest in the world, are quite disorganized in regard to military matters. This ought not to be the case, in such a crisis of history as this is, one day longer. Parliament should give its best attention to the war organization of the country. P. V.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

It seems to me treason alike to humanity, history, and progress, to suppose that in a nation such as ours "war organization ought to get the *chief* attention of our *present* Parliament." Are we who dwell in this sea-girt isle, protected by the waves, by the Providence who rules them, by the navy which rides upon them, as well as by the armed forces which can be brought to the coasts which the waves lap or lash, to crouch and cower in fear, and under the least sensible of all the passions as well as the most despicable, show the quiver of our hearts by the urgency with which we set about arming ourselves against imaginary—possible or impossible—foes? Is this the noble courage of a nation confident in righteousness and truth, or the ignoble cowardice of a people without faith in itself, in others, or in God? We are always inclined to doubt the heroism of braggarts, to "lightly," as the good old phrase is, the boastful and the obstreperous; and we are almost as little inclined to think well of those who tremble with a faintness of heart which cannot contain itself whenever difficulties appear to threaten. What a commentary on our popular toast, "The army, navy, and reserved forces," and all the flummery of sentiment it elicits, would a headlong rush of desperate energy to discuss and amend our war organization just now be! What a palpable self-accusation at once of braggardice and cowardice!

I am not at all one of that class which would purchase "peace at any price," although I am still less an advocate for "war at any price;" and least of all willing to lend aid to the enkindling of war for the sake of securing or maintaining the predominance of any party. But I am entirely opposed to our country demeaning itself in the eyes of Europe by rushing about, crying "Who's afraid? d'y'e

think 'tis I?" while we give up all other purposes and duties to arm ourselves to the teeth, and heedless of expense or need, extravagantly squander that wealth which is power and security, so as, by a continuous course of pecuniary depletion, to weaken ourselves in the time of trial, while we expose ourselves to the ridicule of the Western world. The paper by F. T. F., which opens this debate in the negative, has made some excellent arguments patent to the readers of this Magazine, which we hope will be laid to heart, and help to allay the war-madness which the newspapers seem to be anxious to excite.

I would remark, first, that it is not necessary to give our chief attention to war organization, and that it would be impolitic to do so.

I apprehend that it is not necessary to do so, because—granting all even that has been said about our deficiencies on the score of naval and military organization, we were able before the war to hold in awe the nations which have become belligerents, and since then they have become weaker, while we are not a whit less capable than before of holding our own with them. If it was unnecessary for us to be afraid then, it is still less necessary now; for they have been impoverishing each other in men, money, prosperity, and resources; and have attached to their armies the greatly retarding load of a heavy debt. Besides, war has with good cause become unpopular in both countries, and is not likely to be resumed by either for the best part of a generation. And, as we have said, it would be highly impolitic to devote our chief attention to war organization, for that would imply fear and encourage aggression, at the same time that it would be a confession before the world—or would, at least, be accepted as such—that we had been holding our heads high in the European system on false pretences, and were actually insolvent when we were boasting of our pre-eminent position and power. It would most certainly be unwise in us to do anything which would justify the contempt of our allies and compeers; and to express fear, or avow dishonesty, could scarcely fail to bring that about. Any proposal at present to extend or reconstruct our military system would almost certainly be interpreted in one or other of these meanings, and hence we esteem it unnecessary and impolitic to give the chief attention of the nation's council to war organization.

Let us consider for a moment the circumstances of the case. Two great nations, nearly matched, have just been engaged in a tournament in the lists of Europe. During the course of the six months or so in which the active work of destruction has been plied with all possible energy, twenty-three battles\* (underlined)

\* 1, Weissenbourg, 2, Woerth, 3, Spichern, 4, Panche, 5, Mars la Tour, 6, Gravelotte, 7, Beaumont, 8, Sedan, 9, Metz (at Noisseville), 10, Orleans, 11, Amiens, 12, Champigny, 13, Brie (near Paris), 14, Beaugency, 15, Bapaume, 16, Vendome, 17, Le Mans, 18, Belfort, 19, St. Quentin, 20, the St. Cloud sortie, 21, the onset at Mont Valerian, 21, Saarbrack, 23, Versailles.

have been fought, besides several minor engagements, which, according to some calculations, amount to fifty armed conflicts. To this we have to add twenty sieges, besides the present siege of Belfort, the investment of Bitsche, the blockade and observation of Mamberge, Givet, Cambrai, &c. Many of these engagements were the most bloody, probably, on record. Upwards of half a million of men were in some cases brought face to face as enemies; and in some cases the foes succeeded in decimating one another,—at Gravelotte, for instance, 270,000 Germans opposed 210,000 French, with a result on the German side of at least 600 officers and 17,000 men, and a more serious loss even on the other side.

The result of these mighty achievements in destroying human life, property, and prosperity, has been that those great nations, who six months since invoked the savage arbitration of the sword, ardent, vigorous, animated, and armed, are now much reduced in men, material, and mental might. One lies—

"By too severe a fate,  
Fallen, fallen, fallen, fallen,  
Fallen from its high estate,  
And weltering in its blood,"

almost at the mercy of its conqueror. The other, conqueror though he is, is not in high condition. Though the glory of an imperial crown has been snatched, in the face of Europe, from the laurelled tree of war, it has been gained at a dreadful cost. Hecatombs of men have been madly butchered to make a German emperor. The effective armies with which each combatant entered the field have been mowed down like grass, and have been transformed into rotting clay, or maimed and useless men. The enthusiastic clamour for war has been hushed by the voice of the lamentation, mourning, and woe which has been heard in every hamlet, village, burgh, and city in Germany; and the resources of that mighty nation are pledged for years to come to liquidate the terrible expenditure incurred.

Is it now that we ought to begin to arm in alarm, when the mightiest nations in Europe are either crushed or exhausted, are more than glutted with slaughter or broken by disaster? The proposal is keenly ridiculous, and I cannot but deprecate the use made of our national vanity by "Aye Ready" to stir up an agitation of the *Prussianization* of our army,—of our army, did I say?—of our nation. Let it be remembered in this hour of blundering counsels that every step towards the *Prussianization* of our nation is a step downwards from the height of our hardly won constitutionalism to the despotism of blood, iron, and red tape.\* Every

\* The *Edinburgh Review* for January says, "If France is the representative of the most advanced form of European democracy, Prussia is the representative of monarchy in its most complete modern organization. The King of Prussia is not a tyrant or an autocrat, for he governs in strict accordance with the laws of his kingdom; but the law itself emanates, for the most part, from the royal authority. The royal house of Prussia is the impersonation of the State, and the central force of the nation."

attempt to transform civilized man into a bloodhound thirsting for his neighbour's life ought to be resisted and resented. Every suggestion to awaken again the slumbering savagery of human nature, by re-exciting in his spirit the scent for blood, should be regarded as treason to man, society, and God; a treason which every honest man should set himself with all energy—

“To lash, chastise, and scourge from out the land.”

Now is the time to seize the occasion and reduce our armaments, to make economy possible, not only to ourselves, but to those two great nations which war has brought to the verge of bankruptcy.

It must be palpable to every person capable of putting two and two together, that after these exhausting campaigns fighting men must be scarce, and a disinclination must be felt to make such another sacrifice of life for a long time. A strong public opinion cannot but be found against again engaging in a war of such a harrowing and harassing kind,—not only from the sufferings endured, but from the burdens incurred. Both nations have lost immense numbers of fighting men, of bread-winners, and of tax-payers, at the same time that both have to restore a disorganized industry, recuperate commerce, and meet larger demands for State purposes. With diminished means they must have increased taxation, and the social disorganization resulting from such a breach as has been made in the population must lead to many difficulties to which statesmen must address themselves with the intent of discovering palliatives or remedies.

With such exhaustion of forces, such occupation for their statesmen, such difficulties with and among their populations, it is plain that if we had no need to fear them before, we have less need now; what, therefore, we have to do is not to devote our chief attention to war organization, but to develop all our resources, and redouble our diplomacy in favour of peace.

It is not war organization but peace organization that ought to get our main attention. Never was there a fitter opportunity for inaugurating the true civilization of Christian conciliation. Were Britain now to offer her services as peacemaker in the world, would not she fulfil a nobler rôle than if she shall engage by mighty armaments to re-stimulate war? It cannot be doubted that the constantly extending development believed by Germany to have been given to the army of France by the Emperor excited those jealousies which led to the organization of the Germanic forces on a new principle, and by its continual irritancy having become unendurable made war a necessity. For it is better to have a good war and be done with it, than to live constantly on the rack of watchfulness, draining the coffers of a country annually of as much as might sustain a war and settle the matter. We cannot wisely augment or extend our army in view of the necessarily reduced military force which our neighbours will be compelled to keep through scarcity of men and money, and from their need of resuscitating commerce

and industry, without bringing about heart-burnings and irritations, not certainly tending to peaceful results.

It seems pretty certain that those who have not only the bill of expenses incurred in this war to face and efface by payment as prompt as may be, but also the bills of mortality in which the results of it must be registered, will feel a proper aversion to doubling the amount of either bill for some time to come. Their sorrow may not absolutely lead to repentance, but it most assuredly will to caution and hesitation in entering into a second embroilment. If their pain and grief do not give them an aversion to war, their revenue may perhaps influence their policy so far as to lead them gladly to acquiesce in a measure for simultaneous disarmament, to agree to the issue of a commission to adopt a code of international law, regulating the nature, causes, and operations of war, perhaps having for its object the abolition of war. Ought we not rather to attempt some such measures of conciliatory and sensible policy, than by increasing our army, and agitating the questions that occasion not only waste of our own money, but dissatisfy and distress our neighbours? Do not let us provoke one another to deeds of strife and bloodshed, but to acts of mutual kindness; let us be just, and fear not:—

“Tis not the iron arm, but the strong will,  
Wins in that game wherein we mortals play  
Life against life.”

One of the arguments of “Aye Ready” for undertaking this question appears to me to dissuade from rather than to persuade to the affirmative. He says, “This is a topic on which party strife is sure to run high.” Whenever this is the case irritation is certain to be caused, and incautious words are almost certain to be spoken. Debate requires a freedom and latitude in our house of parliament when stimulated by party feeling, which our neighbours cannot understand, and which, while they would scan eagerly, would prove most probably exceedingly offensive to their *amour propre*. Nothing is so irritating as the criticism of others on the actions performed while quarrelling. The most phlegmatic can scarcely endure that patiently; but in party debate such criticism must arise, and must be pointedly put and met. In either case this would be damaging, for it would implicate most seriously the chiefs of party, who are also the responsible rulers of this country. These leaders ought not to be injudiciously forced into considering questions which can only be discussed with references which would be inflammatory to the heated spirits of the antagonists. It would be well, therefore, to seek in the meantime, those things which make for peace, and to devote our chief attention to internal reforms and missions of international tranquillity.

War in our country should be an outside thing. We ought not to invite it to our territories. It is certain that the war expenditure of this country is far too burdensome, that it acts as a dispen-

agent in many cases, and keeps down the prosperity and commerce of the country far below what they might be. Every penny of over-taxation lessens not only the power but the willingness of the people to endure the strain of a war tax. If the people are constantly taxed to the maximum, how can they meet, unless under confiscation, the expenses of war? If we wish the revenues to be elastic under the exigencies of war we must not keep the bow bent to oppression during times of peace; and in the lower ranks of life it is certain that the taxation presses hard upon the verge of endurance. To magnify the fears of the people, and excite them to incur heavy war taxation now, will only use up the last remnant of patient endurance; and when the tug of war comes, Revelation will be the result of the revulsion. We cannot afford to waste the resources of our country on guns and powder, fortifications and landed proprietors' sons who flaunt in scarlet do-nothingism; nor can we so far conciliate the military party by supinely allowing ourselves to be ground to the dust that they may grow rich and strut in well-paid idleness.

It would be a sad thing indeed if the people should be foolish enough to fall into the trap of the interested classes—the panic-mongers,—who are more to be feared just now than any invaders, and clamour for increased armaments. How true is the sad exclamation of Mr. Froude in February's *Fraser*:—"When the interests of the nation require killing, burning, and destroying, we are all called on to contribute, and are ridiculed if we complain;" but how close-fisted are those very persons who cry out most loudly for war when other great national interests are concerned,—the organization of industry, the extinction of pauperism, the promotion of emigration, the diminution of crime, the culture of the people! Parliament has haggled for more years about a bill for the primary education of the children of England than it spent days over the budgets of the Crimea, the Chinese, or the Abyssinian wars. Parliament is already too prone to give its chief attention to war organization. May the people retain good sense enough not to be hoodwinked by the *franc-tireurs* of agitation, but may they remember that wisdom and love, conciliation and peace, international amity and home prosperity, are far nobler and more beneficial aims to keep before Parliament than the multitudinous murder of organized war.

T. L. W.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

There is in existence a certain number of men, not sufficiently in unison to be denominated a "class," some of them philosophers and some poets, who believe and assert their conviction that war, even while the majority of mankind continue to display the same characteristics as they do now, might be totally banished from the face of the earth. I cannot suppose it. But this at least we might



ask at the hands of modern civilization (without bringing into the question those higher reasons which should approve themselves to all earnest, philanthropic men),—we are at least entitled to ask that war, as a recognised mode of settling disputes between nations, should be decidedly disowned. In so many different phases of the world's history has the experiment been tried, and the result proved a failure, that another hundred wars, great or insignificant, would leave the matter precisely as it now stands. The "appeal to arms" once abolished, and some other plan—of which there are several conceivable—adopted by civilized peoples to settle disputes in those instances which can never be obviated entirely, wherein the possessions, rights, or privileges of one nation are endangered by the actions of another nation, a grand advance would be made. There would only remain to be dealt with wars of unprovoked aggression, and these the "common sense of most" might be trusted to check; and where they could not be stopped at their outset (for it must be always in the power of a strong nation to make an insidious attack upon a weaker), the interposition of several nations might, before much injury had been done, not only terminate the outrage, but exact due reparation. Now every grand and beneficial movement must have a beginning, be it national merely, or earth-wide in its issue; and if war be a folly, an injury, and a crime, and therefore a thing which both peoples and Governments should set themselves determinedly to oppose, it is most likely that a stand made by some country—say either Great Britain or America—which recognizes nationally the Christian religion, and teems with various agencies devised for the welfare of mankind, would have a very marked influence upon every other nation, and tend largely to the elevation of that "protesting" nation in the opinion of every right-thinking man. We of the British race are not a warlike nor a war-loving people, much as we have been engaged in conflict from our earliest known history. Certainly our numerous dependencies have tended to involve us in wars, sometimes extensive, sometimes petty, with tribes and nations occupying a lower status than ourselves; and our position amongst European powers has for centuries led us into wars, not a few being of excessive length, for which we have had to pay heavily in blood and treasure. But since the unfortunate Crimean war, in which we were half cajoled by a "faithful ally," half carried by a popular fervour which saw nothing but nobleness in Turkey, and only baseness in Russia, it is evident that the preponderance of national feeling is dead against our engaging in anything of the same or of a kindred nature; not solely, I hope, as some would spitefully insinuate, because we are desirous of devoting all our energies to money-grubbing and money-hoarding, but rather because we feel how valueless is military renown even when it can be obtained, and how little a resort to arms tends to the rectification of any dispute. I fully believe that amongst our British people there is spreading a feeling that it is high time now for a determined stand to be made against a national

mode of settling quarrels quite as outrageous as the duels between single individuals. This is quite another thing from holding, as some very well-meaning people do, that we (or any people) are not justified in acting in self-defence when an invader approaches our shores or frontiers. This is pushing a valid argument too far—a thing which human nature is very apt to do,—and he must be strangely lacking, one would say, in heroism of character who would suffer his possessions to be despoiled, and his loved ones exposed to imminent peril, and not desire to lift a hand for their protection. Those who differ from me on this point, and assert that Britain is not so pacific as many think her, will call attention to such facts as the increase of our regular army of late years, the endeavours made to render the militia more efficient, and the origin of a new force, composed of men volunteering their services—men of every grade in society,—in order that, should our island be in peril, there may be a large army at once available for her defense.

Yet even such an event as the last-named—the volunteer movement, as we call it—is not necessarily indicative of the real state of the national feeling. Started by an imagined jealousy of France, it has been kept afloat (making passages amidst various perils which have threatened to shipwreck it) for some years now, without causing more than an occasional and spasmodic interest in the public mind. The excitement produced by the threat of an invasion in the beginning of the present century was considerable, but no sooner had the alarm subsided than, saving in the case of some of those connected with it, the whole thing passed into oblivion.

That a like collapse has not extinguished the present volunteer force may be accounted for, in a great measure, by the circumstance that “playing at soldiers” has been made rather more agreeable than formerly by various adjuncts; and the bulk of those who have enrolled themselves as its members have a decided conviction that it is not very, if at all, probable that they will have to smell gunpowder in actual warfare; otherwise we may doubt how far mere patriotism would carry your average Briton in an age like this, especially when he is not called by profession to bear arms, but does so merely as an amateur. I, therefore, in no way recognise this volunteer movement as indicative of a growing national taste for the “pomp and circumstance” of war; nor do I think that our present Parliament, if it moves as an index of national feeling and determination, will devote itself to the worse than profitless task of voting large sums of money and laying out extensive schemes to enable Great Britain to qualify herself for engaging in a Continental war with some probability of success.

The lessons of the recent conflict (scarcely suspended) between France and Prussia must be indeed misread if it is sought to be deduced from them that we should take our turn amongst the worshippers of extensive war organization, and sacrifice at its shrine our present liberties and our future hopes and aims. Not so would I read the scarcely blotted page of contemporaneous

history. Four truths seem to me to stand out prominently; not altogether new are they, but recent events have revived them, and presented them before us in a guise most unmistakable. They are these briefly:—Firstly, that despite modern progress in art, science, and literature, no sooner do we “let slip the dogs of war” than its atrocities and horrors are seen to be in no wise diminished; nay, perhaps they are intensified through our knowing more and feeling more deeply. Secondly, it has been shown again most conclusively how difficult, how well-nigh impossible it is to foresee what will be the result in a war where we should judge both combatants are nearly matched in numerical force, and equally prepared for the fight by training and equipment. And thirdly, this is abundantly clear, that in no land can gigantic standing armies be sustained, or military training systematized and extensively enforced, without there arising also a government of despotism, which may be imperial, monarchical, or even democratic (for *that* is possible), but which must tend to cripple and enervate the energies of the people, though it may stimulate to intense activity certain branches of the national growth, and maintain an outward appearance of health by repressing or glossing over those things which are symptomatic of unsoundness in the common weal. Lastly, too, the absurdity of an axiom which some men of judgment have actually permitted themselves to grant has been made palpable—namely, this, that the best way of keeping at peace is to be well prepared for war. Place it upon a parallel with the assertion that the best way to have an empty stomach is to fill it with food, for both tend equally to an express contradiction in terms.

France has for years past had, under the Empire, vast armies of regular and semi-regular troops, and she has been anything but peaceable. So, too, in Prussia, where prevails a system calculated in case of need to make a soldier of every citizen, yet not, setting aside the plan of maintaining a standing army, in point of numbers exceeding all that could be required for mere defensive purposes. We have seen the result in the occurrences of the last few months, which have proved that universal drill does not inspire a people with an antipathy for war, nor render neighbouring nations less inclined to pick a quarrel. Given the existence of a powerful army, where there are few colonial settlements to which portions of it can be drafted off, and its presence in the country from which it is raised is a perpetual irritant. If not altogether a mockery, it must be employed in some way; and the people, as well as the Government, are likely to see in it a convenient agent by which glory and aggrandizement can be obtained at the expense of some neighbouring country.

By no means would I desire that Britain should proceed any farther in the direction of increasing our army, or by compulsion enrolling hundreds of thousands of our youth as volunteers. We could not raise, by our utmost exertions, nor keep together if we raised it (for desertion from the army goes on, almost unchecked,

at a fearful rate), a land force that would be anything but insignificant and futile beside the hundreds of thousands or the millions of men which some nations of the Continent could bring into the field. It is not by efforts of this sort that the lustre of Britain is to be enhanced in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. Nor need we suppose that, as the alarmists would have us believe, our country is on the eve of being invaded. Our nearest neighbour and quondam enemy is very effectually crippled for a considerable time to come; Prussia and the Germanic countries have quite enough to do in the way of repairing damages and reconstructing their internal arrangements, and are not likely to trouble themselves about us, though an invasion of England and its grand possibilities might be an interesting narrative to be "told to their marines," if they have such a force. The remoteness of Russia and the character of her countrymen show us that we have no need to fear invasion from her. No; let our statesmen and our legislators give themselves heart and soul to the work of home reformation, to the task of making laws which are really LAWS; not beyond the comprehension of the mass of the people, and with *bonâ fide* applicability to real life—not the chimeras of mere speculatists. There is a spirit arising amongst the people which will not tolerate measures that would result in placing an increased force of regular or volunteer soldiers at the disposal of any Government, perhaps to be used as a weapon at home instead of abroad.

CRIS.

CARLYLE is clearly a strong man; that is, he has a strong intelligence, and he knows very well what he himself means. Then he has a singularly picturesque style. The drawing of his figures may be extravagant, and the postures impossible or *outré*, and the general composition full of faults and deficient in harmony and tone. But the colouring is wonderfully forcible, and it arrests the eye, and tells its story, when more correct and academic pictures wholly fail to affect the spectator. His enthusiastic worshippers may liken him to Michael Angelo, and his depreciators to Salvator Rosa, Caravaggio, or Fuseli. Yet the fact that he is thus compared with either the one or the other proves the reality of his power and the originality of his gifts.—*Graphic*.

CONTROVERSY AND CONTROVERSIALISTS.—True concession is not only the strength of polemic, but a positive accession to truth. Controversialists should always begin by concession. It is courteous, and therefore conciliates. There is sometimes a razor-like sharpness between truth and error; sometimes they shade into each other; and the truth often lies in the *via media* between opposite errors. When I cannot find out the medium, I always try to find out the two extremes. The mere controversialist, who must always be in the thick of the fight with error, is no more worthy of credit than the pugilist. The controversial minds are like the lean cattle of Egypt; they are very greedy, and are none the fatter for their feeding.—*John Duncan, LL.D.*

## The Essayist.

---

### THE POETRY OF JOHN HENRY NEWMAN.

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO "THE DREAM OF GERONTIUS."\*

"Most musical

My notes, conversing with the mental sense,  
Not the outward ear."

THE spirit of poetry, like the breath of heaven, permeating and diffusing itself everywhere, is of world-wide sway. What abode or haunt so ungenial can be found that owes not its presence and feels not its inspiring influence?

Even the dim and silent retreat of ascetic sanctity—the "cloistered cell"—feels its influence at times, waking it up to unwonted song. Of this—the poetry of the cloister, as it may be called, taking the expression in a general sense—a notable specimen is afforded in the poetry of that religious recluse and votary of the Muses, John Henry Newman. The biography of the poet, as self-portrayed in the pages of "The Apologia," is so well known to every reader as to demand no special notice at our hands. We shall therefore confine ourselves exclusively to a consideration of his poetry. The ordinary reader of poetry will find little here to attract; everything is conceived in a style of the severest simplicity—no glaring colours or ornaments of any kind. As contrasted with poetry of the richer, more florid, and luxuriant sort, it might be compared, in its keen purity and ethereality, to those mountains of Greece whereof the poet himself sings—those "mountains bare," which—

"In their own pure tints arrayed,  
Scorn earth's green robes which change and fade,  
And stand in beauty undecayed."

Or, to vary the comparison—one, it may be thought, a little beyond the occasion,—it might be likened, in its grave simplicity, to that stern, rude music of primitive times—the Gregorian tones—as contrasted with the softer and more alluring, as well as more artificial and elaborate strains of the modern composer. These poems—all of them belonging in general to the religious order—are various in style as in theme, but may be classed principally under the head of the didactic and monitory (*minatory*, might we not also say?)—and of the meditative and subjective. Of the former class are the two poems, the one on "Sacrilege," the other on "Liberalism,"

\* "Lyra Apostolica," "Verses on Various Occasions."

whose words of stern, emphatic warning, sounding like a prophetic denunciation, seem peculiarly applicable to the present time—an age when faith seems almost dead, and the reign of secularism begun, while a spirit of irreverence is abroad that holds nothing sacred, human or divine.

## SACRILEGE.

"The Church shone brightly in her youthful days,  
Ere the world on her smiled;  
So now, an outcast, she would pour her rays,  
Keen, free, and undefiled:  
Yet would I not that arm of force were mine,  
Which thrusts her from her awful ancient shrine.

"'Twas duty, bound each convert-king to rear  
His Mother from the dust,  
And pious was it to enrich, nor fear  
Christ for the rest to trust;  
And who shall dare make common or unclean  
What once has on the holy altar been?

"Dear brothers! hence, while ye for ill prepare,  
Triumph is still your own;  
Blest is a pilgrim Church! yet shrink to share  
The curses of throwing down.  
So will we toil in our old place to stand,  
Watching, not dreading, the despoiler's hand.

"Palermo, June 4, 1832."

A lesson this of warning import to a godless revolutionary age! The poem entitled "Liberalism" is directed against those who would endeavour to reduce the Christian religion to a mere code or system of morality—a system, like the paganism of old imperial Rome, regarded with favour by the politician or the philosopher, as conducive to the order and well-being of the state and of Society at large.

## LIBERALISM.\*

"Jehu destroyed Baal out of Israel. Howbeit from the sons of Jeroboam, Jehu departed not from after them, to wit, the golden calves that were in Beth-el, and that were in Dan."—2 Kings x. 29.

---

\* "Now by liberalism I mean false liberty of thought, or the exercise of thought upon matters in which, from the constitution of the human mind, thought cannot be brought to any successful issue, and therefore is out of place. Among such matters are first principles, of whatever kind; and of these the most sacred and momentous are especially to be reckoned the truths of revelation. Liberalism, then, is the mistake of subjecting to human judgment those revealed doctrines which are in their nature beyond and independent of it, and of claiming to determine on intrinsic grounds the truth and value of propositions which rest for their reception simply on the external authority of the divine word."—"History of my Religious Opinions," by John Henry Newman, D.D.

"Ye cannot halve the gospel of God's grace,  
Men of presumptuous heart!—I know you well.  
Ye are of those who plan that we should dwell  
Each in his tranquil home and holy place;  
Seeing the Word refines all natures rude,  
And tames the stirrings of the multitude.

"And ye have caught some echoes of its lore,  
As heralded amid the joyous choir;  
Ye marked it speak of peace, chastised desires,  
Good-will and mercy,—and ye heard no more;  
But as for zeal and quick-eyed sanctity,  
And the dread depths of grace, ye passed them by.

"And so ye halve \* the truth; for ye in heart  
At best are doubters whether it be true,  
The theme discarding, as unmeet for you,  
Statesmen or sages. O new encompassed art  
Of the ancient foe! but what if it extends  
O'er our own camp, and rules amid our friends?

*"Palermo, June 5, 1882."*

The meditative and subjective class of poems embrace a wide range and variety of subjects, so that it is difficult to make a selection. We shall choose, then, from the mass, such poems as appear to us best to illustrate the writer's peculiar habits and modes of thought and of feeling. And first, of his self-introspectiveness, and habit of blending the philosophical with the religious element in his meditations, we have a striking instance in the poem or sonnet entitled "Memory." Arguing from the analogy of long-loved earthly scenes, of which, however far by distance divided, the dear, familiar images rise in all their clearness before the mind, he thence, in rapt contemplation, carries his gaze beyond the veil that hides the unseen world, and conceives a picture of the intermediate state, with his soul looking back, as in vision, upon the whole page of its past history, even till the coming of the day of doom:—

#### MEMORY.

"My home is now a thousand miles away;  
Yet in my thoughts its very image fair  
Rises as keen, as I still lingered there,  
And, turning me, could all I loved survey.

---

\* Cf. Wordsworth, *Ecclesiastical Sonnets*:—

"Two aspects bears truth needful for salvation,  
Who knows not *that*?—yet would this delicate age  
Look only on the gospel's brighter page:  
Let light and dark, duly, our thoughts employ;  
So shall the fearful words of commination  
Yield timely fruit of peace, and love, and joy."

*The Communion Service.*

And so, upon death's unaverted day,  
 As I speed upward, I shall on me bear,  
 And in no breathless whirl, the things that were,  
 And duties given, and ends I did obey.  
 And when at length I reach the throne of power,  
 Ah ! still unscared, I shall in fulness see  
 The vision of my past innumerable deeds,  
 My deep heart-courses, and their motive-seeds,  
 So to gaze on till the red dooming hour.  
 Lord ! in that strait, the Judge ! remember me.

*" Off Cape Trafalgar, December 16, 1832."*

Of the same class with the foregoing, though more purely poetical in its conception, is a poem of kindred title and theme—"The Pains of Memory;" memory looking back in *this* instance from the standpoint of the present earthly and temporal scene :—

#### THE PAINS OF MEMORY.

"What time my heart unfolded its fresh leaves,  
 In spring-time gay, and scattered flowers around,  
 A whisper warned of earth's unhealthy ground,  
 And all that these, faith's light and pureness, grieves ;  
 Sun's ray and cankerworm,  
 And sudden whelming storm :  
 But ah ! my self-will smiled, nor recked the gracious sound.

"So now defilement dims life's memory-springs ;  
 I cannot hear an early cherished strain,  
 But first a joy, and then it brings a pain,  
 Fear, and self-hate, and vain remorseful stings :  
 Tears lull my grief to rest,  
 Not without hope this breast  
 May one day lose its load, and youth yet bloom again.\*

*" Lazaret, Malta, January 19, 1833."*

How beautiful, appropriate, and touching is this concluding aspiration!—an aspiration which we might each surely make our own with spiritual profit.

With the above, as breathing a somewhat similar spirit of self-reproachful regret for the past, may be compared the following suggestive poem, entitled—

\* Cf. "O fear, O joy to think ! and what if yet  
 In some far moment of eternity,  
 The love of evil I may quite forget,  
 And with the pure in heart my portion be ?"

*Keble, "Lyra Innocentium."*



## WANDERINGS.

"Ere yet I left home's youthful shrine,  
My heart and hope were stored  
Where first I caught the rays divine,  
And drank the eternal Word.

"I went afar ; the world unrolled  
Her many-pictured page ;  
I stored the marvels which she told,  
And trusted to her gauge.

"Her pleasures quaffed, I sought awhile  
The scenes I prized before ;  
But parent's praise and sister's smile  
Stirred my cold heart no more.

"So ever sear, so ever cloy  
Earth's favours as they fade ;  
Since Adam lost, for one fierce joy,  
His Eden's sacred shade.

*"Off the Lizard, December 8, 1832."*

In this connection—that of painful and remorseful memory—may also be cited the two companion and, indeed, almost correlative poems, "The Brand of Cain," and "The Scars of Sin," as they are respectively entitled.

These poems are specially remarkable as affording an illustration of the truth that, the higher a man's attainments in spiritual perception, the deeper and keener will be his self-abasement and sense of demerit, pure and void of offence though his life may have been in the eyes of the world—as we know that of Dr. Newman to have been. To quote here the words of Isaac Taylor,—“It is manifest,” he remarks, “that when the individual man has reached this point, and has unfeignedly assented to a principle of government to which he is obnoxious, the depth and intensity of the emotions that thence take their rise will bear proportion much rather to the culture, the refinement, and the sensitiveness of his moral constitution, than to the extent or enormity of his actual transgressions. So it is (as must seem likely) that those whose course of life has been in the world's eye blameless, and whose domestic phase is altogether lovely, often go far beyond the ostensibly guilty in those feelings of anguish and abasement which attend their entrance upon the Christian life. Shall we say that such feelings, such agonies, are misplaced—that they are groundless, are morbid? We may say this if we wish to mark and notify our own low place on the scale of spiritual perception.”\*

\* "The Restoration of Belief," by Isaac Taylor.

## THE BRAND OF CAIN.

"I bear upon my brow the sign  
Of sorrow and of pain;  
Alas! no hopeful cross is mine,  
It is the brand of Cain.

"The course of passion, and the fret  
Of godless hope and fear,  
Toil, care, and guilt, their lines  
have set,  
And fixed their sternness there.

"Saviour! wash out th' imprinted  
shame,  
That I no more may pine,  
Sin's martyr, though not meet to  
claim  
Thy cross, a saint of Thine.

"Oxford, November 18, 1832."

## THE SCARS OF SIN.

"My smile is bright, my glance  
is free,  
My voice is calm and clear;  
Dear friend, I seem a type to thee  
Of holy love and fear.

"But I ~~was~~ scanned by eyes unseen,  
And these, no saint surround;  
That mete, what is, by what has been,  
And joy, the lost is found.

"Ere my good angel shrank to see  
My thoughts and ways of ill;  
And now he scarce dare gaze on  
me,  
Scar-seamed and crippled still.

"Iffley, November 29, 1832."

The sweet pathetic grace of the latter poem, simple and un-pretending as it is, is very pleasing. In its more hopeful tone, as contrasted with the almost despondent gloom of its predecessor, it marks, we think, a decided advancement in the writer's spiritual state. Of poems of a retrospective character, one of earlier date, breathing a spirit of deep melancholy and dissatisfaction with all earthly things, is that entitled "Vanity of Vanities, or the Trance of Time." The poet there looks yearningly back to the days of childhood, when, to his "eager eyes," earth seemed an enchanted scene, "a sort of fairy ground," and contrasts that happy time and the feelings which accompanied it with the present, when all this is sadly changed—when the fleetingness and illusiveness of the world's fairest show has been forcibly borne in on his mind, and religion is now his only hope and stay.

## THE TRANCE OF TIME.

"Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,  
Atque metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum  
Subiecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari!"

*Virgil, "Georgics," lib. ii., 490.*

"In childhood, when with eager eyes  
The season-measured year I viewed,  
All garbed o'er in fairy guise,  
Pledged constancy of good.

"Spring sang of heaven; the summer flowers  
Bede me gaze on, and did not fade;  
Even suns o'er autumn's bowers  
Heard my strong wish, and stayed.

"They came and went, the short-lived fair;  
Yet, as their varying dance they wove,  
To my young heart each bore  
Its own sure claim of love.

"Far different now;—the whirling year  
Vainly my dizzy eyes purgane;  
And its fair tints appear  
All blent in one dusk hue.

"Why dwell on rich autumnal lights,  
Spring-time, or winter's social ring?  
Long days are fireside nights,  
Brown autumn is fresh spring.

"Then what this world to thee, my heart?  
Its gifts nor feed thee nor can bless.  
Thou hast no owner's part  
In all its fleetingness.

"The flame, the storm, the quaking ground,  
Earth's joy, earth's terror, nought is thine:  
Thou must but hear the sound  
Of the still voice divine.\*

"O priceless art! O princely state!  
E'en while by sense of change oppress,  
Within to anticipate  
Heaven's age of fearless rest.

"*Highwood, October, 1827.*"

Here, in this closing strain—a burst of "minstrel rapture," a hymn-note of triumph—we see the light of faith, like a bright sunset ray, breaking through the mists that had erewhile overclouded and darkened the poet's vision. True it is that life's golden morn has fled, that—

"Nothing can bring back the hour  
Of splendour in the grass, of glory in the flower."†

Yet has he, in the inward peace of heaven, a happiness left him, deeper and more lasting than all the delights of sense—a joy "that fadeth not away."

The poems already quoted serve sufficiently to illustrate that intense *subjectivity* which formed a characteristic feature of the poet's mind. One poem in particular which tends to bring out this feature in striking relief is the sonnet on Melchizedek—a piece, apparently, of unconscious self-portraiture; the effusion of a rapt, lonely soul. We quote the opening lines:—

\* *Vide* 1 Kings xix. 11, 12.

† Wordsworth, "Ode on the Intimations of Immortality."

"Thrice bless'd are they who feel their loneliness ;  
 To whom nor voice of friends nor pleasant scene  
 Brings that on which the saddened heart can lean ;  
 Yea, the rich earth, garbed in her daintiest dress  
 Of light and joy, doth but the more oppress,  
 Claiming responsive smiles and rapture high ;  
 Till, sick at heart, beyond the veil they fly,  
 Seeking His presence, who alone can bless."

Compare with the following, which shows us his ideal picture of—

#### ST. PAUL.

"I dreamed that with a passionate complaint,  
 I wished me born amid God's deeds of might ;  
 And envied those who had the presence bright  
 Of gifted prophet and strong-hearted saint,  
 Whom my heart loves, and fancy strives to paint.  
 I turned, when straight a stranger met my sight,  
 Came as my guest, and did awhile unite  
 His lot with mine, and lived without restraint.  
 Courteous he was and grave—so meek in mien,  
 It seemed untrue, or told a purpose weak ;  
 Yet, in the mood, he could with aptness speak,  
 Or with stern force, or show of feelings keen,  
 Marking deep craft, methought, or hidden pride :  
 Then came a voice,—‘ St. Paul is at thy side.’

*" Off Sardinia, June 20, 1833."*

Whatever may be thought of this as a portraiture of St. Paul, we can find little difficulty in tracing here the features of the poet-limner himself.

*(To be continued.)*

**GREAT MEN.**—"Great men, of the very first order of greatness—'the heights and pinnacles of human mind,'—are of no country. They are cosmopolitan, not national. They belong not to the Teutonic, or the Anglo-Saxon, or the Italian, or the Gallic race, but to the human race. They are stamped with the feature, rich with the endowments, mighty with the power, instinct with the life, not of this or that phase or section of humanity, but of humanity itself in its most unlimited development and its loftiest possibilities. There is no apparent reason why they might not have born in any one of the nations into which the civilized modern world is divided as well as in another. The *universal* elements of their character and their intelligence override and obliterate the special ones. We do not think of Shakspeare and Bacon, of Spinoza and Descartes, of Newton and Galileo, of Columbus or Michael Angelo, of Kant or Goethe, as Frenchmen or Englishmen, Germans or Italians, but as *men*, whose capacities and whose achievements are at once the patrimony and the illustration of all peoples and all lands alike."—*W. R. Greg.*

## Coiling Upward.

---

JOHN ALFRED LANGFORD, LL.D., &c.;  
*Journalist, Poet, Historian, Essayist, and Politician.*

(Continued from page 62.)

### PART II.

HITHERTO J. A. Langford had held on the tenor of his way in private life, and had attracted to himself little more than the approbation and encouragement of friends. The stirring events of the times had excited his mind, but had as yet exerted little influence on him. The prevailing Radicalism of his order in a centre of population like Birmingham had inoculated him, of course, with democratic ideas; but the agitations on the Charter, the Corn laws, &c., affected him more on the social than on the political side. He approved and accepted the Christian ethics, but cared little about Christian dogmatics. He was not a frequenter of church or chapel, though he perused the Scriptures with some regularity, care, and attention. As one who had felt the pain and pleasure of self-culture, his day-dream of a happy future for man was built on a general thorough education of the people—the elevation of the masses into men. 1846 was a notable year for him. Then the practical though limited development of social communism inaugurated in Rochdale two years previously was attracting great attention, and co-operation became at once the cry and the hope of multitudes. The Birmingham Co-operative Society was commenced in that year, and Langford was appointed Honorary Secretary. *Howitt's Journal* took the field in 1847 as the organ of co-operation, education, sanitation, peace, temperance, progress, and personal elevation. To its weekly record of facts and opinions J. A. Langford became a contributor, and in it some of his earlier writings and poems appeared. These excited such interest in William Howitt that he paid a visit to the Secretary of the Birmingham Co-operative League, of which he gave a most interesting account in the *Journal*, Oct. 16th, 1847, under the title of "A Visit to a Working Man." This is J. A. Langford's first actual appearance, so far as we are aware, as one of those "brave men that teach and braver ones that learn;" and, as *Howitt's Journal* is now scarce, we think we may be doing a service to our readers in reproducing a portion of this graphic sketch written in the white heat of admiration, and under the immediate pressure of the occasion.

"A young woman standing at the entrance of the court directed me to the number of the house, and said, 'But the door is now open, and Mr. — is standing at it.'

"When I came up to it, there stood a very young man with a child in his arms, who was evidently astonished at the appearance there of a stranger at such an hour (11 p.m.). I accosted him by his name, and his surprise augmented, but when I gave my own name it was changed for another sort of surprise. He at once made way, and requested me to walk in, apologizing for his humble dwelling being at that moment hardly fitting for the reception of a stranger. It was indeed the small house of a workman, and occupied by himself and three little children, of whom he appeared to have the sole charge. He placed a chair for me, and dusted it with his apron; sat down with the least child on his knee, and expressed his great amazement and pleasure in seeing me here.

"I had now full opportunity of surveying him, and found him a thin, pale young man, whom I should not have imagined more than four or five and twenty, yet evidently the father of three children. He was the father of four, for he informed me that his wife was just confined, and that he was taking care of these three children, while his mother was waiting upon her up-stairs. Before the fire stood a small clothes-horse, well hung with baby-linen, airing.

"Between my friend and myself stood a small round deal table, on which he and the children had evidently been having their frugal supper, but this had made way for a number of books; and I could not help expressing my wonder that he should attempt at once to nurse and read. But he assured me that he worked twelve hours a day, and was glad to pick up a little knowledge as he could. On this occasion he had to amuse the two elder children, nurse the youngest, and at the same time snatch now and then a glance at his book. 'But,' said he, 'poor things, I must do what I can at such a time to entertain them, as they have nobody else; but they will soon go to bed, and then I shall have a long and quiet time.'

"I asked him how he could study at night and do his work in the day; but he replied that he did not read late like many people; he was satisfied with twelve or one o'clock, and did not rise till five, to be at his workshop by six. He now began to send his children up-stairs, and as I feared he was despatching them on my account, and to the danger of disturbing their mother, I begged him to let them remain. But he assured me that it was now their time, and their grandmother was ready for them; and so they disappeared, and we were left alone.

"I now begged to be permitted to know what the book was he was reading, which appeared to be in the German character, and to be read by assistance of a little stout dictionary that lay upon it. He replied that it was Goethe's 'Faust.'

"'So you read German and Faust? Have you any German acquaintance? How do you get the pronunciation?'

"'No,' he replied; 'I know no German, and have only "German without a Master" for my guide, a dictionary and a grammar; and I get along as well as I can.'

"He assured me that he had already studied 'Rousseau' in the same way, and had read a variety of French authors, some of which he brought out and showed me. He had also learnt something of Italian, and was thinking of Spanish. He evidently had well understood what he had read of Goethe, and appeared in raptures with it. He went and brought out

this and some other works of the German poets, amongst them Uhland ; and I noticed that they were all of the best and most expensive German editions. I could not avoid expressing my astonishment at his being able to purchase such books out of a workman's wages of little more than a pound a week, and with a family to maintain. He smiled, and said that that was his only indulgence, and it cost, perhaps, less than was usually spent by men in his position in beer and tobacco at their alehouse rendezvous.

"I found that he was a teetotaler, a peace advocate, a zealous member of a people's library, and an official one of a society for mutual improvement. His opinions were all of the most progressive kind, yet based, as is now-a-days only too rare, on a solid foundation of religion. In fact, he appeared a perfect incarnation of the best spirit and views of the present age. We talked on a variety of topics, and every minute only made me aware of the great amount of his reading in English literature. That did not now entirely content him, and therefore he was zealously engaged in opening up a channel to the knowledge of the literature of the Continent. And this was a mechanic, working twelve, and often fourteen hours a day ; a youth of some five-and-twenty, with something better than a pound a week, and a family, including himself, of six persons !

"I drew to the table, and gave him a good lesson in German pronunciation, all else he could gather himself ; and then we talked of the movements of the age, and of poetry. Like every reader of the working classes, almost without exception, he, too, was a poet, or had written verses, and he brought forth some of them unreservedly for my opinion. They were songs for the people, and full of the spirit of the time, and of the justest sentiment, but wanted more closely welding on the poetic anvil. Many of them describe the sufferings of the labouring poor, as these stanzas from—

**"THE SONG OF THE PRESENT LABOURER.**

"SOON as the sun is in the sky  
I rise to toil and plod ;  
And labour till he sets again  
In turning of the sod.  
My life is one long working day,  
No hope nor rest have I ;  
O God ! it were a happy thing—  
If such Thy will—to die !

'Are we not men ?—have we not souls ?  
One God created all !  
Then why should wealth hold poverty  
In unprotected thrall ?  
All have their woes ; but we, alas !  
More than our share endure ;  
One crime is ours—a great one here—  
The crime of being poor !'

But, spite of the pressure that lies on the poor, he sees beyond this ; and the shadows of coming events inspire another song :—

## "THE SONG OF THE HOPEFUL.

"Come, brother, come, unfold thy heart,  
 The hopes, the feelings of thy mind;  
 Reveal the yearnings of thy soul  
 For the future welfare of mankind.  
 Dost thou not see the seed is sown,  
 From which will spring a mighty tree,  
 Whose branches, spreading o'er the world,  
 Will bear the fruit—fraternity!

'Dost thou not see oppression cease,  
 See lordly wealth and pride decay,  
 See all the ills which blacken earth,  
 The histories of a bygone day?  
 Dost thou not see the toiler rise  
 From degradation, want, and woe;  
 His ruddy cheek and sparkling eyes  
 Content, and peace, and plenty show?

'Dost thou not see fair woman take  
 Her just equality with man,  
 And labour with him to fulfil  
 The Almighty's love-uniting plan?  
 Dost thou not see the flower-clad earth  
 By happy, healthy children trod,  
 Whose simple innocence reveals  
 Their nearness to their Saviour God?

'Dost thou not see the slave redeemed  
 Firm and erect a freeman tread;  
 The brand removed, with power to earn  
 By labour free his daily bread?  
 Dost thou not see the demon War  
 Grow impotent, and old, and weak;  
 And vainly strive on happy man  
 His burning, pent-up wrath to wreak?

'I see it all, but as a dream,  
 To be fulfilled some future hour;  
 But oh, my brother! 'tis a dream  
 Which sways my soul with wondrous power.  
 I see the future rainbow-hued,  
 And angel-winged, and trumpet-tongued;  
 I see the blest and teeming earth  
 With happy, happy people thronged.

'Oh God! I see, I feel, I know  
 The human mind will soar and soar,  
 Till envy, hate, and malice cease,  
 And dark oppression be no more.



Then come, my brother, raise thy voice;  
Come, heart and soul rejoice with me,  
There yet will be a day for earth,  
And for her sons a jubilee?'

"Such was my visit to a working man; such is his poetry, just as written down for me during the night, and brought to me by him while dressing at my inn in the morning."\*

From the illness alluded to in the foregoing extract Mrs. Langford never rallied. Consumption laid hold of her, and retained possession. Despite the most careful tendance and the most assiduous love, she faded away, and the inexpressible anguish of bereavement fell upon the enthusiast in self-culture before the account of that June-night visit was published in the *October Journal*, so that at twenty-three Langford was a widower, charged with the care of four motherless children, all of tender years. Sad as this grief was, it did not overwhelm his spirit. A sense of duty and responsibility kept him to the taskwork allotted to him, while the necessity of daily labour deadened, though it could not overcome, the sadness of his soul. In a succession of great rapidity death visited his home again and again, taking away first one and then another of the younger children, and next his mother-in-law, who acted as his housekeeper. So rapidly did these bereavements fall to his lot one after another, that he might almost literally have employed the poetically heightened apostrophe of Dr. Young,—

"Insatiate archer! could not once suffice?  
Thy shafts flew thrice, and thrice my peace was slain,  
And thrice ere thrice yon moon had filled her horn."

It was while he was awaiting in terrible suspense the turning hours of his wife's malady that he wrote, out of the depths of an anguished spirit, the following invocation:—

"TO DEATH.

"O strike not, death, thy fatal blow,  
O leave the cherished one below!  
A little longer spare her breath,  
And I will bless thy mercy, Death.

"O turn aside thy threatened dart;  
Pierce not so young, so fond a heart;  
Her soul, O Death, can ne'er be thine,—  
Her life is life to me and mine.

"Pass on then, Death; away, away,  
Nor on my threshold pause to-day;  
Fill not my happy home with gloom;  
Change not my dwelling to a tomb!"

---

\* *Howitt's Journal*, vol. ii., October 16th, 1847, p. 248.  
1871.

Friendship came as the balm for these sorrows first, and the sympathy felt for him in his bereavement knit him more closely to the regard of many.

From *Howitt's Journal* (August 2, 1847) we learn that the Birmingham Co-operative League, which had been established in the previous year, made satisfactory progress under the secretariate of J. A. Langford, and that he had delivered an address "On the Advantages of Co-operation," pointing out so well how conducive to the moral and social elevation of the working classes such leagues were, that it was published at the request of the members in a pamphlet form, and obtained a wide circulation. The arguments in favour of co-operation and the history of the movement as a means of self-help have been made widely known. Here is a specimen of the poetry of that movement from Mr. Langford's pen:—

"THE SONG."

"We are mighty, we are strong;  
 Why have we borne the yoke so long?  
 This the only cause can be,—  
 Want of faith and unity.  
 Rich men know their interests well,  
 Seek they e'er their wealth to swell;  
 Higher raise their high estate—  
 Do they not co-operate?"

"Poor men burning with desire  
 From their miseries to aspire;  
 Rich men scoff, and jeer, and slight,  
 Their vain efforts to unite.  
 Toilers, hence this lesson learn,—  
 Ye have power to toil, to earn  
 Bread, and change life's weary state  
 If ye but co-operate."

Of his sympathy with the stir of the mind in those days when Chartism and Socialism were contending for the suffrages of men, and all the active spirits of the age were thirsting for some millennial manifestation of the good time coming, there were many causes as there are many evidences.

One notable cause may merit particular mention. While the ferment of Langford's spirit was in its earlier stages, "the Rev. George Dawson, M.A.," had been invited (August, 1844) to preach in Mount Zion Chapel; and had in a short time thereafter been chosen to the pastorate thereof. The fresh and vigorous, racy and unconventional style of pulpit prolection which the Harper's Hill preacher adopted created quite a sensation, drew crowds of admirers, and shocked the sober conclaves of the trustees by his exceedingly "broad" expositions of Scripture. In 1846 Mr. Dawson resigned the Baptist connection, and a large majority of his hearers, being adherents to the opinions he had advanced, deter-

mined to secede and form a new cause, as "The Church of the People." On August 8, 1847, however, the new communion was opened as "The Church of the Saviour" with a sermon by the pastor on "The Demands of the Age upon the Church," which was widely circulated and attracted great attention. A series of pamphlets entitled "Things to be Thought on" were also issued under the editorship of Mr. Dawson. Under the influence of this stirring spirit Mr. Langford was brought; and he became a hearty, loving, and, we believe, beloved disciple of the minister of that new church which sought to bring the world to hold—

"One hope, one faith, one law :  
Its ruler God, its practice righteousness,  
Its spirit love."

The freshening impulse of congenial thought, the new literary grace of style of which he felt the impression, the pithy, proverb-like sentences to which the preacher gave utterance, the vivid enthusiasm of this active mind, and the excited sympathy with the great wants of humanity Mr. Dawson displayed, won the heart of Langford. He followed him from the People's Hall and the Unitarian chapel to the Church of the Saviour, and there became a member of the brotherhood who met together in it as a co-operative institute of Christian thought and action—as fellow-workers together for good and for God.

The evidences of his stir of heart are to be found in his active interest in the life of the town of his nativity, which from this time became very intense; in his efforts to aid his fellows to look to higher things; in his lays of love and labour written for the members of his own class in society, and in the various contributions he made to the literature of progress and enlightenment, Langford saw that personal earnestness and truth were required, whatever the outward environments of men might be; and hence he sang thus of—

"THE WANTS OF THE AGE.

"What wants the age? Heart-earnest men,  
To speak the truth, the truth defend;  
Such on the earth we need again  
As God in ancient times did send,  
Men reckless of wealth or fame,  
Of ignominy, scorn, or shame,  
The stake, the fagot, or the flame,  
Their only object God; and truth their only aim.

"What asks the age? Heaven-given powers,  
The seeds of discord to remove;  
To make this dismal earth of ours  
A scene of everlasting love.

To banish hatred, strife, and feud,  
 And error's evil-bringing brood;  
 To gain the pure, the true, the good,  
 To join our struggling race in one great brotherhood."

The literary aspirations which had arisen in Langford's heart had now acquired such strength as to induce him to try his powers in the local journals, and in those widely circulated vehicles of thought in which the ideas of the Progressists were sown among the masses; and quite a flood of verse on social and political topics was poured out by him into the various channels of communication, affording currency to insurgent thought and exalted endeavour during the next few years of his career. Among others he contributed to *The Truth-seeker*, a very able journal of progress, edited by Dr. F. R. Lees; *Cooper's Journal* and *Plain Speaker*; *The Poor Man's Guardian*; *The Public Good*; *The Working Man's Friend*; Passmore Edwards' *Poetic Companion*; *Howitt's Journal*, &c. In the local prints, too, his writing may be traced by the diligent searcher jotting now and again a thought or a sentiment proper to the occasion of some incident in the life of the town, or of some occurrence which excited the attention of the times. Besides taking an active interest in the public questions agitating the public mind, he read and studied closely, taking delight in the works of philosophers and poets, historians and essayists—gaining from their writings, not only happy lessons on many themes, but guidance and example in composition.

Feeling that the formation of character is the chief aim of culture, he sought the highest of the thinkers to whose works he had access to give him the companionship of their thoughts in his studious hours; and hence, although enthusiastically alive to the spirit of freedom, he was able to take moderate and sensible views of the possibilities of improvement likely to result from the eager importunities of the labouring classes for an extension of the franchise. We quote the following passage from *Howitt's Journal* in evidence of his intelligent appreciation of the situation in 1848:—

"Our friend John Alfred Langford, the studious chairmaker of Birmingham, has issued an address to the people of England on the extension of the suffrage which deserves every attention. It is a good sign when the working class take the pen instead of the pike to arouse attention to their condition. His opening remarks embody the general feeling at this moment. 'It is universally acknowledged that a great political crisis is impending over this country. In this all parties agree. They also agree that it is necessary and imperative that measures should be taken to prevent this crisis leading to anarchy, confusion, and bloodshed. This revolution should be prevented by reform. That judicious and timely concessions should be made. That all classes should lay aside a portion of their demands, in order that they may unite for the purpose of gaining a common object; of the utility, wisdom, and practicability of which all entertain the same idea. This union is the great desideratum. This

amalgamation of classes and parties is now the felt want of the country. How this object is to be effected is the great difficulty.' After stating these difficulties, he calls on the *middle classes* to be sincere, frank, free, and liberal in their adhesion to an active and prompt political union; and he concludes with the soundest advice to the *working classes*. 'You cannot,' he says, 'conscientiously join any agitation which goes for less than complete enfranchisement. On this you have taken your stand. On this you must still continue firm. But do not, fellow-workmen, oppose the motions and movements of any class not disposed to go so far as yourselves. Demand freedom to advocate your cause; allow the same to all. For remember no one is so unworthy of the great and glorious treasure of liberty as he who, while he claims a right for himself, refuses the same right to his fellow-men.'

Interthreading thus the interests of his intellect with the material interests of his fellows, he found surcease for private sorrow in public efforts, and gradually gathered into his spirit so large a number of pressing engagements as greatly defeated the depression of care which had been laid upon his heart. Believing with Lord Bacon that "adversity is not without comforts and hopes," he, as well knowing that—

"Some grief shows much of love,

But much of grief shows still some want of wit,"

did not wilfully nurse his sorrow till it should "top extremity," but sought in the fulfilment of duty the true solace of the heart in this world of duty and of death.

About this time (1848) the Rev. Geo. Gilfillan was the most popular sketcher of literary character and the most accepted of British critics. He was the Aristarchus of *Tait's Magazine*, and almost the umpire of fame. In the May number of *Tait* a paper from the pen of this writer, known as the Apollodorus of Professor Aytoun's "Firmilian: a Tragedy," on George Dawson, appeared. It was looked upon as a violent attack, and was highly resented by Dawson's friends. During the currency of that month Langford entered the lists against Gilfillan, as the defender of Dawson in an "examination" of that article; and so great was the excitement felt on the matter, that in a few weeks an edition of 1,000 copies of this pamphlet of sixteen pages was exhausted. To the *Truth-seeker* for March, 1849, he also furnished an able sketch of his pastor and friend in his threefold character of a religious teacher, a popular lecturer, and a political reformer, distinguished at once for freedom and friendliness, skilful in analysis, and full of terse expression and forcible thought, much hopefulness and Christian good feeling.

In the summer of 1848 a society limited to seven was instituted in Birmingham, consisting of a number of young men of literary aspirations. Its earlier members were, we believe, Wm. Harris, Wm. Potter, John Findlay, Hubert Latham, Joseph Jones, Geo. Spencer, and J. A. Langford. Its meetings were held monthly at the respective dwellings of the members. The topics of study, consideration, and discussion on which each was expected to write were

fixed at each meeting, and the papers produced were the subject of searching criticism and severe inquisition. It was called "The Inner Circle." In 1850 a small volume of poems, entitled "Thoughts from the Inner Circle" was published, consisting of selections from the verses of the Septiad. The society, we understand, still exists.

Three prizes of £25, £15, and £10 had been offered, in 1847, by the Christian philanthropist, John Henderson, Esq., of Park, Glasgow, for the three best essays written by working men "On the Temporal Advantages of the Sabbath," to be delivered to the adjudicators on or before March 31, 1848. One thousand and forty-five essays were forwarded. On taking this fact into account a proposal was made at a meeting of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge to provide a larger number of prizes than had originally been offered. These it was suggested should be of the amount of £5 each. Eighty premiums of that amount were subscribed, and among the successful competitors J. A. Langford's name appears. The prizes so awarded were distributed to their winners at a meeting held in Exeter Hall, London, on Wednesday, 27th Dec., 1848, under the presidency of the Earl of Shaftesbury, then Lord Ashley. The hall was crowded; the candidates, as they severally, in answer to the call of the secretary, came forward to the front of the platform to receive their *honorarium*, were greeted with applause of a conspicuously hearty character; and Langford, by the force of contrast, got more than an average share. His immediate predecessor on the platform had been a splendid specimen of England's peasantry—tall, broad-shouldered, brawny, and bronzed; while he was thin, pale, seemingly but a slim slip of a youth, with not even the silken down of manhood streaking his upper lip. The chairman spoke a few words of consideration and hope to him, and the plaudits of the assembly were renewed again and again. While in London, during that eventful week, he visited "the sights of the metropolis," and looked at its "lions" with a confused sense of the vastness of the scene and the wonderful variety of the interests of his country's capital; but did not omit to rummage the bookstalls for a few treasures in literature, seeking some of the writings of the great masters, but avoiding the contagion of those which were—

"Veneered with sanctimonious theory."

He bought "Tennyson's Poems;" and, like many others, fell under the influence of such sweet music; so that his singing, for a time, was suffused with more than its due quantity of Alfredism. But this was natural, for in him once again—

"Love took up the glass of time and turned it in his golden hands."

(To be continued.)

## Our Collegiate Course.

### A LOVER'S COMPLAINT.

BY WILLIAM SHAKSPERE.

#### II.

Upon her head a platted hive of straw,  
Which fortified her visage from the sun,  
Whereon the thought might think sometime it saw  
The carcass of a beauty spent and done.  
Time had not scythed all that youth begun,  
Nor youth all quit; but, spite of heaven's fell rage,  
Some beauty peeped through lattice of seared age.

II. She wore a hat of woven wheat-straw, which protected her features from being scorched by the heat; on these features the mind might suppose it perceived the lineaments of a handsomeness entirely worn out. Age had not taken away everything that ripening years had commenced, nor had maturity altogether departed; for, notwithstanding the destructive wrath of the sky, some loveliness was still observable through the wrinkled front of one apparently withered by years.

Ver. II., line 1. *Platted*, although usually given in the dictionaries as the same as *plaited*, is scarcely so, as the latter implies that the folds of the stuff which has been intricately woven have been flattened, and not left in ridges. This form of the word in the New Testament (Matt. xxvii. 29; Mark xv. 17; John xix. 2), thus,—“*Platted* a crown of thorns;” while the other form is employed in 1 Pet. iii. 3, thus,—“*Adorning of plaiting* the hair,” which, by turning to the parallel passage (1 Tim. ii. 9), we find means “braided hair.”

*Hive* originally signified, of course, that cone of basket-work made for the reception of bees, but is here suggestively used to indicate one of those hats made of straw, or grass braid, peaked towards the back, close at the sides, and projecting over the forehead, which were worn among the better class, though not among the best (who wore felt ones), during the days of good Queen Bess.

*Straw*. Wheat-straw; the stalk or stem of cut wheat, which is, or rather was, the material chiefly used for making head-gear.

2. *Fortified*, protected from injury. *Visage*, from Italian *visagio*, features, countenance.

3. *Thought*, a personification of *mind*, as the conceptive power.

4. *Carcass*, from French *carquasse*, the outer framework, shell.

5. *Scythed*, mowed, cut down, destroyed, defaced, spoiled.

6. *Quit*, left, forsaken it, departed from it.

7. *Lattice*, the chequer-work of wrinkles; a word not only connected

## III.

Oft did she heave her napkin to her eyne,  
Which on it had conceited characters,  
Laundering the silken figures in the brine  
That seasoned woe had pelleted in tears.  
And often reading what contents it bears ;

III. Frequently she lifted to her eyes a handkerchief, which was embroidered with fanciful figures, wetting the forms so skilfully stitched with silk, in the salt tears with which a long-borne grief had beaded her cheeks, while giving

with window or outlook, but also with heraldry. Perhaps, however *lattice* may here mean a *lattice* or lettuce cap, from Italian *latissa*, with three horns or corners, like the forked caps of Popish priests, of which, in an ordinance concerning the reformation of the head-dresses of gentlewomen, it is decreed "that none shall wear an ermine or lattice bonnet unless she be a gentlewoman born, having arms," as may be seen in the Harleian MSS., No. 1770. If this were the case, not only would it show that the head-gear was so old-fashioned as to suggest "seared age" to an onlooker, but also to indicate that the lady was well-born, like Anne Hathaway, who had right to armorial bearings.

*Seared*, withered, dry, and hence veined and cross-barred like an autumn leaf, as in *Macbeth*, "The sere and yellow leaf."

III., 1. *Heave*, lift up, raise, apply.

*Napkin*, handkerchief, from French *nappe*, cloth, and the diminutive *kin*; a small piece of silk, linen, &c. In "As you Like it," iv., 3, Oliver brings to Rosalind a "bloody napkin," and then proceeds to tell—

"How, and why, and where  
This handkerchief was stained."

*Eyne*, the old English plural (as *ox—oxen*) for which we now use *eyes*.

2. *Conceited*, fanciful, imaginary; probably embroidered *characters*, marks, figures, but more likely an emblem, and a *posy* or motto in simple rhyme, expressing a commonplace sentiment, such as "Our contract was Heaven's act," "My heart and I until I die," "Not two, but one, till life be gone."

3. *Laundering*, steeping, moistening, as a laundress would do articles about to be washed.

*Brine*, salt water; as in "*Romeo and Juliet*," ii., 3,—

"Jesu Maria! what a deal of brine  
Hath washed thy shallow cheeks for Rosaline."

4. *Seasoned*, long-endured, lasting, matured; as,—

"He who in want a hollow friend doth try,  
Directly seasons him an enemy."

*Pelleted*, formed, rounded, from Latin *pila*, a ball; French, *pelote*.



As often shrieking undistinguished woe,  
In clamours of all size, both high and low.

## IV.

Sometimes her levelled eyes their carriage ride,  
As they did battery to the spheres intend;  
Sometime diverted, their poor balls are tied  
To the orbèd earth: sometimes they do extend  
Their view right on; anon their gazes lend  
To every place at once, and nowhere fixed,  
The mind and sight distractedly commixed.

shrill utterance in outcries of varying tones, though leaving the special causes of her sadness unmarked.

IV. Occasionally her eyes, which had been looking straight forward, would be upturned intensely to the sky; at other times downcast, her strained sight would remain turned towards the globed earth, and thereafter they would stretch their gaze in a straight line; in a short space again the wandering sight would pass along in all directions, having no object, but showing that the spirit and the vision were both alike unfixed.

6. *Undistinguished*, perhaps immoderate, as not marking the gradations of less or more in her grief.

7. *Size*. Here there seems to be one of Shakspeare's puns, where the sound *size*—degree of intensity—is probably intended to suggest *sighs*, sobs.

IV., 1. *Levelled*, fixed, set, aimed at an object, upturned.

*Carriages* means the frame upon which cannon is mounted and conveyed from place to place, and are so supported as to be able to be levelled as need requires.

This meaning of the term carriages is brought out in the following passage of Hamlet, v., 11:—

"*Cor.* The king, sir, hath wagered with him six Barbary horses; against the which he has imponed, as I take it, six French rapiers and poniards, with their assigns, as girdle, hangers, and so: three of the carriages, in faith, are very dear to fancy, very responsive to the hilts, most delicate carriages, and of very liberal conceit.

"*Ham.* What call you the carriages?"

"*Hor.* I knew you must be edified by the margin ere you had done.

"*Cor.* The carriages, sir, are the hangers.

"*Ham.* The phrase would be more german to the matter if we could carry cannon by our sides. I would it might be hangers till then. But on: six Barbary horses against six French swords, their assigns, and three liberal-conceited carriages; that's the French bet against the Danish."

*Rides*, strains, exercises.

2. *Battery*, the issue of cannon-shot from a line so set as to destroy.

*Spheres*, stars in the firmament.

3. *Diverted*, down-turned; turned in a contrary direction to that in which they were formerly gazing.

4. *Orbed*, round, finely used in contrast to the complete circularity in every direction of the heavenly bodies.

5. *Lend*, pass hither and thither, wander, move about.

## The Reviewer.

---

*Colloquia Peripatetica.* By the late JOHN DUNCAN, LL.D.  
Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas.

THIS is a book of philosophical and theological *and* somewhat more resembling Selden's "Table-Talk" than Spenser's "Anecdotes." The colloquist in chief was Dr. John Duncan, Professor of Hebrew in the New College, Edinburgh; and the Boswell of the Rabbi was William Knight, a Free Church minister in Dundee, who, having the philosophical culture to appreciate, and the sympathy of intellect to lead out the deep thoughts of a singularly gifted speculative mind, strolled with him along the sea-coast of the seaside village of Wemyss, and took shorthand notes of those deep-sea soundings in faith and philosophy which the queer, eccentric, and singular Hebraist had made. We select a few of these which strike us as most likely to interest our readers, and we would most warmly advocate its addition to the libraries of young men's associations, as being a treasury of thought. It is a book which often gives *glints*, as the professor might have said, into "the white radiance of eternity."

**"PROGRESS AND CONSERVATISM.**—There is a progressive element in *all* things, and therefore in religion; though I am much more of a Conservative in theology than in philosophy, or in politics, or in anything else. There we have a 'foundation laid.' But we have no political Bible, no philosophical Scriptures, no scientific infallible writings. And yet we are now in an older age of the world than the apostolic. It is a mistake to look to the fathers as our seniors. They are our juniors. The Church has advanced wonderfully since its foundation was laid. Polycarp would have stood a bad chance in an examination by John Owen. I think I could have posed him myself. Finest devout men these old Christians were. But what did they do? They came together and prayed, and read a great deal of Scripture, and sang, and talked, and went away again, and fell to tent-making; then came back, and read, and prayed, and sang, and so forth. And yet the conservative element is always good. Each age needs some men to go back into antiquity, and jealously to guard its treasures, that they be not lost; and this is always good if we are not bigotedly conservative, *i. e.*, blind to progressive light. It is true that to many the light shines in the darkness, and the darkness comprehends it not. But there is a destructive school of progress that I cannot endure. It would simply destroy the past to make way for itself. Conservatism alone, and by itself, is obstructive; neoterism alone, and by itself, is destructive.

**"PROGRESS IN THEOLOGY.**—A good way of determining the progressive landmarks of theology might be by selecting typical texts to describe the points made emphatic by the principal teachers of the Church. Thus, to take only six, I would connect the name of *Athanasius* with the words,

'Go ye into all the world, teaching and baptizing, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost;' *Augustine*, with the words, 'By grace are ye saved, through faith, and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God;' 'Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us, by the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost, which He shed on us abundantly,' &c.; *Anselm*, with the words, 'Christ suffered for our sins, the just for the unjust, that He might bring us to God;' *Remigius*, 'I am the Good Shepherd; the Good Shepherd giveth His life for the sheep. My sheep hear My voice,' &c.; *Luther*, 'Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, that we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law; for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified;' and *Calvin*, 'Blessed be God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath chosen us in Him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before Him in love.'

"**INDIVIDUALITY.**—Individuality is the basis of all noble character. I like to see a good block of it in all men. But there is an ultra-individualism which may be a very bad thing. A man who does not feel the tie of a common connection with his race, who is not like the vulgar herd of us, may find a greater difficulty in admitting our common depravity. And a man who does not feel this keenly, but who feels, as it were, cut off from his kind by force of his individuality, may find a stumblingblock in the doctrine of a common atonement, the very same for all of us. But we are not only all indebted to one another, but the same provision is made for the general mass of the race, and for the most marked individual in it. And unity is as great and as wonderful as variety and individuality are. There is a tree. It is diverse from every other tree, yet it is a unity, and it came from a seedling, which connects it with the genus tree and with its own species; and so the umbilicus is a wonderful thing. The race is one till it is severed. God has made of one blood all the nations of the earth.

"**FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY.**—We must mark the difference between minds wishing to 'add to their faith knowledge,' and minds wishing to drag all faith to the bar of knowledge—the difference between wishing to found faith on philosophy, and to deepen faith by philosophy. We must analyze our faith as far as we can. No rational man will resist that. And we must systematize all our knowledge. We must keep our faith *orderly*, by rational methods, while we 'give unto faith the things that are faith's.' Philosophy was born a pagan, but she may become Christian, and should be christened 'Mary.' She may be proud to sit at Jesus' feet. Hellas coming to Judea's Messiah is a rarely beautiful sight. But Judea is also the better of going to Greece. For what is our New Testament system but Hebrew thought in a Greek clothing? The Hebrew affords the concrete matter, but it puts on the raiment of the Greek form.

"**EXTREMES MEET.**—One man states a truth which may be one-sided. I state this counter-truth, anxious to escape from the one-sidedness of error. It is a strange thing, that middle station between opposites. It is more than a *juste milieu*. It is the keystone of an arch which props the two sides; and sure enough it is no contradiction if your *juste milieu* contradicts the two extremes. The keystone of an arch is not antagonistic to the two sides it supports. Being itself neither the one nor the other, it upholds both.

"**KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.**—Our knowledge of God is apprehensive, never comprehensive; but it is real and presentative, not ideal and representative. Yet it is through the Son that we directly and immediately perceive the Father. If we have seen the Son, we have seen the Father also. But we cannot truly see the Son without also seeing the Father in Him. We dare not separate the personality of the Divine Essence. The Father's nature is, in a real sense, adumbrated to man in the Son. And I do not believe in any direct vision of the Father in the future, except as through the Son, and with the Son. I cannot concur with the notion of the schoolmen, '*ultima beatitudo non potest esse nisi in visione divine essentie*' ('the highest blessedness is impossible unless in the perception of the Divine Essence'). To see '*in speculo essentie*' ('in the glass of essence') is impossible to the creature. To comprehend the relations existing between the created and the Creator, we must first make a leap out of our creaturehood. But as to the Son, as '*the express image*' of the Father, I have at times a glorious high gleaming of the truth that '*in Him all the Father shone substantially expressed.*' There is nothing possible to the one nature not possible to the other, except the necessity of abiding on the throne. But this is so high a theologeme that it vanishes soon. It is granted to the intuition of faith, but cannot be propositionally worded. And so it is with all high intuitions. They gleam on us, but they are the distilled essence of distillations, and if you try to seize them and detain them for examination, straight they vanish in cloud. They will not allow you to dissect them, because you cannot get them near the dissecting table. They often arise on me in the meditation of a text; and that which most of all suggests them is the life and words of Jesus Christ."

This book of thought-seeds has already deservedly passed into a second edition. We are glad to learn that an extended memoir of the scholar, philosopher, and Christian, whose mind was so suffused with the light of heavenly thought, is shortly to be issued. We shall in all probability take up that book when published in another department of this serial, and deal with it in such a way as to increase the loving reverence of the reader for this wise diviner of the mysteries.

*The Sunday School World.* By Rev. J. C. GRAY.  
London: Elliot Stock.

This is "an Encyclopædia of facts and principles, illustrated by anecdotes, incidents, and quotations from the works of the most eminent writers on Sunday school matters," arranged under the headings the Institution, the Superintendent and the Secretary, the Teacher, the Scholar, the Infant Class, the Children's Service, the Library and the Librarian, Auxiliary Agencies and Encouragements. It is a work at once complete and replete. An excellent compend of good thoughts on Christian educational endeavour. It should be in every Sunday school teacher's library. Its author is doing a noble work in Christ's vineyard.

## The Topic.

### OUGHT MILITARY DRILL TO BE INCORPORATED WITH ELEMENTARY EDUCATION?

#### AFFIRMATIVE.

It has been asserted \*—and indeed Continental experience proves that it is true—that the importation of a thorough system of military drill into our primary schools would be equal to the saving of six months of drudge work to the army recruit so trained. While this is an important recommendation, and one which partially sways us to the decision now recorded, it suggests another, to which, in our mind, it gives place for importance and cogency—one affirming the advantage of the principle advocated in a period of extreme national panic, should that ever arrive to our country. And, be it remarked, it is consistent with an opposition to the Prussianizing of our army system that we maintain this opinion. For, remembering the serviceableness of an early-formed familiarity with drill to the army recruit, it is easy to conceive how greatly it would facilitate the speedy organization and preparation of a defensive civilian force in the hour of need. The necessity of the Prussian system in our country is therefore greatly reduced, if it may indeed be supposed to exist. And besides, the value of the drill, as an athletic exercise to youth, constitutes another consideration in favour of its incorporation with elementary education.—J. F. B.

If we pay a visit to our training ships, public, British, national, and union schools, where military or naval drill is taught, we find that the boys are strong, active, and healthy. The same may be said of the girls who have had calisthenic exercises in the open air. Two great insurers of a sound mind in a sound body are fresh air and exercise. Without sufficient exercise the muscles are not fully developed, the blood has not a healthy circulation, and the person is liable to become round-shouldered, weak, languid, and morose; *ergo*, very susceptible to disease. Exercise is *good*, but to be trained methodically is *better*. Military drill by an efficient master or sergeant is *far superior* to the indiscriminate use of the gymnasiums in our parks and schools. If we would reap the advantages of a military drill, early training is essential; exercise is rather to develop strength and prevent disease *than* to cure it; in fact, in some cases disease would be made worse by exercise, more especially when the bones are set, and the system weakened through the neglect of systematic physical training in youth. Thus the children, in having a disciplinary and physical education, will be stronger in body, firmer in mind, and better prepared for the uncertainties or hardships of life.—GEORGE D. E.

#### NEGATIVE.

The war spirit is already rampant. It requires discouragement rather than encouragement.

\* *Contemporary Review* for February—"Popular versus Professional Armies."

The justice and righteousness of war ought not to be taught as a foregone conclusion to children. It is altogether a false principle to act upon, to create in the mind of a nation a delight in, a taste for, and an anxiety to indulge in war. If we want to demoralize our population from their earliest years, to dechristianize the very innermost core of the hearts of men, we may incorporate military drill with elementary education. But if we wish for times of peace, if it is our duty to train and culture our children to do unto others as they would have others do unto them, we cannot, we dare not familiarize their young minds with thoughts of destruction and quarrelsomeness, of battle and besiegement. Is it not enough that men are clamorous for blood and war? must we evoke in the hearts of children the terrible desire for war? It is a tremendous responsibility to adopt to recommend such a scheme. It is to poison the waters of social and civil life at their very fountain, and to drug the young soul with the opiates of custom against the feeling of the errors, the terrors, and the horrors of warfare. Oh, let us pause before we destroy the hope of nations in the bud; let us remember that the Prince of Peace said of little children, "Suffer them to come unto Me," and do not let us lead them over to the enemy.—CHARITAS.

No! no! we must have no fa-

miliarizing of our children with the weapons and exercises of war. We must have them at least held sacred from the polluted politics of armed hosts. Is it really to be proposed, in our country, which professes to be Christian, to retrograde into pagan idolatry of battle; that we, with peace on our lips, should nourish war in our hearts. We cannot surely be so blindly inconsistent as to put in the one hand of our children the weapons, and subject them to the drill of war, and in the other that Book which proclaims "Glory to God in the highest, on earth peace, and good will to man." To institute military drill in our common schools would culture in the minds of the young all those delights in war which it has been the object of modern civilization to eradicate, and would give war a new lease of power in the world. You cannot regularly and peremptorily train children to the manoeuvres and employments of war, and yet inculcate the love of peace. It is impossible to create and destroy associations in the minds of children at the same time. It seems to me a reversion to barbarism to think of accustoming the minds of children, and of training them into habits which are calculated to make them love war upon others, while it would inoculate their young spirits with the tyrannous servility of military subservience.—J. M. G.

---

## The Inquirer.

---

### QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

938. Can any of your readers oblige me with a short biography of George Dawson, the lecturer, and with some idea of the class of lectures he delivers? Is he the author of any works?—J. THOMPSON.

939. You will greatly oblige me with information on the following point through the medium of your magazine. In the early history of this country a grant of land appears to have been given to the nobles, on condition that they should support

the king in case of war with a certain number of men. I suppose the land is still in possession of the nobility, but I cannot ascertain whether they provide the men or not. If this stipulation has been repealed I should like to know the date, and what has been imposed instead.—J. T.

940. If you, or any of your talented correspondents, condescendingly would answer the oft-repeated question, doubtless, of the best standard and modern works for a general course of reading and study, it will confer a lasting obligation upon—CYMBRO.

941. Can you, or any of your readers, give me a little information about, or the name and price of any work or works (within the means of a working man), in which I could procure the same, concerning the family of the "Borgias"?—A. R.

#### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

926. Paul's quotations are to be found—(1) Acts xvii. 28: "For we also are His offspring," from Aratus, a Cilician poet, who flourished B.C. 277. He lived much at the court of Antigonus Gonatus, king of Macedonia. His principal work was "Phænomena," from the fifth verse of which Paul quotes. The same expression occurs in Cleanthus's "Hymn to Jupiter," but as Paul was a Cilician, he probably knew the former work well. (2) 1 Cor. xv. 33: "Evil communications" (literally companionship) "corrupt good manners," from Menander, a comic poet of Athens, who is supposed to have drowned himself, B.C. 293, aged 52. He wrote more than 100 comedies, of which only fragments remain. Terence is supposed to have borrowed from him. (3) Titus i. 12: "The Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, slowbellies," from Epimenides, one of the seven wise men of Greece, contemporary with

Solon, born at Phæstus, in Crete, B.C. 659, is said to have lived 157 years. His writings are lost.—N. A. R.

987. There is no doubt whatever that mutual improvement societies might be traced much farther back than the year 1843, though they did not at first receive that appellation. The Mechanics' Institutes lacked definiteness in their plan, and did not admit of discussions being carried on with sufficient freedom and cordiality. Hence what were called "young men's societies" were set on foot, and from the paragraph following, which I quote from the *Family Magazine* of 1835, it is obvious that they were then no novelty. The editor writes:—"A correspondent has directed our attention to the proceedings of a number of associations called *young men's societies*, which have been for some time past silently and unostentatiously rising into vigorous existence in different parts of the country. The objects of the "young men's societies" are similar to those of mechanics' institutes, with this important difference, that they are established on the broad basis of Christianity, "making knowledge" (to adopt the language of the report of one) "as far as possible tend to confirm and illustrate religion, and keeping constantly in view the important truth, that religion and morality are the chief ends of knowledge, as they certainly should be our guide in the pursuit of it." Full information, however, regarding the early organization of those mutual improvement societies which were designed for young men, and were based on certain fundamental principles, will be found, I am informed, in the life of Mr. Nasmyth, who is commonly reputed to be their founder. Oldest of all amongst discussion societies were those debating clubs connected with certain

of our colleges. In these, certainly, if "mutual improvement" was less specifically the object aimed at by those who supported them, the means used, rightly applied, might tend, and did so, in many instances, to that result. One obvious fault unavoidably attaching to these collegiate institutions—which have still strong vitality, at least some have—was that the discussions were apt to be narrowed down too much to certain issues, through the lack of a sufficient variety in the training and modes of thought extant amongst the members.—C. S. R. J.

938. George Dawson, son of a

Baptist schoolmaster, was born in London, 1821. He was educated under his father, and afterwards studied in the University of Glasgow, where he graduated M.A. In 1844 he was chosen assistant minister at Mount Zion Chapel, Birmingham, but differences arose, and he established the Church of the Saviour, 1847. As a lecturer he combines a good deal of the talent of W. J. Fox with the style of Sydney Smith. He has a quaint dash of Puritanism in him too. He prelects on moral, literary, and social topics with great acceptance.—E. C.

## Literary Notes.

GEORGE ELIOT is engaged on a new novel for Messrs. Blackwood & Son. The *North British Review* is discontinued.

Mrs. Norton is employed on "Lives of the Poets Laureate of England."

David Laing, the Scottish antiquarian, has published a biography of Milton's tutor, Dr. Thomas Young.

"The Newspaper Press: its Origin, Progress, and Present State," is in preparation by James Grant, formerly editor of the *Morning Advertiser*.

Rev. J. Oswald Dykes, the successor of Dr. James Hamilton, is editor of the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review* (new series).

It is stated that the Savage Club is to be reconstituted.

G. H. Lewes has nearly ready a new edition of his "Biographical History of Philosophy," in which, under impulse from J. H. Stirling, LL.D., he has entirely re-written the chapter on Hegel; and has

besides considerably revised his estimate of Comte.

The Sheriff of Lanarkshire, H. G. Bell, well known as a biographer of the Queen of Scots, has prepared a critical work on "Mary Stuart and the Casket Letters."

"A Philosophy of the Sciences" in opposition to Comte's views is anticipated from the pen of Professor Huxley.

Prof. A. C. Fraser's edition of Berkeley's Works is to be ready early in 1871.

"It appears, from the notes to Herr Ten Brink's 'Studies on Chaucer,' that Herr W. Hertzberg, German translator of 'The Canterbury Tales,' was the first critic who, in print, pronounced 'The Testament of Love' spurious. His reasons were published a twelve-month prior to the date of Mr. (John) Payne Collier's essay in 1867"—concerning which a controversy has been going on between that gentleman and Mr. Furnival, Edmund Bræ, Esq., &c.



## Metaphysics of Theism.

WILLIAM HONYMAN GILLESPIE, Esq., &c.,

*Author of "The Argument à priori for the Being and the Attributes of the Absolute One and First Cause," &c.*

"He who hath not much meditated on God, the human mind, and the *summum bonum*, may possibly make a thriving earthworm, but will most indubitably make a sorry patriot and a sorry statesman."—*Berkeley*.

LUTHER was one of those great strong souls to whom the awful task of ennobling and regenerating men has been committed. He was superior to the tame, selfish prudentialities of ordinary minds. His was a straightforward, sublimely passionate spirit, delighting in controversy and exulting in victory. He was moved at once by feeling and by faith. To him God was a vital inspiring deity,—not transcendently or mystically, but really living within the soul of man, and the exciting cause of the inward spiritual life of faith. He refused "presumptuously to seek to understand the incomprehensible majesty of the incomprehensible light of God's glorious works," and hesitated to attempt by the plumb-line of his understanding to fathom the infinite depths of truth contained in the declaration, "I am the Lord thy God." In this he was rather a theosophist than a philosopher. His own faith was theopneustic—a divine inbreathment. The Platonic mysticism of Tauler had influenced Reuchlin—in whose magnificent work "Concerning the Mirific Word," the philosophy of the deification of the soul by steadfast faith and earnest prayer was ably set forth; and he largely affected Luther, the will, and Melancthon, the intellect of the Reformation; the former received, the latter believed God, the supreme life of the soul.

The longing of the human spirit for a nearer communion with the Creator, Ruler, Preserver, induced them to disregard the skeletonic sophistries of the maintainers of the vicegerency of the Pope as representative of Deity on earth. They sought a father, not a factor. The unanimity of Christendom was felt to be a sham—a shackle on the free soul inimical alike to literature, science, civilization, and religion. "When the tale of bricks is doubled Moses comes," and Luther, the emancipator, by the power of a new divine life, bade the spirit of man take to itself the terrible responsibilities of enfranchisement. Then began a series of wanderings in the wilderness of speculation. The long subjection of the intellect to prescribed tasks and superintended labours made independence a difficult form of energy. The unsatisfied activities of man employed

the most diverse means of seeking the appeasement of their desires. Traditionalism gave place to rationalism; and an ever-extending deference to and trust in reason as the guide to truth was felt and fostered. Faith sought reconciliation with reason, and theology fraternized with philosophy. Cause became almost synonymous with reason, purpose, and end; constancy in nature required to be harmonized with consistency in creed; and the sphere of knowledge was held to be imperfect which did not exhibit God, man, and nature as at least a possible unity.

Calvin, the most thorough-going of the logicians of theology, the uncompromising reasoner on religion attained to a high and wondrous altitude of thought on the Being and Attributes of Deity. He did not however reason to but from Deity. Deity had become to man a self-revealer. He felt as if the very hand of God from heaven had grasped the human soul in the escapeless gripe of infinitude of power, and left the impress unmistakably thereon. He had no need for metaphysics about God who had known the might and majesty of Jehovah. With stern resoluteness he accepted the Almighty as the everlasting I AM, and with flinchless invincibility of syllogistic rigour he wove the all-encompassing web of predestination around the living soul of man, while with equal unreluctance he awarded to that soul a responsibility arising from free will so hazardous as to impart a terrible solemnity to life. He did not seek to reconcile the formal issues of the ultimate results of the promises which had been given to man over the doubtless evidence of the veracity of the true God. He had nought to do with the polemic of reason which would unsettle the grounds of faith. God was to him the fountain of decretive predestination, resistless, selective, and irreversible. He did not attempt to construct a metaphysic of theism; he accepted (at the same time, however, he interpreted) the Scripture canon as the basis of theistic belief.

Telesius advocated empirical materialism in a modification of the Anaxagorean naturalism; Patrizzi endeavoured, by a sort of neo-Platonic mysticism to explain the Deity and nature. Light is the shadow and representation of God. It prevails in space, and avails in life. God is its invisible essence; it animates the universe, and under His law; unity, cohesiveness, variety, and creatural forms are results of light operating in space. Giordano Bruno, in the intensity of his zeal, assumed the name of Philotheos, and under that *nom de plume* issued many able and valuable writings, full of wit, learning, thought, and wholesome as well as holy wisdom. It is not our province to speak of the passion and poetry which vivified the sad eventful history of his strange, strong, stormy life, or the glare of the martyr-fire with which the tragedy of it ended. It is ours to notice the bright auroral light of thought which his soul shed forth into the speculations of the world—the fresh outglow of a heart full of the thought of God.

We like to fancy Fulke Greville, and Sir Philip Sidney holding dialogue with Giordano Bruno in the glades of Warwickshire,

meeting "our pleasant Willy" of Stratford, and catching, in the friendly contest of conversation, from Lord Brooke a living love of truth, from Sidney the divine madness of heroic manliness, and from Shakspeare the sparkle and the glow of dramatic dialogue. But this is not the place to indulge in "imaginary conversations," in which Bruno, as might "fit his humour well" like Touchstone, should ask, "Hast any philosophy in thee?"

Bruno was much and acknowledgedly influenced in his speculations by the "Ars Magna" of Raymond Lulli, the Christianizer of the Cabbala; by the Telesian physico-theology, and by the discoveries of Copernicus. These gave the prime impulse to his thoughts, and directed him, as a hunter after truth, to seek to comprehend in some measure "that intellect which is called by Socrates, Plato, Tremigistus, and our theologians—God." In his work "On Cause, Origin, Unity," he essays a metaphysic of theism—a philosophical not a theological study of the prime Potency, the first form and infinite intellect to whom an investigation of nature leads. Deity is conceivable apart from nature; but nature is impossible without Deity. He is the super-essential One who fills the great whole of being, illuminates the universe, and empowers nature to produce all its species and its appearances. He is the innermost efficacy of which Existence is the forthflash and outcome—the principle of every cause. A principle is that which from the inner centre conceptively concurs in the production of any substantial entity, and remains ever present therein; while a cause is that which, in the outer circle, effectively concurs in the production of any specific entity. The principle *informs*, impregnates, and vitalizes; the cause *forms*, matures, and specializes: the former effizzes, the latter effectuates. In God all is, and God is in all. Nature is God's thought realized. He is its formative and moving invisible infinite first—the inner life-spring of all the evolutions of organism and force which sense and science can trace or know—the central self-source of the (*ictus primus efficacie*) first touch of potency, whence the *actus efficiens* (effective impulse) of causation, takes its origin. The principle of the universe is within, without, around, and above sensible existence. Matter is but the form it takes in its determinations of the possibilities of existence. This infinite perfection of self-developing good-will is the principle or first of every formative and formal cause, and is exercised in every process or procedure, from the innermost firstling of efficacy to the most remote result which it is capable of producing. God is therefore the All. Nature is deified, and the infinite world-soul, in absolute being, abides for ever, the Unity of unities, and the self-sustained Sustainer of every possible efficacy and existence. Sense sees, science translates, the signs of the divine in nature. Intellect inspects and philosophy reflects upon the evidences of God in nature and in being; and metaphysic shadows forth the truth of God—as a guide in and to life, life being the everlasting evolution of the Deity in His theocosmic activity. Of the moral philosophy flowing from

this ontology we have not to speak ; our topic being to trace, in outline, the manner in which the human spirit has striven to penetrate the circling environments of experience in search of the evidences of a Father of being.

Of the theosophism of Lucilio Vanini (1583—1619), Bruno's fellow-martyr to what Ferrier calls "the brutal bigotry of a ferocious ecclesiasticism," we possess little knowledge. The following terse argument from his "Eternal Amphitheatre of Providence" seem to us to disprove the charge of atheism to which he has been subjected. "All beings are either finite or infinite. No finite being is sufficient of itself, or can subsist by virtue of its own nature. Hence the demonstration of the being of a God is easy ; but this depends rather on the relation of phenomena to matter and being, than upon the relation of cause and effect. For since every finite creature is imperfect, something must exist which is perfect, that is, infinite ; otherwise a finite creature would be impossible, and nothing could exist at all. It is impossible that there could be nothing at all in existence ; so that there must be an infinite and eternal being—who is God." Of the opinions of the English mystic and Paracelsist, Robert Fludd (1571—1637), an ill-appreciated thinker in his own age and land, though other learned men—Gassendi, Kepler, and Mersenne—regarded his ideas as worthy of controversy, we have no direct knowledge. We have seen but have not read five folio volumes of his works, and we have heard an abstract of his views from one of the chief theosophists of this age. Light is the primal active principle of existence, the essence of all things. Out of the first great intelligential light—"the Father of lights"—light material for ever flows, and forms the entirety of the animate and inanimate universe, as the soul of man forms and informs the bodily frame in which it dwells and operates.

The great generative thinker, Jacob Boehme, the shoemaker mystic of Gorlitz, who wrote out of an environment of divine light, has largely influenced the religious and the philosophic world : in the former Moravianism, Wesleyanism, and New Jerusalemism acknowledge his power ; in the latter Newton, Schelling, Hegel, &c., were so stirred by the light with which he dazzled the reason, that they accepted into their hearts and lives much of the essence of his morals and metaphysics. His works are professedly "not the production of his reason, but of immediate inspiration," as he avers in his "Aurora, the Morning Redness in the East ; or, the Root and Mother of Philosophy, Astrology, and Theology," 1612. In his "Mysterium Magnum"—an exposition of the First Book of Moses,—issued 1622, he professes to give an explanation of the entire physical and spiritual universe—of all existences in their most intrinsic essence, and in the completeness of their relations. God, regarded in Himself, is a mystery far removed in what to use are the vast and gloomy distances of infinity, from comprehension : and yet around, in, and over all—the principle, the substance, and the end of every existence. To us, in the innermost reality of His

being, God is infinite and indefinable. He is neither good nor evil, joy nor grief, hate nor love, desire nor will. In Himself He is to us conceivable neither as anything nor as nothing, so remotely inaccessible to our thought is He. He is everything, because He is origin, essence, and form; and yet He is nothing, for conceivability only begins in us when form and quality and purpose are given.

In this intrinsic eternalness of absolute being God the Father dwelt in abysmal incomprehensibility, in a silence and darkness unpierceable and inappreciable by us from the continuous music of its glory, and the excessive brightness of its radiancy. Out of His harmony and brightness the Son manifests the glory of the divine will as the wisdom of creation and the Word of life; the Spirit interpenetrates and quickens all the expanse of space with the active vitality of the Son and the sustaining power of the Father; and creation beams forth out of the chaotic darkness of immensity, as the reflection of the will and wisdom of the infinite Triune, out of which nature emanates, and from which man derives his being, destiny, and personality. So that even as the inmost spirit of man, Reason, is the power of thought, the operative intellection of man, understanding, is the power of specific cognition, and the affective disposition of man, Passion, is the active and applying power by which desire is accomplished. The triune everlasting First—of which these are only adumbrations—acts as immanence, emanation, and creation—light, life, and delight: all three implying their shadows, darkness, death, and disease in its double form of sin in soul and sickness in body; because God is all and in all. God is the Source of every resource, the divine Essence of each existence, the single static Being out of which all creatural states issue, the absolute Unconditioned in which all conditioned existence inheres, the ineffable Infinite enshrined in the imperturbable calm of a never-beginning and a never-ending eternity of self-existence.

Boehme began his metaphysic with faith, Bacon and Descartes commence theirs with doubt—doubt as a purging of the mind from prejudices and prepossessions. Bacon, however, does not work out a science of the divine nature. His *prima philosophia* the taproot and essential of all knowledge, is not a science of God. From the special experiences in or with which all human knowledge begins, we see that all things, by harmony or conformity of nature, tend to lose themselves in higher generalizations, and these again in others, till they reach a great first unity. In this way, from the intellectual aggregation of our experiences and their implications, all things in their infinite variety, as in an ascending scale, lead the ideas of men from the sensible elements of knowledge to a unity of all things. But of the true preternatural essence of the Deity we can acquire no impression from nature which shall shadow forth the Most High. The true knowledge of God is possible only through revelation. Science has no border-land of theistic metaphysic. It cannot find a basis for faith, it can only act as the refuter of disbelief. The suggestions of God in nature we can oppose to atheism, but we can-

not gain from them the repose of religion. *That* lies beyond science. Science ascends to the interpretation of nature's laws; religion transcends this, and faith opens to us an interpretation of the laws of God—to whom also science must trace onward its discoveries, that it may find an original force and creative power as the first cause of the universe of experiences.

Science and religion are handmaids, fellow-servants, but they have different duties and different aims—different but not diverse, apart and separate but yet coadjutant. Each is deficient acting alone; both are co-efficients in the progress of humanity towards truth and happiness.

Bacon's views develop themselves along the line of speculation in Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Hartley, Mill, &c.; while an opposite school, starting with Descartes, may be traced through Spinoza, Leibnitz, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, &c. Descartes is the acknowledged founder of modern dogmatic idealism, as Bacon is the reputed father of modern experimental realism; yet they both posit doubt as the prime condition of philosophy, and insist on it as the preliminary purification of the thinker's mind. Bacon accepted experience as doubtless, Descartes relied on consciousness; these are their *first facts*, and the inquiry to which their respective philosophies were devoted was to evolve the true significance, discover the reach, and determine the results and teachings of these unanalyzable elemental perquisites and pre-requisites of reflective thought. Experience gave Bacon the *object* of philosophical investigation; consciousness supplied Descartes with the *subject* of his speculative research. *Cogito* (I think) was the one irrefragable postulate of Descartes; *that* is the experience of consciousness, and I cannot doubt that, without proving that which I attempt to deny. It is impossible to think I do not think. This *one* fact, however, conceals two others in its *essence*—(1) existence, (2) personality (*I am*), while it implies activity.

Being is necessary to thought, and personality to conscious thought; therefore the Cartesian postulate is "so firm and ascertained that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptic are incapable of shaking it." "Kant," says Hegel, "has objected that *being* is not contained in *thinking*, that it is different from thinking. That is true, but still they are inseparable, or constitute a single identity; their unity is not to the prejudice of their difference." This is clear, is unthinkable otherwise, and hence it is true; hence metaphysic starts from thought as holding certainty in itself, and as a doubtless element. A clear and distinct consciousness is the only evidence of valid truthfulness. We cannot manufacture ideas out of nothing. "By the word *idea* I understand," says Descartes, "all that can be in our thoughts; and I distinguish three sorts of ideas: (1) *adventitious*, like the common idea of the sun; (2) *framed* by the mind, as that which astronomical reasoning gives of the sun; and (3) *innate*, as the idea of God, mind, matter, a triangle, and generally all those which represent true, immutable, and eternal

essences." Thus ideas, in as far as they are images, differ among themselves, and possess objective reality in proportion to the perfection of those things which they represent. In consciousness he found not the sense of finiteness only; but that sense implied that he was not All. He had in his nature a perception of infinitude and perfection, which he could not originate and could not compose—could not even eradicate, strive as he might; for the very denial of the idea proved the reality of its existing in mind.

We do, therefore, incontestably possess the idea of a being, infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, omniscient, omnipotent, and perfect. As the elements of such an idea could not arise groundlessly in ourselves as finite creatures, nor be originated in us by the outward world of finite things, we must conclude that His being is as indubitable and actual as our consciousness; but much more real must He be than human consciousness, for He has so manifestly and indelibly impressed His being as absolute and infinite, that to escape from a sense of His reality is impossible. Hence God *is*. But still farther we may reason from our original postulate *I am*; not only that I am not All, but that my being is derived. The efficient cause of my being must be greater than all its possible effects. I am finite, so is all the race; so are all things that surround me; none, nor even all of these could be the original of me because I have the idea of all possible perfections in myself as attributes of Him, and this idea could only be gained from the all-perfect One, who implanted it in me. Hence again God *is*. But all that we clearly and distinctly conceive of as contained in anything is true of it; the existence of God is clearly and distinctly contained in our idea of Him, and hence again I find that God *is*. By this trinity of proofs the being of God is made manifest as a necessary consequence of the credibility of consciousness, of whose certitude it would be suicidal to doubt, for that would be self-extinction. The *cogito* (I think) is the ground in reason of the *cogitatio* (thinkable). That is the fact beyond which the law and the lawgiver are to be sought, in order that by the reason these principles, which faith unreservedly adopts, might be shown to be irrefragable, inasmuch as all that stands should be understood, all that is acknowledged by sense should be transformed into science, and all that is physical ought to be harmonized in the metaphysical. God is the prime might of the facts of nature and the acts of man, the Potentate who potentiates all, the sole Sovereign of thought, life, action, and endurance.

Hobbes, though equally inclined with Descartes to lay great stress on mathematical method, had so great a disposition to see names as signs and counters that he could not but regard God as the convenient symbol of causative efficiency to which men must consent, because in the pursuit of causation they must stop somewhere; but he accepted God as a necessity of thought rather than demonstrated the existence of one first mover—an eternal cause of all things. He regarded God as a need-be more than a must-be. The intel-

lectual life of Ralph Cudworth was an earnest protest against Hobbes' notion of God as a sign for power, and a strong-souled assertion of the moral personality and potentiality of the Divine Being. God is not a mere philosophical necessity, and His will is so shed abroad in man's soul and in nature as a righteous will, that the doctrine of philosophical necessity is a deadly and deadening error. The operations of the Deity are not made effective through the blind physical agencies of material force; nor is He necessarily confined to the effecting of His will only through the supremacy of His general, immutable, and essential laws; nor does He invariably act in rigid accordance with absolute, inflexible, eternal laws. If He did, He would abdicate His sovereignty, and abnegate His own hold on and interest in man, as well as invalidate all trust in His fatherhood. "The True Intellectual System of the Universe, wherein all the reasoning of Atheism is refuted and its impossibility demonstrated," 1671 (the date of imprint, and 1678 the date of publication), although a mighty tome is only a huge fragment—an immense piece of a conglomerate of learning and thought upon cosmogony and theistic speculations. His proof of the "oneliness" of the divine essence, and that man possesses notions which are not "fantastical" derivations from sense, but are eternal in their nature, are not only recondite but effective. With an idealistic intensity suggestive of Plato he strove to unswathe from the imagings of the senses all the accidents of experience, so that he might come at last to the pure noematic ideas which man receives into his soul directly from the divine intellect. The acute reasoning and the amazing learning with which he prosecutes his purpose make us regret that he was so discouraged in his labour by the *odium theologicum* that he desisted from the task of translating into legible characters the archetypal impressions of divinity upon the soul. His conception of an intermediate plastic matter between the divine and the human spirit appeared to us a gratuitous hypothesis when, long ago, with his grand old folio on our knee in a splendid lake district, we pored upon the treasure-trove of the book, which contained such testing reasoning as made us halt ever and anon to take a resurvey of the Greek-beset and Latin-dotted pages, that we might reassure ourselves that we had caught some gleams and glimpses of the author's mountain thought. It is true that it supplies a mode of accounting for the correspondence of idea between the spirit of man and that of the one chief intellect whom men call God; and that it was used by Cudworth merely as a hypothetical explanation of how God might give perfect impulses that might result in imperfect apprehensions in the spirit of man. But the noble thought of Cudworth was that Deity had so written His being in the inmost essence of man that even polytheism could not obliterate it nor atheism escape from using the phraseology of faith—so vitally had the divine life been imaged in the human life; so essentially was the intellectual system interwoven into physical nature and the constitution of man. "Truth is bigger than our minds;" "whence we ought



to be led to this acknowledgment, that there is another perfect mind or understanding being, above us in the universe, from which our imperfect minds were derived, and on which they depend. Our creaturely intelligence is not adequate and commensurate to the in-taking of the infinite essence of things; but only "because our weak and imperfect minds are lost in the vast immensity and redundancy of the Deity, and overcome with its transcendent light and dazzling brightness, hath it to us an appearance of darkness and incomprehensibility; as the unbounded expansion of light, in the clear transparent ether, hath to us the apparition of an azure obscurity; which yet is not an absolute thing in itself, but only relative to our sense, and a mere fancy in us. . . . The Deity is indeed incomprehensible to our finite and imperfect understandings, but not inconceivable; and therefore there is no ground at all for this atheistic pretence to make it a nonentity."

It ought to be noted that Cudworth's aim was less a direct demonstration of the existence of Deity than a proof of the pernicious fatalism of atheism and a defence of human freedom. Hence his arguments are rather addressed to the assertion that God cannot but *be*, than to the positive truth that God *is*. Henry More, John Smith, Bishop Cumberland, Benjamin Whichcote, Lord Herbert of Cherbury (the first philosophical Deist in our literature), Peter Sterry, &c., are all great names in reference to the polemic between idealism and realism in the seventeenth century; but as they do not offer direct new thoughts on our theme, we can only notice the fact that they wrote, as evidence of the importance then attached to speculations on the metaphysics of theism.

The passage from Cartesianism to Spinozism and Berkleyanism may best be taken through the speculative labyrinths of Nicolas Malebranche. In a style as clear as one of the landscapes of Claude he winds along the mazes of metaphysic with the grace of a courtier and the serious *impreusement* of a father of the oratory—a Descartes Parisianized. He defined body as that which is possessed of extension and mobility, and spirit as characterized by reason and will. Hence he was unable to perceive any possibility of reciprocal action, so that neither in body nor spirit could any change occur except through the immediate operation of God, in whom alone we have solid ground for any science of the surrounding universe. We see the intelligible world in our reason, but the sensible world we know only because it is revealed to us in God, in whom we see the true meaning of all things.

Truth is the light that issues from Deity. We cannot reach out and arrest the world of sense; we can only assume *that* it is. But we know our thoughts, these lie in us. We have the idea of extension, of space, space without bounds; we have the idea of being, of being infinite; and these we cannot efface from our minds. As they, however, transcend our minds, they cannot be modifications of our minds, and hence they must be envisaged to us in God. This finite apprehension of the infinite is witness in and to the

finite thinker of an infinite cause of thought—a sovereign reason in whom all ideas are luminous, so that when they shine in on us they are their own evidence. God is, and is the infinite wisdom and will from whom all arises, and to whom all must be subject. We live by Him and in Him, and we know Him through Himself.

This *aperçu* of the Cartesian development of Malebranche will put our minds in the way of comprehending the sublime metaphysic of the "God-intoxicated" Spinoza. He made himself master of the Cartesian theory, and issued an "Abridgment of the Meditations of Descartes,"—with an appendix in which the first germs of his own speculations are found. The clearness and precision alike of his epitome and his suggestions attracted attention. He had cast off the authority of the old religion of his ancestry because it depended on authority, not on reason, and reason seemed to him the only ground of trust for man. Reason then, and that which can be evolved from it by the activity inherent in it of reasoning, shall be his single source of trust. *Cogito*, the Cartesian root, is also that of Spinozism. It contains at once the Egoism of individuality and the otherness of a personality beyond, inasmuch as it is a conjoint issue. It tells not only that "I am," but also that "another is." *What* that other is, becomes for Spinoza the prime topic of philosophy. *I am* but an accident, is *that* a substance—a ground of attributes, out of which ideas arise and are? "Substance is prior to all accidents in its nature;" for "substance is in itself and is thought of by itself." As "everything must either exist in itself or in something else," there must be at least one thing which is self-existent. "That Substance, which is in itself and is supremely perfect in itself, in which no imperfection can be perceived or thought, which exists independently of accidents, is the Absolute Infinite Being"—*God*. "By perfection is meant reality of existence." "By how much anything is more perfect in its nature, it involves a greater and more necessary existence; and, conversely, by so much anything involves a greater or more necessary existence, by so much is it more perfect." The *substance* in which thought dwells immediately is *mind*; while that which is the subject of extension (or of any accident of extension) is *body*. Two substances are said to be wholly distinct when one can exist without the other; and as they have nothing in common with each other they cannot be understood the one by the other. "*I am* can only be known by itself," and that "only in so far as I think;" for we cannot be absolutely certain of anything as long as we are ignorant of our own existence. That I have a body is not a primary truth, or one that can be known by itself. *Sense*-knowledge is vague and vain, yielding only vulgar opinion; *scientific* knowledge, better though it is, is *vitiating*, because it depends on sense; and *incomplete*, because though it develops into law it does not explain the law it affirms. Metaphysical knowledge alone possesses absolute certainty, for it alone is superior to the deceits of sense and the illusions of science; because it ascends to and depends on substance,

"the nature of which is to develop itself necessarily by an infinity of attributes which are also infinitely modifiable." Hence it must have an infinity of qualities; but of these two only are known to us with irrefragable certitude—thought and extension. Each attribute of an infinite must be infinite in energy at least if not in quality. Extension in itself can have no bounds, and thought must be equally free from limitation. Extension is cognized by us not in itself but in its modes, that is, by the forms which crowd its spaces and the motions which diversify its vastness. Each of these is finite, and the whole is multiplex, but they are all involved in the infinity of extension. So the modes of thought are *ideas*, and they multiply and flit into a variety amounting to immensity. Yet all this variety is but the infinite unity of substance in manifested cognition. Out of the infinite of being they but well out into figurate conceptability,—they show, but are not God. The conception of God involves His existence. His existence is known from the mere consideration of His nature. *Being* is the very nature of Deity in the soul, and Deity is being in the fullest, the most transcendent measurelessness. He is not immensity of being, but infinity—infinity not in a negative form; but as expressive of the positive perfection which all accidental being wants; for its negative form is a reflex from ourselves. Simplicity, immutability, and ubiquity are His. He is understanding and will, the Divine One, whose I AM, spoken once to Moses audibly, is spoken in the consciousness of every man. Spinoza stood not before the mystery of things, but before the mystery of being—of which life is only a momentary mode, and in God he found the *ens* from which each holds his *existence*. Reason is reunited to faith; and authoritative reason demands belief in God, for God, and metaphysic become the tabernacle of which theology is the temple. Spinozism is not pantheism, but divinism—God "all in all."

Thinking *into* thinking tends to give us back very much that which we are—as the reflections of a lake give up as shadowy picture what is thrown in as light. Locke could not "see all things in God" like Malebranche, nor think infinity from his own finite thoughts. He had not length of tether for that. Mind is the hand-writing of experience, and from what that writes philosophy must construct as best it may its theories and knowledges. Experience we cannot transcend or get beyond, and no authoritative belief can arise in or be held by the soul that has not its origin and is not a compound or compend of experience. This is a rebuff to, if not a rebutment of Spinozism. "God has not given us any *innate* ideas of Himself, yet we cannot want a clear proof of Him so long as we carry ourselves about us." "To show that we are capable of knowing, *i. e.*, being certain that there is a God, and how we may come by this certainty, we need go no farther than ourselves and the undoubted knowledge we have of our own existence." "Man knows that he himself *is*." "He knows also that nothing cannot produce a being, and therefore that there is something eternal."

That eternal Being must be most powerful and wise, and therefore is God. Hence we have a more certain knowledge of the existence of God than of anything our senses have not immediately discovered to us. Again, there are two sorts of beings, cogitative and incogitative: the latter cannot produce the former; therefore the eternal First must be wise, and cannot be material: for matter is not cogitative; and a system of unthinking matter could not result in thinking beings. And matter is not co-eternal with an eternal mind, for we cannot think ourselves to be eternal as bodies, nor can we think of bodies otherwise than as beginning to be. But we cannot think thought out of the universe, and beginning in it, for that would be to think the creation of the Creator. There is therefore an uncreated thinking essence whence we derive being,—that is, there is a God. This demonstration has been acutely shown to be wanting in axiomatic severity and logical rigour, as well as confused in its parts, in a review attached to the fourth edition of his "*Argument à Priori*," by W. H. Gillespie, (pp. 15—33); but as we are stating, not debating the grounds of the metaphysics of theism, we cannot effectively criticise, even if we could confute the several inept arguments of so many speculators.

Locke, though he opposed the theory of Malebranche even when it had been somewhat purged of its tendency to a pantheistic view of the omniform essence of God in the "*Reason and Religion*" of John Norris, did not fully comprehend the metaphysic of Spinoza—according to his own confession in his letters to the Bishop of Worcester,—yet he objected to it, as well as to the theory of Hobbes, that it resolved "all, even the thoughts and will of men, into an irresistible necessity." To *this* point Leibnitz directed the whole energy of his imperial intellect. He accepted substance as the basis of all our ideas of independent being—but not in the dead, cold, logically, abstract and morally despotic sense of Spinoza. He affirmed that man was not enwrapped in the huge Inertia of Extension, but that the only rational idea we could have of Other Substance than ourselves is that of an external energy of inherent activity, by which it becomes known to us as the force of life, the cause of being, the establisher of the geometry of existence. Extension is not dead outwardness and not-self; it is energy existing and manifesting its existence by active force behind all the forms and shows of things—from the inanimate mathematics of crystallization—through the physico-psychology of man, to the eternal dances of the astronomic orbs in the infinite spaces of the world—a power embracing every other power, whose works are unseen but mighty—ministers of the invisible intelligence which is the prime of being. So it is that the soul becomes a glorious microcosm in which phenomena and law, energy and form, by the everlasting miracle of a pre-established harmony, become transformed from feelings to thoughts, and the undulations of air or light excite as counterparts, ideas of sounds, or colours, and experience *saisit* itself as space, time, form, extension, externality and substance, the

highest result of the utmost stretch of metaphysic, the primal Power of being, the lawgiving Ruler of the spirit, the all-wise Creator of the world-machine, the self-existent First of all co-existences, the independent Establisher of the whole frame of things—God, the Absolute Cause.

The Leibnitzian theory was opposed in physics to the Newtonian philosophy, and led to a controversy between the originators of the most fertile speculations of their age. It called also into the list of earnest voyagers through the dim seas of metaphysic, Dr. Samuel Clarke, a staunch Newtonian, who had been appointed Boyle lecturer, and in this capacity had issued sixteen sermons, the first eight of which consist of a "Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God." The "singular ingenuity" of this production of a thinker so abstract that Voltaire has called him "a reasoning machine," has been maintained by many of our best writers, although it has received some sharp criticism, and from none a more thorough and cogent examination than from William H. Gillespie. It is to be observed, however, on Clarke's personal behalf, that his own belief in regard to God was not rested solely on his Demonstration, which was designed to show that, as philosophers "had made use of those kinds of subtleties *against*," "the same way of reasoning might be better made use of *on the side of* religion." It is, therefore, as an apologetic rather than a purely metaphysic treatise that it should be considered, as it claims only an overbalancement of argumentative weight. He reaches theism speculatively, but supplements it theologically, dovetailing his demonstration from reason with his assurance by faith. Something exists, he says, and that must have always existed or must have sprung into existence; what has always existed must be either one independent being changeless in itself, or an infinite series of changeable and dependent beings: but the latter idea is absurd, as it implies change without cause from within or without; and hence the former notion is the right one. This changeless independent being must exist by necessity of nature, and be self-existent. Could that be the outward universe? No, for the universe is a tissue of contingencies, which we could conceive existing otherwise, or as not existing at all; but there are things—as time and space—which we cannot think away. These are qualities, and qualities imply substance; of these the one is eternal, the other illimitable, so that the substance must be infinite as their possessor and container. As Newton had said, "time and space are constituted by the existence of God;" Clarke affirms that time and space are the irresistible evidences to reason of God. Here Clarke escaped the Spinozistic divinism on its pantheistic side, for Spinoza, beginning with substance as absolute, inferred attributes, arising as necessities of thought into necessities of nature; whereas Clarke, taking the attributes as given in experience interpreted by thought, could accept them as given to thought, and yet infer from and sublate to them a divine personality as God, and so could overturn the fatalistic conclusions of Spinozism. Dr. Joseph

Butler, whose labours in advancing the logic of analogy we have previously explained, read this Demonstration with the avidness of a keen and subtle mind when a youth, and criticised it acutely. That he afterwards accepted the argument as valid—for its purpose,—and held that it established the trustworthiness of “the proof of an intelligent Author and Governor of the universe,” the analogy of whose proceedings in providence and in grace he proposed to exhibit and develop, says a great deal for its conclusiveness.

This he somewhat clenched in his own mind by the consideration that every properly derived idea, however abstract, has an archetype in the concrete, so that the reality of an infinite and eternal being could only be doubted by doubting the only field of truth accessible to the thorough research of man—the mind.

But the splendidly endowed mind of Berkeley perceived that if we accept as the basis of our reasoning the maxim that “all our knowledge consists in ideas as the immediate objects of consciousness,” and assent to the statement that the mind is the only organ of specific information we have in regard to what is true, we must be wary in our mode of transition by inference, from the inner organ of ideas, mind, to the outward world of material existence, or to the deduction of an ontology from its revelations. Our ideas, and nothing else, must be the real objects of our knowledge; they have no invisible, unknowable substratum or substance, or upholding synthesis of attributes, apart from ourselves as spirits, not seeing all things in, but absolutely ourselves subsisting in God. By the law of parsimony we are excluded from availing ourselves of a gratuitous and unnecessary dualistic interpretation of the mystery of existence—mind and matter; all that we do or can know is ideas. Thought is the one existence in whom all existence is; to be is to be perceived, and to be perceived is to be. To ~~unsee~~ false entities is as requisite as to *see* true ones. We cannot analyze God’s synthesis which is true, but we can undo from our spirits our own false notions, and annihilate them. We can unthink matter; we cannot unthink thought. God is thought essential, man is thought perceptible. Hence we can intelligently receive into our reasonable faith God as personal life—the Lawgiver alike of nature and of spirit, one simple, undivided, active Being, which thinks, wills, and perceives—in short, is. Clarke and Berkeley debated their respective theories with considerable acrimony, and it is stated, that the heat of controversy excited in Malebranche, in a personal encounter with Berkeley, so exasperated an inflammatory disease of the lungs under which the author of “The Search for Truth” was labouring, that it accelerated his death.

Hume appeared as the sceptic, the destroyer of fallacies, not of faith, phantasies that were called philosophies. “Had there been no Berkeley,” said Hamann, “there would have been no Hume; and if no Hume, then no Kant;” and this could be carried much farther. Berkeley had affirmed that ideas are all we know, and Hume nailed him fast to *that*. If this is conclusive against a sub-

stance material, it is equally so against a substance spiritual; each is an inference, not a knowledge. Believe what you like, receive only what is true. Belief is a habit, good or ill according to its results, but philosophy is the unbelieving as well as the unseeing of the false. We experience ideas, and believe the rest. Hume was a sceptic not of man, nature, truth, and God, but of the philosophy which made itself the apologist of beliefs by arguments merely formal, by paralogsms of the reason, making metaphysic not a lighthouse, throwing radiance on the infinite ocean of truth, but a mere harbour of refuge for the imperilled creeds of a lukewarm age.

Cast away from you the notion of eliciting life from the processes of the dissecting-room; seek the life of the soul in the living vitality of its experience; do not fight falsehood with falsehood, but re-edify your philosophy on the single true basis of permanent safety—experience in its fulness the fulness of faith if you can attain to it, but at least in the fulness of reason. Doubt is double-thought, and out of that root may grow faith and reason. There is, to man, but one doubtless thing, his experience; while we have that, need we despair of a philosophy of nature, of man, and of God? Hume's scepticism related to the abstract God of metaphysics.

Reid and Kant took up the task of rebuilding philosophy, after having dug beneath the *débris* of the metaphysic of dogmatic idealism to the inner consciousness of the soul, the constitution of the mind itself, and the laws of thought intertextured with our being. Buffier's "First Truths" rather confounded faith and philosophy than clarified the thoughts of the age. Jonathan Edwards reasons, from being to life and action, as pre-supposed in human existence, as necessarily implying God—the goal of all human desires and hopes; but this rather as a theologian than as a metaphysician. It was with the same subordination of metaphysic to theology that Hugh Hamilton, Bishop of Ossory, while Dean of Armagh, elaborated an essay to prove "that there is one only undervied, unoriginated Being, God the Father Almighty, the original fountain of all existence;" and Moses Lowman's "Argument to prove the Unity and Perfections of God *a priori*" is also considerably more a theological tractate than a purely speculative treatise. Boyle, Voltaire, and the *Encyclopædists* cannot be properly introduced into a mere running hurry-graph like this, nor can Bossuet, Pascal, or Arnauld. We can scarcely pass unnoticed the Dissertation on the Being and Attributes of God, which occupies the first chapter of the second part of Hartley's "Observations on Man." The several leading propositions of this argument are to the following effect. Something must have existed from all eternity; there cannot have been a mere succession of finite dependent beings, but there must have been at least one infinite and independent being, endued with infinite wisdom and power, benevolent, even God. That God is spiritual, eternal, and omnipresent, immutable, free, holy, just, true, and merciful—our Creator, Governor, Judge, and Father. In the reasoning by which these theses are sustained,

Hartley's intellect shows less attractively than his sympathy of spirit, and his instincts triumph over his logical consistency; for if all human knowledge consists of associations and their compounds, God can never be otherwise to us than a far-off negation, unrealizable to thought. Swedenborg's gorgeous mysticism, his argumentation of the imagination and of the heart rather than of the reason, glowing and fervent yet, though variable as the shadow of a dream, singularly consistent and strongly held, we could not place in a just light unless we had a larger space before us than the utmost reach permitted us here, or perhaps the patience of the reader would allow. We may therefore now revert to Reid.

"Abstract truths," Reid thinks, "may very properly be called necessary truths; because it is impossible they should not be true at all times and in all places." The existence and attributes of the Supreme Being is the only necessary truth regarding existence; "but although the existence of God is necessary, I apprehend we can only deduce it from contingent truths." "All other beings that exist depend for their existence, and all that belongs to it, upon the will and power of the first cause; therefore neither their existence nor their nature, nor anything that befalls them, is necessary, but contingent." "The only arguments for the existence of a Deity are grounded upon the knowledge of my own existence and the existence of other finite beings. But these are contingent truths." "If we have any knowledge of our own existence, or of the existence of what we see about us, or of the existence of a supreme Being, that knowledge cannot consist in perceiving the agreement and disagreements of ideas;" for if things which are not ideas be objects of knowledge, they must be objects of thought. On the contrary, if ideas be the only objects of thought, there can be no knowledge either of our own existence, or of the existence of external objects, or of the existence of a Deity." But we have a knowledge of these things, therefore they are not mere *ideas*, but realities, and *God is*.

Besides this argument, Reid makes full use of the argument from design, "which," he says, "may be reduced to a syllogism," having these two premises:—(1) "that design and intelligence in the cause may with certainty be inferred from marks or signs of it in the effect; (2) that there are, in fact, the clearest marks of design and wisdom in the works of nature; and (3) the conclusion is, that the works of nature are the effects of a wise and intelligent first cause."

This is the argument to which Paley, in his "Natural Theology," gave outward development. Of writers on the external evidences of Christianity, Dean Paley is perhaps the chief. Nor is this, as has frequently been done, to be attributed to him as a fault, or used to countenance a charge of want of spirituality in the author. To get clear of assumptions and presumptions is given as the mark of a clear, honest thinker. Paley resigned the domain of faith, and went outside of the ramparts of the creeds, that he might all the more surely show that there is an indubitability in religion which



can dispense with the barriers of articles and the fortifications of creeds. He would give and take a fair field and no favour, and reason alone should furnish the weapons of the controversial fray, and give law to its wagers. To write "evidences" for believers was absurd. Hence Watson, Leland, Paley, and others, relinquished the forts of revelation, and went into the open field to bring in evidences to unbelievers.

It was a necessity forced upon them by the times, and they did well in magnanimously sacrificing, in their zeal for truth, the vantage-ground they might well have held, and the weapons they might have wielded "for argument's sake;" we shall give you all the odds, they said, and even at such disadvantage we shall maintain the cause of God against all who disbelieve. On the tented field of mere experience let us engage in honest conflict, and win who may; the fault is ours, not Deity's, should we fail. "Truth," as Berkeley said, "is the cry of all, but the game of few;" we engage in the hunt, but do not guarantee the gaining of the quarry. Written though it was amid the paroxysms of a disease which brought him gradually but painfully to the grave, the argument is followed out with consummate judgment, tact, and skill, so as to be, if not one of the most convincing, at least one of the most interesting theological works in the English language. The general idea, and much of the material, indeed, is borrowed from "The Religious Philosopher" of Bernard Nieuwentyt (1654—1718), an English translation of which appeared in the year of the author's death. Human life is only possible, in our experience here, through organization as its instrument. But organization could not have preceded intelligence in the order of existence, for organization is obviously and eminently a product of intelligent design. Every organ in every animal indicates design, inasmuch as each either is, or consists of parts which, however unconsciously—and the more unconsciously the more pertinent becomes the argument,—co-operate to the performance of some duty by the accomplishment of some end. Either then a being possessing intelligence, and not necessarily dependent on organization for existence, does exist, or we must deny that organization displays design. Can this be denied? No, unless at the expense of science and philosophy, that is, of all knowledge; for science is but the perception of plan in creation, and philosophy only the perception of plan in thought. If it cannot be denied, cannot even be doubted, that nature displays design, then a designer is a necessity of nature; for how all these parts, which altogether constitute nature, or any of them, as organs, "could come together without a disposing intelligence it is impossible to conceive." "The world must therefore have had an intelligent artificer." This common-sense analogy is thus expressible,—“Wherever there is arrangement there is an arranger; wherever there is adaptation of means to our end, there must be an adapter; wherever an organization, an organizer;” and—suited the argument to the present state of scientific thought—if there is evolution, there must be an evolver. Paley's

reasoning is simple, perspicuous, and well put, and though the style is homely, it is vigorous, and few books are pleasanter to read than his "Natural Theology."

Kant, the most subtle analyst that ever lived, in his deep metaphysical researches, pursued with inexorable and remorseless rigour as well as unshrinking consecutiveness, came to the conclusion that we could never reach, by demonstration of reason, beyond a doctrinal belief in the existence of deity; that God stands at an infinite distance from philosophical cognition or knowledge. The theoretical reason is powerless to attain to a trustworthy knowledge of God, though the practical reason may afford us sufficient ground for a discursive proof, entitling us to hold for true, and pre-suppose, a moral author of the universe. He disdains the subtlety of fine-spun ratiocinations, and founds his belief in the Supreme Being on the practical conviction which the sense of moral law implies. In "The Only Possible Argument for the Demonstration of the Existence of God" (1763) he denies the legitimacy of every attempt to effect a transition from the region of the speculative reason to reality. The idea of God, as absolute cause, he admits is a necessity to reason, but it is a subjective necessity only, it does not lead us to, or necessitate the knowledge of, a real, all-creating, all-sustaining omniscience and omnipotence. Intuition and conception are the elements of all man's knowing; so that conceptions without intuitions in some way corresponding to them, and intuitions without conceptions, cannot produce cognitions—whatever beliefs they may give ground for.

He examines the ontological proof based on existence, but denies that existence is ever a possible predicate determinative of objective as opposed to subjective reality; transcendental theology, as deism acknowledging a cause, and as theism affirming an author of nature, and natural theology as seeking for a supreme intelligence as the principle of natural perfection or of moral order, is passed under criticism, and is declared to result in a conception which closes in and crowns speculation, but is ideal merely. Physico-theology requires us to pre-suppose an infinite efficient, and ethico-theology demands the granting of a moral cause, but either or both assume as essential, but do not prove as real. Practical philosophy requires us to regard as indispensable a supreme self-sufficient Good as the condition of happiness; but that is a necessity to thought, not in reality. We postulate, but do not demonstrate it. We reach here the not-impossible but not the certainly existent. Moral theology leads us to infer from the moral end of being a moral first, who determined these purposes, but this as a belief, not a knowledge. Physical theology is an endeavour of reason, from the final causes of nature, to infer thence an intelligent impartor of their purposes, but this is to attempt to mount up to a supreme cause by, certainly, beautiful and pleasing, but still empirical steps,—that is, to seek a reasonable Deity in the merely physical elements of experience.

The testimony of revelation, though a proper ground of religious,

is not of metaphysical trust; for the idea of God must precede and test the conception of the God revealed. Thus with a scrutinizing intelligence of surpassing keenness, Kant passes round the whole circle of the speculative sea which surrounds man, and casting the light of criticism over its wide wastes, he determines that each is, of itself, incapable of giving full gratification to the soul which would presume to scan the infinite in search of God. If, however, logical accuracy and completeness claim our regard, carefully abstracted syllogism and nicely conducted speculations win our intellect, those theories which lead along the *a priori* road deserve preference; but if levelness to ordinary comprehension, liveliness of impression, attractiveness of illustration, and power of moving the moral springs of human nature receive our favour, the *a posteriori* argument, as having the greater general utility, should be commended. It is, however, as the essence of all being, as the essential possibility of existence, which, being supposed away, would destroy or annul all cogitability, that the real necessity for holding as true the being of God arises and becomes an imperative of the soul. Unknown and unknowable in His essential being, experience persuades and intelligence convinces men that God is, and is the Father Almighty, Cause, Author, Ruler, and Rewarder—the Maintainer of order, the Regulator of progress.

Consciousness is veracious, every sentiment that stirs to happiness, every high poetic thought which leads us to the beautiful or the sublime, every aspiration that induces to dutifulness, every truth of science, and every possibility of metaphysic, are pledges of the trustworthiness of an intellectual belief and a moral faith in God. Every result of the research of the deep, large thinkers of the past, and every energy manifested in the church and in the world by men whose spirits were suffused with and stirred by enthusiasm, which is the indwelling of the Deity, form cumulative proofs of the certainty of the existence of a Father of our race. The worth of each is valid in its own sphere, and the validity of each is enhanced by its being harmonized with and dovetailed into the architecture of a metaphysic, the unity of result of a great number of things, so and so disposed, that when taken in at one view as a complete edifice of evidence, gives warrant of the irresistible truth of God's sovereign self-existence and supremacy.

We have been able but slightly to hurry over the speculations of three centuries, and now we must adjourn consideration of the farther reaches of speculative inquiry concerning the being and attributes of Deity. We shall pursue the theme at our earliest opportunity, and bring our survey of the theistic metaphysic down to the newly completed theory of William H. Gillespie.

---

## Religion.

---

### IS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE SCRIPTURES TO WARRANT BELIEF IN THE GODHEAD OF JESUS CHRIST?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

THAT there is a great deal of hypocritical cant amongst all classes of people, and all sects and denominations of Christendom, I will not deny, for I have seen and heard so much of it, even amongst my fellow-labourers in the vineyard of our Lord, that I have been heartily sickened with it, and at all such times have taken my stand in aid of my Unitarian brethren; so much so, indeed, that the epithets "Infidel," "Atheist," &c., have been hurled at me fast and thick. As regards cant, C. S. L. and I are one, but he must not abuse all Trinitarians because some with whom he may have come in contact are ungenerous, illiberal, or narrow-minded. Such Trinitarians do not in general advance much argument, and what they lack in argument they make up for in abuse; but here, in the *British Controversialist*, argument will be the only arbiter of the present question.

Another observation I have to make, and that is with respect to the several theological works of Trinitarians and Unitarians: as a rule, they quote Scripture to suit their own purposes, without any reference whatever to the context. This error I wish to avoid, and I would that all who may take part in this debate, both affirmative and negative, would try to do likewise.

C. S. L. calls attention to Genesis, where it is stated that "God created the heaven and the earth." A little more attention and a little further research, and we find "For by Him [Christ] were all things created that are in heaven and that are in earth, visible and invisible" (Col. i. 16). Now as the Scriptures declare God to be the Creator of the universe, and Jesus Christ to be the Creator, the only inference that can be drawn from this is that Jesus Christ is God. This conclusion is forced upon us by the arguments adduced by the evangelist John. Not only does he prove the prior existence of Jesus Christ, but also that he is the Supreme God. "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. All things were made by Him, and without Him was not anything made that was made. He was in the world, and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not. And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us" (John i. 1, 3, 10,

14). From these passages of Scripture it is quite evident that Jesus Christ and God are one and the same Being. Again, as there was only one creation, and the act of that creation is ascribed to Jesus Christ and God respectively, the inference is plain that Jesus Christ is God. In close connection with the foregoing passages it is stated that Jesus Christ came unto His own (the world), or, as the original reads, "He came unto His own things (or possessions), and His own people did not receive Him." This further shows that Jesus Christ is the Creator and Possessor of all things, for it was to His own that He came, His own by creative power, He having called them into existence.

C. S. L., in proving the unity of God, has, I think, made a slip in stating that "Jesus himself disclaims worship," for we find that He is worshipped, and never does He rebuke the worshipper.

The unity of God no Trinitarian denies, but we hold that Jesus Christ is that God. This is evident from certain considerations which we shall now bring forward.

I. That Jesus Christ is perfect God is evident because He is so called in the Scriptures. "Therefore the Lord himself shall give you a sign; Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call His name Immanuel" (Isa. vii. 14). "Behold, a virgin shall be with child, and shall bring forth a son, and they shall call his name Emmanuel" (Matt. i. 23). These passages undoubtedly refer to Jesus Christ. "For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given: and the government shall be upon His shoulder: and His name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, The mighty God, The everlasting Father, The Prince of Peace" (Isa. ix. 6). This evidently has reference to Isa. vii. 14, and can only be applied with any truth to Jesus Christ, for we find that such are the characteristics of our Lord; although these names may not, perhaps, be applied to Him literally, yet they are descriptive of His character, His power, His work, and His being. This is evident from the whole tenor of the New Testament, from which I select a few verses as proof passages. "Looking for that blessed hope, and the glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ" (Titus ii. 13). In this verse the word *kai* which is translated "and," may quite legitimately be rendered "even," and then we read that "the great God [is] even our Saviour Jesus Christ." And we find that the apostle Peter acknowledges Jesus Christ and God to be one: "Simon Peter, a servant and an apostle of Jesus Christ, to them that have obtained like precious faith with us through the righteousness of God and our Saviour Jesus Christ" (2 Pet. i. 1). There is in the latter part of this verse a slight mistranslation; the original should be rendered "our God and Saviour Jesus Christ." "And we know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding, that we may know Him that is true, and we are in Him that is true, even in His Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God, and eternal life" (1 John v. 20). Here Christ is the *true* God. And again, "Whose are the fathers,

and of whom as concerning the flesh *Christ* [came], *who is over all, God blessed for ever*" (Rom. ix. 5). Can we have more emphatic language than this, in which Christ is described as "God blessed for ever"? More evidence there is that Jesus Christ is perfectly and truly God; the clearest and strongest to my mind I shall now adduce. "Thus saith the Lord the King of Israel, and His redeemer the Lord of hosts; I am the first, and I am the last; and beside Me there is no God" (Isa. xlv. 6). "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith the Lord, which is, and which was, and which is to come, the Almighty. I [John] was in the Spirit on the Lord's day, and heard behind me a great voice, as of a trumpet, saying, I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last: and, What thou seest, write in a book. . . . And I turned to see the voice that spake with me. And being turned, I saw . . . one like unto the Son of man. . . . And when I saw Him, I fell at His feet as dead. And He laid His right hand upon me, saying unto me, Fear not; I am the first and the last: I am He that liveth, and was dead; and, behold, I am alive for evermore" (Rev. i. 8, 10—13, 17, 18).

From a careful comparison and thoughtful consideration of these passages of Scripture, who will not say of a truth Jesus Christ is God? Many more passages of Scripture, of like import, may be given, but space forbids; only one series of syllogistic quotations I now give. "The voice of Him that crieth in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make straight in the desert a highway for our God" (Isa. xl. 3). "Behold, I will send My messenger, and he shall prepare the way before Me, . . . saith the Lord of hosts" (Mal. iii. 1). "He said, I am the voice of one crying in the wilderness, Make straight the way of the Lord, as said the prophet Esaias" (John i. 23). These verses speak for themselves.

II. That Jesus Christ is God is likewise evident by His forgiving sins. "When Jesus saw their faith, he said unto the sick of the palsy, Son, thy sins be forgiven thee. But there were certain of the scribes sitting there, and reasoning in their hearts, Why doth this man thus speak blasphemies? who can forgive sins but God only?" (Mark ii. 5—7). From these verses it seems to have been an admitted truth that God only can forgive sins. Now if God alone can forgive sins, and Jesus Christ forgives sins, does it not, as a matter of logic, follow that Jesus Christ is God?

More passages of a similar nature might be brought forward, but we think that this is sufficient of this class to prove that Jesus Christ is God.

III. That Jesus Christ is God also appears because He is the object of religious worship. "Wherefore God also hath highly exalted Him, and given Him a name which is above every name: that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth; and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God

the Father" (Phil. ii. 9—11). "And again, when He bringeth in the first begotten into the world, He saith, And let all the angels of God worship Him" (Heb. i. 6). If that the angels of God render their worship to Christ, is it expecting too much at our hands that we should worship Him who is our Redeemer? "And they stoned Stephen, calling upon God, and saying, Lord Jesus, receive my spirit. And he kneeled down, and cried with a loud voice, Lord, lay not this sin to their charge." Here we have an account of Stephen, who was filled with the Holy Ghost, praying to God and Jesus Christ; in the first place he prays that Jesus Christ may receive his spirit, and secondly, that Jesus may not lay the charge of murder against those who are stoning him. If this be not an act of worship, I do not know what is. In Revelation we have a scene of the universal worship of Jesus Christ, which is truly magnificent: "And they sung a new song, saying, Thou art worthy to take the book, and to open the seals thereof: for Thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by Thy blood out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation; and hast made us unto our God kings and priests: and we shall reign on the earth. And I beheld, and I heard the voice of many angels round about the throne and the beasts and the elders: and the number of them was ten thousand times ten thousand, and thousands of thousands; saying with a loud voice, Worthy is the Lamb that was slain to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory, and blessing. And every creature which is in heaven, and on the earth, and under the earth, and such as are in the sea, and all that are in them, heard I saying, Blessing, and honour, and glory, and power, be unto Him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb for ever and ever" (Rev. v. 9—13).

According to these verses Christ is worshipped in heaven: if He be not God, then the worshippers—that is, the angels and saints—are guilty of idolatry.

IV. That Jesus Christ is God is still further made manifest because of the attributes of God being ascribed to Him. I will only notice three of the attributes.

*Eternity.*—"In the beginning was the Word, . . . and the Word was God" (John i. 1). "Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Before Abraham was, I am" (John viii. 58).

*Omnipresence.*—"For where two or three are gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them" (Matt. xviii. 20). "Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you, and, lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world" (Matt. xxviii. 20).

*Immutability.*—"Jesus Christ the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever" (Heb. xiii. 8). We think that there is enough evidence here to show that Jesus Christ is eternal, omnipresent, and immutable; and furthermore that we have brought forward evidence sufficient to justify our belief in the Godhead of Jesus Christ.

NEANIAS.

## OUGHT THE AUTHORIZED VERSION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES TO BE REVISED BY A ROYAL COM- MISSION?

### AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

It is certainly a remarkable circumstance that, in a controversy of this nature, there is not one of the writers on the other side who has not admitted the force of the arguments used in support of a revision. What seems most to have excited their indignation is the fact that, as they say, I have diverted the question from its proper channel by opening the question of revision, whereas this discussion ought, according to their ideas, to have been confined to the question of Who should revise?

I do not in the least withdraw from the position I at first assumed, and I still assert that the prime consideration in this matter is, whether the Scriptures require revision at all; and that the question of the medium through which that revision should take place is one of minor importance, if only from the fact that only one class of men can do the work, viz., those who are familiar with the original languages and with the ancient MSS.

But let us come to the articles on the other side without further comment. The first is written by a gentleman who prefers to be anonymous, not even giving us an initial by which to designate him, and therefore to suit his humour I will call him "Anonymous." It is difficult to classify his objections. He admits that, as an abstract proposition, there can only be one answer to the question whether or not a revision should take place, and that that answer should be in the affirmative, although he shrinks from the task because of some fancied difficulties. But in this, as in many other instances, if we really look the difficulties fully in the face, they will be found to be easy to overcome. He clothes one of these difficulties thus:—"At present, Christendom, so far as it is English-speaking, is one in reference to this matter;—how many changes might such a translation necessitate?"

In the same strain he continues, "Not only the three kingdoms, but the immense English-speaking territories of the southern seas, the greater part of the American continent, a large extent of India, considerable portions of Africa, are all interested in the Authorized Version, and not only should be thought of in regard to it, but should be consulted about it." The important question "How?" arises, and this "Anonymous" does not attempt to answer. According to his theory, before we can have a revision we must wait till "we have the concurrence and agreement of all the people whose language is English, as well as the concurrence and agreement of all the sects in the countries in which the Authorized Version of the Scriptures is already employed." "Anonymous" does not seem to be aware that the Americans have issued a revised version of



the New Testament, and it may here be remarked that the present Authorized Version would never have existed if the then translators had allowed themselves to be influenced by such absurdities as those propounded by "Anonymous."

"Anonymous" also makes this proposition:—"It [the Authorized Version] was brought into general use and received into general favour before the unitive energies of Protestantism had had opportunity for becoming relaxed, and prior to the appearance of any powerful schismatic influence." Surely when propounding this, he must have forgotten that the most powerful schism had arisen before the preparation of the Authorized Version, viz., that of Arminianism, and that that schism has been working ever since, to the almost complete absorption of most of the churches, Anglican and other.

But he admits that the Authorized Version is replete with defects, and that fact—curiously enough—constitutes one of his reasons why it should not be revised. He argues in this way. Everybody, he says in effect, if not in these precise words, knows that the errors in the Authorized Version are abundant, and therefore it compels those who wish to have a correct version of the text to compare the various renderings of the numerous translations, and thus engenders the "special peculiarity of keeping in constant exercise the critical faculties."

One would have thought that one of the great advantages of a correct version would be to do away with the loss of time which now "necessary exercise of the critical faculties" necessitates, so that a Bible-reader might be able to obtain a greater knowledge of his subject through not being tormented with doubts as to the correctness of his text. "The issue of a new authorized version would do a great deal to discourage scholarship and research by stereotyping for a long time to come an accepted version." If this reasoning were sound, we might well wonder at our being now possessed of the means for a revision, for, of course, if this theory be true, the acceptance of the present Authorized Version in the reign of James I. should have deadened all inquiry and stopped all research from that time downwards, whereas it has had precisely the opposite effect, for Biblical scholarship has never attained to so good a position as at the present time, nor has there at any time been so good means for revising at our disposal as there now are. If we should judge, therefore, by experience, the acceptance of a fresh authorized version will stimulate further inquiry and research, which must always have a good result.

"Anonymous" then puts forward an idea with which we are again confronted by subsequent writers, and a more artificial objection it is impossible to conceive. It is that the revision of the Scriptures will upset all literature, by creating a confusion which he supposes will ensue in all references, &c., to the Scriptures. The objection answers itself, for, as it is not proposed to suppress the Authorized Version, those who wish to refer to it can still do so

under that name, and those who wish to refer to the proposed Revised Version can also refer to it under its proper title, while all allusions which, up to the issue of the Revised Version have been made to the Scriptures, must, as a matter of necessity, allude to the Authorized Version.

But even presuming that all these supposed huge difficulties stood in our way, let me ask, Ought we to allow them to prevent us for one moment from conferring a great benefit upon all those English-speaking nations to which "Anonymous" refers?

One word to J. V. Y. He fully admits the propriety, nay, the necessity of revision, but the way in which he suggests that it should be done renders its accomplishment totally impracticable, and the result of such a revision as he suggests would be worthless. J. V. Y. wishes to make revision a kind of binding contract upon all to accept and abide by the results of such revision. The way in which he proposes to revise is also peculiar. He wishes scholars to be kept out of it, theologians to be excluded, and the revision to be made by those who are quite ignorant of their subject. Indeed, he goes so far as to say that no version can be made unless with the consent of all the English-speaking races in the world, who should, he thinks, be summoned to a kind of parliament for the purpose.

The numerous and peculiar processes through which, according to J. V. Y., the work should pass before it reaches the public, the reader will find elaborated in the last three paragraphs of his article.

My most pronounced opponent is S. S., but it is comfortable to reflect that even he agrees that the proposition now being debated consists of the two questions named by me, viz., 1st, does the Bible require revision? and 2nd, if so, shall it be done by a Royal Commission? and he comes to a negative conclusion on both. His article deserves attention, if only for the reckless assertions he makes, and for the skill he certainly displays in evading the real point at issue. His first reason for denying the necessity of revision is that—as he says—in all probability some of the points of contention now existing will by a more correct version be removed. One would have thought that this would be a very desirable object. There is no need for a number of spurious points of contention, and the fact that a correct revision would cause the removal of such (really non-existing) points of contention constitutes of itself a strong argument for revision. If S. S. choose to sacrifice truth for controversy, he can do so by refusing to use the Revised Version, and as it will not be forced on any one, he can still use the Authorized Version, or, if he please, he can go back still further to the version which existed prior to the year 1611, when, I believe, the present Authorized Version was made.

The great object to be attained is the possession of the most truthful version possible, and this should be done without any regard to that destruction of the numerous "isms" which S. S. fears may be its consequence, and without any thought for the

creeds and dogmas now in existence. S. S.'s next objection is, that the men who would be selected for the office of revision would be "such men" as Dean Alford, upon whom he makes a special attack.

Now I imagine that most persons—even of the Nonconformist body, to which I have the pleasure to belong—regarded the now deceased Dean as a man particularly well fitted for the task. It was known that he had spent the best years of his life in Biblical research, and in the translation of the New Testament, his version of which is the object of a just admiration, added to which his theology was sound, and his working powers great. But what think you is S. S.'s great charge against Dean Alford? Simply this. Every one will no doubt recognise the passage from 2 Tim. iii. 16, "All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable," &c. This passage Dean Alford translates, "Every scripture inspired by God is also profitable," and this fact is sufficient to fire S. S.'s indignation. There is no doubt Dean Alford's is the correct translation, as it is obviously the only intelligible one, inasmuch as *all* scripture is *not* given by inspiration of God, otherwise I should be forced to the conclusion that this writing had also the divine inspiration. "But," says S. S., "Dean Alford is a latitudinarian." Now to put this into plain English it means this, that Dean Alford believed, as I hope I do, that one man may differ from another conscientiously and sincerely, whereas S. S. and a large number of other dogmatists are so bigoted as to say that they are right, and that no one else can sincerely believe in anything other than those dogmas in which they themselves put their faith, and they would fain force every man to compel his mind and belief to run along their dirty narrow rut.

Attacks conceived in a similar spirit are made on other members of the body of voluntary revisers now at work on the subject, of which body the late Dean Alford was one.

S. S. contradicts himself sadly. In one paragraph, numbered 2 in his article, he professes to believe that a revision is needless because so little change would be effected by it. But from his two succeeding paragraphs one would imagine that he believes that the consequence of revision would be the universal upsetting of all professors of Christianity. To refute his numerous minutiae would scarcely be profitable to the reader, and as they are utterly frivolous, I abstain from going into them in detail. I should, however, like to know who are those "most learned and able men" to whom S. S. refers without giving their names, especially as the best Scripture scholars are upon the Voluntary Revision Commission.

It is but just to S. S. to say that in his 5th paragraph he does admit that there are grounds for revision.

S. S., however, feeling himself obliged to descend from his theological stilts, condescends to notice some of the few instances of mistranslations, &c., which I gave in my opening paper.

I have stated, and I reiterate the statement, that 1 John v. 7, as

it now stands, is a pure invention, that none of the patriarchs of the church alluded to it, and that Erasmus did not give it in his first and second editions. Now at the outset it is to be remarked that S. S. does not name a single Greek MS. which contains it. I admit that it may be found in many Latin MSS., but that fact does not bear upon the question, the only MSS. to be relied upon being Greek. It is not difficult to suppose that Athanasius, the author of the creed bearing his name—to which this verse is particularly directed,—would eagerly seize it, although there are abundant materials for his creed without it. Undoubtedly its genuineness has been maintained by numerous writers of a comparatively recent date; but this is also quite immaterial, the important fact being that Erasmus, certainly the best Greek scholar of the sixteenth century, and a thoroughly unprejudiced man, when writing his version of the Greek Testament, after a careful consideration of all the authorities—which were few,—*rejected* it on the ground that it was not genuine. He did not *omit* it, as S. S. would have us believe, but rejected it, and refused to insert it in his first and second editions, notwithstanding the pressure put upon him by the ecclesiastics; and it would never have found a place in his subsequent editions, and consequently not in our Authorized Version, had he not ultimately, as I have before stated (in which statement I am borne out by theological history), in consequence of “a vehement clamour having been raised against him for thus honestly printing the text of Scripture as he found it in the best authorities to which he could appeal, unfortunately promised to insert the passage if a single Greek MS. could be discovered containing it” (evidently showing that up to that time, viz., the sixteenth century, it was not contained in any known Greek MSS.). “One such was at last produced (the Codex Montfortianus, belonging to Trinity College, Dublin), and Erasmus accordingly restored the text in his later editions, whence it found its way into our Authorized Version. But it is now the settled conclusion of criticism that in the few Greek MSS. which contain it this passage is a *translation of the Latin*” (those Latin MSS. referred to by S. S.), “and had in the interests of orthodoxy been foisted into the sacred text. It found, however, many zealous defenders in the last century” (the persons named by S. S. being among the number). “A considerable library might be formed of the volumes and pamphlets which have been published for and against it, though there has hardly been any argument produced in its favour, except the apparent value which the verse possesses, as embodying a statement of the doctrine of the Trinity. This is one of the cases in which not a few Protestant writers have been too ready to imitate the conduct of many Papists in preferring seeming expediency to truth. They have clung to this verse as a bulwark against Socinianism, while by so doing they have only enabled the enemy to triumph in the implied confession thus made of the weakness of their cause. Truth in everything must at last prevail; and as surely as the first verse of St. John’s Gospel, which con-

*tains such an illustration to our Saviour's deity is genuine, so surely is this verse a forgery, and ought never to be quoted or referred to as possessed of the authority of the word of God. Every one who knows the history of the passage must feel pained so long as it continues to be read as inspired Scripture; and one of the most certain gains to be anticipated in a revised version is that this hurtful interpolation would disappear for ever."*

The above passage, quoted from the orthodox writer of an article on Bible Revision in a very orthodox periodical, will at once show which statement is the correct one, mine or S. S.'s.

If, before S. S. had so recklessly launched his assertions, he had consulted the Tauchnitz edition of the New Testament, he would have seen that my statement was also supported by the authority of the three great MSS., viz., the Sinaitic, the Vatican, and the Alexandrian. He might also, on referring to the American version, have found that the latter also supported the statement made by me.

While on this point I give an example of a somewhat similar interpolation. In Acts viii. 37 we find in the narrative of Philip and the eunuch the following. In answer to the inquiry of the eunuch in the 36th verse, "What doth hinder me to be baptized?" the 37th verse proceeds, "And Philip said, If thou believest with all thine heart, thou mayest. And he answered and said, I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God." Now it so happens that there is no authority for supposing this 37th verse to have been in the original. None of the ancient MSS. contain it, nor is it to be found in the majority of the later copies. There can be little doubt that the cause of its interpolation was the fact that some such liturgical confession as it contains came at an early date to be made by the applicant for baptism, and hence the verse seems to have crept into the sacred text.

Space forbids that I should enter into the objections made by S. S. to the minor points put forward by me.

It is true that I asked for the meaning of Job xxxvi. 33, and S. S. undertakes to give it, but the manner in which he professes to do so is somewhat remarkable. It must be borne in mind that a proper version of the passage would at once make its meaning apparent, without the necessity for resorting to those flights of imagination to which S. S. has betaken himself.

On reference to S. S.'s article on this point, it will be seen that it is in fact a reiteration, with numerous additional words, of the verse itself, and leaves the question entirely unanswered, and so much so that, besides inquiring what the meaning of the verse itself was, I am now forced to make the additional inquiry, What is the meaning of S. S.'s explanation of it?

S. S.'s explanation of Job xxxvii. 22, to which I invited and still invite attention, is equally fallacious. In attempting an explanation he has misquoted the passage, as he has placed a comma after the word "north," instead of the semicolon which should be there,

which of course makes a considerable difference in its sense. The passage is :—"Fair weather cometh out of the north : with God is terrible majesty." The way in which he attempts to connect the two clauses of the verse is this,—he apparently consults his concordance on the word "north," and he finds that word is mentioned in Prov. xxv. 23, where it says, "The north wind driveth away rain," from which very weak basis he wishes us to conclude that the clause "with God is terrible majesty" is proved by the fact that the "north wind driveth away rain," and that this latter fact supplies the wanting link between the two wholly unconnected clauses of the verse in question. But why fly to the book of Proverbs for an explanation of the Book of Job, and strain our imaginations to force ourselves to fancy that the one interprets the other, when on a proper revision the passage itself would be clear?

After noticing a few of the less important of the passages quoted by me, to show the advantages to be derived from a revision, S. S. comes to the following self-comforting conclusion :—"The remainder of H. K.'s objections to our Authorized Version of the Scriptures are of a similar character to those we have noticed," thus endeavouring to give the go-by to the most important instances cited by me. He forgets that the instances I have quoted are not isolated examples, but that similar mistranslations abound in every page and chapter of the New Testament especially.

What does S. S. say to the quotation from Archbishop Trenchard's article "On the Authorized Version of the New Testament?"—what does he say to the mistranslations therein pointed out in Rom. v.? Absolutely nothing. He does not even condescend to notice them, although a revision would tend to settle serious doctrinal complications, arising from the present incorrect version of that chapter.

M. N. has been ably answered by T. E. E., a writer on this side of the question, and it would therefore be worse than useless to notice all the numerous absurdities which M. N. has managed to crowd into a small space.

M. N., harping on the old string, wants to make us believe that if a correct version were made, the result would be the unsettling of all the churches, because they would have, as he says, to debate which version they would use, the present or the new ; and then he says, with an air of triumph, "Look at the Nonconformists, with their innumerable hymn-books and hymn-book discussions and dissensions, and take that as a slight specimen of the confusion worse confounded which would arise when churches and sects debated, Which Bible, the old or the new ?

It so happens that I am a Nonconformist, and have been all my life, and there are not among that body any of those dissensions about hymn-books which M. N. seems to have raked up from his imagination.

If one Nonconformist body desire a particular collection of hymns, they have it and use it ; and similarly if it were a question which version of the Bible should be used, it would be settled with equal

facility. Besides this, however, if M. N.'s illustration of the supposed hymn-book dissensions were correct, it would bear no analogy to the point in question, because these supposed innumerable hymn-books do not purport to be each a correct version of the same set of hymns, but different collections of different hymns.

But what does this bugbear of the predicted unsettlement of the churches really mean, and what bearing has it on the question? The same point might have been, and no doubt was, used at the making of the Authorized Version in the reign of James, but did the Authorized Version unsettle the churches? On the contrary, it helped to settle them; and there is no doubt that the result of the proposed new version will be the same. But such suggestions are entirely unworthy of this discussion. The question is not one of expediency, but simply, having the means within our reach, shall we have an exact version of the Bible or shall we not? Surely there can be but one answer to this question.

M. C. L. H. begins by admitting the necessity of revision, treating that as a foregone conclusion, simply from the fact that that question was debated in this Magazine nearly twenty years ago.

The rest of his article is almost incomprehensible. I beg to take direct issue with him on his quotation from Tischendorf, whom he has dragged into this discussion as an authority on his side of the question, whereas the whole of the labours and writings of that great Biblical scholar point directly the other way. Every one cordially agrees with him that the "Authorized Version" of the New Testament has not only become an object of great reverence, but has deserved to be such. But is this a reason why we should not supply its acknowledged numerous defects, which page after page of Tischendorf's notes to the Authorized Version declare to be necessary?

From the tenor of his article one might conclude that M. C. L. H. was a Papist. He insists so strenuously that the State must not have anything in the slightest to do with a revision of the Bible, because, as he says, it would give to the State the power of prescribing the Scripture to be used, and exercising a tyranny over the consciences of men.

No one would oppose more strenuously than myself the giving to the State any such power, or would support more earnestly the entire severance of Church and State. But in this matter what really does "the State" mean? Merely that power which is able to call together a body of men for a certain work; and where else does such influence exist? No doubt this idea of M. C. L. H. was well aired in the time of James I., but no such evil results as those now predicted followed the calling together by the Crown of able men competent for the task; and it is still less likely that such result would now follow a similar exercise of power, as it could only be put in exercise through first consulting the representatives of the nation, so that it would, in point of fact, be the nation which would call to the work men known as able and competent for the purpose.

We cannot expect that the revisers of 1871 will be clothed with the powers of direct divine revelation, any more than were the revisers of 1611.

M. C. L. H. contends that a certain mystical body, whom he calls "the Church," are the only proper "custodiers" of the Bible, and that no one must revise a single verse of it without the authority of this "Church." I deny both these propositions. What have we been struggling for in bygone years, if it is to be now asserted that the Bible is and must remain the property of "the Church"? If it were we should probably get very little of it, and should be in the same condition as that in which Luther was before he made the discovery of the old Latin Bible in his monastery. I assert that the Bible is as much my property, and the property of every one else, as it has been the property of all the archbishops and bishops of all the churches that ever existed. But what is this "Church" about which M. C. L. H. talks so much? Is it Anglican, Roman, or Nonconformist? There can be but one answer to this question, and it is this, that the only church ever recognised by the Scriptures is the universal Church of God spread over all nations and countries, and this of itself shows the entire impracticability of M. C. L. H.'s notions, as even he must admit the utter impossibility of summoning this, the true Church together. It would not even be practicable to call together that part of the Church which is in these islands alone; and the consequence is, that if we wish for a revision a responsible body must take upon itself the responsibility of calling together well-known and able men thoroughly competent for the task set before them, and the nation will be satisfied with the result.

Ought we then to have a revision? In the most trivial affairs of life it is desirable to be correct, and if this be so when we are dealing with the highest interests of mankind, how much more necessary is it that strict correctness should be obtained? It is admitted that the present version is defective and inaccurate, and that we have the means of enlightenment and accuracy. Shall we reject these means remitted to us almost miraculously from the far distant past, or shall we thankfully accept and use them? There is, I think, no escape from the conclusion that the Authorized Version should be revised. But by whom? By the most dependable body of men to be found. At the present time there is no body more dependable than the State, from which the so-called Royal Commission would issue; but if there be one found, then by all means let us have that.

H. K.

#### NEGATIVE REPLY.

A RATHER unfortunate accident—the omission of my initials. G. G., from the close of my paper—has, I fear, a little incommoded the opponents of my views. Perhaps this may have been one reason why so slight an amount of notice has been vouchsafed to my paper



or my thoughts. An idea like this may be more gratifying to my self-esteem than true. However, it is of far more importance that the question should be thoroughly discussed, than that any gratification should be given to the writers on either side. The late Dean Alford, in perfect harmony with the principles of this serial, has truthfully said, "Unless we have thought and felt for ourselves in matters which none but ourselves can decide for us, we shall find, when the day of trial comes, that the fabric of our opinions and judgments will not abide firm."

On no subject can it be more important for us to form a judgment, a correct judgment, than upon the word of God, the word of everlasting life. In all lands the great majority of the people must be content to have the Scriptures in a translation, that it may be known to them in their mother tongue, and it is of vast importance that we should be able to trust our several translations. It is one of the privileges of our age that agencies abound for testing the accuracy of every version, and facilities are within everybody's reach for knowing the facts regarding the original texts, as well as the value of particular versions.

A translation that has a history, and is incorporated with a living and large, a valuable and important literature, is a treasure which should be carefully guarded. A translation whose terms have gone down into the soul, and have grown classic as expressions of the noblest aspirations, the holiest feelings, the highest hopes, the most pleasing and most profitable thoughts, should be esteemed, not for its worth only, but for all the endearing and enduring associations which cluster round it, and have given it a home in the heart as a joy for ever. To tone this down to the speech of the present age would destroy the fine archaic flavour which smacks of the olden glorious time, when the lexicon of Shakspeare and Bacon, Sir Thomas More and Sir Matthew Hale, Ben Jonson and Richard Hooker, Sir Philip Sidney and Sir John Davies, was ransacked to get the best phrases our language could afford, in which to interpret the words of inspiration. The highest and best forms of the language of the highest and best minds have thus been collected together to supply us with the highest and best translation of the Scriptures which anywhere exists. It is this version of the Scriptures to which this controversy refers, and it is asked concerning it, Ought we to have it transmuted into the speech of our time—the phraseology of Carlyle or Macaulay, of Dickens and Thackeray, of Byron and Browning, of Stanley and Alford, of Thirlwall and Grote, of Jowett and Orby Shipley, of Dale and Spurgeon, of Lewes and Darwin? I cannot think that it would be possible to fuse and compound these into a form of sound words anything at all comparable to the composite structure of the dear old venerable Bible we have in the Authorized Version, in regard to which we should notice the following things:—

It was an honest attempt to give the very spirit of the Scripture, unbiassed by any sectarian desire. It was begun and finished 1871.

under the full impression of the sacredness of the text—when a free and open Bible was considered to be the very foundation of the Church ; and hence it is, on all hands, admitted to be a good and true, substantial and thoroughgoing piece of workmanship.

It was begun and finished in an age of scholars and of great writers. The text was well known, and the lexicon by which the text was translated was fresh, vigorous, and vivid ; so that the more we go back in our readings among the old writers, the greater is the expressiveness of the language found to be in which it is written. It is impossible to assert that in intensity of culture, in entire consecration to their work, in greater vigour of faith and energy of mind, any set of translators could now engage upon the work of making a version of the Scriptures.

It is unquestioned that the sense of the Scripture is in all except a few rare instances fully and fairly given in our authorized translation ; and when we consider that it is an heirloom of the ages, I think we ought to hesitate before we attempt to undo the labours of those who have for 260 years been the trusted expositors of the Bible. The Authorized Version is not supposed, by any sect or denomination, to contain any serious flaw in translation, such as might lead even the unwary to make any mistake concerning any article of faith absolutely necessary or essential to salvation. It is only pleaded that we might have a more graceful, elegant, refined, literate Bible. But if we dissociate and detach all the old familiar heart-affecting, soul-touching phraseology of the Scriptures by a new translation, when shall this literary refinement produce an equivalent effect to that of the old and good influences of the version we have got ? Ought we for an uncertain gain to lose a certain good ? Should we, on the chance of getting a more accurate and smoother tongued translation, risk the great evils which might result from the notion entertained that, so set before the churches as the new translation would do, the Scriptures would lose their old influence over the life and conduct, without taking a new and fresh hold on society and on the individual spirit ?

In our day most men bring their creed to the Bible, and test the Scriptures by their adherence to that, instead of taking their creed from the Bible, and seeking conformity in the former with the latter. In the age in which our Authorized Version was framed this was not the case. The Bible was the religion of Protestants, and its contents were held as too sacred to be tampered with. Now, however, creed and sect are the religion of Protestants, and the plainest passages of the Scriptures are set aside as wrong or wrongly translated if they do not conform in signification to the creed or sect of the reader. In any attempt in our time to re-translate the Scriptures, it would be difficult to avoid the influence of this inclination.

It must be recollected that it is not easy to engage in translation, and to keep the mind solely and purely to that, instead of combining with the work of translation also a little of the labour of

interpretation, in the day when our Authorized Version translation was the only aim, and interpretation was not sought. We have been so long accustomed to read our creeds into the Bible, that we could not avoid, in any modern version, having not only the battle of the texts but the battle of the creeds fought. The winning party alone would use the new version, and the losing party would hold to the old, so that one good thing, our Christian union in regard to the Scriptures, would thus be broken up.

While the value of this unity of the Christian acceptance of the Authorized Version of the Scriptures, as the common fountain of appeal in all ordinary cases, ought to be as highly prized and fully maintained as possible, we ought always to recollect that behind the appeal to the letter of our translation there is an allowable reference to the original text—besides the ultimate appeal, by prayer and supplication, to the Spirit of all grace, from whom the book proceeds. These are great helps to the candid consideration of scriptural questions, and for the courteous construction of Christian differences. Such aid to calmness of judgment and Christian consideration would be taken away by the authoritative introduction into our churches of a new version. For that would be appealed to as a final settlement of all disputed questions, and any one who upheld or advanced an opinion in opposition to that furnished by, or grounded on, the new Authorized Version, would be charged with arrogance, contumacy, and self-conceit, and an unfavourable influence would be exerted on the full, free, impartial, and honest discussions of differences on religious topics; thus destroying, so far, the unity of the Christian community, which, however divided into sections in opinion, is at one in the acceptance and use of the Authorized Version of the Scriptures.

I cannot help thinking that H. K., in introducing his double view of this debate, has materially injured its practical usefulness. Just now many believe that we may have from Convocation a good and fair attempt at a fresh translation; others again think that no satisfaction should be felt in a version prepared under Church and clerical auspices, that the lay element ought to be recognised and included, and that a clergy Bible would be of little avail. This is a definite and practical issue which it would be well to determine. But H. K., as opener of the discussion, has set us afloat on a sea of double currents, and we can make no practical progress in what has been turned into a quadrilateral controversy. I am not in favour of any material revision of the Scriptures, but if it were to be revised at all, I should certainly, above all things, oppose a Bible by Royal Commission. I know very many things to which a Royal Commission has devoted itself that have been spoiled in the process; and even though I should grant H. K.'s plea for the necessity of a revision, I would give a direct and emphatic negative to his proposal that this should be done by Royal Commission, and would approve of the plan proposed by J. V. Y., which seems to me the best suggestion that has anywhere been made, viz., a general con-

gress for Bible revision (pp. 202--204). That article is highly valuable and suggestive. G. T. H. appears as if he thought all distinctive features should be deleted from the Bible, and that a Royal Commission would issue an edition of the Christian Scriptures in neutral tints.

Though "Aspirate" writes in an exasperated tone, he points out some matters worthy of consideration, but he forgets that "times change, and we have changed with them," so that we are no longer situated as the revisers of the 1811 Bible were. S. S. most ably controverts H. K.'s arguments for a new version, or rather conversion of the texts he quotes. R. W. treats somewhat too cavalierly the force of habit on men's minds as an argument against revision; and he surely does not expect that a new translation would make the need of aids to Bible study less imperative than they are now. M. N. wisely urges the old argument of making a beginning without considering the end of destroying an existing edifice—known and loved of all men—that a new one may be erected on its site, which may or may not be as generally acceptable as the previous one. T. E. E. while he carries on H. K.'s line of argument in quoting small errors, may be "hoist with his own petard" by being asked "would he peril the loss of souls" by his "much ado about nothing" arguments; for the changing of our "form of sound words that cannot be condemned," as declaring the whole counsel of God, for a few minor errata, such as he notes? M. C. L. H. has given a sedative to the alarmists by his mild but effective statement of the case. E. C. G.'s article ought rather to have been a contribution to the debate on the divinity of Jesus than to this one. N. R. G.'s brief paper has a good ground of argument, and is particularly convincing on the worthlessness of the statistics of Bible difficulties. On the whole, the discussion has called out considerable ability and variety of information and of thought, and it can scarcely fail of being serviceable to the reader.

It would be undesirable—even if it were possible in the brief space at our disposal—to follow this debate through all its windings. It may be confessed that a large amount of scriptural information, and several useful items of Biblical criticism, have been gathered together by the writers on the affirmative side of this controversy. It would be strange, indeed, if such had not been the case; for discontent is always louder in its wail than content is in its thankfulness, and the talk of the advocates of change is always possessed of wider scope than the more guarded discourse of those who seek to have what is good retained and maintained. It is equally undoubted that men's sympathies are far more easily excited towards change than towards satisfaction with things as they are. In an age like this, when the contentions of sects are keen, and the eagerness of each to find support for its views in the word of God, it is not wonderful that men should fancy that, in the general scramble of change, they should be successful in gaining something more than they have; just as in seasons of revolution it is hoped that in

the whirling of chances something may turn up to the advantage of those who engage in it. I think the difficulties which have arisen in the Scripture's revision committee of Convocation shows that this subtle warfare of sects has had an evil effect. How much more evil would this contest ~~be~~ if the intent were to make the revision by Royal Commission and its acceptance compulsory!

The following suggestions might, if approved of, satisfy all the just requirements of honest Bible readers:—

1. The proper and uniform equivalent of each proper name should be introduced into the text.

2. A glossary, explanatory of all the obsolete archaic words, should be added to our present version, especially in school editions.

3. That a few notes, explanatory of the manners and customs of the ancient nations, so far as they affect the signification of the passages in which they occur, might be added.

4. The Scriptures might be printed in paragraphs rather than as they are now, divided into chapters and verses,—these signs being retained for reference,—but so as not to interfere with the regular perusal of the Scriptures as other works are read. Farther than this I doubt if it would be wise to go. This should, if it is done at all, be done by theologians, and not by politicians. This might easily be done by submitting the work done by a committee to the several public authorized bodies of the several communions. But we steadfastly adhere to our previous belief that no revision of the Authorized Version of Scripture should take place—except such as may explain, but not interpret; and that if anything is done it should be done not by any Government agency, as a Royal Commission, but by the churches as the guardians of Holy Writ.

**VIRTUES CROSS VICES.**—As in virtues, he that hath one hath all; so in vices, he that hath one hath seldom one alone. He that will steal must lie; and he that will steal and lie, will swear his lie, and so easily screw himself up to perjury. He that will be drunk, what will he not be when he is drunk? and being slipped down from the top of reasonable sense, where stoppeth he from tumbling down into a beastly sensuality? I will therefore give the water no passage—no, not a little, lest it make a breach, and that breach let in an inundation to drown the sweet pastures of my soul. I see the devil's claw is an entering-wedge to let in his foot; that foot his whole body. I will be careful to set a watch and keep the door; that sin may have no admittance. I cannot be too careful, so it be to the purpose; it cannot be to the purpose if it be too little.—ARTHUR WILKINSON.

## Education.

---

### SHOULD THE BIBLE BE READ IN SCHOOLS WITHOUT COMMENT OR EXPLANATION?

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

THE present age has been emphatically styled the "age of progress." New systems are being developed, and old customs abolished. Old stars of history are being fast blown out, and luminaries of a more "reflective" character taking their place. In this great "march of intellect" the Bible—Britain's guiding star—is arrested! It has been computed that a purely secular system of national education would effect greater and more universal good than a system which combined secular with religious instruction. Revelation, according to a certain portion of society, is bound to bow in humble submission to the inroads of reason; and that time-tested Book is in danger of being superseded by the overpowering sway of "modern thought." Truly we live in sensational times, and cannot be otherwise than astounded as to where this great "intellectual" strain may lead us to.

In supporting the negation of this debate we do so from a deep conviction, acquired from experience, of the value of the Bible, and of the vast importance of instilling its truths into the minds of the young.

The question is a very peculiar one, inasmuch as both sides uphold the principle of the Bible being recognised in the school; the difference being whether the use of the Bible should or should not be restricted. That the Bible requires comment and explanation before it can be properly understood, and that it is the only book truly able to teach morality, few will deny. It therefore appears to me rather paradoxical to question the influence of the Bible in the face of these acknowledged opinions. The main topic from which the arguments of our opponents are adduced is sectarianism. Now why should sectarianism be made the means of laying restrictions upon the Bible? The Bible is *not* a sectarian book, because *all* sects point to it as the foundation of their doctrines. But the supporters of the affirmative assure us that if the Bible is permitted to be commented upon and explained in the school, it will not only preserve sectarianism, but be the constant cause of sectarian disputes. This argument is also advanced by those who are in favour of the exclusion of the Bible altogether from the school. They argue that the simple reading of Scripture would instil sectarian doctrine, as the portions of the Bible which more

prominently sustain the primary principles of any particular sect would be brought before the minds of the scholars.

If these arguments look well in theory, they certainly look quite the reverse in practice. The idea alone of instilling doctrine to such an extent into the minds of the young is, in our opinion, perfectly ludicrous. However, to give all due deference to the opinions of our opponents, we will endeavour to prove that the explanation of the Bible, besides being necessary to the understanding of it, has not been productive in the preserving of sectarian religion, but, on the contrary, it has done much in amalgamating the differences of opinion in the various denominations. For example, in Scotland there are upwards of 4,450 schools, and these schools, with very few exceptions, are attended by children belonging to all the denominations in the country. "It is notorious that children of all denominations in Scotland attend the same schools. The parish and other Presbyterian schools are upwards of 4,000 in number, and the Education Commissioners tell us that there is a character common to all the Presbyterian schools in Scotland—that of 'being entirely undenominational as respects the attendance of scholars.' 'In this respect,' they continue, 'there never has been in Scotland any material difficulty arising from what is called the religious or conscience element.' If more evidence is wanted about these schools, here is a fact which settles the point that the rights of conscience are not interfered with; I refer to the number of Roman Catholic children in attendance. I find from the report of the Commissioners that in the parochial and other Protestant schools there are no fewer than 7,345 Roman Catholic children, and that in the Roman Catholic schools there are 5,229 children. That is to say, that for every five Roman Catholic children who go to a Roman Catholic school there are seven Roman Catholic children attending a Protestant school."\*

As far then as experience goes the explanation of the Bible in the school has *not* tended either to preserve or increase sectarianism, but rather the result effected being the spreading of a universal and unsectarian religion throughout the country.

Could there be, I ask, a more effectual system adopted to sustain sectarianism than the prohibition of Scripture comment and explanation? How are we ever to expect unanimity in religious doctrine if we lay down a law that *religion* must not be *taught*? S. L. C. says the State "has no right to violate the freedom of conscience, and freedom of conscience cannot co-exist with a State which teaches religion." In reply to S. L. C.'s remark I would ask, Would the State not be violating the consciences of those who affirm the absolute necessity of Bible explanation in prohibiting the full use of the Bible? S. L. C. also quotes, "The Bible alone is the religion of Protestants." How then can S. L. C.

\* Extract from report of a public meeting held in Glasgow on 25th April, 1870.

hope for the decrease of Popery: and the extension of Protestantism when he would lay a restriction upon the Bible—the sure course to preserve these distinctive religions?

"The State," says S. L. C., "is bound to be impartial in its action," and "Samuel" expatiates thus:—"Suppose it to be decided that the Bible shall be read and also explained in all State-supported schools, then in a district where the Baptists had a majority upon the school board, a schoolmaster would be appointed who would teach the children of Episcopalian parents that when Christ commissioned His disciples to baptize, He intended them to dip," &c. (see page 136). Points like these are rarely made use of by the majority of teachers; but even though these differences were taught, is there no counteraction on the part of the parents of the children? The parents who are careful about the religious training of their children are not likely to neglect to instil their own particular doctrine into the young mind. But we must not forget the vast majority of parents who are careless about the religious welfare of their children. Accordingly, if the Bible be left unexplained in the school, the children of such parents grow up in almost total ignorance of the truths contained in that wondrous book, having lost the only opportunity afforded them. It will therefore be seen that this particular argument of "Samuel's" has reference only to a comparatively small portion of society, and leaves no provision for the masses who recognise no religion whatever. "Impartiality" is generally used in connection with justice, but to argue that the State should prohibit all denominations the power to explain or comment upon the Bible in the school is certainly an entirely new and altogether unique definition of the term "impartiality."

"Samuel" comments upon C. P.'s remark, "What a weariness is an uncomprehended task-book!" and observes that comments upon a lesson are still more wearisome when the explanation given is not understood. Very true, but that is not answering C. P. "Samuel" has no right to assume that the explanation must necessarily be as incomprehensible as the verse or verses referred to. There are many secular task-books given to the scholar which are eminently more difficult to construe than the doctrines of the Bible. Certainly there are many utterances in the Bible which altogether baffle the most mature mind, but that is no reason why the whole book should be "sealed" from explanation.

Every book in the school is treated according to its value, more time being devoted to some than to others. Some branches of education are taught every day, while others are only taken up once or twice a week. The Bible is used every day because of its importance; to place, therefore, restrictions upon this book, while all others are allowed to be freely explained, is certainly "treating it with disrespect." "Samuel" argues that this does not necessarily follow, for if each secular subject be studied twice or three times a week, the Bible is read every day. "Samuel" in making this



statement doubly treats the Bible with disrespect. He compares the Bible with other task-books—books that are only used "twice or three times a week,"—a mode of argument which is highly disrespectful, because the Bible is beyond comparison. But why compare it with those books that are used only "twice or thrice a week"? Would it not be more in the spirit of fairness to compare it with those books which are used every day?

Apart from the question whether the Bible should be explained as well as read, we would ask what benefit do children get by the simple reading of the Bible? S. L. C. says, "By the reading of the Bible in school we attain a great good. Children are brought to know its contents, and are therefore ready to receive instruction in its doctrines," &c. (p. 44). Very true, but if the thought of the scholar is not permitted to be exercised, how is it possible to expect that the doctrine of the Bible will become indelibly impressed upon the MIND? The young mind is more easily impressed than the mature mind, and to deprive from the teacher the power of explaining the standards of morality which are only to be found in the Bible, is acting unjustly towards the rising generation.

Education without religion is worthless, and I maintain that a religious instruction cannot be given if the Bible is prohibited from being commented upon and explained. Children must be treated as reasonable, responsible, and immortal beings. If the dull, monotonous reading of the Bible is capable of teaching the attributes of God, and the duties He requires of us, then I admit I am greatly mistaken in my belief.

C. B.

**BOOKS AND READING.**—If books are false and wicked, we ought to fear them as evil spirits loose among us, as messages from the father of lies, who deceives the hearts of evil men that they may spread abroad the poison of his false and foul messages, putting good for evil, and evil for good, sweet for bitter, and bitter for sweet, saying to all men, "I too have a tree of knowledge, and you may eat of the fruit thereof, and not die." But believe him not. When you see a wicked book, when you find in a book anything which contradicts God's word, cast it away, trample it under foot, believe that it is the devil tempting you by his cunning, alluring words, as he tempted Eve your mother. Would to God all here would make it a rule never to look into an evil book or a filthy ballad! Can a man take a snake into his bosom and not be bitten? Can we play with fire and not be burnt? Can we open our eyes and ears to the devil's message, whether of covetousness, or filth, or folly, and not be haunted afterwards by its wicked words, rising up in our thoughts like evil spirits, between us and our pure and noble duty—our baptism vows? . . . . A flood of books, newspapers, writings of all sorts, good and bad, is spreading over the whole land; and young and old will read them . . . . The same gate that lets in good lets in evil. We cannot silence evil books, but we can turn away our eyes from them. We can take care that what we read, and what we let others read, shall be pure and wholesome.—CHARLES KINGALEY.

## Politics.

---

### OUGHT WAR ORGANIZATION TO GET THE CHIEF ATTENTION OF OUR NEXT PARLIAMENT?

#### AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

PARLIAMENT has taken this question out of the region of debate into the realm of fact. It *has* made war organization one of the great questions of the session. In the Queen's Speech the necessity of doing so was announced, and in the subsequent debates war has been the most frequent topic, directly or indirectly, almost day after day. The debates, too, have been of a highly virulent character, and have been carried on with an amount of acrimony which shows that the subject needed all the ventilation it has got and more. About our army organization there has been a goodly amount of concealment, and an endeavour to hush up has been pretty much insisted on. Both parties in the House have had reason for desiring to evade full and free consideration of the question, and this proves the wisdom of the country in insisting that the entire subject, from private soldier to subaltern officer, and from subaltern officer to commander-in-chief, should be re-investigated in the interests of the country, not of the parties who have brought the island to such a pass, that even its governors, past, present, and prospective, confess that our national army is spectacular and theatrical, not real, tangible, and effective; troops, officers, commissariat and all, often as they have been reviewed, are shows and gauds, but are not in reality fit for any service.

The importance of this subject is so evident that we cannot think the country will consent to the matter sinking into the stagnant quiescence into which it is almost certain to get if it is put into the hands of a committee. The nation has a right to know the best and the worst. The Tory party while in power vaunted the state of efficiency into which they had brought the defensive forces of the country. Our Whig Government only a little while ago repudiated the insinuation that they had allowed the army to deteriorate. Both boasted before, and now both bandy accusations; and when the truth is likely to escape in the heat and excitement of debate, the attempt is made to shelve the inquiry by getting a committee empowered to deal with the question. This is disingenuous and unfair. This justifies the anxiety of the country to know how matters really stand, and proves more clearly than ever that war

organisation ought to receive the chief attention of the Parliament. Have we an army in which we can trust or not? If we have, let us know more of it than an array of army statistics; if we have not, tell us why we have been having an ornamental thing called an army which has cost us twenty millions a year, and is only a humbug and a mistake, a perfect apple of Sodom—fair without, within all worthless.

This is not really a question between advocates of peace or lovers of war, as the affirmative opener of the debate assumes. It is an affair of honesty between people and government. We have been taxed and overtaxed for this precious army of ours—this soldierly show and parade of chess men; and all the while they have been but whitewashed and pipeclay officers and men, who look like but are not soldiery. Our governors have been calling upon us, in hard cash as well as in after-dinner speeches, to trust them and the soldiery. Our soldiery are confessedly not what they should be, our officers are what they should not be, and yet they have had our good gold. This expensive machine has been turned about and surveyed by general inspectors, has been exhibited on gala days, has been warranted fit for any proper sort of soldierly work by nobles and officials, and has been all the while only an outside of workable material and dummy machinery in the interior. We have been endeavouring to get up legislation against commercial adulteration and deception, and now we find that the very chiefs of legislation have all the time been showing off as all-efficient and trustworthy an army of no proper worth, and quite incapable for the duty it had been vaunted to execute so well.

There ought to be no rest in the country till this is seen to. No adulteration could be so fatal as palming off a sham army for a real one;—not even Sam Slick's well-shapen mahogany hams. We ought to come to a thorough understanding upon this subject, and if the army is a real defence, a sure bulwark, a safeguard and a glory, let us know it, and put an end to anxiety upon the question; if it is not, let no compromise be made, but let us set to work with a will to have an army in which the people may have confidence.

Any army, to be effective, must be not only workable, but worked,—must be organized and kept active. It should neither be allowed to stagnate in vice in camp, nor to rust in barrack indolence. It should be kept in proper camp effectiveness by labours and exposures, by training and marching and massing, by sudden turnings out, and unexpected orders to be in arms, and ready for whatever it may be told at any place, at any time, and in any manner. If the working people of the country are kept constantly at their labour, why should not the army—officers and men? Were our army thoroughly and fully worked, the word "mess" would never have got so disagreeable a meaning as it has, and fewer officers would figure and make others figure in the law courts of the country.

F. T. F.'s warnings against war and war agitators are not arguments against what we have advanced in this article, nor against

those observations with which we opened this debate. We have an army—so called. It is the nation's army. Armies have risen in importance since Germany and France have been contending for the primacy—the physical Poppedom of Europe. It is the interest and duty of the country, if it is going to keep an army at all, to have one of the right sort. That is what we want. To secure this is of such importance that everything should be postponed to the settlement of this question; for without this settled, the policy of this country is one of hazard and doubt; public opinion must be expressed with bated breath, and even the parliamentary discussion of public affairs requires restriction and curbing. An army is the vital force of a nation. Its power in the commonwealth of states is measured by that; and if it venture to adopt a policy it is unable to enforce, that policy will fail, and the nation becomes ridiculous, and a laughing stock. If the country desires a large true policy it must make sure that its army is effective, or it must curb its sentiments, and set its policy asleep; we must chloroform public opinion, muzzle debate, and entreat the forbearance of newspapers concerning public events.

T. L. W. must surely know that foresight and providence against evils must be taken by men, not because they approve either of the evil or of the means taken to avert or prevent it. We do not love law as a personal matter because we seek to perfect it; nor do we love crime because we arrange our law so as to reduce it. We do not necessarily love war because we advocate the perfection of its embodied form, and hence all his opening remarks are beside the matter in hand. If T. L. W. will certainly, surely, and infallibly abolish war in the world, we shall most unmistakably rejoice in his accomplishment of that great work; and when it has been achieved we shall scout, decry, and hunt down any attempt to get up or keep up any war organization.

T. L. W. seems to think that because we have lied (or something very like it) about our army efficiency before and during the war, we ought to act out and upon the lie now. We doubt the morality of beginning the lie—although there is such a thing as strategy in war,—but we are certain that continuance in ill-doing is not wise. If we have done wrong by misrepresenting our army hitherto, let us now hasten to put it on a proper footing, and get it into effective working order. Hence army organization is all the more necessary now to prove we were right in our boasting, or to make our boasting no longer a stratagem but a reality.

T. L. W. thinks war has exhausted itself. We doubt that. Let him and us bethink awhile. Of course France is "cabined, cribbed, confined" just now, and she cannot fight in the meantime; nor is she likely first to set her army in array against us. Germany is a despotism which goes to war for an idea—the unification of all German-speaking states. Germany took 6,000 guns from the French, and is to have two millions of money, besides having gained largely in population in Alsace and Lorraine. Austria holds

German states under her sway, and as France defeated Austria, and Germany France, there is little doubt as to what war between Austria and Germany would come. As Germany cannot have us for an ally just now, and as France, with thirty-six millions of men, lies close on her flanks, she is strengthening herself by alliance with Russia. This encompasses Austria helplessly, and brings Turkey under pressure. Russia looks Levant-wards, and has an eye to India. If we lose the freedom of the Mediterranean we shall greatly impede our management of India, and weaken our power there. Russia might aid in the conquest of Austria if Prussia would help with Turkey. Unless we are able to prevent such a coalition by our army, or army and navy combined, we must submit to the results, and these would eventually be the loss of India and the commerce of the Mediterranean.

Besides, may not Germany desire to be the single arbiter of Europe, and may she not challenge our power to hold opposition against her? In that case it is said that in two tides a force which would vastly outnumber our army, and which might easily demand the capitulation of London. The capitulation of London would involve a loss of £1,500,000,000, and would form a most excellent military prize. If to this were to be added Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Edinburgh, and Glasgow, with intervening requisitioning, we fancy that almost any amount of taxation would be thought preferable to the fate to which an invasion would compel.

"Cris" thinks that if we make all right at home, and that if we get rich and prosperous, all will be well. But does he not forget that the richer and more prosperous we become, the more probable would be the invasion of our country? If the wealth of the country forms a ground for attack, the prosperity of a country forms a cause for envy. Hence every internal movement made towards improvement, if not accompanied by the consolidation of our entire armaments, would only hasten, not lessen the likelihood of war. It is because we wish to acquire the highest securities possible for immunity from invasion, and because we desire that war may become an impossibility, that we think our war organization requires our chief attention, and that we should be—

ATK BREADY.

#### NEGATIVE REPLY.

THOUGHT is the great instrument of civilization, the very heart's core of social progress and peace. Thought is the sovereign element of life. It is the preparer of every development of history, and is the master of the masters of men. In all consultations there is danger, however, that passion, the restlessness of fear, and the timidity of mere present-sight may upset the calm of settled confidence, and destroy the wise counsels of those who apply forethought to politics. In nothing is thoughtfulness so requisite as in

politics; in nothing is it allowed to have such small influence. Charlatans with their cut-and-dry modes of empiric management, rhetoricians with their mere indefinite platitudes of speech, outweigh in politics the trained logician who has minutely studied the sequences of things, or philosophic thinkers who have pondered on the ways of life. Demagogues of all descriptions, stirred by the paltry ambition of personal effectiveness, lash into fury all the anarchical passions of the mobile many, and the outcry "that something must be done" resounds everywhere; men are hounded on to premature action. If men of superior intelligence were understood and appreciated, they would insist that "the right thing must be done," and they would set themselves to discover *that*. Our Parliament has rushed hot-headedly into the panic of the cowards, and are now exciting the laughter of Europe at their maladroit admission that their cry of "Who's afraid" was a trick and a blind.

Our present debate, however, will not be without use if it should lead our readers to reflect on the momentous interests involved in war, and the questions it necessitates.

It appears to me that this is of all times the most opportune for initiating a policy of peace. At no former period in history has there been such an uprise of the horror of civilization for war than at this present. America, Austria, Italy, Spain, France, Germany, Denmark, Russia, Turkey, and England have all had a touch from the wand of the Furies—war, since the opening of the Temple of Peace in Hyde Park, 1851,—and probably each of them feels that, of all profitless speculations possible in the world, war is the most hateful and abominable. It is a drastic of population and prosperity, and a disarranger of the entire system of social life. With the lessons of experience fresh in the national mind, how much better would it be if we were to try the effect of some movement for the abolition of war than for an increase of alarm and armaments, a fanning of the war spirit, and a tempting display of force out of which other nations can scarcely but desire to try to take the shine. Considering these things, we cannot but maintain that, however Parliament may have acted, it ought not to have given its chief attention to war organization. This is our simple contention in regard to the war question. We warned our readers to beware of certain classes who had war interests, and of whom we thought it would most probably be true, that they would agitate for getting up a war-expenditure. This has occurred; all the interests we noted have gone in for war preparations in some form, and none of them have attempted to propose to throw oil on the troubled waters of European politics. These parties succeeded in exciting a heated contest; and the result has been that all Europe has been called to hear the defects of our army and navy, to learn how defenceless our right little tight little island is—as if our politicians had approved of the wisdom of a person in the garrotting season "going out o' nights" and bellowing, "I am rich and defenceless, but meddle with me if you dare."

Already our war alarm has occasioned a deficit of three millions in the revenue; already demands are lowering, demanding an increase of three millions over last year's estimates, and already we are threatened with a burden of eight millions to buy up the purchase system. Already expectant recipients of war-voted money are racking their brains as to how to get hold of it; and all this we have gained by being "aye ready" to give so much attention to war organization.

Our army is twice as expensive—and much less extensive it is said—than the army of any great power in Europe. Perhaps it is so; but we must take into consideration how much of the life and interest, the labour and the capital of the people other nations confiscate for their army by conscription and compulsory service before we can be quite sure of that. If, as Mr. Mill affirms, "our army is absurdly inadequate to our needs," we must, of course, either increase our army to adequacy or lessen our needs. This second branch of the dilemma few seem anxious to consider. If fifteen or sixteen millions cannot provide anything more than "an army corps," how much would it cost to give us an entire army? Having estimated that might we not turn round and endeavour to estimate how much it would cost to do without this great huge machinery of destruction? Must we revert to the old uncivilized mode of each being a fighter? and must the art of self-defence become the only safeguard of our nation? Is this what our attention to war organization has led to? Has our war machinery, the pet of the nation for a couple of centuries, and which has cost during that time nearly as much as would have purchased the whole island at an estimate of thirty years' rental—so egregiously failed? And do we still persist in pursuing our experiments with the old machine in its old fashion? Why should the wars of nations, like the quarrels of individuals, not be settled by law? What is the use of international law at all unless that is possible? Professor Lorimer and Professor Seeley have both presented forms for courts of international law; why not discuss these and diplomatize about these as well as about "our army, navy, and volunteers"?

"Aye Ready" has clearly shown that our war organization ought to have received attention, but not that it required the chief attention. He has shown that many things required to be discussed about, but he did not show how many other things required attention too. When all these are numbered up, they form a collection of items far more important than the one question of war organization. Indeed, one question arises which requires more attention than any other—taxation, its levy and expenditure; for without that war organization is impossible. The whole domestic legislation of the country has imperative claims for revision and re-organization. It is the duty of a Government to make war an improbability, if not an impossibility, and that may be best done by remaining at peace and interfering with the internal affairs of no

other country. Fair play among nations is the only safeguard of peace, and international law ought to be based on seeing fair play done all round.

R. R. M. says this era forms "a fresh starting-point in history;" so do we: but he says this is a reason for going on as we have in the past with our old war organizations and our brutal machinery for injury, damage, and destruction; while we affirm that this is a reason for pursuing a different course, and making history no longer a record of war and misery, but of peace and prosperity. He says, *Fight*; we say, *Do right*. All the "elemental" influences are on the side of right in the long run of events. He scoffs at what he calls "F. F. F.'s millennium." It is not a human, but a divine millennium that F. F. F. believes in or advocates. He quotes the almost universal shout of people for a good army, a soldierly safeguard, and a protected coast at any cost, as a reason for giving way to this foolish panic. We affirm that no more certain way of evoking war can be got hold of than provoking men by the cry,—

"Come on, come all, this rock shall fly  
From its firm base as soon as I."

The heroism of peace we hold to be holier and nobler than war; and we maintain that it is rank folly, absurdity, stupidity, and treachery to the great, good Father of peace to allow our minds to be—

"Confused by brainless mobs and lawless powers"

into neglecting everything else for war and war organisation.

R. R. M. shows himself to be among the terrorists by talking of the terrible consequences of an invasion, but there are two sides to that question. Every general makes sure of a basis of retreat before he invades: what basis of retreat is sure for an army invading England? No general, if true to his army and his own fame, ever makes so sure of victory as to neglect all consideration of defeat. Hence he must lay his account for having a disposable fleet, fair weather for his purpose, and such forms of communication between fleet and army as may give him a fair chance of getting out of as well as into our island; for in war there is such a thing as entrapment under the name of stratagem, and a foreign army might readily manage to land on the British islands without being quite certain of getting a free passage for his army thence. T. L. W. has dealt with this matter in an able and sensible manner.

P. V. makes some ingenious parries, but he does not wound much; his sword-fence is better than his efficiency in making his mark. He certainly makes out, as R. R. M. does, that our army is in such a bad state. But this is inevitable in an army which wastes by rust; and it is a two-edged weapon which costs such family in Britain somewhat more than a pound a year. We say our army has little chance to do anything else than rust or wear



itself out by sharpening year by year. Germany is not likely to try another war for a while, and France is not able.

Our best "reserve force" is national prosperity; our safest army is righteousness. Let us give ourselves to recuperate and revive our national interests, rearrange all our diversified methods of taxation, throw off a large portion of the burden of our enormous war debt. If we go on as we are doing we shall waste our revenue, over-burden our population with taxation, cripple trade, and destroy commerce; and when the hour comes for trial of strength, if come it must, our taxes will be up to the maximum, and the war-tax levied in time of peace will effectually disconcert all possible plans for sustaining the sinews of war.

The cry of our opponents is, "Set thy house in order:" so is it ours. They think, however, that we ought to set our house in order rather against fire from without than from fire within or want. We hold that watchful care within and absolute impartiality without, with thrift, energy, and good conduct, will greatly help to keep "the old house at home" right for a good while. We beseech our readers not to be led away by the war-cry of the times—of the interested and of the thoughtless; we say to them, Strive as earnestly as may be to get our rulers to keep the peace; and may the very God of peace sanctify truly our island home to be a nation that loveth and followeth after the ways of righteousness and peace.

F. T. F.

## History.

### WERE THE CRUSADES BENEFICIAL TO SOCIAL PROGRESS?

#### AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

THE article written by us upon this subject was, much to our own surprise, placed in the van of the Affirmative position; consequently, the duty of replying to the arguments of our opponents has unexpectedly devolved upon us. We could have wished that this duty had fallen to some abler and more learned contributor; but as we are expected to bring up the rear of the Affirmative army in this debate, we will now, without further preface, address ourselves to the task before us.

Amongst the many able and learned men who have narrated the history of the crusades, probably no one has produced such an impression upon successive generations in this country as Gibbon, the renowned historian of the "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire." In looking at Gibbon's estimate of the effects produced

by the Crusades, we must consider the character of the man. Gibbon railed at Christianity, and sarcastically derided the faith of Christians. The religious element in the Crusades would inevitably rouse the scorn of such a man, whose writings are embued with a spirit of contempt for Christianity. We wonder not that Gibbon should have spoken of the fanaticism of the Crusaders; we wonder not that in some parts of his work he speaks of their exploits almost as we should speak of the violent, aimless, and unreasonable acts of frenzied madmen; yet even Gibbon's History contains passages which present striking evidence in favour of the Affirmative of this question. In our opening article we quoted a noteworthy passage from Gibbon concerning the effects of the Crusades, and now we would refer our readers to his account of their origin. After referring to the pilgrimages of Christians to Jerusalem, he thus describes the motives which led to the first Crusade:—"The pilgrims were the victims of private rapine or public oppression; the pathetic tale excited the millions of the West to march under the standard of the Cross to the relief of the Holy Land; a spirit of religious chivalry arose; a nerve was touched of exquisite feeling; and the sensation vibrated to the heart of Europe. . . . When he (Peter the Hermit) painted the sufferings of the natives and pilgrims of Palestine, every heart was melted to compassion; when he challenged the warriors of the age to defend their brethren . . . every heart glowed with indignation; the rustic enthusiast inspired the passions which he felt, and Christendom expected with impatience the counsels and decrees of the supreme Pontiff. The council assembled by Urban for considering this important enterprise met at Placentia. . . . At the tale of the misery of their Eastern brethren, the assembly burst into tears, and the most eager champions declared their readiness instantly to march under the holy banner." Now, when we look at the character of the historian, the consideration weakens the force of his remarks upon the fanaticism, ruthlessness, and failures of the Crusaders; whilst at the same time it adds an additional weight to this testimony regarding the compassionate feelings by which the prime movers in the Crusades were actuated. Even Gibbon, the historian who scoffs at religious enthusiasm, clearly shows that many of the Crusaders were actuated by a strong feeling of noble sympathy and a generous impulse to deliver their persecuted brethren from the oppressor. Can it have been that these noble feelings, so unusual in those days, were evoked in that uncivilized age without a benefit accruing to the cause of social progress? We think not. A remorseless strife was truly the immediate issue of these tender motives, but in the end chivalry and the cultivated polish of civilization were born of this religious fervour and barbaric ferocity.

The late William Smyth, the learned and judicious Professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge, states that "the Crusades are considered by authors in general, and by Dr. Robertson, as a powerful cause of the improvement of society," and he

himself supports this view. Professor Smyth says that the Crusades "*happily* dispersed the possessions and influence of the great lords, and therefore materially assisted the progress of society;" he also maintains that "whatever may have been the less worthy motives that contributed to carry such myriads to the Holy Land, no warriors would have reached it, if a piety, however unenlightened, —if a military spirit, however rude,—that is, if devotion and courage had not been the great actuating principles of the age; but courage and devotion are still virtues, however unfortunately exercised. . . . Piety and magnanimity are still our virtues, as they were theirs. The Crusaders, indeed, were inflamed by the images of the Holy Land; for they saw—and they were overpowered with indignation when they saw—the sacred earth which had been blessed by the footsteps of the Saviour profaned by the tread of barbarians, who rejected His faith, and outraged His pious and unoffending followers; but in this the Crusaders only submitted to the associations of their nature. The same power of association is still the great salutary law by which we, too, are animated or subdued,—by which we, too, are hurried into action or moulded into habit; and it is as impossible for us now, as it was to the Crusaders of the middle ages, to behold without affection and reverence whatever has once been connected with objects that are dear and venerable in our eyes."

Our former article upon this subject having been written subsequent to the publication of M. F. A.'s paper, we have therein noticed the arguments contained in the opening article on the Negative side of this debate, and therefore we will now proceed to review the second Negative article, "L. M." (Nov., 1870, p. 363), and "R. L. B." (Feb., 1871, p. 131). Both demur to our assertion that "the Crusades fostered union, harmony, and peace amongst the turbulent nations of Western Europe," because "they engendered great jealousies, fomented high quarrels," "gave full sway and swing to European turbulence . . . aroused feuds and contests," &c. There is much truth in the arguments of our opponents upon this point, and yet they do not overturn our position. The remarks which followed the above-quoted assertion from our former article show that we intended to affirm that the Crusades induced a union of independent states for the accomplishment of one object by the mutual efforts of many banded together for the furtherance of one project and of one aim; and that the Crusades also tended to stay the internecine conflicts of the contending factions within each individual State, by causing the leaders of these hostile parties to cease from civil warfare and to fight side by side under the same banner. Upon this point hear the testimony of Guizot, who says that "previous to the Crusades, Europe had never been moved by an identical sentiment, nor had acted in one and the same cause; there was, in fact, no Europe. The Crusades unfolded Christian Europe. . . . In the same manner as the Crusades were an European, so were they in each country a national event. In each nation all classes of society

were animated with the same conviction, obeyed the same idea, and abandoned themselves to the same enthusiastic impulse. . . . Kings, lords, priests, burghers, husbandmen,—all took the same interest and the same share in the Crusades. A moral unity amongst the nations broke forth, a fact as novel as the European unity."

L. M. does not deny the assertion that "the Crusades led the Western nations to visit Eastern lands," but to him "this does not seem to be a great benefit," and he observes that what we wish "to make of this argument does not very well appear." We had thought that our remarks upon this point were sufficiently free from ambiguity, and clear enough to be easily comprehended by the intelligent readers of this serial; but perhaps we were mistaken. Perhaps we have hidden our thoughts under a form of words without definite meaning. We will therefore quote the words of who can speak with greater clearness and weight than we could pretend to do. Macaulay says that "in times when men were scarcely ever induced to travel by liberal curiosity, or by the pursuit of gain, it was better that the rude inhabitant of the North should visit Italy and the East as a pilgrim, than that he should never see anything but those squalid cabins and uncleared woods amidst which he was born. In times when life and when female honour were exposed to daily risk from tyrants and marauders, it was better that the precinct of a shrine should be regarded with an irrational awe, than that there should be no refuge inaccessible to cruelty and licentiousness. In times when statesmen were incapable of forming extensive political combinations, it was better that the Christian nations should be roused and united for the recovery of the Holy Sepulchre, than that they should one by one be overwhelmed by the Mahometan power. . . . Its effect was to unite the nations of Western Europe into one great commonwealth. . . . *Thus grew up sentiments of enlarged benevolence.*" A. H. New, in his "History of Austria," says that "if the Crusaders accomplished no other object, they gave a stimulus to literature in its various branches. It was no longer confined to monasteries and monks. Noble knights and counts related what they had seen and heard in their marvellous wanderings. Chronicles have come down to our times, some in verse and others in prose, recording the deeds of kings and emperors," &c. In support and confirmation of the preceding sentences from New's History, we quote the following words from Guizot:—"Compare the contemporaneous chroniclers of the first Crusade with those of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. . . . When we compare these two classes of writers, it is impossible not to be struck with the distance which separates them. The first are animated chroniclers, full of vivid imagination, who recount the events of the Crusade with passion. But they are at the same time men of very narrow minds, without an idea beyond the time in which they have lived, strangers to all science, full of prejudice, and incapable of forming any judgment whatever upon what passes around them, or upon the events which they relate."

Open, on the contrary, the History of the Crusades by William of Tyre; you will be surprised to find almost an historian of modern times; a mind developed, extensive, and free; a rare political understanding of events, completeness of views, a judgment bearing upon causes and effects. . . . *In a word, between the chroniclers of the first Crusades and the historians of the last there is an immense interval, which indicates a veritable revolution in mind.*" Maunders, a modern writer of historical compendiums, &c., of considerable repute, says that "by means of these joint enterprises the European nations became more connected with each other; feudal tyranny was weakened; a commercial intercourse took place throughout Europe, which greatly augmented the wealth of the cities; *the human mind expanded*; and a number of arts and sciences, till then unknown by the Western nations, were introduced."

We hope that L. M. will now be able to see what we wish to make of the argument from the indisputable assertion that "The Crusades led the Western nations to visit Eastern lands." We maintain that the Crusades were "a great benefit" to the cause of social progress, by inducing the expansion of the human mind, by introducing to Western nations arts and sciences previously unknown to them, and by enlarging to them the sphere of observation and contemplation.

In our former article we affirmed that "the Crusades tended to decrease the influence of sacerdotalism and superstition;" but this, L. M. says, was "but the accidental and far from intended result." True, this was not the *intended* result, but it was a real and actual result of the Crusades. The prime movers in the Crusades did not intend to produce such a result, but as this result did actually flow out of their enterprises, the want of intention on their part did not prevent this result from producing a beneficial effect upon social progress. J. M. Cramp, D.D., who earnestly condemns all tyranny, persecution, and war, writes thus, "The Crusades the veriest triumphs of ignorance, folly, superstition, and savagery that the world had ever seen. . . . *And yet some good came out of the evil.* At first the popes seemed to have it all their own way. . . . Rome drove a profitable trade in those days. *But loss was at hand.* The Crusades aroused and expanded men's minds. Commerce found additional avenues; municipal institutions were established; the learning and the arts of the East became known; intercourse with foreign nations was extended; curiosity was awakened and inquiry stimulated; the literary treasures which had long been hidden in Eastern monasteries were brought to light and circulated, and forgotten tongues were learned again." Cramp also says that before the Crusades "the world was asleep, intellectually and morally asleep. Rome had administered an opiate, and Europe lay slumbering in her lap," but after the Crusades there was "activity and progress." The Crusades broke the spell of Rome's opiate and induced a measure of free activity which was incompatible with the full success of Rome's designs.

J. A. J. charges us with seeking to *justify* the Crusades; but this is a most unfounded accusation. In the commencement of our former article we explicitly disclaimed all intention of *justifying* the deeds of the Crusaders. In dealing with the question before us, we have not to inquire into the justice of the cause, the morality of the actors, the rectitude of the exploits, but rather the effects produced by these events upon the cause of social progress. We know that there was much ignorance, folly, superstition, and savagery in the ranks of the Crusaders, but this is not incompatible with the belief that the Crusades were beneficial to social progress. Our maintaining that the results of an act have been productive of good, does not necessarily imply that we justify the act itself. The crucifixion of Christ was the greatest crime, and the most unjustifiable act, ever perpetrated, and yet greater blessings flowed from it than from any other act of man. So we do not pretend to justify the Crusades in themselves, yet we believe that they led to results beneficial to social progress. J. A. J. speaks of the Crusades "as agents for procuring conformity by force," but, as previously stated, the Crusades were undertaken not so much to convert the infidel as to dispossess them; not to make them Christians, but to obtain possession of the Holy Land. J. A. J.'s article proceeds almost entirely upon the assumption that the justifiability of an act and the beneficiality of its effects are inseparably linked together; our preceding arguments rebut this assumption, and therefore his article does not demand of us a more detailed criticism.

J. A. J. and R. L. B. both seem to judge the tree of these historical events by its blossom and not by its fruit. The Crusading spirit bore the blossoms of fanaticism, cruelty, rapacity, and deadly war, but the fruit followed the blossom. The Crusades produced effects and results which we believe were beneficial to social progress; these appeared after the wars of the Crusades; they were the fruit of the Crusading spirit, and we estimate the value of the tree not by its blossom but by its fruit.

Our opponents have said but little in reply to our assertion that "the Crusades undermined the foundations of feudal institutions," and to this argument we attach great importance. As to the influence of feudalism upon the cause of social progress, we quote the following words from a recent review of Wright's "Womankind in Western Europe":—"Under this (feudal) system the aristocracy assumed, each in his own domain, sovereign power. The old dwellings were exchanged for castles, in which, often at a distance from social life without, the lord and lady lived in all but complete isolation. Of necessity, to the male portion of the household, life would become so exceedingly slow, that it would be their great desire to get away from it; and accordingly we find them engaged in adventures of every kind—wars, plunderings, anything which afforded scope for violent activity. *This state of things afforded a powerful barrier in the way of social improvement*, and the early ages of feudalism especially were dark-ages." Professor Smyth

speaks of "the unhappy effects which the feudal system produced on the inhabitants of the town and the country," and then refers to "the salutary effect which the Crusades had on the manners and the state of property." Smyth also says that "the leading and important evils of mankind, I must contend, became at last the feudal system and the papal power. . . . Whatever had a tendency to break up and dissipate the power so collected was favourable to the interests of mankind. . . . The great cause then, of the improvement of society during these centuries was the rise and progress of commerce; for the great point to be attained was the elevation of the lower orders." And then Smyth affirms that "the Crusades destroyed the feudal lords, and brought forward the middle and lower orders." Feudalism had been a strong barrier standing in the way of the advancement of the nations of Western Europe. The Crusades broke down this barrier, and thus conferred a great boon upon the cause of social progress.

Our opponents have shown that there were many iniquitous deeds connected with the Crusades, and that some of the effects produced by the Crusades were antagonistic to social progress, but this we were prepared to admit at the commencement of the debate. We believe that our opponents have not succeeded in showing that the influences produced by the Crusades which were prejudicial to social progress more than counterbalanced those which were beneficial to it; and therefore we still maintain that on the whole the Crusades were beneficial to social progress. SAMUEL.

#### NEGATIVE REPLY.

It is not a little singular that the discussion has lagged so much that, though our first paper opening the debate appeared in August last, we have only now, by editorial intimation, been called upon to close the controversy on this side of the question. I do not know that it would be right to infer from this that there has been a degeneracy in the readers of and in the contributors to *The British Controversialist*; and that they prefer rather to discuss theoretical than historical difficulties; because that in the former it is not so easy to confront opinion with fact as it is in historical affairs. If we consider the importance of correct views of history—if we knew the importance of being able to

"Learn the future in the causes which arise  
In each event."

If we regarded history as the school of statesmanly politics and rational ecclesiasticism, we surely would not leave controversies on the results of past events to linger slowly in the debate books, but be glad to stir up each other to a clear understanding and a proper appreciation of important historical questions. History is our best teacher regarding the necessity of reflective care before engaging in actions or taking part in movements, that we may endeavour to

foresee the issues of our aims and the consequences that are likely to flow from the course of conduct we feel inclined to adopt. "History is philosophy teaching by example."

One of the most interesting of those exemplary lessons which history presents to us has been brought under our notice in the present debate. What shall we think of the Crusades? shall we affirm that—

"History is but the shadow of their shame"—

Or shall we assert that they have been the world's noblest battles? Have they been beneficial to social progress, or the reverse? We have undertaken to maintain the negative—to show that the Crusades have not been beneficial to society in any sense commensurate with the great sacrifices they demanded, the magnitude of the evil they originated, or the influence for the deterioration of man they involved.

Of course our opponents evade the preliminary objection raised against the Crusades, that they implied the propriety and fitness of the sword as an instrument for deciding matters in dispute between nation and nation—especially in bringing to a close controversies concerning faith by saying that they are not concerned with the beginnings and causes of the Crusades, but with their results. But the results of wars are involved in their causes, and the Crusades are certainly amenable to the charge of being barbarous wars, which sought justification for their crimes by quoting their sanctified end of "compelling the Saracenic infidels to come into the fold of the Church; and one of the most certain of the results of the Crusades has been to cast a sham glory over religious war.

It is on this account more than on any other that the Crusades deserve the particular attention of those who seek to comprehend the influence they exerted on the civilization of Europe. The Cross was made the emblem of war, not of peace; and under that as a symbol the hosts of Europe were dashed together like the waves of a tempest-tossed sea—against those of Asia until millions on millions of men perished on either side on the absurdly false plea of fighting for the glory of God and the kingdom of Christ. The fact that the Crusades were religious wars made them the type of the religious wars which afterwards prevailed in Europe, and formed the precedents upon which the people of many nations were harassed for conscience and afflicted with the woes of war for the propagation of the faith of the Church and the extension of her power. This fact appears to us a direct negative upon the assertion made by Samuel (p. 281) that "the Crusades fostered union, harmony, and peace amongst the turbulent nations of western Europe." On the contrary, we know that the Crusades afforded precedents for insatiable thirst for territory and the attempt to conquer lands which had not yet submitted to the Church or showed signs of revolting against their tyrannies; and that they gave the Pope a fictitious right to



claim dominion over those nations who had not yielded to the faith he held or professed to hold.

Here I am reminded that the defender of the days when—

“The cowed zealots with united cries  
Urged the Crusade”——

Thinks that I am somewhat mistaken in the idea that the word has degenerated, as so many words have done, to signify any romantic, foolish, hopeless undertaking. I did indeed think that any one observant of the common usage of words might have noticed this for himself; as, however, several readers may, like Samuel, not have observed this determination in the signification of the term, I shall quote an example which will show that I am right. Observe the use made of the word *Crusade* in the following sentence quoted from the *Saturday Review* of Feb. 25th, 1865:—“With disappointment, restlessness, self-blame, self-questioning were yet associated the generous earnestness, the romantic belief in the future which gilds even a *Crusade* for common good, or a scheme for fraternity of labour.” Thus do I redeem my gage to Samuel.

I have already stated that the Crusades had a disastrous effect upon the people of all lands by giving a seeming sanctity to places of pilgrimage. The ostensible object of the Crusades was to recover and secure from the power of the infidels the tomb of the Saviour in that Holy Land on which He had trode, and where His divine footsteps had been planted in human likeness, when the majesty of His glory was veiled in the form of a servant.

This was expressly opposed to the sayings of the Master, whose promise had been given that neither in this mountain nor yet in Jerusalem men should worship the Father; but that His worship should be a spiritual worship wherever two or three are gathered together in His name. The custom of making pilgrimages and of visiting sacred places is a superstitious, not a religious one. Superstition is not a noble feeling; it deadens every noble feeling. Samuel may have heard of the poems of Robert Burns, and may even know his personification of Superstition and Hypocrisy—

“The two appeared like sisters twin  
In feature, form, and clothes;  
Their visage withered, long, and thin,  
And black as any sloes.”

If he has read these lines and pondered their meaning, he cannot surely believe that superstitious feelings are noble. Hence, again, we are constrained to offer a direct negative to his second head of discourse—“that the Crusades called forth holy feelings” (p. 291) as well as to his fourth proposition, that “the Crusades tended to decrease the influence of sacerdotalism and of superstition” (p. 292).

L. A.'s outline of a good debate on the Crusades (p. 359) is very good if he had only carried it out; and in his first division there is a considerable deal of matter with which we could agree. But

when he proceeds to affirm that my objections to the Crusades refer to the accidents of them, while Samuel calls to "our minds real and permanent genius" he was surely asleep, dreaming, or under some other form of delusion. Our objections go to the principles, deep down to the root of the matter; and we affirm that, if they have ever been in the least beneficial, it has been by accident, not through principle. In their beginning they were bad, in their conduct they were the occasion of great evils, jealousies, quarrels, revenges, and many, many crimes—as Acre testifies, and the dungeon of Thierusteign proves; while in their direct consequences as infallibly deduced as demonstration can attain, they led to a long inheritance of disaster, mistake, and misery—misery from which the earth is not yet freed. L. M. has met this set of arguments with peculiar force and neatness, and leaves me nothing really to do in the matter.

"Semaj" has been overwhelmed with the sentiment of some poetry about the hymn the brave Crusaders sang on Canaan's sacred hills which he thinks must have reached heaven. But has he thought of the hacked limbs, the dying throes, the curses of rages, the heats of wrath, the struggles of fierce foemen, and the premature deaths of the slain as a holocaust quite fitted to give joy to the angels of heaven, who are glad at the repentance of a single sinner rather than a soldierly singer.

I have read with such care as I could the several papers on each side of this controversy; and am satisfied that, though a good deal may be said in favour of the Crusades, the greater part of what is said refers rather to matters which had been overruled for good by "Him whose prerogative it is to bring good out of evil." I do not believe that the reasoning is tenable which runs thus:—

"The end is good;  
And if the end is good each several part  
May for its private blots forgiveness gain."

I do not agree in the gospel of Carlyle that force is the true and perfect measure of right. I think that, if we wish to know that the results of anything have been beneficial, we should take a correct view of the conditions of things. I should have liked to have seen an idea worked out which I once heard was entertained by a writer of some celebrity—that was to suppose what would have been the condition of society in the time of the Crusades to have continued without this break out of enthusiastic and misled as well as misleading passion, and to have worked out an imaginary history for the ages subsequent to them. I am afraid, however, that the plot of history has been so woven that this would be difficult to accomplish, even by such a writer as the author of "*Secularia*." Yet, though we cannot undo the great achievement of history, whether in wickedness or in excellence, we may refrain from looking in loving regard upon the crimes of history on account of their beneficial accidents. For instance, the murder of

Prince Arthur may have given the possibilities to which Magna Charta is due; or the villanies of Richard may have given the occasion for the Tudor dynasty, and made the Reformation a historic fact. But we ought not to cast back upon the crime the gilding that the future has gathered round it. The universe is so arranged that good must fall out from almost any congregation of the chances—so mercifully is the providence of God exercised upon the earth. We reason wrongly when we attribute the good that arises, despite an occurrence, to that occurrence. It is a blessed frame of mind to be able to find "good in everything;" but that is quite a different thing from finding that everything is good. That the Crusades have been influential in history it is impossible to deny; that their influence has been beneficial it is possible both to dispute and doubt. Sad, however, as we believe the Crusades to have been in their origin, course, and consequences, we are glad that we can help even against ourselves, our opponents, by making our consideration of this question a means of warning our readers against superstition, persecution, and forced conversions. If the Crusades are made a warning, they may have so much of a beneficial result to us.

M. F. A.

## The Essayist.

### "EXCELSIOR."

"Excelsior."—Longfellow.

HAD Professor Longfellow given to the world nothing else but this one piece of poetry ("Excelsior"), his reputation as a poet would have been of no mean order. "Excelsior" has become a household word—a word of daily occurrence—young writers have adopted it as their *nom de plume*, literary societies as their title, and every one as their motto. It is written with his usually bold hand and vigorous style, and contains more than usually the characteristic of his poetry—encouragement and hope to aspiring youth. He weaves a magic web about the mind, leads it captive, and soars above this grovelling earth through unknown heights, and enters the portals of truth; he fires the soul with zeal, and incessantly wrings from our lips the vehement cry "Excelsior!" Fired with our war-cry, we would attempt impossibilities: we would cross the sea, traverse unexplored regions, ascend the highest range of mountains, and plant our standard on the highest peak; we would brave the Furies and dare fate; nay, we would go farther; we would cross the dim regions of space, and pause before the gate of endless light, and did we hear our cry echoed within, we would even dare to knock. But life, instead of being, as it is often represented, a fleeting cloud of fancies, a shifting scene of excitement, is more

frequently a thunder-shower of leaden realities, and excited fancy cools down when brought in contact with reality.

Perhaps few words in our language are more comprehensive in meaning than this word "Excelsior!" Followed out, it constitutes all the requisites for greatness. It does not show you any royal road, any shorter path, or easier way. There is no royal road. Genius cannot suggest one, talent cannot construct one, and wealth cannot buy one. Wealth may purchase position, but not greatness of intellect, or the esteem of mankind. Many have tried easier paths, but have failed, and, failing, have given up all hopes of becoming great, have sunk into oblivion. But they have not followed out our motto. The way is along the well-trodden path of perseverance. Along this path have passed, and must pass, all great men. The road is rough, and the mountain is high. You may not climb it the first time, nor the second; but, *nil desperandum* and "Onward!" There is no mountain that man cannot climb. So it is in life. The loftiest and most hazardous may be ascended. The (so-called) defects of nature may be overcome. Demosthenes might have said, "My form is ungainly, my voice is weak and stammering, and I can never hope to be anything great." But he did not. He climbed the mountain, and inhaled the free air of Greece; he stood on the rocks, and made the sea his audience; he filled his mouth with pebbles, and spoke to the waves. And with what result? When he stepped forth on the platform of Greece the tyrant trembled, and the despot shook! He spoke, and oppression tottered, and the tyrannical monarch started back aghast!

It is the duty of every man to make "Excelsior" his motto. Every man has talents committed to him, and it is his duty to use those talents for the benefit of the world. Every one may not have within him the germ of a Stephenson or a Newton. It may not fall to the lot of every one to banish some dark cloud of ignorance or control some element of nature. But it is, nevertheless, our duty to struggle on. No great man, at the commencement of his journey, could see the exact road he would have to travel. Should we fail in our endeavours, the struggle will be none the less honourable. But we must not depart from the path of duty to accomplish our ends; although it enables us to shout,—

"Higher, higher will we climb  
Up the mount of glory,"

still it bids exclaim,—

"Onward, onward may we press  
Through the path of duty."

Men who make this their motto must be self-dependent. Many young men think that if they were wealthy they would stand a better chance of rising. If we may judge from former examples, poverty is no detriment. Dependence and perseverance are above half the victory. There is a certain ordeal through which all must

pass, and men bred amidst luxury are ill prepared to pass through this ordeal. The poor man has less friends and more sincere ones, less ceremonies and more (really) spare time, less studies and more chance to be thorough. And a man of wealth is more apt to depend on his means than on himself; he thinks that difficulties will succumb to wealth better than to perseverance:

Life, to the man who is struggling upward, is a journey fraught with excitement, danger, and fatigue; a battle-field full of engagements, victories, and reverses. At every point the mind feels discouraged, at every point enemies press upon us, and trials stand in our pathway. Many a voice would try to discourage us, saying, "Try not the pass," or, "Beware the awful avalanche." They would tell us the lowering sky portended a storm; they would make us shudder by telling us of the danger to be encountered, of the mighty torrent, of the roaring cataract, of the dark, yawning abyss, round whose bottom eternal night had settled, and to look from whose giddy heights made the traveller shudder and recoil. But heed them not! Pause not in your weary path. Stop not to contrast the glowing fire in the happy homestead with the frowning mountains, up whose craggy sides you must clamber. Dream not of danger! Fold your cloak around you more closely, grasp your staff more firmly, plant your foot securely on the base of the mountain, and, bounding up its side, shout "Excelsior!" The way may be rough; and the road rugged, but the danger to be encountered only enhances the value of the prize.

Trust not in genius to aid you. They who lean upon the idea that nothing but genius can attain the prize rest on a very feeble staff. Many as fine a man as ever graced the temples of literature, or took his stand in the ranks of greatness, has "been born to blush unseen,"—has been born in the most abject poverty, cradled on the lap of want, and died as he has lived—almost unknown, and unwept. The dull clod has rattled on his coffin, the grass has grown over his head, and nothing is now known of him except what we learn from the simple stone that, sentinel-like, watches over him, and which seems in silent mockery to inform us that he lived, died, and was buried. We little know what wealth of intellect a country churchyard contains—what Shakespeares and Brunels lie mouldering in the dust beneath us. And should it be thus? No! Let every man start in the race; let every muscle be strained, every nerve stretched to its fullest extent, let every limb be agile, and, having once started, pause not till the goal is reached—stop not till the victorious wreath encircles your brow; shun the cooling shades and tempting streams of ease till you can quench your thirst at the clear, limpid stream of knowledge, and fan yourself beneath the waving palm tree, and, looking back over the broad, dusty plain to your competitors in the race, cry triumphantly, "Excelsior!"

If you would become great, if you would write your name on the tablet of fame, if you would clamber up the sides of Helicon, or

revel on the heights of Parnassus, you must make it your motto. Are you a student? you must write it on every page of your book; a soldier? you must grave it on your sword; a traveller? it must cheer you in the desert when death stares you in the face. "Excelsior" has been the motto of all self-made men—men who, born in the peasant's cot, have dined with kings, and fared with princes. "Excelsior!" cried Stephenson, as those great mechanical inventions flitted through his brain; "Excelsior!" cried Newton, as he gazed on the stars, and solved his laws of gravitation; and "Excelsior!" cried Kirke White, as he struggled on, and night after night saw him bending over his books, and pursuing his studies by the aid of his flickering taper.

Press on! press on! fellow-traveller on the rough and weary pathway of life; press on! and cross swords with the enemy. Press on, and should you fall, it were nobler to do so than languish in prison a fettered slave. Press on! fight while the dew is yet upon the ground, fight as the sun attains its zenith, fight as the day wears on, and, if it needs be, fight when the shades of night close around your path. Ah! and fight as long as the last star twinkles in the heavens, that, as the first ray of eternal morning bursts upon you, you may hear the cry, "Well done, good and faithful servant;" and hear the cry echoed in the land you have left, "Well done, well done!" Press on! the phantoms which loom up in your path will vanish as you approach; press on! the pathway you tread has been trodden before, and the thorns which wound your feet are red with the gore of some previous passenger. Press on! although the road is thorny and rough, yet you will find many a rich gem in the hard granite, and many a bright flower will cheer your way with its fragrance. Press on! the darkness which shrouds you shall give place to glorious day. Press on! press on! and be like that—

"Youth, who bore 'midst snow and ice  
A banner with the strange device—

"EXCELSIOR!"

J. H. R.

---

## Toiling Upward.

JOHN ALFRED LANGFORD, LL.D., &c. ;  
*Journalist, Poet, Historian, Essayist, and Politician.*

(Continued from page 230.)

### PART III.

"It is," says Lord Lytton, "one of the grandest advantages the peasant and the artisan have over those above them [in social position], that they are justified, even by prudence, in adding the most steadfast and the sweetest of all motives to that industry, through which, humble though it seem, they are the founders of commonwealths and the mainsprings that move the civilization of the world. . . . A certain additional weight on an individual's industry only gives more force to his sinews and infuses a brighter spirit into his heart." It is not perhaps possible for him in ordinary circumstances to know that passion, in its utmost intensity of joy and sorrow, of storm or of sunshine, so as to feel the autocracy of the emotion when it is the tyrant of the fancy. But even to him it comes as a great ruler and modifier of mind, heart and soul. If it is true—as of verity it is—that

"Even to be happy is a dangerous thing,"

it is, on the other hand, still more true that

"Sorrow's crown of sorrow is remembering happier things."

Hence a "rooted sorrow, especially if irremediable, is a sad some tenant of the heart. The domestic influence is particularly precious in a working man's house. It brings satisfaction, confidence, and ease. To live comfortless, despairing, and homeless, is the result of being and remaining alone.

Having formed an auspiciously-begun attachment to Miss Mary Anne Pine, eldest daughter of Mr. F. Pine, a printer in business for himself, of some literary taste and ability—whom, we believe, has issued some poems of merit,—J. A. Langford married this lady, 7th April, 1849, and after spending a short time in Derby and its neighbourhood, settled in Cheapside, to work again with a fresh hope in his spirit. Labour was still, however, combined with literary inclinations, so that when, in 1850, R. Podmore, Esq., Mayor of Worcester, offered to the working-men of the Midlands three prizes for the best "Essays on the Tendency of Mental Culture," he competed. James Saville, John Randall, and J. A. Langford gained these prizes, and the essays were published in 1850. In the same year he issued his "Religion, Scepticism, and Infidelity: their

History, Course, and Mission," a work of research, culture, and thought, which excited the attention both of the doubting and of the believing, and was particularly hardly dealt with in "*The Reasoner*," edited by J. G. Holyoake. It was admirably dedicated to George Dawson. In the winter of 1850 he was appointed teacher of the evening classes in the schools of the Church of the Saviour, removed to Edward Street, and established a depot for the sale of newspapers, periodicals, &c., giving up chairmaking. An account of a tour on foot through North Wales, in 1851, appeared in *The Working Man's Friend*, and in the same year, as a guest of Mr. John Chapman, publisher, met some of the *litterati* of *The Westminster Review*, among others memorable, Miss Maria A. Evans, translatrix of Strauss' "Life of Jesus," Feuerbach's "Essence of Christianity," then, we believe, co-editress of *The Westminster*, and since celebrated as George Eliot, one of the most notable of novelists. As agent for Mr. Chapman's publications, and in extension of his previous enterprise, Langford opened a book-shop in New Street. Here he wrote "*The Drama of Life and Aspirations*." Some items in the drama are excerpts from the emotional and intellectual life of the writer, and several of the lyrics are full of earnest sentiments on striving as an aid to thriving. The book attained a fair success: Here, too, was begun "*The Lamp of Life*," a poem in the stanza of Tennyson's "In Memoriam," which seems to have taken its clue and hue from Newman's "Phases of Faith," "*The Soul: its Sorrows and its Aspirations*," Froude's "*Nemesis of Faith*," &c. It is a record of thought-struggles and heart-strivings, of a life of doubt and trial, of a speculative, ardent, aspiring mind, striving to see through the mist of sense and mystery of being, the faith that fits a soul for fulness of effort, and imparts the strength of hope and love. It traces and narrates in passages of irregular length and varied intensity the progress of a stirring spirit stricken with a sort of palsy of the power of belief, till it overcomes the dread deadness, it feels and glows with the inspiring life of a sense of heaven and God, and the sweet, sad, sanctifying and satisfying salvation of Christ Jesus. The melody is flowing and graceful, and the descriptive passages are vivid and graphic. It is a work of power and worth. It was issued in 1855.

Meanwhile, in all the local and much of the general politics of the time Langford took an active part. The events which had been occurring on the Continent excited great interest in all who had dreams of a political future in which all classes would and could co-operate in the duties and responsibilities of the Commonwealth. To the sympathies of British politicians in general the affairs of Italy and Hungary presented considerable claims, and Langford, fired with the poesy of patriotism, regarded the efforts after independence made by these nations as full of promise. When clouds and shadows fell on the prospect his heart beat high, and his eagerness to aid and uphold the vanquished gave him energy and ardour. When, therefore, a branch of the Friends of Italy was formed in



Birmingham, Langford was appointed honorary secretary, and he was thus brought into relation with the leaders in Hungarian and Italian revolution, Kossuth and Mazzini, as well as many of the exiles from these lands of hardship. This gave him subsequently the power of speaking with special aptness on the questions concerning foreign politics—as he did, for instance, in his pamphlet on “Kossuth, Mazzini, Urquhart, and the Conferences,” a tract which had its origin in a controversy between the Anti-Palmerstonians and the Friends of Freedom. Literature and politics probably interfered with commercial success, especially in a business so pressingly demanding instant and constant attention as bookselling, and in a short time the New Street business was disposed of by private bargain, and a new career required to be chosen.

At this time the topic of education was under the Lancashire Public School Association, of which Samuel Lucas was a leader, attracting much notice. This was greatly increased by the introduction of the Education Bill of W. J. Fox. Educational conferences were called together in many of the great centres of population. Stimulated himself by this movement, and desiring to aid in the solution of the vexed question, J. A. Langford published in 1852 his “Religion and Education in Relation to the People.” It attracted considerable attention on its appearance, and is a valuable tractate on the oft-debated topic of the religious difficulty in education. After this book was issued Langford proposed to take up the business of his father-in-law, Mr. F. Pine, and having under his instructions attained skill as a pressman and dexterity as a compositor, “J. A. Langford, Printer, 45, Ann Street, Birmingham,” began to appear as the imprint of specimens of his typographical capacity. For some years he prospered in his new venture, and published a good many of his own and of his friends’ works. Among those of his own is a small publication entitled “English Democracy in its History and Principles,” a revised re-issue of a series of papers which were published in “The Political Examiner,” a journal issued under the editorship of James Walker, at Carlisle, and circulating largely among the radicals of the north.

It was the intention of the author in these letters “to provide a manual of the history of reforms, divested of the usual accounts of battles, of the conduct of kings, and the intrigues of courtiers, which occupy so much space in the ordinary histories of England;” to show “how the people have obtained their present position.” It is a sort of epitome of civilization in its course among the people, and a brief compend of the causes and consequences of popular movements. It is a miniature philosophy of history condensed in its eight chapters; there is a great deal of the results of careful and extensive reading fused together by honest thought and much personal toil of brain. Its text is taken from Goethe’s telling question and answer—“Which is the Best Government?” “That which Teaches Self-Government.” Chapter I. carries the reader from the earliest times to 1066; II., from the Battle of Hastings

to Jack Cade's Rebellion, 1450; III., from 1450 to the Death of Charles I., 1649; IV., from 1649 to 1688—the Commonwealth and the English Revolution; V., from 1688 to the French Revolution; VI., From 1789 to the present time: VII., The Principles of Democracy: 1st., The Political Equality of Man; 2nd., The Equal Dignity of Labour; 3rd., The Brotherhood of the Race; and VIII., Democracy—its means, viz., Education and Peace. But the peace he advocates is not peace at any price, as may be seen from the following extracts:—

"Peace, peace, no matter at what price, is now the watchword of some of our leading men, and societies are organized for the purpose of indoctrinating the nation with the idea that any amount of suffering, injustice, and oppression is preferable than war. To such a doctrine we can in no wise subscribe. There may be an unjust and pusillanimous peace, and there may be a just and generous war, and a nation suffers lamentably more by submitting to the one than in encountering the other. . . . For right and justice and honour and freedom are involved, and the life of a people is robbed of those ideas which alone make life noble and worthy the living. But while we admit that war is not the greatest calamity that can afflict a nation, we would not for a moment advocate a rash or hasty appeal to arms to settle any dispute, however important it may be. We should in no wise seek to cultivate a war spirit among the people, and think that those who attempt to involve a nation in war, except as the last resource for the preservation of its own honour and the rights and liberties of weaker nations threatened by a stronger, commit a wrong, and create impediments to progress. . . . War should only be invoked for the noblest ends and from the highest motives. To involve one people in physical strife with another for the sake of gain, is a crime which calls for our most indignant protest, our sternest denunciation. Democracy should battle for liberty and right, not for 10 per cent. profit, a new market, and a new customer. . . . War would retard domestic improvement, by supplying foreign excitement. The attention would be drawn from internal abuses, and a few years of war would require fifty years of peace to recover the loss. Only a war that will warrant such national self-sacrifice can be justifiable; and the only war that would warrant this, is a war for the defence of liberty against tyranny, for the support of peoples against their oppressors, for the triumph of democracy over oligarchy, in a word, for the upraising of the down-trodden, and the enfranchisement of the enslaved."

In 1855, besides the publication of "*The Lamp of Life*," which occupied him greatly, Langford wrote for the *Literary Companion*, and the *Atlas*, and for the *Birmingham Daily Press*, a paper started under most excellent auspices, in anticipation of the Repeal of the Stamp Duty on 7th of May, 1855. From being a contributor Langford, having relinquished his printing business on account of the serious illness of his father-in-law, who had been acting as his manager was advanced to be sub-editor of the newspaper above mentioned, the chief shareholders being his friends—George Dawson, W. Harris, &c. This position he occupied about a year.

In 1857 Langford's mother died, and the sixth child of his second

family was born. In this same year the Aston Hall Park purchase scheme excited a large amount of interest. Its proprietors, Messrs. Greaves and Gregory, Warwick, were willing to part with the old hall and about fifty acres of park for £36,000. The use of the park was granted to the Working Man's Committee for a *life*, by which about £700 were raised. Of this committee, J. A. Langford was vice-chairman. A Limited Liability Company was next formed, to raise in guinea shares £42,000. Of this company he was also chosen secretary *pro tem*. By this association the park was purchased, £4,000 as a deposit being paid, and in February, 1868 it took possession.

J. A. Langford was elected manager, and was granted a residence in Aston Hall. At the request of the managers and of the town council, Her Majesty consented to open the park as a public recreation ground, and the hall as a general museum. On 15th June Her Majesty and the Prince Consort visited Birmingham, and one of the four persons formally presented to the Queen, and permitted to kiss her hand, was J. A. Langford. The fete on this occasion entailed a considerable loss on the company, and we believe that disaster after disaster followed in quick succession, till the association was dissolved, by the purchase of the park and hall by the Town Council in 1864. On the winding up of the company a testimonial, consisting of a gold watch, a copy of "Knight's Pictorial Shakspeare," "Golden Leaves," &c., was presented to J. A. Langford, who had acted as manager and secretary for the greater portion of the time the company held the property.

We must now retrace the course of time a *new* what, to bring up our notice of his literary career to this point. During the period of his acting as manager of the Park Company, Langford continued his connection with the press as a contributor to *The Daily Post*, *The Birmingham Journal*, &c. In 1859 he collected a number of short poems, which had been published in the magazines and periodicals, and issued them with others under the title of "Poems of the Fields and the Town." The volume was dedicated to Edward Capern, the postman poet, with whom he had spent a joyous summer holiday in Devon, in 1856. Here, besides the gladsome spirit of downy Devonshire, with whom he wandered free and far with sympathetic exhilaration; he had the pleasure of meeting with J. A. Froude, the historian and philosopher, who was at that time residing at a short distance from Bideford, and F. T. Palgrave, author of "Idylls and Songs," &c., as well as with many of the fine old families of that district, who love life, thought, poetry, and Edward Capern, of whom Langford sings feelingly and affectionately:—

"My bonny boy, my benny boy,  
Thy life is bright and free,  
For all things, dowered with life and grace,  
Have witting charms for thee:

The flowers along the green hedge-side,  
 The birds upon the wing,  
 The toil of merry labourers,  
 Thy muse delights to sing."

Snatches of graceful song, sweet emotional phrases, fine lilting singable stanzas abound in this volume. The love poems are exquisite, the social ones touching and pleasing, those illustrative of the feelings of the lowly in station, are dexterous in diction and conception. The more ambitious poems, perhaps, seem a little out of place, but they bear evidence of the versatility of the power of the writer. We quote about a third of "An Ode to the Memory of Shakspeare," with regret that we cannot give the poem entire:—

"See summoned by his mighty name,  
 The beings he created, rise;  
 See Romeo, with heart of flame,  
 Othello, with his agonies!  
 And Lear, with his dead darling of the three,  
 And Hamlet, probing life's too fatal mystery.

"And England's ancient heroes dead,  
 Live in his page eternally;  
 And show us how our fathers bled,  
 To make and keep their country free.  
 Their stories told as he alone could tell,  
 Still have the power to make the patriot bosom swell.

"But lo! there comes a fairer train,  
 To glad the eye, the heart to move;—  
 List! 'tis Ophelia's dirge-like strain;  
 See Julia with her deathless love,  
 And Desdemona crowned with wifehood's crown;  
 And Constance, dear to all who mother's love have known.

"See regal Catharine's noble face,  
 And love-compelling Rosalind;  
 Hermione with Grecian grace,  
 And Imogen of purest mind;  
 And all that fair and noble galaxy,  
 Which makes him woman's fittest laureate to be.

"O men, O women of this land,  
 Thank God for this, His gift of grace;  
 The king of song His bounteous hand  
 Has given to His English race;  
 And made this little spot, this sea-girt isle,  
 The earth on which the Muses shed their brightest smile!

"On Avon's banks his sun arose—  
 On Avon's banks his childhood's home;  
 On Avon's banks his bones repose;  
 To Avon's banks fond pilgrim's come.

From far-off lands they come to greet our shore—  
His name and grave have honoured us for evermore.

"O magic might of poetry,  
And all-subduing power of song,  
Thou art the glory of the free;  
God's noblest gifts to thee belong.  
And Shakspeare is the monarch of the band,  
Who are the pride of man—the lords of every land."

A few of the poems in this volume have been translated into French by M. de Chatelaine,—whose versions of Chaucer, Shakspeare, Gray, &c., have attracted the admiration of scholars. The critics gave the work a favourable reception, and the influence of its genial-hearted music and sentiment, gained him a lively recognition from several of his fellow singers.

In 1860 Mr. Langford published "*Shelley*," "*The Death of Polycarp*," and other poems. This work was dedicated "to Sir Percy Florence and the Hon. Lady Jane Shelley," as a "tribute to the memory of the immortal poet, whose name they inherit." The chief poem is modelled on "*Adonais*," and contains, in 107 stanzas, an outline of the life, and an estimate of the mind and works, nature and influence of the poet Shelley. The music of the verse is sweet and flowing, though it wants the terseness and the exquisite touches of celestial light which the elegy on John Keats displays. Phrases, we mean, of such surpassing power of thought and melody of diction, as—

"Nought we know dies. Shall that alone which knows,  
Be as a sword consumed before the sheath,  
By sightless lightning?" *Adonais*, xx., 6-8.

Yet here and there excellent phrases occur, for example:—

"The sky,  
With its continuous changefulness of glory." (6)

"Learn  
How for a great and self-absorbing cause to burn;" (12)

"What unimaginable depths of shame  
The noblest things can bear, when lies have sapped their fame." (26)

"All pain is worth its cost;  
All grief is gain; and in the after years  
Its teachings, though severe, are never lost,  
But prove a priceless pearl; who has will value most." (76)

In addition to the mere specimens of diction here noted, we think the following stanzas, which contain an estimate of the poet, whose thoughts were like the skylark's song—noble, sustained, earth-loving, yet heavenly.

"The spirits which the woods and streams enshrine;  
 The dwellers in the grass, the trees, the flowers;  
 The Presence which make all things divine;  
 The mid-day and the midnight haunting powers;  
 The Graces which attend the fleeting hours;  
 The Beings that, unseen, still people space;  
 And bring their blessings with the sun and showers,  
 With him hold converse, and for him would trace  
 The ever-present glories of their dwelling-place,  
 And in this post-world he lived alone,  
 And with its bright inhabitants he dwelt,  
 Till life became a portion of their own,  
 And all their feelings into his did melt.  
 Their spiritual existences were felt  
 As pure realities, and thus became  
 The subjects of his song, which boldly set  
 The grace, the power, the sweetness, and the flame  
 Of the bright inter-lunar world from which they came,  
 In strains harmonious as ever fell  
 From lips of poet in divinest hours,  
 Did he the wondrous revelations tell  
 Of mystic kingdoms and of mystic powers;  
 Mind's noblest workings, and the thought which dowers  
 Man's life with glory, beauty, and with awe;  
 The love which cheers, the joys which are its flowers,  
 The sorrows that oppress; the truths that draw  
 His judgment first to know, then gladly bow to law  
 The pain, the triumph, and the ecstasy,  
 The grandeur and the mystery of life,  
 The loveliness and the sublimity  
 Of all the visible universe, whose strife  
 Is desolation, and whose peace is life  
 With all that can entrance with visions bright;  
 Of liberty, with love, his wedded wife,  
 Together leading man through darkest night,  
 To uplands of sweet peace, and homes of calm delight." (47-50)  
 His themes were glorious as his song was sweet;  
 Of truth, and liberty, and love his strain;  
 Of men and women robed and crowned complete  
 In freedom and in virtue; scorning pain,  
 And toil, and woe, and torture, to attain  
 The true heroic height, that earth might be  
 The blest abode of Godlike men, whose reign  
 Would shatter Wreng's all-cursing empire,  
 And bring the afflicted joy and make the captive free." (78)

"The Death of Polycarp" is a good poem on a splendid subject,  
 the Martyrdom, under Statius Quadratus, of Polycarp, Bishop of  
 Smyrna, in 166, when—

"Aurelianus ruled in Rome. The noblest head  
 That ever wore th' imperial diadem.

Brave, pious, temperate, just and learned was he;  
 The virtues of the pagan world were his,  
 He loved his people and revered his gods."

The poem is founded on the touching narrative contained in the "Ecclesiastical History" of Eusebius (Ch. xiv.) Some of the "Miscellaneous Poems" in this volume are sweet and pleasing; and there are a few snatches from the laurel-wreaths which form the crown of German song, on which we marked the names of Uhland and Goethe. One of the Miscellaneous poems entitled "The Village Fountain" seems to be touched with the very spirit of Heine. "Wedded and Buried" has a Tennysonian echo; but surely Mr. Langford with his knowledge of poetic sympathy should have felt that "the sweet sad music" of "In Memoriam" held in its very inmost essence a protest against being employed to speak of "Solferino," even in deprecation of the purposeless amusement of an upstart emperor! The memory of "Sturge" and the murderous crime of Solferino ought not, as we think, to have been "set to the same music." The volume earned the praise of many of the best of the Metropolitan organs of criticism, the *Leader*, the *Critic*, the *Literary Gazette*, and even the praise-grudging *Athenæum* admitted that "Mr. Langford commands imagination and language" no slight commendation in an age when so many rhymers are commanded by imagination and run away with by language.

Of Mr. Langford's next venture, "Prison Books and their Authors," which appeared in 1861, a notice appeared in these pages, but in a memoir sketch such as this is it, would scarcely be fair to pass the production over without notification of its issue, and a statement of its contents. From the long bright roll of the "glorifiers of the prison," the author has "taken a few given sketches of their lives, and analyses of their books." In a brief introduction the writer gives us the moral of his story—it is, in fact, a plea for toleration,—and he intends his illustrations to show the truth of the opinions expressed in these terms,—"Truly a noble record of the power of the mind to make its own kingdom,—a perennial teaching of the benign influence of sorrow, and a glorious monument of genius are the world's prison books." There follow in the work sketches of Buethius, with an estimate of his "Consolation of Philosophy;" the Earl of Surrey, with specimens of his poetry; Cervantes, with a criticism on "Don Quixote;" Walter Raleigh, with an account of his doings, writings, and sufferings; the Catholic martyr-poet, Robert Southwell, George Wither the parliamentarian, and Richard Lovelace the cavalier; Bunyan, and his "Pilgrim's Progress;" Dr. Dodd's "Clerical Forger, and his Prison Thoughts;" James Montgomery, the Christian minstrel; Leigh Hunt, "the most blithesome prison bird that ever warbled in a cage," and Thomas Cooper the Chartist, whose name has so recently appeared at the head of some of the most excellent chapters of the series of papers (of which this is one) entitled "Toiling Upward."

"Pleasant Spots and Famous Places" appeared in 1862. It is a capital book of its class. Its object is to bring into the mind those associations which ought to be carried with us when we travel or ramble through a country so rich in historic scenery and so full of poetic interest as our own land. As the author observes in his preface, "this book has not been written for the learned and the antiquarian, but for the Rambler." The sketches are full of the influences of nature and poetry; and though they exhibit little of the pedantry of archæology, or the fussy pretentiousness of the guide-book historian, they contain not a little of the fine allusiveness to events which gives zest to scenery and delight to outdoor travel. A genial Leigh Hunt-like chapter on "What to do with Fine Weather," is followed by "A Desultory Ramble," and "A Day in the Woods"—which refresh, and have the sound of the sylvan breeze, and the song of birds in them. "Edgehill," "A Moated Grange," at Compton—Wyngates; "Great Orme's Head," "Holyhead, and the South Stack Lighthouse," take us in one direction; "The Clent Hills," "The Peak of Derbyshire," "A Ramble by Flood and Field," "Round about Derby," "Kenilworth," "Naseby," "Boscobell," supply another series of holiday scenes; Bristol, with memories of Chatterton; Bath, with gossip about old times. Clifton and its scenery lead us south, and therefore we are taken to "Bideford," "Ferry Dell," Clovelly, Appledore, and St. Branock in Devonshire—charmingly sketched and full of snatches of song: after a day with the Archæologists in the neighbourhood of Birmingham, we are taken to Tewkesbury, and the meeting of the Avon, and the Severn; in a pilgrimage to England's Mecca, we get Shakspeare and Stratford brought nearer and made dearer, and the scene closes with a visit to "Drunken Bideford." Here is a book which shows us how a thoughtful Rambler may vivify and enliven all he sees by all he knows, and in which we get an example of how to get, to employ the closing phrase of this pleasant book, "a pleasant day, with pleasant reminiscences, with pleasant rambles, and pleasant scenes; with the memory of Shakspeare haunting and glorifying them all in some way or other.

This book was dedicated to "Wm. Harris, Esq., as the dear friend of many years, and the genial companion of most of these rambles;" and as we read them, they seem as if they found a justification of these lines which we extract from the contributions to "The Inner Circle" made by that gentleman:—

"For not a noble deed hath e'er been wrought,  
 Or noble word  
 Spoken in all the earth, but it hath brought  
 A rich reward;  
 And in the future, when shall be made bright  
 The Spirits eye,  
 The praise of what is good, and true, and right,  
 Shall never die."



## The Reviewer.

---

*A Glance at some of the Principles of Comparative Philology.* By LORD NEAVES. Edinburgh: Blackwood & Sons.

THIS small but clever book contains the substance of a paper read before the Royal Society of Edinburgh, an institution founded in 1739, and chartered in 1783 for the encouragement of science and literature. It appears that for nearly half a century science has so over-mastered literature in its meetings that literary communications have been gradually becoming rarer; and this, too, although there exists in the northern metropolis a Royal Physical Society, exclusively devoted to natural history and the physical sciences by its deed of institution, 1771, and of incorporation, 1788. Perhaps the ready outlet for literary material, if of any value, now provided by the serial literature of the day may in some measure account for the comparative paucity of literary contributions among the members, though it might be supposed that a few papers of literary merit might greatly enhance the general pleasure of the meetings of the members. Though dealing with the science of comparative philology in a literary manner, this paper does not rival in scope the "Survey of Languages" taken by Max Müller. It confines itself to the Latin and Anglian forms of speech, but fulfils its rôle in a simple and profitable manner.

Its author—Charles, Lord Neaves—one of the most urbane, versatile, and gifted of the members of the northern college of justice, the Court of Session, was born in 1800, was educated at the High School and at the University of Edinburgh, and was called to the Bar as a member of the Faculty of Advocates in 1823. He was a popular and well-employed practitioner, and was engaged in several of the *Causes Célèbres* in the higher courts in Scotland. In 1845 he was appointed to the sheriffship of Orkney and Shetland—a position which he resigned in 1852 into the hands of W. E. Aytoun on his promotion to the office of Solicitor-General in the government of Lord Derby, on which occasion he was honoured by the university with the degree of LL.D. Under Lord Aberdeen he was appointed one of the Lords of Session, and received his commission under the title of Lord Neaves. He had always literary leanings. In 1823 he had been admitted a member of the "Speculative Society," and two essays which he delivered there are yet remembered by his contemporaries—"The Influence of Italian upon English Literature," and "The Pleasures arising from represented Distress." He has been a frequent and valued contributor to *Blackwood's Magazine* for many years, and even yet aids in keeping up the racy spirit of that periodical to somewhat of the

tone of the times of his friends Wilson, Aytoun, Theodore Martin, George Moir, &c., whose mark has been indelibly made on that notable channel for Conservative advocacy. His "Songs and Verses, Social and Scientific," from *Maga*, by "an occasional contributor" are not only an evidence of this, but are proofs of a remarkable power—possessed by no Scotchman, except it may be by Professor Blackie—of extracting fun from the most unlikely circumstances, events, or materials. Here we have mirth shaken out of metaphysics—Mill's "Logic," Ferrier's "Institutes," Fraser's "Berkeleyianism," Darwin's "Origin of Species," the Permissive Bill, Woman's Suffrage, Carlyle's "Vaticinations," and a hundred other themes have been made the topic of clever squibs and *Vers de Société* with a well-defined melody and singable verses. Of circles where intelligence and fun are possible he is a most popular and acceptable frequenter, and he knows thoroughly how to make light literature a pleasing relaxation from severer pursuits in the care-weighted walks of professional and official duty, while he makes his attention to serious themes and matters patent by his varied and pertinent addresses on many matters of import and interest before the philosophical, literary, and educational institutions in Edinburgh and its vicinity. From this present production we make two quotations:—1st. A comparative critique of several studies; and 2nd. On language and the lessons it teaches.

"It has not the symmetrical beauty, the perfect development, and the faultless harmony of parts which make the mathematical sciences so alluring to those who engage in them. Neither, on the other hand, does it bring to its admirers any dowry of wealth or distinction, such as often enriches or exalts the successful wooer of the physical sciences. It cannot, again, compete either in moral dignity or practical utility with logic or the sciences of the mind, or with those of politics and social organization; and even towards literature, with which it might seem to have the closest connection, it has few useful, or at least indispensable, relations to recommend it. The poet and the orator may each touch the hearts or gain the convictions of his audience, though he knows little or nothing of the origin or primitive history of the words which he is using; and thus it is that, while other sciences are highly prized and eagerly cultivated, the science of which I am speaking is, as a study, almost wholly neglected. In this vast empire of ours, where so many different languages are spoken, some of them of the highest dignity and importance, embracing the most diversified varieties of speech, from that of west Ireland to that of the east of India, we have scarcely realised the fact that a sisterly tie unites them all.

"Language is, in all respects, the most imperishable of all monuments, and is by far the surest and clearest guide to what may be called the prehistoric progress of man. It is as certain as if we had a contemporary record of the facts that there existed, ages ago, a primitive Arian race somewhere near the north-west of Asia; and that from that region, as from a hive, successive swarms have issued in different directions, bearing their primitive language with them, but having it modified in various ways, according to the nature of the new countries in which they settled and the new circumstances in which they were placed. It does not necessarily fol-

low that all the nations now speaking an Indo-Germanic tongue are of Indo-Germanic blood, because it happens sometimes in conquests that the invader imposes his language on the country which he subdues, as the Romans did with the Roman provinces; and sometimes that he forgets his own tongue and adopts that of his new country, as happened to the Northmen in France. But in general the language and the ethnology will agree; and where such is the case important considerations will arise.

"The fact suggested by history and rendered certain by the study of language, that so many great or important nations are so near akin is one of immense moral and social significance. That we here in Britain and that all the Germanic and Roman races should be so closely connected together, and connected also with the men of Greece and Rome; and that within the same family should be comprehended the Arians of India, and the Sclavonians in all their diversities of dialect; and again, that to these must be added our Celtic neighbours, both of Wales and Ireland, is a consideration that suggests views which seem to justify bright hopes for the future of the civilised world. All these tribes can be traceably shown to have started with the same tongue, and in all probability to have possessed the same religion and the same laws and customs. The religious element is conspicuous in them all, and is apparent both in their language and history. That they had a deep reverence for the Unseen; that they perceived behind the sensuous appearances of nature a divine mind which framed and guided these phenomena; and that they believed the actions of men to be under the observation of that Power; and liable to a retribution according as they might be good or evil—these feelings, which are the essence of religion, cannot be overlooked in the history or in the language of these races, whatever varieties of form may have been occasioned by qualifying circumstances or contact with other nations. The most important of these medifying influences has undoubtedly been the substitution of a pure monotheistic belief, derived from the peculiar tribe to whom, in the course of Providence, that creed seems to have been specially entrusted. It is remarkable, however, that Christianity, though springing from a Semitic root, has flourished with its greatest vigour when grafted on a European stem; and it is not beyond our hopes that an approach to Christian civilisation among all the Arian nations may be nearer than at one time seemed likely."

Besides the paper itself, there are a number of notes of great value; and the production, though brief, is suggestive, interesting, and interpretative of many words and terms in common use.

---

## The Topic.

### OUGHT MR. FORSTER'S "BALLOT BILL" TO BECOME LAW?

#### AFFIRMATIVE.

THE experience of recent years has not been barren of evidence conclusively showing how eminently unfair influences, despite the attitude of the law towards them, may become active and powerful agencies in our electoral contests. The ballot presents itself as the best conceived scheme based on the comprehension and attempting the suppression of an evil so operating, and with this fact so distinctly recognized in the bill of Mr. Forster, we earnestly desire that that bill may very soon be legalized.—J.F.B.

There are, no doubt, certain portions of Mr. Forster's Ballot Bill which are objectionable even to those who advocate the Ballot; still it is to be hoped that it will be adopted, and become law during the present session of Parliament. It is possible, however, that several improvements may be made in the bill before it is passed, and that thus most of the objectionable parts will be got rid of. May I be permitted to add that the name of the late Mr. Berkeley, the Ballot advocate, appears to be forgotten, even in the House of Commons—whether rightly or wrongly is not, however, in this Topic the subject for discussion.—R. D. ROBERTS.

Secrecy in the exercise of political or constitutional right is sure to be looked upon with a certain amount of distrust. Besides, it lays the electoral community open to the charge of moral cowardice. Yet, it must be admitted, that the recent

scheme of political enfranchisement has rendered the Ballot, or some other protective measure, an imperative necessity. Mr. Forster's bill has been framed to meet this exigency. We deny, however, that the bill will be equal to what its supporters assert of it. Still, if it be energetically worked, it may render inoperative, to a great extent, the machinations of ruffian demagogues. With some minor points in the bill we entirely disagree; but it is difficult to speak very decidedly as to its aptness for our country before it has been actually proved by experiment. We would ask for Mr. Forster's bill a full and impartial trial.—W. MACKIE.

#### NEGATIVE.

Moral cowardice is the worst vice of a commonwealth. It is above all things necessary that men should learn to have the courage of their opinions. Freedom of thought can be of little avail if there is hesitancy in acknowledging what is held as right and proper. Instead of encouraging or increasing bravery of thought or independence of spirit, the Ballot Bill will induce cringing hypocrisy and moral cowardice, and therefore I think that the Ballot Bill ought not to be accepted by the country.—B.N.J.

Concealment of an evil is not a cure. It is too frequently the resource of fools, not the habit of the wise. If evils in the state rage and are rampant, it is the statesman's duty to fix upon the means of avert-

ing, avoiding, and curing those evils: it is not proper to allow the gangrene of political corruption to gather round the vital portions of the constitution. The Ballot Bill provides for the concealment of any political evil which may prevail in the body-politic. The very circulation of the blood of political life may be poisoned at its source, and not be able to be detected. This is folly. If a man is worthy of a vote, he ought to be worthy of confidence; if he is worthy of confidence as an honest citizen, the State ought to secure the free and full exercise of the rights it confers on its electors. It is useless to talk of the abolition of political coercion until we write on our Statute-book that the highest crime of which any citizen is capable is treachery to his country, and to coerce the free thought of another is political treason.—K.B.

If votes are entrusted to citizens, citizens ought to be protected in giving these votes. If citizens are unfit to use the franchise, or are in such circumstances that they cannot freely and properly use the franchise conferred without suffering prompt and immediate evils, far greater than any benefit it sup-

plies, then the State has made a mistake, and ought not to have given it. If it has done so, it should confess this mistake, not by throwing the whole political vitality of the nation to work in darkness, but by insisting on the condign punishment of any one who would place, by bribery, corruption, or coercion, his own interests above the interests of the State; and every person should be regarded as doing so who intimidates or seeks unjustly to turn aside the free and independent decision of the electors. It is obvious that those who give their votes in secret may give them in direct opposition not only to their own wishes, but also to the interests of the country; but under the Ballot Bill there will be no possibility of laying one's finger on the plague-spot of the Constitution, and the liberties of the nation may be secretly given away or surrendered without the State being able to avert so dire a calamity. This would be more than surrendering at discretion, it would be surrendering at the command of crime or folly. Better a nation should fall by the enemy's ball than by its own Ballot.—L.G.H.

---

## The Inquirer.

---

### QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

ALLOW me to direct attention to an unanswered query of mine in the first half-yearly volume of *BRITISH CONTEMPORARY*, 1868, p. 172, No. 762 Query. The question is propounded from (as will be seen) a purely *orthodox* stand-point. If Mr. T. Emky Young (the author of the essay therein alluded to) will favour me with *his* own solution of what must, as it appears to me, be

an insuperable difficulty to conventionally-pledged "orthodox" people, I shall stand gratefully indebted to his kind courtesy, both on *their* behalf, and for (heretical) reasons personal.—O.D.

942. Would any of your readers kindly inform me of the best edition of the *Septuagint* published, with cheapest form, its price, and its publishers?

943. Could you, or any of your

readers, favour me with any information on a new Italian metaphysical work, I believe entitled "The Divine in Nature," by Father Rosmini? I understand it has been examined by the Congregation of the Index at Rome, and received its approval. I am very desirous to have some idea of the general tenor and nature of the work; and if a brief exposition of the theory or doctrine (if there be any) therein expounded be kindly given, together with references to any views extant in our language, the favour conferred would be much enhanced.—J. H.

944. Is Washington Irving's or Jared Sparks' "Life of George Washington" considered the best one; and where, and at what price, is that one procurable? Also, would any one who is able kindly state where I might find the opinions of any great British writers on the character of Washington?—J. F. B.

#### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

923. As no reply has yet been given to T. L.'s query on this topic, I have thought it might not be amiss to forward a sort of answer to it, quoting a considerable portion of the matters of my note from a clever article on the subject which appeared in the *Scotsman* newspaper of date Feb. 23rd. As the subject connects itself in a certain fashion with two debates now occupying the attention of the readers of this magazine, it requires some care to steer clear of strife in the reply. It is matter of fact that a Committee of the Convocation of Canterbury for the Revision of the Holy Scriptures was appointed. The motion of the Bishop of Winchester (formerly Samuel of Oxford) was couched in these terms:—"It is desirable that Convocation should nominate a body of its own members to undertake the work of revision, who shall be at liberty to

invite the co-operation of any eminent for scholarship, to whatsoever nation or religious body they may belong." One would imagine that this latter clause was clear and comprehensive enough, including every species of religionist likely to be learned in the Christian Scriptures, and such as to justify the admission as a member of the Revision Committee of Mr. G. Vance Smith. Out of this has arisen, however, a contentious controversy "which promises to be known to history by the name of the "Westminster Scandal." This scandal consisted in the celebration of the Holy Communion by the Dean of Westminster in his Cathedral Church on the occasion of the commencement of their labours by the company of scholars from all churches whom Convocation had selected for the work of revising the Authorized Version of the Scriptures. Among the company was Mr. Vance Smith, an eminent Unitarian scholar, who joined in the rite as far as he conscientiously could, contenting himself, as afterwards appeared, with omitting to recite the Nicene Creed, in which, it is well known, a description is given of the Spiritual Head of the Church, to which a Unitarian cannot subscribe.

To many people this act of communion seemed a very becoming and impressive spectacle, not unworthy of the laudation bestowed upon it by the Dean of Westminster when he called it "an elevation of the Host above the divisions of Christendom." To a great many others, however, both clergy and laity, Anglican and Nonconformist, it appeared a very terrible thing that a Unitarian should have knelt down by the side of the Bishop of Gloucester and received the sacrament at the hands of a Dean of the Church of England in Westminster Abbey. Those persons accordingly

mised an exceedingly loud and bitter cry, directed partly against Mr. Vance Smith, the communicant, and Dean Stanley, the celebrant in this "scandal." Mr. Vance Smith they blamed for engaging in an act of worship with "mental reservations."

The Dean of Westminster seems to have suffered not less than Mr. Vance Smith from the irate portion of the Anglican religious press and public, the only difference being that, while Mr. Smith was blamed for being too reserved, the Dean was blamed for not being reserved enough. His defence is rested upon the intrinsic property of the proceeding itself—his right and even duty as a minister of the Anglican Church to give the rites of the Church to any Englishman who asks them, leaving to himself the responsibility of accepting of them—and especially on this occasion, the action of the Revision Committee of Convocation itself in selecting Mr. Vance Smith as one of its associates. If this gentleman was enough of a Christian to be entrusted with a share in the work of editing the authoritative documents of Christianity, was he not also enough of a Christian to participate with his fellow-editors in commemorating Him for whose sake those documents are considered valuable?

In spite of such considerations, the "scandal" grew in bulk and bitterness, and at the very first sittings of Convocation broke out in *gravamina*, resolutions, riders, *manages*, *artifici clerici*, and other alarming technical forms. In the Lower House it was found impossible to obtain a judicial condemnation of the Westminster communion. Two separate attempts of this kind were made, but failed. A third attempt in the same direction, in the form of a motion expressing hope that the like would not occur

again, succeeded by a very narrow majority.

In the Upper House of the Bishops, however, the Bishop of Winchester opened the proceedings by moving that "it is not expedient that any person who denies the Godhead of our Lord Jesus Christ should assist in the revision of the Scriptures." This was carried by the members of the Episcopate. Jonah was cast overboard, and Mr. Smith's name struck out of the Revision-roll.

But the very next day the Bishop of St. David's, who, along with the Bishop of Exeter, had endeavoured to bring a little reason to bear on the proceedings, resigned his position as chairman of the Old Testament company on the ground that the work had now dwindled from a Catholic to a sectarian undertaking; but at the same time induced his brethren to pass a resolution to the effect that in their work the translators shall "keep themselves as much as possible on their guard against any bias or preconceived opinion on theological tenets in the work of revision."

The loss of Dean Alford by death among the revisers of the New Testament, and of the venerable Bishop Thirlwall from the Headship of the revisers of the Old Testament, are certainly very grievous results to have arisen for an Act in itself so appropriate, and which appears to have been gone about with the reverence and solemnity of Christians engaged in a common consecration of their common work to their common Lord in a holy communion of effort and of devotion.—L. U. G.

941. In the latest and, we are sorry to say, the last number of *The North British Review*, a very elaborate attempt to rehabilitate the Borgia's appeared. The most easily-accessible sources in English are Raposo's "Life of Leo X.," Ma-

chisvelli's "History of Florence" and his "Prince," Ranke's "History of the Popes," in Bohn's Library of Standard Authors, 8s. 6d. each. The best histories of the Church and of Italy contain a good deal of

matter regarding this singular, almost abnormal, family.—G. F.

942. The Oxford Press edition (Holmes & Parsons) is in five vols., and costs sixteen guineas.—R. M. A.

## Literary Notes.

John Tyndall, LL.D. has prepared a collection of his writings in one vol. under the title of "Fragments of Science for Unscientific People; a Series of Detached Essays, Lectures, and Reviews."

A second series of "Short Studies on Great Subjects," by J. A. Froude, is in preparation, and will, we believe, include his recent able lecture on *Calvinism*.

Alibone's "Dictionary of British and American Authors" is finished.

Francois S. Drake has nearly ready "A Dictionary of American Biography."

"A Historical View of Literature and Art in Great Britain from 1714 to 1870."

Alice Carey (born 1820) American poet and novelist, died 10th Feb.

Robert Chambers, LL.D., author and publisher, died 17th March, aged 70. His life is an eventful record of "Toiling Upward."

Augustus L'e Morgan, mathematician, logician, &c., died 18th March.

A Compilation is projected, to be entitled, "Our Educational Parliaments," being Biographic Facts about the members of our School Boards.

Quite an extraordinary demand has arisen among the booksellers for the people's edition of the works of Thomas Carlyle to be issued in two shilling volumes.

A Dictionary of Biographical References by Lawrence B. Phillippe

is announced. It is to contain 100,000 names of celebrities.

A new English Dictionary in weekly numbers is projected by W. & R. Chambers for immediate issue.

John P. Mahaffy, Professor of Ancient History in the University of Dublin, is about to issue his Lectures under the title of "Essays on Evidence for Ancient History. The author is a thinker of great vivacity and perspicacity.

Mr. Stephen Leslie, author of "The Playground of Europe," is said to be the editor of *Cornhill Magazine*.

George Gottfried Gervinus, Professor of History, Heidelberg, is dead.

Principal McCoosh, of Princetown, has in a forward state a new work on "Natural Theology and Apologetics."

Butt's edition of Priestley's "History of the Corruptions of Christianity" is to be republished at a shilling.

Charles Hugo, eldest son of Victor Hugo, died 17th March. He was a journalist, dramatist, and Shakespearean translator.

"The Growth of Municipal Institutions in Germany," is the subject of the Marquis of Lothian's prize, Oxford.

Alsager Hay Hill has added to the debt the people owe him by suggesting the publication of "Penny Statutes for the People."



## Past, Present, and Future.

---

"The flight of time" is a commonplace of poets and rhetoricians, and yet it is a great fact—great in its reality, its importance, and its consequences. Time taken but as a synonym for toil of brain and struggle of intent, for research and endeavour, for force of effort and hardihood of endurance, for persistency of purpose and perseverance towards progress, has a strange and complicated significance, which is not lessened in its intensity when it is thought of as implying besides the overbeating of the heart in its aspirations, the stir of the frame in its hardly pursued plans, and the stern-set determination of the spirit to make some accessions to the world's betterment by the devotion of life to the prosperous on-carrying of an idea and an aim. But time, however definable by metaphysics as an abstract, an impalpable notion, is more to the human soul than a succession of experiences. It is the very parent of chronology, and it includes all the possibilities of history and life. Hence it is that the mind attaches a singular importance to the close of seasons and the recurrence of anniversaries—the touch of the finger of time which shuts up the volume of the irrevocable years, and brings into distinctness before us the fact that the eye of memory alone can review—while it cannot revise—the past; and that the pen of the historian may portray, but cannot reproduce those periods of endeavour and of hope which quickened the pulse and enlivened the heart, which stirred to labour and led to thought. When the fire-flash of memory darts along from now to then, how strange is the retrospect, and how affecting the contrast between the hope of the sunny hours of youth and the reality of the record of life past!

Our readers will scarcely feel surprised that we have opened our present number in this moody strain of moralizing when they remember or are told that twenty-one years have now elapsed since the *British Controversialist* took its first step into the presence of the public, and sought a fair field and no favour from the critic and the reader. Longevity is not by any means the common lot of magazines. Year by year, indeed, these have their birth and their forgetting; and during the thrice seven years of our continuance in being we have seen the rise, decline, and fall of many contemporaries, but no rivals. Our path was chosen with a definiteness and is adhered to with a tenacity which has been felt to offer no scope for a second in the race; while our course has involved so much self-sacrifice as to present no inducement to attempt to supersede us. With the exception of the elder reviews, publications issued by large societies or under the patronage of religious denominations, and a few periodicals which have been accepted as

the organs of special opinions in politics, religion, literature, or science, the serials of our country have, in general, only a precarious and often but an ephemeral existence.

It has appeared to the projector of this magazine, and to the writer of the earliest article in its pages, that it would be an excusable and, it might be, an advisable proceeding on their part if now, after the lapse of a period of collaboration so long and so intimate, so engrossing and so heart-endearing—a period during which no shade has clouded and no change has dimmed their affection and esteem, they should indulge conjointly in a few words of retrospection and review, and perhaps while re-stating the aims, re-urge the claims of this issue of their literary life alliance—that “the coming of age” of the *British Controversialist* may not pass unhonoured and unnoticed by reminiscence and good wish.

The great central idea which this serial was designed to embody and illustrate was this,—that it is possible to establish an impartial arena for the contests of mind, and a place on which men of every creed and variety of opinion might meet as upon neutral ground, to engage in the calm and deliberate consideration of every topic of interest to them in reasoned rather than passionate debate; the main design being, by the culture of thoughtfulness, to introduce kindness into such discussions as seemed requisite to the attainment of argumentative investigation of a satisfactory sort, and such criticism of ideas as might lead to the acquisition of reasoned truth.

In the realization of this idea we had to meet, struggle against, and overcome many obstacles and much discouragement. Respectable publishers, when consulted on the project, fought shy of our proposals, objected to our title as excessively pugnacious, and likely to excite reprisal, and sagaciously suspected that, under the innocent guise we chose to assume, we had hidden ulterior objects of a very revolutionary nature. Others who were consulted shared their dubiety and their apprehensions. Many declared that they had no faith in our profession of intended impartiality, and hinted or insinuated when they did not openly state their belief that we should ourselves be found to be in the long run (if we ever got a run at all) the upholders of some old sect or party, or, perhaps, what would be worse, the projectors or promoters of a new one. Distrust or doubt, hesitant admissions of possible honesty and sage advices to reconsider our ways and be wise, were about the sum of the results of our tentatives at initiation.

Undaunted by prophecies of failure or fears of success, strong in the faithfulness of the purpose of our hearts, and conscious of the rectitude of the principles by which we were animated, we persevered with our design one step farther, and on January 1st, 1850, we issued in several magazines our first prospectus, which contained the novel intimation that “the projectors of the magazine were not anxious to bear the responsibilities of such an undertaking, but that they would not shrink from doing so if it were thought that good would result from the issue of a periodical of the nature which

they had planned." They therefore solicited all who approved of their project to communicate with them, and intimated that "upon the nature of the response given to this request the existence of the magazine would depend." The answer made to this appeal was in the highest degree gratifying. Notes of encouragement, almost of invocation, came from men of every shade of opinion and from all parts of the United Kingdom. The approval thus expressed so unequivocally was to us as a command which we at once prepared to obey.

Our preliminaries were soon arranged; and having called to our aid as many of our friends as we could enlist—for it has always been our design that this should be a co-operative magazine of cultured thoughtfulness,—we had quickly on hand or undertaken such literary contributions as enabled us to descend upon the particulars of our earliest issues. Our first printer was Mr. Charles Reed—now M.P. for Hackney,—and our publishers were Messrs. Houlston and Stoneman, a firm which, by the demise of Mr. Stoneman in 1856, and of Mr. Houlston in 1869, has recently been reconstituted under the name of Messrs. Houlston and Sons.

On the 1st of May, or rather the 30th of April, "the *British Controversialist*, No. I.," price threepence, consisting of thirty-two pages, made its appearance in Paternoster Row, the centre of the circulation of the literature of the land. It bore on its cover as a motto, an adaptation of the words contained in the First Book of *Ecdra* iv. 41, as the acclaim of all the people who had heard a great controversial tournament in Persia—" *Magna est veritas, et prevalebit*," "Truth is powerful, and she will prevail." That was an anxious day to those who were interested in the fate of the new venture upon the perilous sea of periodical projection. How to forecast the prospects of the freshly launched craft from the signs of the weather in which it had set out was a problem beyond their scanning or cunning. As the day wore away, and orders came dropping in from the various collectors for the trade, it was found that 300 had been disposed of—a number which, though small in our eyes, was as large, our publishers comforted us by saying, as that which they had sold of the *Family Friend*, a serial, price twopence, which had subsequently reached a circulation of between 7,000 and 8,000 per month. By May 14th, 900 copies had been sold. This progress was regarded as sufficiently encouraging to justify the preparation of our second number. On 3rd June there had been issued 1,400 copies of No. 1, and 1,200 copies of No. 2. Our original impression amounted to 2,000 copies. In a short time a second edition of No. 1 was called for, and this was at intervals repeated again and again, so that the first number attained a fifth edition, and a re-issue of No. 2 was required within a year. Encouraging as this was, in view of the aim with which the serial had been commenced, it was not a little embarrassing; for going to press with small additional quantities, the result was that the literary success entailed an actual pecuniary loss; so that, like

Tarpeia of old, our safety was endangered by the granting of what had been desired, although, unlike her, we have survived the danger arising from our success.

Even from what we said it will be seen that the reception accorded to our first number was pretty gratifying. *Punch* honoured it with a kindly smile, and most of the reviewers passed it from their judgment with "honourable mention," and good auguries of our usefulness if we continued to maintain the position we had assumed. The most remarkable exception to this general acceptance and favour was a critique which appeared in the *Liverpool Courier*. Its writer, anxious to discover the *raison d'être* of such a magazine, evolved the theory of its existence from his own consciousness, and suggested that it had been set on foot to present to the world certain debating club orations, which the authors would "not willingly let die;" and prophetically announced the doom of the project by remarking that the world would have no hesitation in letting the magazine die! The unfeeling world which this sage stigmatised proved more kindly, if not wiser, than this prophet of evil, and recognised merit where he saw none. It did not nip our being in its bud, but has extended its patronage to us for a very considerable space of historic time.

Exception to our enterprise was taken by others on different grounds. No proof having appeared to substantiate against us the charge of partiality, the terrible accusation of latitudinarianism was brought forward. As an illustration of things bygone, it may now be told that one of the conductors, during the period of our literary novitiate, on going into the reading-room of a literary institute in a large northern town, saw lying on the table a suggestion-book, intended to contain the titles of those works which the subscribers desired should be added to the supplies already afforded to those who frequented its well-furnished apartments. Feeling interested in seeing if in that place the *British Controversialist* had been privileged to make any friends, he opened the book of open secrets, and soon discovered with delight that it had several. The first entry regarding it was dated May, 1850, and the recommendation given of it was very strong; this had been endorsed by several others; but it appeared, upon farther research, that these friendly advocates of our periodical had had their efforts nullified by a smart opponent, who had appended the following critical objection:—"This magazine ought not to be taken in; its pages are open to Chartism, Socialism, Atheism, and every other *ism*—even *my own ism*." What his "*own ism*" was, the writer had not had the candour or the charity to tell, and we speculated on this topic awhile, till, in wandering mazes lost, we concluded that, so far as appeared in the text presented, the *ism* most nearly resembling one which would issue in such a phrase was *egotism*,—but we were sure the magazine was not open to *that*! This writer—whom we leave in anonymity—was but the representative of a class—of a class who think mere adherence to a creed of words and dogmas constitutes faith, that investigation is a sin, and that it

is a doctrine of evil which proclaims it to be a human duty and a human right to "let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind." They say,—

"Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise."

But *where* is ignorance bliss? Is it not well said by one of England's noblest,—

"Ignorance is the curse of God,  
Knowledge the wings with which we rise to heaven"?

Do we not remember that one of our recently lost worthy inheritors of the old renown of English letters has said, "Knowledge, as all followers of it must know, has a very limited power indeed when it informs the head alone; but when it informs the head and the heart too, it has a power over life and death, the body and the soul, and dominates the universe"? and is it not on this very account that in the prophecy of the blessedness of the later day of the earth's happiness it is declared that "many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased"?

Latitudinarianism! What is wider than the universe of God—except the grace and mercy of the divine character of the Deity himself? To know God, himself, and nature, with all their relations and interrelations, surely that is a wide enough field for thought, and that is the latitudinarianism allotted to man in his inquiries and investigations. To know the worth or the worthlessness of every *ism* which may lead or mislead men is to exercise the right imparted by the Scriptures, which lay it down as the duty of man to "prove all things; hold fast that which is good."

The class of advocates for unreasoning faith and verbal adherence to uninvestigated creeds and cries in philosophy, politics, science, social life, or religion, is passing away—becoming not only numerically smaller, but actually less influential amongst men.

One of the most sagacious of the Roman Catholic priests of Scotland—himself an eager cultivator of philosophy and an author of note among his own confraternity,—on reading some of the earlier papers in our magazine, said to their author, "You are certainly engaged in a good work; if we live in an age of reason, in which intelligence claims to be the eye of the soul in the perception of truth, it is right that intelligence should be so trained as to be single; i. e., unobscured by sophistry; for if the eye is single the whole body is full of light. Deepen and widen the culture of the people, and you will ennoble their lives!" This observation we draw from its source because it is important in its bearing on investigative thought, and for no other reason. Many similar testimonies might be quoted, such as the saying of a distinguished professor of logic,—“Why, you have really succeeded in opening a college for the people, and, in fact, bringing it to everybody's fireside!”

We have no doubt that, during the twenty-one years in which our magazine has been acting as a missionary of culture, it has had good effects in bringing men to see the possibility of impartial, honest, and vigorous discussion being employed in the search after truth without sacrifice of the keenness of chivalry and the courtesy of charity. Indeed, those who remember the state of the press at the close of the half-century in which the *British Controversialist* was rooted, must have noted how gradually, but surely, since that time "the open column" has been added to the other departments of the newspaper, and must recollect that no provision of a similar nature was common previously to that time; nay, so palpable has the advance in this matter become, that even periodicals established for the express promotion of certain tenets or opinions not unfrequently introduce into their pages communicated controversions of the principles advocated. In some newspapers it is not unusual to see on important topics a digest of contemporary opinion presented, *pro* and *con.*, drawn from the best news-sheets of the day. One newspaper has been established with the very design of supplying this *vidimus* of public opinion. But perhaps the most remarkable and gratifying fact we can mention is the practical adoption of the principle of free discussion of subjects in the same serial, partially introduced into *Macmillan's Magazine*, formally announced and acted upon on the side of positivism in the *Fortnightly Review*, and substantially practised in the cause of Christian faith in the pages of the *Contemporary Review*. Even in the elderly journals of criticism it is not unfrequently the case, that articles taking different views of the same topic are issued with only a slight announcement conservative of general editorial consistency. It so happens, therefore, that while we have held on our way thus from the first, and have earnestly laboured to bring into practical exercise among our readers the discursive reason, we have seen the adoption of our plan, more or less, in other serials give proof of its soundness and of its suitability to the times, of its acceptability with the public, and its justice in the estimation of the thoughtful.

In the earliest prospectus we issued it was stated that "no efforts will be spared to make the magazine worthy of extensive patronage and support. The proprietors will enlarge and improve it in proportion to the patronage it may receive." On finding at the close of 1850 that we seemed to have secured a steady sale of upwards of 2,000 copies per month, we felt bound, though our re-issues had absorbed considerable cash, to keep faith with our subscribers and the public, and in January, 1851, without increase of price, its size was increased to forty pages, and several improvements in the contents were thus rendered possible,—one especially, the introduction of "The Young Writer and Student's Assistant," a department which involved great labour and a heavy outlay.

In 1852 the friendly nature of our relations with our readers was such that we made arrangements for an autumnal tour, in which we

held meetings with our subscribers and their friends in many of the chief towns between the Metropolis and Aberdeen, a form of personal intercourse which has since been repeated with pleasant effect, and has been extended to Ireland as well. All these meetings were of the most encouraging character, and many of them led to the establishment of lasting and important friendships among our readers, of literary associations, and of manuscript magazines, and not a few other forms of mutual aid in culture.

The value attached to the favourable opinions expressed of the articles on "The Art of Reasoning," by thinkers of such adverse views in general as Professor De Morgan, Sir William Hamilton, Archbishop Whately, Dr. R. Vaughan, Samuel Lucas, G. H. Lewes, and J. S. Mill, together with their general popularity, induced their publication in a separate form, and they were shortly afterwards approved of by the Committee of the Privy Council on Education. A similar appreciation was paid to the subsequent series by the same writer on "The Elements of Rhetoric." Several other reproductions from its pages have also had, in a separate form, a widely extended sale. Of few magazines can it be said that the first volume passed into a fifth edition, yet that is a fact in regard to the *British Controversialist*; and the second volume has passed through a third edition.

The subsequent three years were employed in the development and improvement of the several departments of the serial, which had thoroughly established itself as a valuable agent in the diffusion of knowledge and in the extension of self-culture, having an enthusiastic *clientèle*, who looked on its conductors as friends closely knit to them in soul.

At the close of our sixth volume in 1855, change in the professional duties of one and in the circumstances of another appeared to make it desirable that the ardency of the toil should be shared in by others, and that the weight of the cares which the management of such a serial inevitably entails should be transferred to other shoulders; while still the interest of its projector and conductors should be continued as advisers and contributors. This step was not resolved on without hesitation, deliberation, and forethought; and such care was taken as was thought likely to improve the tenor and material of the periodical. This change involved material changes in the method of conducting the magazine; and after consultation with the publishers, the printers, and our readers, it was resolved in 1856 to commence a new series, enlarged to forty-eight pages, and raised in price to fourpence. For a time this had a depressing effect upon our sales; but after a short period the success of the new series was felt to be achieved. We had now to bring out the magazine in half-yearly instead of yearly volumes; and this, as well as the need for keeping an ever-increasing number of volumes in stock, materially hampered our hands in any attempt to extend the circulation. It is seldom, perhaps, that the spirit which has animated the founders of anything injects itself into

those who enter into their labours. The essential anxieties of those who had watched at the cradle and tended the *British Com-tresser* in its early years were but slightly lightened by its being, as it were, put out to nurse. The geniality of some of its early supporters wavered under the new régime, and some renounced their allegiance and revoked their interest. True, new friends gathered round "the impartial inquirer," and the trusted and the tried of former years, even amid the increasing cares of personal, professional, social, and civic life, did not withdraw entirely from the nursery of their youth. It came to be thought that the old spirit was required again; and when the hour of emergency occurred, the early conductors resumed their control and exerted their efforts to redeem what had been, perhaps, a false step, although at the time it seemed not merely advisable, but inevitable. On the announcement of their intention to resume their active interest in the concern, a spontaneous glow of joy developed itself in the hearts of the subscribers; and on its being represented to them that the continuation of the serial, in accordance with the aim of the projector, and so as to include the departments which appeared to be demanded by the requirements of the times, would involve a simultaneous increase in size and price, the proposal was advocated and adopted by ninety-eight out of the hundred of those who were consulted. In January, 1859, the price was raised to sixpence, and its size was increased to seventy-two pages, at the same time that vigorous efforts were made to elevate yet popularize, improve yet endear the magazine among those who sought for an introduction to high thought and honest reasoning, original writing and carefully prepared abstracts of the best productions. This change again justified the hopes and calculations of the conductors, and the confidence as well as sympathy of the subscribers having been fully shown, the proprietors in 1862, adhering to their original professions, enlarged the monthly number to eighty pages without increase of price. This considerable enlargement added largely to the cost as well as the labour of production, at the same time that the increase in the number of volumes of which stock required to be kept on hand further crippled resources by tying up capital in a form which was only gradually realizable. These considerations, pressing specially at the time in consequence of a very extensive addition to the number of the magazines issued monthly, in 1864 induced the conductors to ask their readers bluntly but broadly if they thought that the hour had arrived when their share in the intellectual work in the world in this form was done, and if they should now retire from the stage. The reply was prompt and ingenuous, and in the negative. It was thought that our disappearance would cause a blank—not only for the intellect, but for the heart; and we were earnestly asked to continue at our post, and to endeavour for some time longer to hold up the banner with the motto which proclaimed the prevailing might of truth. We assented then, and only once in the interval faltered in our purpose.



We have strained every nerve to hold to our intent, and to maintain the integrity of our honours. We have striven hard to preserve the present true to the history of the past. We have bated no jot of our determination to uphold and exemplify the right of free thought and fair inquiry. Friend has not beguiled and foe has not succeeded in making us traitors to our aim and scheme; and though self-flattery cannot blind us to our failings and our faults, we believe we can hold out a stainless escutcheon as the champions of culture, debate, research, and the full, free exercise of the powers of the soul for the attainment of truth.

As the preceding statement may serve to show, the hope, desire, or endeavour after pecuniary gain has not been a moving power with the proprietors; the gain they sought has been far other, and they have faith in the divine saying, "It is more blessed to give than to receive," and the comment of the poet upon that, "We receive but what we give." So far, indeed, as pecuniary matters are concerned, the existence of the magazine, even in its most favourable years, has resulted, if not in the actual loss, at least in the locking up of a considerable amount of available capital. For whenever it was possible in the state of the financial department they have set aside such portion as seemed to be the result of some specially favouring gale, to be employed in acknowledging, they never dreamed of calling it remunerating, those contributors who, not being of the proprietary, had most frequently and ably seconded their efforts. All along, the magazine has been, as it was designed to be, essentially a co-operative intellectual enterprise, the profit of which was to be progress, culture, and self-elevation; and that not of the promoters, but of the purchasers and perusers. The labour has been willingly undergone; and the loss, so far as it reaches, has been very ungrudgingly borne,—

"Because whoever with an earnest soul  
Strives for some end from this low world afar,  
Still upward travels though he miss the goal,  
And strays—but towards a star."

Now, however, it impresses itself upon us that we should re-examine our position, and take counsel with our readers frankly regarding their interest in our labours, and their inclination to aid in lightening somewhat the onerousness of the cares which have not only been made greatly heavier in the progress of the years and of our toils, but feel more so, being borne along with the engrossing anxieties of personal duties, and under a sense of the lengthening shadows of our life day. Of the amount of labour given to this work, the conductors feel bound to instance the almost unparalleled fact in periodical literature, that during these twenty-one years, in sickness or in health, and amid all the vicissitudes of life, the entire series of the leading papers, unless otherwise announced, and therefore with the exception of scarcely more than a dozen, have been the contributions of one pen. Of the

originality, vivacity, excellence, erudition, fertility of thought, wealth of expression, and careful adaptation to arouse as well as inform, which these papers display, this is not the place to speak; their merits have been acknowledged by the highest authorities in the matters on which they treat. Besides this, the same writer as an essayist, a reviewer, an answerer of inquiries, and a general adviser, has been indefatigable and prompt at any call. The conductors may truly say—and be echoed by readers and contributors alike,—Many have done well, but thou excellest them all.

A large number of other contributors have given great and substantial aid in various departments of the work, and have from time to time cheered and encouraged the conductors. But it happens with all such concerns, that new interests, fresh cares, removals of a glad or of a sad nature, and changes of various sorts, cause lapses and withdrawals, so that unless the number is constantly recruited by men moved by a similar spirit, the work falls heavily upon those who bear the heat and burden of the day. While this overtaxing of strength—amid competition so keen as is now occurring in magazine literature—reacts against the true vitality and variety of the serial, it is true that the scheme and plan of the *British Controversialist* are still unique; and that there does not seem, even yet, any contemporary who could readily be named as combining the characteristics of this work as an organ for impartial debate (open to all readers as contributors); of mental culture, designed to extend and increase knowledge of the higher sort; and of moral improvement in the great elements of earnestness and considerateness. We have followed no imitative course, our initiative is our own, and has been persevered in on principle and with intent. Hence many magazines of a more popularly attractive nature, which have been started under fresher conditions, and unweighted with the responsibilities of years, commend themselves more readily perhaps to the young, who make taste their adviser, and feel that the didactic is the dull. It is not by any means the desire or design of the contributors to be heavy or tiresome; and as far as the topics upon which they treat will permit, they endeavour to add enlivenment to enlightenment. In making as fair an estimate of the contents of this serial for the period in which it has been acting on the public, the conductors think that for fulness, variety, suggestiveness, originality, and accuracy, it need not fear comparison. Especially in its presentation of the results of deep study or researchful thought, and in the contributions of valuable materials, derived from original sources, regarding the greatest living thinkers and writers, it has taken its place as an interpreter and an authority. We have, therefore, no hesitation in believing that those who know it in its history and its purpose, in its past and in its present influence, may be asked to consider now if it may be thought that "superfluous lags the veteran on the stage"? If not, then may we not, secure in the evidence of a twenty-one years' usefulness and suitability, ask our readers to use such efforts

as may lie in their power and inclination to increase our usefulness, encourage our endeavours, aid us in our work, and invigorate the enthusiasm which has as yet unhaltingly stirred the spirit of the responsible conductors, and given to literature thirty-four volumes of valuable, interesting, and trustworthy matter—most of which is free from the ephemeral character which many periodicals display?

Ten years ago we thought ourselves justified in claiming, as the results of our enterprise, certain facts as giving us a right—founded on the opinions of our readers, the notices of our contemporaries, and the facts made patent in the course of the history of our aims and their issues—to look upon our serial as worthy of a foremost place among the higher periodicals of the time. We believe we may reiterate these with the added emphasis of the years that have elapsed and the experience that has been gained. These are,—

"I. *The British Controversialist has been the means of diffusing a large amount of valuable instruction through its leading articles, educational essays, careful debates, Collegiate Course, &c.*

"II. *The British Controversialist has in a very large number of cases excited a desire for mental culture, and created a taste for literary pursuits.* To give all the testimonials on this one point with which we have been favoured would require a volume."

"III. *The British Controversialist has demonstrated the possibility of men of the most diverse opinions being induced to meet for calm and kindly controversy;* and though it still remains without a rival, it has exercised a most powerful influence upon the conductors of the press, some of whom, through its example and success, have now their 'open column,' their 'neutral page,' or their 'controversial section.'

"IV. *The British Controversialist has become a standard work of reference,* and has issued thirty-four volumes, in which upwards of 250 of the most important questions which have ever engrossed the thoughts of man are subjected to the crucible of impartial controversy."

"V. *The British Controversialist has firmly established itself as the only organ of free discussion in existence.* And while with undiminished earnestness it exercises its special functions, it associates with them those of a public instructor and a literary guide."

"We thus briefly indicate some of the principal points connected with the history of this serial, in order to show that, though twenty-one years have been passed, the work has undergone no decay in spirit or in power—that its resources are unexhausted—and that the requirements for its existence are, it seems, as urgent as ever."

What then is the special purport of this statement, this "coming of age" address to our constituents? It is, briefly, that this appears to the conductors a fitting time to elicit from their subscribers, contributors, and readers some distinct and tangible sympathy and support, encouragement and patronage, impulse and practical aid. Not that we desire anything from them too onerous or irksome—

anything that would greatly incommode them or task our own spirits. All that we aim at attaining by this notice is that, having been thus fully informed of our position, they should seriously think whether, on their part, all has been done that might be done to help on this serial, which of old time was delightedly named by its readers "Our Own Magazine." We wish our readers to make it more their own magazine by their living interest in it and for it.

Our pages are, as we have often announced, open to the matured thought and the deeply felt conviction of our readers. It is one of our most anxious wishes that all who have opinions on the matters under debate should contribute their share to the general store; make it the vehicle for spreading what ideas or information they have, and the means by which the noblest co-operation possible to man—co-operation in thought—may be more and more diffused. By essays, replies to questions, notes of meetings of an interesting kind, by discussing the *topic*, and by sharing in the debates, much might be done by many who take little other part in the work than the trouble of perusal. Then, if the suggestive minds among our readers would jot down and send on the hints which they could give, as to subjects for debate, matters of interest on which information was desired, they would find themselves repaid for all the trouble such efforts would cost by the betterment of the magazine, and the consciousness that they were aiding "the good time coming."

Those who cannot help us actively by pen and thought, can aid us effectively by heart and tongue, by commending and recommending the magazine to others, and by the use of means to bring it under the favourable notice of those who do not know of its existence, or have not been actively interested in its purchase. Not a few could show their sympathy by notices in the press, and by reference to it in letters, speeches, manuscript magazines, &c.

All help is valuable, and all is required, if this serial is felt to be a benefit to those who use it. It is needed as a sign of sympathy and a spur to enthusiasm; it is required as a justification of the toil and thought, the sacrifice and the anxiety implied in its being and employed in regard to it; it is wanted to keep up the vital circulation of mind and of money, on which even the most disinterested of periodicals must greatly depend; and it is essential to that constant renewing of the participators in its benefits which is requisite to make up for the inevitable changes of life, time, circumstance, and interest.

The conductors need not hesitate to say that they would resign with reluctance and regret the work which has entwined itself so much with their ambitions, aspirations, efforts, and reflections as to have become almost a life within their life. Nor need they say that so long as the magazine is in their hands the ablest endeavours they can make shall be devoted to its interests and interestingness; that no labour, thought, or care will be wanting on their part, should it be shown to them that the utility of their lives has a fair

prospect of being expended to good results. Neither need they say that, having proceeded thus far, they are willing to go further in promoting the progress of culture; but they leave it to their readers to give them their cue in and for the future, and they will try to better their instructions.

Give us *now* sympathy in our labours, aid in the fulfilment of duty, interest in the personal use of the magazine, and helpful contributions towards its effective literary conduct. Let all who can, introduce it to friends; contribute to its pages willingly and thoughtfully; supply its editors with hints and helps; and get the secretaries of the societies with which they are connected to send reports of their meetings, plans, and progress to its pages. Let us all work earnestly, hopefully, and truly, to advance our own and others' intellectual power.

In hope and trust, we renew our endeavours to promote and further free, kindly, and impartial debate, mental culture, and moral improvement; and we leave our success therein in the hands of the readers of and contributors to the *British Controversialist*.

**PUBLIC OPINION.**—Public opinion is not merely the sum of the opinions of the individuals composing the public. The individuals must be brought into relation with each other, and be formed into some sort of organic whole, before anything worthy to be called a public opinion can spring up among them. It is by discussion and communication that men arrive at a common understanding. But, supposing such a common understanding created, it could not become a commanding force in politics except in certain conditions. It would require, first, some means of obtaining a constant supply of information upon public affairs; and, secondly, some means of making its conclusions known. Public opinion is organized when it has three things—(1) sources of information, (2) means of discussion, (3) organs of expression. These three things are enough for organization. Wanting them, public opinion is powerless; possessing them, it becomes a power, and is in a condition to govern. Perhaps something more is required to make it wise as well as powerful—to make it govern well as well as govern. All these three conditions of power public opinion in the eighteenth century may be said practically to have wanted, though it did not want any of them absolutely. It acquired them in the period between 1770 and 1829, through the extension of the newspaper system, through the rise of the practice of association and public meeting for political purposes, and through the extension of the old practice of petitioning. That period may be called *the period of the organization of public opinion*.—PROFESSOR SEELY.

## The Philosophy of Politics.

### PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATION ;

#### *Or, Votes, Voters, and Voting.*

JOHN STUART MILL is, perhaps, quite right in affirming that "a reconstitution of the representative system on fixed and definite principles is not at present to be looked for." It is a peculiarity of British politics that it is practical rather than philosophical, and more distinguished for recourse to compromise than to systematic schemes. The workable is the highest in excellence of political methods. Yet it cannot be doubted that the thinkable has often a most powerful influence upon human government. All history, law, diplomacy, and civic institution was once thought, and all the improvements which in later times have been wrought in civilization have previously been thought as speculation. That there is little hope of a present realization of his ideas is less a discouragement than an encouragement for a thinker to proceed with the building up of an edifice of systematic thought. Fear might paralyze his reflective powers if immediate risk of adoption was run ; while, if he can expect considerate criticism and impartial discussion of his suggestions, he knows that he may utter his whole mind without danger to the immediate welfare of the state, and with the prospect by investigation of having his opinions canvassed, their good accepted, and their evil cast away after the winnowing of controversy has purified them from error.

We have already signalized the confusion introduced into political controversy and representative reform from not defining with precision the element to which the largest amount of consideration should be given in representation. If it is admitted that government is the entire series of means employed for the maintaining and promoting of the order and progress of society, that law is opinion in its static form, and legislation the means by which the force of opinion as a dynamic of change may be absorbed into and correlated with the state as an organized and vital whole, it must be regarded as a matter of sovereign import in what manner opinion may become concrete and effective. Opinion (*δόξα*) exists not only in the transition state of agitation and discussion (*πειραστικά*) undergoing tentative investigation, but also in the condition of true opinion founded on principles and reducible in the ultimate to science ; after which, by wise modifications, it may be adapted and applied in all possible cases with some approximation to rightness intellectually and righteousness morally. Legislation is the ultimate of tentation, the upgathering and induction of opinion and the passing of it over (*pro tem.*) into the region of law

to be regarded as science, and to be applied with due modification to circumstances as they arise,—until higher generalisations are attainable, and legislation is capable of ascending to a more correct, because a properly revised induction.

In our representative system it is highly necessary to incorporate and preserve the life-giving virtue of self-government—to make it a vital political organization, capable of adaptation and adjustment to altered and altering conditions of existence. If we desire or design to knit together into a compact and strong unity the whole community, so that it may be truly a state, we must do all in our power to produce or encourage among all the classes of which it consists a thorough understanding among themselves, a common sympathy, a disposition to co-operate, and a confidence in the essential justness of the aims of each. This is the way to make parliamentary government entirely worthy of the admiration so frequently expressed for it. If by parliamentary government we mean the choice of legislators by the votes of the citizens freely and fairly given, and the responsibility of the executive to the legislators thus chosen as the representatives of the people, it is of immense importance that the conditions of choice, the means of election, and the forms of recording the voice of the nation, should be such as are simple, just, impartial, and uniform, based on clear principles and carried into practice with undeviating rectitude. This would make statecraft helpful and hopeful, and serve to confirm and strengthen patriotism and social unity.

If our Parliament is to be regarded as the mere representative of opinion, then it consists of delegates rather than counsellors, and its duty is rather to weigh votes than to balance considerations. If it is a deliberative assembly at all, it must be the reasons advanced for or in favour of giving legal or executive effect to any opinion that it should examine, compare, investigate, and debate. If it is a congress of delegates, it has only to reckon votes and declare the proportions of force which these place in the hands of the State as determinants of its action. As it is at present, it can scarcely be said to be either; it deliberates and orates about the truth or justice of a proposal, and yet it votes, in the main, according to the exigencies of party. It, as a general rule, speaks as a deliberative and acts like a delegated assembly. And the people love to have it so; they take pledges from and use influences upon their representatives which are directly opposed to deliberate, impartiality, and they charge with apostasy, "ratting," hypocrisy, or political tergiversation those members of Parliament who disappoint their expectations or disregard their expressed wishes. I notice this as a fact in order that the reader may see that there is a confusion of idea in regard to parliamentary representation, arising, as I suppose, from the undefined nature of our notion of legislative responsibilities and duties.

Of possible *bases* of representation there are, perhaps, eight which might be considered as claiming the attention of any one

endeavouring to construct a philosophical system:—(1) Persons; (2) interests; (3) opinions; (4) property; (5) classes; (6) intelligence; (7) parties; (8) will: and out of these elementary forms of representable possibilities a considerable number of compound schemes might be formed. Of course, in taking as the ground of our theme a Philosophy of Politics, we have freed ourselves from the necessity of discussing the question of whether justice or expediency ought to bear the greater force upon our minds while seeking to determine what might constitute a proper method of enfranchisement. We cannot proceed upon the hypothesis that men have no rights except those which the law of the state confers upon them; we must commence with the minimum of representability—that is, *the person*. The person, however, whose interests and concerns, whose being and well-being is to be cared for by the State, or rather by himself in his action on and within the State as a represented citizen, is a person political; i. e., a person holding distinct individual relationship in service and serviceability to the State. This would exclude minors, lunatics, criminals (under sentence and probably for some time thereafter), paupers and married women (in the legal enjoyment of conjugal rights), subjects of other nations, resident but not naturalized, actual rebels and traitors opposing in illegal ways the purpose and designs of the state; but it would enfranchise all single women of age (maidens or widows) at the same time that it would implicate these in giving to the State, whenever required, public service (personal or substitutionary); for equality of electoral rights can only be morally claimed in return for equality of social dutifulness. Here there emerges the difficulty of basing representation entirely on personality; for that is not *a unit* of a oneness sufficiently specific to admit of its being taken as the single element to calculate from. Personality is to the individual a unit; to the State it is a differing quantity in so far as regards sex and health as measures of serviceability; wealth or industry as measures of taxability; intelligence and principle as measures of manageability. Hence the fiction of the equality of persons in the eye of the State can scarcely be laid down (philosophically) as one which is valid and efficient: as might be shown by supposing that all persons (as defined above) being allowed the suffrage, necessity arose for considering the advisability of raising our army by conscription. In such a case the argument of sex would invalidate many votes; equally so would that be the case in regard to a law designed to control or modify the results of certain of the sins of cities. The personal franchise cannot be regarded as fair and equitable if conferred on man alone, and yet it cannot be impartial in its effects if conferred on women, while the unit of personality is not sufficiently uniform for State purposes.

But the term person political may be regarded as covering a much larger area of signification, and may indeed be considered as extending to all the civic responsibilities undertaken or implied in



being a partner in the State, and all the stake in the prosperity of the estate which they possess as citizens. This would bring the signification of person as a political term to be as nearly as possible synonymous with *interests*, and hence many advocates of political reform consider that the main consideration in the allocation of the suffrage should be the possession of a stake in the country, some definite interest in its welfare and prosperity as a national unit, requiring and worthy of some sacrifice on the part of those who share in the benefits of its laws and arrangements. But the interests of men are vague and unmeasurable, even when in their most palpable form; so much so that it would be difficult to appraise and value the most enlightened self-interest so as to make it the denominator of political representation. Interest, in fact, so much rests upon opinion, that for all common purposes opinion may be regarded as the convertible of interest. This is so much the case that we are very prone to misjudge a man by measuring the honesty and trustworthiness of his opinions by our estimate of the interest he has in upholding them. Of the extreme difficulty of representing opinion by any modification of the parliamentary suffrage we have already spoken. It may be that in "spirit and effect," as Mr. Austin said, "the interests and opinions of the entire population of the country (and not only those of the sovereign body) are habitually consulted by the Legislature, and by the executive Government" of this country. "But it cannot be neglected, in considering this matter, that the opinions of men vary exceedingly in value, and that in any electoral contest founded on the plan of summing up the opinion of the community by votes, 'a vote which is not the expression of a conviction counts for as much and goes as far in determining the result as one which perhaps represents the thoughts and purposes of a life.'" Hence the plans proposed for "the representation of minorities," but all minorities cannot be represented, and hence the equation of opinion with opinion cannot be adequately settled. On this ground men have fallen back upon the tangibilities of life, and have formed a theory of representation of property. The chief argument in favour of a property qualification is the measurability of the wealth of one as regards another, and this consideration has led again to the proposal that there should be a multiplicity of votes conferred on those who possessed property representing a large stake in the *status quo* of the country, and who therefore require a considerable amount of opportunity for protecting themselves against any changes likely to be detrimental to their interests.

A mere property qualification is, however, considered by many as a fluctuating and unsteady one, which, easily measurable though it is, is singularly unstable. On this and other accounts it has been thought wise to generalize the idea into one of property-holders, and so to arrange society into classes, and to allot representation to classes. In this point of view it has been declared that "it is the

principle of the English Constitution that Parliament should be a mirror—a representation of every class ; not according to heads, not according to numbers, but according to everything which gives weight and importance in the world without ; so that the various classes of this country may be heard, and their views expressed fairly in the House of Commons, without the possibility of any one class outnumbering or reducing to silence all the other classes in the kingdom." But while we may admit, in ordinary speech, that the nation consists of a congeries of classes, it is pretty certain that any endeavour to classify men, even in a rough practical manner, for political purposes, would bring us face to face with difficulties ; while, even if it were possible, the adoption of such a principle would lead to our Parliament becoming an arena for the strife of orders, rather than for the maintenance of order and the furtherance of progress. It is moreover an evil to define and embody in states legal distinctions which are not founded on real and lasting differences.

It is not unfrequently stated that as statesmanship consists in the management of the affairs of the nation, and as nothing can be properly managed without intelligence, intelligence ought to have weight allotted to it in any representative Government. It is thought that in the arrangements requisite in allocating the electoral suffrage, care should be taken to secure its transference to and its conferment upon those who are personally fitted by culture, thoughtfulness, and ability to comprehend the issues at stake. It is undoubtedly of great moment to secure the most efficient representation of intelligence, and as intelligence is in a great measure capable of being determined by examination, and is susceptible of being brought to proof, a good case seems to be made out for the giving of a plurality of votes to those who can give satisfactory proof or reasonable presumptions of their possession of superior intelligence. But the transfer of intellectual into social and political power, unless under safeguard for its moral use, it is argued, would be highly disastrous, for, at all times, the greatest dangers to the people have arisen when a subtle but unprincipled intelligence has been entrusted with the actualities of government. Intelligence, then, if properly guarded, should hold a high place in the selection of a deliberative assembly ;—but under what guardianship can it readily be placed ?

This question introduces us to a defence of party as a political agency. Party is the means by which the consistency of intelligence and the intensity of passion can be both brought into co-operative activity on behalf of the state. The time which truth and wisdom take to travel from the philosopher's study to the senate-house for discussion and incorporation with the laws of a land or the practices of government is vastly accelerated when the force of passion and the persistency of party impel their progress. Intelligence has a constant tendency to outstrip realization, and to advance its theories into spheres so far remote from practical

results when free head is given to it, that it is always best managed when it is kept in the yoke with the personal interests of men, and under the leadership of those who constantly task its strength by the immediate labour of the hour. This party does: it enlists intelligence in giving expositions of the forms of legislation which would best accomplish given ends, in diffusing among those who desire to see these ends accomplished some idea of the arguments in favour of the plans proposed, and in exciting them to agitate for the acceptance of these plans by the Legislature. Hence the utility of party in a state; and hence the claim put forward for the representative advantage of government by party as a means of securing earnest solicitude and careful discussion.

Party employs intelligence and passion as agents to move the will—to bring men to decide upon a course of action, and to persist in it. This is called political consistency, fidelity to one's party and professions. The imperial effect of partisanship is, however, the act of the will by which the deliberative power invested by law in the voter is placed in charge of the representative of his party. Thus it unfortunately comes about that, "whatever may be his worth or want of worth in other respects, the voters who are on the same side in politics vote for him *en masse*; whether he is to their taste or not, they cannot, by proposing another candidate, divide the party; they must either bring him in, or lose their votes and give a victory to the other side." This fact suggests that it might, perhaps, be possible to make a ground for representation the one simple act of *will*—the will of each individual is the whole sum of his determination, and may be regarded as certain to be equal in value in each individual to the individual. To give the state, then, that perfect cohesion of life which the individual possesses in having a deliberative will, it seems requisite that we should clear off as much as possible the polemics of the hour from affecting the vital determinations of men as to *who* shall represent them, and in *what* they shall represent them. In political considerations too frequently the aspirations or interests of the moment acquire a greater though not a graver influence than principles, and passion inclines itself far more peremptorily to persons than to truths. There is a danger, therefore, that in the moment of choice the accidental may assume larger apparent proportions than essentials, and the question of the hour or of the locality may decide a vote which is to be exercised for years and for the nation. It might be well, therefore, to separate the agitation of specific opinions as the grounds on which suffrages were asked, and to declare general political principles rather than to give specific pledges on certain specific measures. In the latter case we impart a casting power to transient interests, and leave out of our account the exoneration always available through the on-taking of new phases by the question and the difficulties arising from the development of contradictory interests. We ask men for pledges regarding variable facts instead of seeking to gain a declaration of adhesion to a given set of invariable princi-

ples, and so delegate our will to an expediency in the circumstances of the state in preference to a principle having an active power of appeal to the conscience of the representative. In the militancy of opinions it is, perhaps, better to consent to a principle than assent to a specific—for the former ought to cover and govern the latter. The latter is fugitive, the former permanent.

Parties exist only by their co-existence, and their discord is only the dissonance of the claim of order to the equally valid claim of progress, in their equipoise of force the statics of the state is harmonized with the dynamics of events. Habits are the result of the constant impression of the will on the active faculties in one direction; and as the habits of men are subject to the decision of the will, so are they subject to all the passions which act on the will. Whoever has will upon his side has power. Whoever has opinion on his side is, in the long run, sure of power; for will is, in reality, governed by opinion. This, probably, therefore, shows that in political action opinion should be felt as a free dynamic force, while will ought to be held as a fixed static force—the specific fulcrum on which the lever of representation should be rested and wrought. As will is the arbiter in the individual, ought it not to be so in the state as well? As in the midst of the desires, sentiments, feelings, designs, opinions, plans, and purposes of man, the self or personality of each stands regnant among them in the form of will; so, rescuing him from being a part either of the mechanism of nature or the concurrence of its forces, might it not be possible to make the representation by election a consignment of will, a delegation of the determining power of the individual for behoof of the state?

**CONSIDERATE DEBATE.**—"Conference," says the wise Lord Bacon, "maketh a ready man;" and it effects this end not so much by increasing his resources as by increasing his facility in using what he already has. For in conference mind is brought to bear on mind, and not only is the store of one mind, its experience, its acquirements, and its resources, conveyed in large measure to others, but even the collision of mind with mind has its own great and useful effects. In the answering of questions, in the defence of positions, in the meeting of difficulties, half-thoughts become thought thoroughly out; uses of instruments which lay dormant and unsuspected flash forth upon us, and we find ourselves possessed of a machinery of the use or even existence of which we had formerly no suspicion. Even as to the more outward and material part of our work this is true. It is true as to our power of using the resources of our existing institutions for the relief of the physical wants of our people, for their education, for their civilization, for their training as citizens of the great commonwealth to which they belong. But true as it is with regard to these departments of our work, it is perhaps truer still as to its higher branches. As to these we eminently need readiness in comprehending what the pre-ent time requires, and readiness in selecting and in using the proper instruments for meeting those requirements.—*S. Wilberforce, Bishop of Winchester.*

## Religion.

### IS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE SCRIPTURES TO WARRANT BELIEF IN THE GODHEAD OF JESUS CHRIST?

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

It is asserted in the Athanasian Creed that "the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost is all *one*; the glory equal, the majesty co-eternal. . . . The Father is made of *none*; neither created, *nor begotten*. The Son is *of the Father* alone; not made, nor created, *but begotten*. The Holy Ghost is of the Father and of the Son; neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding. So there is one Father, not three Fathers; one Son, not three Sons; one Holy Ghost, not three Holy Ghosts. And in this Trinity none is afore, or after other; none is greater, or less than another; but the whole three Persons are co-eternal together, and co-equal. . . . The right faith is, that we believe and confess, that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God and Man; . . . perfect God, and perfect Man. . . . Who although He be God and Man, yet He is not two, but *one* Christ; one; not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the Manhood into God; one altogether; not by confusion of Substance, but by unity of Person." This, it is said, is "the catholic faith, which faith except every one do keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly"—the Catholic faith which, "except a man believe faithfully, he cannot be saved."

I have quoted the foregoing authoritative definition of the great word of this debate, "Godhead," because I notice that our fellow-controversialists have not attended to the first rule in intelligent discussion—"Define your terms."

I have looked carefully through the articles of those who affirm the express and essential Godhead of Jesus Christ; but I have found in them no clear adequate official definition of what they undertake to affirm. They speak quite indefinitely in general, as if God-ness, and sometimes even as if God-li-ness were equivalent to *God-head*. Godhead is no such convertible term; it signifies the being, state, and innermost nature of God—essential, not circumstantial condition. This is imperatively and peremptorily asserted in the Creed quoted, and nothing less than this can be meant by those who take the affirmative, unless they give explicit forewarning that they employ the term in an unorthodox form—in

which case nobody would trouble himself to debate the question. Even I, in a certain sense, could affirm the Godhead of Jesus Christ; but the Athanasian style of it I cannot accept as possible in faith even, and still less in thought. It seems to me to teem with contradictions—contradictions that are man-made and creed-made, not God-designed and Christ-given. If controversialists will reason about words which they take in different senses, their agreements or their disagreements can only be verbal. Hence I have selected and brought before the reader the clear, the incomprehensible definition of the Church; and I ask the affirmers of the Godhead of Jesus, Is it this thoroughly indivisible, yet essentially distinct and eternally divided Trinal Deity in which they believe?

In many cases, I doubt not, the term is not thus explicitly accepted in their own minds; there is an ambiguity in the sense in which they employ it consciously or unconsciously. For instance, "Neanias" says that "Jesus is *perfect* God" "because He is so called in the Scriptures;" but his quotation of *Emmanuel*, even if it were admitted that Matthew's quotation of Isaiah was *apropos*, is very far from proving his position. The word signifies "God *with us*," and therefore not "very God," pure and perfect. His argument from the forgiveness of sins is equally irrelevant, for the power to forgive sins was imparted to the apostles, and is claimed even by the clergy of many churches. Equally beside the mark is his argument that Jesus Christ is God because He is an object of worship. How much true worship (on the part of the believer in them) has been given to false gods? "Neanias" knows surely that there are many whose "god is their belly," who are chargeable with "covetousness, which is idolatry."

He says, somewhat rashly surely (p. 251), "The unity of God no Trinitarian denies; but we hold that Jesus is that God." We refer him to our quotation from the Creed, or rather to the Creed imputed to St. Athanasius itself, as it is printed in the Book of Common Prayer. There it seems to me to be declared that Jesus is not that God, but that God is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost—one God—a very different thing. And, having taken him to the altitudes of orthodoxy, I will ask him (and my readers) to accompany me to the depths of heterodoxy, and peruse the following passage, intended to show from Scripture that Jesus, the Son of God, is man:—

"He is tempted; He is ignorant of many things; He corrects Himself; (Matt. x. 5 compared with xviii. 19); He is cast down, discouraged; He asks His Father to spare Him trials; He is submissive to God as a Son (Matt. xxvi. 39; John xii. 27). He who is to judge the world does not know the day of judgment (Mark xiii. 32). He takes precautions for His safety (Matt. xii. 14—16; xiv. 13; Mark iii. 6, 7; ix. 29, 30; John vii. 1 and following). Soon after His birth He is obliged to be concealed to avoid powerful men who wish to kill Him (Matt. ii. 20). In exorcisms the devil cheats Him, and does not come out at the first com-

mand (Matt. xvii. 20; Mark ix. 25). In His miracles we are sensible of painful effort—an exhaustion, as if something went out of Him (Luke viii. 45, 46; John xi. 33, 38). All these are simply the acts of a messenger of God; of a man protected and favoured by God (Acts ii. 22)."

The foregoing passage is translated from Renan's "Life of Jesus;" but the quotations are given for reference to Holy Writ, and he who runs may read them there. "Samuel" (p. 180) speaks of Jesus as "no created being;" and, although the Creed speaks of Him as "begotten," the idea that Jesus is an uncreated Being is so common that we lay the following exposition of an opposite view before our readers:—

"That Jesus never dreamt of making Himself pass for an incarnation of God is a matter about which there can be no doubt. Such an idea was entirely foreign to the Jewish mind, and there is no trace of it in the synoptical Gospels; we only find it indicated in portions of the Gospel of John, which cannot be accepted as expressing the thoughts of Jesus. Sometimes Jesus even seems to take precautions to put down such a doctrine [Matt. xix. 17]: "And He said unto him, Why callest thou Me good? there is none good but one, that is, God: but if thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments." Mark x. 18: "And Jesus said unto him, Why callest thou Me good? there is none good but one, that is, God." Luke xviii. 19: "And Jesus said unto him, Why callest thou Me good? none is good, save one, that is, God"]. The accusation that He made Himself God, or the equal of God, is presented even in the Gospel of John as a calumny of the Jews [John v. 18, &c.; x. 33, &c.]. In this last Gospel He declares Himself less than His Father [John xiv. 28]. Elsewhere He avows that the Father has not revealed everything to Him [Mark xiii. 35]. He believes Himself to be more than an ordinary man, but separated from God by an infinite distance. He is Son of God; but all men are, or may become so, in divers degrees [Matt. v. 9, 45; Luke iii. 38; vi. 35; xx. 36; John i. 12, 13; x. 34, 35]. Comp. Acts xvii. 28, 29; Rom. viii. 14, 19, 21; ix. 26; 2 Cor. vi. 18; Gal. iii. 26; and in the Old Testament, *Deut.* xiv. 1; *Wisd.* ii. 13, 18]. Every one ought daily to call God his Father; all who are raised again will be sons of God [Luke xx. 36]. The divine Sonship was attributed in the Old Testament to beings whom it was by no means pretended were equal with God [Gen. vi. 2; Job i. 6; ii. 1; xxviii. 7; *Psa.* ii. 7; *Isa.* xlii. 6; 2 Sam. vii. 14]. The word "son" has the widest meanings in the Semitic language and in that of the New Testament [Matt. xiii. 38; Acts xiii. 10; Mark iii. 17; Luke xvi. 8; xx. 34; v. 34; x. 6; John xii. 36; Matt. viii. 12; ix. 15; xxiii. 15; Mark ii. 19]. Besides, the idea Jesus had of man was not that low idea which a cold Deism has introduced. In His poetic conception of nature one breath alone penetrates the universe, the breath of man is that of God; God dwells in man and lives by man, the same as man dwells in God and lives by God [comp. Acts xvii. 28]. The transcendent idealism of Jesus never permitted Him to have a very clear notion of His own personality. He is His Father, His Father is He. He lives in His disciples; He is everywhere with them [Matt. xviii. 20; *xxviii.* 20]. His disciples are one, as He and His Father are one [John x. 30; xvii. 21]. The idea to Him is everything; the body, which makes the distinction of persons, is nothing.

"The title 'Son of God,' or simply 'Son,' thus became for Jesus a title analogous to 'Son of man;' and, like that, synonymous with 'the Messiah,' with the sole difference that He called Himself 'Son of man,' and does not seem to have made the same use of the phrase, 'Son of God.' The title Son of man expressed His character as Judge; that of Son of God His power and His participation in the supreme designs. This power had no limits; His Father had given Him all power; He had the power to alter even the Sabbath [Matt. xii. 8; Luke vi. 5]; no man could know the Father except through Him [Matt. xi. 27]. The Father had delegated to Him exclusively the right of judging [John v. 22]. Nature obeyed Him; but she obeys also all who believe and pray, for faith can do everything [Matt. xvii. 18, 19; Luke xvii. 6]. We must remember that no idea of the laws of nature marked the limit of the impossible, either in His own mind or in that of His hearers. The witnesses of His miracle thanked God 'for having given such power unto men' [Matt. ix. 10]. He pardoned sins [Matt. ix. 2, &c.; Mark ii. 5, &c.; Luke v. 20; vii. 47, 48]. He was superior to David, to Abraham, to Solomon, and to the prophets [Matt. xii. 41, 42; xiii. 43, &c.; John viii. 52, &c.]. We do not know in what form nor to what extent these affirmations of Himself were made; Jesus ought not to be judged by the law of our petty conventionalities. The admiration of His disciples overwhelmed Him and carried Him away."

The foregoing passage is contained in the same work as that previously quoted from; but, as all the references are open to those who read their Bible, there can be no harm in taking the interpretation of them by a distinguished thinker and student into consideration; and though "Samuel" may be shocked at the very name of Renan, the true thinker should be "sworn to no master" but truth.

It is a sadly significant fact that so many of the creeds of olden and of modern times are so inelastic, and that men in their love of creeds go so much of their lifetime in bondage to them that, if the brand of heresy is once put upon a man or a book, they can see nothing but folly in his reasoning and sin in his syllogisms. Christians seem to forget that in a book of considerably wide diffusion it is said that "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." Creeds enthrall the soul, but Christ came to disenhrall it from any enforced obedience except to conscience, reason, and religion. In His day men's souls had got encrusted with unintelligible dogmas; He came to set them free from the traditions of the elders. Why ought we too not to be made free from superstitions and the creeds in which they are written? especially as creeds have changed their nature, though they have not abated their claims to reverential regard. During the first three centuries of our era great latitude in respect to the character of Christ was permitted. "Some said He was God, with nothing of human nature, His body only an illusion; others that He was man, with nothing of the divine nature, His miraculous conception having no foundation in fact. In a few centuries it was decreed by councils that He was God, thus honouring the divine element; next that He was man also, thus admitting the human side. For some ages the Catholic Church seems to



have dwelt chiefly on the divine nature that was in Him, leaving the human element to mystics and other heretical persons whose bodies served to flesh the swords of orthodox believers." The same disposition still too much prevails, and hence the hate of heretics that so frequently darts forth in the heat of controversy; and hence it is that believers in the union in Christ of the two distinct natures of perfect God and perfect man, hesitate to read the works of Theodore Parker or Miss Cobbe, of Channing and Renan, of Strauss and the author of "*Ecce Homo*." But controversialists should keep themselves free from these prejudices, and become acquainted with opinions entertained by those who hold the ideas they controvert and the reasons by which these are supported.

Jesus himself taught men to pray. This prayer by His command is to be addressed to "*Our Father*"—one Person, and not a Trinity. Jesus himself engaged in prayer to the Father. Do not these words with wonderful force and significance express difference and distinction?—"And He said, Abba, Father! all things are possible unto Thee; take away this cup from Me; nevertheless not what I will, but what Thou wilt" (Mark xiv. 36). The argument of Jesus regarding Himself, too, appears to grant that He did not consider Himself God, even though He claimed to be so filled with God as to be justly able to claim the title Son of God. The words are these,—"*Is it not written in your laws, I said, Ye are gods? If He called them gods unto whom the word of God came, and the scripture cannot be broken, say ye of Him whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest! because I said, I am the Son of God?*" Here Jesus does not assert that He *is* God; He claims merely to be one God-sent. Our opponents should remember that the term "*sons of God*" is applied in Scripture to angels, officials of dignity, the children of Israel, &c. The first suggestion that appears in the Scriptures of a divine Son occurs as an exclamation of Nebuchadnezzar, monarch of Persia (Dan. iii. 25), and is, therefore, rather a piece of Assyrian superstition than of Hebrew theology.

J. R. S. C.'s etymological argument (p. 29), derived from the Greek word *Jesus*, will scarcely pass muster. The term *Jesus* will be found used in the New Testament for Joshua in Acts vii. 45; Col. iv. 11; and, as he observes, Heb. iv. 8. This shows that it means Joshua, and that it was a name commonly given to children at the time. Even though it should be conceded that it did include the two ideas "*Jehovah-Saviour*," as he suggests, it would not materially help his argument. For instance, *Elijah* signifies "*God himself*;" *Elihu* means "*My God himself*." If we are to reason from etymology, what can afford better proof that these men possessed Godhead as well as Jesus? What can such a weak argument as an etymological one do as opposed to the express assertion of Jesus Christ himself, when He distinctly places Himself on a level with—on the same level as man when He says, "*My Father and your Father; My God and your God*"? (John xx. 17). Jesus

Christ was Himself highly satisfied with the declaration of St. Peter—"Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God" (Matt. xvi. 16); but the creeds must heap mystery on mystery, and make the Son exactly the same Being as the Father in everything, and yet entirely different. God by the creeds is declared to be self-existent; and the Son, who is no whit different, but very God, is declared to be begotten. To be begotten is surely very different from being self-existent, and yet Jesus Christ is declared by the creeds to be a self-existent, begotten, selfsame, but different God. G. L.

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—VI.

"Ah! to how many faith hath been  
No evidence of things unseen,  
But a dim shadow that recasts  
The creed of the Phantasiasts;  
For whom no Man of sorrows died,  
For whom the tragedy divine  
Was but a symbol and a sign,  
And Christ a phantom crucified!"—*Longfellow.*

THE mystery of Immanuel is inscrutable to reason, and is only properly to be apprehended by faith. It is a vain and foolish trust in our mere rationality which makes us refuse to believe what we cannot understand. The incomprehensible surrounds us everywhere; and to us, as to the ancient sage, the question may be put—"Canst thou by searching find out God? canst thou find Him out unto perfection?" It is too high for us; we cannot attain unto it. Just because it is so God has revealed Himself to us, and made known the mystery of His nature. The absolute fulness of the knowledge of God is beyond the reach of man; but we know enough to enable us to worship. The worship of the Father is a holy, and ought to be a blessed duty; but we are privileged besides to receive into our hearts by earnest faith the inward spiritual life of Christ. This is the life which becomes possible to us and influential in us—in all the details, thoughts, words, and actions of our existence; because Jesus Christ, as our Lord, God, and Saviour, grants us acceptance. But if Jesus is not God, then is our faith vain, and salvation is a dream. Who can forgive sins, but God only? Who could "bear in His own body on the tree" the sins of the whole world, but One who was indeed divine in nature and in essence? This Jesus Christ is revealed in the Scriptures as being; and it is of the highest import to our spiritual condition to become convinced of this as a gospel truth.

The following proofs from the Holy Scriptures make, as it appears to us, the divinity of Jesus Christ indubitable.—*Direct statements*: Rom. ix. 5; Col. ii. 9; Heb. i. *Divine attributes ascribed to Christ*:—*Eternity*, Micah v. 2; John viii. 58; Heb. i. 8—12; xiii. 8; Rev. i. 17; xxii. 13 (comp. Isa. xlv. 6). *Omnipotence*,

Matt. xxviii. 18; Phil. iii. 21; Rev. i. 8. *Omniscience*, Matt. ix. 4; xii. 25; John ii. 24, 25; xxi. 17 (comp. 2 Chron. vi. 30); Rev. ii. 23 (comp. Jer. xvii. 9, 10). *Omnipresence*, Matt. xviii. 20; xxviii. 20; implied also (with omniscience and omnipotence) in Heb. vii. 25, and many similar passages. *Divine actions attributed to Christ*:—*Creation*, John i. 1, 3, 10; Col. i. 16; Heb. i. 10. *Preservation of all things*, Col. i. 17; Heb. i. 3. *Forgiveness of sins*, Mark ii. 7, 10; Acts v. 31.

"*Divine worship paid to Christ* (comp. His own declaration in Matt. iv. 10 with John v. 23):—Matt. xxviii. 9, 17; John xx. 28; Acts ix. 14, 21; and 1 Cor. i. 2 ('calling on His name'); Acts vii. 59; 2 Cor. xii. 8, 9; Phil. ii. 10, 11; Heb. i. 6; Rev. v. 8, 13. Other instances of 'worshipping' Him while on earth—except those after the resurrection—are not included, because they may not have implied belief in His divinity." These proofs, and such as these, it is to be observed, are the sort to be sought or given in this debate. The Scriptures are the standards to which appeal is made, and no other authority is admissible. Creeds and confessions have nothing to do with the matter. Our reference is to "the law and to the testimony." It is not the Baptismal Service, the Benediction, the Te Deum, nor the Creed that is to influence us; only have we to discover if there is sufficient evidence in the Scriptures to warrant belief in the Godhead of Jesus.

If we consider some of the passages of Scripture with the care they should receive, we shall find that no rational interpretation of the statements they contain can be given which does not imply or express the Godhead of Jesus Christ. In Col. i. 19 it is said, "It pleased the Father that in Him [Jesus Christ] should all fulness dwell;" and again (ii. 9) it is expressly affirmed, "In Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily." If words have any meaning at all, they must be held to assert the whole Jehovah-hood centred and united in Him as the incarnate Saviour. If Jesus possesses and contains essential divinity, what can He be but God? How else could He say, "I and My Father are one" (John x. 30)—"*All things that the Father hath are Mine*" (John xvi. 15)?—or how could He claim to Himself the Godhead as He did when Satan tempted Him, saying, "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God" (Matt. iv. 7)? Take, again, the passage in which Paul speaks of Christ Jesus, "who, *being* in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God" (Phil. ii. 6, 7), which is capable of taking a stronger sense thus:—"Christ Jesus, who, subsisting in the form of God, esteemed not His being equal with God as a thing to be eagerly clung to, seized, and held," &c. Does not this expressly show that He was God? Had He been man, He would have been in the form of a servant, and would not have required to take that upon Him.

In the foregoing section we have advanced some Scripture evidence for the Godhead of Jesus Christ; we must now refer to some of the negations adduced by the doubters of His divinity.

J. A. (p. 114) fancies he has got S. S. quite under his fire when he quotes the words of Jesus, "My Father is greater than I" (John xiv. 28). But J. A. seems not to have observed that Jesus is speaking of the Father in comparison with Himself in this place in respect to His *office* as Mediator between God and man, not in respect of His *nature* as the supreme Lord. In His capacity as the Saviour He (God) speaks of Him (Isa. xlii. 1), "Behold My servant, whom I uphold; Mine elect, in whom My soul delighteth," &c. On this account St. Paul refers Psal. xl. 7 to Him, and makes Him say, "Then said I, Lo, I come (in the volume of the book it is written of Me) to do Thy will, O God." Yet it is to this same obedient mediatorial Son that God is represented as saying, "Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever; a sceptre of righteousness is the sceptre of Thy kingdom" (Heb. i. 8). J. A. imagines he has made a point against S. S. when he quotes the saying of Jesus that He was the Son of God; but the verse just quoted proves that *this* Son was God, for it is "unto the Son He saith, Thy throne, O God, is for ever." If he considers these things, J. A. may, perhaps, feel, even if he should not acknowledge, that there is evidence in Scripture warranting belief in the Godhead of Jesus Christ.

S. T. C., jun., has a great deal to say in depreciation of creeds. It is, however, no part of our duty to examine creeds, but Scriptures. The Godhead of Christ seems to me to lie like a beam of the clearest sunlight upon every page of the Bible. This is brought out with singular distinctness in the institution of the ordinance of baptism as the mode of admission into the Christian church—"Go ye therefore and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost" (Matt. xxviii. 19). Here in this passage we notice the distinct individualizing of three Persons in the Godhead in the co-equal importance and self-subsistence ascribed to them by the repetition of the copulative of equality—and; but there is also an equally clear and unmistakable ascription to them of oneness and selfsameness in the use of the word *name*; not, be it observed, *names*. One name covers, contains, comprehends, and expresses the three differing, distinct, co-equal, but yet strangely conjoined and united Persons; and it includes them all in the Godhead as co-partakers in it. Jesus Christ is, therefore, God. This is the Christianity, not of the creeds, but of Christ.

Again, let us look at the apostolic benediction—accepted by all churches as an inspired and holy word of God, written for our learning. It runs thus:—"The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost, be with you all" (2 Cor. xiii. 14). In this scripture we have the independent co-equality of all the Persons implied, and the unity of them all indicated, while with beautiful appropriateness "the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ" is invoked as the *pre-condition* of attaining to the love of God, and the love of God is regarded at once as the occasion and the cause of the communion of the Holy Ghost.

It is all the more important, as we have already said, that we should have a firm and well-grounded faith in the Godhead of Jesus Christ, because that "through Him" (that is, Jesus Christ as Jehovah, the Saviour) "we both" (that is, the apostle himself no less than the Christians to whom this word is revealed) have access, by one Spirit, unto the Father. Here, again, we have the three-fold unity of the Godhead impressed upon us, and shown to be essential to human salvation. As we have remarked before, this is a mystery, and it is presented to us in the gospel as a mystery. We are told not *how* this is, but *that* it is. "Who shall declare His generation?" says Isaiah (liii. 8); but Jesus says, "I am *from* Him (showing His oneness in *nature*), and He hath sent Me (showing His office), (John vii. 29). What we have to seek is to get the truth; the means are, "Search the Scriptures." Oh, let us do this honestly, thoroughly, candidly, seeking the light of Him who lighteneth every serious inquirer; and may our consideration of the question lead us to draw nearer to God through Jesus Christ daily.

S. A. W.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—VI.

THIS is a question regarding *evidence*—of "evidence sufficient to warrant belief." I am surprised, therefore, that those intelligent "British controversialists" who have hitherto taken part in this debate have not thought it necessary to define evidence, and indicate to us somewhat of the nature of that evidence which should be "sufficient to warrant belief."

I do not make any pretensions to being a philosophical thinker, but I have read, I hope with some profit, a work or two on logic, urged thereto at first by the chapters on "The Art of Reasoning," which this magazine at first enriched the minds of its readers with. If I am right, logicians recognise three kinds of truth—(1) objective, (2) moral, (3) logical; and anything which produces in the mind a conviction that something asserted is in one or other of these senses truth, is evidence—evidence *to that mind*, but not evidence *of that truth* as an absolute fact. A proposition when asserted is objectively true if it agrees entirely with fact; it is morally true if it agrees with the belief of a thinker; and it is logically true when there is no inherent contradiction between its parts. The evidence on which the mind accepts of truth is intuitive or inferential. If we have intuitive evidence of any truth, we cannot doubt, but must believe it; it is only inferential evidence, therefore, which can be referred to in this discussion.

The sufficiency of inferential evidence depends on (1) the testimony or fact on which we require to base our trust—about which there may be difference of opinion; as in this question, What is the witnessing of Scripture about the Godhead of Jesus Christ? (2) our ability (a) to comprehend, (b) to interpret, (c) and to apply the testimony given to the problem to be settled.

*Belief*, again, is the credit we assign to something that we do not know and cannot know of ourselves, but accept as true on account of the authority, validity, or trustworthiness of the evidence offered for it. It is for this reason that Froude stigmatises it as a "superstition that, in the eyes of the Maker of the world, an error of *belief* is the greatest of crimes;" for either the evidence proposed may be faulty, or the power to comprehend its force may be wanting. It is quite evident in the ordinary affairs of this life that what is good evidence for one man is not to another. This is what makes our differences so great, and occasions such intense bitterness in controversy, especially in religious controversy. We blame one another for not feeling the force of truth, when in reality it is the force of the evidence of the truth we fail to agree about. A great and much-neglected truth upon this subject has been stated by Professor F. W. Newman in his "Miscellanies," which, for the information of our fellow-controversialists, we should like to quote:—

"In the great controversies which have agitated the world, the *true posture* of the argument has always been the main point contested; and this generally means, From *what* are we to proceed as from first truths? To discern not only what are with us first truths, but also what are such with our opponents, is the greatest of all necessities, if controversy is to be useful. We need to penetrate to our fundamental differences. It is easy to gain reputation as a controversialist by developing the results of the first truths assumed by one's own party, and neglecting to observe that of an opposite school; they are not admitted as truths at all."

I cannot help thinking that S. S., in his essays in controversy, neglects this fact; perhaps from a want of sympathy with views of an opposite sort to his own. His opinions are so well fixed in his own mind, and he has become so accustomed to hold them peremptorily, that he can scarcely make allowance for defaults of power to see as he sees in others. He appears to read the Scriptures through an old-fashioned, formal creed, and when he has heard an opponent's argument, instead of weighing its force, he weighs it with his creed, and rejects it as wanting in power to move him. His arguments have been pretty well seen to by others; we shall turn to his auxiliaries.

J. R. S. C. does not seem as if he comprehended the gravity of the question which he discusses. There must be very few of the readers of the *British Controversialist* who have not got beyond the very elementary arguments which he adduces for a belief in the Godhead of Jesus. His arguments from the confession of the demons at Gadara are singularly simple-minded; for if Jesus himself said, "I receive not witness from men," how much less likely is He to accept witness from devils! J. R. S. C.'s argument is, in reality, not asking us to believe in God, but to believe the devil; and we know that Jesus has given us example that we should resist the devil. His denunciation of the attempt of some critics to show that the first two chapters of Matthew's Gospel are unauthentic, as

a "vain attempt," without reason assigned or evidence given, does not say much for his estimate of what a serious controversy requires. He cannot, nor can any one, so far as I have been able to discover, get over the great discrepancy between the three early and the later Gospels,—the untheoretical narrative of the Messianic Gospels, and the highly theoretical and gravely philosophical Gospel of the Lord's friend John. They prove too little, and he proves too much; and the subsequent books of the Scripture may be interpreted variously, according to the creed one reads through.

One great reason which weighs upon my mind in opposition to the Godhead of Jesus is the likeness of that idea to the old world heathenism which Christianity came to dispel. "Trinities, incarnations, virgin mothers, and atonements are to be found in a great variety of religions, and under a great diversity of circumstances." The evangelists of Christ Jesus in their Gospels do not present us with the terrible view of man which modern creeds assert—that all mankind is, in the presence of God, a mass of loathsomeness and sin, only deserving of punishment. They do not exhibit God in a predicament, and display Him as compelled to say, "Either man or justice must perish." They present us with no strange theory of the Deity incarnating His own infinite nature into a human being full of frailty and weakness, for the purpose of bearing in His own body this load of sin and misery, and expiating, by His own death upon the cross of agony, the iniquity of a race,—enduring not only the desertion of man in that terrible moment, but also a singular and mysterious self-desertion, a theory which only the conventional sanctity of the uninquiring can at all accept as able to be comprehended by the human mind, or capable of being revealed by an infinite and holy God, to whom the infirmities of the human spirit are perfectly well known.

It looks to us as if the old-fashioned *credo quia impossibile est* were very popular among those friends who write in the affirmative. The Bible nowhere asserts in express terms that Jesus is very God while very man; the very metaphysical subtlety of the idea renders it very unlikely to have been fixed on by God as a belief essential to salvation. There are many who cannot compass such abstract ideas, and it is plain to me that God desired that all should be saved, and so must have designed things so that all might be saved. In this case, from mere defect of metaphysical comprehension, many would be incapable of seeing God in Christ,—a finite enclosed in a finite, and limited in life, in time, and in space. It is incongruous in S. S. and J. R. S. C. to ask us to believe this *because* it is revealed, without first showing us *that* it is revealed. The latter has been doubted in all ages, and the former has never been proved with such irresistible power as to convince gainsayers. This may arise from intellectual obtuseness on their part, as I have shown; but most people speak as if it arose from moral obliquity. In a matter which involves mere reasoning moral obliquity should not be a chargeable fault; unfortunately, as things are, this is generally

the short and easy method taken with those who cannot endorse a whole creed.

I am glad to notice that high authorities in the religious world are looking on this matter in a different light. It has been announced, as I am writing, that the Boyle Lecturer for this year, the Rev. James Augustus Hessey, D.C.L., late Head Master of Merchant Taylors' School, Prebendary of St. Paul's, and preacher at Gray's Inn, is to take up "The Moral Treatment of Unbelief," and is to show how conscientious scruples regarding the revelation contained in Scripture—such as those occasioned by observing the character and acts which God commands in the Bible—the special commands attributed to Deity—the representations it contains of the divine under a human aspect, and conversely of the human under a divine appearance—from the inadequacy of metaphorical expressions, unless properly understood to convey truth properly to the mind—and such allegations of moral defects in the character of the Saviour as Renan, Strauss, Voysey, &c., urge. This is as it should be; sufficiency of evidence is not the same to all, and sneers are not the proper agents for conversion. For myself, I rather halt between two opinions than agree with either. But as a matter of reasoning, apart from the influence of the schooling of faith, I am inclined to cast in my vote with those who deny that there is *sufficient evidence* in the Scriptures to warrant belief in the Godhead of Jesus Christ.

E. P. T.

WIT ON TOMBSTONES.—A vast amount of wit is to be gathered from tombstones, and mortuary puns have long been famous. The epitaph of the witty divine, Dr. Thomas Fuller, is worthy of himself, simply—

"Fuller's earth."

There is a professional point in the epitaph of the eminent barrister, Sir John Strange,—

"Here lies an honest lawyer—that is *Strange*."

There is something quaint and touching in this epitaph of Grimaldi, the distinguished clown,—

"Here I am."

One of the best of this briefer kind was proposed by Jerrold, whose wit did not always wear so courteous a dress. Charles Knight, the Shaksperian critic, was the subject, and the words—

"Good Knight."

It is added that the injured man recommended the author to use the inscription as a motto for his own journal. Of historic epitaphs the best is this one, on one of Shakspeare's actors,—

"Exit Burbage."

In a similar vein, a wit gave a couplet to Mrs. Oldfield, the most celebrated actress of her day—

"This we must own, in justice to her shade,  
'Tis the first bad exit Oldfield ever made."



## Politics.

---

### A PROFESSIONAL OR A POPULAR ARMY—WHICH SHALL WE HAVE?

#### PROFESSIONAL.—I.

"No man entertains a higher respect than I do for the spirit of the people of England. But unorganized, undisciplined, without systematic subordination established and well understood, this spirit, opposed to regular troops, would only expose those animated by it to confusion and destruction."—*Wellington*.

AGAINST panic there is only one preservative—preparation: against war only one protection—wariness. "Peace" cannot be purchased "at any price"—war can be easily had at any time. The complications of modern society are such that the probability of war overhangs the states of Europe as constantly as the probabilities of lightning and storm, and the possibilities of epidemics and earthquake. The poetical enthusiasm of 1850 about the inauguration of the reign of peace, the closing for ever of the temple of Janus, the disbanding of all armies, and "the federation of the world" has been rudely shocked by the breaking out of a new Burmese war, the *coup d'état* in France, a war with Russia, wars against China and Persia, the Indian mutiny, the Mexican war, the American struggle, Italy's attempt to secure sovereign unity, the difficulties in Japan, Schleswig-Holstein crisis, the Fenian raid in Canada, the humiliation of Austria, the Abyssinian expedition, the revolution in Spain, and the Franco-Prussian war. All these within twenty years have had their sudden outburst and their horrid immolations, in which life, property, happiness, and moral stability have been rudely interfered with by the rude impertinence of war. And even now the war-hunger, like the unslaked demonism of an unsated tiger which has tasted blood, is raging like a venomous madness in the veins of one-half of the people of Europe, creating unrest and distrust.

Who, as the year 1870 dawned with its fresh, pure sunlight on the world on the day of Janus—faced "looking before and after"—could have forecast the crash of three quarters of a million of armed men at Koniggratz, more than half a million of men at Gravelotte, of almost an equal number at Mars-la-Tour and at Sedan, and the overwhelming of the mysteries of Paris by the miseries of the capital of pleasure? Who, standing in the audience-halls of the Tuileries on that day, could have guessed of Wilhelmshöhe, or what 1871.

homes in Germany had forewarnings of the terrible desolations that were to sweep through them, and what prophetic voice gave warning to the left bank of the Rhine of the whirlwinds of destruction which would devastate its lovely plains? Time's sphinx-like face gave the conditions of the knowledge in enigmatical calmness; but who could read the riddle of the future as it has turned out, or could foretell the story of invasion and conquest which the year 1870 has written with bayonet-point and gun-shot in the records of history? And we know that it is "the old, old fashion" of history to deposit in the past the seeds of future events, and to lay down in the hard and unreviseable pages of the past the premises of syllogisms which are to be worked out to their conclusions by the callous logic of facts in the future. One of these we are about to consider—the army of the future, what should it be—professional or popular?

Discipline is the all-availing, all-prevailing requirement of an army. Discipline makes an army; want of it reduces it to an armed mob. Discipline is the result of drill, habit, influences of superiors—in short, of professional training. In every walk of life there is required a thorough reduction of the activity of a man to a sort of automatic professional dexterity and almost mechanicality of activity. This has passed into a maxim of political economy, and the benefits of "the division of labour"—to use the technical phrase for it—have been lauded in philosophical treatises, times and ways without number. If this is a correct and proper requirement of social life in its industrial, intellectual, and relative departments, why should it not be regarded as equally requisite in army organization? It is all very well to say, "Oh, everybody can fight!"—but everybody cannot fight on a field with due regard to military evolutions and to concerted actions, offensive and defensive, which demand combined intelligence, drill, subordination, and devotion. War is a huge mechanization of men, in which the condition and nature of the service required by each may be changed at any moment under the exigencies of strategy; and therefore it requires a practised intelligence concerning the evolutions and manœuvres, with a submissive readiness "to fall in" to the place and to perform the duties assigned without hesitation or inquiry, self-opinion or halting.

One single word—a word lately enounced with much pertinence, gravity, and good sense by Lord Strathnairn in the Upper House—contains in itself the whole secret of this debate, and makes it at once palpable that we require a professional, not a popular army; that one word is *strategy*. It is quite a mistake to suppose that to a Briton fighting is—

"No more difficile  
Than for a blackbird 'tis to whistle."

When the blare of trumpets, the thunder of guns, the sound of on-rushing cavalry, and the thousand cries of war are added to the march-

ing and counter-marching of bannered regiments and battalions with their colours flying, the steadiest brain may find the dissimilarity of unexpectedness affect him, and may notice his brain reel and his intellectual self-possession on the point of slipping away. He cannot take in the turmoil at one view, and collate it into unity. He has to learn that he is detailed off to a definite duty which he is calculated on to do; but he is not to calculate. The soldier who attempts to calculate is lost; before him there should lie but one thing and one thought—duty;—only on this condition can there be vigour in action and steadiness in endurance; and without being able to calculate on these, strategy is impossible. Professional training, as it secures this unquestioning unanimity of action, is a pre-requisite of successful strategy; and this proves that we ought to have a professional army.

Professionalism is the form of our national life. "If an Englishman requires a legal opinion, he goes to a lawyer; if he is threatened with illness, he seeks the advice of a doctor;" if he thinks he needs instruction in morals or in religion, he consults a friend or a clergyman known for his sympathy with and knowledge of such cases; if he intends to build a house, he takes the plan of an architect, and gives the contracts to masons, &c.; if he wishes to have a little outing in summer at the sea-side, he fees a boatman; in everything we find that the man who has devoted himself to one thing does that best. Nay, we have got to think that the man who attempts to do more than one thing is very likely to do one of them, if not all of them, ill. It is evident, therefore, that professionalism has some good claim in its favour over and above amateur work of any sort. One reason, probably, for this is that, when a man devotes himself to a study, trade, art, profession, &c., he sets all his mind to it, and gives it his best attention. He seeks the best models, imitates the best men, thinks over it, plans regarding it, and altogether, as we say, "goes into it" with spirit, energy, enthusiasm, and earnestness. He knows that perfect work is expected of him, and he feels that he has no such excuse as the amateur may plead. When we reject amateurism in everything else, should we accept it in soldiering? when we accept professionalism in everything else, ought we to reject it in soldiering? If not, we should have a professional, not a popular army.

We expect the best science from those who know most about a matter; and, in order that men may devote their whole energies to special studies, we affix special rewards, honours, and acknowledgments to success in these. That men should suppose that war is more easily studied than law or surgery; that you can make an army out of any sort of men, and bind it into a serviceable mass by the mere possession of the right to command, is one of the stupidities engendered by the belief accorded to the peace party that war is wrong, and therefore worthless and useless. But we are all agreed that theft is wrong, and yet we do not propose to leave the detection of acts of stealing, robbery, or burglary to amateur detectives,

and the punishment of their perpetrators to amateur judges and gaol-keepers. We all grant that *disease* is disadvantageous, but we do not choose to entrust the extirpation of epidemics to empirics, the cure of accidents to amateurs. So, though we may think war wrong, foolish, and sinful, we may yet take precautions against it by bringing our forces to such perfection that they may be a warning to those who love war for its own sake or the sake of its results not to try it with us or among us. A professional army seems to me the only one which would make such a consummation possible. It is lawful to learn even from an enemy, and by warlike preparation we may destroy war. J. K. N.

#### POPULAR.—I.

EXPERIENCE is a severe disciplinarian; and the battle-field is a school where drill is severe, lessons are imperative, and punishments are summary. History is a dogmatic teacher, and those who trust to the quackeries of theory instead of the truths of practice are very likely to be speedily and effectually undeceived. It is absolutely vain to cry, "Peace, peace, where there is no peace." It is as vain as the April cuckoo's cry, which has great potency in superstitious minds, but not in those who comprehend realities. There is an absolute necessity for being prepared for war. Safety is only possible as a general rule to those who are forearmed. Whatever we may think of or design regarding war, we have no means of controlling or resisting the designs of others in regard to war, except by being able to cope with any proposed assailant; prevention being in this case, as in so many others, better than cure. As things are in Europe, we are in a state of smouldering peril—like a village on the side of a volcano; and so long as the nations are in such an unsettled condition as they are, war is a possibility against which no statesman can shut his eyes and be safe: and still less can any nation remain blind to the necessity for preparations such as may enable it to hold its own in the contests of circumstance called politics. We may determine to keep out of war, and the complications that lead to war, but can we restrain others from bringing upon us the necessity of war?

The policy of war is intimidation. It demands respect for might, it does not command admiration by right. Strength and numbers are in war superior to honour and truth. It is impossible, therefore, to take effectual measures for the restraint of war except by the embodiment of the force of the nation in the form of an army.

Two questions arise, then, in regard to this embodiment of force. How is the most efficient force to be had, and how is it to be most economically maintained? However fine the talk of the romantic enthusiast may be concerning glorious war, it is, in reality, governed by the most elementary of the principles of political economy. How may it be had most efficiently and at the cheapest rate? It

is a question of general and serious interest, and demands grave care in the discussion of it.

A professional army to be effective would require to be about a quarter of a million strong. This is only to be had for a heavy money payment, that is, weighty taxation. A popular army would consist of the prime and pick of the whole nation, having as reserve the elderly and the staid—it would be costly, but the cost could be defrayed by labour rather than money, and the drill requisite for effectiveness might be suited to the development of higher industrial power and superior health conditions. We give the preference to the latter over the former.

In any way we look at an army it is an expensive machine ; but a professional army is not only expensive but profitless. All the good results of a discipline such as an army requires might be absorbed into civil life, and while every man would thus be, as far as possible, fitted for being in extremity a safeguard and a defence for the country, the country would, in the meanwhile, obtain the sanitary results, the physical training, and the dexterity of frame and thought implied in drill. Nor would it be necessary to use the conscription. If military duty were incorporated with education, and made equally compulsory on all—due regard being had to exceptional cases, we could have a possible soldier in every citizen, and by a judicious distribution, and use of holidays and drill seasons, we might have volunteer encampments of able men year after year ; enduring the burden, but sharing the sense of duty of a soldierly life. While all the actual requirements of garrison duty and foreign service could be accomplished by enlists, for terms of years, from those who felt a vocation for arms. All the orderly conditions of life would be improved by a popular army, and the stupid glare and absurd romance of soldiership would be eradicated from society, while the special vices of the camp and the barrack might be largely subjected to control, regulation, and, if properly attended to, eradication.

The people ought to be its own defence. Self-preservation is the first law of nature and of nations. For a long time the political condition of this country has been such that its inhabitants have been sedulously trained to cowardice and habits alien to war. The revolutions in our country led to a policy for disarming the people and reducing them to serfage by a large paid professional force. Our standing army was well weaponed and well drilled, but it has always been regarded by the aristocracy as a defence of order—their order,—as a defence of the nation, its inhabitants, or its property. If it is wished to bring into first-rate and effective condition the character, conduct, spirit, and principle of the people, then we ought to have a citizen army, a noble mobilization of the entire population, to undergo with patience, endurance, and persistency the training requisite to make men able personally to defend their hearths and homesteads, their country and its institutions, their own heroism and devotedness. It is better to pay the

hard commands of military training than to submit to the harsh demands of military conquest; and hence we should have a popular army. But it is of far higher importance that the defence of the country should be in the hands of those who have no natural lust of conquest, an aversion to bloodshed, and no sympathy with wanton cruelty, than in those of a hired gang of men who hold life cheap, and love war for its own sake, or for the chances it brings.

The stern tuition of war would do no detriment to a nation so absorbed as we have been in small cares, petty party intrigues, selfish interests, and forms of commerce or industry not very productive of elasticity of spirit or of elevation of soul. It might greatly temper for good our devotion to external prosperity, our love of ease, our corrupting selfishness, our worship of wealth and show. It would breed in us *manliness*—the true heroic valour of duty, the old *vir-tue* of our race. It might hearten us to nobler enterprise, invigorate and dignify our daily life. It would, or at least it might, knit the bonds of society more closely, and might lessen the apathy often displayed by men in submitting to any sacrifice which involves both personal risk and personal interest. It would supply us with lessons on the dependence and interdependence of class upon class, and ennoble our life by a sense of duty. A popular army would supply a popular training in uprightness, earnestness, patriotism, dauntlessness, and love of freedom and of law. A professional army can scarcely ever be anything else than a rank and file of inferior men, much given to sloth and vice, and a set of officers who have a love of pleasure and change, of position and pay, of place and of promotion.

Ours is a nation peculiarly favourable to the effective institution of a popular army. Our people have warlike instincts, they have, too, the spirit and the habit of subordination in the field as agriculturists, in the workshop, the factory, the ship-yard, and the navy squad. Personal ardour and physical vigour, combined with capacity for organization and the subordination it requires, are plentiful in our land, and therefore we have all the elements of soldiery at our command, almost prepared to our hand. In addition to this we have just inaugurated a national education, with which all the elementary drill of recruits might be incorporated, and so we might have the raw material of armies almost ready in boyhood, to acquire the higher elements of training, while we had them given in the docile, teachable, tractable state in which they could be speedily prepared for serviceability. Fear of political resort to the weapons of warfare to attain reforms need scarcely now be dreaded, and therefore there need be little reluctance on that score to put weapons in the hands of those who are green and withy, to whose physical recruitment it would do so much good, while it would afford a certainty of recruitment for an army of a habitually obedient and a thoroughly drilled and disciplined force. To make the army popular it must be a people's army, and to make it a powerful it must be a popular army.

I cannot comprehend the great outcry of the professional agitators for a large and expensive, well-officered and thoroughly drilled standing army. They speak of the difficulty of handling and massing large bodies of men, of gaining efficient service and sufficient obedience, of securing subordination and respect. In an age such as ours, when the "great captains of industry" have displayed such ample powers of organizing rude masses and raw material into the conquerors of nature to an extent unparalleled in any period of the world's history, are we to be told that the great captains of war are less capable of fusing and welding the banded braves of a popular army into fitness for great achievements than they have been? Willing hands and willing hearts cannot surely be so ill to manage. Is this doubt of a popular army not, in reality, the result of the great mistake of classing the scamp of the semi-rascaldom, or the dullard of the skill-less clodhopper class, as the types of those who would form the *personnel* of the army of the people. But this is a rank mistake. The army of the people, if properly engineered—so to speak—would not be all drafted into any squad, but would be (or at least could be) assorted so as to be brought into working order with sympathies of class and order, ambitions and abilities of special sorts and aptitudes for particular service, by any captain of men thoroughly capable and in earnest.

Professional means, in reality, theoretical and pedantic, governed by rules of art, fettered by red tape, and bound to traditions, tortured by routine and drill, moved like pawns on a chess-board, and manœuvred by strategic regulations. Professional means a merely conventional and artistic deployment of troops, not the strenuous employment of them. Professionalism always means a low, set style of doing things. There is a lack of enthusiasm and of vital warmth in it, and there is a constant tendency to take it easy and make things comfortable. The worst condemnation of a professional army is to be found in the fact of the need for this present discussion. If a professional army had been the most trustworthy, and if professional people had the best knowledge of what was required, and the ability to bring all about in the best order, how is it that with an army more costly by far than any other in the world, we have sunk to this state, and that we have a more useless, though a more expensive army than any other first-class nation? Every argument that can be employed in favour of a change in our present army tells back against our standing professional army. Let us put aside professionalism and cultivate patriotism; and surely we can scarcely be worse in our organization and moralization under a popular than under a professional army. J. W. S.

#### PROFESSIONAL.—II.

For the following reasons we believe that we should have a *professional*, not a *popular* army.

1. Our having a popular army would completely upset the long-

settled pursuits of the community, by calling away the people from them. It would seriously interfere with and disturb business and family arrangements. It would be an innovation upon established practices, which have, for many generations, been highly conducive to the prosperity and well-being of this flourishing nation. It would introduce an entirely new condition of things, and by directing the people from those settled occupations, the steady and continuous following of which has been so beneficial to the community, would be highly injurious to the British nation. To a professional army this objection does not, in anything like the same measure, apply, the individuals who compose it being persons who make it voluntarily their calling, and who, while attending to the military duties incumbent on soldiery, would not be neglecting any other profession or occupation of their own, as would be the case with a popular army.

2. We believe that a popular army would not be so well qualified for its duties as a professional one. An army composed of men who are continually kept in an organized state, instead of a part thereof, being continually severed from the rest—that severed part being in a disarranged condition—must necessarily be the more effective. An army composed of men who are kept in an active state, who are continually undergoing military training and discipline, whose powers of manœuvring, &c., are trained and maintained at the highest pitch, must be more effective than an army composed of individuals who are frequently leaving a soldier's life and occupation for that of a civilian's, and who have thus continually to unlearn what, under military training, they have learned. The same individual cannot excel in many branches of knowledge. To be proficient in his occupation he must concentrate his attention upon it. The minute subdivision of labour which has long been carried out in our manufacturing processes has been one of the main causes of the excellence and perfection which has been attained. The dividing of the talents, energies, nicety of skill, and attention of an individual amongst several employments greatly differing from each other, necessarily makes the individual to be in them all inferior to the man who concentrates his attention on one of them. If an individual be occupied for a short time in the use of tools, instruments, or weapons of a certain kind, and then be diverted therefrom to the use, for another short period, of tools or instruments of a totally different sort, the consequence necessarily is that he does not acquire that expertness, dexterity, and precision of manipulation which is acquired by those who are constantly employed in the use of the same kind of instruments. We are well acquainted with young men who have been proficient in drawing and music when they have left school, after which period, as they have not practised either, their time and attention being devoted to the farm or to some other business, after the lapse of a short period it has become utterly impossible for them to perform that which shortly before was easy to them and pleasant. Great readiness and



nicety in most arts is acquired by continual practice. The neglect for a brief period of practice in any art greatly diminishes the power of working in that art with quickness and precision. The man who continually works at some art or trade is able to surpass him who works at the same employment only occasionally. And in military science, with the skilful use of arms, and readiness in the performance of various military movements, there is sufficient for the employment of a man's concentrated and continuous attention. Therefore we should have, not a popular, but a professional army.

3. Another objection applies to a popular army. Many feel, for various reasons, a great and well-grounded dislike to personally serving in the army; and they would much rather pay a heavy tax for the support of an army, and be exempted from personal service, than pay a light tax and be compelled in their turn to perform military duties. And those who entertain so great a dislike to military employment ought not to be compelled to serve therein. Such compulsion would be quite opposed to the general letter and spirit of British legislation and government for some time past, as well as to a disposition which is becoming growingly prevalent and powerful among the inhabitants of Great Britain.

4. There is not the shadow of a necessity for such compulsion as the institution of a popular army would necessitate, there being an amply sufficient number of individuals who choose, or might choose, the military profession, and who therefore feel it to be no hardship to serve therein. Even were there a lack of persons volunteering to be soldiers, the rulers of Great Britain would need to hesitate before establishing compulsory army service. But there being no room to plead for a popular army on the ground of a lack of individuals volunteering to enter military service, why should those who entertain a great dislike for such service be compelled to serve, when there is no need for their services? Those who feel a love for military service can still enlist without the establishment of a popular army. The non-establishment of such an army will do them no injustice, neither will it exclude them from effecting their own wishes. But those who greatly dislike military service cannot, if a popular army be established, be exempted from serving. The establishment of such an army would, to them, be an injustice; it would prevent them from effecting their own wishes. As a professional army, and that alone, will admit of the accomplishment of their wishes, both by those who love and by those who dislike military service, let us have such a one. By this means injustice will be done to none, fairness will be shown to all. As, then, a professional army will interfere the least with settled, fondly cherished, and beneficial usages, as it will be more effective, as a popular army is unnecessary, and as a professional army will be more universally fair and just, we say, by all means let us have, not a popular, but a professional army.

S. S.

## POPULAR.—II.

It is difficult to think how this question is to be discussed. At the first glance it seems as if the antithesis of "professional" was "popular," and that it is impossible to have a *professional* army that can be *popular*, or a popular army that can be *professional*. The facts of experience violently oppose this view—for our army, which is professional, is also popular—popular to a proverb, so that a red-coat, it is generally admitted, can vanquish almost anything in the shape of a woman, even in the piping times of peace; and that he can overcome his foes we need no proverb but hard history to tell. Then the German army, which is popular, is, like everything in that country, professional. In these senses there is no contrast between a professional army; it is quite possible, then, an army may be both. This, then, is not a debatable sense of the question.

We must turn to some other form of significance in the term. A profession is often employed to signify a chosen or selected pursuit, one which being voluntarily chosen is devotedly followed and assiduously studied—made a profession of. A professional army in this sense would mean, so far as concerned the main body of it, an army procured by *enlistment* for a greater or less term of years. The word popular, again, is often used, not only to signify favoured by the people, but proceeding from them. An army of such a sort could only be procured in one of two ways—conscription or volunteering. The former mode, although the army raised by that means would really proceed from and consist of the people, would only be in a technical and etymological sense *popular*; in the true sense it would be the very opposite, offensively unpopular.

Conscription is, in fact, confiscation and kidnapping. It is making citizenship rather a crime than a joy. It is treating the honest, well-meaning, peaceable man as if he were an offender, and giving him a number of years' drill and servitude at the will of the State rather than at his own. It is thus we have hitherto treated criminals; all others we have left free to choose and to follow the bent of their inclination, and the tenor of their convictions. Confiscation or conscription would alter all this, and change the nature of citizenship from that of freedom to servitude. It cannot, therefore, be this that is meant by a popular army—for a popular army must be one towards which the heart leaps, and with which it has noble sympathies. A conscript army, as being regulated on and by principles which take and can take no cognizance of individual hardships and personal disinclinations, would be quite inadmissible in this country, in which the State is singularly sedulous to lay its hand gently on the individual, and seeks to press as lightly as possible on persons and classes.

I do not know whether the readers of the *British Controversialist* will agree with me, and I do not think that I shall receive a vote of thanks from the House of Commons, or a pension from the Civil

List for my suggestion, and yet I feel that there is something in the idea that I am about to propose which deserves attention. But I must not come too suddenly to my proposition; I shall therefore premise a few remarks to lead your readers gently into the light of my proposal.

My first observation is that volunteer effort is in the highest degree admirable. In fact, a paid patriot has never in history been deemed especially noble, and we know how keenly the term "hireling" is felt to be a reproach even to the purest character. Even the noble and pure energies of the Church have in a great many instances been greatly impeded by the idea given sanction to even by Milton that the clergy are—

"Hireling wolves, whose gospel is their maw;"

or, as he elsewhere even more offensively phrases his objection, that the holders of benefices are—

"Such as for their bellies' sake,  
Creep and intrude and climb into the fold!  
Of other care they little reck'ning make,  
Than how to scramble at the shearer's feast  
And shove away the worthy bidden guest."

This, of course, is a mistaken idea, for "the labourer is worthy of his hire;" but the fact is quoted and noted to show how highly valued among us volunteer effort is. And the amount of volunteer effort among us is truly wonderful. Statesmen and members of Parliament, magistrates, mayors and town councillors, churchwardens and vestrymen, poor-law guardians and road trustees, local preachers and Sunday school teachers, lecturers and many instructors at mechanics' institutes, presidents, treasurers, and secretaries of friendly and other societies, managers and committees of public movements, school boards and chapel trustees, tract distributors and directors of charities, are only a tithe of the amount and variety of volunteer effort prevalent among us.

I have next to observe that Britain has two great deficiencies in regard to physical culture,—(1) a good system of gymnastics, and (2) a good number of holidays. Perhaps a good general system of gymnastics may be incorporated with our school system, and instruction in all that tends to develop and enhance the powers of the body may then be communicated simultaneously to the entire youth of the nation. If this were done, there can be but little doubt but that the best gymnastic would greatly aid in giving that aptitude, unity, elegance and ease of motion which are requisite in massed bodies, and would form a good preparative for the after practice of all military exercises. This excellent preparatory drill would give a good help towards the solution of the difficulty we are now considering, as it would realize in the minds of youths the habits of discipline, order, and combined action, which are in reality the essence of soldierliness.

In almost every place we have seasons of holiday; these are now,

however, neither so long nor so frequent as they might judiciously enough be made. Were these seasons of local holiday utilized by the Government, and properly extended, so as to be really valuable agencies in the establishment of health, and the general strengthening of the physical stamina of the people, a great improvement would undoubtedly be the result, and a large benefit would accrue to the community. It is well known that change of toil is rest, and that he best guards life who best employs all its manifold activities. We plead for a large extension of well-regulated holiday-times, and for the promotion among all classes of rational, healthy, and useful amusement.

Our proposal now "looms in the distance." We would suggest that, as far as possible, all ordinary local holiday seasons, or those which are likely least to impede or disturb the common current of life, should be taken into the notice of the State; that where possible these should be so extended and arranged that three clear fortnights in the year might be made fully available for physical culture and military drill. On this being arranged, Government should provide proper officers and instructors, and, to all who enrol themselves, rations, accommodations, prizes, perquisites, drill, and training should be given; the drill and training to be military, and part of it at least to consist of excursions, by rail, waggons, or on foot, as might seem most judicious to the instructors, to places of interest at a distance, but under military discipline and manœuvring. In this way the good old English principle of life would be re-introduced, in which every man had soldierly training, and was able to defend his hearth and homestead, at the same time that the liberty of an Englishman in person and inclination should be respected to the utmost. Were this done vigorously and earnestly, by far the greater proportion of the lithe, active, and strong, the enthusiastic and the progressive, would attach themselves to the drill excursions and military encampments, and would find joy and health in the course of their holiday. A great national improvement in health and habits might thus be brought about, our ideas not only of holidays but of life be much improved, and a spirit of active patriotism might be educated. While this would happen with all, and the average physical nature of Englishmen would be improved, full scope would be given to the development of a taste for military life in those who were given to that sort of pursuit. The Government rations and accommodations could not cost much, but would be sufficient for the light-hearted and jovial holiday-makers who would enjoy their drill. The prizes and perquisites, whatever these might be, would aid to stir up the competitive faculties, and thus we might have national training at little cost, and the *élite* of these would find their way into the army easily; while, being already up to the drill and exercise, they would be economically got for soldiers.

Such is an outline of my scheme for training a popular army.  
K. N.

## Education.

---

### SHOULD THE BIBLE BE READ IN SCHOOLS WITHOUT COMMENT OR EXPLANATION?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

I BELIEVE that it may be laid down as an indubitable axiom in education, that he who is heartily interested in any subject in which he is about to instruct others, young or old, will prove more successful than another whose work in the matter is purely perfunctory. And if this is true of ordinary branches of instruction, how much more must it be the case with religious teaching! Nay, there we might almost go so far as to assert that such teaching, when only a matter of routine—a duty that has to be got through—will, in very few instances, be productive of any good result, and may very possibly culminate in disgust on the part of the taught. Greek or geometry a teacher *may* drive into his pupil's head, though he love neither the one nor the other; not so Bible doctrine and Bible practice. How was it that at one time it appeared as if the philanthropic project which aimed at the religious training of the young by means of Sunday schools was likely to collapse totally? Because it was endeavoured to carry it on by means of an organized body of paid teachers. The noble and self-denying band of Sunday school teachers now at work amongst us (and surely, as a whole, they may be allowed to merit these adjectives) labour the whole year round without pay; and if minor motives have a place with some, the majority, and certainly the most indefatigable, are urged on by loving zeal. Now, if we apply this to the present instance, I think it will be manifest that we cannot expect to find, in the bulk of the teachers engaged in imparting secular instruction, those qualities which would fit them for the grave duty of imparting the rudiments of religion, or explaining the Bible either briefly or in detail. Nor, indeed, should it be considered as their proper work in the case of the lower class of children; for we could hardly suppose that, coming from them, it would be generally received by their charges in a way likely to be productive of benefit. With those of small refinement, the schoolmaster and his work are too closely identified with each other, and if they are not actually disliked, they are not, except in a few instances, the cause of pleasant emotions in a child's mind. The *task* is a task, whether it has to be done in or out of school hours, and the Bible lesson, received from the same individual who teaches spelling and arithmetic, is regarded very much

as these are. It is otherwise, as will be readily seen, with the children of the upper, or the larger section of the middle classes. Some may assert that by this argument the Bible itself might be excluded, because it becomes a sort of lesson-book. There are various reasons, however, which have been pointed out, why it is desirable, or even necessary, that the Scriptures, not in their entire state, but in such portions as are suited to the age and intelligence of the children, should be read in schools, either in our present Authorized Version, or in a trustworthy revision when we have it. The Bible is more intelligible to children in its present English dress than many suppose, for it speaks in simple, forcible Saxon, and, with certain alterations, it might unquestionably address itself still more plainly to their minds. The six days' reading of the Bible in the week-day school may prepare the way for the right reception of scriptural truth as applied to the heart and conscience by the teachers, inspired by Christian love, in the Sunday school.

Much that has been said on the other side fails to touch the question, because the debaters assume that it is wished to prohibit all exposition or explanatory teaching of Scripture. Not at all. What we desire is that this should be put in its proper place. Separate expressly religious instruction from that which is of a secular character. To the one it may be the business of the State to insist that all within its domain shall be compelled to give attendance; for the other, though the State may offer many facilities, it must allow voluntary effort, on the part of churches and individuals, to make provision. As a Christian State, it should not withhold from those it teaches through the week the Book which is the basis of all Christian life; but beyond this were those charged with the function of national education to attempt to proceed, they would find themselves in a labyrinth of difficulties. There are parents who, through stupidity or prejudice, will not permit their children to attend a Sunday school, or receive religious instruction otherwise; and the regular week-day Bible reading, which is known to be unaccompanied by any attempt to warp the child's mind, and which is not made the groundwork of any doctrinal teaching, can scarcely be objected to by the most bigoted or the most free-thinking of parents. And who shall say what results may accrue in after life from the implantation of the seeds of divine truth in soil which would otherwise have been destitute of sough which could fructify, or avail to the spiritual advantage of the individual, or of those with whom he has to do? By all means let us provide for the young, both on Sundays and on evenings during the week (if need be), direct instruction in matters of religion; but let this not be mingled with secular teaching. The Bible must not be a sealed book from any in a Christian land, and lest by some mischance there are children, as may always be, who can by no persuasion be induced to come within the pale of any sect or denomination, at least these shall know Christianity by its inspired records, and be perhaps the happier because they have drawn truth from the foun-

tain head. The labours of the expositor or preacher, of the present day or of the past time, are deserving of high honour, and have their exceeding value: yet we must remember that God can teach from His own word without man's aid, and by a sudden and mysterious intuition a child, when reading the sacred page, has sometimes struck upon a meaning at which grave and learned men have only arrived by slow processes..

It is not necessary to draw an inference from what has been argued, to the effect that he or she whose life-work it is to initiate the young in those branches of knowledge which will fit them for the various pursuits of life should not employ themselves also in communicating religious instruction. In this respect they may act as others do; all that is asked is that with the official capacity of teacher in the week-day school there shall not be combined the character of the teacher of religion in any form. Out of this engagement the State has no right to interfere with the individual teacher; the pursuits of his leisure hours fall not under its cognizance, only in so far as to ascertain that they do not tend to disqualify him for his particular calling. Many engaged in secular teaching are also most successful when they enter at other times upon the domain of Biblical instruction, and they are so because in that sphere they work from love, not compulsion. It is not supposed, indeed, that it would be needful to prohibit all allusions to matters religious or moral which may be suggested by lesson-books, or by any circumstances occurring in the ordinary routine of school. All that I contend for is that there shall be no express teaching based upon the Bible lessons,—teaching which would be of a very diverse character, and which would be, to a very great extent, irresponsible. I cannot, therefore, but regret that the London School Board should see fit by resolution to decide upon putting into force this mode of communicating religious instruction. No; by all means let the Bible be read daily in schools—read, if possible, in such a way as to preclude the idea that it is a portion of the task-work which has to be got through. That certain parts of the volume should be omitted (at any rate while our English version remains unchanged) will approve itself to every thoughtful man. In this a discretionary power must be placed in the teacher's hands.

CRIS.

---

“THERE is no wealth but life. Life, including all its powers of love, of joy, and of admiration. That country is the richest which nourishes the greatest number of noble and happy beings; that man is the richest who, having perfected the functions of his own life to the utmost, has also the widest helpful influence, both personal and by means of his possessions, over the lives of others.”—JOHN RUSKIN.

## Science.

### HAS MAN DEVELOPED FROM THE SAVAGE STATE?

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

PROGRESS is a fine word, but it is often misapplied, and civilization has become almost a word to conjure with. Progress is the whole secret, according to Darwin, of man's evolution from the lowest state of life—some marine mollusc, composed of a substance apparently identical with the cellulose of plants, and consisting only of carbon and hydrogen; and civilization, according to Comte, is the whole secret of human dynamics—it is positivism. With a singular perversity of phrase, Darwin calls his tracing out of this inhuman origin of humanity "the descent of man," instead of the development or the ascent of man; and Comte, with equal irrelevancy, denominates the superlative civilization to which he desires to raise man, positivism. It is, perhaps, lucky for us that we do not require, by the terms of this question, to trace back the human race to the primordial solitary or social Ascidians from which man is evolved, or to take him up as our topic from the unitarian *sac*, in which he made his appearance as a creature capable of development. We are permitted to begin with him as man, "an artless savage," but withal a man, and the question propounded to us is, "Has man developed from the savage state?" If Darwinism is true, and man has issued forth from and progressed through all the states of life that lie between what he now is and a mollusc, he must have been something much lower than a savage, and is indeed a much more progressive animal than most people have believed him to be. We doubt this extraordinary progressiveness of man; and we think it may well be required of those who would have us to believe such miracles of development, to explain how it comes to pass that we have so few instances of savage nations progressing now, when so many of the appliances of civilization surround them, seeing that they made such impetuous progress in the days of old. The whole past is a witness to the present, that progress is not the issue of lower states into higher ones, but stagnation or deterioration is much more frequent than progress. China stagnates, Africa has deteriorated, the native tribes of America have not burst into sunny civilization, and even in Europe one may justly doubt whether man, as man, has really developed, and whether the vast accumulation of circumstantial influences has not dwarfed the spirit of man, and made him less truly man than were his predecessors in the brave days of old. The men whom Chaucer describes, Spenser pictures, and Shakspeare reproduces, do somehow seem more self-contained and nobler in nature than the heroes of Byron, Tennyson, and Browning.

Our present topic, perhaps, dates its suggestion to the paradoxical



reply which "the censor of civilization"—Rousseau—gave in 1749 to the query proposed by the Academy of Dijon, "Whether the progress of the arts and sciences had tended to the purification of manners and morals?" Diderot suggested to the eccentric thinker that greater notoriety would be gained by taking the wrong side, and hence Rousseau took up and maintained the negative with that brilliancy of rhetoric which has so served to dazzle and destroy in France from that day to this. His vehement denunciation of civilized life, began in paradox, and for notoriety, has had a singular weight in making France the land of revolution,—in making the land in which the idea of a social contract took its rise, the land in which social contracts have no power, but selfishness seeks unrestrained change, and the social savagery of civilization is most terrifically exemplified. The paradox of progress from savagery to civilization has resulted in the revolution of 1789, and all the successive attempts made by revolutionaries to work out the doctrines which lie at the base of the supposititious *contrôle social*. The paradox has borne bitter fruit in politics, philosophy, and social life, and stands very much in need of examination. Perhaps before we go farther in discussing it we may refer to Voltaire's opinion of similar tenets.

When Rousseau sent a copy of his essay "On the Origin of Inequality among Men" to Voltaire, the latter exposed its fallacy in the following sarcastic style:—"I have received your new book against the human race, and thank you for it. No one could paint in stronger colours the horrors of human society, from which our ignorance and weakness promise themselves so many delights. Never has any one employed so much genius to make us into beasts; when one reads your book, he is seized at once with a desire to go down on all-fours."

The mistake of the theorizers about civilization and progress is that they think of the aggregates of the concomitants of civilization as social worth, and on the ease with which these can be attained as progress. But the true distinction between savagery and civilization is not in circumstances but in morality. Savagery consists in the spontaneous indulgence of the senses of the present hour, and an existence regulated by the caprice of a will that has been unsubdued by reason, and regulated to thoughtful restraint. Civilization is, on the other hand, self-consistent, willing activity, forethoughtful in purpose, and persistent in design—an endeavour guided by an ideal, and subordinated to an end. People and nations rank high or low in the scale of civilization in proportion to the power of individuals to be a law unto themselves.

The tribes of Central Africa and of the Polynesian isles rank very low in the scale of civilization; they are rude, uncouth, and uncontrolled by the high forethoughtful self-restraint of a reasonable morality. Oriental people have a higher place, though still a very low one, on account of their wills being so little exerted, their moral nature being so little regulated by principle, and their self-

indulgence leading them to supine endurance rather than severe exertion. Caprice and arbitrary determination have too much influence on the acts of men, and the ideal of a high aim has taken no possession of them. The progenitors of the civilization of Europe introduced those protective influences and forms of social life by which citizenship leads to civilization; and what we call Christian civilization depends on the introduction of principles of moral life into the social state, which regulate the intercourse of men, and hold before them a lofty ideal of their personal worth and the possibilities of their nature. But we have no evidence in history of self-originated civilization. Every advancement of any nation has been ascribed to some influence exerted upon it, not rising within it. Improvement is dated to immigrants of some sort or other; and all social changes have been preceded by changes in the principles held by the people among whom progress has been made.

Archbishop Whately was no common thinker, and he, in a remarkable and interesting lecture on "The Origin of Civilization," delivered before the Young Men's Christian Association in 1854, maintained that there has never been any such thing as a nation civilizing itself—that civilization has never developed itself out of savagism. He maintained the same argument in his "Political Economy," in opposition to the use made by the cultivators of that science of an intelligent savage, branding this as one of the fallacies of illustration. I am sorry that I have neither of these books beside me for reference, but as I read them with interest, I think I can trust to my memory of the general result, to say that I am supported by that great thinker in affirming that neither reason nor history supports the idea that all mankind were originally savages; and his reasoning quite convinced me that had they been savages in their origin, they would most probably have remained so for ever. They could have formed no idea of a civilization which had never existed, nor could they have felt wants or desired comforts which had not been suggested by their experience. Man in a savage state does not possess within himself that thirst for knowledge, that desire for improvement, that consistent industry, that hopeful endurance, and those aspirations after security and happiness, which characterize the inhabitants of civilized countries.

We know that modern civilization in Europe derives itself from three sources,—Roman legislation, Greek philosophy, and Christianity. Christianity was revealed, Roman jurisprudence had its ground in Greek thought; Greek civilization got its chief impulse from Egypt. Egypt and Babylon appear in history at the earliest date as civilized, having a knowledge of the sciences, arts, and morals of the antediluvian world. Savagery, therefore, seems to be a deterioration of the race, a falling away from an earlier and purer state—a state which gave to poetry its tradition of a golden age, and which in sacred writ receives the name of paradisc. We have a test of this in America. Where is the savage race on that broad continent, which has risen and emulated the moderns, who took to its shores

European culture, industry, and Christianity? Is not the progress of man, as a self-civilizing agent, an idle and vain dream, a figment of philosophers and of revolutionists? Farther confirmation of this may be found in the fact that as men separated in quest of new settlements, and removed from each other, so as to be little brought into community, whether by the intervention of rivers, mountains, forests, or laws, customs, or hostile feelings, they sank to lower depths, they became degraded; and do we not see in our own land this degradation going on in its worst forms—as the *débris* of civilization?

It is admitted on all hands, even by Mr. Darwin, that in all essential particulars man, as man, however savage his condition may be, has all the faculties of man latent in his nature. Now the great characteristic of savage life is its unprogressiveness, while the most striking mark of civilization is progression. In the former we see men stunted and benumbed, impotent by habit, and unstirred by any high ideas; in the latter we see man eager-hearted and aspiring, feeling the burden but recognising the responsibilities of life. Savage life presents itself to view as grovelling and debased, inert and self-indulgent, supine and inconstant. In civilization all is different. There it is felt that man cannot live by bread alone; but that he must have stimulant thought and the pressure of a purpose. Industry stirred and excited by a high standard of the comfort of life—by an increase rather than a reduction of the wants of man, especially the need of a margin beyond and above the mere supply of the requirements of nature,—this is a work of civilization. To be satisfied with the smallest amount which will preserve and propagate life, to feel joy in the mere exertionless being of animal existence, to have a brute's instincts, with a reasonless acquiescence in being nothing more,—that is to be savage. We have seen no race rise from any such state without persuasion, instruction, or stimulant of some sort; and we do not think, therefore, that it is probable that man has ever developed from a savage state into civilization.

Savagism is relapse, a backsliding and not a first condition. Civilization is the point of departure towards savagery, and it is an inversion of facts to say that civilization is progress from savagism. It is because men have shrunk from toil, forethought, guidance, and government, that they have receded from the standard of humanity, and taken the degenerate state and fate of savage life. They have departed from the coercion of circumstances and of social-law, and they have deteriorated and become barbarous. We have only to look at the wonderful forms of faith, the singular imperativeness of the olden governments, the marvellous codes of law, the exquisite arts, industries, and even sciences of the past, to learn that man has become embruted and degenerate, rather than improved and moralized. We think there can be no question but that the laws and customs of the earlier nations show an excellent, though a different civilization from our own. The civilization of

regimented labour is not ours, but perhaps our modern trades unions are, in reality, not much else than a means of regenerating labour, and bringing into play as semi-voluntary acquisitions the frugal, patient, fair-proportioned activity, self-restraint, and foresight which are required in civilized life, and which have been lost in our transition from one condition of civilization to another—the civilization of command for the civilization of self-command.

Take language as a witness. The old languages are far more complex and intricate than the new. They include a far more excellent and systematic set of inflexional arrangements than modern languages do; and their syntax, while it admits of greater sinuosity of style, is more compact and exact. Compare the singular complexity of the language of Greece with all the flexibility of compounds and variations which it allows, even with the German of our days, and it will be found to have a far finer structural model than it. If we do the same with the speech of Rome, and that of either Italy or France in the present day, we shall find that the latter has lost the fine sonorous expressiveness of its compact and perspicuous root. Equally true is this of the grammatical framework of Anglo-Saxon and of modern English. We have had in all these a general disintegration—a weakening and a deterioration. This does not seem to argue very conclusively for the progressive intellectuality of the race which has felt it necessary to destroy the symmetry, flexibility, and closely knit texture of the languages of antiquity to fit them for the races of the present, who find great difficulty even under culture and training in comprehending the exquisitely adapted phraseology of the syntax of the learned tongues, and of such as are similarly constructed in their inflexions and variations.

It seems to me, on a fair view of the whole matter, that man is not naturally a savage creature, that he did not rise up into being by the mere chances of development, that he has not made progress from a rude semi-animal existence to his present thoughtful civilized condition. It seems to me to agree far more with the actual facts of history, language, religion, morals, law, traditions, &c., to regard man's civilization as his normal state, his savagery as a depreciation of his nature from neglect of the principles of social life impressed on the early ages. I do not think a thermometer of civilization is capable of being constructed which would show the zero of humanity normal, indicate the races which have fallen below that in gorilladom and monkeyism, and mark off the races, Aryan or Semitic, which have risen into a state of modern freedom, excellence, and culture. Civilization seems to me to be a swinging of the pendulum of existence between government and self-government—a seeking of an equation between these, when the will of the people shall be law and law shall be the sovereign of life. Change rather than progress has been the tale of history. I cannot believe that man has developed from a savage state, and on the above grounds I think the negative view is made probable.

L. T. B.

## The Essayist.

### THE POETRY OF JOHN HENRY NEWMAN.

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO "THE DREAM OF GERONTIUS."

(Continued from page 220.)

STERN, simple, severe, and unadorned as Dr. Newman's poetry may seem in reference to its general character, yet herein have we proof that even in the seemingly sterile soil of asceticism, in that apparent desert of the heart, the flowers of sweet, natural affection can grow—blossoming forth in the form of poetry of ineffable tenderness and genuine grace. Take, for instance, those touchingly beautiful "Consolations in Bereavement," written on occasion of the death of a beloved sister forty years ago, with a series of kindred poems on the same subject:—

#### CONSOLATIONS IN BEREAVEMENT.

- "Death was full urgent with thee, sister dear,  
And startling in his speed;  
Brief pain, then languor till thy end came near,  
Such was the path decreed,  
The hurried road  
To lead thy soul from earth to thine own God's abode.
- "Death wrought with thee, sweet maid, impatiently,  
Yet merciful the haste  
That baffles sickness; dearest, thou didst die,  
Thou wast not made to taste  
Death's bitterness,  
Decline's slow-wasting charm, or fever's fierce distress.
- "Death wrought in mystery,—both complaint and cure  
To human skill unknown:  
God put aside all means, to make us sure  
It was His deed alone;  
Lest we should lay  
Reproach on our poor selves that thou wast caught away.
- "Death urged as scant of time; lest, sister dear,  
We many a lingering day  
Had sickened with alternate hope and fear,  
The age of delay;  
Watching each spark  
Of promise quenched in turn, till all our sky was dark.
- "Death came and went; that so thy image might  
Our yearning hearts possess,  
Associate with all pleasant thoughts and bright,  
With youth and loveliness;  
Sorrow can claim,  
Mary, nor lot nor part in thy soft soothing name.

"Joy of sad hearts, and light of downcast eyes!

Dearest, thou art enshrined

In all thy fragrance in our memories ;

For we shall ever find

Bare thought of thee

Freshen this weary life, while weary life shall be.

*"Oxford, April, 1828."*

Of the tender, pensive-breathing grace, the purity of tone, and the pathetic simplicity which characterize these stanzas—the last two in particular—what need to speak? They must surely at once strike and fascinate every reader who has a heart to feel, an intellect to comprehend, and a taste to judge. The same deep-felt bereavement also gave inspiration to a little poem, like the last, of no common charm. The spirit of the departed one, from its abode in the realms of bliss, is there imagined as consoling the sorrowing friends left behind on earth—sending them words of peace in—

#### A VOICE FROM AFAR.

"Weep not for me ;

Be blithe as wont, nor tinge with gloom

The stream of love that circles home,

Light hearts and free !

Joy in the gifts Heaven's bounty lends ;

Nor miss my face, dear friends !

"I still am near,

Watching the smiles I prized on earth,

Your converse mild, your blameless mirth.

Now, too, I hear

Of whispered sounds the tale complete,

Low prayers, and musings sweet.

"A sea before

The throne is spread ; its pure, still glass

Pictures all earth-scenes as they pass.

We, on its shore,

Share in the bosom of our rest,

God's knowledge, and are blest.

*"Horsepath, September 29, 1829."*

Attractive as the theme may be, and inviting of our stay, we can do no more than just refer here to two other poems deriving their inspiration from the selfsame source:—"A Picture," a poem so entitled, having for its motto, "The maiden is not dead, but sleepeth ;" and a tender and beautiful poem entitled "Epiphany Eve : a Birthday Offering," the birthday being that of the truly mourned sister. Another "Birthday Offering," dedicated to his brother, Francis William Newman, no less beautiful in its way, derives a painful and melancholy interest from the fact that all the bright and glowing hopes therein expressed in reference to that loved brother's future career were doomed to such sad and lamentable disappointment. We quote the three concluding stanzas of this poem:—

"Dear Frank, we both are summoned now  
 As champions of the Lord;  
 Enrolled am I, and shortly thou  
 Must buckle on thy sword;  
 A high employ, nor lightly given,  
 To serve as messengers of heaven!

"Deep in my heart that gift I hide;  
 I change it not away,  
 For patriot-warrior's hour of pride,  
 Or statesman's tranquil sway;  
 For poet's fire, or pleader's skill  
 To pierce the soul or tame the will.

"Oh, may we follow undimayned  
 Where'er our God shall call!  
 And may His Spirit's present aid  
 Uphold us, lest we fall!  
 Till, in the end of days, we stand  
 As victors in a deathless land."

Let us in charity hope that this fond fraternal prayer may even yet be realized, and that the wanderer may, with him, one day have his part at the right hand "on life's eternal shore!"

In these "Poems of the Affections"—to adopt Wordsworth's nomenclature—we have seen that the poet, rigid, ascetic, as he may have become and be, has yet had his seasons of tenderness—deep, human-hearted tenderness. Nay, further, we shall find proof that he could withal relax from his severity at times, and even condescend to playfulness, acting, as we may suppose, on the old Horatian maxim, "Dulce est desipere in loco," though, from the specimens afforded us in this line, his "Album Verses" and "Valentines to Little Girls," it must be confessed that the good father's sportive freaks are not always in the happiest vein. As a specimen of his graver literary trifling we give a little poem, if it may be allowed that distinction, entitled—

#### A HERMITAGE.

(FROM ST. GREGORY NAZIANZEN.)

"Some one whispered yesterday,  
 Of the rich and fashionable,  
 Gregory in his own small way  
 Easy was and comfortable.

"Had he not of wealth his fill  
 Whom a garden gay did bless,  
 And a gently trickling rill,  
 And the sweets of idleness?

"I made answer, 'Is it ease  
 Fasts to keep and tears to shed?  
 Vigil hours and wounded knees,  
 Call you these a pleasant bed?'

"Thus a veritable monk  
Does to death his fleshly frame;  
Be there who in sloth are sunk,  
They have forfeited the name.

"Oxford, 1834."

The metrical effusion under the above title, written many years prior to the author's secession, shows plainly the working of those principles which eventually led him to seek refuge in the Church of Rome. Here, for instance, we have the *ascetic* principle clearly and unmistakably defined. This, if need were, might be confirmed by a large induction founded on passages in his other poems—poems, *e. g.*, such as, "The Sign of the Cross," "Relics of Saints," "The Good Samaritan," &c.; all, especially the last, opening with the passionately yearning exclamation,—

"Oh that thy creed were sound!  
For thou dost soothe the heart, thou Church of Rome,"

betokening a steady and gradual Romeward tendency. Nay, more, strange as it may appear, even some of the specimens of his lighter literary trifling, his toyings with the muse of the Album, afford distinct evidence to the same effect; as, for instance, a set of jangling rhymes, of the class referred to, entitled "Monks;" a rather curious contribution, in sooth, towards that department of light and elegant literature. He begins in a strain of interrogation,—

"Why, dear cousin, why  
Ask for verses when a poet's fount of song is dry?  
Or if aught be there,  
Harsh and chill, it ill may touch the hand of lady fair.  
Who can perfumed waters bring  
From a convent spring?"

And he closes as follows:—

"Grey his cowl'd vest  
Whose strong heart has pledged his service to the cloister blest;  
Duly garbed is he,  
As the frost-work gems the branches of yon stately tree.  
'Tis a danger-thwarting spell,  
And it fits me well!"

Here, in this freak of fancy, not a particularly light or airy one of the kind, sooth to say—offspring of an early period, the poet's future destiny is not obscurely foreshadowed; that destiny which should eventually, after many wanderings, find him a congenial refuge in the cloistral bosom of the Church of Rome. Even already, in the secret chambers of his heart, he seems to have taken, as by anticipation, the monastic vow. We might also refer in this connection to a poem of a graver cast, entitled "The Married and the Single;" a poem ostensibly purporting to be "A Fragment from St. Gregory Nazianzen," that monastic votary, the ideal of Dr.



Newman's admiring contemplation. Marriage and celibacy (understanding thereby *religious* celibacy) are here represented as two rival claimants pleading each its own cause, the verdict being finally awarded in favour of the latter. Not without a certain beauty of its own—a beauty sad and pensive as the dying glow of an autumnal eve—is the picture drawn of those lone travellers on life's pilgrimage, dedicated spirits, virgin souls, in angelic purity evermore :—

“Circling round the king of light,  
A heaven on earth, a blameless court and bright,  
Aiming as emblems of their God to shine,  
Christ in their heart, and on their brow His sign,  
Soft funeral lights in the world's twilight dim,  
Loving their God, and ever loved by Him.”\*

Marriage urges her suit in a strain of winning and graceful eloquence, as in the following passage, where she temptingly sets forth her claims :—

“Nay, list again! who seek its kindly chain,  
A second self, a double presence gain;  
Hands, eyes, and ears, to act or suffer here,  
Till e'en the weak inspire both love and fear;  
A comrade's sigh to soothe when cares annoy,  
A comrade's smile to elevate his joy.

“Take love away, and life would be defaced,  
A ghastly vision on a howling waste,  
Stern, heartless, reft of the sweet spells which swage  
The throes of passion, and which gladden age.  
No child's sweet pranks once more to make us young;  
No ties of place about our heart-strings flung;

---

\* “But, if the truth must be spoken, what are the humble monk, and the holy nun, and other regulars, as they are called, but Christians after the very pattern given us in Scripture? What have they done but this, perpetuate in the world the Christianity of the Bible? Did our Saviour come on earth suddenly, as He will one day visit it, in whom would He see the features of the Christians whom He and His apostles left behind them, but in them? Who but these give up home and friends, wealth and ease, good name and liberty of will, for the kingdom of heaven? Where shall we find the image of St. Paul, or St. Peter, or St. John, or of Mary the mother of Mark, or of Philip's daughters, but in those who, whether they remain in seclusion, or are sent over the earth, have calm faces, and sweet, plaintive voices, and spare frames, and gentle manners, and hearts weaned from the world, and wills subdued; and for their meekness meet with insult, and for their purity with slander, and for their gravity with suspicion, and for their courage with cruelty; yet meet with Christ everywhere—Christ, their all-sufficient, everlasting portion, to make up to them both here and hereafter all they suffer, all they dare for His name's sake?”

—J. H. Newman's “*Sermons on Subjects of the Day*,” Sermon xix., “*The Apostolical Christian*,” December 20, 1829.

"No public haunts to cheer; no festive tide,  
When harmless mirth and smiling wit preside;  
A life which scorns the gifts by heaven assigned,  
Nor knows the sympathy of human kind."

The poet at the close thus apostrophises Celibacy, hard-pressed as she may be supposed to be by her rival's eloquent and heart-moving appeal:—

"Hail, O child of heaven,  
Glorious within! to whom a post is given,  
Hard by the throne where angels bow and fear,  
E'en while thou hast a name and mission here.  
O deign thy voice, unveil thy brow, and see  
Thy ready guard and minister in me.  
Oft hast thou come heaven-wafted to my breast,  
Bright spirit! so come again and give me rest."

To this ardent invocation of her votary, the spirit replies with downcast eye and in a tone of gentle plaint,—

"Ah, who has hither drawn my backward feet,  
Changing for worldly strife my lone retreat?  
Where, in the silent chant of holy deeds,  
I praise my God, and tend the sick soul's needs,  
By toils of day, and vigils of the night,  
By gushing tears and blessed lustral rite—  
I have no sway amid the crowd, no art  
In speech, no plea in council or in mart.  
Nor human law, nor judges throned on high,  
Smile on my face, and to my words reply.  
Let others seek earth's honours; be it mine  
One law to cherish, and to track one line,  
Straight on towards heaven to press with single bent,  
To know and love my God, and then to die content."

What further proof after this is needed of the accuracy of our assertion that the cowl and "cloistered cell" had already even from the first claimed the sympathy of the poet's heart?

We now come, as by an easy transition, to that class of poems belonging strictly and exclusively to the cloister period, after the author had finally seceded to the Church of Rome. Those we have hitherto been considering, though breathing, no doubt, the *spirit* of the cloister, yet were written while he was still not only a denizen of the world, but an ordained and officiating priest in the Church of England; many of them, indeed, during the intervals of travel, by sea or by land; thus, as he himself expressly tells us, the beautiful and well-known hymn, "Lead, kindly Light,"\* &c.,

\* For those of our readers who may happen not to be acquainted with the poem, we here subjoin it:—

was written on one occasion, while lying becalmed in the Mediterranean Sea, off the coast of Sicily; and again, the poem on "Angelic Guidance," beginning with the line, "Are these the tracks of some unearthly friend?" he tells us was written on another occasion, while waiting for the train—a situation not ordinarily deemed favourable to poetic inspiration. But to return. The poems of this (the cloister) period are not, in our opinion, in general characterized by any striking merit. It might even seem as if the bleak atmosphere of the cloister, in its hard, naked reality, and contact with its sequestering walls, had in a manner cramped and chilled his poetic genius, and dimmed its lustre. At times, indeed, the old poetic fire, like the lightning gleam, flashes forth keen and vivid as ever,—notably so in that supreme effort of his genius, "The Dream of Gerontius," which will demand a separate and distinct notice at our hands. Before coming, however, to that very remarkable religious drama, we would first, by way of introduction, quote two poems illustrative of Dr. Newman's views on the Romish doctrine of purgatory—a doctrine which forms the main theological basis of the drama referred to. These poems are respectively entitled "A Hymn for the Dead" (that is, for the souls in purgatory), and "The Golden Prison" (purgatory, under that conception, as the prison of hope, in contradistinction to hell, that iron dungeon of despair).

## FOR THE DEAD.

## (A HYMN.)

"Help, Lord, the souls which Thou hast made,  
The souls to Thee so dear,  
In prison, for the debt unpaid  
Of sins committed here.

"Lead, kindly Light, amid the encircling gloom,  
Lead Thou me on!

The night is dark, and I am far from home—  
Lead Thou me on!

Keep Thou my feet; I do not ask to see  
The distant scene—one step enough for me.

"I was not ever thus, nor prayed that Thou  
Shouldst lead me on.

I loved to choose and see my path; but now  
Lead Thou me on!

I loved the garish day, and, spite of fears,  
Pride ruled my will;—remember not past years.

"So long Thy power hath blest me, sure it still  
Will lead me on,

O'er moor and fen, o'er crag and torrent, till  
The night is gone;

And with the morn those angel faces smile  
Which I have loved long since, and lost awhile."

"Those holy souls, they suffer on,  
 Resigned in heart and will,  
 Until Thy high behest is done,  
 And justice has its fill.  
 For daily falls, for pardoned crime,  
 They joy to undergo  
 The shadow of Thy cross sublime,  
 The remnant of Thy woe.\*  
 Help, Lord, the souls which Thou hast made,  
 The souls to Thee so dear,  
 In prison, for the debt unpaid  
 Of sins committed here.

"Oh! by their patience of delay,  
 Their hope amid their pain,  
 Their sacred zeal to burn away  
 Disfigurement and stain;  
 Oh! by their fire of love, not less  
 In keenness than the flame,  
 Oh! by their very helplessness,  
 Oh! by Thy own great Name,  
 Good Jesu, help! sweet Jesu, aid  
 The souls to Thee most dear,  
 In prison, for the debt unpaid  
 Of sins committed here.

"*The Oratory, 1857.*"

This, it cannot be denied, is, in its way, a marvellously beautiful hymn, worthy, indeed, of a better, and, as we think, a sounder theology than that which it illustrates and adorns. Other modern Romanist poets also, as Faber and Aubrey De Vere, have followed in the same course—have thrown all the charms of verse around, and invested with a kind of imaginative and sentimental halo, the to us displeasing doctrine that, like a "lurid mist," would show—

"The righteous suffering still  
 Upon the eternal shore." †

Nay, it is even possible—such are the anomalies of human nature—that the doctrine may, *in itself*, have, for some minds, a certain dread fascination—a mysteriously mystic charm sad enchantment.

Of a more *personal* character is the second poem—a sort of anticipatory poet's epitaph, that entitled—

#### THE GOLDEN PRISON.

"Weep not for me when I am gone,  
 Nor spend thy faithful breath  
 In grieving o'er the spot or hour  
 Of all-enshrouding death;

---

\* *Vide* Col. i. 24.

† Keble, "Christian Year."

"Nor waste in idle praise thy love  
On deeds of head or hand,  
Which live within the living Book,  
Or else are writ in sand.

"But let it be thy best of prayers,  
That I may find the grace  
To reach the holy house of toll,  
The frontier penance-place,—

"To reach that golden palace bright,  
Where souls elect abide,  
Waiting their certain call to heaven,  
With angels at their side;

"Where hate, nor pride, nor fear torments  
The transitory guest,  
But in the willing agony  
He plunges, and is blest.

"And as the fainting patriarch gained \*  
His needful halt midway,  
And then refreshed pursued his path,  
Where up the mount it lay,—

"So pray, that, rescued from the storm  
Of Heaven's eternal ire,  
I may lie down, then rise again,  
Safe, and yet saved by fire.

"*The Oratory*, 1853."

Whatever we may think of the doctrine of purgatory so set forth, we can be but of one opinion as to the beauty and pathos of this poem. How inexpressibly touching the humility that asks for no elegies or eulogiums, but only the simple tribute of a prayer! What melancholy pathos in the confession—the utterance of one now in the evening of his days—that all his earthly deeds, of whatever count or value in the eyes of men, if they be not recorded in the book of life, are but writ in the fleeting sand!

As for the peculiar theological tenet which forms the leading idea of the poem;—purgatory, it is worthy of remark, in Dr. Newman's verse, becomes wonderfully etherealized and transfigured from the coarse and common conception of it. A prominent feature of the doctrine, as here set forth, is the perfect and entire acquiescence of the will of the sufferer in the divine will—his willingness to drink to the dregs of that bitter cup, thoroughly to be baptized with that baptism of fire.

We now stand upon the threshold, so to speak, of that striking religious drama, "*The Dream of Gerontius*,"—a profoundly personal conception, shadowing forth the poet's own passage

\* *Vid.* Gen. xix. 20—30.

through the chill, dark waters of death, and purgatory's fiery surge. He may at this period be supposed to have reached that stage of his life-pilgrimage when earth, with all its scenes, is fast fading away—"melting into nothing from th'uncumbered sight,"—that stage, nearing his journey's end, whence, as from some Pisgah's mystic height, dawning glimpses can be descried of—

"That vision which shall burst  
In glory on the eternal years." \*

Here, while calmly awaiting his departure, he pours forth, like a sage seer of old, the feelings of his soul in a poem entitled "The Two Worlds," a swan-like strain of melody—the farewell note of time.

#### THE TWO WORLDS.

"Unveil, O Lord, and on us shine  
In glory and in grace;  
This gaudy world grows pale before  
The beauty of Thy face.

"Till Thou art seen it seems to be  
A sort of fairy ground,  
Where suns unsetting light the sky,  
And flowers and fruits abound.

"But when Thy keener, purer beam  
Is poured upon our sight,  
It loses all its power to charm,  
And what was day is night.

"Its noblest toils are then the scourge  
Which made Thy blood to flow;  
Its joys are but the treacherous thorns  
Which circled round Thy brow.

"And thus, when we renounce for Thee  
Its restless aims and fears,  
The tender memories of the past,  
The hopes of coming years,—

"Poor is our sacrifice, whose eyes  
Are lighted from above;  
We offer what we cannot keep,  
What we have ceased to love.

"*The Oratory*, 1862."

With this prelude strain—one of sweet-breathing solemnity—we enter immediately upon Dr. Newman's last and greatest poetical work, "The Dream of Gerontius," a drama of strange and weird imaginative power.

B. C. H.

(*To be continued.*)

---

\* "May Carols," Aubrey De Vere.

## Coiling Upward.

JOHN ALFRED LANGFORD, LL.D., &c.;

*Journalist, Post, Historian, Essayist, and Politician.*

(Continued from page 312.)

### PART IV.

A NEWSPAPER, though but the world-history of a day, is surely, if we look at it aright, a marvel. In its folios we have an epitome of the variety of life, thought, adventure, endeavour, accidents, joys, sorrows, pageants, wretchedness, follies, crimes, sins, designs, aspirations, achievements, and passions, which stir the human race. It is an every-day photograph of life's eventfulness, and as a social influence, perhaps the most powerful of the agencies by which the sympathies of human brotherhood are stimulated, directed, or controlled. It is not the fourth but the first estate in the realm; it is public opinion, embodied and concentrated, suited to affect the understanding, influence the conduct, and move the sympathies of the multitude. It brings into effective impulse in us the whole power of the world's affairs, and so makes us cosmopolitan in the largest and best sense, by widening the horizon of our vision, and extending the reach and stretch of our sympathies. It at once forms and informs public opinion, and Mr. J. S. Mill says that "public opinion is already, as every one now sees that it is, the ruling power in the last resort." "Great is journalism," says Carlyle. "Is not every able editor a ruler of the world, being a persuader of it?" "The newspaper is the only instrument," as De Tocqueville remarks, "by which the same thought can be dropped into thousands of minds at the same moment." Hence Benjamin Constant said truly, "The press is the mistress of intelligence, and intelligence is the mistress of the world."

It is as a journalist that we now meet Mr. Langford, fairly engaged in that profession which delineates, day by day, the changing features of the—

"Mass of busy life,  
Its fluctuations and its vast concerns."

*Aris's Birmingham Gazette* was commenced November 16th, 1741, being, with the exception of a short-lived adventure entitled the *Birmingham Journal*, started in 1732, the earliest newspaper established in the central town of England and the metropolis of

the Midlands. In succession to, or rather in connection with this oldest existing Birmingham newspaper, a daily Liberal Conservative organ was projected, and on 12th May, 1862, this journal was begun as the *Birmingham Daily Gazette*. Its first editor was Mr. J. Herbert Stark, who had previously been engaged upon the *Globe*; and its sub-editor was Mr. J. H. Chance, who had been employed on the *Hereford Journal*. Both, though able men in their profession, necessarily lacked local knowledge in regard to the "midland" capital of the realm, and could not but have a difficult task if unaided by some one fully conversant with the personal peculiarities, the social standing, the political proclivities, and the civic position of the leading members of the town; acquainted with the ranges and aims, the schemes and governors of its public institutions; and acquainted with the thousand and one special elements which go to the making up of the general interests of a great constituency in which life is intense, and all the forms of life are varied by the opinions, inclinations, and designs of those who affect and influence the tidal pulses of being. This was speedily felt, and in a happy moment the proprietors, desiring to secure the best possible assistance in this matter, cast their thoughts upon John Alfred Langford. His opinions and principles were thoroughly known, and they made no attempt to seek or secure tergiversation on his part. They asked his aid on local subjects alone, and completely exonerated him from any responsibility in regard to political matters. Of course this proposal was made because they did not see in their purview any man of their own party who could give them the "coaching up" upon local affairs which was essential to a daily paper competing with other news-sheets whose editors were thoroughly acquainted with the entire life of the community whose life it was their aim to influence. Mr. Langford became a contributor on local subjects towards the close of 1862. For nearly a year he remained, as it were, an outsider, having no commerce with the leaders of the political movement in whose interest the paper had been established. It is probable that in this subordinate sphere of "toil co-operant to an end," in the determination of which he had no share, he had been found abundantly faithful, for in 1863 a closer connection with the paper—a position as an *interne*—was offered to Mr. Langford. After a full exposition of his own views, and a fair statement of the position of the *Daily Gazette*, terms were agreed upon between the proprietors and Mr. Langford, by which the latter became local editor in regard to all such matters as were non-political, performing, as opportunity offered, such sub-editorial duties as could be discharged within such a limitation. In a very short time after this had been concluded, a considerable improvement in the circulation of the paper took place, and in the succeeding year, we believe, the newspaper more than covered its expenses, and yielded a *bonus* to the literary conductors. Shortly afterwards Mr. Stark retired from office, and Mr. Chance was installed as general, with Mr. Langford as local



editor, with Mr. Sebastian Evans, known as a poet and essayist who had graduated B.A. about ten years previously, as literary contributor. In a short time thereafter Mr. Chance demitted the editorial chair, and Mr. C. T. Browne, who had been on the staff of the *Daily Telegraph*, was promoted to the vacancy. In consequence of ill-health Mr. Browne was unable to devote the assiduous attention to the paper which was requisite, and Dr. Evans, who had meanwhile become known as the author of "Brother Fabian's Manuscript and other Poems," was elevated to the general editor's chair, J. A. Langford retaining under these changes his position of local editor, co-equal in rank.

In 1867, by the demise of Mr. Scholefield, senior, member of Parliament for Birmingham, a vacancy in the representation of that town occurred. This occasioned the first political difficulty that had arisen of any importance during the incumbency of the local editor. The Liberals proposed George Dixon, and the Conservatives put up Sampson S. Lloyd. Dr. Evans supported Mr. Lloyd, who was one of the mainstays of the *Gazette*, with might and main, pen and tongue. Langford, local-editor though he was, was, as it were, tongue-tied; he could not assist, and he would not oppose; yet probably his patrons felt that as he was their servant, and in receipt of an income from them, they had a right to all that he could do for them. The difficulty was intensified when, in 1868, the general election occurred, and political feeling rose to its extremest pitch of excitement as the parties mated their strength and matched themselves for contest. Mr. Lloyd and Dr. Evans became candidates in the Conservative interest, while the Hon. John Bright, George Dixon, and P. H. Muntz were accepted by the Liberals as their nominees. The candidature was keen and the contest severe between the rivals for the suffrages of the "Men of Birmingham," with the exception of the seat of John Bright, which was not seriously threatened. Dr. Evans being much engaged, editorial assistance such as could be relied on in such a political emergency was sought, and Mr. F. Williams was engaged for that purpose. Dr. Evans was probably irate at the neutrality of his coadjutor, and the proprietary probably felt the necessity of their position in regard to Langford somewhat disagreeable, and were naturally anxious to gain an ally politically as well as editorially. In the latter part of 1867 it was, we believe, suggested to Mr. Langford that the presentation of his resignation would not be unacceptable to the proprietor, and Dr. Langford—for so, as we shall relate anon, he had become—gratified the company by giving six months' notice, and when his term of service expired, it was carefully explained to him that only the necessity of reducing the expenses of the paper had induced the proprietary to accept his demission of the post he had filled; and before his departure from the editorial chair his colleagues presented him with a large collection of the best works in modern letters, amounting in all to twenty volumes of choice reading.

1871.

2 c

One good result of this journalistic engagement we have yet to note. The proprietors of the *Gazette*, as the purchasers of the copyright of Aris's paper, had come into the possession of a complete file of that newspaper for a century and a quarter, with the exception of one year's issue. Having access to this repository of local history, Langford's fertile mind immediately saw in it the quarry whence a work of great interest and value might be dug. Giving the earliest benefit of his ingenious scheme to the proprietors of the newspaper on which he was engaged, he contributed to it a series of papers on "Old Birmingham Life," illustrated by the contents of this file of news-sheets. The series proved highly attractive, and drew a considerable deal of interest to the paper. So encouraged, and seeing that approval shone upon the scheme, he resolved to enlarge the plan, and after most laborious transcriptions and arrangement, he found himself in possession of such an abundance of materials for a work, that he issued proposals for the publication by subscription of a book, in two volumes, to be entitled "A Century of Birmingham Life," or a Chronicle of Local Events, from 1741—1841, and in 1868 the first volume appeared; it was immediately successful, and was greeted with warm approbation for the excellence of the presiding idea, as well as the deftness of the workmanship. Next year followed Volume Second.

The following is the author's estimation and description of his production:—

"This book is simply what it professes to be, a compilation. It appeared to me—and friends, on whose judgment I could rely, agreed with me—that it would be more interesting and useful to let our forefathers speak for themselves, than to tell their story in other words. In almost all cases, therefore, I have quoted the advertisements, paragraphs, and reports literally. It would have been a much easier task to have given the substance of these extracts in my own words; but the object and intention of the book would not have been effected by such a proceeding. Every one acquainted with literary work knows that it is less labour to read and make an abstract of a report, than tediously to copy its *ipsissima verba*. I mention this in self-justification. It was not to spare my own pain and toil that the plan of giving as much matter as possible in extracts was adopted, but in order to present to the reader the picture of the town, its people, and their life, even in their habits as they lived.

Some may object that the extracts sometimes relate to trifling subjects. It must, however, be remembered, such is happily the variety of people's tastes and pursuits, that things which appear trifles to some are interesting and important to others. The true picture of the life of a town will include tragedy and farce, things grave and gay, trifles light as air, and subjects of the deepest importance; for of such endless variety is life composed. A complete picture of Birmingham for a hundred years could not be painted without including each shade of its many-coloured and varied existence. *The frontispiece* is a photograph copy of the first page of the first *Gazette*, published on November 16, 1741."

The getting up of this work involved great labour; but his toil was cheered by the hearty sympathy and co-operation of all the

best men of the hardware centre—aid generously given and genially acknowledged. By the help thus accorded to him he has been able to illustrate and clarify many of the dark bits of the newspaper history of the town, and Birmingham may now boast of having the materials for a proper history more thoroughly sifted, better arranged, and more excellently compacted than any other locality. It is much to be hoped that the men of wealth and energy in other large centres would duly countenance a similar work wherever the means and the man are to be found; for Dr. Langford has set a good example, and given a good model in and of a good work. Only those who, like the present writer, have been called upon to digest into history and chronology the heterogeneous matter from which such compilations are made, can estimate the difficulty of the task, and the dreary patience which must be exercised in picking the readable grains of wheat out of the bushels of chaff amid which they are hidden.

The work opens with an excellent introduction, containing a great deal of information of the Birmingham of the olden time. From this we quote the following as a specimen:—

"Only one hundred and twenty-five years have passed since that date, but during that time the little hardware village has grown into one of the largest, most energetic, industrious, and enterprising of the towns in Great Britain. It is a subject of no light interest to trace the growth and development of such a place, to watch how bit by bit, and through a long series of years, the town slowly encroached on the country; how our quiet, easy-going, steady, and contented forefathers gave place to the restless, striving, and happily discontented folk who dwell and labour in it at the present time. It is the object of this work to recall the past, and thus enable our readers to form a more distinct idea of the rapid growth of the town from almost a country village to its present far-stretching and still rapidly-expanding boundaries. The files of *Aris's Gazette* extend to 1741, the year of its birth; and thus for a century and a quarter we have a complete record of the life and doings of the people of Birmingham. From this rich storehouse, and other sources not generally available, we propose to select information respecting the habits, customs, amusements, and life of our ancestors. This work will be rather the material for a local history than the history itself. From a most careful inspection of the files of the paper we can confidently assert that no authentic history of the town can ever be produced unless they are used. No other source of information so rich and authentic is now extant; and we hope so completely to exhaust its riches that the future historian will only have to refer to its pages for verification of our extracts—should he decline to take them upon trust.

"In dealing with the large mass of material we shall adopt the following plan:—From 1741 to 1841 we purpose taking periods of ten years, and confining ourselves to quoting such passages as will illustrate the changes which have been made in the appearance of the town, and the general life of the people. These quotations will be arranged in a connected and systematic manner, and illustrated by information obtained from other sources. These will be carefully indicated, and all our obligations faithfully acknowledged.

"Sunday schools were opened at Gloucester at the end of 1781 or the beginning of 1782, and in 1784 they were opened in Birmingham. Mechanics' institutes were founded in 1823, and one was opened in Birmingham on March 21, 1826. When this had done its work—and a noble work it was—and passed away, the Polytechnic Institution succeeded it. This was in 1843. For a few years the new institution struggled through a rather weakly existence; for it never possessed the vigorous strength which for many years characterized the Mechanics' Institute. This, too, passed away; and in November, 1855, the late Prince Albert laid the foundation stone of the present Midland Institute, which, in its industrial department, now numbers upwards of a thousand students. Within its walls any working man, or working woman either, who has the desire, united with the necessary industry and persistence, can obtain a first-class education, either literary or scientific. Birmingham has also adopted the Free Libraries and Museums Act, and in 1861 the first of these excellent institutions was opened in Constitution Hill. Since that time three other branch libraries have been added, one in Deritend, one at Gosta Green, and a third at Adderly Park. A central lending and reference library has been built in Ratcliff Place, at a cost of nearly, if not over £13,000. The lending library, together with its admirable reading-room, was opened by Mr. Henry Wiggins, then mayor, on September 6th, 1864, when an inaugural address was delivered by Lord Stanley. The reference library, which is by far the finest room of any of the free libraries in the kingdom, and contains about 18,000 volumes of the best works in all literature, was opened by Mr. E. Yates, mayor, October 26th, 1866, when Mr. George Dawson, M.A., delivered an inaugural address. To the central library is also added an art gallery, which, we trust, contains the gems of a noble and useful collection of the fine arts."

"The Century of Birmingham Life" was exceedingly well received by the press. The *Times* devoted three columns to it; the *Saturday Review* gave a lengthy notice to each of the volumes; Charles Dickens, who had always a pleasant interest in Birmingham, wrote a genial and commendatory notice of it in *All the Year round*; and other literary organs and newspapers gave approval to the author's design and workmanship. In 1869 a second edition, in monthly parts, illustrated, was issued, having a large subscription list in its favour. As a consequence of the reputation brought to him by this book, Mr. William Mackenzie, the eminent Scottish publisher, proposed to Dr. Langford to undertake the superintendence of a county History of Warwickshire and Staffordshire as part of a projected series of topographical works. This work, which has cost great labour, and is to be issued in two large quarto volumes of 700 pages each, richly illustrated, is now going through the press, and will, we understand, be shortly issued.

After leaving the *Gazette*, Dr. Langford took a tour through Scotland, visiting the places in it most celebrated in poetry, commerce, and history, and during his absence on that excursion the council of the Birmingham Midland Institute appointed him conductor of the class of English Literature attached to that centre of intellectual life in his native town. The duties of this office

he commenced in Oct., 1868, and passed through a highly successful session.

In 1868 the Historical Society of Great Britain was founded, and Dr. Langford was elected a member of the council; and to the Transactions of that society he contributed a paper on Prince Rupert's Visit to Birmingham. Dr. Langford had always been a great admirer of the mightiest of dramatists, displayed a considerable taste for theatricals, felt a *penchant* for the stage, delighted in strolls to Stratford, was an enthusiastic member of the Birmingham Shakspeare Society, one of the leading managers of the Shakspeare Library, and a serviceable member of the Shakspeare Reading Club.

Under the impulses of the Tercentenary excitement he had written many finely appreciative criticisms on the wondrous alchemist of mind, and during many years he had been accustomed to deliver speeches noteworthy for *verve*, spirit, vigour, and fitness, on the recurrence of the 23rd of April in its "yearly course" as a "holiday," bringing "salutation and greeting." At length, under the stimulus of that dramatic fervour which had stirred his being in his boyhood, and had enchained the heart-strings of his manhood, he essayed to awaken once more in Warwickshire the chords of that—

"Wild harp that silent hung  
By silver Avon's sacred shore,"

and composed "an historical play," entitled "The King and the Commoner"—printed for private circulation,—of which a notice appeared in our "Reviewer" a short time ago.

There is in this play, as our readers know, a goodly amount of the dramatic spirit, and the writer thinks that by a little judicious arrangement the representative power of the drama might be much enhanced; and we certainly should like to see the "pride and glory" of stage effect given to this play, which has more of the right matter for representative reproduction than many of the modern poem plays of our age.

We have for some time in our sketch been entitling the subject of it—like the hero of *Faust*—Doctor, and we have not as yet indicated the source of the honour deservedly attached to the name of one who has fought a good fight in an upward course in the face of much enmity of circumstance. We perhaps cannot do better than reproduce the earliest public announcement of the fact which attracted our notice. It appeared in the *Daily Gazette*, then under the management of Dr. Sebastian Evans (date unnoted in our memorandum), and ran as follows:—

"It gives us great pleasure to announce that the senate and trustees of Grenville and Tusculum College, Tennessee, have unanimously conferred on Mr. J. A. Langford the degree of LL.D., as a mark of their high appreciation of the value of his literary labours. The distinction is one thoroughly well deserved; and while we cannot in this case complain that the prophet is without

honour in his own country, we are heartily glad that the genius of one of whom Birmingham has just reason to be proud has not only obtained recognition on the other side of the Atlantic, but has there carried off one of those legimate rewards too often denied to merit."

There had long been an intention among what might be called the more advanced Liberals of Birmingham to establish an organ for the diffusion of their views and the inculcation of their opinions. That side of the party of progress had outstripped the Whig-Liberal party, who dominated if they did not predominate, in the heart of England. George Dawson, who has exerted a singularly composite influence on the intellectual, moral, political, and religious opinion of the Midlands, had always, we have heard, newspaper proclivities. Advanced Liberalism looked to him as leader, and sought his generalship in its endeavour to press forward in its aim to set the world in better trim. He, though full of persistent life—being then under fifty years of age,—had considerably overwrought his physical system, and required to take a holiday in the East. It was felt, however, that during his absence the party ought not to defer preparations, for a battle of principles seemed imminent. At the suggestion of Mr. Dawson, Dr. Langford was chosen to hold the place of honour in his absence, and to have the proper chieftaincy of the party entrusted to him, with full power to initiate and carry on such business elements relative to the projected campaign of popularized politics as might enable it at any moment to project itself into action fully accoutred and thoroughly prepared. The duties of organization were entrusted to Dr. Langford, and the details of practical management were placed in his charge. He was requested to consider himself as engaged in the service of the new concern, and to abstain from entangling himself in any other pursuit or engagement. It is generally supposed that the passage of the Education Bill in 1870 rather took the party of progress by surprise, so that they required to carry on their contest for ascendancy in the school boards without the special advocacy of an organ of their own. How this may be we do not know. We have heard that in their zeal many would have precipitated the production of the paper, so as to have brought it out before Mr. Dawson's return from his health-search. This, however, the majority of the party considered themselves bound to veto, and the resolution was adhered to, that Mr. Dawson's leadership should be looked for and waited on, and that all that was requisite was to be in utmost readiness on his return. This took place in September, 1870, and on January 2, 1871, the first number of the *Birmingham Morning News*, with George Dawson as consulting editor, and J. A. Langford, LL.D., as superintendent of the staff, conductor, and publisher, as representing the proprietary.

Before the present notice of this persistent and not unsuccessful endeavour after self-help can reach the hands of the reader, "the

glorious hundred days" which are said to test the vitality of a daily newspaper will be complete. We have no means of knowing the secrets of the *sanctum*, and we can only speak on hearsay, but we have been informed that the success of the venture has been more than commensurate with the expectations of the party. It is highly probable that the Shakspeare week will bring up the circulation to a high figure. The literary arrangements of the paper are believed to be very complete, and of a higher cast than usual in what are called provincial papers; in politics the conductors are well informed and particularly pronounced. We have not heard that they have made any distinguishable inroads on the ordinary English newspaper—an article which the present writer thinks susceptible of a great deal of improvement. There can, however, be little doubt, we presume, that in the editorial chair of the *Morning News* Dr. J. A. Langford has attained an appropriate place, and that it is a fitting reward for his industrious and persevering "toiling upward" that he should hold this seat of honourable influence and capacity for good, and that by the voice and consent of his fellow-townsmen he should occupy the chair which is becoming more powerful than that of the Commons House—the chair of the *first* estate in the realm—Public Opinion.

We shall not attempt here to appraise and estimate the life and labours of Dr. Langford. He has not yet become—and long may it be ere he shall be—

"A memory to the thought and life of man."

There is undoubted power and pith in him; he has versatility and perseverance, intellectual capacity and practical sagacity. If he is not gifted with—

"The vision and the faculty divine,"

which may enable him to emulate the greater singers, he has a sweet heart-music of his own; and if he has been unable to realize all the glorious hopes and aspirations which have glowed within him, while striving—

"To raise his mind up to his own esteem,"

he has accomplished not a little towards the completion of what he planned; and he has himself sighed out—

"How poor the *done* with what remains to *do*!"

It is true, the foregoing narrative may show that "the web of our life is of a mingled yarn, good and ill together;" but it is also true what the same bard says, "The harder matched, the greater victory." We close our notice of this true hero of "toiling upward" with the hope that his life may be still given to nobleness and duty, that he may be quotable hereafter among those who have illustrated humble birth by noble effort, and—

"May he live

Longer than I have time to tell his years."

N. L.

## The Reviewer.

---

*Literary and Social Judgments.* By W. R. GREG. London:  
N. Trübner & Co.

WILLIAM RATHBONE GREG is a peculiar thinker, and as a political and miscellaneous writer the signature "W. R. G." is well known to indicate the author of the "Creed of Christendom; its Foundations and its Superstructure," a work which twenty years ago shared with J. A. Froude's "Nemesis of Faith" and Newman's "Phases of Faith" the attention, if not the consternation, of the religious world: a "Westminster Reviewer" of original force, and a literary man of much industry and persistency in stating and unfolding as well as impressing his views. He was born, we believe, about 1810, and he succeeded the late famous political economist, John McCulloch, in the lucrative State appointment of Comptroller of the Stationery Office. He is a pamphleteer of note, and a newspaper writer of influence. He has recently collected a few of his contributions to various periodicals into a volume, and, under the title of "Literary and Social Judgments," given them to the public. These contributions are twelve in number, and refer to the following topics:—

I. "Madame de Stael," a striking and telling, though rather harsh notice of that wonderful woman, who entranced and yet irked the nobler minds of her day; which would have been better if—like its subject—it had been less French.

II. "British and Foreign Characteristics," a lively, discursive, interesting, and thoughtful paper, tracing, at considerable length, with fair perception of character, and a worldly-wise estimate of the comparative value of, the modes of life prevalent in France and Germany.

III. "False Morality of Lady Novelists," a subject of great importance, treated somewhat unsympathetically, and not a little liable to the censure that, while it seems to insist on the logical rigour of life, the morality suggested is not quite so severe as the logic enforced.

IV. "Kingsley and Carlyle," a strong article; sour and sweet; singularly, skilfully, and touchingly mingle in this estimate, comparison, and contrast. From this paper we quote some passages below.

V. "French Fiction" is trenchant and powerful; "the scorn of scorn, the hate of hate," could scarcely be expressed in more vigorous language, or in more excellent manner. It shines and stings.

---



VI. "Chateaubriand" endeavours to persuade us that "humbug" or "hypocrite" ought to be the synonym of the most splendid stylist of the Restoration.

VII. "M. de Tocqueville" is a tribute of friendship, and glows with admiration and appreciation.

VIII. "Why are Women Redundant?" is a very able, calm, thoughtful, and reasonable discussion of a question growing in importance as civilization advances. From this paper we quote a summary in the sequel.

IX. "Truth v. Edification" has for its *raison d'être* Bishop Colenso and his criticisms on Scripture difficulties, and is a plea—"spoken plainly, broadly, and, as many will say, shockingly"—for the full and impartial discussion of every topic, especially those which most closely concern the spirit of man.

X. "The Doom of the Negro Race" is an attempt to solve the negro problem in the interest of civilization, and contains many ideas of grave significance.

XI. "Time" is a semi-philosophic speculation on the use of abstract terms as proper nouns, and speaking of them as entities.

XII. "Good People" is a defence of the world, as it goes, from the common depreciation to which society is exposed by the specially religious, or rather the *religieuses*. While open to many counter-vailing considerations, it contains a good deal of valuable reflection.

Altogether, there is a heterodox flavour even in the best of these productions—in some a good deal, in others but a *souppçon*; but they are independent, strong-minded, and hesitationless, with little subterfuge, and less of the blarney of rhetoric common on such themes.

CARLYLE AND KINGSLEY COMPARED AND CONTRASTED.—"The one is full of reverence, but has no fixed or definite belief; the other is orthodox enough in doctrine, but does not know what reverence means. The one has no creed, the other has no doubt. Mr. Carlyle—as all deep and great spirits must—approaches the high mysteries of the Infinite and the Eternal with awe unspeakable, and almost with humility. He dares not even define the illimitable agencies; he always speaks of them in the plural number. You cannot tell what he means precisely when he whispers of the silences and the immensities—probably he could not tell himself; but there is no mistaking the natural tone and sentiment with which the man refers to something supremely and incomprehensibly above him. There may be no distinct Being for whom this awe is felt, but the awe is unquestionably there.

"In Mr. Kingsley there is nothing of all this. The great creative and pervading Spirit of the universe, who for Mr. Carlyle is *l'Être Suprême*, for Mr. Kingsley is simply *le bon Dieu*. He is not a stricken mortal, prostrate before the Ineffable Intelligence, but a workman of God, a soldier of Christ, a messenger who has got his orders from his immediate superior, and will execute them like a faithful labourer. He knows God's will, and it always harmonizes strangely with Mr. Kingsley's objects and opinions. He has an unquestioning obedience, cheerful service, boundless devotion

to his Father who is in heaven; but of what we call reverence, hushed and breathless adoration, solemn sense of infinite depth and infinite littleness, we can perceive no trace whatever. . . . He is unpleasantly fond of introducing the great Name on all occasions; it is always 'God's work,' 'God's feasts,' 'God's heroes,' 'God's bells,' 'good news of God,'—expressions which, just and fitting enough when sparingly, solemnly, and appropriately used, produce almost a profane effect by their incessant and uncalled-for recurrence; appear to be dictated chiefly by an appetite for strong language operating on a gentleman in orders; and are, in fact, we believe, Mr. Kingsley's way of swearing.

"There are further points of resemblance between the two men still. Roaming through our world of complicated and corrupt civilization, laying about them with an iron flail, and smashing shams, follies, and abuses with little mercy and less discrimination, they have yet both their weak places and their blind sides. Iconoclasts as they are, they are idolaters also—and idolaters of the worst sort, and at the coarsest shrine. These teachers of mankind in an age of advanced science and refinement, trained in the highest culture, rich in the noblest endowments,—

'These, the heirs of all the ages, in the foremost files of time,'

worship much as the barbarians of old did, and much as the savages do now, and fall prostrate before brute force and a tyrannous and unrelenting will. They are 'Titanolaters,' as Archdeacon Hare appropriately named them. . . . The one idolizes chiefly strength of purpose, the other chiefly strength of muscle and of nerve. Both probably have 'gone in' for their own especial line of superiority. Mr. Carlyle—never strong in health or agile in frame, nor trained either as ploughman, sportsman, soldier, or athlete, but having had to fight his way in life with a persistent energy and a self-denying power which do him infinite honour—thinks little of mere bodily strength, and, indeed, seldom speaks of the animal frame at all, but feels an irresistible attraction towards inflexible temper and overmastering volitions. Indeed, he is essentially and consistently a despot; and with all despots, if only they be relentless and inconsiderate enough, he has a prompt and abounding sympathy. If they be utterly brutal in addition, there are no limits to his admiration. His heart yearns to them and leaps up to meet them as to a brother. He calls them 'men,' 'true men,' 'types of real manhood'! No one acquainted with Mr. Carlyle will, we are sure, charge us with one shade of exaggeration. Every book and almost every page will witness for us. The fierce, rough Dantea was among his earliest idols, bloody and ignorant as he was, because he was simple and earnest, knew what he wanted (or thought he did), and went with Juggernaut directness and recklessness to his end. Samuel Johnson, too—noble old bear that he was,—Mr. Carlyle really loves for his unendurable brutality. But it was not till he met with Frederick William of Prussia—probably the most truculent ruffian that ever sat upon a modern throne; an absolute savage in taste and temper; often half-mad, and constantly quite drunk; for ever and in every relation of life trampling upon justice, decency, kindness, and natural affection—that Mr. Carlyle recognised the 'realised ideal' of his fancy, and hugged the 'just man made perfect' to his heart of hearts.

"But Mr. Carlyle not only worships 'forcible' men, he would apply force—physical force—to all recalcitrants; he would govern the world by

force. The wise and powerful must rule; the ignorant and foolish must submit. The scourge and the sword must carry out the dicta which Mr. Carlyle sees to be good. The negro must be flogged into sugar-making; the wandering, misguided multitudes of all lands must be 'regimented' under 'captains of industry,' who will *compel* them to their task. The same offensive disregard of the rights of individual humanity, the same contempt for freedom, the same exaggeration of its mischiefs, the same denial or unconsciousness of its benefits, runs through his works, and mars the beauty and the value of them all. Truly, the despots of the world—whether priests, legitimate tyrants, or military usurpers—never before among literary celebrities had an apologist or an adorer like the philosopher of Chelsea.

"Mr. Kingsley's idolatry of power shows itself in a different fashion, prompted, no doubt, by his different organisation, and somewhat more befitting his clerical profession. He himself is endowed by nature with a vigorous and exuberant organisation, is a sportsman, a fox-hunter, an athlete, and would probably have been a gladiator if he had not been a Christian. He revels in the description of every species of athletic exercise and desperate strife. Accordingly, all his heroes are men of surpassing animal strength, all bone and muscle, marvels of agility, boiling over with exulting and abounding life, and usually miracles of physical beauty likewise. They are constantly 'models,' and very often 'young Antinouses,' or 'Phœbus Apollos.' He loves above all things to paint, and to display in action his ideal of the perfect 'animal man.' Softness and feebleness he cannot abide. The perpetual moral of his writings, which crops out of every sentence, is the old sentiment,—

'To be weak is miserable,  
Doing or suffering.'

He does not, like Mr. Carlyle, bow down in reverence before might when utterly divorced from right; but it is impossible not to perceive that admiration for what is strong, as strong, is but his most vivid original instinct. With all his Christian feelings, his varnish of modern civilization, his noble aspirations, and all the intense philanthropies of his heart, Mr. Kingsley, beneath the skin, is something of a Goth, a pagan, and a school-boy still. Finally, and not to weary our readers further with this prolonged parallel between the two most picturesque and graphic writers of the day, one other guilty similarity remains to be denounced. Both are declaimers, not reasoners. Their declamation is always powerful, often splendid; rich with gorgeous imagery; full of lightning gleams, sometimes lengthening out into steady rays of grand and saving truths; frequently, usually, perhaps, flashing forth in the cause of humanity and right; often striking the real offender and the real sin, often proclaiming the true hero and extolling the true virtue; magnificent in its wrath, withering in its scorn: but, after all, only declamation. Neither writer ever *reasons* in the strict sense of the term. Inspiration supersedes all necessity for the slow and cautious processes by which conscientious mortals of the ordinary stamp must painfully work out truth and light; and both Mr. Carlyle and Mr. Kingsley believe themselves inspired. The industrious collection and collation of premises, the careful elaboration of conclusions, are beneath them. They despise the inductive process. Mr. Carlyle hates facts. Mr. Kingsley hates logic. The hatred of both breaks out on all occasions.

Their opinions on subjects, their judgments of men, are not formed by reflection, but dictated by sentiment; and therefore the first are constantly unsound, and the second constantly unjust. What they like, what fits into their temperament, *that* they believe, and *that* they praise. What they dislike, what grates upon their tastes, *that* they repudiate and denounce. Their abhorrence of reasoning is heightened by a further peculiarity common to the two. They are singularly *impatient* men. They are too impatient to observe and inquire, too impatient to perpend and reflect; too impatient to entertain doubts and resolve them. They are not ruminating animals; they do not chew the cud of thought. They *possess* upon ideas, catch bright glimpses of them, have them written on their souls as by a flash of light, shoot them flying, wake in the morning and find them there; but never create, educe, mould, revolve them."

WOMAN'S RIGHTS AND WRONGS; SOCIAL REQUIREMENTS.—"To sum up the whole matter. Nature makes no mistakes, and creates no redundancies. Nature, honestly and courageously interrogated, gives no erroneous or ambiguous replies. In the case before us, nature cries out against the malady, and plainly indicates the remedy. The first point to fix firmly in our minds is, that in the excess of single women in Great Britain we have a curable evil to be mended, and not an irreparable evil to be borne. The mischief is to be eradicated, not to be counterbalanced, mitigated, or accepted. To speak in round numbers, we have one million and a half adult unmarried women in Great Britain. Of these half a million are wanted in the colonies; half a million more are usefully, happily, and indispensably occupied in domestic service. The evil; thus viewed, assumes manageable dimensions, and only a residual half a million remain to be practically dealt with. As an immediate result of the removal of 500,000 women from the mother country, where they are redundant, to the colonies, where they are sorely needed, all who remain at home will rise in value, will be more sought, will be better rewarded. The number who compete for the few functions and the limited work at the disposal of women being so much reduced, the competition will be less cruelly severe, and the pay less ruinously beaten down. As the redundancy at home diminishes, and the value is thereby increased, men will not be able to obtain women's companionship and women's care so cheaply on illicit terms. As soon as the ideas of both sexes in the middle and upper ranks, on the question of the income, and the articles which refinement and elegance require, are rectified—as soon, that is, as these exigencies are reduced from what is purely fictitious to what is indisputably real, thousands who now condemn themselves and those they love to single life, will find that they can marry without foregoing any luxury or comfort which is *essential* to ladylike and cultivated and enjoyable existence. Finally, as soon as, owing to stricter principles, purer tastes, or improved social condition—or such combination of all these as the previous movements spoken of must gradually tend to produce,—the vast majority of men find themselves compelled to live without all that woman can bestow, or to purchase it in the recognised mode,—as soon, to speak plainly, as their sole choice lies between marriage and a life of real and not nominal celibacy, the apparent redundancy of women complained of now will vanish as if by magic, if, indeed, it be not replaced by a deficiency. We are satisfied that *IF* the gulf could be practically bridged over, so that women went where they are clamoured for; and *IF* we were contented with the *actualities* instead of the empty and unreal and unrewarding shadows of

luxury and refinement; and if men were necessitated either to marry or be chaste—all of which things it is a discreditable incapacity in us not to be able to accomplish,—so far from there being too many women for the work that must be done, and that only women can do well, there would be too few. The work would be seeking for the women, instead of, as now, the women seeking for the work. We are disordered, we are suffering, we are astray, because we have gone wrong; and our philanthropists are labouring, not to make us go backward and go right, but to make it easier and smother to persist in wrong."

---

## The Societies' Section.

---

### GLASGOW PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY.

A MEETING of the Sanitary and Social Economy Section of the Glasgow Philosophical Society was held in the Lecture Hall, Corporation Buildings. Mr. Smith presided. Mr. William Melvin read an able paper "On the social, economical, financial, and commercial results in Great Britain from the conversion into intoxicating liquors of seventy millions (or thereby) bushels of grain per annum, by brewing and distillation." Mr. Melvin explained that the object of the paper was to show, from facts drawn chiefly from the Government returns, that at the present time this country might be the most prosperous nation in the world in point of position, energy, and resources, if it was not blighted by the prodigious waste of food, and the destruction of seventy million bushels of grain in the manufacture of intoxicating liquors by brewing and distillation, coupled with the vast drunkenness which prevailed. The resources of our country had placed in our power means of accumulating wealth that were not possessed by any other nation in the world; but while the wealth of the nation was valued at

six thousand millions sterling, and the yearly income estimated at nearly nine hundred millions sterling, destitution and pauperism deluged us on every hand. In answering the question how this arose, reference must first be made to our improvident expenditure on intoxicating liquors. From a report published by the Inland Revenue he found the number of persons engaged in selling intoxicating liquors was, for the year ending 1869—publicans, 98,009; and beersellers, 52,590; making a total of 150,599, being one to every 204 of the population, or about one to every 40 houses. In the same report statistics were given with reference to the other houses in which drink was sold, which showed that the total number amounted to 186,096, or one to every 33 houses. In addition to these temptations, by the Act of 1862 special licences could be taken out for fairs, shows, *soirées*, balls, &c., so that every facility had been given to spread intemperance, and every temptation had been placed in the way of the people in order to lure them to habits of drunkenness. During 1869 the quantity of drink

sold in the United Kingdom amounted to 944,853,570 gallons, costing the people £112,885,603. The grain consumed in the brewing and distillation of this drink was literally wasted; and in illustration of this statement, Mr. Melvin mentioned that if the grain was used for food it would give 170 4-lb. loaves to every family of five persons in the United Kingdom during the year. But in addition to this loss of grain for food, local taxation was increased, legitimate trade injured, and capital abstracted by the purchase of grain from foreign countries. There were also a number of indirect injurious results, such as deteriorating the character of men, and loss of life and property, which it occasioned. The distillation of this grain had also the effect of creating destitution and pauperism, which burdened the community; and as a proof of this he stated that during the year 1869 the sum paid for poor's rates and police taxes in the United Kingdom amounted to £13,541,827. Mr. Melvin then proceeded to say that, after considering these facts, the only logical conclusion they could come to was that the conversion of such an amount of grain annually in this country, by brewing and distillation, into intoxicating liquors was a great evil, and that it should be suppressed. He had the strongest faith in the action of the enlightened and patriotic citizens who had combined for the benevolent purpose of getting this evil suppressed; but at the same time he held that the Legislature, in the language of Mr. Gladstone, must "enact such laws as will make it easy to do right and difficult to do wrong." A long discussion followed. Mr. Chapman considered the results mentioned by Mr. Melvin were truly appalling. He thought, however, that it would not be generally admitted that the amount of grain which Mr. Melvin

had stated was totally wasted, because a great proportion of it was converted into beer, and many people regarded beer as being nourishing and refreshing. Many people would consider that Mr. Melvin was not warranted in saying that grain consumed in this way was totally wasted. The great point which ought to be considered in connection with this question was whether there should be interference on the part of the Legislature in restricting the liberty of the subject. While he was in favour of the liberty of the subject, he was very much disposed to think that men who were in the notorious habit of getting drunk regularly, doing injury not merely to themselves and their families, but to society at large, were proper subjects for punishment and restraint on the part of the Legislature. It was most humiliating to think that in our country, which was making such strides in material wealth, so much destitution and pauperism prevailed. Mr. M'Gavin said he would far rather see the people of this country become sober through the moral influence which was being brought to bear upon them; but with regard to the question of the liberty of the subject, he never felt a hesitation thus far, that if in a country an evil existed which was striking at the root of society, that that evil should be put down by the arm of the law. Replying to Mr. Chapman's remarks about the use of beer, Mr. M'Gavin stated that it was an established fact that men who drank only water had a better chance of long life than men who drank beer. After some further discussion, in which Mr. Walker, Mr. Leggat, Mr. Westland, and Mr. Hoey took part, Mr. Melvin replied. The thanks of the meeting having been conveyed to Mr. Melvin for his instructive paper, the proceedings terminated.

**BIRMINGHAM.**—At the New Church Mutual Improvement Society, Summer Lane, Birmingham, on April 18th, a lecture was delivered by Mr. J. S. Wright, on "*Egypt, the Pyramids, and the Suez Canal.*" The lecturer commenced by stating that in consequence of the vastness of the subject, he should be compelled to rattle on at express speed, hoping by that means to be able to give a rapid sketch of the most interesting points in his travels. He left Marseilles, in company with a number of persons from the various countries of Europe, for Alexandria, as the invited guests of the Pasha of Egypt. After passing the Straits of Messina, whence was telegraphed that fact to all parts of Europe, and passing into the open sea, the *Delta* arrived in due course at Alexandria. After taking a survey of the town, mention was made of "Pompey's Pillar," "Cleopatra's Needle," and other objects of interest. The plentifulness of dogs was spoken of, likewise that of flies. Passing on, the lecturer gave an interesting account of the ceremony of the opening of the Suez Canal, with the many vessels containing people of all nations, the titled gentry and

the commercial worlds being fully represented. Here Mr. Wright, having first pointed out, by means of a map specially prepared, the course of the Suez Canal, gave an explanation of the circumstances of its commencement, the uses and objects, and the advantages which it would give to the commerce of the world. Passing on from the ceremony of the opening, and sailing down the canal, the party departed for Cairo, the grand seat of revelry. Arriving at Cairo, a rapid sketch was given of the scene, with its crowds of people and its great illuminations. Notice was also given of the shops, streets, and inhabitants of Cairo, the bazaars and the mosques; likewise to those great monuments of interest—"The tombs of the Caliphs." A description of the Pyramids was then given, with their size, construction, and supposed uses. The lecture was given in a genial and pleasing style, and was highly gratifying to the large audience who assembled to listen to it. A very hearty vote of thanks was tendered to Mr. J. S. Wright for his kindness in delivering so interesting and instructive a lecture to the society.

## Literary Notes.

MR. R. ARBER hopes to have his parallel-text edition of Bacon's *Essays*, in four columns, ready for his series of "English Reprints" this month.

An elaborate "History of the Battle of Bannockburn," by Robert White, Newcastle, is in the press.

A monthly review, entitled *The Taspaper*, and devoted, as its name implies, to subjects connected with imperial and local taxation and expenditure, is announced.

Mr. David Laing's cheap edition of

Sir David Lyndesay's works has just appeared; his library edition is in preparation. Mr. Laing has also lately re-edited four very rare parts of the old Scotch Psalter.

Alessandro Manzoni, the celebrated author of the "*Promessi Sposi*," forms the subject of a monograph by Professor O. M. Sauer, of Prague, in which the author points out the important place which he considers is held in literature by the Italian writer and poet.

A series of lectures under the auspices of "The Christian Evidence Society," by the Archbishop of York (William Thomson), the Dean of Canterbury (Payne Smith); the Bishop of Carlisle (Harvey Goodman); Rev. Stanley Leathes, &c., are to be delivered between April 25 and June 2, and published, immediately after delivery, by Messrs. Hodder and Stoughton.

Pierre Leraux, author of "Humanity in its Principle and its Future," died 11th April.

Edinburgh social life in the eighteenth century is to be illustrated by the publication of "The Letters of Mrs. Alison Cockburn."

*The Dawn* of a satirical journal in Scotland is announced, and heralds of the *Dawn* are out.

The issues in the Rev. Alex. B. Grosart's Fuller's Worthies Library are out, and consist of "The Works in Prose and Verse of Henry Vaughan, Silurist," now first collected and edited. Vol. I. of Poetry, and Vol. III. of Prose. Two other vols. will complete the work. In the *Miscellanies* he has issued poems of Henry Lok, Gentleman (1593 and 1597). Two rare poems by Gervase Markham, and the *Anatomie of Basseverse*, a satire (from a unique copy) by J. Andrewes (1615).

Three biographies are promised during the coming season—a memoir of Mr. Julian Fane, by the Hon. R. Lytton; a life of St. Chrysostom, by the Rev. W. R. Stephens; and a biography of Dr. Cooke, of Belfast, by Professor Porter. A volume of "Biographical Essays," by the Rev. Whitwell Elwin, re-issued from the *Quarterly Review*, is also announced.

T. Hewitt Key's "Latin Dictionary" (on the stem system, we believe) is now approaching completion, after the labour of many years.

Samuel Halket—the Mezzofanti of

Scotland—keeper of the Advocates' Library, Edinburgh, died 20th of April. He has left an almost completed work on "The Pseudonymous Writings of British Authors."

Professor David Masson's "Life of Milton," vol. ii., 1638—1643, six eventful years, is nearly ready.

Professor Fawcett's "Pauperism; its Causes and Remedies," is announced.

Dr. Carpenter is about to issue a treatise on "Cerebration—the Relation of Brain and Thought."

The revised translation of the Gospel of St. Matthew is almost ready for issue by the Convocation Company. We hope it will be published in a people's edition.

A series of Sanitary Maps, indicating the disease most prevalent in the several parts of Britain, are in progress.

The late G. L. Craik's admirable work, "Spenser and his Poetry," is to be issued as a supplement to "Bell's English Poets." Might we suggest the addition of John Saunders's "Chaucer," issued along with it in Knight's weekly shilling vol.? Of course both should be revised, as new matter on both lives has been discovered. By-the-bye, who will produce for us now a similar series of good, useful, solid, improving reading?

Rev. W. W. Skeat has nearly ready a new edition of "Chatterton's Poems," with much new information and new matter.

"The Tayler Prize"—fifty guineas—offered through the Statistical Society for the best essay on "Local Taxation," has been won by Robert H. Inglis Palgrave, of Yarmouth, third son of Sir F. Palgrave, the historian.

Herr R. Oppenheim has issued a translation into German of G. H. Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy, from Thales to Comte."



## Metaphysics of Theism.

WILLIAM HONYMAN GILLESPIE, Esq., &c.,

*Author of "The Argument à priori for the Being and the Attributes of the Absolute One and First Cause," &c.*

"He that takes away *Reason* to make way for *Revelation* puts out the light of both, and does much about the same as if he would persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the remote light of an invisible star by a telescope."—*John Locke*.

"OUR belief in the being of a God," says Robert Hall, "is the belief of a very profound mystery. The very idea of such a being would appear incredible, were it not necessary; because the greatest absurdities would flow from supposing the contrary. Nothing can be accounted for, unless we admit the existence of a causeless cause—a presiding governor of the universe. We are compelled, therefore, to admit the less difficult of the two; or, rather, to choose difficulty instead of impossibility, mystery instead of absurdity; and hence we repose on this grand truth. This is the great mystery of the universe, which is at once the most certain and most incomprehensible of all things; a truth at once enveloped in a flood of light and an abyss of darkness. Inexplicable itself, it explains all besides; it casts a clearness on every question, accounts for every phenomenon, solves every problem, illuminates every depth, and renders the whole mystery of existence as perfectly simple as it is otherwise perfectly unintelligible, whilst itself remains alone in impenetrable obscurity. After displacing every other difficulty it remains the greatest difficulty of all, in solitary, insurmountable, unapproachable grandeur."

It might perhaps be possible on other grounds than the incomprehensible glory of the theme to account for the general failure of any single form of argumentation to receive acceptance as a final and complete demonstration of the being and attributes of the Deity. Man is a compound being, and is not an intellectual all-in-all of reasoning power compact; and logic, however trenchant in its specific syllogisms, cannot convince the heart or fill the imagination. The æsthetic and the ecstatic forms of mentality cannot be moved to worshipfulness by ice-cold and ice-clear demonstrations; while that which can stir these to admiration and adoration affects the intellect less and less as investigation proceeds. Hence the true secret of the debatability of this question, which, at first sight, seems to be the least capable of yielding elements for discussion. The relative power and activity of intelligence, feeling,

experience, conscience, and imagination, are ever changing, and as they change, this supreme theme requires readjustment and reconsideration. Hence though we have traced the main course of the theories of a Creative Power to Leibnitz and Kant, we find the same topics forming chief matters in the philosophies of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Ueberweg; and though we can trace a line of able thinkers through Derham, Dodwell, Ray, &c., to Paley, we yet find the Scottish school of metaphysicians, from Hutcheson to Hamilton, Stirling, Fraser, &c., engaged in considering and expounding this great primal truth of natural religion.

Nor has this been so unnecessary as many might at first sight imagine. Despite the charm to philosophic minds of endeavouring to penetrate into the hidden mysteries of things, and to attempt to trace the signature of Deity in the records of creation, there is a constantly recurring practical need of speculations on these transcendent themes. The sense-world wraps itself so closely round us, and so insinuates into us a feeling of its attractiveness, that it not unfrequently wiles us into the belief that it is all-in-all, that nothing higher, better, or other exists. The buoyancy of life and the heyday of health mislead us on the one side, and the social discomforts of misfortune, or the painful experiences of disease, mislead us on the other. Either inclines us to lay a greater stress and value on the things of time and sense than rightfully belong to them, and by a fallacy of the emotions we fill up these outward sensible things with all the elements of pleasure, so as to look upon the physical comforts of life as a veritable Jacob's ladder, not only reaching, but leading from earth to heaven. In such seasons worldliness presses itself not only upon but into the soul, and a man is thought to be sensible only when he limits his desires to sensible things. This, which takes place in individuals, occurs also in communities, and hence the recurrence in history of periods of great moral prostration, social luxury, and intellectual sybaritism, developing into a practical falling away from worship, and forgetfulness of God and of divine law. It is a fact that the immediate historic consequences of the unsettlement of the Revolution of 1789 had remoter philosophical consequences. That event led men to place kings and priests among men of *craft*. Atheism became popular, and specifics for bringing up a race of nobler beings than had hitherto dwelt on the surface of our planet were plentifully announced, most of them beginning by the proposed erasure from human life of belief in God. St. Simonism, Fourierism, Owenism, &c., projected the mechanization of life so that it might be encircled and controlled by a concourse of inevitabilities, necessitating the development of the race so as ultimately to change the face of society, turning shadows into realities, and making man a new creature in all the issues of his physical, moral, and intellectual attributes. Hence we find Shelley, as a student at Oxford, writing on "The Necessity of Atheism," and in his "Queen Mab" (1812) making this invocation :—

"Spirit of nature! all-sufficing power,  
Necessity! thou mother of the world,  
Unlike the god of human error, thou  
Requirest no prayers nor praises;"

and hence, too, we were told that in the practice of the rational religion then proposed *worship* should consist in those "inexpressible feelings of wonder, admiration, and delight, which, when man is surrounded by superior circumstances only, will naturally arise from the contemplation of the infinity of space, of the eternity of duration, of the order of the universe, and of that incomprehensible power by which the atom is moved, and the aggregate of nature is governed."

By an unfortunate conjunction of circumstances, in this country the doctrines of "The Age of Reason" and "The Rights of Man" came to be thought of as almost inseparable. The fallacy of association affected both parties. Statesmen in power looked on infidelity as the handmaiden of revolution, and Churchmen sedulously cultured the misconception. Reformers, again, saw so frequently the evils of social life propped up by the professedly religious, and found that Church and State were held to be so indissolubly joined that any attempt to effect change in one was regarded as treason to the other, that too many of them took to infidelity as an agent in the destructive work which they felt to be necessary before the progress of man could have free course. In this transition state Atheism almost became a boast, and reformer and infidel were held to be near akin in significance. Even to our own day an echo of this condition of things has come down, and we not unfrequently find the aggressive claiming to be also the progressive among men. A more rational mode of thought has, however, with the spread of intelligence, been brought about, and men have learned that the spheres of thought embraced by politics and religion are not by any means identical; and we can now advocate social and political reforms without necessarily doubting the rule of providence or the sway of Deity.

In the early part of the present century, under the impulse of the German philosophy, stirred by the popularity of Paley, and excited to reaction by the French Revolution, and the latent as well as active infidelity to which, as we have already observed, it gave an impetus, a considerable amount of speculation was adventured on the evidences of the existence of a supreme Being. A very considerable inducement to the culture of such studies was given by the institution of "the Burnet Prizes"—two bequests in favour of natural theology made by Mr. John Burnet (1729—1784) of Dens, who had been a general merchant in Aberdeen, and left a large fortune for charitable purposes, including the foundation of two premiums to be awarded every forty years for the best "Essays on the Evidence that there is a Being, all-powerful, wise, and good, by whom everything exists." The competition is to be open to all, and the

prizes are to be adjudged by three responsible persons of public reputation selected by the trustees of the testator, the ministers of Aberdeen, and the authorities of the University of Aberdeen. The first competition took place in 1815, when fifty essays were sent in. The judges were Dr. Gilbert Gerard, Professor of Divinity; Dr. Glennie, Professor of Moral Philosophy; and Dr. Robert Hamilton, Professor of Mathematics. The first prize, £1,200, was awarded August 4th, 1815, to Dr. Wm. Lawrence Browne, Principal of Marischal College and the University of Aberdeen for his "Essay on the Existence of a Supreme Creator," published in two volumes in 1816; and the second (£400) to Rev. John Bird Sumner, then Fellow of Eton College, afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury, for his "Essay on the Records of Creation," issued in 1817. It is probable that not a few of the efforts of the other competitors saw the light. Among works upon this theme, at any rate, the following publications appeared, either simultaneously or shortly afterwards:—Thomas Chalmers' "Astronomical Discourses," 1816; Samuel Drew's "Being and Attributes of God," 1820; Lady Mary Shepherd's "Essay on the Relations of Cause and Effect," 1824.

The Earl of Bridgewater (Rev. F. Henry Egerton), 1756—1829, had been deeply impressed by some of these argumentative treatises, in which the proof of the Deity's relations to nature and man were expounded and enforced. He drew up an outline work on that topic, and had it privately printed by Didot, in Paris, where for the most part he resided. By his last will, 25th February, 1825, he left £8,000, invested in the public funds, to be paid to the author of the best treatise on "The Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God as manifested in the Creation." The selection of an author was left to Davis Gilbert, President of the Royal Society of London. He having advised with Dr. William Howley, Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. C. J. Bloomfield, Bishop of London, and a relative of the testator resolved that, instead of giving the entire sum to one author for one work, the earl's intention would be better accomplished if the money were offered to eight different individuals, who should each write separate treatises bearing on the same important theme, each exhausting, as far as possible, one phase of the subject. The copyright of each production was to remain the property of the author. This arrangement, as it was a departure from the letter of the will, occasioned some controversy at the time. The result, however, has been acquiesced in, and the Bridgewater Treatises have now been added to the evidence literature of modern theology. These works do not so much demonstrate the existence of God—though most of them give a little consideration to that phase of the question—as, assuming that existence as a primary fact, prove that in creation His power, wisdom, and goodness are displayed in essentially the same manner as revelation leads us to expect they would. They speak of the light of God transmitted through the created world, and so try to bring the intellect into a right condition with regard to God by teaching us to

see through nature, as a transparency, a living Soul in the universe, supreme, loving, good, and adorable, and to think of all the things we see around us as so many evidences of an originating and sustaining Mind. They bring together a vast mass of scientific knowledge, information regarding almost every department of human inquiry, and they show how the discoveries and truths of science go to prove and bear out the idea that a designing Mind is discernible in creation, determining the modifications and controlling the movements of the entire aggregate of nature. The works are not certainly all of equal value or merit, but as a series they constitute a wonderful harmony of just and beautiful observations and reasonings on the Power who formed and shaped nature to His purposes.

"They are—1. 'The Adaptation of Eternal Nature to the Moral and Intellectual Constitution of Man,' by Thomas Chalmers, D.D. (Lond., 1833, 2 vols., 8vo.) 2. 'Chemistry, Meteorology, and the Function of Digestion, considered with Reference to Natural Theology,' by William Prout, M.D. (Lond., 1834, 8vo.) 3. 'On the History, Habits, and Instincts of Animals,' by the Rev. William Kirby. (Lond., 1835, 2 vols., 8vo.) 4. 'On Geology and Mineralogy,' by the Rev. Dr. Buckland. (Lond., 1837, 2 vols., 8vo.) 5. 'The Hand, its Mechanism and Vital Endowments, as evincing Design,' by Sir Charles Bell. (Lond., 1837, 8vo.) 6. 'The Adaptation of External Nature to the Physical Condition of Man,' by John Kidd, M.D. (Lond., 1837, 8vo.) 7. 'Astronomy and General Physics, considered with Reference to Natural Theology,' by the Rev. William Whewell. (Lond., 1839, 8vo.) 8. 'Animal and Vegetable Physiology, considered with Reference to Natural Theology,' by Peter Mark Roget, M.D. (Lond., 1840, 2 vols., 8vo.) All these works have since been republished in *Bohn's Scientific Library*, revised and re-edited where necessary;—forming a handsome uniform series. To these may be added a volunteer and highly original work by Charles Babbage, entitled 'A Ninth Bridgewater Treatise,' a most ingenious attempt to bring mathematics into the range of sciences which afford proof of divine design in the constitution of the world."

In 1828 appeared George Combe's singularly clear and exquisitely written treatise on "The Constitution of Man, considered in Relation to External Objects." Dissatisfied alike with dogmatic and metaphysical Calvinism, he proclaimed the doctrine of Scientific Necessity, and advocated the universal reign of physical law. He offered his philosophy as one that would directly and immediately guide and explain actions, and so lead to effective results. His chief teaching might be summed up in this thesis,—By the Most High Providence, which has constituted and overrules the universe of things, we have been placed in the midst of a material world, governed by perfect and changeless order, and ever acting on us. We cannot change in any essential particular that outward universe, and therefore we should put ourselves in harmony with

it; to do which we must ascertain and recognise its laws, and submit ourselves in willing obedience to their immutable behests. Such a theme, so stated and so treated, was looked upon by many as bringing science into conflict with religion; but a more mature consideration shows that, if the reign of law be so imperative in the universe of nature, it must have its power among the operations of mind, so that by the substitution for the idea of man's entire dependence on nature, that of an interdependence of nature and consciousness, we can conciliate the two poles of thought, and destroy the supposed negation of religion by the constitution of man and the laws of nature.

Between Dr. George Combe and Sir William Hamilton a phrenological feud had been going on for several years prior to the issue of that expansion and enforcement of the principles of physiology and phrenology, as the rulers of vitality, which the "Constitution of Man" promulgate. It was, perhaps, not without a silent reference to this highly popular work, and the materialistic tendency of thought in which it was supposed to culminate, that Sir William Hamilton selected as his earliest topic for a contribution to the *Edinburgh*—"The Philosophy of the Unconditioned," a paper in which he not only laid the basis of his metaphysical fame, but the foundations of a new school of thought on the science of the Absolute. This paper deals with the nature and degree of our idea of Deity—our power to conceive of Him as a reality in His reality, our capacity either to know Him in the fulness of His Being, or only in the manifestations of Himself which He has deigned to make. This article, so distinctly opposed to the sensation and association theorists, was made in the spirit of Kant, but contained elements which the Kantian analysis could not reach. It aimed at showing that all attempts to transcend thought were illegitimate and illusive, and hence it declared against any adequate knowledge of the Infinite One in whom all perfection dwells and is, while it gave to our notions of causality and substance a fresh process of development, and elevated faith into a higher power than any previous philosophy had done. Withal, however, it proclaimed not a science, but a nescience of Deity.

Following close upon the original Bridgewater Treatises there appeared a "Discourse on Natural Theology," from the pen of Lord Brongham—a work which he had begun in 1830, but did not publish till 1835, and which he subsequently elaborated and enriched, with many acute reasonings and many explanations of strange facts in nature, in a more thorough edition in 1856. At his instigation, too, Sir Charles Bell was brought to give his attention to the extension and annotation of "Paley's Natural Theology," so that a new edition, brought up to the ripest state of science, was produced. Gideon Algernon Mantell's "Wonders of Geology," 1838, and "Medals of Creation," 1844, gave highly interesting adaptations of that science to the service of natural theology; as did also Dr. John Pye Smith's "Relation between Holy Scripture

and Geological Science," 1839. In 1834 the Rev. B. Godwin delivered a series of admirably conceived and able "Lectures on the Atheistic Controversy" in Bradford, where, as in many other large towns, there was an association of professed Atheists. These were published at a cheap rate, and had an extensive circulation. These lectures, revised and modified to suit the change of view brought about in the lapse of time, were re-delivered and published under the title of "The Philosophy of Atheism," in 1863. These lectures are an excellent contribution to the treatment of the subject. The "Natural Theology" of Dr. Edward Turton, 1840, is also highly valuable, though, perhaps, rather too unsparing in animadversions on Lord Brougham's able though rhetorical "Discourse." Almost simultaneously with these masterly treatises there came from the Edinburgh press a thin octavo of sixty-seven pages, developing that side of the question which had been almost left untouched by British thinkers for nearly a century—in fact, from the time when Joseph Butler corresponded with Dr. Samuel Clarke—"The Argument *a priori* for the Being and Attributes of God." It bore the name of William Gillespie as that of its author. From a criticism issued very shortly after the publication of the work we extract the following account of the book:—

"The existence and attributes of the King eternal, immortal, and invisible, whose name is Holy, are reasoned of here with the same passionless apathy as if they were the properties of an arbitrary and cold abstraction, or as if the subject of discussion were a mere algebraical symbol. . . . As it is, we have from Mr. Gillespie's pen rather the skeleton of an argument, the naked propositions and successive steps necessary for the formal evolution of the conclusion, than anything entitled to be considered as a full and finished performance. . . . The author evinces a very intimate acquaintance and familiarity with this most perplexing topic. . . . The style, too, is remarkably clear, natural, and perspicuous; approaching as nearly, perhaps, to a perfectly colourless and diaphanous simplicity as the very nature of the difficult and general terms, which enter so largely into the texture and composition of the argument, would admit. It bears no inconsiderable resemblance to the concise, simple, and manly manner and models of the school in which it has obviously been formed—that of Locke, of Clarke, and of Butler; with a little affectation, too, of the same antiquity."

In addition to this notice from a point of view not wholly friendly, we may add a few sentences of bibliographic interest from the preface of the book itself, in which the author undertakes to—

"Exhibit a brief historical survey of things from the commencement:—First of all, there appeared, as the original demonstration, what (barring alterations) is now comprised within the limits of Divisions I. and II. No greater were the dimensions of that first edition of the 'Argument.' After a period of some length, during which the work was, in various ways, much before the public, and much, too, upon its trial in all respects, the propositions (relating to the *Happiness* and the *Goodness*) represented by

the first subdivision of Division III. were added, and came out in the Torbanehill edition (1843). After, again, a much longer interval, in which events of moment to the fate of the demonstration were proceeding, the Relative Moral Attributes, as corresponding with the second subdivision of Division III., were published in a little volume by themselves (1865). Lastly, the Complex or Compound Moral Attributes, comprehended in Division IV., were in a minute volume given to the public in the beginning of this year (1870). Such has been the course of events and the progress of the demonstration to consolidation and completion. . . . The 'Argument' had been no long time in existence when it was assailed by an enemy to all theistical ratiocination, of whom it may be truthfully said that, on the side of the Atheists, his equal in metaphysical and logical powers and general grasp of his subject has not yet arisen. Yet even the celebrated 'Antitheos' (for it is of him I speak) was obliged to lower his ensign by virtually acknowledging overwhelming defeat at his own weapons. . . . For a dozen, or for perhaps a score of years after *Antitheos's* day, the Atheists of the east no less than of the west, and of the south as well as the north, tried to find a weak spot in the coat-of-mail endued by the author of the 'Argument'; but an unprotected joint in the armour became obvious to the eye of no Atheist, how keenly soever he might peer. All the scrutiny was in vain."

This was not the first time that the name of Gillespie had been connected with this abstruse theme, as the following excerpt, with the simple explanation that the Rev. George Gillespie (Milton's "Galasp") was the youngest member of "the Westminster Assembly of Divines," will sufficiently show:—

"In one of the earliest meetings of the committee the subject of deliberation was to frame an answer to the question, *What is God?* Each one felt the unapproachable sublimity of the divine idea suggested by these words; but who could venture to give it expression in human language! All shrank from the too sacred task in awe-struck, reverential fear. At length it was resolved, as an expression of the committee's deep humility, that the youngest member should first make the attempt. He consented, but begged that the brethren would first unite with him in prayer: 'O God, Thou art a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in Thy being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.' When he ceased, the first sentence of his prayer was immediately written down and adopted as the most perfect answer that could be conceived,—as, indeed, in a very sacred sense, God's own answer descriptive of Himself."\*

We are in possession of a number of *memoranda* of the events of the life of the W. H. Gillespie, although not affording quite so complete a series as we could desire, but exigencies of space withhold us from entering here and now upon the biography of this powerful and accomplished controversialist and notable dialectician. We can only mention a few of the other writings with which he has enriched the libraries of the thoughtful. Next in importance to his as yet matchless metaphysical treatise on Theism we would place his work on "The Truth of the Evangelical History of our Lord Jesus

\* Hetherington's Life of Rev. George Gillespie.



Christ: proved in Opposition to Dr. D. F. Strauss." This book contains a condensed but exceedingly lucid view of the main design and object of each of the four Gospels and of the Acts of the Apostles, and assigns as the *reason* of their apparent discrepancies "that each evangelical biographer had his own peculiar and specific object in writing, and that he noticed just those circumstances in the life of Christ, and those only, which subverted his own particular purpose;" and these too only in the phases and in the forms suitable to his own design—a design inspired by "the one great Author of the gospel histories, so wondrously harmonizing in a fundamental unity," on that account. Next to this we may note "The Theology of Geologists," a criticism of Hugh Miller, Dr. Fleming, Dr. Paton Gloag, Peter Bayne, &c., of considerable trenchancy, grim tart humour, and controversial cleverness—although in part, as a war with and against the dead, it seems to us somewhat wanting in the charity of controversy. We have seen a "Sketch of a New Method of operating to reduce Fortified Places, Encampments, &c.," by the same author. The topic appears to have been suggested by the circumstances of the Crimean war, and to have been considered during the currency of the Indian mutiny. It was brought under the notice of the Government of the day, but we do not know that it received more than the ordinary *courtesy* accorded to the suggestions of outsiders by our naval and military authorities.

These works, however, are but slightly connected with our subject, and we pass on to notice that in 1838 Mr. Gillespie issued, in reply to an exceedingly able antagonist, who, on being challenged as an Atheist to refute the "*Argument à priori*," had issued a book in "*Refutation*" of that work. Gillespie's "*Examination of Anti-theos's Refutation*" is elaborate, and displays a wide and varied course of metaphysical reading. To this there may be added a notice of "*Atheism or Theism?*" a report of a debate carried on between Iconoclast, the representative of the infidel portion of society, and the author of the argument *à priori* for the necessary existence of God. Out of this debate there arose two publications which have been brought under our notice, "*An Examination of Gillespie's Argument*," by Thomas Squire Barrett (of which a second edition has just come to hand), and "*A Refutation of Mr. W. H. Gillespie's Argument*," by R. H. B. In order to give within the space now available the best united consideration we can on the theme of Theism to the most thorough-going, condensed, and rigidly logical specimen of *à priori* reasoning in our language with those of the modern opponents of his views, we shall present our readers with an *epitome* of the argument; and whenever we find that a specially good hit has been made by either of his antagonists we shall subjoin the same in notes to the relative passages; we shall do so with a few relative passages from other writers on this grave subject. We shall not attempt to reconcile the opinions of the author of the argument with those of his opponents, nor can we undertake to give

articulate exposition to our views of which is in the wrong, as that may be gathered from the tenor of our observations on "The Metaphysics of Theism" as we have gone along.

We had completed our epitome, of the fifth edition, and placed it in the hands of the printer, when we received proof sheets of a sixth edition, considerably extended by "a new division, containing the Transcendent Excellences." This, however, is not yet published, and as, on a hasty glance, it appears to contain no material alteration in the main argument, our epitome shall stand, and we shall supplement the same by so much of the reasoning in the unpublished matter as seems to be requisite to give a complete view of the argument; an argument, as we have said, unique in its consistency, thoroughness, pertinence, and compacted involution of form -- bursting into concurrent beauty and attractiveness as a rose with all its splendour of form, tint, and scent from a rosebud.

This work cannot properly be called, what Dr. Clarke's "Demonstration" has been termed, a Deification of Space and Duration. It is an eliciting of the necessities of thought, an unfolding of the concepts which are implicit in our inevitable ideas into explicit consciousness to ourselves. It assumes that there are necessary ideas, i.e., ideas which under the excitation of experience must have being in the mind whenever its constructive capacity is stirred. The author claims his right to regard as *axioms* that "every proposition which we cannot but believe is a necessary truth," and that "everything the existence of which we cannot but believe is necessarily existing." These being granted, the foundations of his argument *a priori* are laid. Such an argument follows the deductive method of *proof*, not the inductive form of *investigation*. Reason is the organ of philosophy, and its validity for us depends on our conviction of the reality and truth of its operations when legitimately conducted. Every principle of thought, however imperatively derived from close induction of phenomena, must have had a pre-existence that the observed phenomena might be possible, unless we assert that induction creates principles! These principles, as first truths, constitute the body of philosophy; and are such that a retrogression beyond them is impossible to us. These principles, in themselves, must be doubtless, must admit of no rational question; and they must, while forming a consistent unity, be such as to yield as forthgrowths of themselves the explanations of all that experience presents. Truth is the entire consistency and harmony of thought and experience. Philosophy is the explanation of experience to thought in a series of reasoned-out truths. Experience is the outward embodiment of truth, philosophy is the inward presentation of truth, truth is that alone on which and with which Reason is satisfied. Truth is the object of its toils and zeal, for the attainment of truth is the mainspring of its activity and effort. Whatever requires to be accounted for to the soul, comes within the scope of philosophic inquiry; and hence surely one of the beliefs which, in one form or other, has been regarded as the highest expression of reflective

reason, Religious faith in Universal Mind, becomes a proper theme of speculative consideration.

Wm. J. Fox affirms that "the human ever believes in the Divine. The notion of Deity is as natural to man as that of humanity," and although a direct negative has been given to this opinion in the able little work entitled "An Examination of Gillespie," issued by Thomas Squire Barrett, in the assertion (supported as to the *prior half* of the matter by reference to Locke) that "the belief in the existence of a Deity is neither innate nor intuitive;" we cannot avoid thinking that the great weight of evidence goes to support the opinion that a belief in Deity characterizes the majority of men—that, as Fox says, "real Atheism is an abnormal condition, it is out of the rule of human life and human feelings." We think therefore that the being of God forms one of the fundamental topics on which Philosophy should employ her highest powers and finest energies. It seems to us that Kant is right in his opinion that there exist certain *necessities* in human thought which, in their constructive power, yield instructive facts for the philosopher. To elicit from these all the possible truths they imply is a first duty in one who would properly comprehend himself or his surroundings. We cannot believe that our nature has been intentionally framed to be a mighty and incorrigible suggester of falsehood and imparter of deceptive ideas. This seems a hideous impossibility. On no question do we accept of such a mode of escape from the consequences of our reasoning. We accept the necessities of thought as binding and overpowering, as true and trustworthy: for they are involved in the very possibility of our being, if they do not even involve *it*, they are the issue of a correlation of the necessity of thought with the necessity of things. We know because we experience, but we experience because we know. We correlate the two necessities into unity, and we pursue the results through all the processes of regulative thought. This is reasoning *a priori*. We *adduce* thought in its necessary state, we *induce* experience to it, and from the union of these we *deduce* truth. Argumentation *a priori* proceeds *from* the inevitable necessities of thought *to* the entire forthflow of results implied in them; *i.e.*, is *from* antecedents that are undenied or undeniable, accepted as true or unexceptionable as truths, *to* consequents; logically, that is, irrefragably deducible from them.

The argument for the being and the attributes of the Deity is capable of being carried on in a threefold manner: 1st, *a priori*; 2nd, *a posteriori*; 3rd, from a combination of both.

In reality, the argument *a priori* issues from the depths of the human consciousness. Selfhood and causative will, intelligence, affection, and moral disposition are the formative and suggestive elements of the God-idea. Cause and independence, extension and duration, though felt *in* the soul, yet stretch beyond the vastest reaches of thought in its outgoings, in reflective search, for a Father and a former, a giver of love and life. The argument *a posteriori*, though it seemingly starts from nature and experience, yet ultimately

rests upon an *a priori* element giving the notions of existence, will, and intelligent design, and owes its efficacy as a theory to the objective transference of our subjective consciousness. Only by this projection of selfhood into the appearances of things does the argument from design attain force and pertinence. On this account, in our view, it would be wise in our theologians were they to combine into a simple unity the two forms of argumentation, so that experience and thought might both be brought to give a proof and a properly certified utterance on the subject. That this may be effectively done it is well that the full power of each of the forms of argument should be exhibited, and this is what Mr. Gillespie has now done for the "argument *a priori*," as may be seen from the following sketch of his aim and its progress in this :—

"The first complete edition of 'The Argument *a priori*,' or the argument as embodying the whole of the moral attributes, from *goodness* onwards to *holiness*, the apex of the construction, as well as containing that preceding portion which may be regarded as the immutable foundation and solid basement story of the whole edifice, however high it may be carried. . . . The simplicity of the great Being treated of seems to transfer itself into the argumentation about him. . . . The truth about the Being of beings, as He is in Himself, is simple and capable of being clearly stated in few words. . . . In Divisions I. and II. the great substratal substance is viewed—or His modes are viewed—as absolute as well as simple. But in the subsequent portion of the piece the attributes, become moral, are at length directly relative, and they come to be at last complex or compound. Now it is plain that the elucidation of the subject of relative and complex attributes can by no means be trajected in so unelaborate a way as that sufficient for the handling of the simple and absolute modes. The very circumstance of their relativity necessitates and enforces a more involved, intricate, and perplexed method of treatment.

"Another matter, connected with the same topic, is worthy of even more consideration. In this argument the *demonstrations* themselves are the weighty things; all else is, comparatively speaking, quite subordinate and unimportant. If the demonstrations fail, if in truth any one of the main demonstrations be not infallible, all goes for nothing. If they are all infallible, all is right. . . . A demonstration must be irrefragable; a scholium, however, may be faulty in deducing a certain inference without at all damaging the connected proof containing the imagined inference sought to be drawn and applied. . . . Our age is unquestionably *infidel*, and even *atheistical* in tendency. The highest philosophy and the exactest science alike on the one hand, and on the other the lowest literature and the loosest *pseudo*-science, are equally set against any true recognition of a righteous moral Governor of the world, the supreme source of all human lights, and the final cause to which all mundane things must infallibly tend, whether men like it or no. Again, the whole of religion, speculative and practical, rests on the one foundation of Theism; and the sole root-doctrine of Theism is, there is a God. If this doctrine be satisfactorily established, and be firmly settled in men's minds, the solid basis of religion is laid, and the superstructure may be advanced to completion. But if the doctrine be insecurely made out, or be generally

deemed to be so, the interests of religion at large cannot be on a safe and proper footing, and the ranks of infidelity may be expected to increase still more rapidly in accordance with the spirit of the times. The days on which we are fallen are unquestionably evil, and evil they will continue to be, and they will be increasingly evil unless men can point to some proof which believers shall hail as a true demonstration of the truth of their faith; while the unbelievers seek in vain to demolish the edifice. . . . After the aspirations and heart-yearnings of so many weary waiting years, the years have fulfilled their course, the star of hope has risen above the horizon; and, after a happy ascension, it is to be beheld now in the zenith."

Division I. deals with "The Being and the natural modes" (of God). Prop. I. "*Infinity of extension is necessarily existing*:" for "even when the mind endeavours to remove from it [self] the idea of infinity of extension as really outwardly existent, it cannot, after all its efforts, avoid leaving still within it the idea of such infinity."\* Now "everything the existence of which we cannot but believe is necessarily existing." Prop. II. "*Infinity of extension is necessarily indivisible*," i. e., "the parts of infinity of extension are necessarily indivisible (either really or mentally) from each other"—"unless it be false that whatever is, is where it is, and when it is," and, as a *scholium*, "it is a necessary consequence that the thing, the parts of which are *divisible* from each other, is not infinity of extension, nor any part of it." From this proposition the corollary is drawn, "that the parts of infinity of extension are necessarily immoveable among themselves, really or mentally;" for motion of parts among themselves supposes of necessity separation† of the parts;—from which it is, as a *scholium*, a necessary consequence that the thing the parts of which are *moveable* among themselves is not infinity of extension or any part of it; *part*, in the sense of partial consideration only; for otherwise infinity of extension can have no parts." Prop. III. "*There is necessarily a Being of infinity of extension*. Either infinity of extension subsists (or is conceived to exist) with a substratum or support or without one; in the latter case it is a *substance*, and in the former it has a *substance*; in either case this substance is the *Being* of infinity of extension.‡

Prop. IV. "*The Being of infinity of extension is necessarily of unity and simplicity*;" the former because it is indivisible, and the latter because true

\* "Space and time are invariable elements of every act of consciousness, which no effort of thought can get rid of or conceive of as absent."—*Mansel*.

† "It may be the fact, but it requires further proof. *Separation* of parts requires that the parts separated have superficies of their own, and be removed from each other, be it by ever so little a distance. Does motion of parts require all this?"—*T. S. Barrett*. "It would have been better to have said at once infinity of extension

is necessarily inseparable."—*R. II. B.*

‡ "Whatever can be conceived by a clear and distinct idea necessarily implies the *possibility* of existence." . . . "Did it imply any contradiction, it is impossible it could ever be conceived."—*Hume*. "Extension does not belong to thought, because thought is not a *being*; but there is need of extension to the existence of *every* being."—*Dr. S. Clarke*. "Being signifies real existence."—*W. A. Butler*.

unity is very simplicity; whence issues the *scholium*, "On the whole, therefore, the thing, the parts of which are divisible from each other, is not the substratum of infinity of extension, nor any part of it; and the thing, the parts of which are moveable among themselves, is not the substratum nor any part of it; part in the sense of partial consideration only." To this is attached the *sub-proposition* that "*the material universe is finite in extension*;" otherwise we should require to assert that "the material universe is the substratum of infinity of extension."<sup>\*</sup> But the parts of the material universe are divisible and moveable among themselves; and it has already been proved that "the Being of infinity of extension is necessarily of unity and simplicity;" indivisible into parts, and immoveable as to parts. "Extension infinite generally, or without general boundaries, but with interspersed hollownesses, were—not true infinite extension (which requires *fullness*), but, at most, infinity in number, of finite extensions; each one of the empty interstices bounding or limiting or making finite, the extension all round the circumferential spaces." From this consideration we derive this "general scholium as to extension," that "infinity of extension must *penetrate* the material universe and every atom, even the minutest atom of it." "Accordingly, let us confine to *matter*—namely, to the distance of the extremities of matter from each other—the name *extension*; and apply to the extension of infinity of extension, a part of which (part in the sense of partial consideration only) penetrates all matter to the minutest atom or corpuscular monad, the name *expansion*."<sup>†</sup> Expansion, then, "*penetrates* matter, hence we have the fact and the doctrine of spirituality coming to the surface. That which intimately penetrates matter, all matter of whatever kind, is of course immaterial," and "may be called a spiritual substance; in one word, a *spirit*." Thus it has been shown that "there is necessarily existing a spiritual substance or spirit, of infinity of expansion, or in other words an infinite spirit."<sup>‡</sup> This element of spirituality, however, we need not carry expressly with us from point to point of our argumentation; let it suffice that it is "latently present, ready when necessary to be evoked and drawn from potentiality into actuality." This agreed to, we reach the close of the first part of the first division of the work in Prop. V. "*There is necessarily but one Being of infinity of expansion*," otherwise there would be *two* infinities, or more, which is inconceivable. So far the argument has taken its rise in the category of space, the

\* "This sub-proposition may possibly prove that the material universe is not the substratum of infinity of extension, but it certainly does not demonstrate that it is finite in extension."—T. S. Barrett.

† "It were possible to be wished that the name *extension* were applied only to matter, or the distance of the extremities of particular bodies; and the term *expansion* to space in general, with or without solid matter possessing it, so as to say space is expanded and body

is extended."—Locke. "Space is the logical condition of the possibility of extension."—*North American Review*, July, 1864.

‡ "Mr. Gillespie uses the word 'substance' as synonymous with 'being,' which is neither more nor less than saying it is an 'existence.' . . . To support accidents is not [proved by Mr. G. to be] a necessary faculty of *being*, though it is of *substance*. . . I grant therefore the *entity*, but not the *substantiality* of infinity of extension."—R. H. B.

special relation of extension or expansion; the author next reverts to the equally necessary relation, in human thought, of what is called time, and from this making a new departure, he proceeds in the second part of the first division to give us as—

Prop. I. "*Infinity of duration is necessarily existing*,"\* and by parity of reasoning, Prop. II. "*Infinity of duration is necessarily indivisible*," and by corollary "necessarily immoveable."† Prop. III. declares that "*there is necessarily a Being of infinity of duration*,"‡ which Prop. IV. sets forth as "necessarily of unity and simplicity." From this there comes the *sub-proposition*, "*The material universe is finite in duration*;" "or, it began sometime to be." "Matter, or (if you prefer it) the material universe, is emphatically *the divisible and the moveable*; duration or infinity of duration is the subject to which the predicates divisible, moveable, are totally inapplicable. The ideas of the two things, duration and divisibility, by separability of parts, are absolutely incompatible." And, on the other hand, matter is simply another word for that which is divisible in every sense, or in every possible way." As a corollary from this sub-proposition we derive this, that "*Every succession of finitely extended substances is finite in duration*."§ A "succession of worlds emerging one by one from the depths of eternity would be nothing more than the material universe" "renewing itself over and over again; and we have seen that the material universe is itself finite in duration." Hence follows, as before, Prop. V., "*There is necessarily but one Being of infinity of duration*."

\* "The truth or falsity of this turns on how the predicative phrase 'is existing' is to be understood. 'Is existing' is the present tense. Now, really, the present time is infinitesimal, dividing two extremities, an infinite past and a never-ending future. . . . In this respect there is no infinity of duration."—*T. S. Barrett*.

† "Division is an idea applicable only to things possessing extension; the idea is utterly repugnant to that of duration."—*T. S. Barrett*.

‡ "No! Infinity of duration would not be a being if it had no substratum; for, in order to be a being, a thing must exist, and infinity of duration . . . does not exist."—*T. S. Barrett*. "Mr. G. tacitly acknowledges that duration does not 'subsist,' as he uses the word 'exist' where, in the parallel reasoning with regard to infinity of extension, he employs 'subsist.'"—*R. H. B.*

§ "Here are two kinds of divisibility and moveability, as distinct

as anything can be. The parts of duration are indivisible and unmoveable from each other *only* in this sense; the moment of time which exists *now*, for example, cannot be moved back to, nor change place with any moment of time which existed in the year 1750, neither can the present moment be moved forward to any period yet to come; in this sense *alone* can *immoveability* be predicated of the parts of duration. . . . And *yesterday* and *to-day* [*e. g.*] cannot be *separated* by a certain period of time from each other; in this sense *alone* can duration be said to be indivisible. . . . But indivisibility and immoveability are predicated of the parts of matter in an *entirely different sense*; and . . . it necessarily follows that the material universe cannot be proved finite in duration by considering the divisibility and moveability of its parts. It requires other proof."—*R. H. B.* "Eternity is the synonym of pure time."—*Cousin*.

Here the two foregoing trains of reasoning make a concursus, meet and form one, so that we have a fresh start of the united train, in part third, in Prop. I., "*There is necessarily a Being of infinity of expansion and infinity of duration*:" for "the whole of infinity of expansion being in the whole of infinity of duration, the whole of the Being of infinity of expansion is in the whole of the Being of duration" (and *vice versa*).<sup>\*</sup> "*Whole in every instance, but as a figure.*" Thence follow, by easy transition, Prop. II., "*The Being of infinity of expansion and infinity of duration is necessarily of unity and simplicity*;"<sup>†</sup> and Prop. III., "*There is necessarily but one Being of infinity of expansion and infinity of duration.*" As a *scholium*, "We may, for an instant, evoke here the always latent principle or element of spirituality," and conclude "consequently, as there is one, so there is but one immaterial or spiritual substance, or Being of infinity of expansion and infinity of duration,"<sup>‡</sup> and the *epilogomenon* is "Here endeth the considera-

\* "All limited duration is comprehended in time, and all limited extension in space. These, in their capacious womb, contain all finite existences, but are contained by none. Created things have their particular place in space and their particular place in time; but time is everywhere and space at all times. They embrace each other, and have that mysterious union which the schoolmen conceive between soul and body—the whole of each is in every part of the other."—*Reid*.

† "It is not necessarily true that any eternally existing thing must be indivisible." At least, Mr. Gillespie has advanced nothing in proof thereof. . . . Divisibility and indivisibility of the *substratum* may be spoken about because it is of extent (whether of infinite or finite extent); but divisibility and indivisibility of infinity of duration itself cannot be spoken of because infinity of duration is not of extent, but of duration."—*T. S. Barrett*. "It would be nonsense to say infinity of duration is infinitely extended. . . . An infinitely extended substance we could easily conceive as non-existent; i.e., we could easily conceive infinity of extension to exist without that substance."—*R. H. B.*

‡ "There may be an infinite number of beings of infinity of duration, which do not exist necessarily."—*T. S. Barrett*. "The demonstration given is no demonstration at all. It aims, moreover, to prove more than the actual statement in the enunciation, viz., that infinity of expansion necessary has a *substratum*, and that there necessarily is, in consequence, a being of infinity of expansion and infinity of duration which is not merely space."—*T. S. Barrett*. "Mr. Gillespie must admit that no two parts of duration exist together, and yet he says the whole of infinity of duration is [i.e., exists at the present speaking] in the whole of infinity of expansion; thus making the whole equal to its part; and also making yesterday and to-morrow exist at the present moment!! . . . Consequently, as infinity of duration has no two parts together, but all the parts following each other in endless succession, so likewise the being of infinity of duration has no two parts existing together, but all following in succession. Therefore, as it is a contradiction to say the whole of infinity of duration is, so also, under this hypothesis, it is a contradiction to say the whole of the being of duration is."—*R. H. B.*



tion, as of the BEING, so of the *natural* or *physical* modes or attributes. These attributes are also absolute and simple.\*

Division II. deals with "the intellectual attributes," and is arranged in three parts, each consisting of one proposition, and the remarks or inferences necessary to give completeness to its form and thoroughness to its matter.

Prop. I. "*The simple, sole Being of infinity of expansion and of duration is necessarily intelligent and all-knowing.*" "The secret in the *cogito* is the ultimate to us all." *Cogito* is intelligent thought. "Intelligence either began to be, or never began to be." "What is not of intelligence cannot make intelligence begin to be." "If intelligence began to be, there was intelligence before there was intelligence;" and as intelligence is of infinity of duration, and supposes a Being," it necessarily follows that that Being is intelligent to the extent of being all-knowing. As a *scholium* we may affirm that "the simple, sole Being of infinity of expansion and of duration, being intelligent, is a mind—a mind conscious of itself"—for "this much at the least is implied in the very being of thinking with consciousness."

Prop. II. "*The simple sole Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is all-knowing, is necessarily all-powerful.*:" for "He who is all-knowing made matter begin to be." "The material universe is finite in duration, or it began to be." "Therefore the material universe had a cause." Now "there existed no substance or being to be the cause of the material universe other than the necessarily existing intelligent substance or being of infinity of expansion and duration;" "therefore this Substance or Being was and must have been the very cause or creator of the material universe or all matter." "Creation is the highest conceivable exercise of power. Creation is, in truth, the test and sign of omnipotence."†

Prop. III. "The simple, sole Being of infinity of expansion and of duration, who is all-knowing and all-powerful, is necessarily entirely free,"‡ inasmuch as "He made motion begin to be." "The Being causing or making begin to be all motion, or motion absolutely, is free, or must be supposed to be free—free of all outward or extraneous influence, i. e., in the truest sense of the word. To be the cause of all motion—to originate absolute motion, is, and has universally been allowed to be, the best possible test and sign of the possession of true freeness;" hence the very cause or creator of all motion must be entirely free. This yields as *scholium* that as all successions of substances or beings, as *successions* are moved, "the Being (spoken of) is the Creator of men." Thus "the consideration of the attributes, called by a certain licence the intellectual attributes," is brought to a close.

Division III. deals with "the moral attributes" in two subdivisions, the former referring to the transitional and the latter to the relative attributes. This part opens with Prop. I., *The simple, sole Being of infinity of expansion and of duration, who is all-knowing, all-powerful, and entirely*

\* "If action be admitted to be mutation, this reasoning is evidently self-destructive. If to act is to change, God changes; and then either what is changeable cannot be self-existent, and therefore His being is not self-existent; or else what is changeable may be self-existent, and therefore the universe, without God, may be so."—*A. J. Scott*.  
† "At once free and necessary?"—*W. B.* "On the word 'Free,' volumes have been written to perplex the world."—*T. S. Barrett*.  
1871.

2 R

*free, is necessarily completely happy*;\* to which there is added this sub-proposition that "He is perfectly good;"† for unhappiness must proceed from defect or imperfection, but no imperfection can inhere in a mind conscious to itself of the attributes seen by the previous reasoning to be His. Any such mind in causing created things to be could only do so from a desire to increase happiness, otherwise creation would be the result of intents incongruous to His own nature, and a mind labouring with incongruous motives cannot be happy. "Now to produce, in consequence of desire to produce, all creaturely happiness is to be perfectly good." This proposition as to goodness is the great transition proposition. It passes from the *absolute* positions to those which are *purely relative*, itself constituting the link between the two sorts. The truly absolute propositions discourse of an unconditioned Being while, a supreme mind yet exists in and by and for itself; while goodness takes (so to speak) that mind beyond (as it were) itself, and supplies the creaturely objects for the exercise and display of the relative moral attributes or perfections.

"The penultimate proposition, with its positions relating to happiness, is, it is to be noted, of a different complexion, in that the happiness, strictly considered, is quite an absolute thing. That is, the Being treated of in the proposition now in question is consummately happy in itself. By itself it is in possession of complete happiness, needing or indeed admitting of access, or the possibility of increase in essential happiness from no quarter whatever; least of all from the creature the product of its own will and mere good pleasure. But, the happiness overflowing, goodness as a distinct thing is to be seen in being, and the creature in its train is the result. The creature once in conscious existence, objects for the manifestation of the relative qualities or properties of mind stand out as realities."

Having reached this stage in subdivision second, the author proposes to abbreviate the phraseology of the subsequent propositions by substituting for the Being whom he has brought before the reader as "the Good One," the condensed term *God*, as having "the great virtue of suitableness," and correspondingly to transmute the pronoun neuter hitherto used into *He*, as connoting personality but not as denoting sexuality.

He then proceeds to continue the subject in—

Prop. II. "*God is necessarily true*," not only as a reality but as trustworthy. As a *lemma* we must admit that "there are objects of God's truth—objects in relation to which God's truth must be." "There is then to be supposed *the other than God*, and so as a postulate "let it be granted that the other than God exists as objective to Him, but that God does in actual deed, act, or make communications towards the other—the objects being men." "For a mind to be true is to consciously act as things are, and not as they are not." "God, a conscious mind, in acting as He is to men as men, goes not beyond the reality of things," for there is no extraneous being to cause Him to energize falsely. So that "God must manifest Himself as God, and He must manifest Himself to man as man," or

\* How can our theologian be sure that such a belief is indeed a conviction ineradicable from the human mind? Surely the belief in God's happiness cannot be placed in that category!—*T. S. Barrett.*

† "The existence of Devil worshippers shows that the proposition of God's goodness is by no means an intuitive belief of the human mind."—*T. S. Barrett.* [But it leaves intact the *idea* of goodness.]

"God, as God, must communicate with man, as being what he is, man." The following corollary from Prop. II. may thence be deduced: "*God who is true is necessarily faithful.*" "Truth is not faithfulness, but the latter involves the former, and is neither more nor less than an application, a particular application of truthfulness," having reference to "a Divine promise." Hence Prop. III. "*God who is true and faithful is necessarily inflexibly just.*" "Justice is a quality having necessary reference to the deserts or merits and the demerits, that is, the goodness or the badness of its objects. Take moral states away and you obliterate the possibility of the exercise of justice." "God must be just to men as moral beings." "Conscience is the greatest perfection in man's whole intellectual system." "God, as the originator of man's conscience," is "Himself the conscience of consciences;" for an effect, as an effect, cannot possess any original distinct perfection which is not in the cause, either actually, or at least in a higher degree." Wherefore "God and Justice stand to each other as necessary inseparables." [Here follow certain *scholia* of great interest and importance, to which, however, as departing from the main argument with which we are dealing, and as diverging into the pathways of controversial theology and metaphysics, we cannot now give the attention they merit for their logical acumen and their well-knit reasonings. They regard (1) "man as a moral being, inhabiting the earth; (2) the indissoluble connection between morality and happiness and immorality and misery—showing as a sub-scholium that sinners are likely to hate God, and God shall punish sin; and leading theme to the scholium (3), which treats of the justice of the future" under these three heads, viz., 1. Shall there be a future state for man? 2. How shall justice be administered in the future state? and 3. Shall future punishment be eternal?] Whence proceeds this corollary from Prop. III., "*God, who is true and faithful, and inflexibly just, is necessarily altogether righteous.*" Justice in act must proceed from a capacity of being just; in other words, justice points back to a principle,—"the act proceeding from the faculty giving birth to it." "We denominate the absolute principle in question by the name of righteousness. By this God is "ever and necessarily determined towards that which in thought is in itself right." "Rectitude, however, was ere the universe of finites was: it was from eternity, and from eternity it was a necessary constituent of the Divine mind." Prop. IV. "*God, who is true and faithful, and inflexibly just, and altogether righteous, is necessarily all-loving, yes, love itself.*" Lemma (1), "Conservation, or preservation of existence, is plainly tantamount to continued creation." Lemma (2), "Creation involves the possibility of annihilation. A creator may therefore annihilate." "The goodness of the consummately happy Supreme was the cause or reason of the creation." "The Living Goodness, as a potency, was put forth in acts." "Conservation involving continued goodness; the goodness in each continuous living act is love." "Love imperatively needs an object." "Without any object love would inevitably cease to be love—becoming an unsatisfied longing for—it would not know what; there could remain no more than an everlasting pining." "Love does therefore evidence the existence of its own objects by its intimate living relation to them." "Love is, without doubt, a tree of life." "Love is the central attractive power of the universe." "God is love; and when we say so we evoke the omnipotent word representative of the all-radiant idea which throws warmth upon the field of the world. Possessed of this secret, we feel we are in possession of

the talisman yielding the primal causation. When we have reached as high as love, we have reached (to use the humanly most significant expression) the very heart of God." "The happiness of the Supreme Being, uniting with His goodness, does, as it were, flow over." "Overflowing the confluences freely out-births itself in creation." (The author then proceeds to discuss, "Shall the rewards of the good and the punishments of the evil be to all eternity?" in an *excursus* of considerable power, in which we cannot follow him.) Here terminates the consideration of the at once directly *relative* and purely moral attributes; "and we pass on to consider in Division IV. the complex or compound attributes. In this a verbal abbreviation is made, so that in place of such words as *God, who is the true, and the faithful, and the inflexibly just, and the altogether righteous One; who is also the all-loving One—yea, love itself*, as occurring in the last section of the preceding proposition, in future there shall be employed, for the most part, these terms,—**GOD THE LORD, OR THE LORD GOD.**"

Prop. I. "*As God the Lord is the Best, so He is, necessarily, the wisest of beings.*" "Wisdom is not the same as knowledge. But wisdom implies knowledge, as knowledge implies intelligence, and intelligence, again, implies a mind. Knowledge is implied by wisdom as the less is implied by the greater. In itself, wisdom may be said to be the capacity of designing to employ means to ends, so as to bring the ends or purposes about. Wisdom, therefore, involves the knowledge of the use of the most proper means in aiming after purposes or objects. Wisdom may even be said to involve the capability of handling things so as to turn them into causes adequate to produce effects. Thus wisdom is knowledge of a certain kind applied in a certain way. Wisdom is the knowledge of the relations of things—especially of the relations of some things, as means, to other things, as ends. Wisdom is also the knowledge of the fitness of causes to produce effects, in combination with the power to employ the means, and to bring the ends or effects to pass, in combination, moreover, with the actual realizations of the mere potentialities. For wisdom implies somewhere a power of execution, and power must be measured by the actual execution or effect. The elements, therefore, going to constitute wisdom are *knowledge of relations, will and power to use means, and thereby to realize ends or put in execution affairs.*" "The ground being thus opened up by the appropriate definition or description, we are ready to advance to the *demonstration* itself of the proposition, *that God the Lord is necessarily the wisest of Beings.*" "God the Lord has been demonstrated to be the intelligent and all-knowing Creator of all things whatsoever, and He has also been proved to be the Upholder or Sustainer in being of all things; it consequently follows that He knoweth all the relations, actual and possible, of things to each other." "To know all the possible relations of things to each other involves the knowledge of the adaptability of the powers of things as means to ends." "God the Lord is all-powerful as well as all-knowing. He must have ability to accomplish the realization of all the adaptations of things arising from so many fitnesses; so that God the Lord can bring about all the purposes which His all-knowing Intelligence presents, and which are desired as effects." "The proof, in the foregoing demonstration, was greatly confined to the predicate; now, joining subject to predicate after another fashion, we have the perfect goodness and love of God the Lord adjoined to His measureless wisdom. The practical result of the conjunction will be that all the ends accomplished by the Being of beings

must be the most benevolent as well as the most wise; i. e., as God the Lord is the best, so He is necessarily the wisest of beings. God the Lord is also the loving One conserving all. He created all the things of the world in goodness, and He sustains them in love." "Only benevolent effects will be aimed at by One who is endowed with an assemblage of such perfections, acting ever harmoniously." "Thus there is love as the moral motive, wisdom as the intellectual director." "There is another sort of wisdom than that which is purely or almost entirely intellectual—a wisdom, to wit, which has a distinct moral element inherent in it." "The moral wisdom is twofold. First, there is wisdom with the addition of the eminently moral quality of goodness, beneficence, benevolence, &c. And there is second, a kind of wisdom which has an addition of an opposite character—wisdom which is evil, aiming at wicked ends, being animated by the desire to accomplish cruelties. This kind may be denominated *false wisdom*, as the former kind may be denominated *true wisdom*." "True wisdom is simply wisdom in combination with goodness, or it is the wisdom of a good being." "False wisdom has regard to ends of a totally different character. It seeks to accomplish evil effects. It is the wisdom of the wicked mind; its motives, therefore, are malevolent." "There is a wisdom whose origin is from beneath, which is 'earthly, sensual (or animal), devilish' (or demon-sprung); and a 'wisdom which is from above,' this heavenly wisdom being 'full of mercy and good fruits,' or benevolences. In short, the one wisdom is cruel, the other altogether beneficent." "No malevolence can be, or be supposed to be, in the Supreme Cause, the Cause of causes, for this very reason, that malevolence implies the unnatural and the imperfect. And to bring together the idea of the First Cause and that of imperfection—of what kind soever or degree soever it matters not—were to associate together things which are in irreconcilable opposition." "On the contrary, all benevolent and worthy consummations have their origin in God the Lord, the fount of all creaturely life and blessings."

Prop. II. "God the Lord, who is the wisest of beings, is necessarily of ineffable moral purity." "According to our highest standards of English, the term *holiness*, when applied to the Supreme Being, has two meanings. It means either entire absolute moral purity, or the excellency involved in and flowing from the confluence and conjunction of all the attributes. First, holiness is expressive of moral purity, or the opposite of moral impurity. Second, holiness expresses the combination of the excellences, even the commingling lustre or glory of all the divine attributes." "*Purity*, or *moral purity*, shall be employed to express the former idea, *holiness* the latter." "Moral impureness signifies or involves some defect or imperfection. And no absurdity could be greater than the absurdity which would couple the idea of any defect or imperfection with God the Lord." "A stain of impurity must needs be something impressed from without or brought about from within. In the case of the Lord God, a stain would involve a change from the pre-existent immaculate cleanness. The Being demonstrated in the preceding propositions cannot be subject to being changed or acted on from without. Equally clear it is that no change from a pre-existent condition of purity can be conceived as passing upon the Lord God from within Himself."

Prop. III. "God the Lord, who is the wisest of beings, and of ineffable moral purity, is necessarily the Holiest One,—a proposition which forms a culminating point in our progress." "Taking holiness to denote the

excellency of the Lord God as implied by or flowing from the union of the whole of His attributes, there is needed but the simplest application of the doctrine. The whole is equal to the sum of the parts. Take the predicates in all the preceding propositions, and unite them in one predicate, applying this to the same subject as that which appears in the last demonstrated proposition in our series, and you have, of course, a predicate or whole expressive of what is equal to the sum of all the individual predicates or parts." "*Holiness* may be considered as if it were but one attribute, and no more; yet none the less true is it that the holiness which expresses the universal excellence of God the Lord is a result and the resultant of all the other qualities or properties of the divine nature." "The Lord God is in possession of so many attributes, each one of which is an excellency in itself; therefore He is in possession of that far greater excellency which is the result of the union of all the individual attributes or excellencies." "All the attributes being surveyed one by one, there is not the slightest taint of impurity or imperfection in any one of them all. The other declares all the attributes, in all their perfections, are present, and from their commingling and intensifications a great glory is the necessary result, —glory, indeed, so dazzling as to be insupportable by mortal eyes."

Division V. treats of "the Transcendent Excellencies of the Deity." "Prop. I.: *The Lord God, who is the Holiest One is necessarily the Self-beautiful and the All-perfect Being.*" "Moral excellencies are beautiful by virtue of a law of mind to which, as a first principle or necessary truth, consciousness testifies; and the testimony of consciousness in an affair of this kind admits of no questioning." "Moral excellencies are, in fact, most beautiful properties of mind—but to combine them in thought with intellectual perfection is to raise them to the highest pitch of possible beauty." "The Mind which is over all, because the Creator and Sustainer of all, must, in respect of beauty, be all-perfect." "Each single attribute [of His] is an excellency"—a perfection,—“and the totality of all perfections constitutes all-perfectness. He must be also the Sublime, or, in other words, the super-eminently High and Lofty One."

Prop. II.: "*The Lord God, who is the Self-beautiful and the All-perfect Being, is necessarily the Ever blessed One.*" Blessedness may mean consummate happiness (and of that the proof has already been given), or consummate well-thought-of-ness, or well-spoken-of-ness—of which latter the demonstration is now to be given." "Can that Being [who possesses the attributes already demonstrated] be otherwise than well thought of?—well thought of, if we think of things as they are and should and must be, and not as they are not and cannot be." "As long as moral excellencies, closed up in all-perfectness, be as they are, so long must a corresponding absolutely universal glorification—a be ever blessed—be due to and not to be withheld from the Being of beings—the all-perfect . . . blessedness is beyond happiness, even happiness the greatest that can be." "Blessedness involves and distinctly and directly includes" all the moral attributes whence happiness wells. Then follows an argument on the worshipfulness and the Fatherhood of Deity, and an exhortation to holiness, or rather God-likeness, and the volume concludes with an illustrative expansion of "the prayer which JESUS taught His disciples," commonly called THE LORD'S PRAYER.

We have now traced in outline a high and elevating theme from the positive basis of the self-evident and necessary postulates of

space and time—through a long process of rigid mathematico-syllogistic (sometimes pretty remorselessly pursued) reasoning—to the proof *à priori* of a Being who is infinite in wisdom, power, and goodness, not only the substance of all phenomena, but the personal Creator and Parent of life in nature and the soul, the Father of our spirits, and the Sovereign of grace. The argument has been cogent and terse, abstract and trying, but it is of singular closeness and length of reach. It is a compact and orderly scheme of logical evolution, whose united effect is very powerful on the mind, which holds it at one view in the very eye and prospect of the soul. The splendid apparatus of logical consecution is used in a masterful manner; and though a loose thread of dogmatism or a *scob* of sarcasm occasionally ruffles the web of speculation, it is a well-devised, excellently executed, thorough-going, and valuable exposition of the argument *à priori*. In its own course it is full, in our opinion *over-full*, in introducing *scholia*, which belong to the dogmata of theology rather than to the doctrines of metaphysic.\* But we have always to remember that no single argument can fully exhaust “the metaphysic of theism.” In estimating the power of the argumentation in itself, we can accord it the highest praise for dialectic efficiency, even while we hesitate to endorse its sufficiency as a complete and entire *metaphysic* of the theme.† It leaves untouched and unappropriated that other side of the evidence for Deity which springs from experience as interpreted by science. Science, which is the induction of the unseen from the seen, which beyond the sphere of *material* effects perceives the *spiritual* element of cause and law, co-linking into unity science and philosophy, cosmic knowledge and theosophic faith, and bringing thought’s every region within religion. We note this, not in disparagement of the work, but in deprecation of any hasty inference from the perusal of an argument requiring high power to comprehend it, that because it does not take full possession of the soul, it is because the “metaphysic of theism” is inept and inconclusive. This is a view, as it were, of the *interior* of the temple of God rising from basement to roof, towered and buttressed, pillared and arched, with organ and altar, window and dome; but there is, besides this, the *exterior* view, with other adaptations, attractions, splendours, glories of plan and purpose, worth and work, suggesting by the outward form the inward use. *Both* constitute the temple, though each directs the thoughts to Him for whom the temple has been raised—THE DEITY.

\* “If Mr. Gillespie claimed less for his reasonings, if he were content to call his last few pages arguments giving *probable evidence* only, we might then have no fault to find. But when he asserts that his words construct *demonstrations*, he attracts adverse criticisms which he might not otherwise have

drawn upon his work.”—T. S. Barrett.

† “Almost every one who argues in dilemma as forgets that there are always three ways of proceeding. If you go on you must either go to the right or to the left, but you may also stay where you are.”—“*Essays by a Barrister*.”

## Religion.

---

### IS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE SCRIPTURES TO WARRANT BELIEF IN THE GODHEAD OF JESUS CHRIST?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—VII.

It has been somewhere beautifully and truthfully said, that the Bible contains depths of truth in which a giant may drown, and truths so shallow that a child may ford. The truths that are essential to the salvation of man are laid down in such explicit language as to enable the weakest intellect to comprehend them; it is only when man's spiritual interest is not concerned that the way of God is in the sea. Every true student of the Bible, in his meditations, is compulsively led to exclaim, "Thou art a God that hidest Thyself."

The mystical doctrine of the Trinity is dogmatically stated in the inspired Volume; and although incomprehensible to the human mind, that cannot be urged as a reason for unbelief. In exercising our reason on the utterances of Scripture, we should only exercise it in so far as it assists the elucidation of divine revelation; but when the word of God soars beyond our mental powers, then reason must be held in complete subservience. To disbelieve any portion of God's word on the ground that it cannot be explained, is to place reason superior to revelation—human thought in pre-eminence over the word of God.

The divinity of Jesus Christ is clearly substantiated in many portions of the Bible—that He is equal in power and glory with God—that He *is* God, the *true* God. "And we know the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding that we may know Him that is true; and we are in Him that is true, even in His Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God, and eternal life" (1 John v. 20). The extract from Professor Renan, quoted by G. L., affords easy combat.

Renan says, "He [Christ] is tempted." True; but did He fall into temptation? Christ's divinity is shown forth in a remarkable degree in being tempted, yet able to resist temptation. He took to Himself the *nature* of man, and consequently was subject to the afflictions and sorrows akin to humanity; but possessing the *nature* of God as well, He was insusceptible of falling into error. He was "in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin." Renan's statement in reference to Christ's being "ignorant of many things" is an accusation which is eminently confuted in the Bible. The examples contained in the



four Gospels of Christ's omniscience throws this idea to the wind. For example, when did the infinite knowledge of Jesus present itself more strongly than at that remarkable conversation with the woman of Samaria, when He told her all things that ever she did? and also His remarkable revelation at the calling of Nathanael? Could there be, I ask, anything unknown to a Being who gave such unexampled proofs of His omniscience?

Again, Renan says, "He is cast down, discouraged." This is simply confounding Christ's human nature with His divine. It was in His office as Mediator that He was "submissive to God." "Father, if Thou be willing, remove this cup from Me; nevertheless, not My will, but Thine, be done," only exhibits the terrible suffering He underwent in His *humiliation*, when—

- "Cold mountains and the midnight air  
Witnessed the fervour of his prayer."

The argument that Jesus never dreamt of making Himself pass for an incarnation of God is distinctly confuted in Scripture. Jesus said, "Whom say ye that I am?" To this question Peter answered, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God," which Christ does *not* contradict. In another part of the Bible it says, "I and my Father are one," and "Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus: who, being in the form of God, thought it no robbery to be equal with God: but made Himself of no reputation." These verses surely contradict the argument that "Jesus never dreamt of making Himself pass for an incarnation of God." Another argument adduced by Renan is that Christ corrects Himself. He refers the reader to Matt. x. 5, to be compared with Matt. xxviii. 19. Does the comparison of these two verses demonstrate that Christ corrected Himself? It proves the very contrary. The first command was given *before* Christ's mission was fulfilled; the second command *after* it was finished. The mission of the gospel was first sent to the Jews—God's "peculiar people,"—and from them to "every living creature." It was the divine decree that the Jews were to be "an honoured people," and "the decrees of God are unchangeable." In proof of this we have the sublime prophetic saying, "In Israel will all nations be blessed;" besides innumerable allusions to the curses of God descending upon all who despise, hate, and oppress that "peculiar people."

Let us turn to another point. The office of a Redeemer could be accomplished by no creature. It required a Being, pure and perfect in His nature, to act as a Mediator between a just God and a fallen humanity. "It is an office for which no creature is sufficient. 'The redemption of the soul is precious.' The price of it could be paid by no creature. None could be invested with this office but a divine person—1. Because the evil to be removed was infinite. Sin is an infinite evil, and deserves an infinite manifestation of the displeasure of God. This no creature could present. 2. Because it required a sacrifice of infinite value to atone

for sin. This no creature could give; indeed, no creature could offer. 3. Because the blessings to be secured were also infinite, and such as no creature could procure for another. This office, then, was only suited to a divine person. If the office of Creator, or of Ruler and Judge, be so, then much more is the office of Redeemer."\*

The divinity of Jesus Christ is also distinctly proved by the appellation of "the *only begotten Son* of God." "The term sons of God," says G. L., "is applied in Scripture to angels, officials of dignity, the children of Israel," &c. If G. L. will reconsider his remark, and study the Bible a little more closely, he will find the term "sons of God" is used in a very different sense when applied to man from when it distinguishes our Saviour. Besides, the title of Son, when applied to Christ, is coupled with the other names of the Trinity—Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. The Son being co-equal and co-eternal with the Father, His name is sometimes placed before the Father's—"The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost."

Another argument eminently proving the Godhead of Jesus Christ is that He is the object of worship—"He is worshipped in heaven." If, then, Christ be not God, idolatry is practised in heaven itself—worshipping the creature more than the Creator. The following passage from "The Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation" will greatly assist in establishing the divinity of our Saviour Jesus Christ:—

"There is but one thing which is charged against men, in the New Testament, as a fundamental and soul-destroying *heresy*, and that is, not denying the Lord, but 'denying the Lord that bought them.' It is rejecting the purchase of Christ by His self-denying atonement which causes the destruction of the soul, because it rejects the truth, which alone can produce love to the God of love.

"But further, the facts have been fully proved that God-Jehovah, by taking a personal interest in the well-being of the Israelites, and labouring to secure their redemption, secured their affections to Himself; and that His acts of mercy produced this effect was manifested by their song after their deliverance at the Red Sea. 'I will sing unto the Lord, for He triumphed gloriously: the horse and his rider hath He thrown into the sea. The Lord is my strength and song, and He is become my salvation.' In like manner, Jesus Christ secured to Himself, in a greater degree, the affections of Christians by His self-denying life and death, to ransom them from spiritual bondage and misery. The Israelites in Egypt were under a temporal law so severe, that while they suffered in the greatest degree, they could not fulfil its requirements; they therefore loved Jehovah for temporal deliverance. The believer was under a spiritual law, the requirement of which he could not fulfil, and therefore he loved Christ for spiritual deliverance. This fact, that the supreme affection of believers was thus fixed upon Christ, and fixed upon Him in view of His self-sacrificing love for them, is manifest throughout the whole New Testament—even more manifest than that the Jews loved Jehovah for temporal deliverance. 'The love of Christ

---

\* "The New Creature," by the Rev. Peter M'Bride, pp. 15, 16.

constraineth us,' says one, thus manifesting that his very life was actuated by affection for Jesus. Says another, speaking of early Christians generally, 'Whom [Christ] having not seen, ye love; in whom, though now ye see Him not, yet believing, ye rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory.' The Bible requires men to perform their religious duties, moved by love to Christ. 'And whatsoever ye do, do it heartily, as to the Lord, and not unto men; knowing that of the Lord ye shall receive the reward of the inheritance: for ye serve the Lord Christ.' Mark, these Christians were moved in what they did, what they said, and what they felt, by love to Christ; love to Jesus actuated their whole being, body and soul. It governed them.

"Now suppose that Jesus Christ was not God, nor a true manifestation of the Godhead in human nature, but a man or angel authorized by God to accomplish the redemption of the human race from sin and misery. In doing this, it appears, from the nature of things, and from the Scriptures, that He did what was adapted to, and what does, draw the heart of every true believer—as in the case of the apostles and the early Christians—unto Himself, as the supreme or governing object of affection. Their will is governed by the will of Christ, and love to Him moves their heart and hands. Now if it be true that Jesus Christ is not God, then he has devised and executed a plan by which the supreme affections of the human heart are drawn to himself and alienated from God, the proper object of love and worship; and God having authorized this plan, He has devised means to make man love Christ the creature more than the Creator, who is God over all, blessed for ever more."

To the weak and imperfect understanding of man the mysteries of God will remain shrouded in obscurity, until man is "made perfect in holiness." Our reason has its limits; and God has thought it wise to keep the revelation of many truths hidden from its view. We must grasp God's word in simple faith—"Whom having not seen, we love; in whom, though now we see Him not, yet believing, we rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory." C. R.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—VII.

THIS debate is one which refers to sufficiency of evidence, and has nothing to do with belief or disbelief. We often believe things which are not proved, and we often doubt what is most plainly evident. It is a theological question that is to be determined upon in regard to its logical grounds. Personal belief and favourite creeds have nothing to do with it. I have no doubt from the circumstances of the time that the true meaning of this debate in any intelligent person's mind is, have we such a clear and definite, precise and unambiguous amount of evidence in the Scriptures concerning the express Godhead of Jesus Christ, as to justify the holders of the common creeds of Christendom in looking askance at and endeavouring to excommunicate those who hold other views of His character and personal relation to Deity? We are not asked to determine the question, "Is Jesus very God, one and indivisible with, yet distinct from Him?" That is the theological question. The logical question is—Is the evidence on this topic so plain in meaning and so specific in its nature as to give no warrant for believing

otherwise—or even of remaining in doubt on the subject? It is of great importance that the topic should be debated without the *odium theologicum*; and it looks to me as if the form of the question had been most judiciously chosen to secure for the debate a thorough consideration, and yet to avoid the bitterness with which direct discussions of doctrines themselves are too frequently conducted. I quite agree with E. P. T. in his opinion that this question has been wrested into a contest about creeds, rather than gone into as a calm consideration of sufficiency of evidence.

I do not myself care to enter into the discussion of this question as one about the rightness or wrongness of creeds, confessions, articles of faith, &c.; for there is a *heat* in conviction, when a creed has really been accepted, which regards opposition as an insult and an injury deserving of resentment; and an intensity in the holding of it which resists reasoning against it. I have never seen this so forcibly brought out, and the reasons for it given, as in a good though short paper on "The Emotion of Conviction," by Mr. Walter Bagehot, of the *Economist*, which appeared in the *Contemporary Review*, April, 1871, to a small portion of which I am desirous of calling attention, as having bearings on this subject. The passage runs as follows:—

"In the mind of a rigorously trained inquirer the process of *believing* is, I apprehend, this:—*First* comes the investigation, a set of facts are sifted, and a set of arguments weighed; *then, second*, the intellect perceives the result of those arguments, and, as we say, assents to it; *then third*, an emotion, more or less strong, sets in, which completes the whole. In calm and quiet minds the intellectual part of this process is so much the strongest that they are hardly conscious of anything else; and as these quiet careful people have written our treatises, we do not find it explained in them how important the emotional part is.

"Persons of untrained minds cannot long live without some belief in any topic which comes much before them. It has been said that, if you can only get a middle-class Englishman to think whether there are 'snails in Sirius,' he will soon have an opinion on it. It will be difficult to make him think; but, if he does think, he cannot rest in a negative—he will come to some decision. And on any ordinary topic of course it is so. A grocer has a full creed as to foreign policy, a young lady a complete theory of the sacraments, as to which neither has any doubt whatever. . . . Most persons who observe their own thoughts must have been conscious of the exactly opposite state. There are cases where our intellect has gone through the arguments, and we give a clear assent to the conclusions. But our minds seem dry and unsatisfied. In that case we have the intellectual part of belief, but want the emotional part.

"Probably, when the subject is thoroughly examined, 'conviction' will be proved to be one of the intensest of human emotions, and one most closely connected with the bodily state. . . . Once acutely felt, I believe it is indelible; at least, it does something to the mind which it is hard for anything else to undo. I think experience proves that no one who has had real passionate conviction of a creed, the sort of emotion that, burns hot upon the brain, can ever be indifferent to that creed again.

He may continue to believe it, and to love it; or he may change to the opposite, vehemently argue against it, and persecute it. But he cannot forget it."

The foregoing observations of Mr. Bagehot show how difficult it is to discuss theological questions with any hope of dismissing or discharging any accepted creed from the mind; and the consequent hopelessness of any good result arising from direct religious debate that may be measured by change of opinion. Of course I do not say that religious discussion is useless, for were I to affirm that, I should deny the greatest fact in history, that religious discussion has been of more importance to the world than any other form of intellectual activity. I instance in support of this, though but a side question, the establishment of Christianity, the Reformation, and the Nonconformist agitations in England for freedom of religious faith. We cannot engage, as a general rule, either with expectation of profit or pleasure in any direct religious debate. We must get it in such a form as shall divest it of its hold on the passions; for only when free from the influence of passion can the mind work impartially. And hence the importance of getting the inquiry transferred to the reasoning process, that we may test that upon which the idea is rested; for men do not always believe, are not always convinced by good reasons or pure reasoning. Mr. Bagehot says:—

"The properties that determine the power of an idea to *cause conviction independently of any intellectual process* are these:—

"(1) *Clearness*.—The more unmistakable an idea is to a particular mind the more is that mind predisposed to believe it. In common life we may constantly see this. If you once make a thing quite clear to a person, the chances are that you will almost have persuaded him of it. Half the world only understand what they believe, and always believe what they understand.

"(2) *Intensity*.—This is the main cause why the ideas that flash on the minds of seers—as in Scott's description—are believed; they come mostly when the nerves are exhausted by fasting, watching, and longing; they have a peculiar brilliancy, and therefore they are believed.

"(3) *Constancy*.—As a rule, almost every one does accept the creed of the place in which he lives; and every one, without exception, has a tendency to do so.

"(4) *Interestingness* (by which I mean the power of the idea to gratify some wish or want of the mind).—The most obvious is curiosity about something which is important to me. Rumours that gratify this excite a sort of half-conviction, without the least evidence, and with a very little evidence a full, eager, not to say a bigoted one. . . . And the interest is greater when the news falls in with the bent of the hearer. A sanguine man will believe with scarcely any evidence that good luck is coming, and a dismal man that bad luck."

It is plain then, as it seems to me, that we cannot get this question properly discussed unless we examine the *reasons* given for the *conviction* held, and adjudicate on *them*, not on *it*. It of course will stand or fall as a *truth* by the result, but not as a *conviction*; for—

"A man convinced against his will  
Is of the same persuasion still."

Without going into the *theological* question as stated by S. S., and enlarged upon by subsequent writers on the affirmative side, I shall state briefly a few points which incline me to take the negative of the *logical* question.

1st. It is a *debatable* question, and none is so in which the evidence is so complete as to preclude a doubt. 2nd. The history of what is called heresy, in the words Manichean, Sabellian, Nestorian, Arian, Socinian, Arminian, &c., proves that the evidence is not sufficient to settle the question; and to this same point tends the fact of a large body of Unitarians existing in our own day—not to mention Swedenborgians, who believe in the Godhead of Jesus as the *one* Personality and divine Father.

From these two facts I conclude that among Christians this should be an *open* question, and that those who advance the affirmative ought to prove it beyond doubt, while no one can ask another to "prove a negative." Taken as a logical question the negatives have it, but no holder of the negative would willingly abhor those who are theologically convinced, from holding *that* as true. Only do not excommunicate others for not holding affirmatively what they may incline to, but cannot *close* with. G. B. A.

#### AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

Before remarking on the *arguments* of C. S. L., we cannot forbear noticing the distressing, if not disgraceful levity of his style when writing on so solemn a subject. Were we writing in opposition to a religious doctrine, we should consider it to be most inappropriate to write in the flippant style of C. S. L., for whether writing in defence of a doctrine that we believe to be scriptural, or in opposition to a doctrine that we believe to be unscriptural, the *subject* is solemn and momentous, and demands seriousness, not jocoseness. The levity with which C. S. L. regards the subject now being debated clearly shows his state of mind to be such as renders him perfectly unfitted to write on so weighty a topic. In his paper jests and ridicule abound, which weapons are quite unlawful in writing on sacred themes. C. S. L. ridicules the expression "our common Christianity," and styles it a cant expression. But did not an inspired apostle employ a very similar term—"the common salvation"? (Jude 3). And does there not spring from "the common salvation" a common Christianity?

C. S. L. styles his opponents "the unctuously orthodox." Here, again, he uses jestingly a term which is altogether scriptural in its spirit, and almost in its letter. In 1 John iii. 20 we read, "Ye have an unction from the Holy One." In ver. 27 the apostle John tells those to whom he wrote that this "unction" or "anointing" taught them of all things. Of course its teaching was *sound* teach-

ing, and thus the persons who received it, being both unctuous and orthodox, were "the unctuously orthodox"—the very characters whom C. S. L. ridicules.

We believe as fully and maintain as firmly the real unity and essential indivisibility of God as does C. S. L. himself. We do not believe in *gods* but in one *God*, and that not gods but God created the heavens and the earth, but that the words of the decalogue, "Thou shalt have no other gods before Me;" are a negation of the claim to Godhead set up on behalf of Jesus Christ, is what we cannot see. We believe that the God who said, "Thou shalt have no other gods before Me;" and who said, "I the Lord thy God am a jealous God," is Jesus Christ. We believe that it was Jesus Christ who said, "I am *the* Lord, that is *My* name, and *My* glory will I not give to *another*." These words of God are equally the words of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, for they are the words of the Triune God, therefore when God here speaks, the Father speaks, the Son speaks, and the Holy Ghost speaks.

C. S. L. asserts, "Jesus himself disclaims worship." When did He disclaim it? Point us to the chapter and verse in which it is recorded that Jesus disclaimed worship. We show in our opening paper that Paul, Barnabas, Peter, and an angel, each refused to be worshipped. We also show that Jesus accepted the worship of men without rebuking or censuring them for it. Yet in the face of such scriptures as Matt. xv. 25, Matt. xx. 20, and Matt. xxviii. 9, 17, C. S. L. has the boldness to affirm that Jesus disclaimed worship. If our readers will but glance at the scriptures to which we have just referred, they will see that the statement that Jesus accepted worship from men rests not on our mere affirmation, but on the express testimony of the Scriptures, the evidence contained in which is the point now being debated. Therefore the assertion of C. S. L., that Jesus disclaimed worship, is incorrect.

C. S. L. imagines that he adduces proofs "that Jesus Christ is not God, though God was in Christ." The first of his imaginary proofs "is that Jesus Christ always spoke of God as His Father." But how does this fact prove that Christ is not God? It does, indeed, show a distinction of personality between Himself and the Father, but not a difference in nature. Between a father and his son there is a sameness of nature. Myself being human, my son is necessarily human likewise. In the Scriptures Christ is declared to be "the only begotten" Son of God, clearly showing that Jesus Christ is the Son of God in a sense in which no other is, and that He is the true and proper Son of God; therefore, His Father being God, He is necessarily God likewise. C. S. L. adduces in support of his doctrine, "I can of Mine own self do nothing, I seek not Mine own will, but the will of the Father which hath sent Me." We can see in this scripture nothing contrary to the Godhead of Jesus Christ. "I can of Mine own self do nothing;" that is, "separate from My Father, or contrary

to His will, I can do nothing. I do all in conjunction with Him, the Father co-operates with Me, and I with Him; in all things there is a perfect oneness of will between us." Again, "I seek not Mine own will, but the will of the Father;" that is, "As man I seek not Mine own will, but the will of the Father, whose servant as man I am, being sent by Him to do His will and work." C. S. L. likewise adduces as evidence that Jesus Christ is not God; the words of Jesus, "My Father is greater than I," and the words of Paul, "The Head of Christ is God." Here, again, we fail to see any denial of the Godhead of Jesus Christ. "My Father is greater than I;" that is, "As man I am the Father's inferior, and My Father is greater than I." Again, "The Head of Christ is God;" that is, "As man, the Head of Christ is God, Christ being as man the Father's servant, by whom He was upheld, and whom He obeyed both in life and in death."

The flippancy and banter which we have pointed out as found in the article of C. S. L. are found also in the papers written by S. T. C., jun., and J. A. It is a striking circumstance that while the negative writers have indulged in ridicule, the affirmative writers have not manifested a disposition so to do, but have, on the contrary, expressed their sense of the great gravity of the question which they were engaged in debating. S. T. C., jun., styles the doctrine of the Trinity a "cobweb of scholasticism," and asks what mortal can profess to understand it. He then proceeds to ridicule the reverence with which the doctrine is regarded by those who believe in it, making a jest of its being styled "one of the profound mysteries of the faith which cannot be fathomed," as also making a jest of the line—

"A God that's understood's no God at all;"

laughing, too, at this doctrine being regarded as "one of the incomprehensibilities of the faith once delivered to the saints." Now we would seriously ask S. T. C., jun., whether he does or does not believe, the assertion contained in the line which he ridicules,—

"A God that's understood's no God at all."

If he disbelieves this assertion, does he not at the same time disbelieve the scripture, "Touching the Almighty, we cannot find Him out"? (Job xxxvii. 23). And does he not also disbelieve that God is a Being whose existence never had a commencement? If, on the other hand, he does believe that God's existence never had a beginning, does he understand such a God? And if he believes in a God who ever existed without being able to understand Him, then he (as well as ourselves) believes in a God who is not understood. And in that case, in ridiculing the line which he quotes, he ridicules his own belief.

S. T. C., jun., speaks of "the gospel, as of itself, without creed." What does he mean by *the gospel without creed*? If, indeed, the gospel contains no creed, then it no more contains the



creed of S. T. C., jun., than it contains the creed of S. S. And if the gospel is without creed, why does S. T. C., jun., believe that there are not three Persons in the Godhead? and where is his creed fetched from? S. T. C., jun., asserts that if it is shown that God is one, it is made plain that there is no Trinity of Persons, thus asserting that the doctrine of the unity of the divine Essence and the doctrine of a Trinity of Persons in the Godhead are contradictory of each other. Now when we examine the real nature of a contradiction, it cannot be found in this case. A contradiction is to deny and affirm the selfsame thing in the selfsame sense—to affirm what both is and is not at the same time. Wherever there is a contradiction, it may ultimately be resolved into this, that it is, and is not. To say that three persons are one person, and no more, or that one God can at the same time be three Gods, is to affirm a direct contradiction. But we do not affirm that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are but one Person, neither do we affirm that the one Godhead subsisting in three Persons is three Gods. We assert that the three Persons are but one God, not that They are one Person. We assert that the one Essence subsists in three Persons, not in three divided essences. The charge of contradiction, therefore, cannot be justly imputed to our assertions.

Our opponents understand the word *Person*, when applied to the Persons of the Trinity, in the same sense as they understand it when it is applied to finite beings. When the word is applied to finite beings a distinct person implies a distinct being, therefore as the persons are multiplied, so are the distinct beings multiplied. But when we assert that there are three Persons in the Godhead, we do not mean that the essence is multiplied according to the plurality of persons, but that the essence is one and the same, subsisting in all the three Persons. That it does so is evident, because divine attributes and divine operations are in the Scriptures ascribed to each of Them, and also because some things are asserted of each of the three Persons which cannot be truly asserted of the others, thus showing that the distinction of the Persons is not nominal, but real.

S. T. C., jun., further writes, "S. S. assumes in his premises what he professes to bring out in his conclusion—that Jesus Christ is one of the Persons of the Godhead or Trinity; but it may be admitted that there are three Persons in the Trinity, while it may be denied that Jesus is one of Them. There might be a Trinity without Christ, and therefore the existence of a Trinity would not prove the divinity of Christ." We beg to remind S. T. C., jun., that we did not *assume* that Jesus is one of the Persons of the Godhead. *We adduced Scripture evidence that He is*, as our readers may see for themselves by referring to our paper. And we believe that the doctrine of a Trinity of Persons in the Godhead cannot be admitted without thereby admitting the Deity of Jesus Christ; and we believe that our opponents are well aware of this. Those who deny the Deity of Jesus

Christ deny a Trinity of Persons in the Godhead, being sensible that the two doctrines stand or fall together. And S. T. C.'s own coadjutor, J. A., admits this, for he says, "Need I ask if this question would ever have been proposed for discussion had it been admitted that a Trinity existed in the Godhead?" thus giving us reason to conclude that his own belief is that the admission of the doctrine of the Trinity necessarily includes the admission of the Godhead of Jesus Christ.

S. T. C., jun., writes again, "After having manufactured or accepted a creed which requires a great deal of explanation, and the very name of comprehending, which seems as if it were a testimony to one's superiority, it is humiliating to be led to confess that we had first made the quagmire over which we propose to construct a railway carrying passengers, warranted with all safety, to the station beyond the quagmire. For instance, S. S. (p. 19) proposes, by showing that the Scriptures declare Christ to have performed such acts as none but God can perform, to prove that Christ is God. How much of this quagmire is made by ourselves? We first adjudicate and determine upon what God alone can perform; next, we limit the power of God to personal action, and deny Him the use of an agent; then we fix upon certain acts done by Jesus Christ as such as none but God can perform, and we have completed our nice little railway over our self-made quagmire. Now, before we began the quagmire was safe walking-ground, and could easily give passage even to a railway, by our reflecting that Jesus as the agent of God could do any works which God chose to commission Him to perform. The subsequent reasons of S. S. are all tinged with the assumption that his creed alone is correct. 'God created the heaven and the earth,' we admit, for 'by the word of His power were the heavens made,' and the earth is the work of His hand, and all things were made by him.' This S. S. brings forward as a proof that Jesus Christ is God. We have actually no ground for connecting the creative word of God with Jesus Christ at all. It is a mere scholastic play upon words. *Logos* is a word, and *logos* is reason. God in His reason, and for a reason, created all things by His word. This word proceeded from Him, and so became the son of His lips, and Jesus called Himself the Son of God, the bearer of the word or message of God, and thus two things perfectly distinct by logical legerdemain were brought to be thought of as one. So *ratio* is reason, and *oratio* is speech. God spoke the decision of His everlasting reason, and the universe appeared."

Let us give a little consideration to this reasoning of S. T. C., jun. He maintains that our argument that Christ is shown to be God by His being declared in the Scriptures to have performed such acts as none but God can perform is fallacious, arguing in opposition thereto that "Jesus as the agent of God could do any works which God chose to commission Him to perform." Here our opponent insinuates that though Jesus Christ is declared in the

Scriptures to have created all things, yet He was in the work of creation merely an instrument. But that creation by which things are brought into being out of nothing does not admit of any instrumentality. Where an instrument is made use of, there must necessarily be a pre-existent subject for the instrument to exert its instrumental causality. But in the creation of all things out of nothing, there was no pre-existent subject for the instrument to operate upon, therefore in that case there could be no instrumental causality exerted. Even supposing the possibility of exerting instrumental causality in the production of things out of nothing, where could an instrument have been found equal to the conveying such an *almighty* causality and power as was needful to produce such an effort as the bringing of all things out of nothing? Whatever instrument can be supposed to be made use of in such a case, it must either be a finite or an infinite one. An infinite one it could not be, for if it were, there were two infinite beings—the efficient cause and the instrumental cause—and thus a plurality of Gods, which is what our opponents strenuously fight against. But it could not have been a finite instrument that was used to convey infinite power, there being no proportion between the infinite power conveyed and the finite conveying instrument. Were the strongest giant to attempt to knock down an ox with a straw the effort would be vain, because through the weakness of the instrument a sufficient blow could not be conveyed by it. So the finiteness of the instrument supposed to be employed in the creation of all things out of nothing, makes it utterly incapable of conveying that almighty power which is needful to bring into being things that had no existence. Thus we see that neither a finite nor an infinite instrument could be employed in the creation of all things out of nothing, therefore no agent or instrument was made use of in that work.

The arguments of J. A. are weak and futile. He tells us that "the only begotten of the Father" is not Christ, but Adam; whereas the term is in Scripture applied to none but Jesus Christ. See John iii. 16, 18; 1 John iv. 9. With reference to the remarks of J. A. on Heb. i., we may observe that Christ is *appointed* heir as man, and that though He is set down on the right hand of the Majesty on high, He is not set down at His own right hand, but at that of the Father. *As man* He is *made* so much better than the angels, and with reference to Christ saying, "*My kingdom is not of this world,*" there is in that remark no indication that Christ is not God, but simply a declaration that the kingdom which Christ came to establish was not an outward, earthly kingdom, like that of Cæsar, but a spiritual kingdom set up in the hearts of men.

It is quite true that the word "*god*" has in the Scripture been applied to inferior beings, as in Ps. lxxxii. 1; but the Supreme God is represented as judging among them and controlling them. In Exod. vii. 1 the Lord says to Moses, "See, I have made thee a god to Pharaoh." Moses was *made* a god; he was not a god by

nature, as the Maker of heaven and earth is. And Moses was made a god *to Pharaoh only*, in the room and stead of the Supreme God, to command, threaten, inflict plagues, and perform such miracles as could be done only with the power of God. Jesus Christ is repeatedly declared in the Scriptures to be God, but there is not the slightest intimation that he was a *made* God. Had there not been a self-existent God there could have been nothing, for nothing could never have created anything, and that self-existent God Jesus Christ is.

G. P. S. evidently feels that the Scripture testimony concerning Jesus Christ is, at least, so much like a declaration of His Deity, that to avoid the admission of Christ's divinity he is driven to make a distinction between *Godhead* and *Godhood*, admitting that Jesus Christ is possessed of the latter, but not of the former. We believe, however, that this distinction will not at all serve the purpose of G. P. S.; for as *manhood* certainly signifies *human nature, man's estate, or the state or quality of being a man*, so *Godhood* must be held to signify *the divine nature, or the Deity*.

G. P. S. adduces scriptures for the purpose of showing the non-identity of Jesus Christ with God, but these texts do not prove that which they are adduced to prove. Such scriptures as "the glorious appearing of the great God *and* our Saviour Jesus Christ," "denying the only Lord God *and* our Saviour Jesus Christ," and "the righteousness of God *and* our Saviour Jesus Christ" do in no way show that God and our Saviour Jesus Christ are not the same Being. The words *God* and *our Saviour Jesus Christ* are simply different titles of the same Person. A native of Hindostan might say, "The Queen of Great Britain *and* our Empress." A Patagonian might suppose the speaker to be speaking of two different persons; but we should know that by the two titles he was speaking of only one and the same person. Other scriptures which G. P. S. produces, as "God our Father *and* the Lord Jesus Christ," do but establish the doctrine for which we contend, and which G. P. S. opposes—viz., a plurality of Persons in the Godhead.

G. P. S. brings forward Deut. xviii. 15 as evidence that Jesus Christ is not God, but we cannot find in this text any evidence of that nature. The declaration that the promised Prophet would be like unto Moses is not an assertion that He would not be God, but is simply a repetition in other words of the previous declaration that He would be of Moses' brethren. Being of Moses' brethren, he would necessarily be like unto Moses. The text then affirms the manhood of the promised Prophet, but in no way denies His Godhead.

The paper of G. P. S. next contains a string of exceedingly weak arguments. The writer of it argues that John i. 1, "The Word was God," will not bear the construction we have put upon it, unless it be convertible into "God was the Word," and remarks that it is nowhere asserted that God was Jesus Christ. Now

we beg to remind G. P. S. that the proposition—a gander is a goose—is strictly accurate, yet it is not convertible into—a goose is a gander. Just as God is a Spirit, though every spirit is not God; so the Word was God, though every divine Person is not the Word. G. P. S. further argues that as that which is *with* us is not ourselves, so the sentence, “The Word was *with* God” shows that the Word is not God. But this sentence, so far from disproving the Godhead of Jesus Christ, simply affirms the doctrine for which we contend—a plurality of persons in the Godhead.

G. P. S. tells us that the fact that there have been controversies in the Church from the earliest ages respecting the Godhead of Jesus Christ, shows that there is not in the Scriptures sufficient evidence to warrant belief in it. But from the earliest ages there were controversies in the Church respecting the manhood of Jesus Christ. Does this fact show that there is not sufficient evidence in the Scriptures to warrant belief in the doctrine of Christ's humanity? G. P. S. tells us that to warrant belief is not merely to allow or favour, but to compel and necessitate. Does G. P. S. really mean what he says? Do not the Scriptures *warrant* or *authorize* all to believe in the doctrine of future happiness and misery? But do they *compel* or *necessitate* all men so to believe? Are there none who disbelieve that which the Scriptures *warrant* or *authorize* them to believe? G. L. opens his article with a quotation from the Athanasian Creed, and having done so he complains of having found in the articles of the affirmative writers no clear definition of what they undertake to affirm. He charges them with speaking indefinitely, and as if God-ness and God-li-ness were equivalent to Godhead. This charge which G. L. brings against his opponents is, we believe, without good ground, while we quite agree with him that Godhead “signifies the being, state, and innermost nature of God—essential, not circumstantial condition.” “Nothing less than this” is meant by us.

Some portions of the paper of G. L. are very sophistical. To the affirmers of the Godhead of Jesus he puts the inquiry, “Is it this thoroughly indivisible yet essentially distinct and eternally divided trinal Deity in which they believe?” Here G. L. gives such a representation of Deity as is not our view of Him. He dresses up our views in a garb of his own, that he may make a laughingstock of them, and charge us with holding a self-contradiction. We believe in a “*thoroughly indivisible*, yet *essentially distinct* Trinity of Persons, but we do not believe in an *eternally divided* Trinity. We believe in an *essentially distinct*, but *undivided* Trinity of Persons in the Godhead. Speaking of the paper of “Neonias,” G. L. says, “Equally beside the mark is his argument that Jesus Christ is God because He is an object of worship. How much true worship (on the part of the believer in them) has been given to false gods? ‘Neonias’ knows surely that there are many whose ‘god is their belly,’ who are chargeable with ‘covetousness, which is idolatry.’” In these remarks G. L. makes a sophistical use of the word *true*.

It is indeed the fact that much *sincere* worship has been given to false gods, but has *rightful* worship ever been given to them? The fact of these gods being false shows that the worship given to them cannot be true in the sense of being *rightful*. But the worship given to Jesus Christ is never in the Scriptures condemned as unlawful worship, but is, on the contrary, shown to have been commanded by God himself (Heb. i. 6). Yet the Scriptures clearly and repeatedly condemn all worship that is rendered to any besides the true God. The only possible inference is, that as Jesus Christ was an object of lawful, rightful worship, He must be the true God. G. L. quotes from Renan's "Life of Jesus," and states that the object of the quotation is to show from Scripture that Jesus, the Son of God, is man. We do not deny, but cordially admit, that it can be proved from Scripture that Jesus, the Son of God, is man. This is our own belief, and the doctrine is one in which we glory. But believing that Jesus is man is very different from believing that He is *merely* man. We believe Him to be both God and man.

G. L.'s quotation from Renan is as follows:—"Soon after His birth He is obliged to be concealed to avoid powerful men, who wish to kill Him (Matt. ii. 20). In exorcisms the devil cheats Him, and does not come out at the first command (Matt. xvii. 20; Mark ix. 25). In His miracles we are sensible of painful effort—an exhaustion, as if something went out of Him (Luke viii. 45, 46; John xi. 33, 38). Every one ought daily to call God his Father; all who are raised again will be sons of God (Luke xx. 36). He is His Father, His Father is He."

A few words will suffice to refute these misrepresentations of Renan.

Jesus was not obliged to be concealed in His infancy from powerful men because He was without ability to defend Himself. He who, a single individual, could and did deliver Himself from a multitude, as recorded (Luke iv. 29, 30; John viii. 59; John x. 39), had power to defend Himself when He was an infant. The devil never cheated Jesus Christ, and it is a bold perversion of Scripture to say that the devil did not come out at the first command. The disciples could not cast the devil out, but at Christ's command the devil came out immediately. When virtue went out of Christ to work miracles there was no exhaustion, the same amount of virtue remained in Him as was in Him before any went out of Him, and His groanings and oppression of spirit do but show that He was really a man, and therefore subject to infirmities. That every one ought daily to call God his Father is an assertion of Renan's in which the Scripture will not bear him out. Those taught by Christ in His sermon on the mount to say "Our Father" are evidently the disciples, and they are in the same sermon clearly distinguished from hypocrites and others. To some Jesus said, "If God were your Father, ye would love Me; ye are of your father the devil" (John viii. 42, 44). Could it be said of such persons that they ought daily to have called God their Father? In Luke xx. 36,

quoted by Renan, "the children of God" are clearly distinguished from "the children of this world," spoken of in ver. 34 of the same chapter. And that Christ is His Father, and that His Father is He, is an assertion totally unwarranted by Scripture, and clearly disproved by John xiv. 28, John xvii., and many other scriptures. G. L. remarks, "The creeds make the Son exactly the same Being as the Father in everything, and yet entirely different. God by the creeds is declared to be self-existent; and the Son, who is no whit different, but very God, is declared to be begotten. To be begotten is surely very different from being self-existent, and yet Jesus Christ is declared by the creeds to be a self-existent, begotten, selfsame, but different God." We beg to remind G. L. that these his statements are not a correct representation of the views of his opponents. We do not believe that the *deity* of the Lord Jesus Christ was begotten, but a *personality* in the deity. Jesus Christ is the self-existent God, and He is not a "different God" from the Father, but the selfsame God,—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost being but one and the same God, though distinct in personality.

E. P. T. is surprised because none of those who have taken part in this debate have not thought it necessary to define evidence, and indicate what is the nature of that evidence which should be sufficient to warrant belief.

It strikes us that such evidence as *should be* and *is* sufficient to warrant belief does not in a multitude of cases produce belief. An individual may give me such evidence of his desire for me to use a certain freedom with him as *should be* and *is* sufficient warrant for me to exercise that freedom with him. That is, I may be *authorized* to use such freedom. I might be *justified* in using it, yet I may never use it. Not because I am not warranted in using it, but from some other cause. So the Scriptures give sufficient evidence to warrant all in believing certain doctrines, yet notwithstanding the plenitude and clearness of the evidence, a great number of persons do not believe those doctrines. We read in the Scriptures of some who have closed their eyes lest they should see (Matt. xiii. 15). And how many there still are who shut their eyes to Scripture evidence! There are things which they do not wish to see.

"A man convinced against his will  
Is of the same opinion still."

E. P. T. remarks, "The evidence proposed may be faulty, or the power to comprehend its force may be wanting." Thus, according to the admission of E. P. T. himself, the evidence of the Scriptures in favour of the Godhead of Jesus Christ may be forcible, and the reason why that doctrine is not believed by himself and his coadjutors may be an absence of the power to comprehend the force of the evidence.\*

S. S.

\*We are requested to notice that in the May number G. L. says "'Samuel' (p. 180) speaks of Jesus as 'no created Being.'" The words "Samuel" are "no more created Being." In line 23, p. 180, the sentence "But as God all power was given unto Him," read *man* instead of G

## NEGATIVE REPLY.

"We sympathize with the doubts of those who have been unable to believe that the august Being who is the fountain of all life and existence, the Sustainer and Governor of this vast aggregate of systems and spheres, principalities and powers, left His central throne to be, as it were, bound down and confined within a human body in this small and remote globe; or that He gave up for a period of time the rule of His vast dominions to attend solely to the affairs of this our world. For we have no intimation that our Lord in any way interfered in the government of other worlds, at all events while resident in this."

These words are quoted from a little work issued about three years ago, by an author who is to the writer unknown, entitled "The Man of Sorrows and His Relationships," in the perusal of which he found much interest, and from which he is about to borrow, as the introduction of this article, an idea which goes to the root of this question. That is, that the Bible is not a revelation of the absolute Deity in His own inner and incomprehensible essence, but only makes Him known to us in His relation to man, and that "the attempt to define and dogmatise upon the mysterious relationship or connection between our Lord Jesus and God the Father has led to the insuperable difficulty of the doctrine of the unity of the divine Persons, as it is commonly proposed." Hence "we trouble ourselves about a mystery which can never be comprehended on earth."

S. T. C., jun., has very appropriately argued that the difficulty in this debate is less a scriptural than a creed one. In the early dogmatic theology men sought to define the indefinable, and to establish their theologic lore on a basis of logic. The evil results of this have been painfully and powerfully exhibited in Hampden's lectures on the scholastic theology; but it is also very distressingly seen and felt in the number of those who have been led into positive disbelief in the endeavour to bring their minds to accept as a doctrine an article which is irreconcilable to reason, or by reason with those portions of perfectly reliable faith, from a belief in which men can only be driven by the compulsive influence of making dogmas of logical inference as important as doctrines of express revelation. It is perfectly impossible that any creed can contain the whole wisdom of God, and it is certain that those who press on other persons to believe their logic as God's truth do a great injury to the faith as it is in Jesus. We have no fault to find with people for believing that Jesus is very God as well as very man, that if it bring soul's comfort to any one may not do any great harm; but to make the non-belief of it a cause of separation and of ill-will among Christians is totally wrong, and opposed to the reasonable charity which Christ himself not only enforced but practised, because all that appears to be revealed is this, that Jesus was "the only begotten Son of God."



Here then arises an *a priori* argument in behalf of the negative of this debate—an argument which disposes of a large portion of the early part of the paper by J. R. S. C., as well as of “Georgius D. E.,” who dwell much on the importance of this theme as an article of faith. Briefly stated it is this:—the revelation of Himself to us by God is not of Himself in the ineffable glory of His infinite majesty; but of Himself as the moral and spiritual Father of and Providence over man in connection with the work of redemption. It is quite unnecessary for us to know the innermost nature of the Deity. We require only to know Him as the Father of our spirits, the God of all comfort and consolation, the God of our salvation. God never does for any of His creatures what is unnecessary, and therefore we conclude that, evidence being unnecessary, there is not sufficient evidence given to warrant our belief in the Godhead of Jesus.

God reveals Himself as the *Sovereign* I AM, and demands obedience as such; but he reveals Himself as the *God of mercy* through Jesus Christ His Son, and yet the Son of man, that we though sons of men may become also sons of God. This gives us the key to those passages which S. S. and “Neanias,” “Samuel” and S. W. A., so plentifully quote, in which the God-like or divine in Jesus receives the chief attention in the Scripture, and from which they infer that He is God and yet the *only begotten Son* of God, *i. e.*, Himself derived from Himself!

I cannot attempt to follow S. S. and his coadjutors through the labyrinth of Scripture quotation they have produced. The whole of the induction from the texts is vitiated by the fact that they do not interpret Scripture by Scripture or by common sense, and so they read their creed into the most palpably inappropriate texts.

For instance, “I and My Father are one” is quoted to show Christ’s *oneness* in essence with God, whereas it seems to me to indicate oneness in nature, attributes, spirit, and motives, the sameness of similarity, not of identity. So “he that hath seen Me hath seen the Father,” when read along with the passage, “No one hath seen God at any time,” signifies, as I think, “He that hath looked on Me hath beheld all that humanity can bear to see of God.” He took no offence at and gave no rebuke to Philip for not regarding Him as the Father, and so He shows us that we should not make it a matter of necessity in Christian communion to believe in His Godhead. Other texts quoted are “Who being in the *form* of God,” &c. “Who is the *image* of the *invisible* God,” &c. These appear to me to prove just the reverse of what they are brought forward as proofs of. An *image* is not a *person*, a *form* is an outward likeness. It is most important to notice the fact that the term God is not applied to our Saviour above twice in the New Testament. He is called Lord, the Lord Jesus, the Son of man, and the Son of God; but, beside the exclamation of Thomas, “My Lord and my God,” we have only the passage in Rom. ix., “Who is over all, God blessed for ever,” on which commentators differ, and which even Rev. J. H. Hinton trans-

lates, "Their [Paul's brethren] progenitors, are the patriarchs, and descended from them is the Christ, who is over all, God blessed for ever. Amen." Which version attributes a *human* descent to Jesus, and an exalted *official* dignity, but not Godhead. Other translators suggest that the last clause should read "God be blessed for ever, Amen."

Isaac Brown in *The Friend's Quarterly Examiner* (4th Month, 1871) says, regarding the quotation (Col. i. 19), made by S. A. W., &c., "It pleased the Father that in Him [Jesus Christ] should all fulness dwell." *The Father*, though implied, is not in the original. The emphasis is on "*in Him*." Better, "for it was in Him that He (the Father) was well pleased that all fulness should dwell," and this reading transforms the verse into an expression of the *moral* satisfaction of God with the fulness of Christ, than of the theologic assertion of the fulness (in the sense of Godhead) of Jesus. So he says that 1 Tim. ii. 5 ought more closely to be rendered, "For there is *but* one God; there is *but* one Mediator *also* between God and man, Christ Jesus (Himself) man." These texts seem plain, at least thus far, that they do not necessitate and demand us to believe that Godhead belongs to Jesus Christ in the same sense as to "the Father of Lights, with whom is no variableness nor shadow of turning."

When the Jews accused Him of making "Himself equal with God," Jesus did not claim to be so, but explained how the Scriptures spoke of gods in reference to those "to whom the word of God came." It should be noted also that *their* accusation was the inference from His words. It was "because He said that God was His Father" that they accused Him of making Himself equal with God. Does not this show to us the folly, if not the sin, of treating the inferences of men from the words of Jesus as equal in authority to, nay, of greater importance than, the words themselves? The want of direct assertion that Jesus Christ is possessed of Godhead, the express statement that in Him dwelt all the fulness of the power of the Godhead, not the essence of it; the implied acquiescence of Jesus in lower views of His nature than express Godhead requires, and the repeated declaration of Jesus of the greatness, power, and mercy of God as manifested in Him, all tend to prove that there is not sufficient evidence to warrant a belief in the Godhead of Jesus.

"God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself;" "The Father that dwelleth in Me, He doeth the works;"—what can we make of such scriptures as these but that Jesus did not claim to be God, but constantly regarded Him as the possessor of His power, the allotter of His business, the source of His wonder-working might?

So far, then, we think it has been made plain that while those who feel it to be for their soul's good to believe in the Godhead of Jesus Christ—doubt is not unwarrantable on the subject; and hence that the Christian Church should not be sectarianized on account of that tenet of "a creed outworn."

C. S. L.

## Politics.

---

### A PROFESSIONAL OR A POPULAR ARMY—WHICH SHALL WE HAVE?

#### POPULAR.—II.

PEACE is priceless; but peace at any price is too dear. While war and the love of war exist, nations must be provided to guard against, if not to take part in, war. We do not approve of the expensive game of bounce, and have no friendly feeling towards braggardism; but we do believe that prevention is better than cure. No evil is or can be so great as war, except the loss of the spirit and the power of self-preservation.

There is a life of nations as there is of persons, and "the struggle for existence" concerning the one is not much short of that of the other. As hardihood of stamina conduces to long life and success in individuals, so hardihood of moral capacity tends to the prolonged existence and prosperity of the other. It is not necessary in many cases to fight, but it is necessary in many cases to show that you are prepared to fight rather than to give way to principles and methods of life of which one does not approve. If a would-be swell thinks he would look great in the eyes of a small party of cronies and comrades by wrenching off the knocker of a person's door, perhaps it may not be out of place to exhibit to that individual a set of biceps muscles, quite ready to do execution upon the conk of any one who may attempt to trifle with the said knocker,—in fact, to show that it may be a case of double-knocker.

The best precaution for the maintenance of peace is to have no war class. If people know that they must fight out their own quarrels, they will be less likely to get into them. To go to war with other persons to do the fighting is a great deal easier than to go to war with all the fighting to do among ourselves. In the one case we talk big on the strength of our purses, on the other we must act courageously on account of our heart's might. Men will often be found willing to pay for that being done which they would not willingly do themselves. Many, for instance, would not oppose the payment of a spy, although, if they were asked to do a spy's work, they would spurn the offer and scorn the job. Perhaps one reason why the system of *espionage* has not been practised more by our Government has been the difficulty of finding men base enough to take a spy's pay. Now if we were to put the professional temptation to a class away, if we were to have men bound to do the work of self-defence, might they not be found more likely to think twice before they quarrelled; and, even if they quarrelled, before they

fought? So far this would be good; but, besides this, such men when they fought would do so with energy and earnestness which could not animate the mere professional, however much he might be worthy in ordinary life of the pay of an officer and a gentleman;—one feels in his pocket, the other in his heart.

Our professional army is the most expensive in the world, and the least extensive too. "We pay," says Edw. A. Freeman, "a vast deal more for our army than any other nation pays for its army." And why is this? Because a very large proportion of our army is sham. We have ornamental commissioned officers and utilitarian non-commissioned officers, the former of whom do the sham work and receive the solid pay, the latter of whom do the real work and get but the shadow of adequate remuneration. We have to pay double—once for show pretty smartly, and once for use—where once might do. The nation keeps a very large staff of "First Walking Gentlemen," and an auxiliary staff of real working soldierly fellows, and it gives the walkers the workers' pay. This is rather an anomaly in an honourable profession,—as, indeed, are many other things in connection with our army. It is singular that the sale of a bishopric should be disgraceful and its purchase a sin; that the barter of one civil service situation for another should be a transgression of the law, and that the sale of a commission in the army should be not only venial but honourable. *To sell out* in the army is not a "sell," but to sell the position of judge, or even station-master, would be regarded as a wrong and a fraud; yet are they all honourable men who hold army commissions, however sold, however bought!

There may be a reasonable doubt in one's mind that it is a very different thing to engage to kill for pay and to do so as a matter of duty. In every other case "the price of blood" is looked upon as a vile and degrading thing to put out one's hand for; but in a professional army there is no disinclination, but rather the reverse, to accept of the price of blood. There can be no doubt that morally a soldier is "a hired manslayer." This is not the case with a man who is a defender of his own home, hearth, life, hopes, and country. "The member of a standing (*i. e.* a professional) army like ours, formed by voluntary enlistment, volunteers of his own free choice to do the killing for his neighbours as if he liked the job." "But the member of a national army is simply obeying the law" when he does his utmost to destroy the national army, and to commit all the cruelties and atrocities which war involves. *Pay* enforces on the one what *duty* necessitates to another. He who is of his own free will paid for doing evil can scarcely be so honourable, even in the doing of his work, as he who obeys the behest of the national will as his share of a citizen's duty. Hence, in a moral point of view, a professional is a much less reputable method of preparing for war than a popular army. On this account it is clear that the balance of argument is in favour of a popular rather than a professional army.

A standing—that is, a professional—army is a great evil; so great

an evil that it is unconstitutional; and so unconstitutional that it is only made legal by a vote which is taken year by year. A standing army, as a force kept regularly under arms and regularly paid, was introduced into any country in which it has been adopted by foreign conquerors or usurpers. This of itself should make us suspicious of a standing army; for it can at any time, by throwing itself into the service of a leader, give (or betray) a country to whosoever it chooses. This is too great a trust to be reposed in any single class of men. It can be too easily abused to bad purposes, and its sympathies are not likely to be so engrained with nationality as to be a sufficient guarantee for the constancy and the consistency of their patriotism. A professional army may or may not be suffused with the national spirit. It is too apt to grow subservient to its immediate paymaster and the sources of its promotions and honours. The more machine-like a professional army gets, the worse for the country in which it is adopted. The more perfect it is in drill, efficacy, order, and submissiveness, so much the more is it difficult of control by the nation, so much the more easy is it to be used in the control of a nation. Let us bethink ourselves how often a professional army has been an instrument of tyrannous coercion in the hands of governments, and then we shall see that a popular would be preferable to a professional army.

By having a professional army we create and maintain a class who have an interest in the promotion of war, a direct pecuniary and personal interest in fanning the jealousies of nation against nation, and in inflaming the fears of the people,—for fear prompts people to pay readily for the so-called protection which a standing army promises to afford. But this is really levying black-mail on the people, although it is called patriotism in an officer and a gentleman.

By having a professional army we are likely to trust too much to them, to neglect the general defence of the country, to rely on a mercenary army so much as to devote all our energies to the labours of life, the money-making traffics of the age, and to withdraw from the culture of self-defence; this is real though concealed weakness. If a professional army fails, then no adequate recruitment is possible. Our life is not defensible by our own hands, but, because we have left the culture of arms to others, in the darkest hour, that of defeat and danger, we should be helpless. In exact proportion to our trust in our professional army would our dismay and bafflement be when—if such a thing should be—our professional army gave way. Of course it is easy to say that such a thing could not be; but in every defeat some trusted set of men must yield. Let our hope and dependence be in and upon ourselves.

One of the greatest and gravest objections to a professional army is, that wherever you create a profession, you initiate and make possible a professional interest, that is you cannot permeate a professional army with one idea. War for an *idea* is indispensable now; if there is to be war, war as a mere trial of force, war as a challenge of power, a prize-fight among nations, is, we believe, now an impossibility.

However mistaken the idea, it must be under the impulse of one that nations go to war. The successes of the French soldiery under Napoleon I. were gained because the professional drill and flunkeyism of the old army was cast away, and the fervour and dash of the revolutionary times were acted on instead. Then the grand machinery of war trusted in by Prussia, Russia, and Austria went to pieces before the armies animated by an idea—nor till Wellington, as the hero of duty, by dint of almost superhuman efforts, subdued the very hearts of the soldiery of Britain to an anti-Napoleonism, was he able to engage in earth's crowning carnage—as it was then thought—Waterloo. America's army was animated by an idea, and it succeeded. So were the armies of Italy, and so more recently was the German army. But an idea is fatal to machinery and drill, if there is nothing but that, and we cannot have a better proof of the fact here mentioned than the condition of our own army, which, as a professional one, has been pampered and petted, and praised and paid—has wasted its (our?) substance in riotous living—and now confesses itself to be a mass of abuses and a tissue of pretences—"not fit to fight"!

That we must avoid panic does not necessitate that we should continue our trust in professional fighting men—who, by their own confession, are powerless as a shield and a defence to the country. Discipline and drill are surely as possible in a popular as in a professional army, and strategy ought surely to be as well learned by an army intent on gaining efficiency, for the safety of home, hearth, and kindred as by one intent on pay. A popular army, if it is indeed popular, because it is fired with a high and earnest spirit, will not seek to make its soldiering only a pleasant pastime—though much of it might be so,—but will also desire to feel itself safe by all the means possible. These are the principal pleas which J. R. N. offers in favour of a professional army; and the arguments of S. S. are very much of the same sort. The "division of labour" argument is not of any great moment, and may easily be outflanked. Men engaged in quiet and minute or fixed employments absolutely require to get a change for their own sake and that of others. It does not seem quite correct that professional fighters should be the best. Tell and Clive, and Cromwell and Hofer and Washington, and even Napoleon I.—for he changed the arts of massing and drilling—oppose that assertion of S. S. The peace-party argument defeats itself unless it resolves itself into personal cowardice; for whoever pays for the doing of a deed is involved in the guilt—if guilt there be—of the deed. I think on all grounds we ought to have not a professional, but a popular.

R. W. C.

---

## Education.

---

### SHOULD THE BIBLE BE READ IN SCHOOLS WITHOUT COMMENT OR EXPLANATION?

#### AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

On this subject we have had a full and exhaustive debate, and we have had the question laid before us in a variety of forms. On one half of the question we are substantially as one. "Ought the Bible to be read in schools?" may be regarded as affirmed with assent and with consent of the debating parties. We need scarcely, therefore, dilate on that part of the discussion. The Bible ought to be read that the children attending our schools should become acquainted with the purest, plainest, and most idiomatic English that can be found, as well as the most complete, concise, and explicit lexicon of terms applicable to all topics and to all the exigencies of human life and thought. The Bible ought to be read as a record of Providence and as a model history of men and nations, holding up the moral character of man as the regulator of destiny and progress. The Bible ought to be read for the variety of its literature, the eventfulness of the period to which it relates, and for the relations it bears to all other history. The Bible ought to be read on account of the vast influence it has exerted upon our literature, in the number of proverbs, phrases, and allusions to which it has given rise, and the numerous references made to it in English books and conversation. The Bible ought to be read as one of our best classics, as forming a complete and yet a varied collection of histories, biographies, poems, apologues, prophecies, &c., forming a whole, and as a whole forming a closed record. The Bible ought to be read because it is the fountain of the principles of our law, the guiding book in regard to many of our social relations. And the Bible ought to be read because a knowledge of its contents is indispensable for the proper understanding of a large number of higher principles which are to be found set forth in our poetry, philosophy, and religious literature. These are some of the grounds on which it is contended that the Bible ought to be read in schools. It is grateful to notice that our unanimity on this topic is so complete and striking. It has been well and truly said, "It will be admitted by all that the Bible is not a work of *ordinary* talent, of *mediocre* human powers. If it is a production of mere genius, it is genius of the highest order. Everything about it shows this; its hold on mankind, its power to survive attacks, its perpetuated

existence, its undiminished influence in the advances of civilization and the arts, and in the changes of human opinion, its poetry, its eloquence, its unity of purpose, its power of creating interest in the minds of all classes of men,—the most humble as well as the most exalted, *and* the most exalted as well as the most humble,—the poor man, the rich man, the slave and the slave's master, the man of science, the man of the most refined taste and the newly converted savage, the delicate female and the hardy warrior. It is a book that cannot be destroyed, a book that cannot become old, and that is not hidden away in the lumber of old libraries. It keeps its place among living men in ages when new books abound; it has its place, in regard to a living power, not with Strabo, and Galen, and Mela, and Abelard, and Duns Scotus; but with Milton, and Shakspeare, and Macaulay, and Burke,—books that are "thumbed" and read. It is a book that has influenced, and has more influence on man now than Homer, and Plato, and the Koran, and Shakspeare,—than Kant, and Locke, and Bacon altogether. *Is it a work of mere genius?*"

Thus far we go hand in hand. We agree in accepting the Bible as a book of infinite value to the individual soul and to society. We all acknowledge that the Scriptures are able to "make wise unto salvation." One party, however, *our party*, accepts the sufficiency of Scripture as a matter of fact *per se*, while the other party acknowledges the sufficiency of the Scriptures accompanied by the State-paid teacher. We say the truth is plainliest seen in the very light in which God has set it. They say it is best perceived when it is looked on through comment and illustration in an every-day school.

We contend that the Bible is the book of the Church; that it is the place of the Church to provide religious training; and that the State has nothing to do with that—except to make it unfetteredly possible. The State, we say, may well treat the Bible as a classic. It may sanction the perusal of it, and may encourage the study of it as a work of unique and singular character. It may deal with the book in its scholastic character. But it is to the keeping of the Church that the lively oracles of the faith have been entrusted. The faith of the people is the care of the Church; Christ's kingdom is not of this world. Whatsoever belongs to the spiritual training of the people the Church ought to give. The State must not have it in its power to insinuate a faith, or bolster a creed, or use its vast influence for the securing of the triumph of a sect. Nor must it sanction anything which would induce to or give opportunity for the usage, by sect against sect, of an enforced proselytism. We claim for the word of God free course in its simplicity, and we ask the State to provide for the culture which shall enable the children of the people to benefit from and by the spiritual instruction which the Church affords. As a means of abating the strife of sects, we oppose the employment of schoolmasters whose aim would be to indoctrinate their pupils in the tenets of their employers. The



Church has free-will teachers who will see to the spiritual culture of all those whom the State makes able to comprehend the words of truth and love.

I am glad to go along with C. P. so far in his views of the value of Scripture and of education. E. E. C. is also thus far on our side, and is zealous for proper culture in regard to all that concerns the life of man. G. H. W. assents to the utmost the worth of Bible-reading, and only objects that we seek to weaken its force by opposing the comments and explanations of teachers. But this is surely a misapprehension. We wish to bring the spirit of the child into direct contact with the Spirit of God by the reading of the word of God as He gave it to man. He seems to think it can only savingly reach the soul if it is conducted by some human agent. Is he not aware that by human agency the Spirit of grace may be misconducted, and that grave evil may arise thence? C. R. follows much in the same strain. But the greater part of the opposition to our views rests on a misapprehension. We do not wish the Scriptures to be *misunderstood*. We wish them to be understood. But we hold that if the schoolmaster is entrusted with the teaching of doctrines, he can scarcely avoid, on his part, teaching for doctrines the *commandments* of men, and making the gospel of none effect through tradition. He must teach what he is told, not what he believes; and, being made dependent for his daily bread on the tenets he teaches he is justly exposed to the suspicion that always adheres to a paid advocacy.

It is not to *illustrative* and *explanatory* but to doctrinal teaching we object. Geographical, historical, chronological, grammatical, literary matters of detail we have no objection to the teacher imparting a knowledge of as he goes along. We object to creed-teaching and catechism-cramming, to testing the Scriptures or interpreting them by thirty-nine or any other number of Articles. But, be it recollected, we object to this being done by ourselves as well as by others. Separate, we say, between knowledge and faith. Let the schoolmaster communicate knowledge, let the faith of man be free. Let the scholar look on the Bible as he looks on nature, let him learn and study the facts of each; but the teacher cannot teach the higher philosophy of nature any more than he can teach the higher theology. The grace of letters, the glory of science, the marvels of redemption, cannot be taught—except as mere barren dogmas; and dogmas are the artificial flowers of thought—scentless, lifeless, and uninfuential.

We desire to have the Book of God the book of life; to have it so it must be voluntarily taken into the spirit. Drill and gymnastics cannot produce conversion, though they can prepare for it. We wish the good seed of the word sown in every heart; but the dedication of the fruits ought to be to God.

S. L. C.

## NEGATIVE REPLY.

It is not often that in the course of discussion a large amount of convergent thought is got together. Discussion, in fact, too frequently leads to greater divergence by the strong statements in which controversialists commonly feel disposed to indulge. In this debate, however, we have come very near to each other in opinion, and may almost, I think, be brought to shake hands over our very small differences. "Thou hast given a banner to them that fear Thee, that it may be *displayed* because of the truth" (Psa. lx. 4), is a "form of sound words which cannot be condemned," and is not sought to be condemned by the disputants on either side. Full agreement on the value, the inestimable worth of the Bible, pervades the greater proportion of the papers which have appeared on this question.

The writers in the affirmative, however, differ from us in the matter of "display:" they regard that as efficiently done if it is *shown*; we think it ought to be *comprehended*. We might display the Scripture in Greek or Latin characters, but yet that would be singularly unsatisfactory. Every argument that can be used for the translation and diffusion of the Scriptures can be used for the explanation of them, and all that can be said in favour of a revision of our present version may be regarded as so much argument in favour of opening the seals from the book of the Spirit of the Most High.

"The Bible is a peculiar book. It is an old book—the oldest book in the world. Take any book of nearly the same antiquity, and try to read and understand it without note or comment. Try even a book written as late as the latest parts of the Bible: you find that at every step you come to an allusion, or an incident hinted at, or a fact partially told, which is quite unknown to you, and which leaves the text in a state of a puzzle without the key. And observe that not only is the Bible an old book, but it is in great part in that form which makes it difficult to be understood. It is not written in an abstract way. It is not thinking expressed in words; it is simple history, narrative, biography. It is full of local allusions; it takes for granted a knowledge of a peculiar climate, peculiar manners and customs, peculiar dress and institutions, domestic and civil habits, both in peace and war, quite unlike in their main features to anything here and now existing. Let any man take up 'Chaucer,' or any of our earlier poets, and see how far and how long he can read intelligently without the help of voluminous notes, and appendices, and glossaries. . . . And then let him remember that the Bible was written in at least two languages, neither of which is now spoken; that he has it only in a translation, made nearly two and a half centuries ago. Let him think that he is reading about another land than of his native soil, and chiefly of a nation now scattered over all the earth, and of nations who are long ago extinct, even to their very monuments; of whom, out of this book,

even Ancient History has told us next to nothing, though she has told us all she knew. Let him then think that he here holds in his hand an account of the rise and progress of that Jewish nation, from the very biography of the individual who was the founder and father of all that people, down to their final dispersion ; that he holds their sole code of laws in his hand ; that he has their history, their poetry, their proverbial philosophy, their religious life,—in a word, that he has the whole history of their nation, external and internal, their wars, their progress and decay, their triumphs and reverses ; let him well consider this, and he will wonder, not that he needs a help to understand it, but how any one should ever sit down to attempt to read it without the help of maps and geographies and critical elucidations of all sorts. Besides all this, a great part of the New Testament is summed up in three things,—biography, history, letters. More than one-fourth of the New Testament consists of a fourfold biography of an Individual who lived nearly two thousand years ago. We have this fourfold account of His life, labours, and death.\*

On reading the foregoing extract does it not strike one as a singular instance of the wisdom of God that He has given a book to man, at once so plain that he who runs may read, and is yet able to give scope for a culture so wide and comprehensive as that is which Mr. Alexander shows to be requisite. But besides this, does not the passage prove, in connection with this subject, that comment and explanation are very much needed if we would make the Bible lessons given to children in any measure effective and beneficial ?

Our opponents have surely a very slight opinion of the power of truth if they think that their special sects can only be kept alive upon the earth by protectionism. That my sect may be safe close the mouth of the schoolmaster, they seem to say, and make the Bible if you will a dead letter. It is really pitiable to see the singular arguments for the abolition of scriptural instruction in schools insisted on by S. C. L., by "Samuel," S. S., and "Cris." The burden of their cry is fear of proselytism, which is the progress of any *ism* but my *ism*. This is the very cry which has so long and so foolishly retarded the spread of education. It was the jealousy of sects which for half a century at least opposed every attempt made by statesmen to introduce a national system of education. And this paltry aiming after sectarian triumphs, and this petty contention of sect against sect, it is that has almost made useless the Act passed for the improvement of education. If men really believe in the essential power of God's truth, in the certain weakness of devil's error, why do they thus hanker about the prohibition of

\*I am indebted for this extract from a lecture delivered by the Rev. Thomas Alexander to the members of the Sunday School Union, not to that lecture itself, but to that fresh, vigorous, and excellent book, entitled "Counsels to Sunday School Teachers," by J. A. Cooper,—a book which has wonderfully enlightened me as to the need for careful preparation, that the Bible may be taught rightly, and therefore the need of much comment or explanation. The quotation occurs in chapter ii., page 36.

Bible explanation in schools? Is it impossible for them to rise above the cant of creed and the casuistry of sect, and to become nobly generous and nationally just? Do they not see that you cannot safely, wisely, or well, divide the human mind, and train one part of it to serve and love the State, another to look after itself, and another to be to the Church altogether devoted? The mind is one. Nobody really wishes to make the school a sectarian forcing-house; but most people see that if you train a child six days of the week to disregard the Bible, and give it only a seventh day religion, you do your best to *mistrain* the spirit of the child. We may comprehend the reason for all this circumspection against the teaching of religion on week days, but we may assure ourselves well that children cannot, and that they will very naturally conclude that a religion which is only to be taught on the Sabbath—although the Bible be read each day—is only a seventh day affair, and may as readily be eliminated from the week-day life as it can from the week-day lesson.

A few matters of detail in the debate may be noticed. S. C. L. brings a charge of a very heavy nature against the churches of the land when he asserts that "the impartiality of sects cannot be secured" (p. 43); and yet we are told that the highest evidence of true Christianity on earth is to "love thy neighbour as thyself," which is genuine impartiality. S. C. L. mistakes, or misstates, when he says, "In the Jewish synagogue the law was read, not expounded." Did not Jesus expound the law in the synagogue? did not Peter and Paul? I wot so. "Samuel" thinks that *secularism* ought to be the only religion of the State (p. 134), and that it ought to teach men only to have an eye to this world; and he insists that impartiality towards religion is best shown by legally expelling it from our schools.

That "the province of the Church should be invaded by the State" (p. 137) has never been seriously proposed by any body. The clergy do not want *preaching*, but *teaching* schoolmasters. Schoolmasters do not propose to preach. All that is contended is that if the Bible is to be made a class-book, it ought to be, like every other class-book, commented on and explained, so that it may be comprehended. It is not doctrines that require to be taught, but morals and holiness of life. If, rather than we should explain what is read in the Bible, the schoolmaster's mouth must be shut up, why should we not also by law destroy the laws of mental association, and hinder the starting up in the mind, on the perusal of the Scripture lesson, the sectarian teaching of the Sunday school teacher?—usually—*pace* "Samuel"—not over-well furnished for his task.

If, as S. S. says, the Bible is the revelation of God, how can it be right to *reveal* what he has been so good as to *reveal*? Not the *words*, but the *truths* of Scripture are God's revelation. If we allow only the *words* to be read, and insist that the truths shall not be thought, are we not dishonouring God by neglecting His law to

search the Scriptures, that we may read His will there? If, again, the subject is of such vast importance, how do we indicate our sense of the importance of that subject by compelling the words to be read, but insisting that the thoughts shall not be exercised on the topic? Strange education, indeed, is that which makes word-knowledge enough for Scripture, but thing-knowledge indispensable in science and history.

We cannot help thinking that no means could be so successfully adopted for the general diffusion of a stated practical infidelity than this mode of training children to read the sacred records with vacant minds and unapplying hearts. It is a serious responsibility that the sects take on them to do violence to the command of Jesus, "Teach all nations," in order that their ecclesiastical peculiarities may not be interfered with. It seems to us that this is giving sectarianism a first place in our hearts, and the *truth* as it is in Jesus quite an inferior one.

If the word of God is truth, the very truth of God, why should we compel the schoolmaster to become a blind leader of the blind? and why should we determine by law that the eyes of the blind shall not be opened? It is really a sad thing to think of, that the professed followers of Jesus Christ should on principle declare that the glory of their Lord shall not be revealed, but concealed; and that they have come to the conclusion that it is their duty to say to a Christian teacher who has been told to be instant in season and out of season to bring the lambs of Jesus to the Good Shepherd, that he must not do so on pain of loss of bread and opportunity of usefulness. I cannot believe that the acerbities of sect can lead men to such a course; and I must believe that it is only a passing and transitory jealousy which would lead them to do otherwise than declare that the Bible should be read in school without comments and without explanations. C. P.

---

**ARGUMENTS POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE.**—"In questions where there are arguments on both sides, one positive proof is to preponderate to a great many negatives, because a positive proof is always founded upon some real existence, which we know and apprehend; whereas the negative arguments terminate generally in nothing, in our not being able to conceive, and so may be nothing but conclusions from our ignorance and incapacity, and not from the truth of things which may, and we have experience do, really exist, though they exceed our comprehension. We know very well that we think, and at pleasure move ourselves; and yet, if we will think a negative argument sufficient to build on, we shall have reason to doubt whether we can do one or the other. Yet we, having positive experience of our thinking and motion, the negative arguments against them, and the impossibility of understanding them, never shake our assent to these truths, which perhaps will prove a considerable rule to determine us in very material questions."

—JOHN LOCKE.

## Science.

---

### HAS MAN DEVELOPED FROM THE SAVAGE STATE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

It is impossible, now-a-days, to ascertain with indubitable accuracy the primeval form of human society. Of course we have in the account given in Scripture a record of the origin of man as the object of spiritual guidance, but the early forms of social existence, and of passing along *fallentis semita vita* (the paths of deceptive life) in the first ages is left in darkness in the sacred page. History, as the narrative of civilization, shows in its earliest pages a strange agglomeration of phenomena. Kingdoms are seen, but no one can tell who founded them. They are founded amidst and hold rule over tribes of men savage in all the elements of life, except in the cowardice which submits to slavery and tribute. Cities appear as the curtain of history is raised, but they stand among huts and wigwams, tents and cave-dwellings, and the inhabitants of the cities claim superiority, if not sovereignty, over the nomadic tribes. Heroes play their part among contending races, but the heroes are rude and fond of rude indulgences; and the races whom they lead are servile and savage. The very civilization which history shows appears so only in comparison with the homelessness and stirring strife of the clans and peoples around, whose uncouth forms give point to the term barbarians; although even the mob of the citizens have not attained to anything like what might be called the civility of civilians.

Civilization signifies that men have been gathered into cities, have learned to do the duties and take the part of citizens, have become civil and civilized. Cities—

“Send the Graces and the Muses forth,  
To civilize and to instruct.”

In contrast to the life of cities was the life of the woods—of isolation and selfish individualism, of that self-indulgence which prevailed when men ran wild in woods, and so were called savages, or dwellers in the woods. The frequency of the use of savages—club-bearing and laurel-clad—in heraldry appears to support the idea that citizens drew their multitudes from savage life. All the earlier pages of history show us only a few cities and many races rude and wild, living the life of instinct rather than reason. The analogy of this to what goes on in our personal existence gives great support to the idea that men at first subsisted in some way like other animals, in a separate, self-indulging, instinctive kind of life; that love, the social affection,—or fear, the self-seeking one, caused them to congregate and hold intercourse, and so grow considerate and civil.

cultured and urbane. For as we see all the terms which indicate progress, intellectuality, and amiability, refer to states and conditions of aggregation and union; *e. g.*, gentility, civility, urbanity, kindliness, sociality, &c.; hence we infer that a transition from selfish isolation is the main work of civilization.

"A *savage* tribe consists of a handful of individuals, wandering or thinly scattered over a vast tract of country; a dense population, therefore, dwelling in fixed habitations, and largely collected together in towns and villages, we term *civilized*. In *savage* life there is no commerce, no manufactures, no agriculture, or next to none; a country rich in the fruits of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, we call *civilized*. In *savage* communities each person shifts for himself; except in war (and even then very imperfectly) we seldom see any joint operations carried on by the union of many; nor do savages, in general, find much pleasure in each other's society. Wherever, therefore, we find human beings acting together for common purposes in large bodies, and enjoying the pleasures of social intercourse, we term them *civilized*. In *savage* life there is little or no law or administration of justice; no systematic employment of the collective strength of society, to protect individuals against injury, against one another; every one trusts to his own strength or cunning, and where that fails he is generally without resource. We accordingly call a people *civilized* where the arrangements of society for protecting the persons and property of its members are sufficiently perfect to maintain peace among them; *i. e.*, to induce the bulk of the community to rely for their security mainly upon social arrangements, and renounce, for the most part, and in ordinary circumstances, the vindication of their interests (whether in the way of aggression or of defence) by their individual strength or courage."\*

Man in the earlier periods of history appears just in that condition which is here described by Mr. Mill as *savage*. It is quite evident that man as a human being was not in the early ages the social and civilized being he is now—though his civilization and sociality even yet is not by any means what it might be. We cannot suppose that civilization could spring up at once among men. Nor can we suppose that over the earth a race was spread having within itself the elements of actual civilization, so that wherever he planted his foot he also impressed civilization. The slow progress of the most requisite arts of life forbid such an idea. Look at printing, which is little more than five centuries old, although upwards of ten times that space had passed over the human race prior to its invention; surely if man had been civilized at his origin he would not have been destitute of the power of transmitting and preserving knowledge.

"The permanent changes in the condition of man's life, effected

\* J. S. Mill's "Dissertations and Discussions," vol. i., art. "Civilization," pp. 161-2.

by his own intelligence and exertions," according to Professor Alex. Bain, "make up human civilization. It is the *artificial* half of the good we enjoy." The distinguishing feature of civilization is that the changes introduced into human life are so introduced with the definite aim of improving, bettering, and advantaging society as a whole; and its chief elements are—1. The industrial arts; 2. Government; 3. The arts of social intercourse; 4. Morality—conventional, legal, or religious; 5. Science; 6. Literature and the fine arts. It is quite evident, therefore, that civilization is development, and if it is so it must be from the savage state.

There can be no doubt of human progress as a fact. If man had been formed a civilized being he would have been, at creation, a perfect being, and progress would have been an impossibility. But we know that the industrial arts, government, science, art, literature, sociality, and morality, have developed from age to age, and therefore we believe that man has developed; but development from perfection to imperfection is rank nonsense. If man has progressed at all, therefore, he must have progressed from a savage state to his present civilized (or rather civilizing one), and hence we think the affirmative plainly and fully proved. B. E. C.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE old Roman unquestionably thought himself very sagacious and profound, and his age an effete and very "irony" one, when he delivered himself of his axiom, "Nil admirari." Certainly, since his day this round orb of ours has witnessed not a few startling events, which might slightly astonish even him. Surprises, however, are difficult to get now in many departments of human life and thought, and not a few are almost ready to take up the old saying as their modern motto. For speculation (not commercial, but that also of the intellectual sort) has travelled so far, and explored so perseveringly, that soon but little will remain in the way of unoccupied ground. The first modern exponents of the theory, which made some stir in the good old times of George III., that man had, from the savage state, by slow and laboured degrees worked himself up to be what he then was in civilized countries, were regarded with astonishment by some, with hatred by others, who thought them dreadfully heterodox; and yet another moiety very prudently concluded that they were only a "bit crackit." We now hear, and have indeed got almost sick of hearing, various theories regarding human development, which throw into the shade the most daring guesses of our great-grandfathers in their imaginative moods. Not only do the prophets of our advanced schools of thought run back the origin of man to a something inconceivably below the most debased savage; but, taking a look forward, they conceive that, clever as he is now, he may wonderfully improve himself, and become—what may he become?—something superior to an angel, only *minus* the wings; for he has a world's experience,



and science of the latest date, with actual histories, and an abundance of statistics; whereas an ethereal being is reasonably supposed to be debarred these privileges. Necessarily, to those thus the disciples of development, it is only one step in the onward movement to believe that man was once no better than a savage. Others, also, not the supporters of such very extensive views about man's past and future, do still think that he was once, even in those spots which were the early centres of the human race, exceedingly uncultured and barbarian, and they esteem the natives of Australia and Polynesia, the aborigines of North America, and the negro or the Kafir of Africa, as representatives, differing indeed amongst themselves, yet not the less truly representatives of man of the primeval type. This belief has been held by some who, while they were fully persuaded that the origin of mankind was as stated in Genesis, yet supposed that the first human pair had but little of the elements of civilization to start with; nor was the low degree of culture attained to in the earth's first millenium and a half or more, carried to any extent across the waters of the Noachian flood.

The position I take up on this question is the following:—man did not rise by degrees, slow or rapid, from the savage condition to become what we find him now in the most favoured localities. He has within him immense powers of self-improvement, yet he requires a *locus standi* from which to start. Exactly in proportion to the excellence of his moral and religious condition—that is to say, at this epoch, just in the degree in which he recognises Christianity,—not as an empty belief, but a life-influence—will be his real progress in science, art, literature, and all that we comprehend under the phrases civilization and culture. Remove him from Christianity, or let his Christianity become dead, and you insure his degradation, though it may ensue through spurious displays and spasmodic attempts at attaining to a higher place. Not the lapse of successive ages alone would have been sufficient to develop the millions of civilized nations into what we now find them; by Christianity, diffused through the purer medium of the various forms of Protestant belief—diffused also through the less pure medium of Roman Catholicism, has accrued all that makes the nineteenth century of this era so far superior to the first. A people who have attained to a certain degree of civilization apart from Christianity might communicate that civilization with success to another nation yet barbarous; but with far greater rapidity does the work proceed when Christianity takes the lead, and the arts and sciences accompany her. The case of the ancient nations, whose culture reached a confessedly high point, and where there prevailed a mythology both foolish and impure, furnishes some peculiarities. It was in accordance with the divine purpose that Greece and Rome should form notable instances, which will remain in man's memory while earth abides as it now is, how far, without a revealed religion, the human intellect may go in the attainment of knowledge, and what results may arise therefrom. Beyond well-

marked limits, the wisest and the most ingenious of pagans could not pass, and the tendency to lapse into savagery again showed itself from time to time; and the loss of national bravery and independence in Grecian lands, and the prevalence of luxury and lawlessness in the Roman empire, led at last to the declension of both, not only politically, but morally and socially. And again, had these nations been working upwards from remote periods of savagery until they had reached the position in which we can first read their history as authentic, how could we account for their thus stopping short, and their failure, in the main, to gain any true insight into the laws of the universe, and the nature of its Maker and Sustainer? A successful cultivation of the fine arts has given them a world-wide fame; but it served not, in any important way, to increase the knowledge of the majority of the individuals constituting those nations at those periods when they were at their highest altitude. The "light of nature" they possessed, yet no farther enlightenment did they add to this by their own efforts or discoveries, for they had those imperfect ideas of knowledge and its uses which Christianity so effectually dispels. Hence, in the words of Lord Bacon, "men entered into a desire of learning and knowledge, sometimes out of a natural curiosity and inquisitive temper, sometimes to entertain their minds with variety and delight, sometimes for ornament and reputation, and sometimes to enable them to secure the victory of wit and contradiction, and most times for lucre and a livelihood." If this is still a true picture of many men in Christian times, and even more correct of the bulk of those ignorant of Christianity, it will be seen that it tells heavily against the plan of development from savage to sage, because the growth of knowledge is thus liable to be continually impeded, and its communication from man to man retarded; so that what is gained by a nation in one century would be lost in the next, and then again revive, perhaps, to decline again. Only where Christianity comes into operation do we make knowledge stable, and insure its fructifying and producing the seeds of new truths.

Many a volume has been filled with the ingenious speculations of those who have supposed primitive man to have been an utter barbarian, that slowly, through the course of ages, worked out, through his own sagacity and spurred on by his necessities, one discovery after another, until he had achieved an elevation such as we see in the most refined and cultured nations. That in some places he has apparently advanced but little, if at all, beyond the early type, has been ascribed to the influences of climate, locality, and isolation. Something may be indeed said on the last particular, since its effect upon culture, in the case of a race not numerous and of an unenergetic temperament, is well marked; and as it was with the Polynesian Islanders ere visited by Europeans, the habits of a people seem as firmly anchored down as are their island homes. These, however, though rude, are scarcely to be called savages of the lowest grade, and yet they, as much as the bushmen or the wildest

native of India, have failed to induce amongst them habits of civilization. The fact is, that in these and all similar instances we have before us not an advancing man, but a man who has receded or declined from the primeval type. Part of the primitive process this may be, whereby a nation as a nation suffers in its succeeding generations for the misuse of its advantages and its prosperity at some particular period, and is suffered to fall from high art and culture perhaps even to cannibalism. For this, as a modern writer remarks, is bringing a people individually to "the hardest, barest, most unmistakable fact of all—that man is at least good to be eaten"! We have many examples of nations whose annals have perished and left no trace of what they once were; while there are instances, as in the wonderful remains discovered in certain parts of America, where a high civilization has left, if not its literature, yet its well-marked traces on rock and stone. So, too, in Egypt, in Nubia, in Syria, and other parts of Asia, where the pre-ent debased inhabitants, though the race has undergone various intermixtures with foreigners, are yet virtually the descendants of those who, thousands of years ago, built cities, and adorned their houses, and had, in fact, a civilization comparable to that of Greece and Rome; and led a life widely differing from that nomadic or merely animal mode which has seemingly been forced upon their descendants by some extraneous cause, and has not necessarily arisen out of their surroundings.

Accepting the scriptural narrative as the true account of the origin of man as I heartily do, I see that the first human pair were not savages; nor, as their descendants multiplied and extended over a certain though limited area, did they lose the privileges they inherited. Man, at the very commencement of his career, had implanted within him faculties and powers which were capable of speedy improvement and enlargement. His Creator, undoubtedly, by some means communicated to him a knowledge of several facts which would form a basis upon which a superstructure might be raised by his own endeavours. The poet Cowper, in one of his letters, has ingeniously ridiculed the theory of a writer of his time, who asserted that by successive steps man was led to construct a language for himself as he needed it. At first, says Cowper in his satiric working out of this philosopher's idea, we may suppose man would suffice himself with mere exclamations; by and by he would get to name objects, and an "apple" he might utter with emphasis when he beheld that fruit; but some day, seeing one in the hand of another person, he seeks an expression implying transference, and exclaims, "Give apple." The listener responds, but gives it not to the applicant, but to another standing by. Then, adds Cowper, the man must retire again, and, after some cogitation, at length devises a pronoun, "Give *me* apple," and obtains what he desires! But I do not question for a moment that the means of thus expressing thought by words and by written symbols was divinely taught, and the subsequent "confusion of tongues" was also,

obviously, from the hand of God, if the Bible is to be believed. Some progress was made by the human race in the arts before the flood, and it might perhaps have been greater had not the declension of religious life led the antediluvians into debasing immoralities. Those who left the ark carried from it with them their old world knowledge, and it is probable that it was increased by some revelations made from heaven to Noah and his family. Thence grew all the civilization which marked the earlier ages of our race,—a civilization which had its beginning amongst those who possessed also the knowledge of the religion of paradise, and which grew and extended itself as man spread from land to land; nor did its growth cease even when the true religion had begun to decay amongst the wanderers, and false forms of worship took its place.

The possession of a common language by all was undoubtedly favourable to the advancement of mankind, since it afforded every facility for the communication of ideas; and the check temporarily interposed by the breaking up of the Babel-builders into cliques, had its equivalent in the stimulus imparted by the necessities of changes of locality; and the perceptions of many were doubtless quickened by the reception of thoughts in a new dress. In the patriarchal families survived alone the knowledge of the one true God; and through successive generations this passed, sometimes lodging only in a few individuals, until we arrive at the period when the chosen people Israel had their origin. In Egypt, probably, which has been called the "cradle of the sciences," was the most rapid progress made by man, ere Greece or Chaldea had their sages; but Egyptian learning, nurtured as it was under the shadow of idolatries, had sprung from the God-instilled civilization of the primeval era. Already the distinction pointed out by Professor Auberlen had begun to show itself, had mankind been ready to observe it; and the nations of the earth began to group into the three sections of unhistorical, semi-historical, and historical. Of these the semi-historical, such as the Hindoos, Chinese, and Japanese, have exhibited most permanence. They proceeded, at a very early period in their national history, to make various discoveries, some of which were hidden many centuries from the nations of the West; and, having reached a certain status, there they remained immoveably fixed, or with only tendencies to degeneration. Account for it, as you may partially, on the ground of their lack of wide-spread human sympathy, the root of it was the absence of a theology worthy the name. But both the historical and the semi-historical nations rose from a primitive people with a history and a measure of culture, not from early barbarians; and the former, by their subsequent lapses, give an additional proof that civilization was not a gradual development, affecting generally the whole human race, but liable to continual fluctuations, unless centred in Christianity.

CRIS.

## The Essayist.

---

### MENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND CRITICISM.

WHEN we see a painting or a statue, the sensations we derive from it are either pleasurable or disagreeable, in proportion as its several parts are in *keeping* with nature; or at least this ought to be the only criterion by which to determine its merits or defects. If we feel disgusted at viewing the production of an artist, either the work itself is not in harmony with nature, or we ourselves do not know what is harmony with nature. It is this knowledge alone which can give the artist the power of bestowing upon his work those qualities which it ought to possess, or the spectator the faculty of judging of those qualities correctly. Thus, for the painter to depict well, and for the spectator to judge correctly, they must both have this in common,—the knowledge of what ought to enter into the composition of a fine painting; although it is by no means necessary that the latter should be able to illustrate on the canvas those principles which, however, it is as necessary for him to be acquainted with as the artist.

Precisely in this situation does the critic stand with regard to the author upon whose merits he takes upon him to decide. The author must have the genius to create, and the judgment necessary to guide him in creating, so that he may not transgress the laws which Nature has prescribed, nor overstep the proper bounds she has assigned; while the critic must also have the same judgment, in order that he may be enabled to decide whether those laws have been preserved or broken. What is criticism, then, in the highest sense of the term, excluding mere verbal criticism? Nothing but the art of determining correctly what is, and what is not in accordance with nature; an art which therefore depends upon the knowledge of the relations between thought and feeling. This, then, is learned by studying the principles of mind that it is the province of mental philosophy to teach; and consequently criticism, in the highest sense of the term, is nothing more than the application to literary compositions of some of the truths of mental philosophy.

When we consider the duties of criticism, we are too apt to restrict it to the art of determining the correctness or incorrectness of expressions—the art by which syllables, words, and sentences are tried and examined—which has reference principally to the delicacies of language; we seldom think of the high principles upon which it proceeds,—that it draws its rules and data from the sublimest of the sciences—that it is the arbiter of thought, not merely of language. It is this very circumstance which has given us so many incompetent critics, because they have not considered

the art of criticism to be so important or profound as it really is. The legitimate objects of criticism are by no means contemptible or trivial. What is it, for instance, that can determine when the poet restrains himself within the bounds of nature, and when he does not? When he well employs the freedoms which the very nature of his high art allow him, and when he fails? What is it that determines the bounds and limits of poetry? How can we decide whether its metaphor and imagery, bold and original as it may sometimes be, is still in harmony with nature or not? For even fiction itself, wide and extensive as is the latitude which it allows, has limits beyond which the *littérateur* must not, or should not, proceed. What will enable us, then, to discriminate between the claims so justly made by nature and propriety, and those privileges which fiction affords? What can distinguish between those fine lines which, like the colours of the rainbow, seem to blend and melt away into each other? Nothing but an acquaintance with those natural successions of thought and feeling which will make us recognise what is and what is not in unison with nature, and therefore based upon truth. So, too, in the case of the historian, how are we to determine when he is maintaining the gravity becoming one who is writing for the instruction of mankind, in recording the disasters and triumphs of nations, and when he ventures upon forbidden ground? A knowledge of the principles and feelings upon which our minds act, like a touchstone, enables us to separate the congruous from the incongruous. Every critic must possess this knowledge, but surely none can have it so much at command as those who have gained it at the fountain-head by the study of mental philosophy.

---

THOMAS HOOD.—Hood was not one of those men of commanding intellect who arise but once or twice at most in a nation's history. He did not signalize himself by being the first to climb the slippery steep of Pisgah, and catch sublime glimpses of the promised land with which to gladden the heart of the world. He is no cold unapproachable idol of the intellect—to be worshipped from afar with awe and trembling. Rather is he enshrined amid the Lares and Penates of our hearts—our homely favourites—our Charles Lambs and Sir Philip Sidneys; a kind, genial, honest-hearted man of genius, whom one feels it is good to know and pleasant to remember, whose laugh has a hearty ring wherewith to blow away the cobwebs of sorrow and care, and the shake of whose hand does one's heart good. There have been three or four greater writers in our nation's history, and a few more as great, but there has been no one whose noble efforts on behalf of the poor, the outcast, and the sinning, will serve to embalm his memory and his works in a kindlier affection and regard than Thomas Hood, "the darling of the English heart."—*Westminster Review*.

## The Reviewer.

---

"Non Oredo." London: Houlston and Sons.

THIS is a clever little satirical squib against Secularism, written in the form of a "Prospectus of the Ancient and Modern Firm of Nero, Julian, Bradawl, and Co. (limited), established for the Purpose of Securing the Progress of *Free Thought*." It details (1) "The objects of the company,"—the abolition of the religion of Jesus Christ; (2) "The prospects of the company." "From an elaborate calculation, made by the professional advisers of the company, based upon the laws of chance and probability, it is confidently expected that by the end of the year 22,871 A.D. the objects of the company will be entirely accomplished," and "man will rise to the dignity of a distinguished place among the rest of the class *Mammalia*;" (3) "A review of the company's past successes;" (4) The future policy of the directors.

The idea is better than the execution. Had the author, instead of contenting himself with the level of "Dame Europa's School," studied Jean Paul Richter or Swift for a few days and nights he might have elaborated a lasting addition to apologetic literature like the "Argument against the Abolition of Christianity." Still it is a very smartly laid out specimen of humorous writing, and we commend it to the perusal of those who like a bit of well-meant fun. Of its author we know nothing, but his work is one of promise.

*Counsels to Sunday School Teachers on Personal Improvement and Practical Efficiency.* By J. A. Cooper. Author of "The Sunday School Senior Class," "The Objects, Work, and Organization of a Local Sunday School Union," &c. London: Sunday School Union, 56, Old Bailey. New York: T. Nelson and Sons, Bleecker Street.

J. A. COOPER is one who can speak with the authority of experience and self-sacrifice on Sunday school work. He is known, not only in the capital of the Midlands, where he labours among the young vines of the Christian culture-fields, but wherever Sunday school intelligence and enthusiasm, based on principle, are appreciated, felt, and honoured. "Feed My lambs!" has been a command most precious, in his view of the duty the Lord left binding on the Church. He feels the divine vocation of the Sunday school teacher, and in this *vestibulum ecclesie*, or entrance hall of the church, he does not disdain to take his place as a "doorkeeper." There he delights to renew the invitation of the olden time, "Enter within God's gates with thanksgiving, and into His courts with praise." With a diligence that seems invincible, an energy that grows rather than abates, a zeal that glows and irradiates, and a

fervour which is, like sunlight, influential and diffusive for much more than a quarter of a century, has he been among those who "brought little children to Jesus that He might bless them;" and the memory of his earnestness and wisdom in his labour of love is sweet in many a household whose heads he has led into the ways of pleasantness and the paths of peace; while far beyond our ken, we believe, his name is cherished among those who have brought many to righteousness. Those who wish to be suffused with a wise spirit in doing the work of the Sunday school should read this book by one who knows thoroughly the trials, the difficulties, the duties, the toil, the anxieties, the successes, and the failures, to which those who trim the vine-branches are called. It is a loving, wise, practical, earnest work, which none can read without improvement to his whole nature. It covers the entire field of the teacher's aim, duty, interest, studies, and encouragements. It contains "the substance of four lectures delivered to Sunday school teachers," which not only "excited a gratifying amount of interest" when first delivered, but attracted so much notice as to lead to requests to re-deliver them, and the expression of a desire that they should be published. The author, reading aright the signs of the times, says that "the passing of the recent Education Act will inaugurate a new epoch in the religious as well as the secular instruction of the people. The duties of Sunday school teachers will become more onerous than ever, and the demand will daily become more imperative for greater skill, intelligence, and devotedness on the part of those who seek to bring the influence of true religion to bear upon the minds and hearts of the young." A glance at the contents will at once show the completeness and the practical usefulness of the work:—

#### "CHAPTER I.

##### "THE ESSENTIAL QUALIFICATION OF AN EFFICIENT SUNDAY SCHOOL TEACHER.

- "Introduction — *Educational Qualifications* — Reading, Writing, and Grammar—Biblical Knowledge—Books recommended—Objection met —The Effects of a Teacher's Ignorance upon Intelligent Scholars.
- "*Intellectual Qualifications*—The Habit of forming Distinct Conceptions — Knowledge of the Mental Characteristics of Children—Knowledge of the Art of Teaching—Objection of the Want of Time considered.
- "*Moral Qualifications*—Sympathy with Children—Kindness of Heart—Power of a Smile—Kind Words—Forbearance—Perseverance—Devotedness—Common Evils—Consistency.
- "*Spiritual Qualifications*—Earnest Piety—A Prayerful Spirit—Illustrations—Unfaltering Faith in the Promises of God—The Secret of Great Success—Recapitulation—Closing Appeal.

#### "CHAPTER II.

##### "PREPARATION—ITS IMPORTANCE, AND THE BEST MEANS OF SECURING IT.

- "The Necessity of Preparation on the Part of Sunday School Teacher—*General Preparation*—Extensive Biblical Information—Classified List



of Books—Objections met—How to obtain a Knowledge of the Art of Teaching, viz., by Reading, Observation, Counsel—Training Classes—Encouragements—The Village Blacksmith.

- “*Specific Preparation*—Necessity of this—A Fixed Course of Lessons—The Spirit in which the Study of the Lesson should be commenced—The Manner in which it should be pursued—Notes I—Illustrations—Practical Lessons—Preparation Classes—Division of Study during the Week—Concluding Remarks.

### “CHAPTER III.

#### “THE BEST METHOD OF INSTRUCTION FOR ELEMENTARY AND BIBLE CLASSES.

- “*Introduction*—A Welsh Teacher—*The Individual System*—The Simultaneous System—*The Collective System*—Advantages of this System—Best Method of applying this System—Repetition Lesson—Explanation of it—Reading the Lesson—Its Exposition—Importance of Questioning illustrated—The Art of Questioning—Initiatory Questioning—Progressive Questioning; Embracing Fact, Inference, and Doctrine—Illustrative Questioning—Applicatory Questioning—Neglect of Catechetical Instruction illustrated—Information to be given gradually, and to be asked for again—Application of the Lesson—An Earnest Teacher's Manner—The Influence of Earnest Words illustrated—The Operation of the Collective System described—Concluding Remarks.

### “CHAPTER IV.

#### “DISCIPLINE IN THE CLASS, AND USEFULNESS OUT OF IT.

- “*Introductory Remarks*—*Discipline*—Means of obtaining Order—Punctuality—Position during the Opening and Closing Exercises—A Teacher's Demeanour—Excite Interest of Scholars at the Commencement of Instruction—Constant Occupation—The First Manifestation of Disorder—Manner of Reproving—Self-Control—Never reprove in Anger—Barely threaten—Never inflict Corporal Punishment—How to treat a Disorderly Scholar—Detention—Visitation—Reference to the Superintendent—Illustration—Probation—Expulsion—The Great Object of all this.
- “*Usefulness out of the Class*—Always recognise Scholars—Interest in their Temporal Welfare—Home Visitation—Scholars visiting their Teachers—Private Conversation—Epistolary Correspondence—Register of Names and Residences.
- “*The Honour of the Sunday School Teacher's Work*—Concluding Appeal.”

The following quotation will indicate the style of the book :—

“To *teach* really means to *touch* the mind of a child with the mind of the teacher,—to bring the scholar and teacher into coactive, living exertion, and to make them work together. It requires not only activity of mind in the teacher, but earnestness, moral weight of character; because it is by the living energy of the spirit that the communicating touch of the teacher is given. On this account the teacher ought carefully to master all that he intends to impart. Only so can he overmaster the pre-engaged or inert mind of the scholar. But besides this every adjunct and accessory to success should be carefully attended to,—the *voice*, that it may have the tone of earnest gravity and true feeling which is so winning and expressive; the *eye*, that it may be watchful and firm without being annoying or stern; 1871.

the *manner*, that it may be *swave* but not "gushing," and serious without being sentimental; the *temper*, that it may be smooth and moderate, yet reliant and steady; the *heart*, that it may be affectionate but not weak; and the *spirit*, that it may be devout without being bigoted; in short, the entire nature, that it may work in oneness to the attainment of attention to the message of Christ as unspeakably important. This is the touching teaching which works on and into the life of the young spirit till it ends in newness of life,—a life hid with Christ in God."

Some of the closing words of the volume we quote to show the spirit in which and the power with which the work is written :—

"In conclusion, allow me to entreat my readers to seek most earnestly and devoutly the acquisition of those qualifications which are essential to an efficient Sunday school teacher, carefully and resolutely to prepare for the right performance of your work, studiously to adopt the best method of instruction in your class, and resolutely but kindly to maintain discipline therein,—in a word, to cheerfully and unreservedly give yourselves to the performance of your various duties as the religious teachers and trainers of the young. It is, my friends, only as you do this that you can hope for happiness and success in your work, and peace and joy in its retrospection. 'Be ye faithful unto death, and I will give you a crown of life,' are the Master's words addressed to each of us; and it is only as we obey that injunction that we have any right to expect the victor's palm and the conqueror's crown. But while Christ expects this faithfulness at our hands, He gives us the promise of His help and presence. 'Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world,' is an assurance in which every faithful teacher may confide. Go forth, then, my friends, into the untrodden paths of Christian duty which lie before you with strong confidence and unflinching trust. You need fear no evil, for He is with you,—with you to counsel and to guide."

Need we say buy, read, profit by, practise, and realize?

---

## The Topic.

---

### HAS THE CONFERENCE ABOUT THE BLACK SEA BEEN CONDUCTED AND CLOSED WITH A DUE REGARD TO BRITISH HONOUR AND INTERESTS?

#### AFFIRMATIVE.

In discussing this question it is very important to remember that two great European nations were engaged in one of the fiercest wars of modern times. Prussia was elated by victory, and France hopelessly crushed by defeat. If England had insisted that the treaty of 1856 should remain unaltered, most of the other European nations would

have joined in a war which, for bloodshed and misery, would have been unequalled in history. At the request of Prussia, England consented to reconsider the terms of the treaty. Now the question before us is not whether treaties are binding or otherwise, but whether, *England having consented to reconsider this particular treaty*, the Conference has been conducted with due

regard to her honour and interests. That Russia chose an ill time to open the matter, and that she did it in a rude and unstatesmanlike manner, most readers will grant. But would it have been to our honour to rush to arms and defend a cause which many able men, and the leader of the ministerial party himself, could not have approved? Would not the remedy have been worse than the evil? Would it have been to our interest to open a war, when it was doubtful whether our army and navy was in a condition to enable us successfully to carry it on? The spirit of the British Government, and especially of Lord Granville, has been conciliatory. Nor can it be considered degrading to any Government to modify a treaty which plainly needed modifying. It is to be observed that the Turkish representative agreed in the decisions arrived at, and that the Conference was opened, conducted, and closed with exemplary courtesy. The lesson we should learn from it all is to be more careful of the treaties we sign; and it may assist the student of the characters of nations to see how little dependence can be placed in Russian diplomatists, and how far more courteous the Turks are than we usually give them credit for being.—A. O. T.

With an abhorrence of the incalculable evils of war, only equalled in intensity by a determination to obey the bidding of duty, the people of Great Britain, during the recent panic occasioned by the insolent approaches and attitude of Russia, continued with the prayer upon their lips that the avoidance of a violent issue might be made reconcilable with the continuance of their country's honour unsullied and interests unprejudiced. Great, therefore, was their joy when, as in direct answer to that prayer, the interested powers, at the suggestion of Prussia,

arrived at an arrangement to submit the question to conference. And who would deny the manifest wisdom of this arrangement? Granted that Russia was impertinent in the manner of her approach, it would have been unpardonable for Britain to have gone to war about a point of etiquette with a scarcely half-civilized people, who could not be expected to know anything of etiquette; it was enough that the insult was resented in the memorable sharp terms employed by Earl Granville, and which met with the admiration of the world. Those individuals who have since talked so much about disregard to national honour and interests were then silent upon that score. Then as to the demands which Russia made,—it was never asserted that these were such as Britain must deny her assent to, had they been presented in the right manner to the right parties. And consequently had we even gone to war, such action would not have been equivalent to the declaration that what Russia desired was unreasonable. Russia threatened to do a certain act, against the doing of which she had given her promise to certain European powers; Great Britain, one of these powers, replied she must not do that without the consent of those to whom she made the promise. Thus, had war been entered upon, it could only have been on the point of Russia's right to repudiate her treaty obligations without the consent of her co-signatory powers. And, mark, it was the duty of this country at no stage of the affair to *declare* war; Russia simply threatened to commit the act, we acquitted ourselves of duty in replying, "You dare not," and in reserving further action until there was evidence of Russia's proceeding to carry out her threat. So that Britain could not have done other than she has done,

when Russia virtually said, "Well, instead of acting as I threatened to do, I am now willing that my claims be submitted to the consideration of the other powers, and that my conduct be governed by their decision." In all, therefore, that the history of the Black Sea Conference records, we detect nothing to make our country blush, but rather are proud of the evidence therein interwoven of the rule over us of an enlightened policy, framed upon the sublimest regard for national honour and interests. And long may the same rule be over us !  
—J. F. B.

#### NEGATIVE.

Is Russian ambition likely to be less perilous to British interests now than it was in 1856? We trow not. We are not of those who think that Britain's interest in the Black Sea question has grown dull and shadowy. We hold that Britain's interest is as real, substantial, and abiding as ever. Why should it not be? Have we not sacrificed thousands of lives and millions of treasure for its security? Did we not solemnly impose conditions on Russia for the better security of our interests in the East? Did not Russia as solemnly accept these conditions? Unquestionably she did. With these facts before us we cannot but view with regret the result of the recent Conference. We cannot but lament the temporizing part played by her Majesty's ministers. What is the fact? Russia has virtually regained the position she held previously to the Crimean campaign. She may build and float as many war-ships on the Euxine as she chooses. What will be the sequel to that? Another campaign in the East. So all the blood and treasure spent in the last campaign with Russia has been spent in vain. Where now is the honour of Britain?

What will the world say of her? Why, she will be the laughing-stock of the nations. Regarding not her own word, how can she expect other nations to regard it? We submit, therefore, that through the vacillating policy of British statesmen, Britain's honour and interests have been utterly ignored at the recent Black Sea Conference.—W. MACKIE.

The Black Sea has long been the *belle noir* of Eastern diplomacy. It has caused anxiety for nearly half a century, and we have had great difficulty in securing its neutralization. Conference on conference has been employed about it, and a costly war has been waged that Russia might be compelled to abandon aggressive movements on her neighbours in the lonely seclusion of the Euxine, in which she might work great injury before the nations of the West could hear of it or interfere in regard to it. In the recent Conference we have given up all the gains of former conferences and of our war; that is, we have resigned the honour gained and the substantial interests involved in a half-century of history—we have wasted the resources of the country to the extent of the expenses incurred; and we have truckled to an unscrupulous enemy in an hour of peril. This we have done because our armed defenders have deceived us as profoundly as Napoleon's army officials did—they took their pay, but were not prepared to do their duty. Because our army was but a sham, our annals have suffered shame. It is thought that we have been holding the leadership of civilization upon false pretences. British honour has been stained, British valour spurned, British diplomacy outraged by a semi-civilized nation whose governors shamed cheek we could not check.—D. S.

## The Inquirer.

### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

919. The best method of learning the French language is to begin with a determination to accomplish your wish. Buy any grammar (I prefer De Fivas's) and a New Testament in French, which you can get for a shilling at The British and Foreign Bible Society. Open at the Gospel of John, and lay an English New Testament before you. Having read that portion of the grammar which relates to articles, read with the help of the English version verse by verse, or from point to point is perhaps better. Jot down with your pencil as you go along every article met, and compare what the grammar says with what you see before you. Proceed in the same way with the nouns, observing the formation of the plural and the changes employed to indicate gender. Adjectives follow almost the same rules. The pronouns you have fully exhibited in the grammar, and you have only to watch their use—especially their place before or after the verb. Set, however, the chief stress on the verb. Study its changes, and acquire familiarity with their meaning. The indeclinable words can give little trouble. You can thereafter get Meadows's dictionary, 5s., or even J. E. Wesley's (Routledge) pocket dictionary, 2s., and having read in this way the Gospel of John, you should be prepared, having learned the rules of syntax meanwhile, to read a simple French book. Choose one of Lamartine's sketches, of Guttenberg, Columbus, &c. (Hachette, London, 1s.), and you will find that in six months you can read well. If you want to write, retranslate from your English version into French. This is a short and easy

way to master the French; I know, having tried.—W. J. T.

921. They can be had at the headquarters of the Social Science Association, 1, Adam Street, Adelphi, London.—S. N.

927. If Giles's translations are to be used in self-education they must be used cautiously. This may be done thus:—Open the classic to be studied, and read a sentence. Read thereafter the version in Giles, marking the position and force of each term. Close Giles, and resume perusal of the same sentence, translating according to pattern from memory. Having done so, translate in as many different ways as you can, noticing in each that you keep the proper order of cases, and the relations of nouns and verbs. Having fixed upon that which gives the plainest sense in the fairest English, write it down in a scroll-book, and proceed with the next sentence in the same way. Having gone on a week in this way, in every instance of difficulty referring to the grammar in regard to irregular nouns, and concerning matters of syntactic irregularity, retranslate the English into the Latin or Greek of the author's text again. If this is done cautiously and carefully, the translations may be helpful; but they may very easily be so used as to impair the mind, and defeat the object of study. I prefer Locke's "Interlinear Classics," issued by Walton, to Giles; but there is no help to translation so good as an earnest endeavour to work out the idea of a sentence from the verb which is the root to all the branches and ramifications of which it consists. Every grain of labour thus spent becomes worth more than its weight in gold.—W. J. T.

928. The following quotations

convey a little further information about the Westminster scandal than the extract previously inserted on the same topic:—

"Readers of the *Contemporary Review* are acquainted with the sound sense and vigorous writing of the Rev. John Hunt, one of the ablest of the Liberal clergy in the Church of England. A characteristic specimen appears in the May number on 'The Bishops and the Revision of the Bible.' It gives a lively picture of a scene which has not generally been well reported:—

"On the 14th of February, this year, the Convocation reassembled after the Christmas recess. The Bishop of London took the chair, uttering ominous words of sorrow that the Primate was absent, and betraying the consciousness of a gathering storm. There were dark clouds in the horizon, and indications of the special presence of some of nature's unseen but subtle powers. The Bishop of Winchester then rose and said that he never meant to include Unitarians in the company of revisers, though his own hand drew up the resolution that scholars should be invited "to whatever nation or religious body they may belong." He was surprised that Mr. Vance Smith had been invited, and he shared in the indignation which had arisen about the communion in the Abbey. He had letters from American bishops who agreed with him, and he believed that the orthodox Nonconformists were equally opposed to the admission of a Unitarian to aid in the work. He therefore proposed a resolution, "That, in the judgment of this house, it is not expedient that any person who denies the Godhead of our Lord Jesus Christ should be invited to assist in the revision of the Scriptures; and that it is the judgment, further, of this house, that any such one now

in either company should cease to act forthwith."

"This resolution was seconded by the Bishop of London as the only atonement he could make for having himself advocated that the committee should be on a broad and liberal basis. It never occurred to him that members of "the Socinian body" could be invited. The Bishop of Llandaff rose to explain that it was by his vote that Mr. Vance Smith was among the revisionists. There were five votes for him and four against, the bishop voting with the majority. He was surprised to learn that the gentleman for whom he had voted was a Unitarian; but the bishop was deaf, and did not know for whom he was voting. There is a story of Dr. Blacklock, the blind Scotch poet and preacher, that he once preached in a kirk in the south of Scotland to the great delight of all who heard him. There was at the time a great prejudice in Scotland against reading sermons. An elder remarked to an old woman coming out of the church that they had heard a fine sermon. "Yes," said the woman, "but does he read?" "No, no," said the elder, "he canna read; he's blind." "Thank God!" exclaimed the old woman; "I wish they were a' blind." The Bishop of Gloucester said that this resolution was intended to include Jews, but not Unitarians, who were divided from us by a gulf of difference which is "everlasting." Some coruscations of light came from the Bishop of Ely; but to be followed only by the blackness of darkness. He could not see how Jews were to be included and Unitarians excluded. Jews, he said, were Unitarians, and denied not merely the divinity of Christ, but also His Messiahship, and some even His historical existence. Dr. Harold Browne had voted for Mr. Vance Smith. But

since the communion at the Abbey he had passed a perpetual Lent. The penitent bishop spoke frequently at all the sittings of Convocation, rivalling Augustine in his retractions, and Luther in sorrow for his sin. "I regret," "I am sorry," "I retract," again and again repeated the bishop—

"In his fine confessions,  
Which make most people envy his  
transgressions."

"The Bishop of Lincoln rejoiced that this calamity had overtaken the Revisionists. Had they taken his advice, they would have limited their company to members of the Anglo-Episcopal communities. This, he said, was done in the time of King James, when Bishop Andrewes was Dean of Westminster. That orthodox and truly Anglican Dean did not employ Jews, infidels, Turks, heretics, and other Dissenters to revise the Scriptures. He confined the work to members of the Anglican communion. An ingenious person once proposed instituting a missionary society for the conversion of bishops. It was never, we believe, established; but a society for instructing the bishops in the history of the Church of England seems to be a necessity. . . . Three bishops opposed the Bishop of Winchester's resolution. The Bishop of St. David's did not ask whether the revisionists were "Unitarians, Deists, or Atheists." The only thing to which he looked was efficient scholarship. He could not see that the Westminster communion had anything to do with the question before them. The Bishop of Exeter pleaded that the Convocation must keep faith with those who had been invited from other religious bodies; and the Bishop of Bath and Wells was "thankful for the blessed opportunity of communion with our Nonconformist brethren."

"The Lower House of Convocation showed more wisdom:—

"It declined to vote the previous question, but it passed a resolution to the effect that no opinion be expressed on the resolution of the bishops until the work of revision be finished. This was gladly accepted by the Upper House as a welcome escape from the toils in which they were involved by the Bishop of Winchester's resolution. The Bishop of St. David's then withdrew his resignation, and Mr. Vance Smith continues among the revisionists. The schemes of the Bishop of Winchester and his friends have been defeated. Their hands have not been able to perform their enterprise, and they have groped in the noonday to gain the night.—L. U. C.

929. *Bouts rimés*, literally, *rhymed endings*, is an amusement sometimes practised in intellectual parties, and consists in giving a series of rhyme-words which are to occupy the close of the lines in their order, and then each person is expected to compose verses with these rhyme endings. The result is often curious, as exhibiting the strange diversity of associated ideas which spring up in different minds from the same suggestions. A considerable number of exercises in *bouts rimés* have been given during last year and this in *Kind Words*, a magazine for boys and girls.—F. D.

933. "Samuel" is right in his inference; *Beaconsfield*, which now gives title to the accomplished lady who is the wife of the leader of her Majesty's Opposition at present, the Hon. B. Disraeli, was the residence of Hon. Edmund Burke, the eminent orator, who died there 9th July, 1797.—E. L. B.

940. See "The Culture of Being"—its aim, its method, and its means, *British Controversialist*, Jan., 1868, pp. 52—57.—G. X.

## The Societies' Section.

### WATT INSTITUTION AND SCHOOL OF ARTS, EDINBURGH.

RECENTLY Mr. David Pryde delivered a lecture (which was the concluding one of a course) at the School of Arts, in the Lecture Hall, on "The Proper Method of Consulting Books." The Rev. Dr. Gray occupied the chair, and there was a very large attendance of the students of the institution and their friends. In the course of his lecture Mr. Pryde said those objects which a student should aim at in his reading were, first, simply to give all the ideas of an author just as he gave them; in the second place, subtract or discard those ideas of the author which he considered not to be necessary; and, thirdly, he should add to the author's ideas those which he may have only roughly sketched. For want of better names he would call the first function accurate representation; the second, generalizing representation; and the third, creative representation; and he would endeavour to show them how important it was to cultivate these functions. The neglect of them, indeed, was the cause of almost all the mistakes of critics, commentators, and lecturers. By neglecting the first they twisted the sense of an author, by neglecting the second they became prolix and intolerable, and by neglecting the third they became dry and lifeless. The lecturer then proceeded to consider the means of cultivating these functions. The true student recognised the great truth that the business of the memory was not only to remember, but sometimes to forget; that in order to remember one fact that was important it was

necessary to forget many that were unimportant. Accordingly, the true student never aimed at universal knowledge, and while he carefully mastered all the important parts of a book, he would content himself with a mere general outline of any work which did not suit his capacity. Every student, whether young or old, should cultivate the way of consulting books properly. He would advise them that, in the course of their reading, if they came across any remarkable passage which deserved further attention, to write it down. Many would say this was not necessary if they got it thoroughly by heart, but he would add that, in order to remember the ideas of an author, the student would have to get them before his mind with perfect clearness. In order to do so he would require to express them with the greatest accuracy, and he could not gain accuracy of expression unless he wrote down the ideas. The lecture hall was crowded upon the occasion with ladies and gentlemen. On the conclusion of Mr. Pryde's address, the rev. chairman remarked that in all the classes the session had been most successful. It was quite evident that the school was not losing, notwithstanding the rivalry of educational institutions in Edinburgh, but was rather gaining and advancing in popular favour. They were that night without any positive warning as to when they would have to quit their present quarters; and it was to be hoped that their summer session would be continued in the old place. When



they had to remove they would not, he was pleased to think, be going far away. The Town Council had been very fair, and even favourable, in their dealings, and had shown a decided inclination to afford all the accommodation in their power. Mr. J. Clapperton proposed a vote of thanks to Mr. Pryde, which was seconded by Mr. Thomas Knox, and very heartily responded to by the audience.

The various prizes awarded in chemistry, natural philosophy, mathematics, English, French, German, and botany, were afterwards delivered to the young ladies and gentlemen who had been successful in the recent competitions. Votes of thanks to the lecturers and teachers, and to the Rev. Dr. Gray, brought the proceedings to a close.

—  
**QUARTERLY DEBATES.**—A considerable time ago I sent you an account of our M.S. Journal, and I would again crave your kind permission for the purpose of placing before other literary societies an example from what has been done by us here at Hawick. There are two societies in Hawick, the "Hawick" and "Excelsior" Mutual Improvement Societies; the two have always been very friendly, but some people would imagine we were antagonistic, or in other words were in opposi-

tion to each other; now we could never bring our minds to consent that this state of things should continue, and it fortunately occurred to one of the members of the later society at a half-yearly meeting, when two members of the former society were present as a deputation, to propose "that the two societies should hold quarterly debates." Some thought the very idea of such a thing was preposterous, and remarked that debates *between* them would be productive of ill-feeling, or have a tendency to bring about acrimony; but he demolished this argument by making it impossible for the two societies to be ranged against one another, by suggesting that two persons be taken from each society to open the debate, one to take the affirmative and the other the negative. By this arrangement a member from the "*Excelsior*" seconds one from the "*Hawick*," and *vice versa*. The results have been beyond our most sanguine expectations. Apart from the animation which generally attends large meetings, better papers have been read at them, and more logical speeches made, than at the ordinary meetings of either society, and I would strenuously recommend other societies, when there are more than one in the same town, to follow the example of the Hawick societies.—**TERIBUS.**

---

## Literary Notes.

---

**CESARE BECCARIA (1738—1794)** has had a monument erected to his honour in Milan, and Professor P. S. Mancini has offered a prize of 500 lire for the best essay in favour of the abolition of capital punishment.

A controversy is raging between Harlem and Maastricht as to which was really the birthplace of the art of printing.

"The Life of the Good St. Louis" is occupying Mrs. Bray, though over fourscore years of age.

Those who take an interest in the recently issued Memoir of Charles Mayne Young may like to know that Mr. Percy Fitzgerald has in the press "The Kembles," of whom Mrs. Siddons was one.

Sir George Stephen has issued "The Life of Christ."

John Keble is being fully honoured,—a third edition of Sir J. T. Coleridge's "Memoir" is out; his works are published in a complete edition of four volumes; a Concordance to "The Christian Year" has been prepared; and C. M. Yonge, together with a few gleanings of recollections, has issued *Musings on "The Christian Year" and the "Lyra Innocentium."*

The family and historical papers of the Earl of Shaftesbury have been put at the disposal of the nation.

A Life of Mark Lemon is in preparation.

The Cobden Club project an annual issue of a volume of "Essays on Political Subjects."

Rev. J. R. T. Eason, educated at Lincoln College, passed first class, Michaelmas, 1845, fellow and tutor of Merton, Oxford, has been elected Bampton Lecturer for 1872.

The Rev. Thomas T. Lynch, author of "Memorials of Theophilus Trinal," "Lectures on Self-Improvement," "Forms of Literature, &c.," and "The Rivulet"—a book of religious poetry which originated "The Rivulet" controversy about eighteen years ago,—died May 10th.

Sir John Herschel, whose name is a fame, died 11th May.

"Girls' Books," by Mrs. Craik (author of John Halifax, Gentleman), are to form a series of juvenile reading.

Lord Dalting (Sir H. Bulwer) will have the second volume of the "Biography and Letters of Lord Palmerston" ready in September.

Professor Jowett is about to add

to his "Translations of Plato" a critical estimate and an investigation into the authenticity, genuineness, and order of the Dialogues.

Rev. T. Griffiths, M.A., Prebendary of St. Paul's, has in the press, "Fundamentals; or, Bases of Belief concerning Man and God," in which, from facts that may not be doubted, he will reason on to the highest Christian faith and hope.

An exposition of "The Principles of Psychology" upon the theory of Bencke, issued in Germany, by J. G. Dressler, has just been translated into English by J. D. Morell.

It is said that J. A. Froude is about to deprecise himself from the priest's orders he took in 1847, and that he intends to resign his editorial chair.

Mr. Halliwell has discovered proof that my Lord of Leicester's Jestling Will, the player, was not Shakspeare, but his fellow, William Kempe.

"The Home of Shakspeare," by S. Neil, has been received with great favour by the critics.

Positivist literature is acquiring publicity: we are to have Comte's "Positive Politics" translated by Dr. J. H. Bridges, F. Harrison, Professor Bessley, Dr. Congreve, and H. D. Hutton, in four volumes.

The issue of the first volume of "The New Bible Commentary"—*The Pentateuch*,—under the superintendence of the Speaker of the House of Commons and the Archbishop of York, is announced.

A Memoir of R. D. Hampden, Bishop of Hereford, by his daughter Henrietta Hampden, is promised.

A member of the Lockhart family is engaged on "A Supplement to the Biography of Sir W. Scott."

"Curiosities of Street Literature," fac-similes of the Seven Dials press productions, has been issued.

# I N D E X.

	PAGE
<b>LEADING ARTICLES.</b>	
<b>MODERN METAPHYSICIANS :—</b>	
William H. Gillespie.....	81, 241, 401
<b>THE PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICS :—</b>	
Representative Government.....	1
Appendix.....	173—175
The Electoral Suffrage.....	161
Votes, Voters, and Voting.....	394
<b>PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE</b>	<b>321</b>
<b>IN MEMORIAM MDCCCLXX ....</b>	<b>140</b>
<b>DEBATES.</b>	
<b>EDUCATION :—</b>	
Should the Bible be read in Schools without Comment or Explanation?	
Affirmative Articles 42, 133, 189, 305,	447
Negative Articles 38, 138, 192, 278, 450	
<b>HISTORY :—</b>	
Were the Crusades Beneficial to Social Progress?	
Affirmative Articles.....	126, 289
Negative Articles.....	129, 295
<b>POLITICS :—</b>	
Ought War Organization to get the Chief Attention in our Parliament?	
Affirmative Articles..	117, 196, 301, 282
Negative Articles.....	121, 303, 306, 285
A Professional or a Popular Army— which shall we have?	
Professional.....	353, 359
Popular.....	356, 362, 443
<b>RELIGION :—</b>	
Is there Sufficient Evidence in the Scriptures to warrant Belief in the Godhead of Jesus Christ?	
Affirmative Articles 17, 98, 108, 176, 260, 344, 424, 430	
Negative Articles 23, 105, 112, 180, 341, 349, 427, 440	
Ought the Authorized Version of the Holy Scriptures to be Revised by a Royal Commission?	
Affirmative Articles.....	29, 163, 264
Negative Articles.....	35, 187, 273

	PAGE
<b>SCIENCE :—</b>	
Is Man developed from the Savage State?	
Affirmative Article .....	454
Negative Articles .....	368, 456
<b>THE TOPIC :—</b>	
Ought Military Drill to be incorporated with Elementary Education?	
Affirmative.....	237
Negative.....	238
Ought the Ballot Bill to become Law?	
Affirmative.....	316
Negative.....	316
Has the Conference about the Black Sea been conducted and closed with Due Regard to British Honour and Interests?	
Affirmative.....	464
Negative.....	466
<b>THE ESSAYIST :—</b>	
Berkeley's Theory of Vision.....	45
Excelsior .....	299
H. Newman, The Poetry of .....	213, 373
In Memoriam 1870 .....	140
Mental Philosophy and Criticism. ..	461
<b>TOILING UPWARD :—</b>	
John Alfred Langford, LL.D., &c., in four parts .....	54, 231, 303, 383
<b>OUR COLLEGIATE COURSE :—</b>	
"A Lover's Complaint," by William Shakspeare :—	
Introduction .....	63, 66
Text .....	66, 231, 233
Notes .....	66, 231, 233
<b>THE REVIEWER :—</b>	
Cooper's, J. A., Counsels to Sunday School Teachers .....	463
Dunan's, LL.D., Rev John, Colloquia Peripatetica .....	234
Glasgow University, Introductory Addresses at.....	152
Gray's, J. C. Sunday School World .....	236
Gray's, W. R., Literary and Social Judgments.....	363
Neaves', Lord Comparative Philology .....	313
"Non Credo" .....	463
Smith's, Rev. I. G., Faith and Philosophy .....	68
Spare Moments .....	156

	PAGE		PAGE
<b>POETRY:—</b>		<b>SUBJECTS SUITABLE FOR DEBATE..</b>	<b>159</b>
A Hermitage.....	375	<b>THE INQUIRER:—</b>	<b>Q. A.</b>
A Voice from Afar .....	374	Beacon-field .....	156 471
Bereavement, Consolations in .....	373	Bow's Rims .....	79 471
For the Dead .....	379	Bunyan .....	78 79
Hopful, Song of the .....	224	Caryll's Job .....	78
Liberalism .....	214	Cramp, J. M., D.D. ....	156
Memory .....	215, 216	Crown Lands .....	156
Peasant Labourer, The Song of the .....	223	Dr. B——y .....	78
Sacrilege .....	214	French .....	78 469
Shakspeare, The Memory of .....	308	Gavekind .....	156 157
Shelley .....	310	George Offor .....	78 79
St. Paul .....	220	Giles's Translations .....	79 469
The Brand of Cain .....	216	Greece, Society in .....	156
The Golden Prison .....	380	Greek Poets .....	79 157, 239
The Scars of Sin .....	216	Hobbes and the Press .....	156 156
The Secret .....	226	Music .....	78 79
The Trance of Time .....	216	Silk Gown Barristers .....	78
The Two Worlds .....	382	Tanistry .....	79 157
The Wants of the Age .....	227	Vicar of Hell, Henry VIII.'s .....	79
To Death .....	225	Westminster Scandal .....	79 316, 469
<b>THE SOCIETIES' SECTION:—</b>		<b>LACONICS:—</b>	
Birmingham Mutual Improvement .....	399	Arguments .....	453
Borgia .....	239	Bible .....	116
Castle Cary Young Men's Society ..	77	Books and Reading .....	3-1
Clapham Sect. Glimpse of .....	75	Carlyle .....	212
Course of Reading and Study .....	239	Controversy .....	212
Duty—an Address .....	72	Dates .....	340
Edinburgh Watt Institute .....	472	Great Men .....	220
George Dawson .....	238	Life-Wealth .....	367
Glasgow Philosophical Society .....	397	Proteus .....	16
Glasgow University Dialectic Society ..	77	Psalm xxiii. ....	53
Italian Philosophy .....	328	Public Opinion .....	333
Land Grants .....	238	Shakspeare .....	116
Milton and the Free Press .....	156	Sorrow and Duty .....	464
Mutual Improvement Societies,		Tombstone Wit .....	352
Origin of .....	156	Virtues v. Vices .....	277
Paul's Quotations .....	79		
Philosophy of History .....	156		
Posmini .....	328		
Septuagint .....	327		
Washington, George .....	326		
		<b>LITERARY NOTES.....</b>	<b>79, 159, 240, 320, 399,</b>
			<b>72</b>

THE  
BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST,  
AND  
LITERARY MAGAZINE.

---

"MAGNA EST VERITAS, ET PREVALEBIT."

---

• •

LONDON :  
HOULSTON AND SONS,  
65, PATERNOSTER ROW.

---

MDCCLXXI.

111

LONDON:  
PRINTED BY J. AND W. RIDGE,  
BARTHOLOMEW CLOSE.

## PREFACE.

JOHN MARSTON, the dramatist and satirist, under the name of William Kinsayder, dedicates his "Metamorphosis of Pygmalion's Image" (1698), to "the World's Mightie Monarch, Good Opinion." It was a sensible deference to that power of personal thoughtfulness which, under the influence of the Reformation, was stirring among men, and making "Opinion a more sovereign mistress of effects" than any previous ruler over the human intellect. To this same power, ripened and perfected as "public opinion," we venture to present this volume, in the hope of approval. The aim of our labour has been to educate, by the actual exercise of discriminating reflectiveness, the faculties of right judgment and correct thinking. The means taken to effect this gymnastic of the critical reason, have been those which, with success and acceptance, have been employed in this serial in thirty-five successive volumes—the deliberate and impartial discussion of the main questions of interest which have been occupying the attention of men's minds, and the fair and full presentation of the best attainable arguments, for and against the reception of opinions claiming decision in their favour.

We are aware that many people, of earnest mind and ardent philanthropy, regard the dogmatic teaching of opinions preferable to placing them before the intellect for considerate and investigative thought, and look upon controversy as "a shifting wind unto a sail," which—

"Makes the course of thoughts to fetch about,  
Startles and frights consideration;  
Makes sound opinion sick and truth suspect,  
For putting on so new a fashioned robe;

While others are ready to exclaim, "a plague of opinion, a man may wear it on both sides like a leathern jerkin," we have no sympathy with those who hold opinion to be a light, alight, changeable, and fickle acceptance, or rather utterance, of registered ideas in stereotyped phrase. But as little have we any fear of the play of the contrary winds of doctrine upon the sails of good intent in the search for truth. Good seamanship cannot be properly tested unless there is presented to it the need and opportunity of judging and deciding on the strength of those winds which are requisite to drive a ship into harbour; nor can confidence in the results of any form of ratiocination be attained, unless due inquiry has been made about the might of reasoning possible on the other side. We believe that true, honest, and unbiassed controversy enables the student of thought to comprehend the exact correlation of the forces of argument, and to determine the balance of weight in favour of any given opinion so submitted to the test of intellectual and conscientious deliberation. Truth need not fear the keenest assay, or the sagest investigation,—indeed the more cultured the power of reasoning is, the more likely is the discovery of truth to result from its proper exercise. "The cause of truth universally, and, not least, of Religious Truth, is benefited by everything that tends to promote sound reasoning, and facilitates the detection of fallacy."

The experience of years makes us more and more convinced, that truths received on authority merely, or in consequence of the prevalence of fashion, custom, or routine, have little or no commanding power, either in the moral or the mental nature of man. But we know that when the clear decision of reason has been gained on the side of any opinion it becomes irresistible—it acquires active, causative, progressive power. History is one continual *élogé* of controversy.

In the present volume, the controversial papers exhibit great variety of power, expression, and thoughtfulness. The contributors are numerous, and their different points of view give variety to the contents, while they supply gleams of living light to search for truth by. We cannot be too grateful to those who have provided these intellectual contestations for their intelligence and their urbanity. They have shown that reasoned controversy is possible, and that reviling scurrility is no necessary concomitant of difference of thought. This department, we believe, will be voted satisfactory.

The Philosophical Papers in this volume, if they want the variety often observable in the writings of their author, are exceedingly informing, eminently clear, prompt and vigorous in their expository matter. They bear all the marks of thorough familiarity with the history of speculative thought and of biographical detail, which has gained their author his high place among modern popularizers of philosophy.

The *Reviewer* has fully sustained its credit as a sympathetic and intelligent guide to the meaning and purpose of the books of the day. The *Essayist*, suggestive and original, has reached even a higher average than usual. We greatly regret that the illness of contributors has made *Our Collegiate Course* a vacancy, and has prevented the continuance of *Greek Days* and *Roman Nights*. We believe we may confidently rely on these being fully brought up to the mark of usefulness and attractiveness which they have previously reached in our next volume. To *Toiling Upward* less space has been devoted in this issue, as we had given continuously in two preceding volumes large scope to this department. *The Societies' Section* has been somewhat improved, and its contents are worthy of preservation. In the *Inquirer* we have succeeded in getting all the queries replied to, and the answers afford much general information. Our *Literary Notes* retain much of their former character and availability.

The bringing together of the contents of these pages has entailed a large amount of labour, thought, correspondence, and literary toil, on many far-separated friends. Here, however, they are united in the good work of endeavouring to inform, elevate, refine, stimulate, and strengthen the moral and mental faculties of our readers. We hope that assiduous study will be yielded to them, and that in the after years the results may be known, felt, acknowledged, and appreciated: so may we expect our new years to bring grace and benison.



THE  
BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST.

Modern Metaphysicians.

ALEXANDER CAMPBELL FRASER, M.A., LL.D.,  
F.R.S.E., &c.

*Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh.*

Author of "The Life and Letters of George Berkeley, D.D.," and Editor of "The Philosophical Works and Miscellaneous Writings of Bishop Berkeley," &c.

TRUTH is priceless. A belief in the truth is precious, and a knowledge of the truth is noble and ennobling. Hence philosophy, the loving search for truth, has charms for many and interest for all; and "earnest sympathising meditations upon the actual efforts of men to discover the secret and purpose of their life and the ends for which they ought to live, contain equal encouragements to humility and to hope"—to humility in regard to the power of the human intellect, to hope on account of the successes already achieved. Ever as the circle of investigation widens our sense of the unknown enlarges, and yet ever as research is exerted the extent of the known is increased. So that it is really no paradox to say, "the more we know, the more we know we do not know." Hope induces us to strive and search, humility restrains dogmatism and self-regard. It is the summit of human wisdom, truly, to know the limits of our faculties; but in order that these may be rightly known, it is indispensable that their powers and energies should be exerted in every possible form, and direction. We have no right

1871.

to deny the narrow limits of our intellectual capacity, but we have still less right to affirm that impassable barriers surround the soul, unless we have made all thinkable endeavours to scale and to surmount them. Heroism, wisdom, and hope are alike on the side of earnest effort. The philosophy of negation is the science of despair. G. H. Lewes has said: "Every day the conviction gains strength that philosophy is condemned, by the very nature of its impulses, to wander for ever in one tortuous labyrinth, within whose circumscribed and winding spaces weary seekers are continually finding themselves in the trodden paths of predecessors, who, they know, could find no exit." . . . "Perilous as it must ever be to set absolute limits to the future of human capacity, there can be no peril in averring that philosophy never will achieve its aims, because these aims lie beyond all human scope. The difficulty is impossibility. No progress can be made, because no certainty is possible. To aspire to the knowledge of more than phenomena—their resemblances, coexistences, and successions—is to aspire to transcend the inexorable limits of human faculty. To *know* more we must *be* more." But, it is exactly that we may *be* more that we seek to *know* more—

"We live in deeds, not years; in thoughts, not breaths;  
In feelings, not in figures on a dial.  
We should count time by heart-throbs. He most lives  
Who thinks most, feels the noblest, acts the best."

The knowledge of knowledge for man is a knowledge of himself. Man is not explained to himself by expositions of his structural form and his material organization; he knows that he is an embodied consciousness having a thirst for the truth, strong and resistless as an instinct, and in the words "*I think*" he asserts and implies an entire metaphysic. Listen to some of our modern sages on this topic:—

"All the epoch forming revolutions of the Christian world, the revolutions of religion, and with them the civil, social, and domestic habits of the nations concerned, have coincided with the rise and fall of metaphysical systems.—*The Statesman's Manual: A Lay Sermon*. By S. T. Coleridge.

"Plato has profoundly defined man, 'the hunter of *truth*,' for in this chase as in others the pursuit is all in all, the success comparatively nothing. Did the Almighty," says Lessing, "holding in his right hand *truth* and in his left search after *truth*, deign to prefer the one I thought

prefer—in all humility, but without hesitation, I should request—*search after truth.* We exist only as we energeise; pleasure is the reflex of unimpeded energy: energy is the *mesa* by which our faculties are developed; and a higher energy the *end* which their development proposes. In action is thus contained the existence, happiness, improvement, and perfection of our being; and knowledge is only precious as it may afford a stimulus to the exercise of our powers, and the condition of their more complete activity. Speculative truth is, therefore, subordinate to, speculation itself; and its value is directly measured by the quantity of energy which it occasions—immediately in its discovery—mediately through its consequences. Life to Endymion was not preferable to death. . . . It is as the *best gymnastic of the mind*—as a mean, principally, and almost exclusively conducive to the highest education of our *mobile powers*, that we should vindicate to these speculations the necessity, which has been too frequently denied them. By no other intellectual application (and least of all by physical pursuits) is the soul thus reflected on itself, and its faculties concentrated in such independent, vigorous, unwonted, and continued energy; by none, therefore, are its best capacities so variously and intensely evolved. ‘Where there is most life, there is the victory.’ Let it not be believed that the mighty minds who have cultivated these studies have toiled in vain. If they have not always realized truth they have always determined exertion.”—“Discussions in Philosophy,” *Philosophy of Perception*, by SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, pp. 39-40.

“The philosophic reader will not inquire first concerning the number of true propositions contained in a speculative work; he will look to the amount of reflective power, which the study of it discovers or tends to generate. Indeed, a contribution to society of fresh and better disciplined intellectual action, rather than the disclosure of, hitherto, unknown truth, has been, and perhaps must continue to be, the chief service rendered by this department of literature. The thoughtful reader of this class of books does not, it may well be, review the list of new doctrines which his reading has communicated to him, until he has reckoned up some of the changes in his mental experience, which it has promoted. He will look within to find the intellectual movement, which the writing has favoured, as well as without, to learn the propositions it has denied or demonstrated; when he wants to know its character, he will ask, not only what satisfaction, but also what dissatisfaction it has occasioned in his mind—what fresh longing to go beneath the surface of words and common opinions has been awakened—what ideal associations have been kindled—what new conviction of an end in life has been formed, and what old one deepened. Nourishment of this sort is what the truly philosophical taste craves for, and what the best guides in philosophy have sought to supply.—*North*

*British Review*, Feb. 1853, Art. "Scottish Philosophy," by Prof. A. C. Fraser, pp. 369-70.

"The evidence of history and the evidence of human nature combine, by a most striking instance of consilience, to show that there is really one element which is predominant, and almost paramount, among the agents of social progression. This is the state of the speculative faculties of mankind, including the nature of the speculative beliefs which by any means they have arrived at concerning themselves and the world by which they are surrounded. It would be a great error, and one very little likely to be committed, to assert that speculation, intellectual activity, pursuit of truth, is among the more powerful propensities of human nature; or fills a large place in the lives of any, save decidedly exceptional individuals. But notwithstanding the relative weakness of this principle, among other sociological agents, its influence is the main determining cause of our social progress. . . . The weakness of the speculative propensity has not prevented the progress of speculation from governing that of society."—*Logic*. By John Stuart Mill, vol. ii., p. 607.

"The problem of metaphysics is in truth the problem of the ages. It has come down to us from the earliest time. History alone bespeaks our attention to it. But, even apart from this, we carry in our intelligence the instinct which leads us to grapple with it—in our hearts the need which impels us to seek its solution. . . . The truth is that metaphysical conclusions and beliefs interpenetrate the whole body of our ordinary knowledge—of our intellectual, moral, and religious convictions. We are metaphysicians, whether we know it or not. We are daily and hourly influenced by metaphysical ideas. . . . Metaphysics will thus be found to be of all the departments of human inquiry the most widely, nay the most intensely influential."—*Speculative Philosophy*. By John Veitch, M.A., Professor of Logic and Rhetoric, Glasgow, pp. 13-17.

"Perhaps the world of sense, and our life in it, has lost some of its original freshness to the less exercised and more burdened minds of these later generations. We are compensated, however, in the many new points for contemplating this scene in which we find ourselves which past speculations provide. These invite us to look at things with the eyes of departed thinkers and to realize the different conceptions by which they tried to make this strange world more intelligible to themselves. In this way our intellectual sympathies are expanded, our experience is made broader and richer; and, if we learn less about mere nature, we know more about man and God. We have in this, moreover, a moral exercise on candour and charity, by means of which, as the ages roll on, men are learning to appreciate freedom, with its attendant discord of opinion, as the best means for gradually discovering truth in the partial and fragmentary

way that truth is disclosed to finite minds. We are apt to take for granted that problems can be solved only at our own point of view, that they admit of being stated only in one fashion, and that, however our conclusions may be disputed, our premises must not be meddled with. The great magazine of thoughts about things—many of them different in appearance at least from our own thoughts about them—which we find in the history of metaphysical opinion, is by far the most effectual instrument for breaking up these individual incrustations.”—*The Real World of Berkeley*. By Professor A. C. Fraser, “Macmillan’s Magazine,” July 1862, p. 192.

The author of the immediately preceding extract has been a diligent and sympathetic student of philosophic thought on that generous comprehensive principle, and with that love of truth and candour, on which alone the thoughts of other men can be properly understood—that we try to view them from the point which their promulgators occupied; that we seek for the inner vital force which they comprehended; and that we examine most closely their essence rather than their accidents. He has been an investigator of “the mind’s anatomy implied not chosen.” He has loved most him who exhibited—like a Greek sculpture—

“Truth bold and pure in her own nakedness.”

He has under peculiarly adverse philosophical conditions attained and maintained a high position. He has, not unworthily, filled the chair left vacant by the most learned of recent philosophers; and he has, in an instructive, excellent, and indeed fascinating manner, told the story of the life and edited the works of the Plato of Ireland, Bishop Berkeley. It is known that he has engaged in the scientific reconsideration of the formal logic of the schools, and though he has not rivalled the fame of his predecessor in bold originality of metaphysical suggestiveness, he has been a faithful, hard-working, exemplary teacher of patient research and sympathetic study, while he displays great skill in putting into succinct and manageable shape his expositions of the highest thinkers.

Alexander Campbell Fraser was born at Ardchattan, 3rd Sept., 1819. His father, Rev. Hugh Fraser, was minister of the united parish of Ardchattan and Muckairn for nearly thirty years. His mother, Maria Helen Campbell, was the youngest sister of the late Sir Duncan Campbell, Bart., of Barcaldine and Glenure, in the same district of Lorn, where among the prevailing families of

Campbells his was one of the oldest. Ardochattan stretches along the margin of Loch Ective, perhaps the most magnificent of all those arms of the sea which interlace themselves with the western coasts of Argyleshire. "The banks of Loch Ective are richly wooded, assume many fine forms, and embay an almost matchless expanse of the picturesque. . . . Birch-clad and heathery mountains, seen from foot to crest, throw their huge shadows into the waters, and while they deepen its gloom yet heighten its grandeur." About two miles from the Connel ferry, upon a jutting promontory, stands the square castle of Dunstaffnage, the old seat of the Dalriad kings; and at a little distance from Bunawe, Ben Cruachan rises to a height of 3,670 feet. The island of Usnath breaks the uniformity of this sheet of sea. Within the parish are the ruins of the priory of Ardochattan, and tradition places in Ardochattan the site of the ancient capital of Pictish Scotland—*Berigonium*, a city fabled to have perished by fire from heaven. Druidical remains abound in the neighbourhood, and steamships bring every summer thousands of tourists to see its stretches of unimaginable picturesqueness. Amid such scenery, under such parentage, a member of a large family, and among a Gaelic-speaking population, the boy grew in strength and activity of mind and body. Like Isaac Taylor he was home-taught: "his eye, imagination, and reason were in his own keeping." The public school of the parish was found unsuitable for the supply of such education as was desired by the inhabitants of the manse, and the Frasers were placed under the tutelage of some of the promising students of the university, who year after year find the means of attending their classes by engaging in tuition during the summer months among the resident gentry of the Highlands. In the busy, genial home-life of western Argyleshire Fraser passed a happy and gladsome boyhood, gaining acquaintance with the main branches of knowledge under the instructions of an excellent and worthy tutor, for whom he yet entertains a warm affection and regard. He is now Rev. Thomas McCrindle, M.A., minister of the free church of Yarrow and Megget—a pastoral parish on the border of that beautiful inland sheet of water to which Wordsworth refers when he says :—

"The swan on sweet St. Mary's lake,  
Floats double swan and shadow."

Here not unfrequently has the Edinburgh professor during the summers of several years meditated how—

“Rightly his complex knowledge to employ  
And from their shadows trace substantial things,  
Things back again to shadows—thus evolving  
The principle of thought, from root to air.”

The ability alike of tutor and pupil was tested and attested by the fact that in session 1834-5 the latter attended fittingly and with advantage—though fresh from his Highland manse-home—the Latin classes in the University of Glasgow of the most notable of the professors of humanity of that day in the northern kingdom—William Ramsay, author of “Latin Prosody,” “Roman Antiquities,” &c., and editor of Cicero’s “Pro Cluentio,” “Extracts from Tibullus and Ovid,” &c.—as well as the Greek class of Sir D. K. Sandford, D.C.L., the patient, painstaking, and enthusiastic teacher and trainer who had been at once M.P. and professor. After a good and anxious endeavour to brace himself up for a higher effort, A. C. Fraser, next year, enrolled himself as an alumnus of the metropolitan university.

Here it was that A. C. Fraser really began his intellectual life:—

“Off one of the main streets in the Old Town of Edinburgh, at a spot where you would not be apt to look for it, lies the large block of building occupied by Edinburgh University. It is a modern structure in the Græco-Italian style, erected at very great cost between 1789 and 1834, in lieu of the older edifices which had served for the university from its foundation by James VI. in 1582. Entering from the street by a portico with Doric columns you find yourself in a spacious, cold, grey quadrangle fringed round with a raised and balustraded stone walk, whence, at various points, doors and flights of steps give access to the library, the museums, and the class-rooms of the four faculties of theology, law, medicine, and the arts. Into this quadrangle flock at the beginning of every November the students, to the number in late years of from 1,200 to 1,500 in all, who are then to commence, in one or other of the faculties, their annual five months of attendance on the classes. For the Scottish universities differ from the English in this, that whereas the English have three terms of study in the year, extending from October to June, the Scottish crush the entire work (save that there are certain special summer-courses) into the five winter months between the beginning of November and the beginning of April. For a stranger-student, after a walk in a dull November morning through a city all otherwise strange, to arrive for the first time in this quadrangle, with its

columns, with its balustraded stone walk, and its doors leading he knows not whither, is perhaps a unique experience of inquisitiveness struggling with loneliness."

Here Fraser studied under the veterans in humanity and Greek, James Pillans—a fine driller in classics—and George Dunbar—a diligent and persevering scholar, who had plodded up from being a gardener's apprentice to being the leading Greek professor in North Britain, and had been by this time thirty-two years occupant of that chair which he filled for fully fifty-four years altogether. His next session was passed under William Wallace, LL.D., a talented and earnest mathematician who had served an apprenticeship as a bookbinder, and had so risen as to be deemed worthy to succeed Sir John Leslie as professor of mathematics—and Dr. David Ritchie who with that session closed "a career by no means brilliant" by resigning the professorship of logic and metaphysics to which Sir Wm. Hamilton succeeded in the first place, and which A. C. Fraser, after an interval of twenty years, was called upon to fill. In both of these classes he took prizes.

The resignation of Ritchie gave occasion to a very keen and close contest, the result of which was differently viewed at the time by different parties, but the result of which has been regarded by most as at once right and advantageous. The principal candidates for the vacant chair were Isaac Taylor, George Combe, Patrick Campbell MacDougall, and Sir Wm. Hamilton. Isaac Taylor has achieved a fame wider and more varied than any of his competitors, though not so marked as that of the successful candidate; George Combe has an authoritative voice in physiology in its practical applications, in phrenology as an interpreter of moral philosophy, and on political economy in its social relations; P. C. MacDougall was a clever, accomplished, and able man of talent, but was quite unworthy of comparison with these opponents, who had all, in greater or less degree, genius. Hamilton possessed a European reputation, Isaac Taylor was well known in religious circles, Combe was somewhat under the ban of the sects, and MacDougall had a considerable local influence. "It soon became obvious that the final victory must be either with Sir William or Mr. Taylor." After a period of almost unequalled intrigue, in which almost every possible form of indirect influence was brought to assist the direct evidence produced in the contest, the election took place on 15th



July, 1836; as the result of the voting Hamilton was selected by the city councillors by a majority of four—the numbers being Hamilton eighteen, Taylor fourteen. Here is a passage from Professor Fraser on this topic:—

“In 1836 the chair of Logic and Metaphysic, in the University of Edinburgh, became vacant, and the author of the ‘Natural History of Enthusiasm’ was induced to drop the vizor which had so long concealed him from a curious public—as a candidate for this department of the public service of philosophy. Sir William Hamilton, the greatest living master of the philosophical literature of the world, the acutest reasoner about the ‘dozen abstract phrases’ [in the adjustment of which Isaac Taylor thought metaphysics consisted], who had been in this age drawn to a recognition of their import and significance, was met by a rival whose acquaintance with that literature was comparatively scanty, who put small value on the ‘dozen abstract phrases,’ whose studies of human nature were all directed to its actions and transactions in its embodied manifestations, who esteemed Bacon more than Aristotle; but who could not touch any subject without shedding on it the distinctly marked colours of his own capacious imagination, or investing it with the rich glow of humanity. Hamilton ascended the Edinburgh chair to expound and guide the now dominant philosophical movement of Europe. His English rival returned from ‘the grey metropolis’ to the employment more congenial to him—amidst the simple country life in which he guided the education of his own children—of watching the phenomena in the ecclesiastical heavens, or anticipating in thought his own future spiritual embodiment in a purer and more exalted heaven.”—“Macmillan’s Magazine.” *The Literary Life of Isaac Taylor*. Oct. 1865, p. 543.

Having gained the professorship so suited to his genius, Hamilton delightfully began that series of expositions of the metaphysics of perception, that lucid and learned restatement and vindication of the philosophy of common sense, that keen analytic of formal logic, and those splendid, far-reaching excursions into the domains of speculative thought which have fixed his fame as one of the great philosophic impulses of modern philosophy.

Fraser in session 1836-7 joined, as he was required by the curriculum drawn out by the Church for the guidance of students aspiring to serve the ministry, to do, the class of moral philosophy taught by Professor John Wilson, of the University of Edinburgh, and the Christopher North of literature; but, stirred by the

reawakening of philosophy and stimulated by the tone of new inquiry heard all around now where all had hitherto been so mildly tranquil and so calmly though decorously dull, he became a voluntary student in logic and metaphysics and became partaker of the fresh life which Hamilton poured into the more aspiring of the young spirits of his time.

To come under the influence of that massive man with the bold clear hazel eyes, the somewhat dark yet sanguine complexion, the powerful though not tall frame, upon which was set a head of fine proportions, over the full, square, perfectly developed forehead of which dark brown locks clustered, was of itself an education. The concentrated energy of his thought drew together and dented his large arched brow; the deep, fixed, sleepless piercingness of his intelligence was felt through his steady and flashing eye; the firm precision of his style was suggested in the decisive curls of his lips; the combined grace and strength of his nature were indicated by a nose almost aquiline, but that it broadened at the base; withal the whole features were flexible in expressiveness, while they gave a settled look of power. Add to these outward lineaments the courteous dignity, the fascinating simplicity, the enthusiastic earnestness, and the noble inspiration of a thinker devoted at once to his students and his subject—think of such a form alive with thought and love pouring out of a full spirit what seemed to be but the overflow from the mighty reservoir of his exhaustless resources, and you may faintly adumbrate the Aristotle of modern Athens in his prime. Alas! the resolute work of his ardent mind soon led to a change; the eye dulled, the hair grizzled, the features hardened, the full bust stooped; paralysis struck power from the stately step; and slightly affected the clear, full, deep-toned speech! “It may hardly be known,” says Professor Masson, “to those who never saw Hamilton, and whose knowledge of him is only by inference from his writings, what an impression of general massiveness and manliness of character was given by his very look, and what an equipment of passionate nature went to constitute the energy of his purely speculative reason. Calm as was his philosophic demeanour, clear and unclouded as he kept the sphere of abstract investigation or contemplation around him to the farthest range to which his reason could sweep, there was no man who carried in him a greater fund of rage or more of the spirit of a wrestler”—a wrestler in free argumentative discussion against man’s habit of easy,

uninquiring, implicit acquiescence in commonly accepted thoughts and received opinions.

If Hamilton typified the soul-power in the university, Wilson embodied the might of the emotions. Admiring friendship formed the bond between Wilson and those who underwent discipleship in his class. Physically he was a man of men—a vitalized Greek deity in the faultless magnificence and perfection of his form, a form which, by sedulous gymnastic, had been kept in the highest plenitude of pith; intellectually, he was brilliant, powerful, vivid, and—

“So various that he seemed to be  
Not one, but all mankind’s epitome.”

Emotionally, however, he was matchless. Out of his emotions his whole nature was replenished as from the fountains of perennial youth. Alternately, as his theme changed in the course of his prelections on moral philosophy, he melted, electrified, subdued, solemnized to tears, or tickled into laughter his audience of enraptured students as he discoursed upon the sublime and the beautiful, the terrible and the delightful, the ludicrous or the pathetic, and in his geography of the passions at once described, exemplified, and excited each. Freely he gave forth the wealth of his power, and proved himself to be the Shakspeare of emotional philosophy. As his frame dilated, his broad and brawny chest heaved, his eye lit up, and over his lofty round and massive forehead the long twining tendrils of his golden locks fell or fluttered, everything seemed to give the world assurance of a man—a man of noble type and splendid mould, gloriously planned and exquisitely equipped.

Under the influence of Hamilton and Wilson literary and philosophic culture took firm root in the minds of many students; and not only in the classes but elsewhere, the quickened intellects of the young gave delighted effort to the pursuits to which they were called. As one of the Professor’s co-students then, and able colleague as well as fervent friend now, has said in a similar reference :—

“What enthusiasms swept round the cold quadrangle, what glorious scenes there were in its class-rooms, what varied excitement was there communicated, what friendships were formed, what breaks there were in the woods and forests of knowledge, showing vistas along which it might be a delight to career throughout a

long future, till only the sunset of life should close in the enchantment!"

A great re-awakening took place in the literary associations of Edinburgh about this period. This was not so marked in the "Speculative Society," which devotes the larger proportion of its debates to the study of political questions, as it was in *The Dialectic*, established in 1787 for the prosecution of literary and philosophical composition, criticism, and debate; *The Diagnostic*, instituted in 1816, for the attainment through knowledge of mental improvement and practical skill; and *The Tusculan*, founded in 1822, for speculative and literary culture; as well as in *The Theological*, which has existed since 1776, as a students' association for the consideration of those questions which lie on the border-land of imperative orthodoxy, and for the employment of philosophical thought on theological questions. Of the first we have never heard that A. C. Fraser was a member—indeed, it is not much affected by those who have theological aspirations—but we believe that at different times, during his university course, he was a member of one or other of those we have named, and useful in all by taking an active part in their duties, interests, and specific studies. We ought to mention, too, in this connection the Metaphysical Society which was founded by some of the more prominent of the young Hamiltonians, who were anxious to discuss the phenomenology of cognition, to trace out to its ultimates the philosophy of the conditioned, to settle the controversies that rose and fell around the relativity of human knowledge, the quantification of the predicate, the laws of thought as thought, and to learn or expound the alphabet of the thinkable in time and space; they chose Fraser as their first President. This society, founded in 1838-9, "for a considerable number of years held its place in the list of college societies, for which Edinburgh is so honourably distinguished." Among the more notable members of this association, in which the views and speculations of Hamilton were diligently studied in mutual communings, not unfrequently prolonged till midnight, there were Dr. John Cairns, "tall, strong-boned, and granite-headed," "the student whom Sir William Hamilton himself had signalized and honoured as already a sterling thinker," author of the article "Kant" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*; David Masson, now Professor of English literature in Edinburgh University, biographer of Milton, &c.; Rev. John Clark, perhaps the most metaphysically minded of them

all : he died early, and of him Dr. Cairns wrote a graceful memoir ; Rev. Andrew Wilson, afterwards minister of Abbey Church, Paisley ; J. A. Wood, advocate ; and Rev. R. C. Black, a native of Wigton, an early student of German literature, who was not only charmed with "Kant" and "Hegel," but not unfrequently charmed others by his essays on their views. He afterwards took orders in the Church of England. He was second in the competition for "the students' prize," when James Bell, a native of Torthorwald, afterwards minister of Haddington, stood first for an essay on "The Influence of Physical Science on Mental Philosophy." Prior to his too early death Black wrote an able pamphlet on "University Reform," addressed to his friend, Professor Fraser. A somewhat later, but scarcely less remarkable member, was William Shaw, who had passed in 1843 the most severe examination in logic and metaphysics which had been known to have taken place in his university. He subsequently became minister of Bonhill, Ayr, and Alloa, where he died—too soon for the world, though not for himself—aged 47.

Besides the classes already noted, A. C. Fraser had the good fortune to have as his professor in natural philosophy, James David Forbes, a distinguished cultivator as well as an elegant expositor of physics, whose lectures presented, in rare combination, instruction, interest, and originality. He was exact in observing, judicious in experimenting, sagacious in hypotheses, cautious in reasoning, careful in teaching his students to distinguish between fact and theory, and to guard against loose, inaccurate, or superficial generalizations. This class brought him into the presence of the logic of experience and the science of the laws of nature, and so gave him opportunity of learning how far Force may be accepted as the prime and chief of the agents in phenomena.

While the fame of Hamilton as the mightiest in mind among modern metaphysicians was thus fanning the ambition of younger thinkers, and leading them to seek communion with those who had adventured most daringly into the "Hercynian brakes" of speculative science, a few of the more ardent undertook to publish by subscription an edition of Arthur Collier's "Clavis Universalis ; or, a New Inquiry after Truth," 1713, from one of the two copies in the University Library, Edinburgh, in the same year (1837) as that in which Mr. Lumley, a respectable London bookseller, issued Dr. S. Parr's "Metaphysical Tracts, by English Philosophers of the Eighteenth Century, from 1639-64." William Hamilton produced his

profound article on "Idealism," and set those interested in the study of the higher philosophy to the perusal and discussion of the writings of the idealists. Through Collier, and Hamilton's erudite article, Fraser was led to the perusal of Berkeley; and, though Hamilton's investigative, exhaustive, and logically definite treatment of the problems of human knowledge induced him to delight in metaphysical investigations, "Berkeley first engaged his love for philosophy." Inclination and circumstances have drawn him often to the study of Berkeley since, so that it is now upwards of thirty years since, as a student, he took Berkeleyism as the centre-point of ratiocinative enquiry in such a way as to consider, in relation to that singularly lucid and instructive thinker, other preceding or succeeding forms of speculation, in the hope that his idealism might revive philosophy when ready to slumber, or recal it to what is real when wasting among verbal abstraction. He found in his writings then a subtle but beautiful mental discipline, a thorough and comprehensive test of metaphysical insight, and a union of careful reasoning and a graceful fancy with a style that is transparently clear, and a life that is pellucidly pure. Nor after the study of a quarter of a century did he find cause to alter his opinion: for in 1862 the republication of an almost forgotten tract of his favourite author, "The Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained," edited with annotations by H. V. H. Cowel, we find him thus expressing his high opinion of the irreproachable Lord Bishop of Cloyne:—

"It is allowed that no modern metaphysician has equalled Berkeley in the ability to unite a simple, transparent style, and the easy play of a graceful imagination, with deep and uncommon thoughts. Yet the history of his doctrine illustrates the insufficiency of even the best chosen words for the circulation of metaphysical ideas, as well as the manner in which speculative teaching may be perverted from its original design when it becomes a watchword in controversy or the symbol of a sect. Berkeley is popularly conceived as an unpractical dreamer, and a patron of sceptical idealism, who denies the existence of what we see, and hear, and handle. He is supposed to have thus maintained (as Beattie, the Scotch metaphysician, alleges) that to be false which every man must necessarily believe every moment of his life to be true, and that to be true which no man, since the foundation of the world, was capable of believing for a single moment. Now the real Berkeley was no idealist at all, if we mean by the word one who lives in a world of illusory fancies of his own creation, and not in the world of facts which he himself observed. His beautiful life was earnest and

practical in a very high degree. His theory of life is pervaded by an intense sense of reality, in the forms of the social and the divine. Separated from the paradoxical language in which it was originally delivered, it may help us when we are struggling with the current intellectual perplexities of our own day regarding the historical development of natural order, and the relations of human and divine agency to the natural system. It was a practical philosophy of religion and society that Berkeley meant to teach, and his universe is a social universe, supremely regulated by God.

"The reader who tries to think the thoughts of Berkeley as they really were, must remember that he was an independent thinker, and not properly the disciple of any philosophical sect. His apparent paradox foreshadows a deep and liberal religious philosophy of physical science and its methods. Its germ appeared in 1709, in the "Theory of Vision," and it reached its full growth in 1744, in the "Philosophical Reflections on Taste and Water." His aim in the series which commences with the one and closes with the other of these books, was to lead philosophers back from metaphysical abstractions to *experience*, and at the same time to deepen and enlarge the experience of the unreflecting multitude by guiding them from the narrow world of *mere* sense to the truer and grander world of *sense looked at in the light of what we find within*. . . . Berkeley, the most subtle thinker of the Lockian era in these islands, did not mean to be an abstract metaphysician. Instead of that he meant all his life to struggle against abstractions on behalf of our practical faith in the reality and free agency of his fellow-creatures and of God. He was no visionary dreamer, but the most conspicuous man of his time in doing all human and philanthropic work in a large and generous way—work which he intended his scheme of religious philosophy only to quicken and interpret.

". . . The intensity of Berkeley's social and religious convictions and sympathies is expressed all through his life. No philosopher of that generation so habitually recognised *OTHER MINDS* as the real powers which regulate all the changes that appear in sense, and also in the whole natural system of which sensible changes afford us a faint glimpse. A perpetually provident supreme spirit, and present human spirits, subordinate to the supreme, are his real world. His world is a living world, uttering an intelligent language—the divine language of nature, and the artificial languages of men."

The foregoing passages occur in a terse and acute paper in "Macmillan's Magazine," on "The Real World of Berkeley," July, 1862; and, as we shall see, he holds true to his love for Berkeley and for philosophy "even until now."

On the conclusion of his academical course in arts in April, 1841,

when he graduated M.A., Fraser gained what was then called "the University Prize," raised by subscription among the students and professors, for the encouragement and promotion of literary skill, thoughtful culture, and a pure ambition, for an essay,—the topic having been announced in November of the previous year,—on "Toleration." This essay he subsequently read, by request, before the Theological Society, of which he had become a member, after joining the Divinity Hall. This essay was founded on the thesis that it is the indubitable duty of every man, to the best of his ability and opportunity, to search for truth,—by no means could it be his duty, or for his real benefit, to seek after a lie. It followed thence as a corollary, that in order to fulfil this incumbent duty he must be at liberty, so far as external or imposed restraint is concerned, to pursue his researches, and to adopt the conclusions to which these lead, unless these resulted in practically obnoxious actions against the enjoyment of a similar right in others. This he followed up by replies to objections, and a defence of the most unrestrained exercise of the privilege of private judgment. The general doctrine of toleration, and the laws which regulate the attainment of truth, formed frequent matter of speculation and exposition with him; and even yet, as he says himself, "There is wide room for an investigation into those general relations among men, considered as members of society, in regard to individual belief or opinion, which the moral law demands, and which reason and experience approve, as best fitted to secure the most extensive diffusion of truth; and in subordination to which all special organization, civil and ecclesiastical, ought to be regulated. The full solution of this great problem is still among those left to exercise the minds of the men of this or of some future age."

In session 1841-2 Fraser attended the Hebrew class under Dr. Alex. Brunton, who is thus described by David Masson:—"A clerical old gentleman, with a great squab bald head, fat pinkish-white cheeks, portly and punctiliously clean general appearance, and very fat calves, neatly encased in black stockings, who professed to teach the Oriental languages;" and was more famous for having been the husband of Mary Brunton, authoress of "Self-Control," &c., than for his linguistic acquirements. In the same session he studied Church History under Dr. David Welsh, a strong, ardent, and pure-minded man, who saw in the subject of his prelections a topic of the highest concernment, as illustrating the development of the human mind in its noblest and its most intense movements and movements,



and therefore possessing a loftier power to stir and stimulate than the record of the defeats and triumphs, or the rise and fall of States. In this class a prize, awarded by the vote of the students, was gained by Fraser for the best written answers to a series of questions in ecclesiastical history; David Masson, his class-mate and friend, coming in second, though pretty closely. In the succeeding year he studied under Dr. Thomas Chalmers, Professor of Systematic Divinity, whose fame was in all the churches, and whose name is one of the brightest in the theology of the century. This terminated his University career as a student,—a career quite noticeable in itself, as well as remarkable in its results.

Ecclesiastical politics had been raging with vehemence in Scotland for the greater part of the period of Fraser's attendance at the University, and animated controversies engaged much of the attention of all classes of people. Strong in a faith which teaches them, as Froude epigrammises it, that "Words and actions are carved upon eternity," theology in Scotland is apt to be the topic of warm and bitter disputation; and after a long period of active animadversion, agitation, intrigue, quarrel, compromises, understandings, misunderstandings, and alienations, the State Church of that country was disrupted. At the General Assembly held in Edinburgh in May, 1843, this violent disavowance took place. On the first day of the Assembly's meeting, in the presence of Her Majesty's Commissioner, the Marquis of Bute, Dr. Welsh, Moderator, or president, read from his official chair a protest against the interference of the civil authorities in the spiritual affairs of that Church, as contrary to the word of God, and in violation of her ecclesiastical and constitutional principles and privileges. The protest having been read, Dr. Welsh left the Assembly, accompanied by 126 ergymen and 77 elders, who were members of that Assembly, and this protest was immediately adhered to by a body of about 478 clergymen, who, by a separate deed of demission, resigned their ecclesiastical livings, and formed themselves into what is now known throughout the Christian world as the Free Church of Scotland, so writing voluntarily on the page of history a memorable moral event, and inaugurating a remarkable movement.

Into the merits or demerits, the details and specialities of this delisence of a venerable ecclesiastical corporation, it is not requisite that we should enter. It suffices, in regard to the subject immediately before us, to state that Mr. Fraser adhered to the Disruption 1871.

Party, and took orders, being licensed as a preacher, in the Free Church of Scotland, and was subsequently called and ordained to exercise the office of the Ministry in that denomination, in the parish of Cramond, on the boundary line lying between Linlithgow and Mid Lothian. This step we believe he took under pressure of the leaders of the Free Church, whose ambition, fired to white heat, inspired them with the design of confronting every parish church in the land with one unfettered by State restrictions, and under the sole governance of the Church. Perhaps one of the attractions of this parish was, that in its neighbourhood was Oraigerook Castle, the residence of Lord Jeffrey, whose metaphysical and literary fame was very high, and whose sympathies were with the "schismatics" and "martyrs," though he was personally no great enthusiast in matters of religion.

Here he devoted himself to theological studies in connection with philosophy; and in the endeavour to discover some principles of thought which might bring about such a consilience of, or rather a reconciliation between faith and science as should cause their (temporary) estrangement or antagonism to disappear, "as each deepening insight into natural law is felt to bring our thoughts into nearer harmony to those divine thoughts of which our otherwise strange surroundings in the world of sense are found to be the expression." One of the fruits of this period of theosophic meditation was an endeavour to state the essence and estimate the force of "The philosophy of Leibnitz," in an article which appeared in *The North British Review*, May, 1846, in the author's twenty-seventh year. From this paper we extract a few sentences on philosophy, its place, and its purpose:—

"Containing as they do the results, and in many respects splendid results, of purely abstract thinking, the philosophical works of Leibnitz are singularly fitted for contributing to imbue the mind of an ardent student with comprehensive and lofty speculation. While his writings abound in daring hypotheses, they have yet greatly advanced metaphysical science by rendering current a multitude of new ideas; and the fact of the circulation of an amount of abstract thought so great, so peculiar in its kind, and so fitted to set other minds to work, as these books contain, can never be unworthy of the consideration of those who would observe and study literature in its most solemn relation. Besides their intrinsic value, they are connected with an important epoch in the history of speculation. This philosopher looms vast even in the distance, at the entrance of the labyrinth of the

recent German philosophy. . . . The present is a remarkable, and, indeed, anomalous historical epoch. In these islands it is, and has been since the commencement of the century, a period of rapid physical and social progress. Men have gained an increased knowledge of the laws and processes of matter, and thus the world is becoming a much more convenient place of habitation. The principle of commerce has been developed to an extent quite unknown in the ancient world. The present revolution in the means of social intercourse and communication seems to be preparing the way for other changes, about which it is not safe to speculate. All the increased 'subjection of matter to mind' which the world, and especially this country, has witnessed since the principles of the Baconian philosophy have become popular must be very gratifying to every lover of his race. And in the more sublime departments of physical science the same progress is visible. Geology is contributing the details of the past history of the globe on which we live. The telescope is making magnificent disclosures of the distant regions of the material creation. Nor is public interest confined to what is merely physical. Society itself is undergoing fundamental changes; and the science of society, under its twofold form of civil and ecclesiastical, is the theme of discussion and controversy.

"An age in which controversy turns on first principles needs, and will soon demand, a metaphysical literature. That state of knowledge and of general opinion is not a hopeful one in which the thoughts and energies of men are stimulated exclusively by physical, economical, or even social science. When the intellect is in a state of fermentation, bare facts separated from principles, usually excite feeble interest. Men then feel that beneath the stir occasioned by incessant activity among the outward events of this passing world, there lie hid, as it were, the foundations of all knowledge, on which this very stir and activity depends for its existence. These are the first principles of things. Within and immediately around that circle, is the domain peculiar to philosophy. The more deeply thought is exerted on any subject, the further it is compelled to go within the dominions of this science of sciences. The soul casts about for its anchorage in the ocean of thought. . . . The use of idealism and the higher metaphysics as operative forces in society becomes more apparent when we observe how efficacious their spirit has been to neutralize a vulgar sensualism. The study of the systems of philosophy in all their variety, and of the lives and labours of various philosophers, is to be encouraged for many reasons. It supplies curious and useful thoughts, which might never otherwise have been suggested, and it also stimulates reflection in the student. The history of the erratic course which the human spirit has taken in the experience even of profound thinkers is besides fitted to moderate dogmatism. The men of mightiest genius are found often to have fallen into the most

signal errors. It is morally useful to train the mind to the habit of calmly apprehending and appreciating new doctrines, however opposed to what it has previously been accustomed to entertain. "Man," says Pascal, "is made for thinking. To think as we ought is the sum of human duty." Habits of abstract meditation have, further, a use additional to their absolute value to the individual speculator, for they accustom men to a kind of exercise which must always be closely connected with the great progress epochs of history; and by the lucid and comprehensive views which they foster, as well as by the invigorating effect of the act of self-inspection, they become an exceedingly potent force among those at work in society. . . . Philosophy has ever been a struggle between the spirit of doubt and the spirit of dogmatism—of which the one declines to admit as true any conclusion that is not the result of logical deduction, and the other assumes, in whole or in part, the principles which the sceptic assails. Men in all ages have been oscillating between these extremes. . . . Faith is, on the one side, lost in the dark abyss of doubt. On the other, it evaporates in the sunny haze of the empyrean of transcendentalism. . . . A perfect philosophy must recognize and include a body of first principles, consolidated into faith, by which all knowledge of things divine and human must be regulated. . . . To obtain a refuge from doubt, and a sure and rational foundation on which knowledge and action may be based, must always be the aim of the higher philosophy. . . . Reason would be interminable if it did not find its ultimate limit in truths which it cannot prove. Every principle must be either resolvable by the understanding, or else rested on faith; and as every conceivable question may be thus carried down to faith all knowledge runs into mystery. An adjustment of *the fact* of this realm of mystery, from which no effort can disconnect us, has ever been the profound difficulty with men of contemplative minds, which the labours of thinking men of all ages have advanced only a very few steps towards a solution. . . . Mysteries are needed to the attainment of knowledge. Of mysteries we cannot rid ourselves. They rise in a thousand forms, and in them all knowledge merges."

The leaders of the Free Church movement had always been urgent advocates of reconstructive university reform. As they had now the opportunity of reorganizing the arrangements for the education of a rising ministry, they resolved upon the institution of a more efficient and systematic course of training, and determined on carrying it to the highest possible point of equipment and efficacy, so that in high professional culture the theological instructors of their people should be inferior to those of none of the churches of Christendom. This was all the more incumbent on them because

many of their most ardent and able men had held professional office in the Universities, and on denuding themselves of their connection with the Established Church, those of them at least who were connected with the theological faculty, required to demit their University chairs. For these, provision was necessary as an act of justice. The organization of a university, full in its outfit and systematic in its arrangements, for thorough theological training, was therefore determined upon. The Universities had renounced the Free Church, the Free Church would renounce the Universities. This project was set about with hopeful mettlesomeness and elastic capacity (some thought audacity), and a splendid methodization of theological culture was arranged. The plans of the pure intellect must be wrought through the practical realities of passions, interests, obstacles, and dissuasions, sometimes of discouraging opposition and obstinate immobility. The Free Church College scheme was impeded and broken down from its high aim by the practicalists, who hate to build up the dreams of enthusiasts, and feel that sufficient unto the day is the duty or the burden, and that if we can but go on, we do well enough. The scheme was only imperfectly realized, and the funds, the ability, and the interests of the Free Church were dissipated in tiding over the difficulties of circumstance, temper, claims, and jealousies, instead of being concentrated and made effective and exemplary. In regard to the provision for those who had held in the old universities the position of professors there was no difficulty, arrangements were made, and places were provided for them. But there were other objects to be achieved than this. The *odium theologicum* had been specially and specifically excited by Professor Wilson, as the reputed editor of the most able Conservative organ in Scotland, *Blackwood's Magazine*, which had consistently and constantly opposed the advocates of innovation; and Sir William Hamilton had not only declaimed against, but jested at "the brutal ignorance of the clergy;" he had opposed the practice of making admission to professorial chairs dependent on adherence to church sects, and he had made himself particularly obnoxious to the Free Church by the issue of a pamphlet, entitled "Be not Schismatics; Be not Martyrs by mistake"—a demonstration that the principle of non-intrusion, so far from being fundamental to the Church of Scotland, is subversive of the fundamental principles of that and every other Presbyterian Church Establishment. It was determined then that as morals, metaphysics, and

logic held most intimate relations with theology and theological culture, and as those who were entrusted with the University training of students in those branches were inimical to the Free Church, that church in its metropolitan college should possess independent Professorships in ethics and philosophy. The chair of ethics was at once conferred on Patrick C. MacDougall, who had contested the chair of logic with Sir William Hamilton by desire of his party. The professorship of logic was offered to, nay, pressed upon, Dr. William Cunningham, who had written some caustic strictures on "schismatics and martyrs" in "Three Letters on Sir William Hamilton's pamphlet." It was afterwards urged on the acceptance of Isaac Taylor, although his candidature in 1836 had been opposed by the same party, because he did not "believe in the whole doctrines of the confession of faith." He declined, and the chair was thereafter placed in the acceptance of Henry Rogers, then philosophic tutor in the Independent College, Spring Hill, Birmingham, and known by his papers in *The Edinburgh Review*. He also refused the offer. Afterwards negotiations were entered into with the philosophical student who laboured in the Free Church ministry at Cramond, and on considering the matter, A. C. Fraser accepted the nomination. He was, we believe, unanimously elected on the motion of Dr. Chalmers, seconded by Sir David Brewster—both of whom spoke in the highest terms of his character, attainments, and philosophic insight. He delivered in November, 1846, a most admirable inaugural address on philosophical culture, which was published in *The Free Church Magazine*, and also issued as a separate publication, at the request of his colleagues and the students.

Through the exertions of Dr. David Welsh, biographer of Dr. Thomas Brown, and author of an excellent History of the Church, being the Lectures he delivered as Professor of Ecclesiastical History, the sum of £21,000 in subscriptions of £1,000 each from twenty-one individuals, was raised for the erection of a College in Edinburgh, in connection with the Free Church of Scotland. The foundation-stone was laid by Dr. Chalmers, Principal of the Institution, 4th June, 1846. This new college was opened November 6th, 1850, and an "Introductory Lecture on Logic and Metaphysics, was delivered by the Rev. A. C. Fraser, A.M., as professor of these subjects, 8th November. In this lecture he explained the arrangement which "associates the study of Philosophy with the study of Scottish Theology," gave a review of the different schools

of thought in their influences, insisted on the benefit of a true philosophy in "disclosing the horizon of mysteries by which the power of philosophizing is bounded," and maintained that "the true propositions, and the positive discoveries, which speculative philosophy contains, are not numerous; neither are the arguments by which they are reached and vindicated usually long. The power of this kind of knowledge is, I think, more in the wide range of thought which is gained when any article of it is apprehended by the mind at all, and in the nourishment which it thus supplies to the contemplative faculty. Its history is rather the history of highly intensified manifestations of reflective energy, than of growing and elaborated forms of doctrinal truth."

This Professorship was probably much more akin to Fraser's mind than the ordinary duties of the Pastorate; but we doubt that it was ever quite to his mind. We have an impression that a good deal of sympathetic self-portraiture appears in the following extracts from a paper on Isaac Taylor—especially when coupled with the fact that Fraser has since most carefully held aloof from connection with ecclesiastical parties:—

"An independent expression of profoundly-seated convictions was more agreeable to a mind of this order, than the profession of the Christian ministry, in this modern age of ecclesiastical schism, and narrow controversies about systematized theological doctrine. . . . The living communities which most loudly proclaimed their Christian faith were mutually repellent under the influence of sectarian hate. The large conceptions which unite men who are animated by a common belief in eternal truths were exchanged for the pettiness and bigotry which have perverted the history in which he found peace into an occasion of malice and all uncharitableness. The glory of the real religion of feelings generated and regulated by faith in grand historical transactions, was lost in the vain disputes of a verbal one; and the sentiment of its divine grandeur was concealed in dreary symbols and technicalities, from which living meaning had subsided by long-continued professional usage. . . . This Christianity of the inner life is a treasure which has somehow come to us—whatever its historic origin, or however it may have at first become assimilated with the evolutions of human affairs. Must we refrain from *living it* in our daily feelings towards God, until we have settled the controverted questions about the manner of its introduction in the past of human history? There is something in us which responds to it, and with which it blends congenially in good men. Shall we disregard this, and

peril the moral and spiritual treasure upon historical disputes, which—as still maintained among learned and candid persons—must relate to matters of opinion, and not to truth absolute and eternal? With the inner treasure already in our possession, and ready for universal use, Christians may, some begin to think, now and henceforward hold themselves free to pursue any researches, historical or scientific, confident that no iconoclast of ancient historic documents, canonical or non canonical, no physical discovery of what has happened or may hereafter happen, in the wide realm of nature, can alter a manner of feeling and acting in relation to God which—whatever its historic origin—has now found its warrant in the depths of our being, and in all modern experience of it as the supreme motive power in human affairs. In this faith all history as well as the biblical and ecclesiastical—the history of nature and the scientific interpretation of the same, together with the history of man and the interpretation of the moral experience of the human race—is virtually Divine revelation, contributing to nourish and expand those feelings towards God and man which, however the historical and scientific questions to which they give rise may be settled, the scriptural books and the institutions of Christianity have developed and maintained, and must develop and maintain in yet richer harmony, when free from the bondage of the letter, and from the risk of interference with our intellectual growth.”\*

In 1847 Professor Fraser entered into the holy state of matrimony, choosing and being chosen by Miss Dyce, a lady belonging originally to Aberdeen, of distinguished acquirements and intellectuality, the youngest sister of William Dyce, Royal Academician, famous as a fresco painter in the New Palace, Westminster, and as an interpreter, through the pictorial art, of Scripture.

In 1850 Professor Fraser was entrusted with the editorship of *The North British Review*, a quarterly serial, which had been established in 1844, by the chiefs of the Free Church party, for the exposition and defence of the opinions and principles for which they contended, and for the promotion of a Christianized criticism in literature, politics, science, history, philosophy, and theology. It was placed under the management, at first, of Dr. Welsh, after whose death in 1845 it was given to the care of Edward Francis Maitland, Esq., advocate, who in 1846 resigned it to Dr. Hanna, son-in-law and biographer of Dr. Chalmers, from whose hands it passed into those of A. C. Fraser, under whose

\* “The Literary Life of Isaac Taylor,” by Professor A. C. Fraser, “Macmillan’s Magazine,” October, 1865.



charge it remained till 1857. Under his management the scope of the Review was enlarged, and its power was increased. Instead of confining the contributions to Free Church men, Edinburgh men, Scotsmen and others, as had been previously done, he invited the co-operation of all men who had original, wise, and apt words to speak to the public, and he succeeded in securing the aid of the Duke of Argyll, W. R. Greg, H. L. Mansell, De Morgan, Charles Kingsley, Isaac Taylor, A. P. Stanley, Wm. Whewell, Archbishop Whately, &c., besides retaining the services of Brewster, Barton, Cunningham, Duncan, Flemming, Macdougall, Carruthers, Duns, Hanna, Shairp, Veitch, &c., of the more native and endued among scholars. To this Review the Editor contributed a number of learned and varied papers, selections from which were published by him under the title of "Essays in Philosophy." These essays are seven in number, and their topics are; The Life and Philosophy of Leibnitz, Hamilton and Reid—Perception; Scottish Metaphysics—Causality; The Insoluble Problem, a Disquisition on our Ignorance of the Infinite; the Metaphysics of Augustinianism; Ferrier's Theory of Knowing and Being; and the Philosophical Class-room of the 19th Century—the last being an Academical Address.

These "Essays" were noticed by the *Athenæum* as "characterized by acuteness, learning, and moderation. Their author threads the convolutions of the metaphysical mind of Europe without the pretence of a clue which belongs to himself alone;" and in an article in the *Revue Des Deux Mondes* (July 1st, 1856), from the pen, we believe, of Comte C. F. M. de Remusat, biographer of Abelard, Anselm, Bacon, &c., the following passage occurs:—

"Mr. Fraser's writings have just been collected under the title of 'Essays in Philosophy.' The theory of perception, and that of causality, are encountered anew by him in the spirit of Reid and Hamilton, but with success in the effort to add to the exactitude of thought and the precision of terminology. Original discussions regarding the infinite, a criticism of Leibnitz, and of the metaphysics of the school of St. Augustine, prove that Mr. Fraser is no stranger to any question or system, and that he can expound and criticise them with ability. Finally, he has discussed with propriety and moderation, but with great care and solidity, the theory of Mr. Ferrier, and he has maintained, like a good Scotchman, the principles and procedure of the doctrines of psychology against the pretensions of a deductive philosophy. He follows a path in which one is at least certain of not

being lost, and the philosophy he teaches will never issue, as other more pretentious systems are certain to do, in the divorce of Science and Reason."

The immediate occasion of the republication of these essays was the occurrence of a vacancy in the chair of logic and metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, consequent on the death of Sir William Hamilton, 6th May, 1856. The opportunity of occupying such a chair brought forward many competitors. Isaac Taylor and Henry Rogers were both spoken of; T. S. Baynes and John Veitch made some advances; Dr. MacVicar and J. D. Morell set forth their claims; but the brunt of the battle for the Chieftancy of British Philosophy fell, at last, to be borne by A. C. Fraser and J. F. Ferrier—the former gaining the favour of the Whigs and the Free Church, and the latter the interest of the Tories and the Established Church. All the power of Dissent in Scotland was put forth on behalf of Fraser; Dr. Cairns—by repute possessor of the most metaphysical mind in Scotland—refused to put in a claim to the damage of his old friend, and besides, wrote a smart and slashing—though, in our opinion, hasty and unfair—pamphlet against Ferrier, entitled "An Examination of Professor Ferrier's Theory of Knowing and Being." Newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, and conversation were alike entirely absorbed with the question—which will succeed? and since the election of Sir W. Hamilton himself, no excitement comparable to that had occurred in Edinburgh until the occasion of choosing his successor. The wave of agitation passed over into England, and even on the Continent—Ferrier or Fraser?—became a theme for controversy. In the end the electors, the Town Council of Edinburgh, by a majority of three—seventeen to fourteen—settled the question in favour of Professor Fraser, precisely one vote less than that by which, twenty years previously, the chair had been conferred on his illustrious predecessor, the friend and philosophical instructor of both candidates. To show how widely the interest of the contest was felt we may quote from the *Athenæum* the following notice of the gossip of the day: "Among the rumours current, in London at least, as to the circumstances likely to influence the election were the following:—That Mr. Fraser might be injured by belonging to the Free Church, and *per contra*, that he might be benefited by the known intention, in the event of his success, of abolishing the chair of metaphysics in the

Free College which he now holds ; that Mr. Ferrier, as the son-in-law of Wilson, would have an almost certain preponderance, that he would be held disqualified by the Germanism of his opinions ; and that Mr. Fraser would come in as the representative of the Scottish School ;—and so on." Ferrier took his defeat keenly, sorely to heart. He wrote a sarcastic and bitter critique on the election, under the title of "The Old and New Philosophy" immediately, and followed that up in 1858 by a "Letter to the Lord Advocate of Scotland, on the necessity of a change in the patronage of the University of Edinburgh," and, as a matter of fact, greatly in consequence of the agitation occasioned by this contest, the patronage was changed in 1860—though not much, it seems, for the better ; if we may judge from the elections subsequently made and the outcry raised after each. The controversy itself, so far as the interests not of persons but of philosophy were concerned, happily resulted in great advantage. It stimulated Ferrier to prove the philosophic pith of his intellect and incited him to an ardent—a too ardent—ambition to signalize his metaphysic meditations as a manifest contribution to the higher thought of the country, and to prove that they were in harmony with the noblest issues of foregone and of foreign thinkers. It spurred on the strong and stalwart student of philosophic thought, who was now to be the leader of Scottish speculation, to the straining of every effort that he might demonstrate his might to the most sceptical and give evidence that in his hands the cautious conscientious investigations of the principles of mind for which the Scottish School of Speculation was specially famous, would suffer little deterioration, if they did not make sure progress. Thus it affected the individuals more nearly concerned, and of course this had a reflex action on the vigour, sympathy, and success of their influence upon their students. On the public mind its effect was also beneficial. Philosophy acquired new charms in their eyes by losing, for a time, its impersonality, and books on metaphysics and logic had a larger public and a wider scope as well as a deeper efficacy for some years thereafter. The national and philosophical consequences might have delighted an optimist, who believes that a general good may outweigh any amount of individual evil.

It is greatly to the credit of philosophy and to the honour of the gentlemen concerned, that keen as was the rivalry and hot the contest in which they had been engaged, strong even as had been the

passion and temper it evoked, they yet learned chivalronally to honour and respect each other. The defeated candidate, one of the most interesting, pleasant, and attractive of men, with an intellect of arrowy sharpness, swiftness, and straightforwardness, and a moral nature of great openness and candour, acknowledged the learned ability and extensive acquirements of the victor. We know that in his later years "he had forgiven his philosophical enemies, and even forgotten, as if it had never been, the principal crisis signalized by his pamphlet on "The Old and New Philosophy." The victor, too, knew the worth of his co-rival and learned to estimate and appreciate the wonderful energy, clearness, and intensity of the philosophic vision of his vanquished but great opponent. Few grieved more seriously or severely as at the going out of a bright light than he did the early death of James F. Ferrier, whom he justly designated as "the latest Scottish philosopher and the most brilliant philosophical professor of his time in Scotland." In the same article Professor Fraser classes together as "fitted in the most attractive way to absorb a reader of competent intelligence and imagination" Berkeley's "Dialogues;" Hume's "Inquiry into the Human Understanding," and the "Philosophical Reviews" of J. F. Ferrier, and speaks of him thus kindly and wisely, as:—

"The most interesting philosophical personage whom Scotland has given us to contemplate in these years. He preserved the charm of a genial spirit during a life-long pilgrimage in the land of abstractions; as entirely self-dedicated to curious thinking about the world in which all are feeling and acting as any recluse in the annals of philosophy. And his works are the signal example in Scotland of an alliance of artistic beauty with abstract philosophy. Notwithstanding, even those who profess to speculate are only now beginning to penetrate into his meaning and to recognise his chivalrous devotion to abstract truth, in sublime disregard, one may say, of its consequences or of its utility. . . . The system of consequences involved in Ferrier's governing conception, with the unfolding of which in Scotland his name will be associated, and in which his whole life as a thinker is expressed, is not less remarkable, than the personality of its author is uncommon. It derives from that personality a union of very subtle metaphysical thought with poetical feeling, fancy, humour, and transparent diction, unexcelled in their combination in the literature of this country. In itself it is an original attempt to solve, with the precision of deductive reasoning, a part of the *metaphysical* (as distinguished from the

merely physical) problem of the universe. . . . The synthetic intellectualism of Ferrier is at the philosophical extreme opposite to the analytic phenomenalism of Comte. . . . Self-conscious being is with Ferrier the demonstrated essence or inner meaning of whatever now is—in all the forms and degrees which this existence actually takes, in the physical and moral experience of finite persons, who are themselves mysteriously related to Supreme self-conscious Being, beyond whom we can have no analogy.

. . . Ferrier studied academically in Oxford and in Germany as well as at Edinburgh; resting English culture, and German free action of speculative faculty, on a primary basis of Scotch persistency and enthusiasm. . . . With Berkeley mind is the essence of the universe, and also the cause of all its phenomenal changes; with Ferrier consciousness is the essence of being. Narrower in its scope, the system of Ferrier became at last the *refinement of a part* of the philosophy of Berkeley; 'approaches to the region where Plato, Spinoza and Hegel, wrought.' . . . A valuable truth in philosophy pervades this assault upon verbal abstractions or unintelligibilities—a truth of which Berkeley and Ferrier are the chief British apostles. It is the attempt to work intellectually *below* this deepest form of all fact—an attempt which common unreflective language seems to sanction; and which philosophical language ratifies when it theorizes about *unconscious mental substance and material substance existing unperceived by mind*—it is this attempt to be wise beyond the possibility of any conscious experience that has produced a confusion for which the appropriate remedy is habitual reflection upon the metaphysical truth—that being must in every example of it, involve a consciousness of objects—that in this respect matter and perception are one.\*

---

\* "The Philosophical Life of Professor Ferrier," by Professor A. C. Fraser: "Macmillan's Magazine," January, 1868.

---

IGNORANCE AND KNOWLEDGE IN THEIR RELATION TO EACH OTHER.—It is the law of all human knowledge, that the more the rays of the light within us multiply and spread, the increasing circle of light implies an increasing circumference of darkness to hem it round. Increase the bounds of knowledge, and you inevitably increase the sense of ignorance; at all the mere points in a belt of surrounding darkness do you encounter doubt and difficulty. It is absurd, therefore, to suppose that any science can abolish all doubts and prevent all mistakes.—E. S. DALLAS.

## Politics.

---

### A PROFESSIONAL OR A POPULAR ARMY—WHICH SHALL WE HAVE?

#### PROFESSIONAL.—III.

THEORETICAL philosophers, amateur statesmen, and dabblers in politics are apt to conclude that those institutions which are a benefit to one country would of necessity prove an advantage to other countries, and this imperfect reasoning is a fruitful source of error and mischief. Similar institutions will produce similar results under similar circumstances; but if the state and condition of the one country differs from that of the other, then the results produced by the same institutions will be different in each. The liberty and federalism which thrive in the sturdy Alpine republic would prove a bane to the treacherous and effeminate races of tropical Asia. That which is the secret of one nation's greatness might prove to be a root of bitterness if introduced into a neighbouring state. The Irish labourer can subsist upon the potatoes grown in his little garden-plot, and the Spanish peasant thrives upon his bread and onion; but the English mechanic would soon pine away if confined to such food. One nation will be satisfied under an order of things that would excite discontent in another. As each individual person has his own particular constitution, inclinations, and tastes, so every nation has its own special characteristics, and that which would favour the prosperity of one would retard the development of another. Probably every civilized nation is more or less influenced by the working within it of a military spirit, a naval spirit, an agricultural spirit, a manufacturing spirit, a commercial spirit, an artistic spirit, a literary spirit, &c.; but one spirit predominates in one country, and another spirit prevails in another country, and the institutions of each country should be adapted to the prevailing spirit of each nation.

The present generation has witnessed the great successes which have been achieved by the popular army of Prussia, and a clamorous outcry has been got up for organizing the military forces of this

country upon the model of a popular army. But a popular army is an institution which will only thrive where the military spirit prevails amongst the people at large; it does prevail in Prussia, but it is not the predominating spirit in this country. The manufacturing and the commercial spirit predominate in our island, the literary spirit exerts a more powerful influence upon the community as a whole than the military spirit does, and the idea of a popular army is, in principle, diametrically opposed to the genius of the people of England. Probably the military spirit has never been at such a low ebb in this country as it is at the present time, and its influence seems still to diminish, whilst the tendency towards peaceful pursuits appears to increase. The English are truly an enterprising, ambitious, persevering, courageous, enthusiastic race; but their schemes of conquest are associated with social advancement and mental progress, not with territorial aggrandizement or martial glory; they are specially addicted to the arts of peace, and the contests in which they delight are those of the factory, the market, the counting-house, the study, and not those of the battle-field. The English soldier has often done his duty bravely and well, but soldiering is not the *forte* of the English people at large. The French are a people ambitious of military glory; the Prussians are a race that, taken as a whole, are ever ready to engage in war *con amore*; the Swiss, from their intense patriotism and the necessities of their position, will cheerfully submit to any privations for the defence of their country; but to the mass of Englishmen an enforced submission to military drill, and a liability to be called upon for the performance of military duties would be excessively unpleasant if not altogether distasteful. Upon whatever principle its minor details might be modelled we believe that the scheme of a popular army would be opposed to the prevailing spirit of the English people, and therefore we maintain that we should have a professional and not a popular army.

Although it is not included in K. N.'s visionary theory, yet we think we may safely assert that any practicable scheme which could be devised for the establishment of a popular army would, in some form or other, include compulsory service to a greater or less degree, and the principle of compulsory service would be repugnant to the majority of the English nation. The idea runs counter to a Briton's love of liberty. Why should he be compelled to serve a portion of his time in learning the art of war? He has not broken

the laws of his country, he pays his taxes, and meets the demands of his creditors; why then should he be drawn away from the vocation of his choice to serve for a time in the army against his will? Sailors form a professional class by themselves; why should not soldiers do the same? We do not propose to man the navy upon any such basis as is proposed for the formation of a popular army; why then should we remodel our military system upon such a principle? We believe the scheme of a popular army to be incompatible with an Englishman's love of liberty, and therefore we maintain that we ought to have a professional and not a popular army.

We are not opposed to change, we do not belong to that obstructive party which acts upon the principle that "Whatever is, is right"; we go hand in hand with the company of the reformers, but we hesitate to join the band of revolutionary agitators. Army reform most certainly is greatly needed, and we wish for such a thorough measure of reform as will fully meet the requirements of the case; but we do not think that so radical a change is needed as the transformation of our military force into a popular army. Our military system needs a reformation not a revolution; we believe that such a revolution as is brought before us by this debate would prove to be a remedy worse than the disease. The writer of a recent leading article in the *Daily News* has very justly observed that "a war minister and his military advisers cannot afford to forget the special circumstances of a great commercial and industrial country like ours, or the abiding influences in favour of civil rather than military careers. There is unquestionable economy in a system of universal compulsory service as in Prussia, so far as the annual military budget is concerned, but there is also an immense economic waste in the withdrawal of so large a portion of labour from the pursuits of productive industry, and this is a consideration that can never be lost sight of in England." We know that we might have a popular army without exactly copying the Prussian system; but, however organized, the establishment of a popular army in this country would lead to "an immense economic waste in the withdrawal of so large a portion of labour from the pursuits of productive industry," and therefore we maintain that we ought to have, not a popular, but a professional army.

There appears to be in the articles of J. W. S. and K. N. an unreal, unsubstantial, and dreamy tone which greatly detracts from the



force of their words. In the fifth paragraph of his article J. W. S. seems very lukewarm and half-hearted in his advocacy of a popular army; when he says "all the actual requirements of garrison duty and foreign service could be accomplished by enlists for terms of years from those who felt a vocation for arms," he, at the very least, implies the desirability of a professional army forming a part of our military establishment. J. W. S. does not seem to have a thorough faith in the principles he advocates; at all events he has not "the courage of his principles."

J. W. S. says that "a professional army is not only expensive but profitless." A professional army is not necessarily profitless; it might be employed in productive labour when not engaged in active service or military drill, as we believe the engineer corps were employed when the Post Office undertook the telegraphic business of the country. A reform in this direction might easily be carried out; but even taking our military force as it now is, its expensiveness and profitlessness would be more than counter-balanced by the economic waste which a popular army would cause in lessening the productive capacity of the people. All males would be for a time withdrawn from productive labour, and the exercise of their industrial capacities would be stopped at the most valuable period of their life.

We demur to the assertion of J. W. S. that "the stern tuition of war would do no detriment to a nation so absorbed as we have been in small cares," &c. Many a young man dragged to military discipline against his will would probably degenerate in character and in capacity in those pursuits in which he was beginning to be an adept, and many might imbibe a distaste for the industrial vocation to which they were previously attached and become unsettled and disinclined to return to productive labour. J. W. S. says that "ours is a nation peculiarly favourable to the effective institution of a popular army," but we have already taken an opposite view of the subject and maintained, nearly at the commencement of this article, that this country is not suitable for the establishment of a popular army because the tendency to engage in civil pursuits prevails amongst the people more than the disposition towards a military career.

The speculative suggestions of K. N. will probably be no more acceptable to the advocates of a popular than to the supporters of a professional army, and we will pass over his article without  
1871.

further notice. R. W. C. argues that the establishment of a military class encourages national quarrels, and that if the work of fighting a nation's battles were given into the hands of the people at large instead of being entrusted to a professional class, it would promote the cause of peace. But, on the contrary, we maintain that the diffusion of military habits and a belligerent spirit amongst the people at large, would render the nation more liable to be drawn into war.

The argument in R. W. C.'s fifth paragraph is very plausible, but it is sophistical. A popular army would not serve the country gratuitously, it would consist of paid soldiers as much as a professional army, and if the cause in behalf of which the popular army is fighting be such as to render its doing so an act of duty in defending home, country, &c., that cause would be an equal justification of the soldiers fighting for it in a professional army.

Armies are very undesirable institutions, but they are necessities in the present state of society; war is, at all times and under all circumstances, an exceeding great evil; the military spirit should be confined within as small a compass as is consistent with the safety of the State; belligerent tendencies and tastes should not be unnecessarily diffused amongst the people. For these and other reasons previously given we maintain that we should have a professional, and not a popular army.

SAMUEL.

#### POPULAR—III.

THIS question does not seem to be particularly well put. Must a professional army necessarily be unpopular? Must a popular army inevitably be unprofessional? I am reminded by C. H. Spurgeon's *The Sword and Trowel* that there need not necessarily be this contrast of controversy. I suppose, therefore, that the question goes off in another direction, and means ought we to have a standing army—having no other duty or place in the State, and so being professional. Or ought we to have no standing army, but have such a course of military training available among the people as would make "the art of self-defence" a general power among the nation?

I think, if the question is put in that form, that the popular army would be the preferable form—if it could be attained; and it is the duty of our statesmen to realize what the country desires.

The first argument that strikes me in favour of a popular army—that is, an army consisting of the people, not a mere substitute for them—is this: it would aid in the training of sturdy, courageous, and resolute character among the people—would induce a real and genuine independence among them. This is greatly required among us as a people. The quality of courage is fast fading from among us, a sensitive fear of danger overclouds all social life.

Physical courage, or the capacity to expose one's self readily to the risk of bodily pain or death, is rare among us. Moral courage, or the power of being ready to lay one's self open to suffering, inconvenience, or discomfort which does not offer any rewarding inducement, which holds out no prospect of personal interest, is almost even rarer. We live substitutionary lives. We have police to prevent breaches of the peace and other forms of evil, the prevention of which implies the use of force, the risk of injury, and the need for readiness and physical energy. We have firemen to undertake, whilst crowds gaze and gape helplessly around, all the danger and all the risk, to save all and dare all in the case of an outbreak of flame or conflagration. We have life-boats on the coast to venture out, with their stated crews, into the storm-tossed seas to dare the up-heaving tempest and to do the best they can to save property and preserve life. We have Humane Society men to keep guard over dangerous waters here and there, ready to jump in and seek to rescue the unfortunate in accident or the insane in action. Our life is in fact so substitutionary that we do almost all the duties of life by proxy—even to the attendance on the obsequies of our departed friends. Charity, advice, encouragement, help, agitation, everything is so done by a machinery of associated substitutionary agents that we have almost forgotten that we have personal duties to do.

To get rid of this substitution and proxy style of things we might very advantageously begin with the army. The general introduction of drill into our life would harden our *physique* and bring up the average health of the nation to a higher level. This itself would be a great gain, not only as a matter of benefit in any warlike need, but also in the common course of our every-day life. It will be seen that our argument goes right against that of S. S., who thinks that because we are out of taste for personal service in war, we ought not to be asked to acquire a taste for it, *i.e.*, he pleads sickness as a reason why a person who is ailing

should not be brought to try to gain health. Our over-minute division of labour, which finds so much favour in his sight, is just the very reason we would most rest our plea upon for a popular army. It would take us out of our single rut and rub the rust off our unexercised faculties. It would give us new and fresh interest in our national life, and it would put us in the way of learning, in war as in other things, that self-help is, next to God's help, the best help. S. S. must know that devotion to our narrow round of prescribed money-getting is withering up all manliness among us, and to prevent this from becoming altogether fatal to the personal vitality of valour in our nation he might see that almost the only means is to organize a popular army.

The power of self-defence would be a valuable possession—even though it were never to be used, but if it were actually required its value would be all the greater. If "Prevention is better than cure," then the best preventative of war should be that all should be able to defend themselves.

It does not appear to me that for the accomplishment of such a scheme, an enforced enlistment of compelled service in the ranks would be needed. If we were to incorporate military drill and exercise with our public school education, and even, as has been judiciously enough suggested by K. N., with our popular amusements and holidays, the whole body of the people would gain all the sanitary advantage of good, wise, and serviceable gymnastics; and a large percentage of those so trained would pass into the army as volunteers readily enough under due encouragement and on proper terms. While if the pressure of need were felt the patriotism of the people would be properly seconded by preparation. The very ability would lead to the ready rush of men to the post of duty in the hour of danger. To the spirit of the patriot there would be united the instinct of self-preservation and the joy of aiding in the immunity of our country from the invader's foot. I can see no good reason why there should not be a complete popular drill and preparation of the whole nation in the art and mystery of war—even although we were still to have a professional army of training and trained men; but perhaps the fewer of these latter the better.

Of course the great objection to a professional army, its expensiveness, is met by the assertion of its effectiveness; but a popular army, even if it were more expensive than a professional one, would

in reality and without paradox, be cheaper, because the country would receive a large return of the money's worth expended on drill and training in the health, the orderliness, the promptitude and the additional capacity for combined movement acquired by the followers of industry in the nation. How much more valuable would navvies, engineers, ploughmen, and country labourers in general be, if they were drilled to simultaneous activity and co-operative labours! The army drill would be a preparation for gang-work as well as for war, and the entire worth of the expense would thus probably revert to the nation in the improvements likely to result from the popularizing of general army training.

As a fact in history it has often been seen that when a professional army has failed, the national spirit and endeavour have made up for the defects and defaults of the nation's hired defenders. The Armada and the Commonwealth are proofs of the possibility of so employing the common forces of the nation, when the enthusiasm of a cause exists in them, against all sorts of odds. This would be much enhanced by the possession among the people of trained skill in the arts, manœuvres and drill called into action in war.

The "unsettlement" argument of S. S. does not influence our minds in the least; in fact, we think it would be highly advantageous to have such an unsettlement.

S. S.'s second argument in regard to the superior qualifications of professional soldiers, I am inclined to have serious doubts about. We have had, in fact, a large, highly paid, greatly privileged, and well helped army; and yet it confesses its impotence in the face of an enemy to ensure national safety. So had France. Is it not very well known that professionalism has a chilling and a killing effect on energy, change, and expansion? Is it not a fact that almost all improvements originate with outsiders. Watt, a watchmaker, creates steam-engines; Arkwright, a barber, makes cotton-spinning by machinery possible; Clive, a clerk, recuperated British warfare in India, and so on.

Dislike to personal service in the army, as S. S. says, is a formidable objection; but it need not be urged against personal training in the use and practice of arms of war. That need not necessitate engagement in war; but if necessity arose, and the worst came to the worst, even those who disliked war most might not object to being possessed of the power to fulfil life's first law, self-preservation. Besides, this need for personal service might

### 33 OUGHT THE TENURE OF LAND TO BE RADICALLY CHANGED?

usefully supply a motive for these persons becoming more ardent defenders and desirers of peace than before.

We agree with J. K. N. on the advantage of discipline. Because it is so advantageous we would popularize it, and we would diffuse discipline and its benefits through all classes of the community.

The division of labour will readily take care of itself. Those will most improve in the exercises of the field who have the greatest aptitude for such forms of activity. They would devote themselves most assiduously to the practice which results in perfection, and would rejoice in the opportunity of learning the arts of strategy.

That professionalism is, as J. K. N. remarks, the form of national life, is no argument for a professional army. War is not one of the daily occurrences of human life. It is, like earthquake and tempest, an exceptional phenomenon. Though we should be ready for it, it should be a readiness such as is got by a general training. We ought not to study and wait for it. Doctors, lawyers, engineers, &c., have daily duty to perform in their profession. It has been asserted that some men have gained the highest positions in our professional army who have never smelt gunpowder on the battlefield. Greenhouse soldiery may look well, but will not bear much.

While I think that a mixture of both would be the better solution of the problem, yet, if compelled to choose, I think I should prefer a popular to a professional army.

R. O. M.

---

### OUGHT THE TENURE OF LAND TO BE RADICALLY CHANGED?

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE "Explanatory Statement," by John S. Mill, issued in connection with the "Programme of the Land Tenure Reform Association,"\* opens with the following very oracular and far-reaching *proposition*: "Of all our leading institutions *none* are more unsuited to the state of society of which the Reform Act of 1867 is the harbinger." On this we beg leave to remark, (1.) That "*all* our

\* "Programme of the Land Tenure Reform Association,"—with an explanatory statement by John Stuart Mill, pp. 1-6. London: Longman, Green, Reader, and Dyer.

leading institutions" would form a formidable catalogue. (2.) That "leading institutions" is a very wide and indefinite phrase. (3.) That "the state of society of which the Reform Act of 1867 is the harbinger" is not yet and cannot be known until it is an accomplished fact. (4.) That the unsuitableness of any institution to any state of society can only be determined on the determination of that specific state of society. (5.) That the *degree* of unsuitableness of institutions is exceedingly difficult of measurement. It might not be amiss either to notice: (1.) The excessive toto-totality of this Millian negative, "of all . . . none"—equal to none of all, or not any of. (2.) The real superlativism couched, perhaps hidden, under an apparent comparative, "none are more unsuited"—equal to are altogether unsuited, or are not in any way suited. And (3.) The ambiguity of the figurative word "harbinger"—which may signify either a near or a remote, a probable or a certain forerunner.

When we see a master of logic and of clear English purposely choosing to shroud his meaning in forms of negation not usual among thinkers, but among rhetoricians, and giving, his direct negative the outward form of a subdued or scarcely articulated affirmative, we have every reason to doubt the honesty of the cause which needs such a veil thrown over the expression of its foundation principles.

If J. S. Mill had bluntly stated his proposition as it is meant to be argued and acted on by the Anti-Land Law League, of which he has taken the presidency, how would it be accepted? It is—if it has any exact meaning at all—equivalent to this statement:—The land laws—whatever may be said or thought of any other of our leading institutions—are altogether unsuited to the state of society, of which the Reform Act of 1867 is to be made, by our political action if we can, the first step. If this is the case, it involves a few statements in it which can scarcely but prejudice the case against the League. It implies for instance: 1st. That the Reform Act of 1867 has only been accepted by the Liberal party as a means to an end—a harbinger only gives a foretaste to hope and excites expectancy. 2nd. That the end to be accomplished is an entire change of the state of society. And 3rd. That property in land, as the most of our leading institutions, must cease, in any prevalent sense, in this new social world.

Property in land has hitherto been regarded as the most secure

in its tenure, and the most safe from innovating agitation. If the very root of the idea of property be uprooted, what sort of society will that be in which no proper tie of property to its owner is acknowledged? The laws alone form the foundations of the bonds of property, and if these are to be radically altered in regard to land what other property can hope to escape from liability to the same unloosening when the restrictions are felt to be disagreeable. Property signifies the peculiar and exclusive right to the possession, enjoyment, and disposal of anything; and it is acquired by inheritance, gift, covenant, or purchase. This constitutes ownership, or the having of anything as one's *own*; and forms a large element in value. Property is the most complete right which the law of a country gives to a person, to or in any object or matter. It, therefore, altogether depends on tenure, or the manner and form in which it is held. The stringency and security of the tenure by which property is held has large influences on the prosperity and steadfastness of society, and any proposal that may be made to lessen or impair the certainty of possessory rights threatens society in one of its two roots, which are—family and property. A land-tenure reform is therefore a dangerous agitation, unless there are clear and definite limits fixed to it and the terms of the reform be stated most clearly and definitely.

That the "explanatory statement" of the Land Tenure Reform Association commences with a form of words so vague in their expression, and so set in order as rather to conceal than reveal the intended signification, we say, justly exposes the entire agitation which it seeks so to explain to suspicion of wrongfulness.

But the premises by which it is sought to prove this proposition are still more wonderful than the conclusion to which they are intended to lend support. "The country (now) belongs, at least in principle, to the whole of its inhabitants" (p. 6). This statement is either (1) fallacious, or (2) false, or (3) the ground of a far wider movement than that to which it forms the proposed fulcrum. If the ambiguous word "country" is employed as a synonym for land, it is a *fallacious* assertion—for *land* no more belongs to the whole of the inhabitants than any other kind of article, exchangeable, which men may desire, or wish to acquire, use, or enjoy. If it is intended as an affirmation that the country—including all possible possessions—belongs to the whole of the inhabitants of it, the averment is *false* in fact and in reality. If it were true that



the country belongs to the inhabitants law would be tyranny, property theft, and communism the only goal at which the Land Tenure Reform Association could rightly stop.

Again, it is affirmed that "private property in land is a mistake." If it is so, is it not so exactly in the same sense as the private possession of any desirable thing is a mistake? What good reason can be given why "private property in land is a mistake" which is not equally applicable to private property in food, mineral products, manufactured goods, means of transport, sources of joy, articles of ornament; or ability to heal, amuse, instruct, labour, &c.?

But besides this we have ambiguity on ambiguity. If "*private* property in land is a mistake," would *common* property in land be no mistake?—or if "private property is a mistake"—is it intentional or unintentional; remediable or irremediable; blameworthy or innocent; and so on? Or is *mistake* used to mean an error in judgment, an error in morals, an error in law, an error in a class, or an error in sociology; and ought the "mistake" to be rectified at the expense and by the suffering of one class—the possessors—or at the cost and by the endurance of those who would reap—presumably—the benefit of the change? Is it not singular that all these indefinitenesses should be hung around the premises of a logician of high character, and one of the most explicit writers who labour in English literature, unless there were some cause for it in the manner or the matter? And is not this cause the badness of his cause?

The members of the Land Tenure Reform Association "are of opinion that much more is amiss in the present system of landed property than merely restraints on its alienation." Are there not restraints on the alienation of every kind of property? does not the very essence of property consist in there being thrown around it restraints on alienation? *Meum* is only distinguishable from *tuum* because there are restraints against my alienating property that is yours, or you alienating property that is mine. Alienation is taking, passing, or putting into the possession of another; so that the very term property is opposed to alienation—unless for a consideration. "Whether the hitherto fundamental institution of property in land is destined to be permanent or to disappear, the members of the association do not take upon themselves to decide" (p. 7). How condescending and considerate! They do not take upon themselves to decide. They only take upon themselves to agitate, and

#### 42 OUGHT THE TENURE OF LAND TO BE RADICALLY CHANGED?

they will leave it as one of the "questions of the distant future," to be decided by the proper, but not the propertied, classes. They will not ask the abolition, but only the reform of the land tenure of the time; but they will reform it altogether, and refine it into non-existence as a property tenure. This is the radical—root and branch—reform proposed by modern land agitators, the Republican and Communist economists of our times; and the most irrefragable proofs of the righteousness of their proposals are forthcoming.

For example:—"The land is the original inheritance of all mankind." How can this be doubted? The original charter, granting the said land to the said parties, in *pro indiviso* right, in perpetuity, and with due provision against alienation as a hereditament, may be inspected by the misbeliever, of course, at the offices of the Land Tenure Reform Association, 9, Buckingham Street, Strand, London, W.C.1 And affixed to it will be observed the signature of the grantor, properly attested by witnesses to the same! A translation and an exposition of the same, with notes and explanatory statement, facsimiles of the signatures, and an engraving of the great seal thereunto attached, have been prepared, and copies may be had, warranted correct by the hand and seal of the office-bearers of the aforesaid association! One sight of this important and unique document—like that of the feu-charter of the See of St. Peter's at Rome—must not only convince but confound the most confirmedly sceptical of gainsayers. A subscription to the funds of the association entitles the donor to a sight of the original document in the original law-language of the Supreme Disposer of the same; but, doubtless, small photographs of the parchment will shortly be prepared for the gratification of those country residents whose avocations do not readily admit of a visit to the offices where the true original alone is to be seen always "on view."

Observe the statement: "The land is the *original* inheritance"—life is not; then the will requires no proof, and is chargeable with no probate duty: and no proof of heirship is required, *that* is as patent as the patent of man's nobility. But not only so: it is "the original inheritance of *all* mankind" without distinction of name, claim, race, place, creed, breed, activity or inactivity, worth or worthlessness. Over and above this, too, it is the inheritance of mankind *alone*. His co-denizens of the earth have no inheritance, no possessory right. He is the tyrant and exclusive owner. They are

the "beasts of the field," but the field is not the possession of these beasts; they are the fowls of the air and "the commoners of heaven," but they have no right to the products or the possessions of the earth; they are the "lilies of the field," but the fields are the inheritance of the Solomons of the Land Tenure Reform Association, who verily are not arrayed like one of them. They are at feud with the Tories, who would retain their old feudal claim and right to the land, because they are the true feudatories of the One Superior. In a figurative sense man is the "heir of all the ages," but in a literal sense he is heir to all the lands. What extensive estates some of us have without knowing of it! Ought we not each to run with our subscriptions to the association to show our gratitude for the good news they bring us. "The land is the original inheritance of all mankind," and, lo! I also am a man—a unit of the all "mankind" whose inheritance the land is.

"The society do not propose to disturb the landowners in their past acquisitions." "The society" will condone the terrible, the flagrant offence of having acquired property in land, and property in anything else needs no condonation because it is under no condemnation. "The society do not propose"—but any other set of men may—"to disturb the landowners in their past acquisition"—the thing may be done *noiselessly* without any disturbance. "Dead men tell no tales" and make no outcry—and it is not necessary to "propose" such a measure, for it may be more easily "carried out" at once than "carried," by a simple motion which needs not be seconded unless it is carelessly done at first. *Past* acquisitions then are safe; present acquisitions are precarious, and future ones non-effective. "*In* their past acquisitions" let the possessors remain, and beyond them do not let them be tempted to pass. *In* them the society is pledged not to disturb them; but no such immunity is promised *beyond* them. In them they may possess their souls—as well as their land—in patience; but beyond them they will be regarded with impatience. The landowners who possess what belongs to the whole of the inhabitants of the country, nay, to all mankind as an inheritance, must have curious consciences if they are not disturbed in their possessions—possessions to which they can, if the Land Tenure Association is correct, have no possible right.

In the discussion of the question proposed under the term, Ought the Tenure of Land to be radically changed?—it can

scarcely be affirmed that we have made a selection of arguments against which it is no credit to argue. There is no greater name among Radical reformers of the philosophic type than that of John Stuart Mill, and this estimate is quite borne out by the fact that he, who is known as the most distinguished logician and economist in Great Britain at least, has been chosen president of the Land Tenure Association, and has been requested to accompany the programme of that association with an explanatory statement. Well, in opposing his arguments, we may safely assume that we are opposing the best form of reasoning and words that can be brought forward on the topic. It cannot be doubted that the origin of the question as a debate proposed in these pages is due to the active crusade, begun by this association, in opposition to the land tenure of the present day. This has lent an interest to discussions on the land, and made it one of the talks and studies of the time. In default of knowing how this topic is to be treated by our fellow-contributors they cannot accuse us of having tilted against a man of straw: nor can they easily object that we have taken an unauthorized view of the debate—seeing that we have accepted the terms of the advocacy of an active and earnest league.

We may now proceed to consider some of the proposals of the Land Tenure Reform Association, and show that they are untenable and quite unworthy of adoption.

It proposes, first, "To remove *all* legal and fiscal impediments to the transfer of land."

This proposition is both wild and vague.

If we remove *all legal* impediments to the transfer of land—usurpation, squatting, trespass, &c., would cease to be crimes; and quiet possession, secure culture, and peaceable residence would become impossible. If all *legal impediments* are removed what may hinder the forcible ejection of any possessor by any claimant or aspirant. If you restrain any person from taking possession without purchase, gift, inheritance, or contract, you either institute or exercise *legal impediments* to the transfer of land—you do not remove them. But *all*, that is all and sundry, each and every one, of the *legal impediments* are to be removed from the transfer of land. There is no qualification made as to either justice or expediency—a clean sweep is to be made. By *fiscal impediments*, I suppose, are meant revenue exactions, duties, taxes, &c., on the transfer of land; but why should the fisc imperial gain from receipt

stamps, &c., on the transfer of the commonest commodity, and give freedom from expense to the transfer of land alone—what good claim to exemption can land show above labour, goods, money, &c.?

Again, may we not ask, is land ever transferred? Is it not rather the right of property in land that is transferred. A transfer of goods I can understand as a practicable piece of actuality, but the transfer of land to any great extent seems to me a little—more than a little—anomalous. Had the association proposed “to remove all [unjust, unnecessary or inexpedient] legal and fiscal impediments to the transfer [of property in] land,” we might have little objection to consent to the object—but we do rather object to the removal of *all*, without exception.

The association proposes, in the second place—“to secure the abolition of the Law of Primogeniture.” Of course, we are not to involve our readers in a debate on the side question, ought the Law of Primogeniture to be repealed? We have to do with a simpler matter. The Land Tenure Association aims at securing, *i.e.*, making sure of, the abolition of the *Law* of Primogeniture; they do not profess to aim at the securing of the abolition of the *practice* of Primogeniture, or to enforce its discontinuance. They will erase the law from the statutes at large—abolition is their aim—but they will write no new one in its place or enact one opposed to it—so far as the expression, whatever is the implication, of the plan is concerned. Does this look quite “thorough”?

In the third place, they propose “to restrict within the narrowest limits the power of tying up land.” They do not say the narrowest possible, or just, or convenient; it is an entirely absolute “narrowest.” “Limits” are, of course, possessed of extension, and space, if not absolutely, is, in reality, practically infinite in divisibility, so that narrowest may mean next to nothing at all, or the ghost of the shadow of a shade. Why not then say at once “to abolish altogether the power of tying up land”?—that is, to prevent other people from doing what they like with their own, and to compel them to do whatever you like with it—provided it is land. You may tie up jewels, goods, money (in any number of bags), &c., in any amount and way, but you must not tie up land. In that there must be no property; round it no proper tie. Tying up land is one of those figurative expressions which play such havoc in the unfigured syllogisms of fallacious reasoners. It means, of course, the bringing together or accumulating of large or numerous estates

## 46 OUGHT THE TENURE OF LAND TO BE RADICALLY CHANGED?

in the possession of one person or family, and actually implies a breach of the first proposal of the programme, namely, the establishment as far as possible of legal and fiscal impediments to the transfer of land to near relatives, or other large possessors of property in land.

These are only three points—the three first of the Land Tenure Reform Association charter, which consists of *ten*—one more than the “thrice-three Muses,” and twice as many as would have satisfied the Chartist. They proceed to claim “The Interception by taxation of the Future unearned Increase of the Rent of Land.” “Co-operative agriculture,” a “*durable interest*”—which is to differ from property! in the land to small cultivators, the making available for “small cultivators”—meaning cultivators of small portions—of Crown, public, or charity land, the use of commons for a similar purpose, the institution of parks, pleasure-grounds, and recreative spots, and the taking possession by the State of all articles of historic, scientific, or artistic interest.

We cannot enter into all these questions in our short article. We have written enough to show that if this is what is meant by a radical change in the laws of Land Tenure, then it ought not to be encouraged or advocated. The scheme is hasty, ill-defined, unfairly expressed; of evil tendency, and unjust in its application of Communist principles to land only and not extending it to all property. If that were proposed many would oppose it. The first step to evil is the one most to be feared, avoided, and resisted. D. A.

---

PAUPERS may be conveniently divided into four great classes—children and infants, able-bodied idlers, able-bodied and deserving applicants for temporary relief, and lastly, a miscellaneous class, comprising the very aged, the infirm, the blind, the insane, the incurable—all those, in a word, whose poverty is hopeless, and absolutely irretrievable by any efforts, either of their own or of others. Babies, drones, bees, and cripples constitute our pauper population.

## Science.

---

### HAS MAN DEVELOPED FROM THE SAVAGE STATE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE question stated by the conductors of this magazine is—"Has man developed from the savage state?" and it is the affirmative side of the question which we shall endeavour to maintain. But L. T. B. either confuses it, or regards it as identical, with another question—Is man *self* civilized? It is true that L. T. B. does not formally state this latter question, but he certainly argues upon it, and in fact a large portion of his article is devoted to it. On p. 370 he says: "We have no evidence in history of self-originated civilization." He also states that Archbishop Whately "maintained that there has never been any such thing as a nation civilising itself;" and again (p. 371) he asks, "Is not the progress of man as a self-civilizing agent an idle and vain dream, a figment of philosophers and revolutionists?" Now, we maintain that this is not the stated topic for debate. The questions are different and distinct. Whether man has developed from savageism is one question. Whether he is *self*-civilized (*i.e.*, whether his civilization is simply due to his own experience, and his own efforts) is another. And it seems to us quite consistent to maintain that man has developed from the savage state and yet admit, with L. T. B., that man is not self-civilized. L. T. B., by proving the latter point, does not, as he seems to think (p. 371), prove the former. We regard, then, the question whether man is self-civilized as irrelevant, and shall confine our remarks solely to the other question argued by L. T. B.—the question stated above—"Has man developed from the savage state?"

L. T. B., in order to strengthen the negative of this topic, sets upon a theory which, if proved, would be conclusive in his favour. He apparently argues that, so far from man having developed from the savage state, he is tending to it. He says that he regards civilization as man's "*normal* state, his savagery as a depreciation of his nature" (p. 372). He speaks in admiring terms of our "predecessors, in the brave days of old," of the men of Chaucer's and

Shakspeare's time, and of the "golden age." L. T. B. seems to think that there really was a time to which Macaulay's words apply with truth—

"Then none was for a party :  
 Then all were for the state ;  
 Then the great man helped the poor,  
 And the poor man loved the great :  
 Then lands were fairly portioned ;  
 Then spoils were fairly sold :  
 The Romans were like brothers  
 In the brave days of old."—HORATIUS XXXII.

He says, " We have only to look at the wonderful forms of faith, the singular imperativeness of the olden governments, the marvellous codes of law, the exquisite arts, industries, and even sciences of the past, to learn that man has become embruted and degenerate, rather than improved and moralized " (p. 371). But what proofs does L. T. B. bring forward in support of this astounding statement? Only one. Language is his witness. This philological argument certainly seems insufficient to prove so broad an assertion as that quoted above, and at least from one who says that " the true distinction between savagery and civilization is not in circumstances but in morality " (p. 369), we should have expected stronger and different evidence. If morality be the true distinction, why did not L. T. B. prove the superiority of ancient over modern ethics?

We are not sufficiently acquainted with philology to be able to fully examine the argument of L. T. B. based on the deterioration of language. But even if it be sound, it does not seem to us to prove the superior moral condition of past ages ; and we have other and far stronger proof that, so far from man having " deteriorated and become barbarous," the very reverse is the case ; that so far from the governments, the forms of faith, the laws, the sciences, &c., of past ages, being proofs that we are " embruted and degenerate," they, by comparison with modern governments, modern faiths, laws and sciences, show the vast and unquestionable advance of civilization in recent times. Here, in fact, we are literally overwhelmed with proof. What department of social or individual life can we examine, what civilized nation can we name, which fails to show us the superiority of the present over the past? Our modern faiths, our laws, our sciences, and the other things mentioned by



L. T. B., are all witnesses, not that man has deteriorated, but that he has improved.

Take law for example. Whoever will compare the *corpus juris* even of ancient Rome, the mother of legal science, with that of any modern civilized nation of Western Europe, will, we think, admit that the latter, imperfect though it may be, evinces a far higher moral tone than the former. Roman criminal law supplies us with a striking example of this. Professor Maine says, "The only form of dishonesty treated of in the most ancient Roman law is theft. At the moment at which I write [1861] the newest chapter in the English criminal law is one which attempts to prescribe punishment for the frauds of trustees. The proper inference from this contrast is not that the primitive Romans practised a higher morality than ourselves. We should rather say that, in the interval between their days and ours, morality has advanced from a very rude to a highly refined conception—from viewing the rights of property as exclusively sacred, to looking upon the rights growing out of the mere unilateral reposal of confidence as entitled to the protection of the penal law."\*

We would not, of course, ignore the real excellence of Roman law. But that excellence does not consist in its principles, but in its consistency and its arrangement; not in its *material*, but in its *formal* structure. Mr. Austin, the eminent jurist, says, "The principles [of Roman law] themselves, many of them being derived from barbarous ages, are indeed ill fitted to the ends of law; and the conclusions at which they arrive, being logical consequences of their imperfect principles, necessarily partake of the same defect."† And in another place Mr. Austin remarks, "Much has been talked of the philosophy of the Roman institutional writers. Of familiarity with Grecian philosophy there are few traces in their writings, and the little that they have borrowed from that source is the veriest foolishness. . . . Nor is the Roman law to be resorted to as a magazine of legislative wisdom."‡

It is not then in law that ancient nations excel us. Is it in their "forms of faith"? We think not. By "forms of faith" we understand, in short, those moral principles by which men profess to

\* Maine's "Ancient Law" (4th ed.), p. 307.

† Austin's "Jurisprudence" (3rd ed.), p. 1116.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 1115.

regulate their conduct. Now it may be, as Mr. Buckle (supported by Sir James Mackintosh and a host of other authorities) asserts, that there is "nothing to be found in the world which has undergone so little change as those great dogmas of which moral systems are composed. To do good to others; to sacrifice for their benefit your own wishes; to love your neighbour as yourself; to forgive your enemies; to restrain your passions; to honour your parents; to respect those who are set over you,—these, and a few others, are the sole essentials of morals; but they have been known for thousands of years." \*

Yet, if we have made little advance in the "rule of life," we certainly have taken great strides in its practice. The present age does indeed fall far short of perfection, but it makes a much nearer approach to it than Socrates or Seneca ever beheld. The growth and improvement of international law, the increasing aversion to war, and love of peace, the greater respect for life and property, the abolition of slavery, and the toleration of diverse opinions; all these, and many other things, show the moral superiority of the present over the past.

The comparison which we have already instituted between Roman and modern law is another proof of this; for law, as a whole, is a faithful index to the practical morals of a people. More than one passage in the Epistles of St. Paul bears witness to the frightful immorality existing in his time.† These must be familiar to most of our readers, therefore we pass them by. But, did space permit, we might quote many other authorities who testify to the low standard of practical morality among the greatest nations of antiquity. One must suffice. F. Von Schlegel, speaking of Rome in the century preceding the birth of Christ, says, "There can be no doubt that if the Roman history were divested of its accustomed rhetoric, of all the patriotic maxims and trite sayings of politicians, and were presented with strict and minute accuracy in all its living reality, every humane mind would be deeply shocked at such a picture of tragic truth, and penetrated with the profoundest detestation and horror. The licentiousness of Roman manners, too, was really gigantic, so that the moral corruption of the Greeks

\* Buckle's "History of Civilisation in England" (2nd ed.), p. 163.

† See, for example, the revolting statements made by Albert Barnes (the American commentator) in his note to Rom. i. 27.

appears in comparison a mere infant essay in the school of vice." \*

So much for the morals of those ancient nations whose "forms of faith," according to L. T. B., show that man has now "become embruted and degenerate." But not only does L. T. B. maintain the superiority of the ancients in this respect; "even sciences of the past" (physical sciences, we presume) he deems evidence of our inferiority. Shades of Bacon and of Newton! is it possible that this can be maintained? Are we seriously to understand that those whose scientific knowledge, and whose methods of investigation, may as reasonably be compared to ours as the light of a taper to that of the sun, were in advance of the nineteenth century? Surely not. It would not be difficult to refute such an idea. The history of every science gives us proof to the contrary. We cannot, of course, now stay to examine into any particular science to prove this, but we will quote an authority which we think will be unquestioned by most of our readers. Herschel says, "Previous to the publication of the 'Novum Organum' of Bacon, natural philosophy, in any legitimate and extensive sense of the word, could hardly be said to exist. Among the Greek philosophers, of whose attainments in science alone in the earlier ages of the world we have any positive knowledge, and that but a very limited one, we are struck with the remarkable contrast between their powers of acute and subtle disputation, their extraordinary success in abstract reasoning, and their intimate familiarity with subjects purely intellectual on the one hand, and on the other with their loose and careless consideration of external nature, their grossly illogical deductions of principles of sweeping generality from few and ill-observed facts in some cases, and their reckless assumption of abstract principles, having no foundation but in their own imagination, in others; mere forms of words, with nothing corresponding to them in nature, from which, as from mathematical definitions, postulates, and axioms, they imagined that all phenomena could be derived, all the laws of nature deduced." †

\* Schlegel's "Philosophy of History" (Bohn's Standard Library), p. 261. For further information on this subject see Mr. Lecky's valuable "History of European Morals."

† "Herschel's Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy" (Lardner's Cabinet Encyclopedia, 1833), p. 105.

As to the "olden governments," the "exquisite arts and industries" of the past, space will not permit us to examine them. Considering, however, how closely they are connected with the progress of morals and of physical science, and seeing that we have shown these to have improved, it would not be unreasonable to infer similar progress in government, art, and industry; and whoever will take the trouble to investigate into the matter can hardly fail, we think, to find such to be really the case.

"Change rather than progress," says L. T. B., "has been the tale of history" (p. 372). We admit that it is a tale of "actions and reactions," but, to adopt Macaulay's comparison, the world's movements resemble "the sea when the tide is rising. Each successive wave rushes forward, breaks, and rolls back; but the great flood is steadily coming on. A person who looked on the waters only for a moment might fancy they were retiring. A person who looked on them only for five minutes might fancy that they were rushing capriciously to and fro. But when he keeps his eye on them for a quarter of an hour, and sees one sea-mark disappear after another, it is impossible for him to doubt of the general direction in which the ocean is moved." \*

Just such has been the course of events in the world's history. Sometimes the moral and intellectual standard has declined, and that seriously, but only for a time, only to be afterwards elevated to a yet higher level than it had ever reached before. And we feel convinced that few who strip ancient society of the rhetorical tinsel with which some poets and historians have gilded it, and then gaze upon it in all its naked deformity, will be inclined to say, "The former times were better than these."

The delusion—for such we believe it to be—of L. T. B. is neither novel nor rare. There seems ever to have been a tendency in man to be discontented with his present position; and this it is which gives rise to L. T. B.'s notion "that man has become embruted and degenerate." But (to quote Macaulay again) he is "under a deception similar to that which misleads the traveller in the Arabian desert. Beneath the caravan all is dry and bare; but far in advance, and far in the rear, is the semblance of refreshing waters. The pilgrims hasten forward, and find nothing but sand where an hour before they had seen a lake. They turn their eyes and see a

\* Macaulay's *Essays* (Cabinet Ed., 1866), p. 225.

lake where an hour before they were toiling through the sand. A similar illusion seems to haunt nations through every stage of the long progress from poverty and barbarism to the highest degrees of opulence and civilization. But, if we resolutely chase the mirage backward, we shall find it recede before us into the regions of fabulous antiquity." \*

Having now disposed, we hope successfully, of the fallacy that man has "deteriorated and become barbarous," we come next to what is really the question at issue—Has man developed from the savage state? L. T. B. says, "Neither reason nor history supports the idea that all mankind were originally savages" (p. 370). We would ask, Then what were they? Certainly "neither reason nor history" supports the idea "that man sprang into existence like Athene . . . from the head of Zeus, . . . as civilized as in many lands he now is." We cannot indeed with certainty trace the history of all European nations back to the time when they were as degraded as the "tribes of Central Africa and of the Polynesian isles;" but we do know that they were once very far beneath their present standard of civilization, and therefore to us it does not seem unreasonable to infer that even the most cultivated nations which now people, or ever have peopled the earth, arrived at their high civilization by a gradual process of development from the savage state.

L. T. B. has himself noticed one fact which confirms our view of this question. He remarks, "that as men separated in quest of new settlements, and removed from each other so as to be little brought into community, . . . they sank to lower depths, they became degraded" (p. 371). Now if this be true, if civilization declines as the separation between man and man increases, so, we presume, it logically follows that as this separation decreases civilization advances. Here, then, we have an argument in our favour. For with the triumphs of modern science and engineering skill, with our railways, steam ships, telegraphs, post services, and newspapers, there surely never was a time when the physical separation between man was less than it is now. And as regards the separation caused by "laws, customs, and hostile feelings," probably civilized society never knew less of it than at present. We have no hard-and-fast line drawn between patricians and plebeians; hereditary legislators are almost unknown, save in England;

\* Macaulay's History, c. 3 (Cabinet Ed., 1869), p. 442.

slavery no longer exists in Western Europe; and the general advance of a levelling democratic spirit is beyond all question. In all respects, then, the separation between man and man is less now than in any former period. The farther back we go we find it greater, and therefore, according to L. T. B.'s own doctrine, the further back we go we find civilization less.

But perhaps L. T. B. and his supporters will say, "This is but theory, and *facts* must be the test in this question." To *facts*, then, let us appeal.

If we can show that, so far as the scanty records of history go, they prove that all men were once in a condition resembling that of nations now held to be, or to have been, savage, the historical argument will be on our side. For then, since all men were once savage, and some men are now civilized, it will follow that man has developed from savagism.

Amongst those nations which are now generally regarded as savage, we find the patriarchal form of government prevailing to a greater or a less extent. The ruler of the nation or tribe is not chosen by his subjects, but rules by virtue of some mysterious superhuman title, and his power over the persons and property of his people is absolute. We find there also that gross sensuality prevails. Men revel in "the spontaneous indulgence of the senses of the present hour." Their existence is "regulated by the caprice of a will that has been unsubdued by reason." Might is right amongst such men, and consequently, justice is unknown and woman degraded. The tribes of Central Africa and Polynesia mentioned by L. T. B. are examples of this savage state. There we find that government and those customs and modes of living just described, and we consequently call such nations *savage*.

Now we would ask, does not history, meagre as it is, prove such also to have been the condition of all men in the earliest ages? The scanty records which we have of the early history of the world all go to prove that at one time the whole human race were in the condition of those nations we have just mentioned. Indeed, the words used by L. T. B. in describing the tribes of Central Africa and Polynesia apply here with equal force. The early inhabitants of this globe were "rude, uncouth, and uncontrolled by the high forethoughtful self-restraint of a reasonable morality" (p. 369). The absolute patriarchal form of government, the disregard of the claims of the individual, the carelessness of the future, and the un-

restrained power of brute force, are all prominent in the world's youth, and stamp the men of that time as savages, for the same reason as we apply that title to wild African tribes.

Look at the form of government. The Bible gives us the first glimpse of man in his primeval savagism. Some, indeed, may cavil at its authority; but, judging from the general tenor of L. T. B.'s article, we infer that he at least will not be inclined to do so, and for the present we must assume the scriptural narrative to be substantially correct. The condition of the human family after the fall, as recorded in the early chapters of Genesis, must be known to all the readers of this article. We will not therefore occupy space by quoting verses illustrative of that condition. Its general outline may be fairly described as follows:—

"The eldest male parent—the eldest ascendant—is absolutely supreme in his household. His dominion extends to life and death, and is as unqualified over his children and their houses as over his slaves; indeed, the relations of sonship and serfdom appear to differ in little beyond the higher capacity which the child in blood possesses of becoming one day the head of a family himself. The flocks and herds of the children are the flocks and herds of the father, and the possessions of the parent, which he holds rather in a representative than in a proprietary character, are equally divided at his death among his descendants in the first degree, the eldest son sometimes receiving a double share under the name of birthright, but more generally endowed with no hereditary advantage beyond an honorary precedence."\*

Nor is it in their patriarchal government alone that the men of the earliest ages resemble those nations now considered as savages. There is also a striking resemblance between their moral and intellectual condition. No inconsiderable portion of the Book of Genesis consists of a record of sins and superstitions which are always particularly prevalent among savage races. In the days of Noah we are told that "God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually."† And in the record of the ages succeeding the flood, scanty as it is, mention is made of acts of violence, and of several gross and disgusting sins, which clearly indicate the savage condition of man at that period.

Considering, then, such evidence of the condition of man in the

\* Maine's "Ancient Law," pp. 123-4.

† Gen. vi. 5.

early ages of the world as the Bible affords, we think we are justified in concluding that all men were once in a condition resembling that of those nations generally held to be savage, and that therefore man must have developed from the savage state. But as some may be inclined to dispute the authority of the statements we have gathered from the Bible, or the conclusions which we have drawn from those statements, we would further contend that there is also a strong analogy between the condition of those nations which we now deem savage, and that of most of those great nations whose early history we are able to trace with any degree of certainty. Unfortunately, this early history is in many cases either totally lost, or mixed up in such inextricable confusion with what is mythological and legendary, as to be valueless. But there are a few exceptions to this rule, and one of these will suffice for our present purpose.

"When," says Sir J. Mackintosh, "the Greek and Roman writers began to turn their eyes westward, they found Europe, from the farthest shores of Ireland to the banks of the Danube, peopled by a race called Gauls."\* It is this race whose early condition we would investigate. There, as Professor Maine says, were "examples of patriarchal power in its crudest form."† Cæsar (who is "represented as the highest authority on these subjects by the most competent of judges") says, "Among the Gauls the multitude are in a state of servile dependence upon the equestrian and sacerdotal orders. Most of them indeed, for the sake of exemption from taxes, or deliverance from debt, or protection against danger, have enslaved themselves to the nobility, whose power over them is as absolute as that of a master over his slaves." Cæsar then states that knowledge is confined to the Druids—the sacerdotal order, that the people are very superstitious, and that the power of the priests is very great. Next he says, "All the political authority which such prerogatives in the priesthood suffer to exist is exercised by a turbulent and factious nobility, whose constant occupation is to recruit and exercise their devoted adherents."

"The chieftain or vergobret has an uncontrolled power of life and death over all the laymen of his tribe. Their domestic life corresponds to their ecclesiastical and civil polity. Husbands have

\* Mackintosh's "History of England" (Lardner's Cabinet Encyclopedia), p. 1.

† "Ancient Law," 135.



the power of life and death over their wives and children. At the death of a nobleman, if there be a suspicion against the wives, they are put to the torture as slaves; if they be thought guilty, after cruel torments, they die in the flames."\*

Such was the early condition of the inhabitants of that continent which now boasts the most civilized nations the world has ever known. Sir J. Mackintosh truly terms it "a lawless licence of action;" and we find in it most of the elements of savage life. We know that Europe has really developed out of this savage condition. Indeed we can with tolerable certainty trace the steps by which she has emerged into the light of modern civilization. Surely then we are justified in saying that European man has developed from the savage state.

This article is far longer than we originally intended, and we must now conclude it. We have shown that no ancient nation reached so high a stage of civilization as we now witness; that so far from man having deteriorated, the very reverse is the case. We have proved, by L. T. B.'s own theory as to the separation of man from man influencing his civilization, that the further back we go civilization decreases, and consequently savagism increases. We have examined the early condition of mankind and the early condition of Europe. In both cases we found man a savage, and knowing that he has now in many cases reached a very high standard of civilization, we of course conclude that man *has developed* from the savage state. Looking at our present advanced condition, many may feel a repugnance at accepting a doctrine which gives man so humble an origin, and some perhaps construct an hypothesis of their own as to the early condition of our race,—an hypothesis more flattering to their vanity. But reason and not sentiment, facts and not fancies, must be arbiters in this question, and these point irresistibly to the conclusion at which we have arrived.

GEORGIUS.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

RESPECTING the condition in which man was created there is but one source of information—the Bible. Of the authenticity and divine inspiration of that book there are numerous and undeniable proofs. Therefore its statements are not to be set aside to make

\* C. J. Oss. de Bello Gallico, vi., 13. Translation quoted from Mackintosh's History of England, pp. 6, 7.

way for the doctrines of science. It is not out of place to use this argument here, as in the *British Controversialist*, there are repeatedly conducted debates in which the Bible is made the standard of appeal. The account given us in the Bible of the creation of man is that he was made in the image of God (Gen. i. 26, 27; v. 1; Eccles. vii. 29; Jas. iii. 9). By the scriptures here referred to we believe it is made quite clear that man was not created in a barbarous or savage state. In this condition of society men are pagans, attaching a superstitious reverence to a multitude of objects, both in nature and in art; some in this social condition have had their holy rocks and caves, which were believed to afford miraculous aid, and to deliver oracles; others are found worshipping members of the brute creation, as well as practising as a part of their religion such horrible acts as are repugnant to all correct judgment and feeling, such as clenching the fists till the nails penetrate the palms, gazing on the intense blaze of the sun till eyesight is extinguished, and performing various suicidal acts. And is it credible that this is the state in which man was created? If he were created in this condition, could it be said, as the Scriptures affirm, that he was made in the image of God?

What must be understood by the scriptures we have alluded to above? Doubtless this, that man, when created, resembled his Maker in his immortality, in his intellectual powers, and in his purity. Man at his creation was perfectly holy and innocent, which man in a savage state is very far from being; therefore man was not created in a savage condition, and consequently he was not developed therefrom. At his creation all man's affections were pure and ordinate, and he had no sinful passion or desire. In the savage state man's affections are grossly impure, therefore man was not created in this condition, and, as a consequence, has not developed therefrom. At his creation, man's understanding was free from all errors and mistakes, and though there were many things of which he had no knowledge, yet all his ideas were correct ideas, and he had no erroneous notions, either of himself or of God. But one prominent characteristic of the savage state is that of gross darkness and the most erroneous ideas of Deity; consequently man was not created in that condition, and therefore cannot have developed therefrom. Concerning the knowledge of man at his creation we have much testimony in the Scriptures. There we read that God brought to Adam both beast and bird, "to see what he would call

them; and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof." This was a trial of man's wisdom, and it was a proof of great knowledge to give so many animals suitable names so as to distinguish one from another, and point at something that was natural to them, and in which they differed from each other. There is reason to believe that the Hebrew was the original language, and that this language was spoken by Adam in giving names to the creatures suitable to their nature, or agreeable to some property observed in them; and Bochart has given many instances of creatures whose names in the Hebrew tongue answer to some character in them. Likewise, when Eve was brought to Adam, he knew whence she sprang, all which knowledge is vastly superior to that possessed by man in the savage state.

Here we may be asked how the fact that there have long been, and that there still are nations and peoples in a savage condition is to be accounted for, if this were not man's original state. We believe this is fact to be accounted for by man's fall from his original condition of innocence and dignity. Sin is of a degrading, debasing nature; it darkens the mind, it renders the heart hard, and makes the feelings obtuse and indifferent respecting right and wrong. The fall of man was the fruitful parent of licentiousness, selfishness, wrath, envy, malice, hatred, strife, murders, thefts, craft, dissimulation, and idolatry. Even in our own highly civilized country we see what degeneracy is continually going on in certain classes of the people, and that in these classes men and women keep sinking lower and lower in vice, there being a constant tendency in those who are exposed to certain circumstances and temptations to lapse into sin and savagery. Putting together the two facts that man was created in innocency, and that he is now to be found in a state of savagism, it appears clear that man has fallen from an exalted into a barbarous condition, not, as our opponents maintain, developed from a savage state. Indeed, in his present state man is only a wreck of what he was when made. There is weighty evidence for our argument in these facts, that from the time of the fall, man degenerated till, about 1,500 years after that event, the wickedness of man was so great, and the earth was so filled with violence, that God determined to destroy man from the face of the earth, which He did by a flood of waters. From which facts it is evident that during the period which elapsed between the fall of man and his almost total destruction from off the earth by a flood,

he was not developing or rising from a savage state, but, on the contrary, was falling more and more from an elevated to a degraded condition.

The dispersion of men after the building of Babel led to certain portions of mankind sinking still further into a state of savagism. Their language being confounded, as many as spoke the same language would doubtless keep together. Thus mankind would be divided into bodies composed of persons speaking the same language, one body going in one direction, and other companies in other directions, and so settling in different parts of the world. Some portions of the human race—as those who entered and settled in the continents of Africa and America—would necessarily become isolated from the rest. Those who remained in that part of the world which was first inhabited would retain many advantages which the emigrants to fresh settlements would not be possessed of. These would be debarred, not only of many of the means of improvement, but also of the means of retaining their position; and being shut out from contact with those more civilized than themselves, they would sink into barbarism. Indeed, the mere transplantation of men from one set of conditions of life to those of a kind very diverse therefrom would induce a great change, both in organic character and in mental habitude. Such is seen to be the case both with the lower animals and with mankind. The domesticated pig of Europe, when allowed to run wild in America, recovers the tusks and other external features of the wild boar, from which state domestication again brings it. The sheep carried into a tropical climate loses its woolly fleece and retains only a thin coat of hair. In the West Indies new peculiarities of structure have been observed in the descendants of English settlers. Their cheek-bones are higher, and their eyes deeper set in the head than those of the English nation generally, thus approximating to the form of the aboriginal races of the American continent and islands. It has likewise been remarked of the descendants of Africans in the United States, that after three or four generations their features lose much of the native African cast, and approximate to those of the white people; and it is patent to all that a certain physical form and figure is accompanied by certain mental qualities and dispositions. Thus the dispersion of mankind at Babel was doubtless a large element in the precipitation of portions of mankind into savagism. That it is easy for mankind to degenerate from as

exalted to a degraded condition is manifest from the fact that at the present time we have in our midst, notwithstanding the high degree of civilization which we have attained, a mass of savagism. Take as instances of this the dens of vice which are to be found in our large towns and cities, in some of which even the police have not dared to intrude themselves for the purpose of enforcing the laws. It would be difficult to conceive how greater licentiousness, dishonesty, malice, craft, or cruelty can be existent amongst the natives of New Zealand, of America, or of Africa, than is to be found amongst a portion of our own population, many of whom were not born in the condition in which they are now living, but have by successive downward steps reached that state. Others, by contact with them, and by the force of other circumstances, are rapidly undergoing a deterioration of manners and character, which, but for the force of early training, parental restraints, good education, and a continual good example given by those by whom they are surrounded, many others, too, would undergo. Thus a barbarous uncivilized community grows up in the midst of a highly civilized one. We may even assert that the same high civilization which raises one portion of the community uncivilizes and brings into a barbarous condition another part of the community; and as proof of our assertion we will here quote from the Duke of Argyll, in "The Reign of Law," in which work, writing on the state of things which was induced by the factory system in the latter part of the eighteenth century, the noble author says, "The millowners collected as apprentices boys and girls, and youths and men and women of all ages. In very many cases no provision adequate, or even decent, was provided for their accommodation. The hours of labour were excessive. The ceaseless and untiring agency of machines kept no reckoning of the exhaustion of human nerves. The factory system had not been many years in operation when its effects were seen. A whole generation were growing up under conditions of physical degeneracy, of mental ignorance, and of moral corruption."

The rise of our own and of other nations from a condition of barbarism has been brought about by certain influences which have been brought to bear on them, such as conquest by civilized people, colonization, commerce, intercommunication with people in a more advanced state of society than themselves, the translation of the Bible into the various languages of the world, the preaching and influence of missionaries, &c. Civilization is not of spontaneous

growth. It existed at the beginning. It was preserved in the family of Noah. And the nations which are civilized owe their civilization to the influx or contact of strangers.

In his paper, which is written for the purpose of showing that man has developed from the savage state, B. E. C. quotes from J. S. Mill. But the quotation given by him refutes his own argument, for a part of Mr. Mill's description of savage life is, that in it there is "no *agriculture* or next to none." Now in Gen. ii. 15 we are told that God put Adam "into the garden of Eden, to dress it and to keep it." Thus it appears that even in a state of innocency man was not designed to live an idle life, but was to practise *agriculture*. And immediately after the fall we are told that Adam was sent "forth from the garden of Eden to till the ground from whence he was taken." Thus in the earliest ages *agriculture* was practised by man. If, therefore, Mr. Mill's description of savage life be a correct one—which we believe it to be, and which is evidently endorsed by B. E. C.,—man's primeval state was not that of savagism. B. E. C. remarks, "If man had been formed a civilized being he would have been at creation a perfect being, and progress would have been an impossibility. But we know that the industrial arts, government, science, art, literature, sociality, and morality have developed from age to age, and therefore we believe that man has developed; but development from perfection to imperfection is rank nonsense. If man has progressed at all, therefore, he must have progressed from a savage state to his present civilized (or rather civilizing) one, and hence we think the affirmative plainly and fully proved."

We have already seen that man was created "in the image of God" (Gen. i. 27), and that "God made man upright" (Eccles. vii. 29); consequently, man at his creation was a perfect being,—that is, he was perfect in holiness, and his knowledge, so far as it went, was correct, his understanding being free from errors and mistakes. In drawing such an inference as he does respecting man's development from the progress made by the industrial arts, government, literature, sociality, and morality, B. E. C. loses sight of some most important facts. Does not B. E. C. believe that man when created was in a condition of perfect happiness? and if he were, how could he be so unless he were at the same time perfectly holy and innocent? And as man at his creation was perfectly pure, and in strict conformity with the holy law of God, he loved God with all his

heart, and had he continued in his original condition would have loved his neighbour as himself. In that case what human government would have been needed? There would have been no necessity for judges, magistrates, police, or prisons. Man's disposition would have been to do everything that is right and holy, and nothing that is wrong or sinful. Morality would have been perfect. Literature! what a different stamp would have been given to that! We can form no adequate conception of such a state of things, having never experienced nor witnessed anything similar to it. The greater portion of mankind have indeed progressed from a savage to a civilized state, but man's original condition was plainly not a savage but a civilized one. Civilization has been all along maintained in a portion of the human family, and in the course of ages has been carried by them to those who had lapsed into savagism. The argument, therefore, of B. E. C., drawn from the fact of man's progression, that man's original condition was a savage one, falls to the ground.

Most likely many of the industrial arts, as well as the science of government and other sciences, have progressed till they have reached a degree of perfection which they would never have attained had man continued in his original innocence. Man's fall into sin, with its consequent diseases, infirmities, and numberless evils of various kinds, has given scope for the introduction of such remedies as would have been neither needed nor thought of had man abode in his created purity and happiness; even as the fall of man has been an opening for the divine bestowment of happiness and glory, far surpassing both in nature and in degree that which was known by man before he fell, and which surpassing happiness and glory he would never have known had he never fallen. In that case he would never have known death, and would have lived on the earth for ever, possessing a happiness which was perfect of its kind; but that happiness being forfeited he is now raised to the glory and happiness of heaven, which far surpasses the glory and happiness which man possessed before his fall. Therefore the fact that man now possesses a degree of knowledge, dignity, or happiness, or that he will at any future period possess such a measure of knowledge, felicity, or honour as he did not possess in past ages, is no proof that he was created in a savage state, still less that he has developed from such a condition.

S. S.

## The Reviewer.

---

"Master John Lilly hath deserved most high commendations, as he who hath stept one step farther therein than any, either before or since he first began the witty discourse of his 'Euphues,' whose works surely in respect of his singular eloquence and brave composition of apt words and sentences, let the learned examine and make trial thereof through all the parts of rhetoric, in fit phrases, in pithy sentences, in gallant tropes, in flowing speech, in plain sense, and surely in my judgment I think he will yield him that verdict which Quintillian giveth of both the best orators—Demosthenes and Tully—that from the one nothing may be taken away, to the other nothing may be added."—*Wm. Webbe's "Discourse of English Poetry,"* 1586.

*EUPHUES, The Anatomy of Wit: EUPHUES AND HIS ENGLAND: English Reprints.* Edited by Edward Arber. London: Edward Arber.

*Shakspeare's Euphuism.* By M. L. Rushton. London: Longmans & Co.

*On Euphuism.* By Richard F. Weymouth, Esq., D. Lit., M.A., &c.  
*The Byways of English.* Article in *Meliora*, April, 1869, pp. 21—51. London: S. W. Partridge.

*The Dramatic Works of John Lyly.* London: J. R. Smith.

*EUPHUISM.* "Quarterly Review," April, 1861. By Professor Henry Morley.

"*EUPHUISM* is a word with a history. Though originally derived from the Greek *EUPHUES*, which signifies well-shaped, docile, or witty, we owe its introduction and use to an author whose fame has almost fallen out of memory except among literary antiquarians, and to a work which, first published in 1579, about the middle of Queen Elizabeth's reign, passed through ten editions in fifty-six years, and then was not reprinted till October, 1868, when it was issued as one of the excellent series of *English Reprints*, edited by Edward Arber, in a cheap, handy form. That author was the witty, comical, facetiously quick, and unparalleled John Lyly, Master of Arts of both universities, and the book was '*Euphues: the Anatomy of Wit*;' a very clever work upon friendship, love, education, and religion. When Thomas Watson, in 1582, published his '*Passionate Century of Love*,' it had prefixed to it a letter from 'John



Lyly to the author, his friend.' Blount affirms that 'our nation are in his debt for a new English which he taught them. Euphuus and his England began first that language; all our ladies were then his scholars, and that beauty in a court which could not parley *euphuisme*, was as little regarded as she which now there speaks not French.' For a century and a half, at least, Euphuus was a name to which not one in twenty thousand could attach a clear idea. All that most people know about its author and his work is probably derived from Sir Walter Scott's vile travesty of euphuism in the person of Sir Shafton Percie, whose insipid nonsense disfigures the 'Monastery;' or from stray panegyrics or denunciations penned, it may be, by those who know only at second hand that which they praise or condemn. They may, perhaps, have further heard that the alliterative and florid nonsense in 'Love's Labours Lost' is designed to ridicule the alliterative and florid Lyly. But all these facts and much more put together will not give so clear an idea of euphuism as a perusal of a few pages of the veritable 'Euphuus.' Lyly was imitated by Greene, Lodge, and Nash. Ben Jonson caricatured his style in Fastidious Briak, one of the characters in 'Every Man in his Humour.' Webbe, Meres, and Drayton praised him, and Shakspeare himself owes not a little of his grace of speech to this style of Elizabeth's time. Lyly and Ascham much improved the English tongue, and Wilson's 'Arte of Rhetoricke' directed attention to artistic writing. Lyly was also a dramatist of some popularity, although in these as well as in his prose writings the affected sententiousness, the forced antitheses, and the strained smartness read strange to modern ears."

The foregoing notice and description of *euphuism*, its originator and its progress, we have selected from the paper on "The Byways of English," in which Mr. Neil discourses on euphuism, euphemism, cant, slang, &c., as our readers may suppose, in a learned spirit and in an interesting manner. But perhaps we may profitably bring together a little more of the biographical matter which makes the books of an author a greater delight, before we proceed to enlarge on the works themselves, which we are desirous of reviewing at present, as they have a peculiar pressing interest from being chosen as among those which are to be used at the examination in the London University for the B.A. degree, to which not a few of our readers may be looking forward.

John Lyly, Lily, or Lilly, *filius plebis*, a son of one of the common  
1871.

people, was born in the old forest, and forming the Weald of Kent, lying between the North and South Downs, in 1553 or 1554, probably the latter, as he entered Magdalen College, Oxford, in 1569, though he was not matriculated till 5th Oct., 1571 (along with all the members of the college for the first time), and then he was seventeen years of age. He took the degree of B.A. on 27th April, 1573, at which date, according to Anthony Wood, he was in the twentieth year of his age. On 16th May, 1574, he wrote to Lord Burleigh a letter intended to be presented to Queen Elizabeth, requesting to be appointed fellow of his college. Though his application was unsuccessful he found Lord Burleigh so ready, being but a stranger, to do him good, that he ought, he thought, neither to forget him nor cease to pray for him; and it is probable that he held some office in his service. He took his M.A. degree 1st June, 1575; and in 1578 his first counterfeit "Euphues: the Anatomy of Wit" was written, brought under the notice of a nobleman, and licensed to be printed. It was published in 1579, in which year he was incorporated M.A. of Cambridge. The second part of "Euphues" was ready for issue in 1580, and printed. In 1582 he had offended his patron, and a justificatory and apologetical letter of his to Lord Burleigh is extant in the Lansdowne MSS. In 1584 Lyly's play of "Alexander and Campaspe" was played before the Queen (Elizabeth), and on Shrove Tuesday of the same year his "Sappho and Phao" had the same courtly honour; on Candlemas, "Endymion" was performed at Greenwich before the Queen, and "Gallathea" had a similar honour on New Year's Eve. "Midas" and "Mother Bombie" had equally distinguished patronage—the children of St. Paul's in all being the actors.

John Lyly took an opposition part, as did many of the wits, in the great Martin Mar-prelate controversy (of which a notice will be found in James Hannay's "Essays from the *Quarterly*," pp. 85—88 and of which a separate *History* has been written by Rev. W. Maskell), by issuing "Pap with a Hatchet; *alias* a Fig for my God, son; or Crack me this Nut; or a Country Cuff, that is, a sound box on the ear for the Idiot Martin to hold his peace, written by one that dares call a Dog a Dog," 1589. Petitions to the Queen in 1590 and 1593 show that he was in considerable distress, and that he had been an expectant but disappointed hanger on at the court to pick up any inconsiderate trifles which might be handily got hold of, and speaks of writing a work to be named *Lyly De*

*Tristibus*, in allusion to Ovid's "*Tristia*" as to matter, and Cicero's "*De Finibus*" as to style.

Robert Greene (in 1587) issued his "*Menaphon: Camilla's Alarum to Slumbering Euphues*," &c., and "*Euphues, his Censure to Philautus*," &c.; and Thomas Lodge published (in 1590) "*Rosalind, Euphues, Golden Legacy*," on which Shakspeare founded his "*As you Like it*." These circumstances show the popularity and influence of *Euphues*; in addition to the fact that at least six editions of the work were published during Lyly's lifetime.

According to J. P. Collier, John Lyly dwelt in the parish of St. Bartholomew the Less, London; he had several children. He died in Nov., 1606, on the 30th day of which month he was buried in St. Bartholomew's Church.

Besides the works already mentioned Lyly produced "*The Woman in the Moon*," a play in blank verse. "*The Maid's Metamorphosis*," a drama, chiefly in rhyme—and "*Love's Metamorphosis*," a Pastoral comedy. Meres calls him "eloquent and witty." Drayton ascribes to Sir Philip Sidney the overcoming of euphuism, as he—

" Did first reduce  
Our tongue from Lillie's writing then in use."

Among the friends of Lyly were Thomas Watson, author of "*The Passionate Century of Love*;" Henry Lok, author of "*Sundry Sonnets of Christian Passions*;" probably Thomas Lodge, who praises him as "the famous for facility in discourse," Nash, who is thus spoken of by Gabriel Harvey—"Nash; the ape of Greene, Greene the ape of Euphues, Euphues the ape of Envy." John Eliot, author of "*Orthoëpia Gallica*," "*Fruits for the French*," &c. Jonson, Drayton, and Marston opposed euphuism; Shakspeare smiled blandly over its extravagance, and took advantage of its popularity to make a few points.

In Campbell's "*Specimen of English Poetry*" Lyly is said to have promoted a fantastic style of false wit, bombastic metaphor, and pedantic allusion, which it was fashionable to speak at court under the name of euphuism, and which the ladies thought it indispensable to acquire. Lyly, in his "*Euphues*," probably did not create the new style, but only collected and methodized the floating affectations of phraseology. Craik, Hallam, Marsh, Spalding, Angus, Chambers's "*Cyclopædia of Literature*," may all be consulted on this subject with some advantage. Dunham's "*Lives of the*

Dramatists," in Lardner's Cyclopædia, Hazlitt's "Dramatic Literature of the Age of Elizabeth," C. Knight's "Studies of Shakspeare," Dyce's "Introduction to the Works of Robert Greene," Gifford's "Ben Jonson's Works," Nathan Drake's "Shakspeare and his Times," J. P. Collier's "History of Dramatic Poetry," Charles Kingsley's "Westward Ho!" (pp. 275—77)—Thornbury's "Shakspeare's England," Vol. II. (pp. 407-414), all, besides the works previously noticed, contain observations and material able to help the student if wisely used. The several cyclopædias under Lyly's name supply notices more or less complete, and to Mr. Arber's edition of Lyly's "Euphues" there is prefixed a brief abstract and chronicle of his life, times, and works; while in the Introduction to Mr. Fairholt's "Dramatic Works of John Lyly," a considerable amount of valuable biographic matter will be found. Henry Morley's essay on the Influence of Euphuism—of the authorship of which Dr. Weymouth did not seem to be aware, contains some excellent observations in style euphuistic. S. Neil's article refers more to the moral than the literary aspects of the euphuistic language. Dr. Weymouth's paper is a brief, interesting, and entertaining paper read before the Philological Society, chiefly valuable for its demolition of Scott's credit as giving a fair imitation of euphuism. We quote the more valuable portions of this paper:—

"The most important element by far in the euphuistic style is antithesis. And it is very commonly combined with alliteration. I take antithesis (for the word fares ill in some dictionaries) to be the apposition of words or sentiments in sentences in immediate juxtaposition, or in one and the same compound sentence. . . . Much more commonly Lillie combines alliteration with antithesis, making the corresponding words in the same clauses begin with the same letter. It is, so to speak, a transverse alliteration rather than longitudinal. Let us see the title-page of 'Euphues and his England,' in which the author recommends his book as 'delightful to be read, and nothing hurtful to be regarded; wherein there is small offence by lightness given to the wise, and lesse occasion of looseness professed to the wanton.' Lillie's favourite form of alliteration is well marked in this sentence. The *offence* in the first clause answers to *occasion* in the second, *lightness* to *looseness*, *wise* to *wanton*. And this transverse alliteration, though every critic has overlooked it, is one of the most characteristic forms of Lillie's style. . . . But in the sentence quoted just above from the title-page we cannot fail to observe not merely antithesis combined with alliteration, but also that *consonance* or imperfect rhyme which Aristotle

calls *Paromoiosis* and *Quintilian Purison*. This is illustrated in the case before us by *delightful* followed by *hurtful*, and *lightness* followed by *looseness*: . . . sometimes, but rarely, rhyme without alliteration, as *course, force*. . . . In these examples of antithesis, or rather in most instances *pariosis*, we see the clauses arranged by pairs, the members accurately balanced one against the other. But our author also loves to equalize with the like care three or more parts of sentences which are not opposed, but parallel. Thus,—‘And here I am most earnestly to exhort you to modesty in your behaviour, to duty to your elders, to diligence in your studies.’ . . . Another characteristic of euphuism is seen in what we may call the *responsive* form of sentence, a variety of the antithesis, in which the speaker or writer in alternate clauses states objections and answers them. . . . I take a euphuism, in the narrower use of the word, as signifying a particular form of expression specially characteristic of *Lilie’s* prose, and of which every page furnishes examples (for a euphuism ought to mean this and nothing else), to be a combination of well-balanced antitheses with the transverse alliteration of which numerous examples have been given above; while a euphuistic style will be one which abounds not only in such euphuisms, but also in classical and mythological allusions and multifarious illustrations, as well as in the other less important features of *Lilie’s* manner, a few of which we have pointed out. The adoption of such a style is *euphuism* in the wider sense of the term. . . . In fact, the style of ‘*Euphuës*’ is so utterly dissimilar to anything that has been written in English before or since, that, however it may have been for a time the fashion to parody euphuism, as to the written language our entire literature can exhibit but one single euphuist—*Lilie* himself.”

Mr. Rushton has acquired a repute for his *Shakspeare brochures* which gave us hope that his contribution to “*Shakspeare’s euphuism*” would have been a work of some critical research, going into the principles of the question. It is rather a collection of parallel passages—some very loosely textured, and many of them we think rather beside the point to be proved, having evidently a common source in proverbial phrases and current expressions rather than in any conscious or unconscious imitation.

Dr. Weymouth makes a good remark on this matter:—

“It would be interesting to endeavour to trace the influence of this work on the productions of later writers. In every age some feeble men will imitate what is novel and striking, which sometimes others of a robust mould will amuse themselves by mimicking. But rarely in any writing of the later Elizabethan or early Stuart period can careful scrutiny detect a genuine euphuism; and if we find one and another in Ben Jonson, we

may be tolerably certain that they are introduced only in jest. There is something very like a euphuism in Brainworm's words in 'Every Man in his Humour,'—'You seem to be gentlemen well affected to martial men, else should I rather *die with silence than live with shame.*'"

Mr. Rushton says, "It is quite evident that Shakspeare was very familiar with the book ["Euphuus"] wherein I see the origin of many of the famous passages in his works. Shakspeare and Lyly have often the same thoughts, use the same language and phrases, and play upon the same words." His collections or selections do not seem to us, however, to be discriminated, affirm no principle, and afford at best an example of how capable Shakspeare was of catching points of sympathy with his audiences. We notice a few of Mr. Rushton's instances.

The following instances of coincidence and parallelism of expression we refer, not as Rushton does to Shakspeare's acquaintance with and borrowing from Lyly, but to both having made use of the proverbs and popular phrases of the day.

"Most subject is the fattest soil to weeds."—*Shakspeare.*

"The fattest ground bringeth forth nothing but weeds."—*Lyly.*

"A burning torch that's turned upside down.

The word *quod me alit me estinguit.*"—*Shakspeare.*

"The torch turned downwards is extinguished with the selfsame wax which was the cause of his light."—*Lyly.*

"A friend i' the court is better than a penny i' the purse."—*Shakspeare.*

"A friend in the court is better than a penny in the purse."—*Lyly.*

"Comets, importing change of times and states."—*Shakspeare.*

"Comets, which ever prognosticate some strange initiation."—*Lyly.*

"Two may keep counsel putting one away."—*Shakspeare.*

"Two may keep counsel if one be away."—*Lyly.*

"The empty vessel makes the greatest sound."—*Shakspeare.*

"The empty vessel giveth a greater sound than the full barrel."—*Lyly.*

"Smooth runs the water where the brook is deep."—*Shakspeare.*

"Where the stream runneth smoothest the water is deepest."—*Lyly.*

We cannot think the purposes of true critical study are secured by the collation of passages containing such narrow similarities in such common phrases as "Go against the hair" (p. 11), "Play fast or loose" (p. 13), "Chew upon this" (p. 15), "The weaker vessel" (pp. 19—21), "Curst wives" (p. 31), "A fool's paradise" (p. 63), "Mortife" (pp. 80—82), "Meacock" (p. 85) for effeminate,

"White and red love" (p. 86), "Stand upon" (p. 87) for concern, "Hedge in" (p. 96), "Under correction" (p. 99), &c.

Mr. Rushton is a better commentator when he notes the play of words on *addle egg* and *idle head*, which was a common jest of the time (p. 2), or *stoicks* and *stocks* (p. 3), beef-witted (p. 41), *manner* and *manor* (p. 60), *carriion* as if *carry-on* (p. 67), descant and Sol-fa, (p. 79), &c.; and there is real Shaksperian illustration and euphuistic commentary in the capital passages on desperate diseases (p. 11), Pygmalion's images (p. 19), "I banish you" (pp. 22—28), and sweet are the uses of adversity (p. 30). He has made an especially good hit—"a hit, indeed, a very palpable hit"—in his parallel of the Advice of Polonius to Laertes with that of Euphues to Philautus. "Leading Apes in hell" a long-drawn-out correspondence occurred in *Notes and Queries* some time ago, from which Mr. Rushton might have seen that the idea was common in that age. A few good notes on Romeo and Juliet occur, on fashions in hats and feathers (p. 52), and on *violets* as lowly sweethearts. We wonder the author has failed to point out the resemblance between the following passage and the argument of Shakspeare's early sonnets:—

"If thy mother had been of that mind when she was a maiden, then hadst not thou been born to have been of this mind to be a virgin. Weigh with thyself what slender profit they bring to the commonwealth, what slight pleasure to themselves, what great grief to their parents, which joy most in their offspring, and desire most to enjoy the noble and blessed name of a grandfather. Thou knowest that the tallest ash is cut down for fuel because it beareth not good fruit; that the cow that gives no milk is brought to the slaughter; that the drone that gathereth no honey is condemned; that the woman that maketh herself barren by not marrying is accounted among the Grecian ladies worse than a carriion, as Homer reported" (p. 86).

We may perhaps quote here the sentence—"God, when He had made all things, at the last made man as the most perfect, thinking nothing could be framed more excellent; yet after him He created a woman—the express image of eternity, the lively picture of nature"—as an anticipation of Burns,—

"Old Nature swears the lovely dears  
Her noblest work surpasses;  
Her prentice han' she tried on man,  
And then she made the lasses."

We may just notice that if the use of the term "expire thy date" is regarded as derived from Lyly, it would be wrong to quote, as is done, the same phrase to prove that Shakspeare was probably a law clerk; so if the phrase "weaker vessel" is to prove his acquaintance with Lyly, we must not withdraw the use of the phrase as a proof of his knowledge of 1 Pet. iii. 7.

We quote the following estimate of the influence of Lyly from Professor Henry Morley's most erudite and elaborate book:—

"Lyly still in our day suffers injustice. Labelled by the compiler with a certain character, he is now read only by a stray antiquary once or twice in a generation; and the traditional view of his 'Euphues' is represented by the saying of Gifford, that it 'did incalculable mischief by vitiating the taste, corrupting the language, and introducing a spurious and unnatural mode of conversation and action.' The work passed through ten editions in fifty-six years, and then was not again reprinted. Of these editions the first four were issued during twenty-three years of Elizabeth's reign, the next four appeared in the reign of James, and the last two in the reign of Charles I., the latest edition being that of the year 1636, eleven years after that king's accession. Its readers were the men who were discussing Hampden's stand against ship-money. During all this time, and for some years beyond it, worship of conceits was in this country a literary paganism that gave strength to the strong as well as weakness to the weak, lasting from Surrey's days until the time when Dryden was in his mid-career. It was of this *culte* that the euphuist undoubtedly aspired to be the high priest, but it was not of his establishing. . . . Of the true form of his conceited writing Lyly's court plays, some of them written earlier than his novel, furnish even better example; and their studied prologues, the manner of which Greene exactly copied in the prefaces to his tales, are the most finished miniatures of Elizabethan euphuism. . . . If we look from the influence of his day exerted upon Lyly to the influence exerted by him, we shall find this also blended with the common taste for wit from Italy. More prolific than Lyly, as an Elizabethan novelist, was Robert Greene. He was a close imitator at once of Lyly and of the Italians, accepting Lyly as a master in the manner of his speech, but looking more directly to Italian example for the matter of his stories. . . . While 'Euphues' was thus in fashion, Shakspeare being yet young as a play-writer, and at the date of the



critical preface to 'Menaphon,' Bacon was a young barrister, part deviser of the dumb shows at Gray's Inn, and within two years of his appointment as Queen's Counsel. Sir Philip Sidney had been dead two years, and Ascham twenty years. Sackville, Lord Buckhurst, whose pen contributed to the first English tragedy, still had some twenty years of life before him. Of Marlowe's brief career only five years were yet to come; of Greene's but four, during which his overcharged confession and self-accusation of an ill-spent life would give some strain of a wild sobbing earnestness to his last novels. Ben Jonson was then but fourteen years old; Fletcher but nine; Beaumont, Massinger, and Webster, three or four. Donne was a youth of sixteen, and twenty years were yet to pass before the birth of Milton, who was himself ten years older than Cowley, and twenty-four years older than Dryden, who was a man of forty years old at the birth of Addison. Throughout the whole period thus indicated, the taste for conceited writing introduced from Italy, in or before the first years of the reign of Elizabeth, prevailed. . . . At what level euphuism stood, when it came strained out of the brains of those ordinary people who make up the substance of polite society at court, Ben Jonson has shown, with a spice of malicious caricature, in 'Cynthia's Revels.' The play, produced only two years before the death of Elizabeth, was wholly designed as a jest against what its chief euphuist describes as 'your shifting age for wit,' when you must prove the aptitude of your genius; if you find none, you must hearken out a vein and buy." It was to bid men put only to manly use the powers of their intellect,—

"And for the practice of a forcèd look,  
An antic gesture, or a fustian phrase,  
Study the native frame of a true heart,  
An inward comeliness of bounty, knowledge,  
And spirit that may conform them actually  
To God's high figures which they have in power."

We may connect the taste for conceited writing in the days of Lyly with that of the early days of Dryden.\*

It would have been highly useful if some of our authorities had given us a few expositions of the lexicon of euphuism, as,—

\* "English Writers," Vol. I., pp. 38—47.

*Gleyke*, scoff, gibe, joking reply *gleg*, answer.

*Frumpe*, a nipping taunt; a Roland for an Oliver.

*Pinglers*, stable horses, horses of all work.

*Brawne fallen*, wasted, become feeble and fleshless.

*Teene*, keen, sharp, sorrow-giving.

*Imping*, joining, mending, improving.

*Braveri*, huffy haste, haughty impatience.

*Gravelled*, confounded, discomfited, brought down.

But a still greater service would it be to annotate "*Euphues*" in regard to its natural philosophy, its mythology, and its curious statements of strange facts—or fictions regarded as facts.

For instance, why is it that wine poured into fir vessels is present death to the drinkers? (p. 582). What bird is it that the crocodile suffereth to breed in her mouth? (p. 579). Why do lions' bones being stricken together break out like fire? (p. 578). In what way does the crane keep the stone in her foot which saves her from falling asleep? (p. 211). Why are the tears of the hart salt and those of the boar sweet? (p. 120), and a great many things else might be asked, if there were any probability of getting them answered.

We may conclude our notice of these works by saying that the studious perusal of "*Euphues*" may be made a good training in the art and practice of disposing words, and in the instructive discovery of the signification of many etymologies; it may be found to supply a good deal of wholesome advice, wise and strongly put—and it may be used as a good exercise in distinguishing between rhetorical and logical statements. As a culture it may be best read with a good dictionary by one's side—Halliwell's Dictionary of Archaic words and phrases being for this purpose the best, and a note-book into which all difficulties should be entered for further consideration and research. We hope many of our readers will be induced to take up such a study as this, and we think the choice of the London University a wise one in assigning this work a place in its examination list. We hope our notice may be found profitable and suggestive.

---

## The Societies' Section.

### BERLIN. PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY. HEGEL'S MONUMENT.

As several of the readers of the *British Controversialist* were, along with myself, subscribers to the fund for the Hegel Centenary Monument, it may not be uninteresting to them and their compeers to know what has been done in this matter. The agitation for the erection of a monument originated with the Philosophical Society of Berlin—an association founded in 1843 by the pupils and friends of the Teuton thinker. In the belief that the Federation of the Wise would everywhere recognise their illustrious metaphysician as worthy of honour, appeals were made by them to the admirers of the higher culture in other lands for aid in the solemnization of his centenary at Berlin, the scene of his most influential labours. In Britain Dr. James Hutchison Stirling, author of "The Secret of Hegel," one of the rarest and most profound of the thinkers of our land, was asked to become a collector. He accepted the office, and laboured ungrudgingly to make a valid sympathetic sign to his brethren in Germany through a contributory gift. A sum far from large was gathered and transmitted, for which due receipt was forwarded early in 1870.

The terrible political convulsion of last year burst upon Europe to the dismay of many and the dislocation of much that had been previously planned, and among other schemes almost necessarily laid aside was the inauguration of the Monument which was to signalize the fact that a hundred years

had elapsed on 27th Aug., 1870, since the day of the birth of George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the greatest force-unit of thought which has yet appeared in the modern home of philosophy—the place where human reason, as exercised in the highest sphere of speculative effort, has had its furthest reach and its most systematic development.

True, a faithful few assembled in the Prussian capital on 27th Aug., 1870, and talked one with another about the might of the dead philosopher's thought, which has so largely gone to the making of Germany what she now is. But the most important formality of the intended proceedings was deferred till the more convenient season when peace should again bless the land, and rejoicings might be carried out without hindrance or drawback from the thought of possible peril to the Fatherland, of which Hegel was an ornament.

It was properly felt in Germany that a time when she was fighting for existence against a powerful foe was not a suitable occasion for festive rejoicing, even although these were to have been held in commemoration and celebration of that philosopher who had supplied one of the most potent elements that have gone to make Germany what she has at length become. For Hegel was no mere abstract dreamer, but a veritable seer, in whose gnarled and knotted thought and often uncouth language there is a heart and kernel of solid reality which makes him

one of the most practical of writers and of thinkers. However startling and puzzling his philosophy of logic, mind, nature, and God may seem, he is brilliant in thought, searching in acumen, and full of the noblest common sense.

It was thought advisable to wait for quieter times, and so it came to pass that the statue-memorial of the Hegel centenary was not inaugurated till 3rd June, 1871. The statue is a colossal bronze bust of the philosopher, simple but handsome, set upon a pedestal of polished red granite, bearing upon it the single and sufficient inscription—**HEGEL**—and nothing else. A light railing surrounds and at once guards and ornaments the memorial. The bust, which is the work of Herr Gustave Bleaser, who had never seen the master thinker, though it has been worked from pictures, engravings, and reliefs, is spoken of by those few living men who personally knew the philosopher as a striking and effective reproduction of the man, an express and special image of the matchless one. Independently of its truthfulness as a likeness of the grand, earnest, thoughtful countenance, the bust is a high and excellent work of art, which has called forth general admiration. It stands in the centre of the *Bunhof Platzen*, just behind the garden of the University, towards which the face of the bust is turned.

The Philosophical Society, Hegel's friends and members of his family, and a deputation from the university with the rector at their head, assisted at the ceremony of handing over the statue to the charge of the civic authorities of Berlin which took place at 11 a.m. Verses written for the occasion by Prof. Maercker, and set to music by Edward Grell, were sung, accompanied by a brass band. Professor Dr. Edward Maetzner, president of the Philosophical Society, delivered an eloquent

extempore presentation address, and then handed over the deed of presentation to Burgomaster Hedeman and the deputation from the city, which was suitably acknowledged in the name of the city. Three cheers were thereupon given for Hegel, and the proceedings were closed with singing.

At noon a large audience assembled in the Music Hall, to hear an Elogé on Hegel, by Prof. C. L. Michelet, editor of *Aristotle*, well known as an ardent admirer of the philosopher and an able expounder of his system, author of "System of Philosophy from Kant to Hegel," "Schilling and Hegel," &c. The address, on the importance of Hegel in the development of modern German thought, embraced a criticism of the views of those who plead the authority of Hegel for an anti-spiritualistic philosophy, and, after a rapid survey of the system of Hegel worthy of the author of the "Personality of the Absolute," concluded with an encomium of and a plea for the earnest study of Hegel's philosophy. Michelet spoke with great fluency, without the use of notes, and was warmly applauded.

At two o'clock Professor Harms, a distinguished member of the philosophical faculty in the university, delivered an address in presence of the university authorities in their academic costume, a select number of citizens, and a large body of students, in the great hall of the university; a splendid room, with reading-desk at one end, under a white marble canopy stretching the whole width of the room, and supported by white marble pillars. The address was entirely different in structure and in manner from those previously given. It traced the career of Hegel at Tübingen, Frankfurt, Jena, Heidelberg, and Berlin, and examined his philosophy. It was intensely analytical, was closely read, with a calmness which seemed to indicate self-re-

straint only maintained by effort. He assigned a high place to Hegel for the stimulus he had given to philosophical thought, but questioned whether he has done much in the discovery of truth. He alluded to the division of his followers into two schools, the right and the left, and hinted at the awkwardness of the disciples of the same philosopher upholding contradictory doctrines as the results of his philosophy. The address pleased neither party, as impartial estimates seldom do, but it was eminently able. The choir sung Goethe's hymn, "*The soul of man, which, like the water, from heaven comes, to heaven rises,*" before the address, &c. The proceedings were closed by singing two stanzas from one of the odes of Horace (I. 22), "*Integer vita scelerisque purus, &c.*"

The programme of the day concluded with a university dinner. Dr. Maetzer occupied the chair. In the seat of honour was Hegel's son, professor of history in Erlangen, editor of his father's "Philosophy of History"; on the left the rector of the University of Berlin.

Professors Dörner, Maerker, and Michelet; several members of the House of Lords (Reichstag) and House of Commons (Landtag), the members of the Philosophical Society, representatives from various parts of Germany, and a few foreigners, among whom were Prof. Tappan, of New York, author of the well-known work on the Will; Prof. Campbell, of Minnesota; Prof. Calderwood, Edinburgh. A number of speeches were delivered and toasts given, the great feature of the evening being the freedom with which both sides of the followers of Hegel expressed themselves in avowal of conflicting sentiments; the one class maintaining the spiritualistic philo-

sophy, often connected with distinct utterances of Christian belief, while the others spoke as freely in support of a contrary system.

The whole proceedings were conducted with the utmost cordiality, even when the speakers differed most strongly.

"The memory of Hegel" was received in solemn silence. This was followed by "philosophy," "Berlin," &c.; an enthusiastic schoolmaster from the country gave "Hegel as a schoolmaster." The entire details were admirably arranged and managed. The whole proceedings awakened the deepest interest among the students, professors, and lovers of philosophy, and the undertaking proved to be a great success. Hegel's is the first monument in Berlin erected to philosopher. It seems strange that in a country so rich in great philosophical names, so little should have been done in the German capital for the erection of memorials of their greatness.

It is perhaps not to be expected that a philosopher, who influences the great mass of his fellow-beings only by slow degrees, after long intervals, and indirectly through the influence he brings to bear upon those who become the teachers of the people, should be honoured with any large measure of popular acclaim. Yet it surely is wise to preserve, perpetuate, and honour those who win to a country the respect of the world; who conquer to the world some solution of its difficulties, who gain to themselves the admiration of the thoughtful among men. The memorial statue unveiled on Saturday at Berlin will remain to testify to the appreciation, which has begun at length, in Germany and the world of the great philosophical thinker of this century, of modern times.—Hæxli S.N.

## The Inquirer.

### QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

945. May I beg of you or your readers information upon the following?—

1. What are the subjects in which candidates for appointments in the Excise, Customs, and Post Office are examined?

2. Are they *competitive examinations*? what influence, if any, is it requisite I should obtain to secure a nomination? If any of the readers of the *British Controversialist* can and will supply the desired information, I shall be very much obliged.—A. D.

946. Could any reader of the *British Controversialist* kindly give an old subscriber the author and publisher's name, with price, of some simple yet comprehensive work on the composition of a sermon?—H. W.

947. What was the "*Rivulet*" controversy?—D. G.

948. Who were the Della Cruscan in English literature?—M. W.

949. Can any of your readers give any particulars of Erskine of Linlathen?—T. F.

950. What is known as "the Row Heresy"?—T. F.

### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

946. Perhaps, although being "an old subscriber" to the *British Controversialist*, H. W. had not been a reader of this serial during the latter part of 1864. In the months of August and November of that year there appeared in its pages two papers on "The Eloquence of the Pulpit," from the pen of S. N.,

which have since been republished in a separate form in "The Art of Public Speaking," by Samuel Neil, of which work these papers—somewhat abridged—form the portion extending from page 77 to page 96. Within the space there are very few papers on pulpit ministrations from which so much that is valuable may be learned. If our querist has not read these he ought to do so, and to do so in the magazine if possible, for that contains several eloquent passages which have not been republished,—notably a fine passage on varieties in the style of sermons. The most common book on the subject is "Claude on the Composition of a Sermon," but there are several other productions which may be read with advantage. Blair's "Lectures on Rhetoric and the Belles-Lettres" have many good instructions on the matter inquired after; so also have the Lectures of Wm. Barron on "Belles-Lettres and Logic." Dr. Campbell's "Sacred Eloquence" is a standard work; and Ripley's "Sacred Rhetoric," an American work, has been republished in this country. Some excellent matter on the composition of sermons will be found in Dr. Stevenson MacGill's "Lectures on Rhetoric and Criticism;" "Thoughts on Preaching in Relation to the Requirements of the Age," by Daniel Moore; "The Art of Preaching," by Dr. James Begg, have been spoken of favourably. A translation of Athanasie Coquerel's "The Preacher's Counsellor," issued by Elliot Stock, Paternoster Row, at 3s. 6d., was recently reviewed in this magazine in terms of high appreciation. The same publisher

issues "The Model Preacher," by Rev. Wm. Taylor (2s.). Thomas Bosworth, 215 Regent Street, has published M. Bantain's "Art of Extempore Speaking" (5s.), of which a large portion consists of instructions applicable to pulpit oratory. Connected with this subject we may mention Rev. J. J. Halcombe's "The Speaker at Home."

Our own advice on the composition of a sermon would be short. Read the text and context till the scene, circumstance, or theme is familiar in all its elements. Determine on the point it specially

teaches. Arrange according to the aim in view. Observations on the nature, importance, or difficulty of the theme or narrative giving interest to it, doctrine founded on or found in it, application to characters, conduct, or circumstances of hearers. It should always be remembered that preaching is hortation or exhortation—is intended not so much to inform as to reform; is meant to dissuade or persuade, and ought to bring creed and deed into closer union. Only preach Christ, and all will be well in your sermon, however composed.—SCOTONIUS.

## Literary Notes.

Dr. V. A. HUBER, of Munich, has issued in his "Kleine Schriften" a tract on "Spinoza's Philosophy."

George Grote (of whom a biographical sketch appeared in *British Controversialist* for Jan. and March, 1869) died 18th June, aged 77.

The final issue of the Early English Text Society's books for this year is now in the publisher's hands for distribution next week. It consists of a curious collection of Legends of the Holy Rood, edited from the manuscripts by Dr. Richard Morris; the "Minor Poems of Sir David Lindsay," edited by Mr. James A. H. Murray, and with a critical essay on Lindsay by Prof. T. Nicol, of Oxford and Glasgow; and "The Times Whistle," a set of satires on the times of James the First, now first edited, from the MS. in the Library of Canterbury Cathedral, by Mr. James Meadows Cower, of Faversham.

A lost work of Chaucer's, unknown to any of his editors or biographers, is mentioned in the Pro-

logue to his "Legende of Good Women," in the MS. Gg. 4, 27, in the University Library, Cambridge, namely, a prose translation

Of the wrechede engenddrynge of  
mankynde,  
A man may in Pope Innocent  
ifynde.

The prologue in this MS. has some most interesting variations from the other MSS., including the statement that Chaucer has sixty "bokys olde and new," full of stories from Latin and Greek authors about the lives of women.

Professor Porter has nearly ready a biography of Dr. Cook, the famous Theological and Ecclesiastical Controversialist of the north of Ireland.

*The Owl* was christened by the inversion of the initials of Lawrence William Oliphant, to whom the authorship of "The Coming Race" is generally attributed, one of the brilliant but eccentric Palmerstonians, when the followers of that Mr. Affable was a party.

"The Proverbs of Scotland," compared with and illustrated by those of other countries, have occupied the studies of Dr. Patrick Buchan, for many years, and the results are soon to be given to the public.

*The Congregationalist*, edited by Rev. R. W. Dale, Birmingham, is intended it is said to replace *The Christian Witness*.

Thomas Cooper, the Chartist, has in the press a work on Christian Evidence. This announcement reminds us that we have long been expecting his "Paradise of Martyrs."

An essay on "The Uses of Biography," by J. B. Brown, author of the article "Canada" in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, has just been issued.

The study of *euphuism* is going on. Besides Arber's edition of John Lyly's *Euphuus*, we have Dr. R. K. Weymouth's "On Euphuism," and W. L. Rushton's "Shakspeare's Euphuism." This will not only be useful for candidates for the first B.A. Examination in the University of London, but to students of Literature in general.

James McCosh, LL.D.—a high and pure thinker—has in the press "Christianity and Positivism," lectures on natural theology and apologetics delivered at Princeton College, New Jersey, U.S.

The Rev. Robert Baker Girdlestone, M.A., author of "The Anatomy of Scepticism," has in the press "The Synonymes of the Bible compared and interpreted as a sample of Inductive Theology."

Thomas Squire Barrett, author of "An Examination of Gillespie's argument *a priori*," has in preparation "An Inquiry into the Nature of Causation."

Father John Girard's "Narrative of the Gunpowder Plot," with a biographical introduction, is in preparation by Rev. John Morris.

Rev. G. Smith, B.A., Ph. D.,

minister of St. Saviour's Gate Chapel, York, has issued "The Bible and Popular Theology."

"Female Labour," by the Crown Princess, is expected to be a valuable contribution to the question of woman's place and duty in the world.

A work on "Mormonism," by Mr. Stenhouse, formerly editor of *The Salt Lake Telegraph*, is in the press.

Dr. J. H. Newman is revising his "History of Arianism."

Herr Emil Klaat has adapted Shakspeare's "Henry VIII." to the German stage.

Herr Julius Grosse has dramatized "Bothwell,"—as a Mary Stuart tragedy.

Professor Alb. Ereret is publishing in Italy "Sketches of Educators."

Bayard Taylor's translation of the second part of "Faust" has appeared, and is highly commended.

In Prospect Park, Brooklyn, New York, a statue of Washington Irving is to be put up.

A monument of Schiller, by Begas, is about to be uncovered in Berlin.

M. E. Littré's great French Dictionary, part 25, reaching to *Scieur* has been issued.

M. Francisque Michel is about to restudy what Mr. Buckler tried—to write "The History of Civilization in Scotland."

"Jesus the Nazarene," vol. i., by Herr Fr. Clemens, is exciting as much attention in Germany as "Ecce Homo" did in England.

Robert Browning is about to present the public with a Euripidean tragedy.

Mr. Nicholas Michell has nearly ready for issue his poetical works, in seven vols.

A rare collection of ballads, issued in 1723-5, has been republished in *fac-simile*.



## Modern Metaphysicians.

ALEXANDER CAMPBELL FRASER, M.A., LL.D.,

F.R.S.E., &c.;

*Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh ;*

*Author of "The Life and Letters of George Berkeley, D.D.," and Editor  
of "The Philosophical Works and Miscellaneous Writings of Bishop  
Berkeley," &c.*

*(Continued from page 29.)*

THE University of Edinburgh is one which bears a European reputation for distinction in those metaphysical, ethical, and political speculations which are ranked under the general name of philosophy, and for having exerted a powerful influence on the revolutions of thought and practice for which this century has been remarkable. Its chairs have been filled by thinkers of power, and men of far more than average merit. The chair of Logic, though never in reality brilliantly, had for the most part been usefully filled. Under its previous occupant it had, however, been for twenty years the centre-source of a great intellectual light, to which even Europe and America did not disdain to turn for guidance in the mazes of speculative thought. From it, there had issued profound and elaborate expositions and criticisms of systems of thought, curious and recondite researches into the history of opinion, and vigorous dashes into intellectual controversies, which had aroused in men, both at home and abroad, the spirit of reflective investigation, and had inspired in the university a passion for probing logical subtleties, and for threading metaphysical labyrinths, which made it a difficult—almost an impossible task to occupy that chair, and to fulfil adequately the expectations of men concerning its holder. Professor Fraser opened his class-course of lectures in the University of Edinburgh under happier auspices than his predecessor, who had required almost day by day to provide the thought which was on the succeeding day to rouse and charm his

1871.

students. The new professor of logic and metaphysics had a reserve of force in the lectures prepared by him in his former chair. His opening address was modest and manly. He spoke of his predecessor with warmth and appreciation, referred to his own occupancy of a seat in the class-room, in which his students were to listen to a new voice discoursing on the old theme. He made no pretensions to being able to teach new doctrines, but accepted it as his duty to lead them, as far as possible, to see the forms of thought which constituted the science of reasoning in the light of regulative principles, and to use them for the distinguishing of truth from falsehood; and to guide them through the gallery of the thinkers of the past, noticing their history and noting their doctrines, with such annotational remarks as might direct their own minds to the right performance of the critical functions comprised in a studentship in philosophy. He regarded the position assigned to him as involving grave responsibilities, and entered upon his duty with an anxiety to be found useful to his students, an auxiliary in the great work devolved on the university, and able to diffuse a love of truth, if not to advance the sciences of severe thought and reasoned investigation.

The professorial chairs of Scotland are virtually its only educational and literary offices which offer a tolerable maintenance to the intellectual class of the country; and, with their moderate incomes and imperfect organization, their contribution, in the last century and a half, to the common stock of human science and culture, as well as to the list of names of European reputation and influence, has been extraordinary. In last century they were the centres of the most brilliant contemporary literature in Europe. The first to accept and diffuse the great discoveries of Newton, they have since added fresh splendour to the magnificent roll of modern physical discovery. 'The Wealth of Nations,' which has been described as one of the four most influential books of modern times, issued from a Scottish [University] class-room, while the lectures of Stewart helped to spread over Europe and America the doctrines and influence of Scottish political philosophy, and to inform and liberalize the minds of the greatest English statesmen. In their theory of human nature, of knowledge, and of life, and in their application of it to the duties and controversies of men, the Scottish teachers, if they have only imperfectly influenced the great body of their own countrymen, have held a place, second to none, which England has not approached since the days of

Locke, and which has gained respect and admiration for their doctrines in Paris and Oxford [Berlin and Florence, Princeton and Harvard]."

"Nowhere," says Professor David Masson, "is there such an action and reaction of mind, such a kindling and maintenance of high intellectual enthusiasm, as in a university class-room, where a teacher, whose heart is in his work, sees day after day before him a crowded audience of the same youths on the same benches, eager to listen and to carry away what they can in their notes. Nowhere is a man more likely to be roused himself by the interest of his subject, and nowhere are the conditions so favourable for the expedition and permanent conveyance, not only of his doctrines, but of the whole image of himself into other minds."

Professor Fraser has preserved the traditions of his chair as an influential one on human thought, by making his class-room the gymnasium of intellectuality, a centre of culture, and a place for calm, deliberate, and extensive exposition of what man has conquered in the domain of speculative science. He toiled diligently and not unambitiously to give his students full fresh draughts from the fountains of reflective thinking; and though he made no attempt at startling, he strenuously endeavoured to stimulate and inform. His first session was passed in a conscientious, solid, and painstaking manner, and if it occasioned little enthusiasm, it originated a respectful interest, and a taste for farther research.

His second session made a decided impression in philosophical circles. His introductory lecture on philosophical method attracted attention and excited hope. During the winter it was expanded into a tract, and was issued in January, 1858, under the title of "Rational Philosophy in History and in System," as a provisional substitute for a syllabus of a course of expository thought which he was endeavouring to mature "in a region where maturity must be long sought for and late in its appearance." In this lecture the professor sought to present "a view of logic and metaphysics as the philosophical theory of understanding and belief in the mutual relation of their first principles," so as at once "to bring into harmony some of the best current doctrines regarding these studies," and to excite "in the mind of a student that train of meditative experiments which is the essential part of a philosophical life;" yet not forgetting that he required as much as possible "to

unite an efficient logical discipline for the many, with encouragement and assistance to a few, who are able to pursue researches in the profounder labyrinths of philosophy, or the more recondite parts of literature." From this excellent *résumé* of the victories of reason in the domain of thought, and estimate of the ideas most requisite for the education of the inner life, we may make, with advantage, several extracts, as the work has even now become somewhat scarce, and though the opinions of the author have now, as we shall see hereafter, advanced considerably from the philosophic standpoint here taken.

"Rational philosophy, as that term is used by me, is a search for ultimate truth, or that unity of reason which is conceived to be the final reward of the philosophical impulse. It seeks its appropriate intellectual satisfaction through two studies, namely, logic, or the philosophical science of laws, by which the understanding or faculty of thought must, as such, be ruled and restrained; and metaphysics, or the philosophical science of real existence, as revealed to the understanding in belief. Logic is the science of formal truth, metaphysics is the science of real truth. In the one we contemplate the harmony of thought, with its own necessary conditions; in the other, the last relations of the real universe to the universal beliefs of reason. The former contains the venerable science long associated with the name of Aristotle; and now much elaborated under the name of formal logic. In the latter study, in which also Aristotle takes a conspicuous place, we contemplate the phases of being that are apprehended by the understanding in space or time, with the view to learn whether the real world can be comprehended in a mind that is logically ruled and restrained. In logic we study the capacity of thought; in metaphysics, the relation of finite thought to existence. These two sciences, when regarded as thus philosophically correlative, may be termed rational philosophy."

We cannot avoid interjecting here, though somewhat out of chronological order, yet as strictly related to the foregoing in the order of thought, a beautiful and discriminating, a choice and interesting passage on the value of philosophy. It is extracted from, and forms the closing paragraph of an eloquent paper on "Sir William Hamilton and Dr. Reid," published in the *North British Review*. Nov., 1848, in a critique on Hamilton's edition of the works of Dr. Thomas Reid, issued two years previously in an unfinished state; yet even in that state, as about a third part of the thousand pages of which it consisted was contributed by the editor, justly

regarded by philosophic thinkers as one of the most important contributions to the metaphysical literature of Great Britain that the nineteenth century had witnessed. Though a few sentences refer to the then living editor, we do not care to withhold them: first, because they indicate the writer's feeling towards his instructor, friend, and predecessor; and second, because they formed the natural basis of the subsequent reflections:—

“ We have reason to offer our cordial thanks to the distinguished author of these ‘Notes and Dissertations’ for providing among them so many paths and recesses in which the inquisitive student may reflect on phases of our knowledge there presented to him, that will very greatly add to the number of his queries on such topics as those which have occupied our attention in the greater part of this article, and where he may also gather no slight contribution to his stock of answers to such queries. The pages of this volume supply ample evidence that the graspings of the mind of man after the first principles of physical, theological, and self-knowledge are not confined to one generation of the history of the world. These are founded on tendencies which are permanent as the race of man. They are the seeds of a nature fallen from its high and original destiny, but which was not adapted only, nor chiefly, for this earthly life between two eternities. From Thales, Xenophanes, and Pythagoras in the Greek philosophy, and the still older inspired complaints of the patriarch of Idumea, down to our own century, the apparent discord of the theory of knowledge because the real limitation of its sphere; the great objects of knowledge—God, self, and the world,—together with the riddles of creation, and of independent moral action which these involve, have attracted, in order to find an explanation of them, and thus reduce them into human science, a succession of men of different schools, of whose uninterrupted series of fragments of thought that are expressed in the accumulation of philosophical paragraphs, sentences, and references which enrich the learning of this volume, as well as its original matters, form a remarkable confirmation and illustration. Though ever and anon the calls of the circumstances through which men are passing may divert the attention of generations to the arrangement of affairs that are more pressing, if they are less sublime and imposing, the like aspirations will continue to ascend, and not the less passionately as the world approaches its catastrophe. They are worthy of reverence as the emanations of the human spirit in the direction of the permanent, the infinite, and the eternal, the nourishment at once of nobleness and humility of mind; if they are often the baffled efforts of a desire to break the barrier by which its own structure confines the thought of man, who finds instincts instead of explanations when he endeavours to

form such science. This perpetual yet broken struggle after what must in the end elude his grasp, when become habitual and too exclusive in any individual, tends to weaken his judgment in common affairs, by abstracting it from clear and distinct sciences, and palpable individual realities, and tempts his mind to sink into itself in the vain effort to find there that explanation which shall leave nothing to be explained. The check of nature thus imposed upon the unrestrained indulgence of speculation affords an emphatical illustration of the sentiment which pervades the '*Pensées*' of Pascal regarding the mingled greatness and littleness of man."

This should be regarded, strictly speaking, as a huge parenthesis; and yet we cannot help believing that our readers will feel that it is so excellent in itself, and so germane to the topic involved in the tract under consideration, that they would not willingly have lost the opportunity of making themselves acquainted with the fine thought it contains and expresses. We must now, however, proceed with our analysis of the "Rational Philosophy," from pursuing which this passage has to some extent seduced us.

"Every genuine philosophical system is the result of an effort to represent the universe in its deepest and truest aspect in relation to reason. In philosophy the ultimate aim—through many apparently devious windings and mazes—is to determine what is meant *at bottom* by the so-called real existence which appears in innumerable forms, which every human action assumes, and on which life reposes. That is just saying, in other words, that philosophy tries to describe the true ultimate relation between speculation and action—understanding and belief, and to determine whether belief and practice can be ultimately resolved into, or at least reconciled with, understanding and speculation.

"A system of logical and metaphysical philosophy is thus an ultimate plan or scheme of thought concerning the real world that is perpetually presented and represented to us in daily life. It is, moreover, a plan of such a kind, that it must become, to any one by whom it is earnestly adopted, the *intellectual* measure of *all* his *ultimate* judgment about the universe in which he is living; and, consequently, about the department of phenomena to which he is particularly attracted by taste or circumstances. Every philosophical system is, in one word, a type or place of **THEORETICAL REALISM**. . . . The ultimate problem concerning the real must be either *soluble* or *insoluble* by speculative reason. Take the former of these alternatives. The solution must be either positive or negative, *i. e.*, the problem may be positively solved, or it may be negatively dissolved in contradictions. In the nature of the case, there is thus room for three elementary types of theoretical realism.

"Now the actual philosophical creations of the present and past, may be analyzed into three corresponding modifications of speculative doctrine, or rather, two modifications in perpetual collision, ever supplying fresh material for a third. Of the two extremes by which the third or mediate type is thus developed, the one may be called a constructive, and the other a destructive extreme. A constructive philosophy professes to be logically exhaustive, and is therefore dogmatic; a destructive philosophy contains proof that the exhaustive system is self-contradictory, and that it logically issues in a sceptical despair of reason. The third type of realism, intermediate between the constructive and destructive extremes, is the Catholic philosophy, which accepts ultimate human beliefs in their incomprehensible integrity, and confesses the necessary exhaustion of speculative reason in the presence of reality.

"The whole history of philosophy may be read by us, whatever was the meaning of the meditative men by whom its materials were created, as the history of an apparent conflict and virtual co-operation of the three elements into which all thorough-going realism is analyzed.

"The type of REALISM that corresponds with the first may be called CONSTRUCTIVE or SECTARIAN. It includes the different dogmatic systems or sects under the two heads of idealistic and naturalistic realism, with their respective modifications. . . . The second type of rational philosophy we may term the CONTRADICTORY or SCEPTICAL. It accepts, practically at least, the immediate realities of sense and worldly experience, while it delights in illustrating the contradictions that are latent in the whole intellectual life of man, when that life is interpreted through the professed solutions offered in the sectarian dogmatic systems. . . . The immediate theory, as I believe realism proper, may be called CATHOLIC or INSOLUBLE REALISM. This form of philosophical belief acknowledges, on the ground of logical proof, the finitude of understanding; and recognises through our metaphysical experience the counterpart, incomprehensibility or infinity of existence. . . . Apart from the constructive or rationalistic systems and scepticism, catholic or insoluble realism tends to decline. It has been nourished by the struggles of idealism and materialism with one another, and of both with scepticism. This warfare is the most striking feature in the philosophical past; and so far as past experience and the tendencies of the intellectual nature of man enable us to judge, it will form the most striking feature also in the future of philosophy. The world is likely long to need the twofold service of a catholic philosophy of insoluble realism, namely, to repel from the various provinces of science the invasion of constructive metaphysical systems, and of the scepticism which is latent in them; and also to represent to those by whom it is itself studied and accepted, the confined 'intellectual globe' of man, as in progress through illimitable darkness. . . . We see the collisions of scepticism with systems that profess to resolve the

universe about which we speculate into the unity of a single comprehensible principle. We see those systems destroyed by scepticism in succession, as inadequate to the task, the various phases of sectarian realism thus proved to be partial and illogical. And contemporaneously with this we see, too, the growth and amendment of that type of meditative thought which finds, in the collisions of constructive with destructive realism, evidence to support a *rational* acknowledgment that only a theory of the universe as essentially incomprehensible or mysterious, alike under the formal relation of reason and consequent, and the physical relation of cause and effect, is competent to the understanding.

"So it has been, and so we conclude it must continue to be. With men as they are, and with the universe as it is presented in the conscious experience of this mortal life, probably no one of the three types of realism can be discounted consistently with the maintenance of reflection in full vigour. Scepticism, in successful collision with the sectarian systems, is needed to excite and deepen our thought of the insoluble problem which pervades reality. . . . The history of philosophy may be interpreted by us as a history not of conflicting but of conspiring systems. In the technical words and phrases of these systems we seem to hear the race of man thinking aloud, and to see it recording a series either of partial and one-sided, or of sceptical, or of confessedly irreducible systems of knowledge, as the expression of its varied speculative experience. . . . To the formation of this philosophy all the genuine movements of human thought in the past and the present, and of every school, may be viewed as directly or indirectly a comprehensive contribution. In some of these movements the torch of truth has been raised higher than in others, and its light has then extended farther over the dark ocean on which we seem to float, ever surrounded by the infinite."

In the same year (1858) in which this lecture was issued, Fraser was elected Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh (established 1739, chartered 1783; and not long afterwards he was chosen a member of the Council. His colleagues in the university were not slow to appreciate his business talents and his academic zeal; and they gave full proof of their faith in them by conferring on him the honour—implying many duties—of Dean of the Faculty of Arts in 1859, a position which he has since retained by unanimous consent of his colleagues, and maintained to the admiration of all who have to do with the affairs of that Faculty. He also became editor of "The University Calendar," under direction of the senate of the university, gave it its form, superintended its development, and made it a repertoire of information, invaluable to students, and useful to many besides. To this task, notwithstanding the drudgery involved



in it, he devoted himself annually till 1866, when pressure of work demanded the resignation of it into other hands. By this time, however, it had been wrought into shape, and had acquired its character. As Dean of the Faculty of Arts he bent all his energies to the development of graduation among the students. His efforts in this direction, since at the close of Session 1860-1 he delivered the first public address to the graduates of the University, have been very successful, as we may see from the following *vidimus* of ten years' efforts, given in an address delivered by Professor Fraser at the close of the university session, 28th April, 1871 :—

“For 150 years before 1861, graduation in Arts was almost dormant in this university. In that year the number who received the Master's degree was twenty-eight, and besides these thirty-four graduated as Bachelors of Arts in that year. Ten years earlier, in 1851, the number of Masters was seven, besides five bachelors. In 1841 we graduated only five Masters, and no Bachelors, for it was in 1843 that the inferior degree was revived. Five was rather above than below the average number of Masters in the years preceding 1841, backward to the early part of last century. In that long period the power of the university as a school of intellect and liberal training was maintained irrespectively of graduation altogether, by the living, sympathetic influence communicated through the professors, and by the stimulus of the classroom. This was also the case during the same period in other Scotch universities, with the partial exception of Aberdeen; and it has been and is still the case in most of the German universities. This absence of graduation presents a singular appearance to the eye accustomed to the usages of the great English universities, or familiar with the early history of the European university system. Since 1861 the number of our Masters has been increasing. The Bachelor's degree was abolished in the following year, after having, as it seems, rather stimulated graduation in the circumstances of the preceding ten or twelve years. In 1862 we graduated 26 Masters of Arts, and in the successive years till 1868, we had successively 28, 39, 35, 30, 52, and 75. In 1869 we fell to 53, in 1870 to 52, and this year we have 57 entitled to receive the degree. Like our matriculations on the greater scale of the last eighty years, there has been flow and ebb in our graduations in these ten years. From 1861 to 1868 we rose from 26 to 75; since then we have descended below 60. Whether it is a mere back eddy that we are now in, in a movement that is on the whole advancing, in the way that optimists explain portions of the world's history in which mankind appears to be retrograding, I cannot tell. Ten years is too short a period to determine this.

The present system should surely be strengthened and encouraged for some years more before one can say that it has been even fairly tried."

During this time he took great interest in the questions brought under discussion before the Commissioners appointed to make provision for the better government and discipline of the universities of Scotland, and improving and regulating the course of study therein. Of the intelligent consideration he gave to many of the measures we have good evidence in an article on "The British Universities and Academical Polity," published in the *North British Review*, Aug. 8, 1861, from which we cull a few sentences of special importance in thought and in fact :—

"The great universities of Europe are surely among the most remarkable institutions of mediæval and modern civilization. . . . As the State is needed to fulfil the permanent wants of civil, and the Church of ecclesiastical life, the University seems the natural and necessary organ of the intellectual life, which is the counterpoise and complement of the other two. . . . Europe possesses at present nearly a hundred universities. . . . England has four, two ancient at Oxford and Cambridge, and two modern in London and Durham ; while Scotland has her four ancient universities of Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen, and St. Andrew's. Ireland has Trinity College Dublin, and the three affiliated colleges of the Queen's University ; . . . they are all pervaded by one common idea, and they are virtually co-operating towards one end. . . . It is an old maxim in academical polity that the university has its foundation in arts or philosophy. The faculties of theology, law, and medicine rest theoretically on the basis of a sufficiently attested preliminary training in liberal knowledge. . . . The faculty of arts is in theory independent of a merely professional utility, and aims exclusively at a liberal culture of the mind and character. . . . Viewed comprehensively, the university, thus based on arts, may be regarded as the nation, or community itself, in its highest intellectual form and organization ; and aiming, from the intellectual point of view, at the full and harmonious development of human nature in the individual. The university is the nation or the community operating in and through its highest appropriate organ of self-culture. Education and graduation are accordingly the two essential functions of a university, implies a curriculum, or regulated course of preliminary academical life and instruction, and a permanent academical organization of those who are thus trained or cultured. These permanent members may be either resident in one place, for study or as teachers, or else, while organically connected with the university, they may be diffused through the nation as its leading minds, its cultured class. An

academical institution may fail in its high purpose with reference to either of these ends. The stimulus and guidance which it offers in the preparatory course of study and instruction may be deficient, and it then fails as an educating organ; or it may neglect to retain as its permanent members those whom it educates, which diminishes its power as an organ for testing the progress of education, and for the maintenance of liberal ideas in the commonwealth. . . . Scotland, with a population of three millions, has about as large a student population at her universities as England, with a population of twenty millions. . . . The greatest English names in the highest walks of science and philosophy, for the last two centuries or more, have for the most part risen outside the universities; while most of the great names in Scotland, of the same period, have shed lustre on her professorial chairs, and transmitted from thence their social influence."

Professor Fraser was also in the meanwhile a member of that distinguished band of *collaborateurs* by whose united exertions "The Imperial Dictionary of Biography," issued by Wm. MacKenzie, Glasgow—one of the most copious, complete, and authentic which has yet been published—was brought to a conclusion. Among the articles consecrated to philosophical subjects supplied by him to this work we may note a condensed but graphic memoir of Francis Hutcheson, the Scoto-Irish regenerator of moral philosophy in Britain; a careful and informing paper on E. Kant; an appreciative sketch of Leibnitz, the eclectic and many-sided founder of modern German metaphysics; a biographic outline of John Locke, the Socrates of English inductive philosophy; a sympathetic silhouette of Malebranche, and one of his most noted English disciples, John Norris; a concise glimpse of the Welsh political and philosophical controversialist, Richard Price; a capital *résumé* of the common sense of the sagacious Thomas Reid, with relative memoranda of the events of his life; a simple and sufficing statement of the events in the career and of the opinions expressed in the works of Spinoza; and a fair account of Dugald Stewart, the most graceful and polished of all the metaphysical writers who have given celebrity to Scotland. All these communications are clear and pithy, combine together notices of life and writings, and give side-glances into the relations of these thinkers, with their times, their precursors, and their successors. They form admirable co-pictures to those furnished by J. P. Nichol, J. F. Ferrier, Wm. MacCall, John Veitch, &c., of the other celebrities in the realm of philosophic thought.

Amid the labours of the winter session of 1862-3 Professor Fraser found time to produce one of his most able and important contributions to the history of philosophy, an article on "M. Saisset and Spinoza," which appeared in the *North British Review*, May, 1863. It takes a rapid glance of the life and writings of Emile Edmond Saisset (1814—1863), and then proceeds to record the events and describe the speculations of the logician of Deism, the Flemish-born son of a Portuguese Jew, Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza. It is based on a translation of "The Works of Spinoza" which the Sorbonnist had produced; an "Essay on the Precursors and Disciples of Descartes," and several papers referring to science and religion by the same author. It is an article of great excellence and informingness. The acquaintance displayed in it with different forms of thought and the sympathy it shows for seekers after truth in honest endeavours after it, make it very marked. Our quotations from this paper must be twofold: 1st, an abstract of the most salient elements of the opinions of Spinoza; and 2nd, a valuable *résumé* of the history of philosophical opinion; both of interest, not only as exhibiting the power of the writer, but also as condensing for us some of the priceless results of severe investigative research.

1. *Spinozism*.—"A life of happiness in the knowledge of God was thus Spinoza's ideal of religious life. He tried much and long to realize it, for he devoted his days to meditation upon God. A perfect or divine intelligence was the religion at which he aspired. . . . God is One—the only Substance—the Perfect—the Absolute. No power, accordingly, can exist in conflict with Him. He must be the *only* power. We are powers only in and through His operation in us. The more fully and freely we exercise and enjoy ourselves in the development of our highest faculties, the nearer do we approach to that perfection which consists in conscious identification with God. . . . Human happiness coincides with human knowledge or science of God, and thus goodness is identical with the pursuit of truth in the exercise and application of thought. . . . To love and be happy in Deity, God must be *known*. The idea of the perfect—that idea which Descartes taught him to find in the very roots of his being—must therefore be unfolded. . . . Spinozism is a demonstrative system and speculative habit of theology, which, in realizing God, attains happiness and a perfect life. . . . What reception should we give to this conception of the universal in relation to God? Is it an allusion or a true representation? A stranger to the metaphysical springs of thought may regard the foregoing paragraph as

a series of empty sentences. The student of opinion, and of the forces by which society has been modified, knows well that the sentences express a manner of thinking about the universe that has already proved its influence over millions of human minds. How shall we interpret it? In one light it seems to be atheism; in another it looks like a sentimental or mystical theism; and in a third we can hardly distinguish it from Calvinism. . . . We call the Spinozistic problem the supreme problem in metaphysics. Metaphysical systems and speculations are the ultimate reasoned results of the application of thought to the matter about which we think. 'What is it?' is the initial metaphysical question about the world in which we find ourselves; 'why or how is it?' is the second. The one question is directed to the metaphysical nature of matter and man; the other, rising out of the former, expresses our craving for light upon the origin and destiny of both in a knowledge of God. Metaphysics and theology are thus ultimately one, and Spinozism is the most conspicuous result of the efforts of early modern thought to form its system of metaphysical theology. Spinoza is the prince of systematic divines who bid defiance to the wisdom of Bacon—who many times declares that 'perfection or completeness in divinity is not to be sought; adding that 'he will reduce a knowledge into an art or science, will make it round and uniform; but in divinity many things must be left abrupt.' In a word, theological thought must, on account of the very nature of its object, be aphoristic thought. . . . This system, which proclaims the absolute conciliation of reason and religion, is logically forced to resolve *God* into an abstract name—a mere verbal generalization—on the one modification; and on the other modification it is forced to resolve *us*—finite persons—into *God*, and thus equally to dissolve our moral identity. The choice of one of these two modifications of belief is the perpetual dilemma of pantheism. . . . As we look at life with the speculative eye of Spinoza or Hegel, we seem to find its deepest ground in a blind necessity, and not in reasonable will. . . . But the fascination of the mere reasoner is dispelled by the broader and practically irresistible wants of the complete man. . . . We cannot root out the tendencies which spontaneously encourage this faith. We cannot accept philosophy as the discovery that our noblest hopes are an illusion. When unstable pantheism takes to the atheistic decline, it is repelled back by the faith that *God is more than an abstraction*. The universe is felt to be, in its heart, more than either a blind casual or an abstract logical necessity—more than the one necessary cause of Spinoza, or the necessary logical evolution of Hegel. . . . If the consciousness of what we *need* repels us from the atheistic extreme, the consciousness of what we *are* repels us from this other. When all is absolutely one, there is either no real deity or no real finite persons. The former alternative is rejected by our wants and aspirations; the latter alternative is rejected by what we already

find ourselves to be. Man finds, when he reflects, that he is not divine or perfect, his life is inconsistent with the supreme moral order which he acknowledges. . . . Man, at any rate, as a matter-of-fact experience is not divine. . . . The fact that men are not divine—that they are the creators of their own immoral actions—makes folly of the conception of absolute unity that is reached through the assumption that they are one in God. The logical victory of the Spinozist is made to recoil upon himself by the energy of the moral reason, and by our practical nature."

2. *Synopsis of Philosophical Opinion.*—"We discover in the history of opinion three great types of philosophical teaching:—

"I. The *sensuous* or *secular*, which finds its bond of cohesion for all belief in the laws of mental association, and the limit of all legitimate belief in the physical experience of this earthly life. This is the properly sceptical, because non-metaphysical or non-theological school, which consistently proclaims as its creed speculative and practical atheism—ignorance about all beyond this temporal life of sensuous experience.

"II. The *speculatively* or *scientifically rational* philosophy or science, which professes, as Spinoza and Hegel do, to comprehend the solution of the metaphysical or theological problem of this existence in which we find ourselves when we awaken into conscious light on earth, and, with Spinoza, to evolve a science of theology that, in fact, either resolves God into an abstraction or us human beings into Deity.

"III. The *practically rational* philosophy, which proves the scientific impossibility of speculative theology, while it fully acknowledges the facts in human nature that can be explained, and the desires that can be satisfied only in a religiously conducted and Christian life, and in the knowledge needed for its regulation.

"Now of these two last schemes of thought, experience proves that the second naturally conducts to the first, while the third practically turns away from it. The second claims for man what man can accomplish only in the shape of a system of abstract words; and when he becomes conscious of the failure, he relapses into sensuous and secular scepticism. The third, content with what man finds in his moral and spiritual springs of action, accepts these as its legitimate data; and submits to be called sceptical, if by that is meant naturally ignorant of the existence in which we find ourselves, except so far as it is revealed in the moral and practical experience common to all good men.

"It is, generally speaking, this third scheme of thought that Kant represents, although, along with his British and German admirers, he gives greater prominence to his negation of *speculative* than to his affirmation of practical and moral rationalism. It is true that the conspicuous part of Kantism is destructive—not less so than Hume's philosophy; but all destructive philosophy is really conservative, if it is destructive only of a claim on the part of man to construct a speculative and systematic science of theology or

metaphysics. Kantism is, in fact, only the appropriate complement to the philosophy of Bacon. Bacon *assumed* that all real science in man is grounded on and nourished by experiment or trial. Kant *proved that, from the very nature of human intelligence, this must be so.* In the analytical or destructive part of his philosophy he exhibits the theological paralysis of speculative reason; in its constructive part he reveals a positive stay of belief in God, in man's moral and spiritual nature."

It is worthy of remark, as showing the bent of Professor Fraser's mind, that he signalizes as a defect in Saissset's able work the absence of any proper notice of Berkeley and his system. In this connection he observes,

"The metaphysical philosophy of Bishop Berkeley is professedly a system of experimental theology, in which, by the elimination of the material world as a secondary cause, hypothetically assumed without warrant from facts, the presence and agency of God is alleged to be brought as near to us as the presence and power of our fellow-men. At the Berkeley anpoint of view we all find ourselves continually in the very presence of God, who gives reality to the world of sense, of which He is the cause and substance, and in a manner the soul; while we are not ourselves lost in Deity, as we seem to be, when we keep company with Spinoza, or even with Malebranche. We live, and move, and have our being in God, who is the animating Spirit of matter, and whose mind and meaning are expressed throughout the cosmical order; but we are not ourselves essentially divine. Berkeleyanism, in the deep intention of its author, is not the paradox of an idle hour, but a system of practical theological thought, professedly founded on common sense. In its largest view it is a science of religion, based on what its author supposed to be the true metaphysical interpretation of what we experience in sense."

We notice this love for and appreciation of Berkeley's character, writings, and influence, because it shows how habitually his speculations were held before the mind of this writer, how full the subject was of interest for him, and how readily he knit almost every recurrent investigation with the name and thought of Berkeley. This was an influence which had not only been eagerly caught into his soul, but one which had been largely fostered both by book-study and conversational intercourse with those who upheld the doctrines of the presentational metaphysic.

Perhaps the most thorough-going Berkeleyan in the British islands is T. Collyns Simon, author of "Universal Immaterialism," "The Nature and Elements of the External World," a contribu-

tion to the controversy *Mill v. Hamilton*. This acute analyst of perceptive thought held lettered intercourse with Sir Wm. Hamilton, and during a residence of some winters in Edinburgh he acquired great influence over the philosophical thinkers of that city, and discussions on Berkeleyanism agitated the intellectual and critical circles there. He is a man given to careful research, and of singular subtlety of thought, as well as fascination of manner. Fraser and he became great intimates and close friends; and though the professor is not quite such an express acceptor of the doctrine of "the unreality of material phenomena"—to use a phrase of Dr. Newman's—as the Norfolkian speculatist, there can be little doubt that his ideas on Berkeleyanism were intensified and clarified by intercourse with the advocate of immaterialism. To many it may seem strange that in an eminently practical age like ours the views of Bishop Berkeley and of others, if possible, even more idealistic, should be received with favour, and almost threaten to supersede in their own special territory the Scottish realism of Reid, Stewart, Brown, and Hamilton. We do not undertake to explain *why* this is so; we are here about to recount some of the actual steps in the progress of events which indicate *that* it is even so.

At ten minutes before noon on the 8th October, 1863, Richard Whately, Archbishop of Dublin, the restorer of the study of logic in Oxford, passed away, and the present writer was chosen by the most influential newspaper in Scotland, on the following day, to give an outline of his life, an account of his labours, and an estimate of his worth. The sensation excited in Edinburgh, where logic had been almost recreated under Sir Wm. Hamilton, was profound, and the archiepiscopal thinker formed the theme of much discourse. Rightly judging that an event so pregnant with interest might afford matter of grave import to his students if rightly used, Professor Fraser selected as the subject of his lecture delivered at the commencement of the academical session, 3rd Nov., 1863, "Archbishop Whately, and the Restoration of the Study of Logic." It was a gentle and a delicate thought that the successor of him who had made the fiercest and most effective onslaught on the worth and work of Whately's logic should hang a wreath, indicative of sympathy and admiration, on the tomb in the vault of St. Patrick's Cathedral, where the body of "the good archbishop was laid, while the grief of three nations commingled



over his ashes." From the discourse he devoted to this distinguished seeker after truth, this admirable reasoner and logician, we shall quote a few passages, likely to interest and inform the general reader, and to gratify those who delight in knowing that the memory of those who possess and exercise the "power of communicating free, and therefore many-sided intellectual life to the national mind" has been duly honoured.

"A religious layman rather than a professional ecclesiastic in his temper and feelings, Whately now takes his place among famous Anglican Churchmen, with Chillingworth as a reasoner, and with Paley as a master of good sense and penetrating sagacity; while he rivals them both in the curious intellectual humour by which his numerous similes are animated; himself rivalled in the qualities of the philosopher by the more comprehensive genius of Bishop Butler. In future his name must be conspicuous in the small but interesting list of Irish prelates who have, in literature, advanced and adorned the studies which are in immediate relation to man. William King, a century and a half ago, his predecessor as Archbishop of Dublin, produced speculations in metaphysical theology which engaged the controversial pens of Bayle and Leibnitz. Somewhat later in the century we find Peter Brown (the philosophical Bishop of Cork and Ross), a critic of Locke in his 'Procedure of the Understanding,' speculating acutely on the nature and limits of theological knowledge in that treatise, and in his 'Divine Analogy.' Contemporary with King and Brown was George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, that most subtle and fascinating of metaphysicians, with whom, however, except in love of truth, devotion to the liberalizing studies, generous philanthropy, and Christian simplicity, the late Archbishop of Dublin, disinclined as he was to purely abstract speculation and metaphysical refinement, had little in common. . . . The life of this distinguished reasoner and logician is a valuable example of the dispositions and moral tendencies which logical discipline, as I understand its nature, is mainly designed to foster. Foremost was his steady, incorruptible love of truth, as such, and for its own sake. . . . It was love of truth, with the moral and intellectual courage and activity which that implies, that naturally led Whately to logical studies, and made him able to animate them with a new life. . . . The originality of Whately does not appear in any new modifications or extensions of the logical analyses transmitted by his scientific predecessors, but in the clearness with which he restated, and the intellectual genius which he applied in the exemplification of the results of former analyses, and in connecting them with the common experience of life. . . . In no province of intellectual labour, I venture to say, has there been more intellectual movement, during this same thirty years, than in logic, notwithstanding all that we see and

hear of the progress of the sciences which have to do with what is called matter. No science has advanced more than logic has in this period now past, if the excitement of the highest faculties of the ablest men, in the work of modifying and extending its contents as previously received, is to be taken as progress. Hamilton, Mill, and Whewell, among others in this country—not to speak of Hegel, with many besides in Germany—whose exertions have so remarkably affected logic in these days, are surely not second to any living within the specified period in native strength and proved influence in moulding opinion. In the hands of some the forms of syllogistic logic are undergoing a revolution; by others, logical methods for ascertaining premises, by induction and otherwise, are presented in a new light. . . . The practical logician like Whately awakens an interest in the theory of the science which he applies; this awakened interest draws to the theory a fresh application of speculative genius, the results of which yield new inferences and formulas, to increase our resources in a war with every kind of fallacy, the study of which, at the same time, forms an admirable mental gymnastic to the student."

The foregoing estimate of the place and power of a thinker so peculiarly realistic as Archbishop Whately is notable in one who so strongly held those opinions which tend most surely, in most men, to induce an incapacity for comprehending those who give the concrete and the discrete a pre-eminence in their thoughts. This is a peculiar feature in the mind of Professor Fraser. He is an advocate for the study of all forms of thought, and for the honest use of reason in the search for truth. "Truth," he affirms, "advances on the whole by means of the corrections which one-sided opinions administer to each other. Its light is kindled, and burns more brightly by their mutual collision." In this he is a true successor to him whose motto asserted—

"Truth, like a torch, the more it's shook, it shines."

In this he belongs "to what Leibnitz called the one permitted sect of all—the sect of *searchers after truth*; the only one," he says, "which cannot fail in the end;" for "the greater the number of qualified inquirers is, the larger is the intellectual produce in the way of discovery on which society may count." But we must proceed with our memoranda.

To *Macmillan's Magazine* for July, 1862 (pp. 192—202), Professor Fraser contributed an excellent paper on "The Real World of Berkeley." To this paper we have already referred, and from it we have made an extract (*ante*, p. 14) of considerable length, indi-

cating how strong a hold the system of Berkeley had taken on his intellect. The article, besides its own intrinsic importance, has a biographic interest as being the article which led the attention of the delegates of the Clarendon Press to its author, as "one whose own love for philosophy was first engaged by Berkeley in the morning of life, and who regards his writings as among the best in English literature for a refined education of the heart and the intellect." This interest in the author was greatly enhanced by a paper "On Berkeley's Theory of Vision," which appeared in the *North British Review*, August, 1864 (pp. 199—230), founded upon a work by the present Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Dublin, Thomas K. Abbott, M.A., entitled "Sight and Touch: an Attempt to Disprove the Received (or Berkleian) Theory of Vision;" a renewal of the endeavour made by that able and candid thinker, the late Samuel Bailey, of Sheffield, to show that the philosophy of the senses suggested in the works of Berkeley, and advocated by him, is unsound and inaccurate; and thus "reducing to a lower level one who has hitherto been the noblest figure in Irish philosophy." This paper is one of great value, not only as a contribution to biography, but to philosophy, as may be seen from the following quotations. After a few remarks on the position of the author as a Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin, as "an Irish assailant of the great Irish philosopher," and on the overruling principle of the supremacy of truth, he proceeds to a consideration of—

"The real nature and foundation of the celebrated theory which, in the hands of Berkeley, carries us, in its curious ramifications, to some of the least frequented corners of human nature, and in reference to which he himself says that without pains and thought no man will ever understand the true nature of vision, or comprehend what I have wrote concerning it."

"The ground on which this theory rests, and the wide range of principles which it involves, which stretch upwards from the familiar phenomena of vision, through the conception of extension, to the mysteries of creation, providence, and the ultimate relations of the extended world to the power of God, have, as it appears to us, been inadequately apprehended, alike by its avowed adherents and its critics. . . . The speculation is one peculiar to modern philosophy. It was in the year 1709 that George Berkeley, then a Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin, hardly twenty-five years of age, proclaimed himself the discoverer of a prejudice which, assisted by the imperfection of language, and the long and close connection in our minds between what we see and what we touch,

had confused the real nature of vision, blinded men to the true solution of certain difficulties in optics, concealed profound lessons in thought, with which the daily exercise of seeing is so wonderfully charged, and closed the avenue on which we have a most ready and charming access to the mysteries of the strange consciousness into which we all awake on earth. . . . And the problem soon became, in his mind, part of a still wider one. The facts of vision connected themselves with the deepest principles in philosophy. To penetrate to the centre of his visual theory, it must be studied, not merely in the tentative essay of 1709, but in its subsequent developments and ramifications in his later works. Its critics and its disciples have commonly forgotten this. In 1710 and 1713—in his 'Principles of Human Knowledge' and in his 'Dialogues'—he employed the reasonings of the 'Essay' against abstract extension, and on behalf of the absolute heterogeneity of the two sensible extensions of sight and touch, against an abstract world of matter in all its phases. Nearly twenty years later, in 'Alciphron,' he argued that the theory of visual language involves a new and unanswerable proof of the existence and immediate operation of God, and the constant care of His providence. A new edition of the 'Essay' accompanied 'Alciphron.' Attention was thus and then recalled to that juvenile speculation. The discussion then raised, and, in particular, a critical letter published in the *Daily Postboy*, in September, 1732, drew from Berkeley, early in the following year, 'A Vindication and Explanation of the Theory of Vision or Visual Language.' A due appreciation of what he says about vision thus requires a collation of passages contained in works extending over a period of more than twenty years. In the long-forgotten tract last mentioned, which is not contained in the hitherto collected editions of its author's works, the theory is presented in a new light. In the original essay of 1709 the vulgar assumption of objects common to sight and touch is cautiously dissolved by analysis; and the counter theory of a relation between what we see and what we touch, analogous to that between words and what they signify, is substituted in its place. In the 'Vindication' of 1733 the author starts with what is his conclusion in the 'Essay'—that what we see is the alphabet of a language which the Governor of nature is constantly addressing to us for the prudent regulation of our actions in this world of sense; and, as a scientific verification of this conclusion, he deduces solutions of various phenomena, explaining with great ingenuity difficulties connected with visible things. . . . In the closing years of his life Berkeley constructed a 'Siris,' or chain, which connects the deepest mysteries of life with the vulgar phenomena of tar-water. In reality, if not in name, he was engaged in his argumentative youth, as well as in his contemplative old age, in the construction of a 'Siris,' by which the familiar sights of daily life are connected with the deepest problems of meditation, and which constantly reminds us that we are living and moving in a world of wonders.

We have ascended on this chain up to that last link which unites it to the throne of the Supreme Eternal Governor. Shall we now descend, and find in all our future experience the old familiar visual sense charged with a new power of exciting us to the contemplation of the highest things invisible as the result of the reasoning to which Berkeley's subtle metaphysical observation has given rise? Berkeley, through Baxter, Hume, and Reid, first awakened Scotch thought. Perhaps he is destined also to revive it when it is ready to slumber, or to recall it to what is real when it is wasting among verbal abstractions."

In the course of the article from which these extracts are taken, Professor Fraser devotes attention to the following points:— 1. "How Berkeley discovers the only immediate objects of consciousness in sight and in touch;" and 2. "Berkeley's theory or explanation of the connection of what we see with what we can touch, by means of a divinely established mental association of essentially dissimilar phenomena or extensions;" and, with great mastery both of the physics and the metaphysics of the subject, defended the theory of the Bishop of Cloyne from the onset of T. K. Abbott, and touching by the way the arguments of Samuel Bailey and of Sir David Brewster.

The foregoing productions, marked by so much ability in speculation, power of research, and familiarity with the life and works of the distinguished philosopher who expired in Oxford in 1753, confirmed the syndics in a design they had formed of issuing "A complete Edition of the Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne," at the Clarendon Press, Oxford, and induced them to believe that their author was peculiarly fitted for the fulfilment of the duties of editor of the same. Whereupon, after due inquiry and ample proof of the accuracy of their inference, negotiations were entered into between the delegates of the Clarendon Press and Professor A. C. Fraser, which resulted in his being honoured by a request to undertake the superintendence of such an edition of Berkeley's works, by the unanimous decision of the syndicate early in 1866.

In the closing days of June, 1865, Isaac Taylor—a rival, and yet a friend with whom for years he had held pleasant and healthful intellectual intercourse—died. The press teemed with eulogies of the saintly but recluse thinker. Fraser had suffered for his friendship with Taylor. He had admitted into the pages of the *North British Review* a calm, keen, searching, and thorough paper on Dr. Chalmers

from Taylor's pen. That article roused the ire and fire of the whole community, to whom not only the memory but the very dust of Chalmers was dear. Though ten years had elapsed since the sudden translation-like demise of the glory of the Free Church, they could not bear, even from the pen of one of his truest admirers and warmest friends—for such was Isaac Taylor—an analytic of the unmatched spirit. Such was the indignation felt that this paper should have gained admission into the pages of a serial, of which Dr. Chalmers was one of the projectors, that under an accusation of treason to the memory of Chalmers, and ingratitude, if not infidelity, to the party who had laboured for his promotion, Fraser was called upon to resign the management of the *Review*, and had fallen into some sort of disrepute with the Presbyterian party, being suspected of Episcopalian proclivities.\* Fraser now felt that a calm yet honest appraisal of the life-work of Isaac Taylor would do good, and he prepared a very pleasing and interesting paper on "The Literary Life of Isaac Taylor," which appeared in *Macmillan's Magazine*, Oct. 1865. Our readers will welcome the following glimpses of and passages from that article:—

"The *Eclectic Review*, a periodical which could boast of some of the best writings of Foster and Hall, then the intellectual pillars of Dissent, about 1818 received the first published writings of Isaac Taylor. Ten succeeding years of experimental exercise with his pen produced more than one volume still associated with his name. This initial series commenced in 1822 with 'Elements of Thought,' and ended characteristically, about 1828, with disquisitions on the 'Process of Historical Proof,' and on the mode of the 'Transmission of Ancient Books to Modern Times,' which suggest the uniformly concrete and historical character of his early as of his later religious musings. . . . On the well-filled bookshelf, that is occupied by nearly thirty volumes produced by Isaac Taylor, six stand out prominently to the eye of the reader who looks for the key to the inner meaning of his literary life. First of these in chronological order is 'The Natural History of Enthusiasm,' published in 1829, and the last is 'Home Education,' which appeared in 1838. 'Fanaticism,' 'Spiritual Despotism,'

\* The fact is not so generally known as it should be, that when his endeavours to make the *North British Review* a national literary serial failed, through the sectarianism of its projectors and proprietors, Professor Fraser was advised and encouraged by Isaac Taylor, the Duke of Argyll, Sir David Brewster, &c., to start a new and thoroughly independent journal. This he generously forbore to do, that he might not embarrass that party and the public; but without attempt at the rectification of an erroneous public opinion, he devoted himself ardently and eagerly to the duties of his philosophic chair.

'Saturday Evening,' and 'The Physical Theory of Another Life,' were issued in the interval. They all belong to the fifth decade of their author's life. . . . The time in which he engaged in his literary undertaking was to him the 'Sunday morning' of the world's eventful history, and the sabbath of its redemption was near at hand. It was the time to inaugurate an 'Instauratio Magna' for the Church. . . . And this 'Instauratio' was also to take the form of six books, but concerning itself only with ecclesiastical *idola*. It was a religious philosophy offered to meet the wants of an age enfeebled by religious divisions. It proposed to display in one view 'the principal forms of spurious religion: enthusiasm, in which the imagination modifies those feelings and beliefs which the actual revolution of the historical events, which constitute the divine relation, ought alone to regulate; fanaticism, in which malignant passion conspires to a like effect with imagination; Spiritual Despotism, under which beliefs and feelings, as professed, are the mere creatures of ecclesiastical authority, and not the intelligent result of historical research; Credulity, which is ready to substitute any belief and correlative feeling for those imposed by the real historical evidence; Scepticism, which, discarding the history, believes nothing; and Corruption of morals, which practically illustrates the operations of the five preceding substitutes for pure Biblical faith. . . . Only the first three of the six proposed books made their appearance, though what are virtually fragments of the others may be found in the more discursive productions of their author's later life. But the reader will find in the finished and fragmentary volumes more original study of the moral phenomena of man in his relations to the Unseen and Eternal, more massive and even picturesque delineation of the broad principles in human nature which underlie religious history, viewed in their operation in a great scale, as well as richer contributions to the facts of moral science, than in any other English theological writings of the years in which they appeared. No Englishman since Coleridge has done more to conquer room for the intellect to employ itself, and for the heart to expand itself, while continuing to maintain a sympathetic faith in historic records of a supernatural part of the history of our planet and our race. . . . We ought, perhaps, to consider the somewhat discursive and miscellaneous writings of Isaac Taylor in the last quarter of a century of his literary life as if they were produced in discouragement consequent upon the partial abandonment of his chief literary enterprise. The volumes on 'Loyola and Jesuitism' (1849), and on 'Wesley and Methodism' (1851), as well as essays in the *North British Review* on 'Chalmer's and Scotch Theology,' present in diversified aspects his favourite view of Christianity as something continuously embodied in personal and social transactions, as well as his sympathy with a variety of form in its embodiment—provided that each form expresses in its own fashion a profound sense of human guilt and divine deliverance. The essays on

Scotch theology especially indicate his abiding conviction that Christian truth consists of a series of historical events, not of logical deductions from dogmatically assumed definitions; and that a religious community which in these times perverts Christianity into a despotic human system of such deductions must inevitably lose its own hold over educated minds. His 'Restoration of Belief' (1855) is the nucleus of subsequent periodical essays in defence and illustration of his own resting-place of religious belief and feeling in the records of history, as against the disintegrating influences of modern criticism. . . . The shadow of the 'Unseen and Eternal' converted his daily pilgrimage through this strange life into a daily scene of literally supernatural interest. Slightly as the great mystery in which it all terminates usually excites the imagination of the average "religious world," his was not an eye that could withdraw itself from that which to the meditative envelops this transient sense-experience in every part of it with awe and sublimity. . . . By far the most elaborately conceived and executed work of this whole literary life is the one in which its author—under the designation of a "Physical Theory" of continued life under supposed conditions of a spiritual body—employs analogy to lift the veil now guarded by death, and to unfold to our view the splendid possibilities of a conscious history maintained under new relations to a new experience of matter. Through analogy man has long been supposed capable of having his belief confirmed in the nature and attributes of God; through analogy he was now invited, for the confirmation of his faith, to anticipate in imagination his own embodied immortality."

In the year 1865 Professor Fraser, with the approval and consent of the *Senatus Academicus*, opened a class for the study of the history of philosophy and of critical metaphysics. This class, though intended only for an audience fit, and therefore few, who can be stimulated to devote the energy of thought to the elucidation of the specific mysteries of Knowing—Being, has succeeded far beyond the most sanguine expectations of those who favoured the experiment. It has aggregated to itself an average annual attendance of somewhere about forty diligent and delighted investigators of intellect and existence. The theories of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid, Stewart, Hamilton, Kant, Hegel, Cousin, St. Hilaire, Caro, &c., have, we understand, formed topics for exposition, but that of late the theory of Berkeley, in all its developments, applications, and extensions, has received special prominence. A growing love for philosophical studies has been one of the most praiseworthy and important results of the institution of this class. This metaphysical earnestness in 1870 gave occasion to the organization of the Edinburgh University Philosophical Society, having for its



object much the same sort of extra-class-room investigation as had given rise to the Metaphysical Society in the student days of Professor Fraser. Of this association the professor is honorary president, and several members of the *Senatus* have given their patronage and their aid to it, in the pursuit of investigations into the great questions of philosophy. Sir Alexander Grant closed the first session on the 5th of April, 1871, by an address, in which he referred to Fraser's "Berkeley," Jowett's "Plato," and Darwin's theory on "The Descent of Man."

The lectures delivered by Professor Fraser to his class have not been once and for all prepared, and are not delivered and re-delivered annually in much the same form and order. They have been gradually acquiring maturity and value by constant revision and reconsideration, condensation of old matter, and extension into new fields of research. Year by year the literature of metaphysic is passed under review, and an estimate is formed of the chief influences to which it has been subjected. Professor Fraser prefers to rest his philosophy in the Past in a patient and reverential study of the great thinkers, whose force of mind gave new impulses to progress, and by an investigation in an eclectic spirit into the deep soundings that have been made into the mysteries of mind. It is understood that he is about to engage in a re-examination of the life, labours, and works of John Locke; and that he has been for some time employed in such a series of studies as may enable him to map out the main lines of reflective survey in which the chief thinkers on metaphysics have employed themselves, so as ultimately to present the students of philosophy with a complete yet comprehensive epitome of the historical development of modern thought.

During the years 1867 and 1868, although weighted with the care of his task upon Berkeley, Professor Fraser, at the request of the *Senatus*, undertook the charge of the moral philosophy class, his friend and colleague, P. C. MacDougall, being ill. In the course of fulfilling this kind duty, he, though fully occupied with his own class meanwhile, composed several lectures in supplement to or in extension of those which the incumbent had delivered in previous sessions. During three sessions, 1868—1871, he has also held a class in logic and philosophy for ladies, under a scheme intended to extend to women the benefit of a thorough mental training. This class has been highly successful, as many as fifty ladies on an average

having taken part in the studies, and undergone the examinations with credit and interest. Several years ago Professor Fraser was honoured with the degree of LL.D. from Princeton College, U.S., and early in the present year the University of Glasgow has written his name on its honour list as LL.D. A greater honour than these, however, has been conferred on him in his having been asked to accept of an examinership in the "Moral Science Tripos" of the University of Cambridge this year—the first instance in the history of that university of going beyond their own graduates for examiners, and especially of recognising a Scottish professor. This is certainly a change, if not a reform, and it may not be altogether unconnected with that consideration of academical affairs shown in Dr. Ingleby's "Revival of Philosophy at Cambridge," &c., to which we have occasionally directed attention. Dr. Fraser has recently, too, been elected member of the Metaphysical Society, London, of which Alfred Tennyson, W. E. Gladstone, the Duke of Argyle, &c., were among the originators.

We find the space at our disposal completely exhausted, and yet we have been unable to mention in any other than an incidental manner his great and valuable work, "The Life of Bishop Berkeley," and his careful, complete, fully annotated, and highly creditable edition of the works of the Bishop of Cloyne. In a paper on "Berkeley and his Philosophy," now in preparation, we shall revert to this subject. Meanwhile we must express our admiration of the learning, honesty, truth-love, and independent spirit of Professor Fraser. It may not be wise in us to meddle with the sectarian involvements of our age and time, but we may say that it is not improbable that in the after-time his own estimate of Berkeley may be held to be expressive of Fraser's theological position. It is, as far as our knowledge goes, closely applicable, and runs in these terms:—

"His spirit was seen in his religion. This governed his daily actions in an unwearied performance of duty, rather than expressed itself obtrusively in words, for he seldom made it directly the subject of talk. . . . He was unperturbed by Controversial Theology, and dead to ecclesiastical ambition. While his taste and sensibility approved of the grave and beautiful ritual of Anglican worship and its freedom from fanaticism, his large heart kept loyal to the Church Catholic; and he sought glad to escape from the disputes of metaphysical theology to the practical religion of charity."

## Politics.

---

### A PROFESSIONAL OR A POPULAR ARMY—WHICH SHALL WE HAVE?

#### PROFESSIONAL.—IV.

A POPULAR army is an impossibility. A people cannot fight. They can riot and do a single spell of outrage or of heroism, but they cannot do the work of an army. That needs training, perseverance, persistency,—in short, professionalism.

To make a profession of any art or science means to undergo all the pre-requisite and the requisite studies, to continue in the training and practice, to devote one's self to the thoughts and pursuits through which thorough efficiency is attained. It is essential that all important matters should be studied professionally. Amateurs may succeed in playing at, but not in being soldiers. Look, for example, at a street fight, when passion is hot and exasperation is at the highest; how the parties engaged will lay on and take! but contrast this with the cool, masterly give and get of a prize-fight, where passion is tempered by science, and where training has made its men efficient, not only for administering, but accepting chastisement. That is what professionalism does; it cools through custom and invigorates by practice; it makes efficient by science, and imparts a pride in maintaining a full front in the face of danger. See the same in the case of a horse-breaker; how experience and temper work together! and how the cautious manageability of circumstances results from the prudent forestalment of all the likelihoods of each given case! Engineering, dentistry, ploughcraft, &c., give other examples of the express necessity of professionalism in every pursuit.

Who would ever think of manning our navy with raw recruits; of furnishing our railways with engine-drivers, guards, pointsmen, and station-masters from a crowd of amateurs? Look even at a procession of school children, a working man's holiday excursion party, and see how easily they are put into confusion, and how irretrievable are the consequences of but a slight mistake. Take

a gang of navvies, and see how much foremaning they require; observe any large workshop or factory, and notice how discipline must be exercised by watchers and superintendents. Trace the working out of the plans of any great company, and it will be seen that the great and paramount requirement is that keen supervisorship which comes of professional knowledge, and that ready comprehension and falling into duty which comes of professional fitness. Now all these are important matters, but not at all of anything like the importance of an army. Our whole railway system might be shattered and thrown into disarray, but that would only slightly affect the condition of life and the state of trade compared with that of an enemy's attack. We have seen the stagnation of a great staple in the cotton trade of Lancashire not very long ago, and we say how mighty were the efforts required to secure its recuperation; but that even was a small and insignificant event compared with the landing of an army on our shores. We have had great and sudden outbreaks of epidemic, and we have seen how difficult—even with an army in amount of professional men—it was to ward off and turn aside, much less defeat and disable the invading disease. But no epidemic, even of the deadliest sort, could equal the terrible shock of a landed army.

“And the best quarrels in the heat, are cursed  
By those that feel their sharpness.”

How could it be thought that a popular army could fulfil the requirements of an age like ours? Quotations of Tell or Washington, rhetoric about Cromwell and Clive, will not do in a case of this sort. The alteration of circumstances alters the case. In the days of Wallace and Tell it was the matching of men of heart, and courage bore its part in the fray; when Cromwell fought he was opposed by men as little skilled in professional fighting as his own men; when Washington led the armies of America against those of Britain he had a definite knowledge of what could be brought against him, and had a run of territory which gave him opportunity to train his men; Wellington gained the same end by his invasion of the Peninsula. But now-a-days the art of war is the art of engineering applied to the moving of forces, whether of men or of materials, and the greatest requirement is instantaneousness of orderly mobility. But no such readiness of filing and defiling, marching and counter-marching, drill and skill, could be hoped for

in a people in whom, in general, discipline is wanting as Shakspeare says,—

“Celerity is never more admired  
Than by the negligent;”

so may we affirm that courage is very much bepraised but little practised by cowards—and most mobs are cowards.

We have only to look, as an illustration of this, at a charge of police in a mob; or, still more strikingly, at a march of military to the quelling of a riot. The swell of passion and the tide of wrath is high in the mob, but a panic is easily excited; the roar and exasperation of a riot is intense, but the hustle of a shower of gun-shot even overhead makes havoc in the ranks and terrifies all but those who are absolutely infuriated. To put our trust for the defence of the nation in the pluck of the inhabitants is sheer folly; no bosh or bunkum could be so great as that which would even suggest that. The people cannot be drilled, disciplined, exercised, trained, and compelled to military duty. It is, as we have said, an impossibility to have a popular army, when—

“Blood and destruction shall be so in use,  
And dreadful objects so familiar,  
That mothers shall but smile when they behold  
Their infants quartered with the hands of war!”

An army is a huge complex machine of which men are the units. Two things it must have, that it may be thoroughly organized and administered—command and discipline. Both of these are acquired arts, and both are acquirable only through professional study. Command is not a mere characteristic. It requires a knowledge of combinations and forms, of checks and counterchecks, of evolutions and complications; and it involves adaptations of means to ends. Discipline, again, is equally a result of study. It demands self-surrender, submission, ability to do, and will to exercise, faith in the commander, and disposition to follow his orders.

War is a science; the tactics of war have been most carefully elaborated, and the forms into which it is necessary to throw bodies of men that they may accomplish with accuracy and spirit the duty laid on them, are only to be known and understood by those who make war a special study; while the duty to be done by the various members of an army in conformity with their orders as

an army of observation, of blockade, of siege, of cover, a flying or a main army, all require to be known and practised, and proficiency attained therein. It is quite impossible for us to do without a professional army, and entirely ridiculous to think that a people could readily become an army. It is all very well, as rhetoric, to affirm that Lord Palmerston uttered the words of patriotism, and immediately there sprung up, as it were, like the dragon's teeth sown by Cadmus, an army ready made, but good drill and ready discipline are required before these poetic fictions can become realities. It reads nicely to hear that at a mere whistle—

“Instant through copse and heath arose  
 Bonnets, and spears, and bended bows ;  
 On right and left, above, below,  
 Spring up at once the lurking foe ;  
 From shingles grey their lances start,  
 The bracken bush sends forth the dart ;  
 The rushes and the willow-wand  
 Are bristling into axe and brand ;  
 And every tuft of broom gives life  
 To *trusty* warrior armed for strife.

As if the yawning hill had to heaven  
 A subteranean host had given,  
 Watching their leader's beck and will.”

But what sort of drill and discipline, command and obedience, are implied in such a scene? and how different in real life would it be were the people to be called out without rehearsal, to give an illustration of this beautiful passage!

A. K. W. proposes to get us up an army by the few playdays of a holiday season, to transform our country louts and yokels during the brief drill-space of a fair-time or a racecourse “out” into soldiers brave and hardy, to the manner bred! R. O. M. thinks we may extemporize an army, and get up our volunteers easily into a splendid army! Really one would think that the annals of war were but a record of amusing exploits, and that people could get up the manœuvres of a great battle as readily as croquet, bowling, or a regatta. Ought not R. O. M. to propose that we should do our theatricals, concert-room amusements, &c., ourselves? And why should we not have amateurs in all the industrial and artistic

pursuits as well as in the most difficult and dangerous one of all—war? We can see no likelihood of ever having a national army, nor do we think it morally desirable; and we are convinced that a popular army would prove—a popular delusion. W. S. L.

## POPULAR.—IV.

It would appear that, after all, we are not to have a reorganization of the army just yet. There is, therefore, time afforded for public discussion, and for the gathering together of suggestions such as may be likely to aid in the ultimate attainment of “a mature, a comprehensive, and an economical scheme of army reform.”

As it is, we are only about to lop off one of those excrescences which have grown out of our system of professionalism in the army. Purchase of commissions had no place in our professional army at its institution. It has grown up in opposition to the law, and is one of the evils justly chargeable on a professional army. The jealousy of the House of Commons regarding a professional army was so great, that it made the existence of such an army dependent on an annual vote of the House. But so powerful is the routine of use and wont, that the House of Commons virtually gave up the exercise of its right to *veto* a professional army; and so liable to abuse is the existence of a professional army, that it slily made itself sure of continuance of being, and actually made a trade and a traffic in those commissions which attained their validity only through the supineness of the House of Commons. Under the very eye of that House the custom grew up of treating its rights as a mere fiction, and a process of sale went on upon the express supposition that the House would not exercise its rights and do its duty. The sale and purchase of commissions—which are, in reality, and in the eye of the law, valid only from year to year as the House of Commons voted or vetoed the Mutiny Act—would have been impossible had that House not virtually consented to the idea entertained that it would not put in operation any process which would stop the vile traffic. And now the House of Commons is about to levy a considerable number of millions of money on the country to undo the results of its own criminal betrayal of the trust reposed in it; and has resolved to purchase the right of (illegal) sale of commissions, and so to abolish by purchase what ought never to have been permitted. So that we are actually to buy back from the officers of our professional army

the right to regulate and arrange it so as best suits us, not them. Could a stronger argument against a professional army be got hold of than this—that the nation has actually now to pay—to the tune of millions—a price to its own defenders, a bribe to induce them to give up an illegal practice, the growth of generations certainly, but nevertheless undoubtedly wrong? Is not the upgrowth of this practical treason against the country in our professional army a valid argument against so organizing an army that the offices connected with it may be farmed out, and a price may be demanded by those who have the guardianship of the nation's honour entrusted to them for handing over to others promotion not truly theirs to give?

It is of great consequence that this matter should be looked firmly in the face, and that we should see that no system of purchase, such as that which the House of Commons has passed a bill to abolish, could have arisen, had the Parliament held and exercised the power of annual renewal or dismissal, reserved to it by the wisdom of its predecessors, and placed in its keeping for behoof of the country; and had the professional army not presumed upon its necessity to the country to do an act which is not only illegal, but unworthy of gentlemen. Of course now that it has become, as it may be called, "a custom of the trade," a House of Commons chary of interference with "the customs of trade," even to the extent of all but recognising, by refusing to legislate against adulterations in meats, drinks, medicines, &c., has looked upon the offence as condoned, and our gallant defenders, officers and gentlemen, are to be allowed the full profit of their sin against society. But the sin was made possible by the introduction of professionalism in the army, by its being allowed to become the master instead of remaining the servant of the country. This grave error has been made vastly greater by the readiness with which the people, in their admiration of the military profession, have sent to Parliament members of that profession, and that, too, in opposition to the express law against the right of any one to sit in the House of Commons having, holding, or receiving any benefit from any contract connected with Her Majesty's service,—so much have we connived at breaches of the law by members of the honourable professions of the army and the navy. And have we not seen how these brave defenders of their country and ours from the foes which threaten from abroad, have become an enemy to



that country at home by impeding, in their own self-interest, as wholesome and requisite legislation, till their clamours for condonation and recoupment were yielded to? In this case we have permitted the transgressors to be their own advocates, defenders, jury, and judges; and by a majority of which they formed the greater part, the offence of purchase has now been condoned, and their right to repayment has been acknowledged. This is clearly an evil resulting from our having a professional army; and it plainly shows the accuracy of R. W. C.'s argument, "that wherever you create a profession you initiate and make possible a professional interest" (*ante*, p. 445); and affirming most palpably what J. W. S. says, that a professional army is expensive.

If it is not necessarily expensive, what has all our House of Commons talk and our House of Lords squabbles been about? and what has occasioned the strange sense of a *coup d'état* to spread over the face of society, when it was found that the pension-craving colonels had been out-generalled, and that by a flank movement they had been thoroughly defeated? (*Absit omen in futuro*!) The high pay, and the high purchase, and the high pension system had heated the public mind to high pressure, and the safety-valve of the royal prerogative has been used to let off the steam of popular passion. But the expensiveness of the army led to the expansiveness of the rage of the people, and the twopence of income tax gave indubitable proof of the cost at which the military were resolved to sell out.

The fact that by the passing of the Army Regulation Bill in the form it has now taken we have what the *Times* rightly calls but "a meagre instalment of the great problem of army reform," has its origin in the professional interest excited against it.

A professional army loses interest in the country just in proportion as it acquires effectiveness as a professional unity. It seeks exactly what the country does *not* want—war; and it demands exactly what the country is not willing to grant—constant subsidies and ever-increasing supplies.

That a popular army is attainable we know, because our own professional army is not so very ancient as an institution, and prior to that our army was to all intents and purposes popular. Those who fought our battles "in Great Eliza's golden time," at the period of the Protectorate, and at the era of the glorious Revolution, went forth from the use of the sickle and the spade, the 1871.

hammer and the saw, the handling of the plough-shaft and the flail, to do fight in their country's cause; and when victory crowned their efforts they returned to tell of their trials and their triumphs, and so to sow in the souls of others courage for their evil hour. Why may it not be so now? Because we are more willing to purchase than to exercise valour and courage, hardihood and endurance.

In the early times of our country all its citizens could do a stroke of fighting, when and if it was required. Why not revert to the good old plan of educating the people in self-defence? "Samuel" calls K. N.'s suggestions a "visionary theory;" what kind of theory is it that is not visionary? Let it be the business of Government to provide a popular army, and then theory will cease to be visionary by becoming a fact. K. N. has gone a good way to show how much might be done were due facilities granted for giving the people healthy drill and self-defending power.

There need be no conscription for a British army, but there is urgent need of an organization of the nation for self-defence. Let the work be begun in our national schools and continued in our colleges till all the people know the drill and manoeuvres on which steady and firm motion depends. Let our short-time system be utilized so as to bring into general use the power of properly wielding a gun, and employing effectively any other weapon of war. Let our holiday seasons be given to the exercises of the camp and the field, and let the announcement of local reviews and district inspections be frequent and well managed as to facilities for locomotion and rewards for excellence, and the popularity of a Derby day would be nothing compared to a day at Wimbledon, or even a rush to a fray at the now famous Dorking, known for its fowls, and celebrated as the place of the (yet-to-be) defeat of Britain. The national patriotism is not dead, and the reply which the people would give to preparations for self-defence would soon justify the organization of a people's, not a professionalist's army. The country requires only to determine whether it shall rely on its own arm and heart for safety and defence, or whether it shall trust to a hired and professional class; whether all or some of the inhabitants shall be qualified to strike for home and freedom. When the country has resolved on that, the duty of our statesmen will be to mature the plans by which the desires of the people may be realized. It is nobler to trust to one's self than to others.

E. C. A.

## Science.

---

### HAS MAN DEVELOPED FROM THE SAVAGE STATE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

WHAT is development? Is it not the growth determined by internal influences and external circumstances of those capacities which are laid up, however latent, in any given nature? Is it not the maturing and opening out of all the possible manifestations of a being of any special sort? Is it not the process by which the intention and aim of anything is brought forward and advanced so as to give full scope to the original intention which presided over its existence to show itself? Development is, in fact, the ripening and the unfolding of all that is in anything. Development is the entire source of progress, from the original beginning till the final end has been attained.

What is a savage state? Is it not that condition in which the individual and collective powers of man are in their least useful and satisfactory form of operation? Is it not that form of life in which men least perform and show what they have full ability to do? Is it not that method of almost animal existence which supplies us with the lowest idea of the race to which we ascribe it? Is it not the course of existence which shows man in its least useful and attractive manifestations? A savage state is exactly that manifestation of life which we are compelled to express by a series of negations, *unpolished, unrefined, unruly, unplaceable, lawless, &c.*, all more or less indicative of what men in their progress have attained and named, and for the want of which there is no name except one which suggests the want of what has been gained. Savageness is the non-possession or the want of the use of the powers, characteristics, qualities, and modes of life, which civilized nations exhibit and exercise.

The greater part of modern thinkers have decided in favour of the opinion that man in his original state was savage; and the topic we are called upon to discuss is—Has man developed from a savage state? It is quite clear that *man* here signifies *mankind*, the human race. And it is equally clear that when we ask this

question, we mean to inquire if there is any likelihood that men were created in a civilized state, in which case the holder of the negative in the debate would require to make an assertion equivalent to this,—Man has *regressed* from a civilized to a savage state, and has become decivilized or degenerate. We doubt if this would be very easy to do. I do not think that even Dr. Browne's theory, that "the lives not only of men, but of commonwealths and the whole world, run not upon a helix that still enlargeth, but on a circle, where, arriving to their meridian, they decline in obscurity, and fall under the horizon again," is very able to be maintained, though it contains the main thought of Vico's celebrated "New Science." We know that nations have advanced, and that nations have retrogressed. We have a celebrated "History of the Rise, Decline, and Fall" of a celebrated empire, but we have no instance of degradation so great as an absolute return to savagery again. If man began in a civilized state, he has vastly and unaccountably degenerated. He has left behind him all the traces of his early civilization which we would have expected to find; the grand labours, inventions, and records of his pristine civilization could not surely all have perished utterly out of the history of civilized man! Of course, there are many who have formed an opinion, from the perusal of the Bible in that easy-going receptive way which is so common, and that constant addition to the acceptance of *texts* for truths, which has done so much evil, that man was civilized from the first. They found upon such sayings of the Record as this,—“Lo, this only have I found, that God made man upright, but he has sought out many inventions.” But the perfection of mankind is not a dogma of Scripture. It gives an account of the means taken by Deity to secure that a standard of *moral* civilization should be constantly present in the world. But the revelation concerns a man, and a chosen people, not mankind and the human race. Besides, the standard thus held up to man was an objective written rule or code of laws, and was to be received into the heart, and worked into the practical life of nations. This is the real process of true civilization, the working of intellectually approved and heart-adopted principles into moral habits and social practices. Civilization is the softening down and the over-mastering of our animal characteristics, the subjugation of our selfish and gross passions, and the excitement into living

activity of our spiritual nature and higher dispositions. This is effected by the acceptance into our hearts and the assimilation into our lives of the high laws of divine revelation; but the truths do not constitute, they only excite civilization.

Civilization is therefore a development, a raising, refining, and quickening process. T. L. B. may doubt that man has progressed, if he chooses, in the face of facts, but the experience of history is against him. Civilization changes in amount and direction, in place, and in the accidental practices it admits, but it does not die. All the best effects of the past are caught up and contained in the present. The architecture and irrigation of Egypt, the roadways and the domestication of animals of Nineveh; the industries of Persia, the philosophy of Greece, the legislation of Rome, the social community of Germany, the statecraft of France, the worshipfulness of India, the economy of China, have been all intertextured with the Christianity of Palestine, to form and invigorate modern civilization. Through an infinite variety of modifications, exceptions, and disturbing influences, these have all more or less been subordinated to and incorporated with the life of men at present, and notwithstanding the differences of men's races and religions, there is a growing convergence to a unity of mode of living such as marks off our era as one of high civilization. And this progress has been a development, not a retrogression. In the sphere of history, progress is the one prevalent phenomenon. It is evident, therefore, that, if man has developed he must have done so from a savage state; anything else would be decline and decay, not development. Man has, then, developed from a savage state.

L. E. X.

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

As a negative paper on this question by L. T. B. has already appeared in your publication, I wish first to lay down what seem to me the objections to the theory therein advocated, and afterwards to show the reasons for entertaining the affirmative view.

We are asked by L. T. B. to conceive the world at the beginning in a state of civilization—a vague term, which, in such a case as this, should be more closely defined. In some passages I understand him to mean outward cultivation and abundance—the wealth

of nature made to yield more richly by the hand of art: in others he states that the contrast between the savage and the civilized nation lies not in these *surroundings*, but in moral qualities,—the former living merely in the present, and occupied with sensual cares, the latter having a world in the unseen and spiritual also (this is his meaning, if I understand him rightly—I quote from memory). If, then, L. T. B. means to imply that the inhabitants of the world lived in the beginning in a state of cultivation and abundance, I must emphatically dispute the statement. Civilization in this sense is the result of *art*, and cannot be *innate*. It must be the result of knowledge, and knowledge can be acquired only by experience. The faculties which enable us to acquire and to arrange our knowledge are indeed given, but nothing else. Does L. T. B. suppose that the Egyptians had an inborn faculty for writing hieroglyphics or embalming mummies? Yet he would attribute to them, the knowledge of these arts from the very beginning. Or does he think that they were supernaturally born with the gold spoon of civilization in their mouths? The supposition that they had a divine origin is at any rate wholly unfounded, and to conclude that, because their endless chain of dynasties stretches, or is said to stretch, beyond that of any other nation, except so far as the Bible narrative goes, therefore they were necessarily born into luxury, looks like asserting that Egypt was a sort of historical *Mis Kilmansegg*. It is unnecessary to observe that whether we go to the early parts of the Bible, or to the latest conclusions of modern science, such a view is unauthorized.

"In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread," was the stern sentence on all mankind, if we believe the former; and the latter, so far from giving ground for credence in any such *partus mirabilis*, has half made good the connection between man and the lowest of his fellow-beings.

And what principle is it which has forced L. T. B. to this strange conclusion? The principle that there is no such thing as progress, that man is tied to existence by an unlengthening chain, so that if he would change his position, he must go ever backwards, or remain the same. He would have us believe that on the whole the world has rather gone back than forwards, and hence, to account for what is and what has been, to say nothing of what may yet be, he is forced to endow the first men with native cultivation. Civilization

is with him like water, which will not rise above its primary level : let us hope it is something more stable than water, something which will have power in itself henceforwards to become greater than either it is or has been.

Another means which L. T. B. uses to support his position is a supposed deterioration in human language. Now it cannot be denied that the older languages, the Sanscrit and Greek, do exhibit a more perfect system and inward harmony than modern tongues ; that in the former case especially the idea of *terminations* is brought almost to perfection, and that the latter presents us with some of the noblest works which the world has yet seen. Still I cannot admit that on the whole modern languages have changed for the worse. The Greek thought was pre-eminently sensuous in expression, and the harmony of their system of word-formation was almost a necessity to them. Modern ideas seek intellectual rather than purely sensuous expression ; and with all its ruggedness and bareness of case-forms, our language can express probably more ideas than even the Greek, very many more than the Latin ; while, as far as works encased in a language go, we surely need not be afraid to enter the lists against any nation, past or present. Language is, however, the least evident path of our progress since ancient days. In true and positive knowledge, in consistent and searching investigations into all nature which lies open to our view, mentally or physically, who can say that we have not outstripped the very wisest men of old ; that where one eye saw them a thousand see now, that truths dimly portrayed to one or two earnest and piercing watchers are now set down as facts, seen outlined boldly and distinctly ; that a greater morality, a purer feeling, a larger faith, have taken the place of the belief in Olympus and Acheron, in Osiris and Isis, in Ahriman and Ormuzd ; that—but I might multiply instances indefinitely. Surely, then, it is *unnecessary* to suppose a state of things at first not materially differing from the present, provided that we can show any reasonable grounds for believing that the human race has become what it is not by backsliding, not by standing still, but by an eternal and all-ruling energy, which, however it may sometimes turn aside, is in the main leading onwards to a noble end for mankind.

No two men are alike. Some have genius, some not ; some make their way in the world, others are content to breathe their

native air on their own ground. Is this not a mere analogue to the state of nations? Some peoples wish for military glory and lands, others for commerce, others for greatness in literature, art, and learning. In all these there is energy; in all, life. They are the blood which keeps the world alive; the leaven which, though at times it is like that of the Pharisees, is in the main sound and inspiring. And what does this energy show itself in? in imitation of what has been? that is the energy of a copying clerk. No, it is in invention, which is the intimate union of different ideas, like chemical compounds. By this means is the world's richness in ideas increased, and every idea, be it recollected, has a last issue in a *fact*. The steam-engine is the last issue, the congealed essence, as it were, of the union of the ideas of steam, expansion, and motion; and so with every other product of invention. And why do not the Africans, the nations of South America and Asia, invent steam-engines? I hear L. T. B. ask; because they are stagnant pools and inlets from the great river of humanity; because the energy of the first nation has descended not into them, but unto us, as gifts descend in different proportions to different members of one family—and a genius may be brother to a fool. The first man, whoever he was, according to this hypothesis, possessed this energy, in great part latent and undeveloped, but yet there; and that energy, mighty as that which lies silent in an acorn, has unfolded itself down to us, bringing forth buds and flowers, and now and then the full golden fruit. Is not this hypothesis of energy and invention, both known to exist in individuals, fit also to be applied to nations? Moreover, if the stationary position of some nations be supposed to prove that they have descended from a height instead of remaining in the deep places of the earth, why do not the apes who are known to have at one time become men, not do so again? Or have they, too, once been men, and present now only the deformed caricature of what they once were?

Your correspondent also brings forward the instance of Greece and Rome having been influenced much by foreign countries to show that self-culture is a thing impossible. Yet is not outside nature a great instrument in culture? And that is always present, whether or not the influences of greater civilization are brought to bear in addition. The man who could find "sermons in stones, looks in the running brooks, and good in everything," did not



need a university education to appreciate them; and I conceive that a nation gifted as highly as the Greeks were, and left alone with their grand hills and the blue Ægean, would arrive, though perhaps after a longer time, at a culture as high and as delicate as theirs. No Egyptian hand taught Phidias the best part of his art, and no Greek taught Rome to show forth her greatness in huge aqueducts and circuses. Both nations were original and energetic, deeply so; without that, Rome would neither have spread her iron strength round half the physical world, nor Greece have had such a mighty influence on the inner world of all ages to come. We may safely say that where this energy is, a nation will live so long as it keeps it, that it will show it in perpetual invention in the widest sense; and, on the other hand, that a nation whose life is shown only in imitating others, like the Germans in the early part of last century, will, unless it develops a more vital energy, sooner or later droop and fade.

Have I made my case clear? Or shall I still appeal to Christianity, and show that such an idea of the impossibility of progress is utterly opposed to it; that it cuts off man from all lofty hopes, from the pursuit of the ideal which he would fain see become the real; that, in short, we are to give to the winds the great words of Paul,—“Till we all come in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ”?

C. H. HEREFORD.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

THIS question, as I understand it, refers to Man, and not to his circumstances. That the development of invention, trade, commerce, luxury, and an acquaintance with the facts of science, has been very great, nobody would, we suppose, be inclined greatly to deny. That is an inevitable consequence of man's being able to examine, remember, exchange, and feel gratification. But the development of the elements of civilized life is not by any means quite identical with the development of Man; and what we have to consider is, Has Man developed from the savage state? Here we clearly see the point in dispute is *not* as B. E. C., quoting from Professor A. Bain, makes it, about the “artificial half of the good we enjoy” (*ante*, p. 456), but is concerned entirely with the real

half of what we *are*. Has Man developed? and did his development take as its point of departure the savage state?

When B. E. C. talks of "human progress," he speaks without proper care, as it appears to me, of the distinction between "the progress of man" and the improvement of the circumstances of man. The improvement of the conditions of life, for instance, as to business, pleasure, travel, news, &c., in London is very great; but does not this very improvement result in bringing in its train a considerable personal deterioration? for instance, in preferring the ballet and the music-hall *comiques* to Shakspeare and the comedies of the olden time, Braddon's sensations to Scott's reproductions of life, fast habits to slow homeliness, &c. (See Note I., p. 125.)

It is surely a very singular mistake to be guilty of supposing that "human progress" consists in the abundance of the good things of this life which a man possesses; and that *man's* development is synonymous with man's getting property in, or being surrounded by a great variety of things! Is man himself bettered by these possessions and acquisitions? Have we not often seen men grow worse as they grow richer? Have we not even known nations which, as their accumulations increased, became depraved and debased, until nobility of character and purity of principle dwindled and faded away? (See Note II., p. 126.) Take the England of the Restoration, modern Spain, our neighbours the French, as illustrations that the growth of luxury is often a cause of the declension rather than the development of man. This fact of the readiness with which men fall away from the circumstances and advantages in which they are placed by what is called modern civilization is very singular, and yet remarkably patent. The home heathendom of great cities is undeniable, but the heathenism does not consist in poverty or want so much as in personal degradation. We know that among the poor and lowly there are pure and holy lives led; we know that among the rich and great there are wretched and graceless lives passed; these facts show that circumstances do not constitute civilization in its true import, and that man's development does not by sheer necessity of things depend on his mere material advantages.

My belief is that man was created in a high and holy state of being, that his nature was developed, but not exercised. He had in him all the elements of noble character, and was placed in cir-

cumstances to occasion the exercise of pure and elevating thought. He was fitly framed and fashioned for the dominion of the earth, and therefore was in a perfect, though unexercised state. His faculties were ripe and mature, his aptitudes in their best condition. His nature did not depend upon his circumstances, but upon the intention of his Creator. His powers required exercise, were formed for use, not for development. He was to culture and train, to employ and enjoy, to rule over and change all that was placed under him. He was to use and delight himself in the exercise of his God-imparted being—that being, which as it was made in the likeness of God, was perfect and pure. Every faculty was fresh and full, awakening at once to the distinct activity to which it has been appointed on the presentation of the excitement suited to occasion its manifestation. We do not believe in the developable, in regard to man's mental and moral nature in his first estate. That creatures who had their birth and being in the ordinary process of human reproductiveness must have been developable in their condition cannot be doubted, but that they originally started from the savage state does not appear probable to us; for *savage* signifies not a point of indifference as to moral good or evil, but a *state* from which the knowledge and love of good is absent, and the practice of and delight in evil predominate and prevail.

The first estate of man was not that of savagery. We meet in all history not only with a wild and lawless savagery, but with a civilization—a civilization whose mission was felt to be the destruction of this savagery, and its subjection to laws and rule. This civilization always appears as an imported and communicated thing, and savagery as an illegitimate degeneracy and declension. The savage state is spoken of as a disgraceful one, which cannot be submitted to, and must be brought under; to which it was wrong to show tenderness, and with which persistent war should be waged. If it is endured at all as an inevitable thing, it is put under control as slavery, held to taskwork, and constrained to toil in the cause of civilization. B. E. C. explains this by asserting that savageness was the original state, and civilization a process of development from that. We reverse the hypothesis, and contend that civilization—as a mental condition, not a material aggregate—was the first estate, and that savagery was a recession thence. This seems to be implied in the terms which are applied to savage life—depraved, degenerate,

rude, inhuman, and inhumane, declension, fall, &c.,—all of which appear to indicate that there was an original standard and test to which reference was had and made, that standard being the original manliness or humanity, of which civilization felt that it was the representative, and savageness the unmanly and degraded state to which the besotment of sin and self-will had brought man. We cannot on any other hypothesis account for the form of these words.

"Georgius," in his long and somewhat erudite article, despises philology as a witness to man's original uprightness and perfection of mental condition, but he is willing to trust much to law. Did it not strike "Georgius" that law is a conception that entirely opposes his theory? Law is a product of a sense of obligateness. It therefore presupposes a moral sense to determine what is law, what constitutes rights, &c., and a moral sense to accept of these decisions, to see their wisdom, and to incline to obey them. Law is a conception which civilization makes more complex and difficult in its applications and ramifications, but which is in itself a witness for the standard of determination being possessed by man; otherwise there could be no obligation or binding a man against his will to do what the community might determine on as right. *Lawless* is the very term used to characterize *savages*. They are *wild*, that is, moved by their own impulses, however bewildering; but not moved by a sense of law as overruling their own will. How account for the origin of law at all on the savage origin of man theory? for his degradation it is easy to account on ours.

He refers, again, to religion. But the very conception of religion as a binding back of man to an allegiance broken and disrupted, is a testimony in every way against the theory of man's development from the savage state. It implies that a former state has been lost and is to be regained, that known duties have been neglected and should now be performed.

"Georgius" is equally at fault in his conception of science, which is arranged knowledge. In a question referring to man's development, L. T. B. quite justifiably confined his attention to the sciences relating to *man*, and did not meddle with the sciences relating to *matter*. Now it is unquestionable that the sciences of the *modes* of investigation, as differing from the sciences of the *results* of investigation, are not only the higher and nobler, but

the prime. To the ancients we owe the conception of science—a survey of facts and their causes at one view as a linked whole. This suggests and implies that that was the original condition of knowledge from which man had fallen away, and to which it was felt requisite to bring him back by rule and training.

Two other elements in this question may be noted, not enlarged on. First, all our ennobling conceptions in religion—as from the Bible; law—as from the codes of ancient nations; literature—as in Homer, Plato, and Herodotus—come to us from ages nearer to the presumed savage state than our own; yet after thousands of years of progress-time men have not developed higher and nobler ideas, and cannot do more than reproduce and illustrate them. If man had developed from the savage state for thousands of years antecedent to the Adamic time, why was printing so long delayed? why are we yet unacquainted with the secrets of Egyptian architecture and Greek sculpture? why do our best logic, ethics, poetry, and law come to us from the ancients, and remain almost unimproved? Is not, then, the negative of this question more than directly proved?

P. O. S.

NOTE I.—“Shakspeare lived and died, we may say, in the pre-scientific period; he lived and died in the belief of the fixity of our earth in space, and the diurnal wheeling round her of the ten spectacular spheres. Not the less was he Shakspeare; and none of us dares to say that there is now in the world, or has recently been, a more superb thinking apparatus of its order than his mind was, a spiritual transparency of larger diameter, or vivid with grander gleamings and pulses. Two hundred and fifty years, therefore, choke-full though they are of new knowledges and discoveries, have not been a single knife-edge of visible advance in the world's power of producing splendid individuals; and if we add two hundred and fifty to that, and again two hundred and fifty, and four times two hundred and fifty more without stopping, still we cannot discern that there has been a knife-edge of advance in that particular. For at this last remove we see the Romans, and beyond them there lie the Greeks; and side by side with both, and beyond both are other Mediterranean Indo-Europeans, and, away in Asia, clumps and masses of various Orientals. For ease of reference, let us go no farther than the Greeks, thinking apparatuses of first-rate grip, mental transparencies of large diameter, and tremulous with great powers and pulses. What do we say to Homer, Plato, *Æschylus*, *Sophocles*, *Euripides*, *Aristophanes*, *Thucydides*, *Aristotle*, *Demosthenes*, and all the rest of the great Hellenic clusters which these represent?”—*Professor D. Masson, on “How Literature may illustrate History,” “Macmillan's Magazine,” July, 1871.*

NOTE II.—Our attention has been directed to the following instance of lapse from a high to a low state of civilization, in a known district, and within the historic period, as an illustration of the assertion in the text of this article:—

"On the borders of the Lincolnshire fens, halfway between Stamford and Peterborough, stands the little village of Helpston. A so-called 'stipendiary knight,' but of whom the old chronicles know nothing beyond the bare title, exercised his craft here in the Norman age, and left his name sticking to the marshy soil. But the ground was alive with human craft and industry long before the Norman knights came prancing into the British isles. A thousand years before the time of stipendiary Helpo, the Romans built in this neighbourhood their Durobrivæ, which station must have been of great importance, judging from the remains, not crushed by the wreck of twenty centuries. Old urns, and coins bearing the impress of many emperors, from Trajan to Valens, are found everywhere below ground, while above the Romans left a yet nobler memento of their sojourn in the shape of good roads. Except the modern iron highways, these old Roman roads form still the chief means of intercommunication at this border of the fen regions. For many generations after Durobrivæ had been deserted by the imperial legions, the country went downward in the scale of civilization. Stipendiary and other unhappy knights came in shoals; monks and nuns settled in swarms, like crows upon the fertile marsh-lands; but the number of labouring hands began to decrease, as acre after acre got into possession of mail-clad barons and mitred abbots. The monks, too, vanished in time, as well as the fighting knights; yet the face of the land remained silent and deserted, and has remained so to the present moment. The traveller from the north can see, for thirty miles over bleak and desolate fen regions, the stately towers of Burleigh Hall, but can see little else beside. All the country, as far as eye can reach, is the property of two or three noble families, dwelling in turreted halls; while the bulk of the population, the wretched tillers of the soil, live, as of old, in mud hovels, in the depth of human ignorance and misery.—*Frederick Martin's Life of John Clare*," pp. 1, 2.

---

"MORAL PHILOSOPHY is the science of human duty, the knowledge of what constitutes the duty and felicity of mankind; or it may be defined as the art of being virtuous and happy. It may be viewed under the double aspect of an art or a science; an *art*, inasmuch as it embodies into a system rules for becoming virtuous and happy, by the practice of which is gained an habitual power or facility of attaining virtue and happiness; a *science*, since it deduces those rules from the principles, connections, and associations inherent in human nature, and proves that the observance of them is productive of lasting happiness."—E. A. STURGEON.

## Literature.

### IS PULPIT INFLUENCE ON THE WANE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"As dull as a sermon," is only a degree inferior in the severity of its censure to the saying, "As dull as ditch-water." "Not worth an old song," is quite a modicum of praise compared with the saying, "As little worth as a last Sunday's sermon." Whenever we want to characterize a long, windy, dull, uninforming, ineffective harangue, we call it preaching. When we wish to express the least effective form of mental action, we say, "I care as little for that as preaching," or "You need not preach away so to me," or still worse, "Preach away, I care not." All these phrases—and a great many similar ones that might be quoted from every-day workshop conversation—show that a very emphatic opinion is abroad in regard to the inefficacy of preaching.

If we do not choose to take our facts from the region of words, we may get it easily from present observation. If we walk through the streets of any large town, or along the lanes and hedgerows of any considerable village during the hours of divine service, we shall see full and complete evidence that the influence of preaching is on the wane; and this will be confirmed by looking into the churches, whose vacant pews give the same evidence, or by taking a peep, immediately their doors may be opened, into the public-houses; in both sorrowfully ample evidence will be found of the affirmative in this debate.

It is not for us to determine upon the *causes*, but on the *fact*; we have not to tell *why*, but to show *that it is*. Never was there a wider and greater development of the machinery of preaching, and never have results been so sparse and scant. The reverse of our Lord's saying, "The harvest truly is plenteous, but the labourers are few," into the form, "The labourers truly are plenteous, but the harvest is scant," would perhaps come near to a statement of the fact of the present time. Number our churches and our parsons, estimate the amount of talk called preaching, and then look at the home life of the people, the street conduct of men, the law, and the criminal courts of the county, and listen to the whispers of any social circle, about the hidden, or at least half-hidden sin of society. Compare

the adhesion given ungrudgingly to the ranks of vice, the amount spent in gratification and self-indulgence with the beating up for recruits and subscriptions for any scheme of a religious character. Look at our railway stalls and their literature; listen to conversation anywhere; see our popular amusements, and take a peep at our most fashionable games; take a survey of the bankrupt list, and scan even the characters of the office-bearers of the several Bethels of the day; and what evidence do they give of the efficacy of modern preaching? Are not preachers in habit and repute uninfluential persons? and is not the phrase, "I took him for a parson," tantamount to an aspersion of the person so characterized as a good-for-nothing, imbecile ineffective, whom one half pities, half despises, yet tolerates through a sort of traditionary courtesy.

This sort of tame acquiescence in clerical right to civility is, however, fast showing signs of giving way. Notwithstanding the interest attaching to the controversies of religion, kept up in their bitterest and most malignant form, and most persistently carried on from camp to camp; despite the endeavours and labours of partisans and proselytes, complaints reach us from all sections of the Church as to deadness of heart, backslidings, and fallings-away, a beggarly account of empty pews, decrease in zeal, earnestness, and subscriptions, and calls to prayer for a renewal of grace and an outpouring of the Spirit. Here and there a new flash of earnestness lights up the hopelessness of things; but on the whole preaching seems to be effete, and is almost everywhere confessedly a failure. Of all the millions of sermons annually delivered from the pulpits of Great Britain, how many are influential in any large measure, even in exciting attention or eliciting thought? How many altogether fail to move the affections, to sway the passions, or regulate the lives of men—or even of women! Why, the very breath expended in the delivery of these sermons would exert a sensible effect upon a set of windmills, or a merchant fleet at sea; while the moral and religious efficacy of all this machinery for sermonizing people on Sundays falls upon the ears of most as flat and stale, and the people let the preachments pass by them as the idle wind which they regard not.

Testing the preacher's utility by the social power he has been able to elicit and maintain; by the hold he has upon the hearts and consciences of the people; by the effect pulpit ministrations have had on the public morals; by the low position in literature



of sermons in general—and those which are published are, of course, thought to possess some extra element of interest. We cannot come to any other conclusion than that pulpit influence is on the wane. It must be borne in mind, too, in considering the slightly appreciable influence which churches exercise upon the common mind, that we have given credit to the pulpit for the whole effect produced, while it is well known that a large proportion of the influences of churches on society depends rather upon the Sunday school and its adjuncts than upon the preaching. And on the literary side it should be noted that many of those treatises which are issued under the form of sermons—as, indeed, many of those productions delivered as sermons—are, in reality, disquisitions on morals, economics, social panaceas, philosophical questions; and are pulpit literature only in form, not in essence. For example, the Bampton Lectures are prize theological and metaphysical essays, although produced as sermons; the Boyle, Hulsean, and other lectures are of the same sort; and a large proportion of those *discourses* which are published “by request of friends” have other attractions than merely their pulpit influence. Take as the clergy all who wield pulpit influence, and having counted them up, it will be found that, in proportion to their numbers, there is a smaller per-centage of men eminent for the exercise of pulpit influence among them than there is in any professional class whose eminence in the ranks and for the purposes of their profession with whom we can compare, or rather contrast them. Legal influence, medical influence, &c., are gaining ground, but pulpit influence is on the wane.

The spread of vice, the prevalence of scepticism, the commonness of religious doubt, the power of formalism, the ordinary character of those who are most regular in their attendance on religious ordinances, the popularity of ritualism, the agitation for the more general introduction of choir music and instrumentalism in worship, the falling away of men of science and intelligence from churches of every sort, Conformist and Nonconformist alike, the persistent battles of sects for clerical power over lay carelessness or inattention, the converting of the pulpit into a political engine, all give evidence that pulpit influence is on the wane, that the clergy as a class are not progressing with the age, that the Church is failing as an embodiment under different forms of holders of a fixed faith. No proof surely could be more cogent than this—that “pulpit influence is on the wane.”

M. S. A.

## NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"EVERYTHING is deteriorating:" so the *laudator temporis acti* encomiast of bygone days exclaims. Worse and worse grow the times. Crime increases, pauperism enlarges its area, immorality prevails, law itself cannot keep pace in its curative attempts with the extraordinary developments of wickedness and knavery that riot in our midst. Homers, Virgils, Dantes, Shaksperes, even Cowpers we cannot now rival. Platos, Ciceros, Bacons, and even Berkeleys we are now unable to emulate. Alexanders, Caesars, Charlemagnes, Friederichs, and Napoleons, can now only be reproduced in little. Apelles, Raphael, and Chantrey are free from fear of rivalry. The great historic men of old have taken away fames from the world such as can never be equalled. The past is incomparably superior to the present. All our institutions are in a state of rapid and inevitable decline. There were statesmen in olden time, there are none now. Even our revolutions are mere sensational blue-fire and horror scenes compared with what England did in the Puritan times, America under the friends of liberty, and France under the advocates of libertinism. As a Dissenting chapel at Clapham is to St. Peter's in Rome, so is the pulpit influence of our day to those of Peter the Hermit or Luther. even to those of Irving and Chalmers, Hall and J. A. James. Preaching is no longer what it used to be!

This would be a sad story if it were true. But is it true? "that is the question." These fine, easily made, sweeping declarations sound well and put on a good outward appearance, but they seldom stand the test. The inferior metals can be worked into large, showy forms, but only the finer ones can be worked in miniature patterns. It is just these cries, however, that—like the false, fast imitation gold of the present day—astonish and deceive the vulgar. And the worst of it is that when they have attained a certain amount of currency and commonness, the vulgar accept them as real and act upon them as if true, and that too without examination. It is of great importance that at this time this matter should receive attention, and those who have the best interests of men at heart ought to rejoice that this question has been brought up and laid before men articulately for investigation. It is not easy to get these questions brought to the surface. The opposite doctrine is insinuated and spoken of as if it were a generally acknowledged fact, and men find themselves half believing a

proposition which has never been broadly stated to them. We, for our part, disbelieve the adverse opinion held and expressed regarding the pulpit, and believe that it is increasing in power and utility, in effectiveness and in ability.

In substantiation of my correctness in asserting that "pulpit influence is not on the wane," I shall lay down a few remarks.

I. The apparent truth of the opposite opinion is the result of the operation of a fallacy on the mind.

People in these days read more, and have habituated themselves much more to the reception of thought by the eye than the ear, so that ideas get a readier access in that way than in this. Hence they fancy that literature is more effective than preaching.

Again, in reading books they find the composition finely elaborated and brought out just up to the marketable standard—which is to produce an article that will please, a fine set of specimens of spindrift—the *drift* of which, however, it is often very difficult to discover. On comparing the spoken discourse of the preacher with the elaborated phrases of the writer—not unfrequently editorially revised—there appears to be wanting in the former sometimes the ornateness of diction which delights us in the latter.

Still, again, most of those productions—which are the result in general of a far longer period of gestation than a preacher can allot to his one, two, or three sermons a week—deal with what are novelties in fact or thought to us, and have on that account an accidental freshness and interest which the topics of the preacher have not; and we reflect upon the preacher the fault of our minds, and blame the ineffectiveness of the preacher for our inaptitude and insusceptibility.

II. Preaching is relationship of thought, sympathy, and fellowship of mental effort.

In judging of preaching and its effect we too frequently leave out of the reckoning our own overtaxed and exhausted, vacant, or preoccupied minds, and lay to the debit of the clergyman our own deficiency. He comes with yearning sympathy, but we go with stolidity. He brings the stir and stimulant of thought and feeling, we come requiring the whip and spur of intense passion and the flare of tropes and figures; and then we cry, the influence of the pulpit is on the wane, when we ought really to confess that the influence of the world over our souls is on the increase. We blame the pulpit for the fault of the pew.

III. Criticism is fatal to emotion, and we now more frequently go to church in the critical than in the receptive mood. How much more frequently do we discuss the *how* than the *what* of a sermon; the consistency of the doctrine with a creed than with the Scriptures! how much greater a stress do we lay on the hold the sermon has taken on us than the hold we have taken of the sermon!

IV. We have a far larger amount of general floating knowledge now than men had formerly, and a far stronger literary conceit in ourselves; and hence we superciliously regard the phrase, "the foolishness of preaching," a proper, because a Biblical characteristic.

V. When we speak of the influence of the pulpit we too frequently mean the oratory heard in it and the style in which the address was given. Now oratory is a rare gift, and is quite distinct from preaching. We are, therefore, frequently misjudging the pulpit for not giving us what it does not profess to supply.

Such are a few of the fallacies from which the minds of men require to be disabused in regard to preaching before they are able even to approach the consideration of this subject properly. The very signification of the term *preaching* is all but commonly misunderstood. In ordinary phraseology it has come to signify the delivery of a public discourse on a religious subject from a text of Scripture. An essay on a Scripture text is not, however, a sermon in the Christian sense of the term. To preach is to proclaim in the most effective way possible to the individual the gospel of salvation and repentance, to exhort to faith in Christ and the practice of His law, to set forth Christ and Him crucified for the reconciliation of men to God through faith in Him who died, and who will communicate His Spirit to those who seek Him earnestly. When we criticise preaching as oratory or literature we injure ourselves and misapprehend it. It is *influence*, altogether influence; influence excited by word, thought, literature, oratory, action, passion, &c., but still influence; only as influence is it *preaching*.

I affirm that the influence of preaching is not on the wane, because,—I. There is now a greater amount of it and a greater demand for it than has ever yet existed. This is proved (1) by the scarcity of clergy in every body, notwithstanding their number and their competition; (2) by the high premiums offered in all churches for pulpit excellence; (3) by the place it holds even now, while adverse, opposing, and opposition interests are increasing and increasing in activity; (4) by the larger amount of good sermons which take

their place even among the literature of the age than in any previous period ; (5) by the publication of works and the institution of agencies for increasing its value and power.

II. It exerts a greater moral effect on men's minds—independently altogether of spiritual results—than all other forms of instruction yet attempted.

Great is the press, mighty is the public meeting, extraordinary is the power of the club and the drawing-room, and splendid the repute of Parliament, but the pulpit even yet holds wider and deeper sway than all these ; for it must be remembered that attendance on pulpit ministrations are attended with trouble and cost greater than the former, and above all demands the conquest of habit and the dominion of principles over which they exert but a slight effect. Every church is a centre of influence, which, as it is self-denying as to personal ease, is also unselfish in the object kept in view. That the pulpit has subdued even so far the worldly selfishness of men is proof that it has not lost its prevailing power.

III. In the gladiatorial contest with arts, facts, systems, theories, customs, conventionalities, and sins, it has exerted a restraining influence, and exercised a power which worldliness, self-indulgence, hatred of light, love of new things, doubt, criticism, temptations to neglect or disregard it, have been unable on the whole greatly to affect. Culture has decried it, criticism has scoffed at it, science has opposed it, socialism and communism have resisted it, doubt has assailed it, worldliness has offered bribes to allure from it, sloth, carelessness, and love of self have laid their deadening weight upon it ; but it has triumphed over all. Preaching is yet a power in human life, although there have arisen so many new claimants for the possession of the highest place in the human spirit. The forms of churches may change, their relations to states may be altered, their economics may vary, and their trials may multiply, but preaching is an undying influence.

IV. Consider this one thing more ; preachers have the widest and the surest fame. They are widely and worthily known, and no statesman, orator, actor, singer, &c., has so large a place in the heart, as the man who rightly divides the word of life.

Think upon these things, my friends ; do not let the hearsays of theorists betray you ; open your souls to the voice of the truth, and you will soon and surely know that "the influence of the pulpit is not on the wane."

M. D. R.

## The Essayist.

---

### SHAKSPERE AS AN ACTOR.

It has been made almost a commonplace of biography "that Shakspeare first quitted Stratford a needy and undistinguished fugitive." The circumstances of his career do not seem to warrant any such conclusion; and a correct interpretation of his life—taking all the traditions into account—seems capable of yielding a story which, if less romantic in the vulgar sense, comes nearer truth and common experience. Truth is only stranger than fiction so long as its causes are unknown. Real causation must ever be stranger and stronger than any we can feign, and hence it is that real life is genuine romance. Hitherto the biography of Shakspeare has shared the fate of his bust in Stratford Church—it has been sought to improve by painting it, and so, as Shakspeare knew,—

"Striving to better off we mar what's well."

It is an authentic fact that various sets of players—the Queen's company, the servants of Lord Worcester, my Lord of Leicester's players, Lord Warwick's servants, &c.,—had been in the habit, during Shakspeare's youth, of resorting to Stratford-upon-Avon, and giving performances under the patronage of the magistracy in the Guildhall there. James Burbage—father of the more celebrated Richard Burbage—was manager of the Queen's company, under a patent dated 1574, and was a native of Warwickshire; John Heminge, Shakspeare's friend and fellow, was a native of the same county; Thomas Greene, a noted comic actor, was a friend, if not indeed a relative of Shakspeare, and a native of the same town. Even while yet a youth Shakspeare had seen in the Guildhall of his native place most of the best theatrical pieces of his day performed by the best actors of his time. Of his precocity in that peculiar poetic stir of spirit commonly designated being "stage struck," we have specific evidence in Aubrey's "Account of Shakspeare" in these words:—"I have been told *heretofore* [Aubrey died about 1697] by *some of the neighbours*, that when he was a boy

he exercised his father's trade, but when he killed a calf he would do it in a high style, and make a speech." He farther reports that "this William being *naturally inclined* to poetry and acting, came to London, I guess, about 18 [1582?] and *was an actor* at one of the playhouses, and *and did act exceedingly well*. Now B[en] Jonson was *never a good actor*, but an excellent instructor. He [Shakspeare] began early to make essay in dramatic poetry, which at that time was very low, and his plays took well. He was a handsome, well-shaped man, very good company, and of a very ready and pleasant smooth wit."

Are we not too apt, in our wonder at the marvellously *creative* genius he displayed in the composition of the grandest and most varied dramas of which literature can boast, to underrate, if not to forget, the *imitative* talent of the actor? Are we not, indeed, mystified with and astonished at the idea that the man who has filled the realms of imagination with the multitudinous life of so many characters, and originated for us so much eventful poetry, should ever have been—

"A poor player,

That struts and frets his hour upon the stage?"

And yet it is most indubitably true that William Shakspeare, the "Star of Poets," did present himself in actual proper person, before actual living audiences, as an actor by profession, delivering with his own lips the words in which he (or other dramatists) had clothed the bright fancies of their thoughts, and in so doing showed that—

"To make the weeper laugh, the laughter weep,

He had the dialect and different skill,—

Catching all passions in his craft of will."

With the stage Shakspeare was familiar; and even with some of "those harlotry players" who delighted the burgesses of his native town, Warwick, Coventry, and other places in the neighbourhood, it is not unlikely that he held intercourse; and he might well bethink himself that if he had once got him a "fellowship in a cry of players" he could proceed from young Ambition's lowly ladder to climb steadily and surely up the dizzier heights of fortune. He had thrift in him, and a shifty versatility, and he was ready to put his hand to what he found he had to do. His fulness of life made him eager to push to the verge of power the might of

mind he felt playing within him. He had looked on life and touched it with the "heavenly alchemy of the imagination, until his conceptions grew into individuality and glowed with personal vitality," so that—

"The face of either ciphered either heart,"—

and the ideal became real. The necessary and essential are so expressly brought before the bodily eye, while what was implied but not specifically requisite most skilfully—

"Was left unseen, save to the eye of mind."

He felt the shadowy nature of life so fully that even the shadows of the stage acquired for him a beauty which was vivid and an attractiveness which made him long to throw forth upon the surface of men's minds the shadows of the multitudinous life that stirred within him.

There can be no doubt that this was the profession to which the whole bent of his genius inclined him. He took to the stage with the unmistakable urgency of an instinct. His ideas came so vividly before him that they took actual embodiment as they arose, and he knew thoroughly the need of bringing into visibility the things with which we seek to interest men. He was, perhaps, conscious that his "too much conceiving" could not be adequately made palpable to an ordinary mind unless by representation; and he must have made choice of that career which opened to him the possibility of imprinting on men's hearts and eyes that which mere book-print could never do—the reality of the life of thought, and the faerie world of possibility. Thought came to him surcharged with so much actuality that voice and gesture seemed inseparable from his creations. We can easily conceive, therefore, how one who felt that—

"His real habitude gave life and grace  
To appertainings and to ornament"

should, when under the need of choosing a profession, decide—"the play's the thing."

He had seen the keen interest with which the rude spectators followed the growth of the plot of a play, he knew how they caught up from the chief characters the phrases they liked, and drew from the events portrayed inferences which affected them. He saw in this a field not only of usefulness but profit, which he could



till with advantage, could he only gain admittance as a partner in the proper theatre. We do not assume that he took much capital into the concern. It was a great matter at that time as well as in this to put upon the stage—

“A proper man as one shall see in a summer’s day,”

with taste, energy, and a disposition to please. He could not expect much else than that he should undergo some sort of apprenticeship or novitiate, and that, we presume, is referred to in the tradition (registered by Dowdall in 1693) that “he was received into the playhouse as a servitor, and by this means had an opportunity to be what he afterwards proved,”—a simple enough statement of fact, subsequently *improved* by Rowe (in 1709), —“He was received into the company there in being, at first, in a very mean rank; but his admirable wit, and the natural turn of it to the stage, soon distinguished him, if not as an extraordinary actor, yet as an excellent writer;” and got subsequently *developed* by interpretation, for “still the wonder grew”—into “a stage tradition that his first office in the theatre was that of prompter’s attendant,” and then that “his first expedient was to wait at the door of the playhouse, and hold the horses of those that had no servants, that they might be ready again after the performance,” &c. It is far more probable that, being “naturally inclined to poetry and acting,” he conjoined in himself the two characters, of which he shows us the humorous side in his “*Midsummer Night’s Dream*,” in “*Quince the carpenter*” and “*Bottom the weaver*”—the former (as we interpret the piece) the author of the play of “*Pyramus and Thisbe*,” and the latter stage-manager and star of the company of those who had taken a fancy for engaging in what we would now call “private theatricals,” and who, having got hold of a play they liked, endeavoured to “give it an understanding” as best they could. Having in this way, as a frolic for the hour, exhibited occasionally—

“His art with nature’s workmanship at strife,”

his reputation among his fellows would spread, and his love for the stage would draw him into the charmed circle of the players on their visits to Stratford. Under the impression that he too might be a player, he might give them “a taste of his quality,” enough to show them that he might, “as a well-graced actor,” fulfil a fair rôle among

them. Overtures, but slightly hinted at at first, would be enthusiastically caught at; for there was no voice then to forewarn him of the annoyance that he might feel when he had made himself "a motley to the view," or to use such words as Ben Jonson afterwards introduced into the "Poetaster" about actors:—

"Methinks if nothing else, yet this alone, the  
Very reading of the Public Edicts should  
Fright thee from commerce with them, and give thee  
Distaste enough of their actions."

"When the fit is on," the stage fever is very commanding and intense:—

"A summer's day will seem an hour, but short,  
Being wasted in such time-beguiling sport."

There is, perhaps no other enthusiasm which partakes so much of the nature of an on-hurrying passion, so immediate and so telling is the effect of the efforts made on the beholders. Such a nature as Shakspeare's must have led him to the door of the theatre and behind the scenes, and once under the culture of the imagination which his adopted profession applied and implied, he would be pretty certain to obey his own maxim,—

"Make use of time, let not advantage slip."

We know that he meant business, and that he devoted himself to business; for, from the first moment that he put his foot within the theatre, he advanced in a straightforward course to prosperity. He saw, noticed, and studied the conditions of dramatic success. He trode upon and strode along the stage with the keen eye of a man who had business on his hand and ideas in his head. He learned what took with the people, and he knew that he could supply them with the precise article with all the added fitness of stage experience. He wished to gain a livelihood and to acquire a competent income, and therefore he so laboured, even at the drudgery of his profession, as to compel recognition of his merits as one "*excellent* in the quality he professes." That *acting* is here meant rather than writing we know; for it refers to the jeer of Robert Greene,—"*There is an upstart crow beautified with our feathers, that with his tiger's heart wrapped in a player's hide, supposes he is as well able to bombast out a blank verse as*

the best of you; and *being an absolute Johannes Factotum*, is in his own conceit the only Shake-scene in a country." We know from Chettle's apology for publishing this passage that Shakspeare was offended at the imputation, and we fancy we hear a renewal of the protest in "Hamlet," 2, ii., where Polonius says, "That's an ill phrase, a vile phrase; *beautified* is a vile phrase."

It is quite certain that Shakspeare was an actor—one, too, as we believe, the glow of whose sympathy, the thrilling expressiveness of whose eye, voice, and gestures were peculiarly calculated—

"To charm the very faculties of eyes and ears."

He had incorporated the stage with his very being; the earth was "a wide and universal theatre," "life a poor player":—

"All the world's a stage,  
And all the men and women merely players."

History is "an insubstantial pageant," in which too many a hero—

"Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven  
As make the angels weep."

And to his mind even the most notable exertion of the poetic faculty,—

"Imagination bodies forth  
The *forms* of things unknown; the poet's pen  
Turns them to *shapes*, and gives to airy nothing  
A local habitation and a name."

Even the highest praise for the most meritorious deeds or the most beneficent discovery appears to be given in the promise,—

"I will applaud thee to the very echo,  
That will applaud again."

The touching sting of *unpopularity* presents itself to him in a figure thus:—

"As in a theatre the eyes of men,  
After a well-graced actor leaves the stage,  
Are idly bent on him that enters next,  
Thinking his prattle to be tedious;  
E'en so—or with much more contempt, men's eyes  
Did cowl on Richard; no man cried, 'God save him!'  
No joyful tongue gave him his 'welcome home.'"

So entire is the possession that the stage has taken of his associative faculty, that of mankind he says,—

“ They have their *exits* and their entrances ; ” —

a notion which he enforces by observing that—

“ When we are born, we cry that we are come  
To this great *stage* of fools.”

While he asks in another place,—

“ What scenes of death hath Roscius now to act ? ”

These quotations, which are of anything but a recondite sort, indicate how his—

“ Nature is subdued  
To what it works in, like the dyer's hand ; ”

and show how closely and intimately the stage was associated in his thoughts with all the circumstances of life.

Though we have quoted the foregoing passage from that sonnet which has been generally “ held to indicate Shakspeare's disgust at his player's life,” we do not accept that theory of it. We think with Gerald Massey thus far : that “ Shakspeare's name was created at the theatre, that he had no higher standard of appeal. He had not stooped to authorship or the player's life. His living depended on the theatre ; he met and made his friends at the theatre ; he was making his fortune *by* the theatre ; how, then, should he exclaim *against* the theatre ? ” Shakspeare's was a career of triumph ; he was borne from the beginning on a full tide of prosperity ; the stage gave him that which he so obviously valued, worldly good fortune. He could not have been querulously decrying that success which his contemporaries were envying so much. Moreover, he was at heart a player, and enjoyed the pastime : this is apparent in his works. Therefore he could not despise the art in which he delighted, and which was bringing him “ name, friends, and fortune.” A true actor glories in the exercise of his art, and enjoys the delighted approval by which the audiences to which he appeals crown his efforts. Shakspeare was one who believed “ 'tis no sin for a man to labour in his vocation.” Had he thought shame of having to “ stage and stale himself to undeservers,” would he have brought his younger brother Edmund to stand the stare of the groundlings ? No ; he felt there was a dignity and a utility in the

theatre at that time which he knew how to use for lofty purposes for others, and with full profit to himself. Shakspeare's heart did not ache with shame at being a stage-player. His "fellows" loved him, and he loved his "fellows." He remembered them in his will on his death-bed as he had found joy in their company in the heyday of his health, in the hours when the plaudits of the people rung from "the proud round" of the audience, and in the periods when, at the "Mermaid," he took his ease in his inn, where he and they alike—

"Forget they are in the statutes, the rascals ;  
They are blazoned there, there they are tricked,  
They and their pedigree, they need no other heralds."

He had kindly words for the players and kindly thoughts of them ; they were incorporate in his soul with the very mode in which his life manifested its worth,—

"For virtue virtue loves, as art loves art."

We know from John Davies, of Hereford, that he "played kingly parts," and we feel sure that his fellows might justly tell their patrons, "If he be not fellows with the best king, thou shall find him the best king of good fellows." It is, indeed, from this passage in "Henry V." that Davies borrows the gist of his epigram ; from which we are inclined to infer that Shakspeare himself performed the part of that paragon of kings, at whose voice—

"The air, a chartered libertine, is still,  
And the mute wonder lurketh in men's ears,  
To steal his sweet and honeyed sentences.  
So that the art and practice of his life  
Must be the mistress to this theoric."

Seeing him so perform, Davies seems to have been surprised that Burbage and he had received no regal recognition, and were "guerdoned not to their deserts," despite their "wit, courage, good shape, good parts, all good."

We have Ben Jonson's testimony to his excellence as an actor in the placing of Shakspeare's name at the head of the list of those who performed the *dramatis personæ* in his plays ; a like evidence is given by his fellows, Heminge and Condell, in heading the list "of the names of the principal actors in all these plays," in the first folio, with that of William Shakspeare. Just as Davies couples

Shakspeare and Burbage together as players, so does John Marston, when he asks,—

“ Say who *acts*? Drusus or Roscio ? ”

Roscus was the name given to Richard Burbage, not only during his lifetime, but it is the name under which Camden speaks of him after his death. Shakspeare is apparently spoken of as Marcus Livius Drusus, the eloquent tribune of the people; and he is put first, too, to indicate that he it is who springs first into the mind when “ Romeo and Juliet ” is mentioned, as the one whose—

“ Outward actions do demonstrate  
The nature, act, and figure of the heart  
In complement extern.”

Shakspeare was six years older than Burbage, and probably it was through Shakspeare's instructions that he became so great a master in representative art. Their friendship was lasting and intimate, and their interchange of kindness forms a beautiful feature in the character of both. Burbage had two daughters, and one having predeceased the other's birth, they both bore the name of Shakspeare's heroine, Juliet; and he had a son whom he named William. Burbage played Romeo. Did Shakspeare enact Mercutio? It has but recently been discovered by Mr. J. O. Halliwell that Shakspeare acted on two occasions in company with Kempe and Burbage in the year 1594, and that they are all three described as servants to the Lord Chamberlain. This was when the Chamberlain's players occupied the *Newington Theatre*, where the old “ Hamlet ”—to which Nash and Lodge allude—was played. Mr. Halliwell has also recently announced that he has discovered that James I. ordered Shakspeare and his fellows to attend on the Spanish ambassador, at Somerset House, for upwards of a fortnight, in August, 1604, there to perform for his entertainment a round of their Globe and Blackfriars masterpieces. Rowe asserts that as an actor Shakspeare never got further than the performance of the Ghost in “ Hamlet; ” but the foregoing statement suggests the question, Did the poet figure himself in “ Hamlet ” as trainer of the players in his company, or did he give Burbage the opportunity of illustrating how well he had attended to the training in art which Shakspeare had bestowed on him?

It is certain that in “ Hamlet ” Shakspeare lays down “ syste-

matically and elaborately the essential principles both of his dramatic works and of histrionic art, and has triumphantly vindicated the true dignity of both." Here we have "the great dramatist's own idea of the high moral as well as æsthetic purpose of these arts, and the corresponding appreciation which they merited from the highest order of cultivated intellect and taste," "as the noblest field of art and the most effective school of morals." The tradition of the theatres was that John Lurvine and Joseph Taylor had received instructions from the dramatist, and handed down to Betterton, the informant of Rowe, the tradition of the Shaksperian style of giving expression to the passions, his view of the histrionic rendering of each part in his chief plays.

No theory of the actor's art, no exposition of the province of the drama, can for force, concentration, and truthfulness, vie with that master spirit's. "Hamlet" as critic, playwright, and stage manager, sets the matter in full view of the audience, and in so doing gives double effect to the illusion of the play in which fate so strangely eddies round and rises over him. The circumstantial story told of his "kingly" treatment of Queen Elizabeth, if well founded, would indicate his great power as an actor; and, in fact, the very existence of the tradition (though it were inaccurate in details) supports our view that the histrionic talents of Shakspeare, though ultimately eclipsed in the thoughts of men by the extraordinary genius displayed in the literature of his dramas, was such as to make the spectators feel,—

"O! how much more doth beauty beauteous seem,  
By that sweet ornament which truth doth give."

They saw the actor, and admired the outward show by which the inward meaning was expressed, but they could not see that which is most within and passeth show; for they had not the whole round of his dramatic works to study, while we have them in their glorious entirety, his life's—

"Summer's green, all girded up in sheaves."

S. N.

As a sort of postscript to the present paper, the conductors may be allowed to advert with pleasure to the following fact:—

In the *Quarterly Review*, No. 261, for July, 1871, the leading article is on "Shakspeare." It is based on Mr. Howard Staunton's

photo-lithographic reproduction of the first folio edition of 1623, and "Shakspeare: a Critical Biography. By Samuel Neil." It commences thus:—

"The two works at the head of this article are samples of what has been done for Shaksperian literature within the last few years. It is a matter of congratulation to all students of the great dramatist that the appliances of modern science should have given us an exact *facsimile* of the first collected edition of the poet's works, and thus have enabled all readers to judge for themselves of the state and arrangement of the text as it first left the hands of the poet's literary executors. Mr. Neil's little book has done good service in presenting the facts of the poet's biography, and the most material documents relating to it, in their strict chronological order. The value of the slenderest notices derived from original papers in illustrating not only the life of the poet, of his family, and his neighbours in Warwickshire, but the spirit and manners of the period can never be fully appreciated until the whole mass of evidence has been thoroughly sifted. Availing ourselves, therefore, of what has been brought to light by the indefatigable diligence of the poet's admirers within the last few years, and of such papers as still remain unpublished in the Record Office, we propose to lay before our readers a sketch of Shakspeare's life and times, carefully eliminating from the former those supposed facts and theories which have gathered round it on the faith of documents now generally regarded with discredit."

The work which has been selected as the sample "Memoir of the Dramatist" is, as our readers know, a republication of the *British Controversialist*, having formed the main matter of "The Essayist" during the latter part of 1860. The recognition these papers won from distinguished students of England's master-poet induced their revisal and reissue in an extensive form, entitled "Shakspeare: a Critical Biography and an Estimate of the Facts, Fancies, Forgeries, and Fabrications regarding his Life and Works," 1861. It is pleasant to know that Halliwell, Dyce, Mr. Cowden Clarke, Gerald Massey, Sheriff, H. Glassford Bell, Dr. Robert Chambers, Dr. Ingleby, David Masson, Dr. Langford, Sir Wm. Sterling Maxwell, Thos. Aird, Samuel Timmins, W. G. Clark (of the "Cambridge Shakspeare"), Alex. Bain, John Veitch, Dr. Stirling, Thomas Cooper, the late Samuel Lucas, &c., acknowledged the power and value of this endeavour to reform the modern estimate of Shakspeare. Mr. Neil has since continued his Shaksperian studies, and has contributed a paper on the "Moral Character of Shakspeare" to *Meliora*, April, 1864; a Biography of Shakspeare



to the "Warwickshire Worthies;" an essay on "Shakspeare as a Country Gentleman" to the *Birmingham Gazette*, and has recently published "The Home of Shakspeare," with the aim of enabling visitors to Stratford "in the right frame of spirit to look with a love-informed eye, and a sympathetic mind, on the scenes and places connected with and consecrated by the master mind who has made England [and the world] nobler and worthier by his life and thoughts."

### ON MANUSCRIPT MAGAZINES.

AMONGST modern means of intellectual improvement and development, capable also, in a measure, of affording both pleasure and amusement, a place of honour should be assigned to what are called "manuscript magazines." As yet these have not been sufficiently common to enable us to speak of any large results which they have produced, since, though there are some which have lived and thriven for a number of years, a great proportion are very ephemeral, and there are very many spheres which appear to be highly favourable to the growth of a manuscript magazine, and within which it would meet with due appreciation, where one has never been set on foot. We, who from our position have at times to form a judicial opinion relative to modern magazine literature, are obliged to confess that it shows signs of degeneracy, and that the preponderance of the contents of those most sought after is not of a healthful class. If this be so, and the financial difficulty—for editors and publishers must, like other men, regulate their supplies by the demands made upon them—causes much that is really good and substantial in the way of literature never to attain to print at all, why should we not endeavour to influence private circles by its means, circulating from fireside to fireside wholesome reading, which may stimulate thought, and lead perhaps ultimately to a revolution in the taste of what some one calls the "dear public," but which we must frequently designate with regret "a very erring and capricious public."

In connection with manuscript magazines, as with others, we have three classes of individuals, each indispensable. We find that to keep such a periodical afloat it must have an editor or

1871. L

editors, contributors, and readers. Often it must occur with some of these that the editor has to be largely a contributor too, and every contributor, it may be supposed, will be a reader also; while from the circle of readers, be it small or large, new writers ought occasionally to be developed. But, as the expression is, the "life and soul" of a manuscript magazine is its editor, who needs to be not only a person of adequate literary capabilities, but also endowed with a good stock of perseverance, and not lacking in geniality, since, as he is not likely to be able to pay his contributors in coin of the realm, he must contrive somehow to keep them in good humour and up to the work; and also, which is most difficult of all, persuade them to endure amiably the liberties which, as editor, he is obliged to take with their compositions.

Manuscript magazines are separable into two distinct kinds; there are some which are connected with a young men's association, or mutual improvement society; and at certain of their meetings, held from time to time, it is customary with most societies supporting such a periodical to have its contents read and freely commented upon, ere it is passed round for home reading. Then we have, in addition, other manuscript magazines which have perhaps only a household existence—in cases where the members of it are numerous, and possessed of intellectual ability in a greater or less degree; or else they owe their existence to a number of friends, united by some degree of sympathy, though living, it may be, remote from each other. It is sufficiently evident that manuscript magazines of the first sort have decided advantages on their side. The *esprit du corps*, which may reasonably be supposed to exist in a society of that nature, will interest each member in the success of the enterprise, and, despite occasional flagging, render it tolerably easy for the editor to fill his pages; while he may also be decidedly a gainer by the open and usually impartial criticism the magazine receives after it has been publicly read.

As one drawback, however, it must be stated that it is not always easy, even in days like these, when the ladies, dear creatures! are making a decided move in advance, to obtain a due complement of feminine contributors, when it is known that the contents thereof are to be passed through this ordeal.

But it may be asked here, "Of what nature should be the contents of a manuscript magazine intended to teach (in a measure); also to convey information, with, allowably, some lively matter also?"

Well, to quote from the preliminary address of one of these, it should contain "some papers of a religious and philosophical character, critical and expository essays; discussions on subjects of general interest, with historical, biographical, and descriptive sketches." This seems a high-sounding programme, certainly; yet we must remember the saying that it is well to aim high, provided we do not shoot at what is absolutely unattainable. A vexed question will have sometimes to be debated, as it may affect the prosperity or even the existence of a manuscript magazine. This is regarding the introduction of fictitious compositions, which, there is no doubt, many readers of a manuscript magazine will desiderate, and which readers of printed magazines usually look for as a matter of course. When it is considered, however, that at least one of the aims of a magazine of this nature is mental improvement, and that it should also tend to produce literary matter which must frequently be lacking in a printed magazine, namely, that having a more or less immediately personal interest to the reader—and the limitation of space in a written periodical being also considerable—it is clear that the element of fiction should have a subordinate place. To exclude it entirely, as has been done in some cases, is going too far, since a rigid enforcement of such a rule might shut out poetry altogether. Anything at all equivalent to what we ordinarily designate a "novel," in whole or in part, should be rejected; yet as the imagination of writer and reader ought to be allowed, some play, or short fictitious story may be admissible, or a descriptive paper with a thread of narrative connecting its details, only "founded on fact." Then as to the continuance of articles from one number to another. Some advocate the plan, as helping to keep up the interest in the magazine; while others contend that each should, if possible, be complete in itself, as a reference to the preceding number cannot always be made, were it needful, through the memory of the reader losing sight of some link between the two. Of course, where debates and discussions are carried on, the consideration of a subject must be continued from month to month; but, in our opinion, the introduction of these is rarely desirable in a manuscript magazine. Whatever dimensions the magazine may assume, few, if any, articles should be admitted which are more than ten minutes' reading, or about fifteen hundred words. And it is well that, under a suitable title, some portion

of the pages should be regularly set apart for the reception of short miscellanies and jottings on passing events, or, perhaps, correspondence. If any contributor is of an artistic turn, he may be permitted to adorn a page with a pen-and-ink sketch.

Some editors of manuscript magazines supply to those who may propose to contribute thereto a ruled paper of a certain size, and the different sheets thus filled are afterwards stitched together. One objection to this is the fact that the caligraphy of some of the writers is sure to be anything but legible, because of lack of time, carelessness, or incapability; another objection is that the plan almost precludes that editorial revision, or curtailment, which at times is called for. Preferably a convenient book, say of quarto size, is used, and if the cover is a stout one, so much the better. Then in this the various articles received and approved are written in, arranged as may be desirable, the task falling not necessarily upon the editor, as it could, under certain precautions, be entrusted to some one acting under his superintendence. Where he can himself perform the work (which is likely to be sometimes wearisome, it must be conceded), so much the better; but when thus transcribed, it should be done in the same handwriting throughout as far as possible. Each number should be paged and indexed; and an allowance of margin left, so that, if need be, the different parts could be made into a volume. The interval between the issues must depend upon the literary support the magazine meets with, and upon the number of pages each contains. Some appear monthly or bi-monthly, others at irregular intervals, the editor not being pledged to put forth a magazine at any fixed date, but only as the needful "copy" is supplied for its pages.

There lie before me at this moment manuscript magazines, one of which is a production of London, the other of the northern town of Newcastle. I venture to give a quotation from each, one serious, the other light, which may serve to show that a very considerable amount of merit may attach to compositions which the author never expects to see in print. Our first quotation is from a chapter upon "Swells."

"The swell is an essentially modern production, an evolution of this go-ahead age, when everything is fast; an incubus on the body of society, and one of the indirect results of railways, steamships, the electric telegraph, and the general tendency of the age to improve itself off the face of the earth. The swell of the present day has

few points of resemblance to the beau of the Prince Regent's time, or the fine gentleman of last century. These two specimens of the genus *fop* were almost exclusively confined to the upper ranks of society, but the modern swell is found among all classes. The levelling influence of our modern civilization has swept away much of that class distinction and *caste* which formerly prevailed. A man's station in life can no longer be determined by the cut of his coat; an elderly well-to-do merchant might be a peer of the realm, or *vice versa*; and if dress were the true test of position in society, a clerk might be mistaken for a prince of the blood royal. It is to this extreme radicalism in matters of dress, this effort on the part of every class to ape the appearance of that class immediately above it, that we owe the existence of the swell; and there are just as many degrees of swelldom as there are grades in society."

Upon the subject of "Sympathy" another writer observes as follows:—

"Watch the soldier in the fight, watch the weather-beaten mariner, or the explorer and traveller in foreign lands. Watch each ardent individual who bursts away from the love-chains of home to win glory, or to succeed in that which is the ambition of his soul. Watch the noble strugglers after good, the determined ones who will not be baffled, who *must* win, for they succumb not to adversity, to rebuff, to taunt, or to trouble. What is the secret of their earnestness? What nerves the arm, cheers the heart, and forms gentle phantoms of love around them? what is encouraging them as they labour after the end in view? Oh, reader! it is the mighty, yet gentle spirit of sympathy. This it is that buoys up their fainting spirits, that gives almost supernatural vigour to their arms. Gliding upon us at the strongholds of feeling, emotion, and desire, coming up at times unbidden, working mysteriously among the silver threads of our being, deep down in our innermost selves, this spirit holds its dominion, and binds us prisoners with cords unseen, yet never to be broken."

J. R. S. C.

---

## The Reviewer.

---

*The Fuller Worthies' Library: a Series of Books from Early English Literature. Edited with Memorial-Introductions and Notes by the Rev. ALEXANDER BALLOCH GROSART, St. George's, Blackburn, Lancashire. (Reprinted for private circulation only.)*

THE Rev. A. B. Grosart is the minister of the United Presbyterian Church of St. George's, in Blackburn, a centre of industrial activity much more devoted to the manufacture of coarse calicoes than to the production of fine thought or the reproduction of good literature. Noted as the birthplace of James Hargreaves, inventor of the spinning-jenny, and having a little distinction as a place where politics and religion make some stir, this central town of Lancashire will be indebted to a Scottish enthusiast in book-lore and polite letters for any literary reputation it will be able to inscribe on its historic records for a while. That "The Fuller Worthies' Library" was issued there, will be a fact deserving of record in the annals of the cotton centre through which "the brook" flows, when some Blackburnian Whittaker arises to tell the story of the town.

The editor of this excellent and valuable series of works is a native of Stirlingshire—tryst-noted Falkirk being, we believe, entitled to number him among its many distinguished "bairns." He was a student under Hamilton and Wilson—the two sovereign intellectual and literary influences of their time in "the grey metropolis of the North,"—and he seems to have caught not a little of "the copious industry" of the much-knowing Dr. John Eadie, under whose professoriate he studied Biblical criticism in the theological hall of his own denomination. Of the other educative influences of his life, save that its earlier departments were paternally superintended with anxious sedulousness, we know nothing more than that he must have pursued the stated curriculum of studies appointed by the synod of his church for all its students, as he obtained licence to preach, and was duly appointed and ordained pastor of the West Kinross United Presbyterian Church in 1856. Here, in the midst of a tartan shawl wearing population, there was just such a union of the real, the historic, the literary, and the æsthetic as

must have suited a taste of a refined and cultured sort. The beautiful sheet of water which lies opposite the town, recalled by St. Serf's Inch the memory of the Culdees; the castle in the lake brought up the days and eventfulness of the times of Mary Queen of Scots, as well as the life and writings of the humble Scottish "maker," Michael Bruce—whose poem of "Lochleven" describes the impressions of a shepherd lad in the speech of a scholarly student, and whose "Ode to the Cuckoo" is a passage of experience written in the language of the heart. Notwithstanding the existence of Dr. Mackelvie's edition of Bruce's poems and memoir of their author, Mr. Grosart found scope, and audience too, for "The Works of Michael Bruce, with Memoir, Introduction, and Notes;" and this he has followed up by an edition of "The Works, with Memoir, Essay, and Notes, of Robert Ferguson, the Precursor of Burns."

In the learned seclusion of the West U. P. manse of the landlocked capital in the small county of Kinross Mr. Grosart assimilated and imbibed the fine quaint ideas of the writers of the Puritan times, and cultured his critical aptitudes by studious research and careful collation and annotation. To this period belong his editions of the old English Puritan divines—Richard Sibbes, Thomas Brooks, &c.,—and his Memoirs of Herbert Palmer, Henry Airey, Thomas Cartwright, John King, John Rainolds, Richard Stock, Samuel Torshell, Richard Bernard, Thomas Pierson, Samuel Smith, Richard Gilpin, and John Trapp, M.A., Stratford-upon-Avon—as well as a good number of those small publications more strictly professional, of which he is the author, among which are "Small Sins," "Jesus Mighty to Save," "The Prince of Light and the Prince of Darkness; or, the Temptation of Jesus," "The Lambs all Safe," "The Blind Beggar by the Wayside," "The Helper of Joy," "Joining the Church," "Drowned"—a funeral sermon,— "The Key-bearer and the Opened Door," &c. He has, besides the above, issued "Selections from the Unpublished Writings of Jonathan Edwards, of America," "An Annotated List of the Writings of Richard Baxter," "The Grand Question resolved, What must we do to be saved? Instructions for a Holy Life"—a work by Richard Baxter hitherto unknown to biographers and bibliographers,— "Memorials of Godliness, by Herbert Palmer, containing proof that he, and not Lord Bacon, was the Author of 'The Christian Paradoxes;'" and he is the editor of a volume of

select Hymns (and the author of several), issued privately. We have noted what might be considered a pretty fair amount of work to be the result of somewhere about forty years, we should think, of life; for we have never knowingly seen, nor have we even privately any knowledge of the author; all that we mention has been picked up from public authorities or from (noted) hearsay of those who represent themselves as knowing. But over and above all this comes forth the series of works which are intended to form the topic of descriptive criticism in this article—"The Fuller Worthies' Library"—a general title conferred on the collection, "as being all books that Thomas Fuller would have welcomed." This series was projected before the translation of Mr. Grosart from Kinross to the pastorate of Princes Road United Presbyterian Church, Liverpool; it was carried on there, and is now being pursued persistently and industriously in Blackburn, where a splendid church has been built for him by the members of his attached and admiring congregation. It is to be hoped that life, strength, and love may be continued to him to give to literature many more of such books as he has included in this series, and much more of his own in the way in which we hope to hear more of him, viz., in philosophical criticism. We direct our attention now from the personal efforts to the productions of this indefatigable and researchful investigator into all that is intrinsically valuable and extrinsically rare and costly in the literary products of the days of good Queen Bess, and the successors of the sovereign beauty whose prison-house was Lochleven Castle.

As a reason for the fulness of our review notice of the works of this series, we may state that the books are not generally accessible, being reprinted for private circulation only (not published), and that in strictly limited impressions of 126 large paper copies and 156 small paper copies—the former being in quarto, with fac-similes and illustrations, and the latter in octavo unillustrated. The reviewer is in possession of the small paper copy; and he intends to give the readers as much benefit as he can by describing the works, estimating their value, giving notices of their writers, making quotations from the editorial introductions, and supplying select specimens of the productions of those whom Mr. Grosart has chosen as worthy to receive admission into his choice cabinet of the soul's best companions, the authors of good books.



The first volume of "The Fuller Worthies' Library" is, of course, "The Poems and Translations in Verse of Thomas Fuller, D.D." (1608—1661), one of the most voluminous and original of the divines of the English Church of his times, whom Coleridge regarded as "incomparably the most sensible, the least prejudiced great man of an age that boasted a galaxy of great men." The volume "not only furnishes Fuller's larger poems, but for the first time brings together the minor verses scattered up and down his numerous prose writings, and no fewer than fifty-nine hitherto unpublished epigrams by him." The chief poem is "David's Heinous Sin, Hearty Repentance, Heavy Punishment"—a poem which is so scarce as to have brought in the (bibliophilists') book market more than its weight in sovereigns. The British Museum copy has been sold for £17. There then follows a "Panegyrick on His Majesties (Charles II.) Happy Return," a copy of which had brought £3 3s.

Thomas Fuller, their author, was born in the great age of English literature—eight years before the death of Shakspeare,—and died thirteen years before Milton; the space of his life occupying just the same length as that of Shakspeare, and extending from 1608 to 1661. Next to Shakspeare he excited in the mind of Samuel Taylor Coleridge the sense and emotion of the marvelous; Charles Lamb was impressed by him somewhat similarly; and all who write of him regard him as remarkable for piety, wit, kindness, learning, power of memory, excellence of conversation, and versatility of endowments. "He wrote," says Henry Rogers, "with a vigour and originality, with a fertility of thought and imagery, and a general felicity of style, which, considering the quantity of his compositions, and the haste with which he produced them, impress us with wonder at his untiring activity and preternatural fecundity." The chief poem in this volume was issued in 1631 from the same press, Thomas Cotes's, as that from which, a year later, the second folio edition of Shakspeare was issued, having Milton's lines prefixed; and "as everything that serves to furnish insight into the whole nature of a great man has its own use and worth," Mr. Grosart has wisely brought together the strains of Fuller's harp, that they being duly considered along with his prose works may help us to comprehend him who, to a larger extent than many of his age, apprehended the worth of Stratford's illustrious singer, and has handed down to us the tradition of "the

wit-combats between him and Ben Jonson." One great interest attaching to this reprint is that it shows how largely the whole intellect of the Shaksperian and Miltonian ages was surcharged with poetical influences and aspirations. Of this Fuller's mind was fuller than most; but it was a common characteristic of the post-Armada times—for even Thomas Hobbes was a poet though of a very "cut-and-dry sort."

What a perennial thing is poetry! and how recurrent are many of the phases of life, as well as the phrases of verse! We have just been turning over the pages of this volume for a reference, and our eye lighted on this line,—

"More blood than juice of grape nigh Rhine is shed."

And just a little further down we come upon these two lines, almost as pertinent now (1871) as then (1631):—

"The warrs in France, now lay'd aside, not ended,  
Are onely skimmèd over with a scarre."

Here, again, is quite a compact little truth not quite enough heeded in this age of the omnipotence of majorities:—

"Most voices oft, of verity, have mist,  
Nor in most men doth victory consist."

The following stanza contains truth, poetry, and thought combined in a threefold strength and union:—

"Man is a shippe, affection's the sayle,  
The world the sea, our sinnes the rocks and shelves;  
God is the Pylot: if He please to fayle,  
And leave the steering of us to ourselves,  
Against the rugged rocks wee run amaine,  
Or else the winding shelves doe us detaine,  
Till God—the Palinure—returns againe."

In this stanza, though not a peace-at-any-price man, Fuller justly deprecates the savage inventions of war:—

"Were there not used in the days of yore,  
Enough men-murdering engines? But our age,  
Witty in wickedness, must make them more,  
By new-found plotts men's malice to enrage."

So that fire-spitting canons to the cost  
 Of Christian blood all valour have ingrost,—  
 Whose finding makes that many a life is lost."

If it were allowable to suggest emendations on a text so scrupulously edited as Grosart's Dr. Thomas Fuller's "David's Hainous Sinne," we would propose the undergiven as probably required in the text:—

"Now Joab [let] thy valour be displayed,  
 Act not a[s] midwife to a deed unjust;  
 By fear or favour be not overawayed,  
 To prove a pander to a prince's lust."

In his memorial introduction the editor points out many fine flavoured passages, smacking of the olden time, and quotes several excellent specimens of the thought-packed phraseology of quaint and saintly Thomas Fuller.

In the perusal of these "Poems" one finds himself continually reminded in thought, phrase, rhyme, and rhythm, of the literature of the playwrights. The vigour and choiceness, the pungent playfulness and unexpected turns and returns of the verse, the wit-laden as well as thought-bearing fertility of phrase, are quite of that school; so much so that we almost expect to hear the editor exclaiming, with a grim depicted countenance,—

"Thy worthless praying doth their worth dispraise."

With these introductory remarks, touching only one of the special works of this special series, we hope in a subsequent notice to say something on the works of Thomas Washbourne, D.D., and Giles Fletcher. Sir John Davies would require a large review to himself; Phineas Fletcher would supply rich stores of quotation. Sir George Beaumont—brother of Francis Beaumont, partner with John Fletcher in dramatic efforts—is so little known among literary men even, that some space will be required to do justice to his merits. But we must cease from promises, and ask the reader with patience to await time and opportunity, space and editorial grace.

---

## The Inquirer.

### QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

951. 1. In an advertisement (pub. 1854) of a book there is appended an extract from a review by the *Literary World*. What was this *Literary World*? a weekly or monthly publication, or otherwise? was it English or American? was it a high class or not? There are two publications having this name now, one English, the other American; but the one I inquire about cannot be either of these, as both these are of recent date, having been in existence but a few years, unless I am misinformed. 2. Can you tell me anything of the literary reputation of the late R. W. Hamilton, D.D., LL.D., of Leeds? what works did he write, and what is their value? Are his sermons considered models in any respect? if so, what particular excellence do they possess? 3. I should be also glad to know what position in sermon literature the sermons of the late Benjamin Beddome and Jabex Bunting hold; are they considered good? and what are their special qualities?—B. M.

952. Could any of the readers of the *British Controversialist* inform me as to the most complete edition of the works of Thomas de Quincey? and if his "Opium-eater" is considered his finest work?—H. J.

953. Who is William Smith, author of "Thorndale, or the Conflict of Opinions;" "Gravenhurst, or Thoughts on Good and Evil;" "Dramas;" "Discourse on Ethics of the School of Paley," &c.? What is his *status* as a British philosopher? and in what "Reviews" can critiques of the two first (above-mentioned) of his works be found?—T. S. D.

### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

889. The earliest periodical is generally thought to have been "The Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 1665." In it were published original papers and notices of books. The *Gentleman's Journal, or Monthly Miscellany*, appeared in 1692, and was the earliest English magazine. Of the "Philosophical Transactions" an account will be found in "The History of the Royal Society." The *Gentleman's Journal* is, I believe, to be seen in the British Museum.—R. M. A.

947. The "Rivulet" controversy was that which raged amongst Congregationalists and Dissenters generally, when the late Rev. T. T. Lynch published his hymn-book entitled "The Rivulet: a Contribution to Sacred Song," in 1856. Dr. Campbell, editor of some powerful Dissenting newspapers of that time (the *Banner* and the *Patriot* I believe they were called), attacked the hymns, declaring that they were utterly devoid of true Christian sentiment; and he was seconded in his assaults by his faithful ally, James Grant, then editor of the *Morning Advertiser*. The result of this was that Mr. Lynch threw up his pastorate at Grafton Street Chapel, and began preaching at the Assembly Rooms in Gower Street, whither he was followed by such of his congregation as still deemed him a truly Christian minister. From the violent attacks made upon him Mr. Lynch's health suffered severely, and for two years he had to cease preaching entirely; but he began again in 1860, and in 1862 an iron church was built by his congrega-

tion in the Hampstead Road, near Mornington Crescent, where he preached until his death, on the 9th of May this year. Mr. Lynch, and the "Rivulet" too, had lived down all calumnies by that time; never a man died more highly loved and regretted than he was by a circle which was ever increasing; some of his hymns have found their way into most hymn-books, and Sir Roundell Palmer has quoted one in "The Book of Praise." Mr. Lynch's life is well worthy of study, and it is to be hoped that some one well qualified for the task will undertake to produce a memoir of his life and works.—MORNINGTON.

948. W. M. inquires who were the Della Cruscans in English literature? There has always been a sort of Italianated influence observable in English literature which might be called Della Cruscan. It came out in euphuism, and it is to be felt even now in Browning and Swinburne. In its ultimate issues it enriches a language, though for a while it depraves. It gives it an over-luxuriance, a cloying sweetness, and a profusion of prettiness; and this always provokes a revolt. Its music makes its sensuousness at first tolerable, but shortly the sensuous grows more and more palpable, till it outstrips decorum. If this is the sense in which W. M. makes his query, it would require an epitome of the history of English poetry to answer him. If it refer only to that special set of *littérateurs* called Della Cruscans, the task is easier. The name is derived from the celebrated "Accademia Della Crusca" i.e., of the Sieve, a secession from the Academy of Florence. It first supplied a classical dictionary of modern Italian, a vocabulary out of which all vulgar words were sifted. Upon this scheme the dictionary of the French Academy is carried on; and something like this Mr. Matthew

Arnold is said to desiderate for English. This being perused, the following quotations will probably supply all that is required of information by W. M. If not, inquire again we presume is not forbidden:—"The general herd of Della Cruscans may be safely set down as having been mere blatant blockheads. Of some of the fictitious signatures quoted by Gifford we find no interpretation, such as Arno, Cesario, Julia, &c. Others of the names he mentions are real names. Topham, for instance, is Mr. Edward Topham, the proprietor of the *World*. 'Monosop Este,' as he calls him, is the Rev. Charles Este, principal editor of that paper; Weston is Joseph Weston, a small magazine critic of the day. Two of the minor offenders, to whom he deals a lash or two in passing, are James Cobbe, a now forgotten farce-writer, and Frederick Pilon, who was, we believe, a player by profession. The most conspicuous names besides Merry and Greathead are Mit Yenda, or Mot Yenda, stated to be the anagram of a Mr. Timothy or Thomas Adney, of whom we know nothing; Edwin, which stands for Mr. Thomas Vaughan, the same person, we suppose, who wrote a farce called 'The Hotel,' and one or two other things of the same sort, about twenty years before this time; and especially Tony, or Anthony Pasquin, the *nom de guerre* of a John Williams, the author of loads both of verse and prose. If we may judge by a collection of the poems, as they are called, of this Williams, or Pasquin, published in two volumes in 1789—a second edition, with a long list of subscribers, sparkling with titled names—Gifford's representation of the emptiness, feebleness, and sounding stupidity of the Della Cruscans is no exaggeration at all. Nothing certainly was ever printed on decent

paper more worthless and utterly despicable in every way than this poetry of the great Anthony Pasquin, who, in quite a lofty and patronizing style, dedicates one of his volumes to Mr. Pitt, and the other in part to Sir Joshua Reynolds, in part to Warren Hastings (so economically does he distribute the precious honour); who has all these three distinguished persons among his subscribers, in company with most of the rank and eminence of the time—and whom his friends and admirers, West Dudley Digges, W. Whitby of Cambridge, Thomas Bellamy, Frederick Pilon, William Upton, and J. Butler,—all, he tells us, ‘of high estimation in the world of literature’—in a series of introductory odes and other rhyming laudations—extol as another Martial and Juvenal combined—the reformer of the age, the scourge of folly, animating the just criticism of Persius with a brighter fire than Churchill’s, ‘at once the pride and terror of the land,’ a Dryden come to life again, the greatest wit since Butler, a giant magnanimous and proud, fit only to contend with giants.” (*G. L. Craik’s “English Language and Literature,”* vol. ii., p. 404-5.) “Gifford appeared as an author in 1794. His first production was a satirical poem, entitled ‘The Baviad,’ which was directed against a class of sentimental postasters of that day, usually passing under the collective appellation of the Della Cruscan school—Mrs. Piozzi, Mrs. Robinson, Mr. Greathead, Mr. Merry, Weston, Parsons, &c., conspicuous for their affectation and bad taste, and their high-flown compliments on one another. ‘There was a specious brilliancy in these exotics,’ he remarks, ‘which dazzled the native grubs—who had scarce ever ventured beyond a sheep, a crook, and a rose-tree grove—with an ostentatious display of “blue

hills,” and “crashing torrents,” and “petrifying suns.”’ Gifford’s vigorous exposure completely demolished this set of rhymesters, who were probably the spawn of Darwin and Lichfield. Anna Matilda, Laura Maria, Edwin, Orlando, &c., sunk into instant and irretrievable contempt; and the worst of the number—a man Williams, who assumed the name of Pasquin, for his ‘ribald strains’—was nonsuited in an action against Gifford’s publisher. The satire was universally read and admired.” (*Chambers’s “Cyclopedia of English Literature,”* vol. ii., p. 78.) “About the year 1785 a number of English residents at Florence endeavoured to amuse their lagging hours by writing verses, which they published under the title of ‘The Florence Miscellany.’ The insipidity, affectation, and fantastic silliness of these productions transcend all belief; yet such was the poetic destitution of the period, that they soon found a crowd of admirers and imitators. Taking the name of an academy at Florence, the Della Cruscan now began to print their precious lucubrations in England, chiefly in two daily newspapers, called the *World* and the *Oracle*. ‘While the epidemic malady was spreading from fool to fool,’ as Gifford pungently says, one of the brotherhood, a Mr. Robert Merry, came over from Florence, and immediately announced himself by a sonnet to love. It was answered by a certain Anna Matilda, who (as was the custom) praised it immoderately in language even more absurd than Merry’s own. According to Gifford, ‘the fever now turned to a frenzy;’ Laura, Maria, Carlos, Orlando, Adelaide, and a thousand other nameless names caught the infection, and from one end of the kingdom to the other all was nonsense and Della Crusca. Retribution, however, came (for Nemesis

watches the course of poetry as sharply as that of politics). In 1794 Gifford produced his 'Baviad,' and in 1796 his 'Maviad.' Barely has literature witnessed such a scalping. It completely killed the school, and indeed it is only in these two poems that the memory of most of the unhappy Della Cruscan songsters has been preserved—an immortality which may be compared with that conferred by the *Newgate Calendar*." (*Chambers's Encyclopædia*, sub voce "*Della Crusca*."") Should the above not supply enough of information, we shall be happy to point out where more may be found.—A. W. R.

952. In reply to H. J. I may state that the only attainable British edition of De Quincey's works is that published by A. and C. Black, Edinburgh, originally issued by James Hogg and Son, in fourteen vols., then extended to fifteen by the publication of a volume of biographies contributed to the "Encyclopædia Britannica," and two political papers, one reprinted from *Tait's Magazine*, and one printed from MS. To this a sixteenth vol. has been added, containing the continuation of the "Suspiria de Profundis," from *Blackwood*, Sketches of Sir William Hamilton and John Wilson, from *Hogg's Instructor*. But this series does not contain his "Logic of Political Economy," which was issued by *Blackwood*, Edinburgh. I do not think, with the preface-writer to vol. xv. of the "Works of Thomas de Quincey," that that edition "is understood to contain all his contributions to periodical literature of any value." He must have written much which has not been reproduced here, and it is much to be desired that Dr. Ingleby, whose talents in that way are so keen, should add to the obli-

gations of scholars the duty of thanking him for an "Investigation into the Whereabouts and Worth of the Contributions to Periodical Literature made by Thomas de Quincey." Rumour assigned to him many literary reviews in the Edinburgh newspapers, and surely the *London Magazine*, *Lowe's Edinburgh Magazine*, the *Polladium*, *Blackwood*, *Tait*, and *Hogg*, have not yielded up all their treasures. His translations from Jean Paul Richter and Lessing might form a goodly and acceptable volume, and his novel "Walladmor," begun as a translation from the German of a work attributed to Sir Walter Scott, and ended—when the unfeasibility of the novel was seen—from his own fancy, might be yet read as a curiosity. The Boston edition (issued by Ticknor and Field), consists of twenty vols., and contains a good many papers not included in the British edition, among others sketches of Edward Irving, Sergeant T. N. Talfourd, John Clare, Junius, Godwin, Sir Humphry Davy, Mrs. Grant of Laggan, "The Philosophy of Roman History," "Kant in his Miscellaneous Writings," &c. while it wants the queer and quaint article due to the work of Orlando Sabertash on "The Art of Conversation," an excellent paper on Schlosser's "History of Literature in the Eighteenth Century," &c. It is impossible to give a valid opinion on the question which is De Quincey's work. He did no work. His writings are for the most part rhetorical *fantasias*. He improvisatorized rather than thought, or wrought, or wrote. He was a peculiar and specific specimen of man, a rhapsodist rather than a thinker; and as a conversationist one of whom it may be said that you might almost think his body thought.—S. N.

## Literary Notes.

A BIOGRAPHICAL History of the *Times*, from 1788 to 1832, is likely to appear in autumn.

A memoir of the late Samuel Lover, embracing a critical estimate of his talents, as poet, novelist, dramatist, painter, and composer, is employing the pen of Mr. Bayle Bernard, the dramatist.

H. W. Peek, M.P. for Surrey, has offered three prizes of the amounts respectively of £400, £200, and £100, for "Essays on the Benefits resulting from the Connection between Church and State." The Marquis of Salisbury, Dr. Vaughan, and Dr. Hessey, have consented to act as adjudicators.

Mr. Robert Somers, a Scottish journalist, who has gone minutely into investigations on American life and manners, facts and politics, is about to publish the results of his personal experiences and inquiries.

The death of Immanuel Bekker, the recensionist of Greek literature (born 1785), is reported.

The "Social and Political Dependence of Women," by Mr. Charles Anthony, Jun., has just appeared in an Italian edition. The book is in its fourth edition in England, and there is an American edition published by Messrs. Spenser and Co., of Boston. It has also been translated into French by M. Auguste Levy; and a German edition is in the press.

M. F. Le Play, author of "Social Reforms," "The Working Classes of Europe," has issued a revised edition of "The Organization of Labour, or the Workshop and the Decalogue."

Dr. Schuster has issued at Berlin "Æsthetics as the Philosophy of Beauty and Art."

The author of "Wealth and Poverty considered," Mr. P. Barry, has in the press "The Workman's Wrongs and Rights."

"Ripples and Breakers" is to be the title of a new volume of poems by Mrs. Linnæus Banks.

A new version of "The Book of the Proverbs of Solomon," by Rev. A. Elvas, of Leeds, is nearly ready.

A people's edition of Auerbuch's "Village Stories" has been issued at Stuttgart.

Milton's "Paradise Lost," in a Hebrew translation, is to be published on the Continent.

"Studies on Moses and the Mosaic Age, or the Poetry of the Pentateuch," by Dr. Margoliouth, is nearly ready.

Herr Otto Gildemeister has published a German version of "The Sonnets of Shakspeare, with Notes and a Commentary."

The late Dr. C. E. Herz's "Geography of Beloved Lands" has been published by Brockhaus of Leipsic.

"The Collected Poems" of Francis Bennoch (b. 1812) are in preparation for early issue.

Among the "Shaftesbury Papers," presented to the Record Office by Lord Shaftesbury, the MS. of Locke's "Essay on Toleration," dated 1667, has been discovered; hitherto it has been assumed that this work was written in Holland subsequently to 1688.

The papers by "Q.," who is Thomas Purnell, a native of South Pembrokeshire, author of "Literature and its Professors," &c., on the "Dramatists of the Present Day," are to be published, with additions, by Messrs. Chapman and Hall.



## The Philosophy of Politics.

---

### LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION.

THE manner in which the business of the country has been conducted in recent times, but more especially during this session of the present Parliament, has occasioned great anxiety to the friends of order and progress. Men of all parties concur in lamenting the grievous extent to which talk has usurped the place of thought in the Legislative Assemblies. But still more do they agree in condemning the extreme advantage taken of the privileges of the members to make legislation impossible by an overstretch of the rights of free speech. It appears to many that changes in this respect are necessary, nay, are imminent.\* The leaders of the controlling parties in the House of Commons have expressed disapproval of the course adopted of impeding the settlement of great measures by the petty—if not pettish—expedient of “talking against time;” and already some trivial alterations in the mode of conducting business in the House have really been proposed. These things are significant, and may be held to prove the absolute necessity of a thorough study of and a much more widely extended acquaintance with “the Philosophy of Politics” than are, at all, usual in our day. Events are justifying the opinion of the conductors of this magazine that a series of papers on that topic would be opportune and advantageous, if they were expressly free from partisanship, and especially adapted to the requirements of those who take interest in questions relating to the proper administration of the power of the State embodied in legislation.

\* “It is impossible,” says a writer in the *Saturday Review* (August 12th) “to be blind to the very large question as to the conduct of the business of the nation which is already looming upon us, and which must before long assume a definite shape and most serious importance. Parliament is getting impotent. It cannot do the work it ought to do. . . . In every direction it is apparent that Parliament tries to do too much, does very badly much of that which it does, and leaves very much undone.”

It can, of course, scarcely be denied that the legal designation of our supreme legislative assemblies collectively is "The Parliament;" nor need we refuse to concede that that venerable name, dating as it does from its use in the middle of the thirteenth century, being derived from the French term *Parlement*, employed by Louis VII. to denote the assembly of his advisers, signifies primarily a synod in which the members are required to *speak out* their mind on the topics submitted to consideration. The business of the State is to be treated, recorded, and established in Parliament "presentatively by the sovereign, the prelates, the earls, the barons, &c.; and representatively by the commonalty of the kingdom through those whom they have legally chosen to act for their interests." Parliament is the successor of the Mickle Synod or Great Council of the Saxons, the *Witena-gemote* or the meeting of the wise men. The only limits to the *power* of Parliament in making laws or changes lies in the willingness of the people to submit to it, or their ability to resist it. Obviously, therefore, the Parliament is a deliberative assembly, and in such an assembly it is never right of set purpose to speak unadvisedly with the lips; and it is a degradation of the noble office of the Legislature to reduce it to a Commons House of talk instead of elevating it to a place of parliamentary action for the common weal.\* The expres-

\* We quote the following notices, *à propos* of parliamentary talk, from a weekly contemporary:—"There is a general impression that it is only of late years the House of Commons has fallen into the habit of wasting its time by long and useless speeches instead of transacting the business before it with the energy and assiduity of men of business. It is, however, a mistake to suppose that this love 'of hearing themselves talk' is a passion of new growth in that assembly. Three hundred years ago—namely, on the 29th May, 1571—her Majesty Queen Elizabeth addressed both Houses, telling the Commons 'she utterly disallows and condemns those for their audacious, arrogant, and presumptuous folly, who by superfluous speeches spend much time in meddling with matters neither pertaining to them nor within the capacity of their understanding.' This was sharp and to the point, though perhaps a little too harsh; but King James I., on the 30th day of March, 1607, addressed some really kind and good advice to both Houses, which they might well profit by in the present day. On that day, about two p.m., the Lords, bishops, Speaker, and Commons attended his Majesty in the great chamber at 'Whytehall,' when he addressed them for hastening the Union, saying, amongst other things, 'studied orations and much eloquence on little matters is fit for the universities, where not the subject that is spoken of, but the trial of his wit that speaketh, is most commendable. On the contrary, in all great councils of Parliament fewest words with most matter do become best.'"—*Observer*.

sion of the results of deliberation by speech is one thing, deliberate talking against time is quite another and a different matter. The former accords with the purpose of Parliament, the latter is expressly disconform to its aim and intents. The pass to which public business has been brought has, as we have said, led to some proposals for the facilitating of the transaction of business in Parliament. Those, however, which we have seen are mere *succedanea* and palliatives, not root-remedies. It is of the highest importance that our fountains of law should have clear principles as their source, and flow through filters which are guarantees, as far as possible, against corruption and impurity. If we are to seek reform at all—as we have been for many years now doing—we ought to attempt it as nearly as we can at the *fons et origo mali*, or to vary the metaphor, at the *root*, making, in the popular sense of the term, at once a most radical and a most conservative reform.

I have chosen as the topic of this paper "Legislative Representation" rather than "Representative Legislation" that I might bring out prominently the nature of the representation implied in and required for legislation, rather than the nature of the legislation which should result from representative government. The main point for consideration, therefore, is to be the representative function in legislation, more than the results or the methods of legislation through representation. If "the sovereign is bound to govern according to," and the subject is required to obey, "the statutes in Parliament agreed on, and the laws and customs of the same," it is of great importance to determine the principle on which legislative representation, that is, representation culminating in legislation, ought to proceed, be organized, registered, and made effective.

The main duty of Parliament is "to advise with the Sovereign on matters of public import." It is as *advisers* of the Crown on behalf of the people that the House of Commons is called together; and it is as a safeguard of the interests of the people, and as a security that the advice so given "shall be truly taken and acted upon by the Crown," through its responsible ministers, that the granting and providing of supplies for the due and proper discharge of all the legal pecuniary responsibilities of the Government are retained in the power of the people's House. This advice is to be given to the Crown *for* the people *by* their representatives in lawful assembly, and according to such rules and regulations as shall secure

the most efficient discharge of their duties to the Crown on behalf of the people. Advice so given, with the intent of being effective in the proper administration of the law, but more especially with the design of affecting the legislative action of the State, is Legislative Representation. Any representation made through newspapers or other publications, deputations, public meetings, &c., though ultimately acting on legislation, as not being directly incorporated with that end in view, is excluded from our present consideration as lying beyond Legislative Representation.

The giving of advice is a grave responsibility. But the giving of a deliberate advice to the sovereign of a state on behalf of the members of that state, and as their representative, is, while a high and honourable duty, also a weighty moral and legal obligation. It ought to involve wise self-reflection, diligent study, prudent consideration, careful search for information, and an impartial deliberation on all the salient points of the matter on which consultation is to be held. "The greatest trust between man and man is the trust of giving counsel; for, in other confidences, men commit the parts of their life, their lands, their goods, their children, their credit, some particular affair; but to such as they make their counsellors they commit *the whole*: by how much the more are they who perform the part of counsellors obliged to all faith and integrity!"\*

These remarks of Bacon, which are true of all counsel, are supremely important to be remembered by the people's advisers of the Crown. They have, first of all, a threefold responsibility, one or other of which they are apt to forget: (1) to the Crown, to be upright and judicious; (2) to the people, to be trustworthy and faithful; and (3), to themselves, to be bold and independent to the former, and straightforward and dutiful (as promise-keepers) to the latter. But besides these, they have in general, from their position, a duty to the state and to humanity to perform—to preserve the stability and secure the progress of the state, and to labour, directly or indirectly, in behalf of the happiness of the race. The seeking or the holding of such an office as that of a representative requires, according to our notions, the possession, as pre-requisites, of an observant and reflective disposition thoroughly cultivated; a love of man, and a desire to promote his welfare; and carefully elaborated views of how this may be best accomplished in the cir-

\* Bacon's "Essays," of Counsel.

cumstances and at the time; a proper idea of the State, and its place in the scheme of things, with a true conception of the rights and duties of the Crown, an adequate acquaintance with the wishes and requirements of the people, and skill and ability to push on the latter, and maintain, yet restrain, the former amid all the complications of party; a high moral nature, to which duty never calls in vain, and over which principle holds sway; a capacity to weigh and appreciate evidence, party moves, proposed plans, and not only to make but to estimate suggestions, and a resolved will sufficiently decided to prevent flattering submission, either to the behests of the sovereign or the demands of the people, unless they are palpably just and beneficial. The exercising of such an office requires readiness, versatility, profundity, and sympathy; that power of foreseeing in a serene imagination the consequences likely to ensue from change of circumstances, or the bringing into operation of new causes with the intent of eliciting new effects, so as both to anticipate—

“The boundless fields of rapture yet to be,

And learn the future from the past of man.”

Given all requisites and qualifications, or accepting them as being present really or by courtesy, the essence of advice-giving, if it is honest, as a mirror of the principles of a constituency in their relation to the circumstances of the Crown as the head of the State, consists in *deliberation*. That which, as J. S. Mill observes, “can be done better by a body than by any individual, is deliberation. When it is necessary or important to secure hearing and consideration to many conflicting opinions, a deliberative body is indispensable.” “A place where every interest and shade of opinion in the country can have its cause even passionately pleaded in the face of the Government, and of all other interests and opinions, can compel them to listen, and either comply, or state clearly why they do not, is, in itself, if it answered no other purpose, one of the most important political institutions that can exist anywhere, and one of the foremost benefits of free government.”\* But before a deliberative assembly can rightly perform, it must properly understand and determine its true functions. If it becomes a place “of mere talk and *bavardage*,”

\* “Considerations on Representative Government,” by J. S. Mill, p. 106.

it is unjust alike to itself, the sovereign, and the people, and needs must bring upon itself derision and contempt, as an agency for controlling "the enactment of laws and the administration of the general affairs of a nation."

Deliberation is thought so directed as to guide and govern choice. It is the pause and poise of reflection, prior to decision, that hesitant, discreet circumspection, and wary, well-considered caution, which it befits wise men to employ before they finally choose or advisedly determine. Hence Sir J. Denham rightly says,—

"Wisdom, of what herself approves, makes choice,  
Nor is led captive by the common voice."

Choice implies reasoned deliberation and willing preference. "Choice there is not," as Hooker observes, "unless the thing which we take to be so is in our own power, that we might have refused it." The decisions of legislators ought to be "culled and choice-drawn," that they may be such as shall best effect their aim; and in order that they may rightly receive this reconsideration and investigation, they must be weighed and pondered, estimated and compared, picked out and selected; that is, they should be deliberated upon in order that what is just, fit, wise, and equal may be made lawful. Those who are called upon by the people to exercise in their behalf "this brave imperial monarchy of mind," the power of considerate choice in the advising and devising of good and wholesome laws, ought diligently to deliberate upon what is best and wisest, most in harmony with man's nature and God's divine plan of life, as is shown in ethics, politics, and religion, so as to—

"Reduce  
Those abstract rules of truth to rules of use."

Let it be noted, however, that though debate ought to imply deliberation, deliberation does not necessarily imply debate. Debate is occasioned by contrariety of opinion, and therein each endeavours to show that his views are more correct, suitable, or advantageous, as the case may be, than those held by the opposing party. In debate opinions are maintained, not quarrelsomely but reasoningly. It is lamentable in any case, but much more in legislative concerns than in most others, when passion or partisanship so gets the better of the soul, or acquires such an ascendancy among men's thoughts,

as to lead them to debate for victory, not truth. It is possible to argue without disputing, and to deliberate without debating; although some—

“Unskilled to argue, in dispute yet loud,

seem as if they had not mastered this first principle of legislative oratory; and it is in consequence of this that the country has so frequently to repeat, session after session,—

“I wish ye” (M.P.s) “what ye now debate

Had been resolved before it was too late.”

Men may consult, that is, think together, communicate or hear those opinions which seem to offer the best solution of difficulties, or the most advantageous mode of effecting a purpose, without controversy; and even though doubts and objections may be raised or pressed against the proposals made or suggested, cool deliberation may be found preferable to the warm contentions of debate. It is true, that where many persons have the opportunity or the right, the liberty, and, it may be, the duty of expressing their opinions, especially when the matter under consideration is complicated, and, so to speak, questionable, debate is likely to arise, and may very naturally wax hot and earnest; but it is not the less desirable on that account, but all the more so, that the forms of deliberative discourse should be so arranged and regulated as to secure the largest possible amount of attention to “the question,” and the least possible excitement of the passions which the topic is calculated to arouse. In fact, passion and deliberation are so alien that debate into which passion largely enters ought properly to precede rather than mingle with such deliberative thought as may be intended to result in determinative choice, such choice as follows on an exercise of reason, employed as impartially as circumstances admit of. In “Government by Party,” and “Progress by Antagonism,” debate is essential; but it ought not to usurp the place of deliberation—the honest weighing and estimating of reasons proposed, or administrative acts to be sanctioned or criticised, bills introduced, or orders to be legalized. “In deliberatives,” saith my Lord Bacon, following Aristotle, “the point is, what is evil; and of good, what is greater; and of evil, what is less.”

“Lest by disorder States be overthrown

Power must use laws as her best instrument;

Laws being maps and counsellors that do

Show forth diseases, and redress them too.”

It is as the great council of the nation that Parliament is convoked. In it the opinions which agitate and divide the multitudes are brought forward for investigation, consideration, and deliberation. It does not create but criticise opinion. This criticism may be debative or deliberative, but it ought to be at once reflective, corrective and effective. Every opinion requires either to be victorious or to be vanquished; hence, each opinion is combative in the earlier stages of its growth. The stir and din of its strife, however, ought to be exercised in the outer halls of thought, until it has proved its reasonableness to many, defied the contradictions and contentions of its opponents, and acquired by the conflict of general discussion some proof of strength and right to be heard, before it is taken into the inner halls of legislation, lest—

“Chance and opinions, nimble idols, reign,”

where truth, justice, and righteousness ought only to be found. One of the greatest reforms possible in our Houses of Parliament, therefore, would be to determine therein the respective spheres of agitation, debate, and deliberation, and to fix the forms of the constitutional assemblies in accordance with that which may be determined to be best in regard to the legislative representation, not only of persons but of opinions. It is as a contribution towards such a consummation that the present paper is written. The aim of politics is to fix and settle into concrete laws, such as man's actions may be regulated by, the *opinions* which men have formed regarding the limits of just interference with one another and the proper amount of aid to which each is entitled as members of the State. The formal recognition and the proper organization of public opinion as the practical source of effective legislation is essential to adequate constitutional representation. Opinion is, in our day, not only so complex, but so multiplex, that legislators cannot do more than receive evidence from experts, and act as a jury in a large proportion of the affairs that come before them. Were this fact clearly accepted and fully recognised and provided for in our legislation, it would greatly simplify the labours of our Houses of Parliament, and would beneficially unite the whole body of the people with our representative assemblies.

Public opinion may be regarded as the raw material of law. The body of the people, in so far as they are intelligent, form opinions and propagate them by agitation. This public opinion acts as a check on the pernicious exercise of power and so restrains the



operation of evil laws ; it also acts as a stimulant and encouragement to the exercise of beneficial acts of statecraft. Of public opinion Bentham observes, "Able rulers lead it; prudent rulers lead or follow it; foolish rulers disregard it." The organization of public opinion as the source of law is, therefore, one of the prime requisites in effective and beneficial legislation. The opinions of one generation become the beliefs of the next, the habitual forms into which their thoughts mould themselves. They cease to be opinions because they become credences. It is the tendency of every credence to transform itself from being a mere decision of the intellect into a ruler of actions, and so to become a realized and palpable fact in the outward condition of society. As the opinions of a country *are*, so *will* its legislation ultimately *be*. There are now so many means and agencies for the initiation, dissemination, agitation, and discussion of new views and opinions, that we may, as a general rule, delete from our enumeration of the "valuable offices" of Imperial Parliament the praise of being "a grand institution of national education," having, for one of its great duties, as J. S. Mill says, "to create and correct that public opinion whose mandates it is required to obey." Public opinion might now very well be left to take care of itself. Organs exist in which those who can say the best that may be for old or new views may engage in the political instruction of the people, and employ themselves in maturing and enlightening public opinion, so that it may be ready after due ripening for legislative representation as the initiatory step to legislative action.

If proper means were taken for the organization of public opinion, Parliament might be relieved of its plethora of oratory, and legislation rescued from the chronic paralysis which generally overtakes it at the close of the session. The first step in the formation of such public opinion as is intended to issue in legislation, is of course its origination as an idea in one or in many minds. At this stage it merely requires *exposition*, clear, careful, and candid presentation to the minds of others. If it commends itself to the intelligent acceptance of many, *opposition* is pretty certain to arise, and *debate* is sure to ensue. Discussion clarifies and purifies opinion because it brings out the objections felt to it as well as those available against it; and enables its advocates to explain, modify, and reconsider any points of importance. When all matters relating to fitness, rightness, and practicality have been settled after due and

impartial *deliberation*, the opinion may be brought before the people in such a form as to enable them to indicate their *choice*, in the form of resolutions at public meetings, petitions to Parliament, the formation of associations, the sending of deputations, the solicitation of pledges from members of the senate to support, or at least to consider it, and the like. Thus it may be brought under popular, national, or legislative *consideration*, in order that it may be carefully thought over as a State question, and so sifted, studied, and maturely examined, with all its relations to other questions and elements kept steadily in view, as to have its suitability determined. This *harmonization* of new opinions with old, so as now to give the whole that consistency and unity which are the conditions of true stability, being brought about by those of its advocates who know those matters most thoroughly, might justly be regarded as giving the right to move for leave to bring in a bill into the House to determine that the same shall become law. At this stage parliamentary debate might be inevitable. But if all these preliminary requirements had been attended to debate might be greatly curtailed in quantity, and much improved in quality, as the principles rather than the details would demand and receive the special attention of those who took part in the deliberative statement of opinions for and against. Here, at the option of the House, the right of pleading might be granted advantageously, and after a vote of the House had been taken, advocates of the views advanced, and opponents of the propositions made, might likewise be heard. Thus an economy of legislative labour might be effected; and by the best arguments of the best men on either side the members might be instructed in the matter proposed. This might be put under such restraints as the House should see fitting, and should be regarded as a privilege, not like petitioning, a right. Such pleaders might take their place at the bar of the House, which should then be the jury in the case brought before them, and give their verdict, after mutual consultation, in any way it chose, by a vote—aye or no—as to whether leave should be given to bring in the proposed bill. The bill so brought in, if it is allowed, should be the *consolidation* into legal form of the opinion agreed to. The *onus* of bringing in such a consolidated legalization of the opinion, in whose favour the vote has been given, might then be placed on the proposers; or the responsibility might be laid upon the members of the ministry to provide a law which should have the effect of fulfilling the intention

of the House. "There is," says J. S. Mill, "hardly any kind of intellectual work which so much needs to be done, not only by experienced and exercised minds, but by minds trained to the task through long and laborious study, as the business of making laws. "A reason no less conclusive is, that every provision of a law requires to be framed with the most accurate and long-sighted perception of its effect on all the other provisions ; and the law, when made, should be capable of fitting into a consistent whole with the previously existing laws." For these reasons we should throw on the Cabinet the duty of providing explicit, properly drafted, and thoroughly consistent bills, calculated and adapted to give force and efficacy to the determination of the Houses of Parliament. That is "a work of skilled labour and special study and experience," and therefore it can be better done by those who have made it their business than by the amateur legislators of a senate which acts as a congress of opinions.

In the opinion expressed by Mr. Austin, that "there is a growing tendency in the House of Commons to encroach upon the functions of the Executive Government," we entirely agree ; and we believe that he is quite right in affirming that "the functions thus usurped by the House of Commons are transferred from experienced and responsible to inexperienced and irresponsible hands ; while the House, by attending to business for which its constitution unfits it, performs its legislative functions with diminished care, and neglects its important office of supervising and checking the executive." Two evils result from this unskilled tinkering of enactments : 1st, bills are rarely framed with close skill and thorough fitness, but are loosely drawn and vaguely worded ; 2nd, bills being made, clause by clause, the subject of vote and amendment, have frequently such elements introduced to "stand part" of them as makes them cumbrous and unworkable, and not unfrequently inconsistent in themselves. The House, having given orders that a bill should be prepared to accomplish a certain object, should hold in its own hands the right to criticise and canvass every item introduced, to seek full information regarding the operation and incidence of every clause ; and on being satisfied that the bill fulfils the intent of the House, with due regard to the welfare of the country, should by its vote solemnly *determine* on its passing into law, and set in motion the means by which its *final acceptance* as law may be given to it with all the supreme sanctions which the constitution requires. It is then ready for *administration*, that is,

to be honestly and faithfully applied by the Executive, for the effecting of the purpose for which it has been passed. The foregoing may be regarded as a sort of general outline of the forms through which an opinion might pass from the period of its origination to that of its adoption into the legislative decisions of the country, and we have now to show in what way Legislative Representation might be so utilized as to lighten the labours, and quicken the speed, of the passage of bills through the supreme halls of legislation.

Parliament should form the incorporated will of the people. It ought to be the mould, not the mouthpiece of opinion. Its function should be to deliberate, determine, and decide what shall be law. It ought to occupy, not, the *forum* of the advocate, but the highest juridical seat. It ought to be a judiciary court for the examination of proposals for the promotion of order and progress in the nation; for the acceptance or rejection of plans of improvement brought before it; for the critical investigation of every act of the executive; for the sanctioning and maintaining of every requisite for the prosperity and happiness of the people, and for the proper supervision of all the acts of the administration, claiming, exercising, and exerting the right to determine by their vote the ultimate will of the community in regard to each matter brought before it.

In what way, then, should legislative representation act, so as to secure the transition of opinion into legislation? The utmost possible freedom ought to be given to the statement of facts, the exposition of principles, the suggestion of opinions, and the agitation of questions, not only by individuals but by incorporate bodies. The fullest right of association ought to be conceded, on condition that all legalized associations should be open and amenable to law, their office-bearers responsible, and their action confined to the purposes set forth in the articles of their constitution; these having been duly registered in the Home Office, and copies of their rules properly filed there. While individuals ought not to be debarred from the right of petition, or any number of individuals from approaching the House as petitioners, it might be advisable to confine the right of sending deputations to incorporate bodies, and to increase the powers of representation granted to such bodies by encouraging them to report on such topics as they had been incorporated to consider; and so to give to associated bodies a large proportion of that preliminary work which is now frequently committed to

**Royal Commissions.** The authorized reports of such associations might be regarded as valuable *pro tanto*, as showing the hold any opinion had taken on the popular mind, and the reasons most commonly assigned for supposing that legislative action should be taken thereupon. Of course it would be easy to make a distinction between chartered and unchartered societies, and to confer rights on such associations as applied for and received a licence from the Home Secretary, which would not be granted to promiscuous assemblies and unauthorized congresses. Associations of certain sorts might be permitted to assemble, by delegation, to consider and report on special topics, and might be privileged, on petition, to appear before the Houses of Parliament by representative deputy, to advocate the opinions they had felt bound to express. We have, for instance, in the British Association for science, and the chartered societies relating to science, the *nucleus* of council on all matters pertaining to Government action in connection with science (proper). In the Social Science Association, in our incorporated charities, and in our Poor Law guardians, we might, in like manner, have good advice given in regard to the treatment of the poor, sanitary measures, the method of dealing with the semi-criminal, &c. City and town councils, borough incorporations, &c., might offer great help in the matter of local taxation, health preservation, and the suppression of vice; chambers of commerce, and the directors of incorporated banks, and duly constituted companies of many sorts, might usefully consider questions of finance, tariff duties, ship dues, monopolies of carriage, postal arrangements, patents, &c., and advise on them. The universities, the governors of the higher colleges, and the members of school boards, might give attention to proposals made in regard to education. The several governing bodies of the churches of the land might impart their views on religious and moral questions; and many other institutions of the same sort might act as minor preparatory parliaments, so to speak, where consideration, deliberation, and debate might precede the taking up of a question in Parliament, and through which public opinion might flow, as it were, filtered, into reservoirs of reflective thought, whence the great senate might draw facts and proposals suited to the exigencies of the times. Such a method of collecting information, and concentrating reflective thought upon topics of public interest, would largely economize the time and the labours of Parliament, and greatly lessen the anxieties of the administration.

It would not only be a preliminary gauge of what the public most earnestly desired, but it would in general supply the most essential items of which bills likely to satisfy the public should consist.

Much greater effect might be given, too, in many cases, to the right of public meeting by registration in some public office, of the resolutions come to, and in the case of any great and influential agitation, permitting delegacy of a specific sort from public meetings to district conventions. This, besides the immediate benefit of bringing the public mind directly before the Houses of Parliament, would largely benefit them by the educative influence it would exert. As things are, a large amount of political action is taken, and agitation undergone, without specific effect—unless it be to excite discontent that nothing results from the trouble implied in and employed about them. Public opinion is not organized. We have no registration of it except casually in the newspapers; and that is so scattered, and so dependent on circumstances, that the swell of its volume requires to be guessed at rather than calculated. Our scheme would utilize, or at least give the opportunity of utilizing, all the movements made with intent to influence legislation; so that Parliament might know in what direction, and with what strength, the winds of public opinion were blowing.

A great deal of the over-talk of Parliament arises from its rehearsal of all the elements of a case *ab initio*. Were it to accept the public and popular discussion of the question as so much work done, and not requiring to be done over again, the speeches delivered within its walls would be less numerous and more brief, less tedious and more impressive. Its members could then devote themselves to the considerations immediately before them rather than to talk, which is meant for their constituencies, not for the hearers; and which commonly shows that they have been mastered by the subject somehow, rather than that they have mastered it. We plead for the revival of the legislative representation of opinion, as of equal importance with the revival of representative legislation.

Perhaps the forms of Parliament might be so revised in consideration of the large amount of discussion which almost every topic now undergoes prior to its being brought under the notice of the Legislature, as greatly to economize time and talk. It is customary at present, on notice being given of a motion for leave to bring in a bill, to have no discussion, but to reserve debate till the motion is made. It might be advantageous in moving for leave to bring in a

bill, that any one desirous of opposing the motion might announce his intention, and being permitted to speak immediately after the person whose duty it is to show cause why a bill should be brought in, the discussion should then end. On the first reading of a bill scarcely any discussion now takes place. Perhaps the making of the first reading go to the establishing of the *principle* of the bill, and to limit the speakers in that debate to those who gave notice of their intention (unless an adjournment were moved, when, of course, notice of desire to speak might be extended), might aid parliamentary progress; as it is, a first reading is regarded more as a matter of courtesy than an act of legislative deliberation. Were the first reading to be held as an affirmation of the principle of the bill, the second reading might be devoted to the criticism of the *details* of it; and if these were brought in by order of the House, on the responsibility of the ministry, the debates in committee might be greatly curtailed. On the report of the committee any additional clauses, reservations, exceptions, &c., which might seem to be requisite might be stated, and given over to the executive to provide necessary and sufficient clauses to effect the aim sought. At the third reading no discussion of the general principle or of the special details already dealt with should be regarded as relevant, but the whole attention of the House should be directed to the accuracy of its substance, the pertinence of its form, the consistency of its parts, and the clearness of its language. It is almost always the practice now-a-days to pass a bill on the same day as that in which it has been read the third time. Perhaps this is over-haste. It might be better for the practicality and consistency of our legislation if an interval were to elapse before the final vote is taken. This might perhaps be managed by a little change in the order of public business;—if, for instance, it were held that a bill which had passed its first reading, and had thus had its principle affirmed in the House of Commons, should enter into its first stage in the House of Lords then, and should proceed in its successive stages in the same fashion. This implies, of course, that the Upper House should consider the Commons' resolution as an act of legislative representation, and should, in the first instance, accept the bill as a proof that such an opinion as it expressed prevailed, and that both Houses should retain their privilege of rejecting a bill on the motion "that this bill do now pass."

The suggestions here made have for their object the extension,

organization, and officialization—if we may so term it—of public opinion, by the ascription to the Houses of Parliament of the higher judicial functions of deliberative determination, and by throwing upon the public, in one or other of the forms of associative action it exercises, the duty of showing (1) that legislation is required; (2) what legislation is advisable; and (3) on what grounds those suggestions are made and maintained. They would prevent the haphazard, tentative legislation, which consumes so much of the energy, and so fatally affects the hopes of the nation. They would bring into effective use and registrable valuation the right of petition, public meeting, and deputation. They would organize the preliminaries of legislation; and they would greatly economize “the massacre of the innocents” with which our sessions usually close. They would greatly increase the interest of the public in all questions relating to good government, largely decrease the labours of our Legislature, and very effectively educate a race of thoughtful politicians. We believe that they would tend much to unite the several elements of the nation, inasmuch as they would combine in one interest the making of good laws and the passion for good government; the solitary thinker, however humble, the publicist, and the parliamentarian; the noble and the sovereign—so fashioning the whole and bringing them into a community.

Parliament, by being relieved of much of the drudgery of its long sittings, as well as many of the tedious duties involved in attending to committees which are now brought together to gather up the sense of the public special questions, would be able to assume the larger views of politics which make it synonymous with statesmanship, and could learn to look on the proposals made, not as party or partial measures, but as national affairs. Parliament might then cease to be a congress of opinion-mongers and speech-makers, and become a great institution of statecraft, in which the best measures might be secured for the benefit of man; and the order and progress of the state might be so conserved, and yet improved as to realize the dreams of sages during many ages. Organize opinion by giving it representative powers before Parliament, and constitute Parliament into the supreme will of the nation, as the ultimate determiner of all legislation, and men shall revere the laws made, and love the assemblies by whom they are passed.



## Religion.

---

### IS CHRIST'S REIGN UPON EARTH TO BE A SPIRITUAL OR A TEMPORAL ONE—OR BOTH?

#### SPIRITUAL.—I.

A CAREFUL study and a correct interpretation of the different passages in the Old and New Testaments which, either expressly or incidentally, make reference to the kingdom and the reign of Christ upon earth, will, I think, satisfy any one who approaches the subject without undue bias, that Christ's dominion was announced by prophecy, and is actually developed, as a spiritual one. As yet, indeed, it is, if not to be called imperfect, at least incomplete and partial; and in the ages yet to come, from the diffusion of the light, and the general reception of the truth of the one pure religion, our earth shall show most markedly in the conduct of individuals, and in the characteristics of communities, how great has become the influence, and how ceaseless the sway, of the religion of Christ upon the hearts of men. But for all that, as I hold, Christianity is not, even with the attainment of a wide-spread power which the world has never yet beheld, it is not destined to change its character, or to superadd anything thereto which would give it at all the aspect of a monarchy, or any other recognized form of human government. As it has begun, and as it has progressed, through fluctuations and reactions until it has attained to its present status (a status which does undoubtedly hold out much hope of a vast and possibly rapid extension of its agency despite many things seemingly adverse), so shall the religion of Christ proceed, gathering strength and force through successive Christian ages; but not departing from its original and openly stated principles. There was a theocracy once known in Asia. God selected a man, a family, and then a nation, and to this nation He gave a place and position, and a Divine code of laws. That people proved unfaithful to the trust placed in their hands, and disobedient to their unseen though omnipresent Ruler. Centuries under a succession of occasional rulers only served  
1871.

to show what had indeed been hinted at by the inspired author of the Pentateuch, that even such a scheme could not secure the people from numerous lapses from religious duty and social obligations. A change passed over the Israelitish nation and for a short period under David and his son Solomon, while a gorgeous system of worship was set on foot, and all surrounding countries brought to terms of friendship or subjection, it did appear as if the theocratic form of government, though changed as to its mode, and taking effect through a human agent, was about to rest upon an abiding basis. Such anticipations were shortly dispelled by a dismemberment of ten tribes from the twelve, and the daring renunciation by the latter of the Divine supremacy in all things. In the Judaic kingdom, a fluctuating course of events, under various monarchs,—few of whom were loyal to God, brought the people there to the same issue which the sister-kingdom had reached earlier, viz., to a captivity, to a desolation of their cities, and a destruction of national independence. In the case of the bulk of the tribes, this punishment, for such it was, involved in it their being blotted out for ever (as far as we know) from any individual existence in the historic page, as having been once a part of the divinely chosen race. With the others the ruin was irrevocable. After a period they regained their own land and a measure of their ancient privileges, rebuilt their temple, and under their leading priests and other distinguished men, though no longer capable of becoming a conspicuous world-power through the rapid and extensive growth of the great monarchies around, had yet a name amongst the kingdoms. The succession of prophets had, however, now ceased, and the position of Palestine exposed it continually to the incursions or the secret hostility of nations lying contiguous to it. Under the Maccabean dynasty there was a spasmodic revival of life, but the feebleness of the Jewish nation laid it under the necessity of seeking the protection (so-called) of some other power; and when that Italian city, which had been growing at first silently, and then with world-shaking energy sent forth her legions and her eagles into every attainable land, it was only to be expected that Judaea too would have to bow before the imperial sway of Rome. The crisis had come, and the sceptre—of temporal authority at least—had finally been taken from “Shiloh.”

These points thus cursorily touched upon are not irrelevant. Apart from God-given prediction, it is mainly through the past that mankind can form any conjectures as to a future not imme-

diately at hand, nor is it without advantage that we refer to history when we endeavour to interpret Divine announcements as to events yet to come. Judaism was the precursor of Christianity, and it was what, as I believe, Christianity was never intended to be, and therefore will not be, in immediate connection with a temporal kingdom. Interwoven with the Jewish ritual we find much truth, hidden beneath symbols, and it pointed forward also to days then remote, when it should give place to a higher system, and when that religion, which was not antagonistic to the old, but an expansion, and full emancipation of all in it that was not exclusively Jewish, was to be brought into proximity with every country and clime. Christianity recognized—nay, brought out with new and startling force—the universal government of God, and the fact that obedience would be tried by an unerring test; and that this responsibility could be evaded by none to whom the name of Christ was known, yet it announced, not the re-establishment of the old Israelitish power, nor the inauguration of a new Divine scheme of temporal government, which some conceive is by and bye to be revealed, and, in millennial days, is to embrace all mankind under the immediate temporal headship of Christ.

As we find from the gospels—and the contemporaneous history of the times preceding and following Christ's Advent gives subordinate evidence,—the Jews did not cease to hope for and expect a return of their national glory. Many expressions were uttered by our Lord which they chose to understand as favouring their views, and though to His disciples He gave more particular explanations, they could not free themselves from the delusion that the Jewish kingdom was to exhibit more than the splendour of its palmiest days under King Messiah, and in its triumphs they thought that they would share. Owing to these errors, which were only slowly dispelled after the decease of their Master, they failed to realize what Christianity was as a spiritual power; nor could they understand how, by means of its action upon the hearts and consciences of men it was destined by God to work greater social and political changes than it could have effected through any form of temporal government. The disciples hoped to see their Lord upon the throne of the Cæsars, and the sight of His submission to the dominant Roman authority in Jerusalem filled them with surprise and vexation. But Christ's own words on this momentous subject uttered in that closing scene were final; "*My kingdom is not of this world.*" To say that these words

declare only that Christ's kingdom had not a temporal origin is to misapprehend their significance. As the connection proves, Christ asserted that the nature of the kingdom He came to establish was such that it could in no way rival that of any earthly potentate, and it precluded any armed opposition on the part of His followers to the outrages He had to sustain. And, strange as it appears, the efflux of nineteen Christian centuries has not been sufficient to prove to some men that upon earth Christianity has no prospective kingdom, that the reign of Christ, which commenced in Pentecostal days, has been continuous (since, even in the darkest ages, there were solitary individuals, and even companies, in whose breasts was cherished the remembrance of the sacred truths which He declared), and that all now needed to bring about its extension throughout the nations is greater activity on the part of those in whose hands God has entrusted the Gospel, and charged them to make it known to others; secondly, more earnest prayer on the part of believers for the vivifying operations of the Spirit of God; and, thirdly—an event plainly predicted, but the time of which is as yet concealed—a suspension of the Satanic influence and power as exercised over the souls (and bodies?) of men.

To expect greater results from the employment of temporal agencies, even associated with the immediate bodily presence of Christ Himself, than have occurred while He has been spiritually, yet without intermission, present with His followers—that is, from such conjectured events as the restoration of the Jews to Palestine, the rebuilding of the temple, and a visible reign of Christ in Jerusalem—is to mistake, nay, almost to dishonour the genius of the Christian religion. It is in no way needful that Christ should reign, temporally, in actual presence, or by any vicegerent, to bring about those changes which have been predicted as certain to occur when Christianity receives its due recognition from all the nations. It is conceivable, certainly, that God could have ordained that Christianity—like Judaism, holding a temporal position—might have done what Judaism did not, namely, go forth, and enlarging itself from a narrow sphere gradually embrace within its sway all other kingdoms and governments. But He saw fit to endow the gospel dispensation with a power which was merely spiritual, and its appeals to mankind are all the stronger because they touch the heart and conscience through the means of unseen yet believable disclosures which it makes regarding the past, present, and future.

We have very ample evidence before our eyes as to what has been already effected by means of the methods of evangelization which arise naturally out of the Christian system of ethics, and it needs only an expansion, and a more zealous pursuit of these, to displace, and ultimately to extinguish, all false forms of religion. Have we not seen, as an eloquent modern writer observes, "a whole western hemisphere colonized in later times by nations not idolatrous; and there, amidst an unexampled growth of population, we hail a wide revival, a deep and growing vitality, of 'the faith once delivered to the saints'?" While, also, in the farthest East, the light of real science co-operates with the desires and energies of Christians, chasing and casting out those phantoms of a gross mythology which can no more spread their wings in its full sunshine. Would David deem the fulfilment of his predictions equivocal or narrow, and 'his soul be cast down within him,' when, 'looking from the land of Jordan, from the hill Mizar,' over waves which no ship of Tarshish ever crossed—he should find his own hallowed songs read in the hut of the Esquimaux and the New Zealander, chanted in the kraal of the Hottentot and in the churches of Tahiti; when he should hear the name of the Christ resounding on the shores of the Ganges and Ohio, and consider those 'palaces' where God is known for a 'refuge' adorning the once savage banks of the Thames and Delaware." These events are preparing the way for greater events yet to come, when, in the millennial period, as already hinted, multitudes shall be gathered into the Church of Christ, and various distinctive prophecies, as yet unfulfilled, shall have their accomplishment. Towards this consummation all things are tending, and the seeming postponement is only a part of the Divine purpose. Whether any distinct demarcation will be noticeable, whereby all must perceive that a new era is being inaugurated, is doubtful; in my belief, it is more probable that by a gradual onflow of events tending thitherward the change will be brought in, which, though mighty, may not be notable as to its precise commencement. I am aware that a large number of very sincere and good persons look for an inauguration of the millennium in a sudden and visible appearance of Christ upon earth, to reign over the nations for a prophetic period, antecedent, of course, to the resurrection of all and the final judgment. By this personal reign of our Lord and His attendant saints shall be brought about, as they say, that moral revolution amongst the peoples, and that general

acceptation of the truths of Christianity which, at present, seems unlikely to come to pass through the agencies which are in operation. Yet, in conjunction with this view, such persons mostly still cling to the belief that the spiritual efficacy of Christianity is to continue, but think it will be supplemented and assisted by a new temporal power given to it; by which more is to be effected within a very brief space than has been brought to pass by the well nigh two thousand years during which the Church of Christ has been in existence, and never without its adherents, and not often without its martyrs. Already, as we have said, the work which the Church has done gives ample security to those who have a heart-interest in its success; that the fault of failures and lapses rests not with the Founder of Christianity. It is the lack of faith and diligence on the part of its adherents that has retarded the spread of Christianity; and would a visible manifestation of the glory of Christ and His reign upon earth—even as king of all nations—would this be more likely to produce a universal acceptance of the gospel of Christ than the previous means used to urge men to believe in and to obey it? Might it not be said with reason that such an astounding appearance would in fact alter the character of the dispensation altogether? Faith can never be abolished; it must always be a part of the nature of a finite being, whatever world he be a habitant of; but the faith which forms so essential a particular in the Christian life would necessarily undergo an entire transformation, or indeed cease to exist, when the object of it was revealed to the bodily sense. Let Christ descend upon earth in sight of all—nay, let this not be universally seen, but only reported on undoubted authority—and the most incredulous once as to the truth of Christianity would hasten to yield a perfunctory obedience, if it might avail them aught. Actual transformation of the characters of men from vice to virtue would be no more wrought by this manifestation than by Christ's appearing to judge the world. We must suppose, then, that by His spiritual influences God will still continue to draw men to Himself, and have we any proof that the existence upon earth of a temporal kingdom under Christ's authority would further the salvation of those as yet in spiritual unbelief? I should say not; the history of the Jews teaches far otherwise.

This erroneous view, towards which our attention has been directed, has been largely supported by a misapprehension of those

passages in Scripture which speak of the coming of Christ. This phrase is used in a variety of meanings, and it is necessary to distinguish carefully between those places where it applies to a personal coming and a coming which is providential or spiritual. There are two, and but two, comings which are personal. Christ came, at the appointed time, to redeem men, He will return, as He departed from earth, to be their judge, but *subsequently to the millennium*; and then follows the close of the gospel dispensation, and the reorganization of our planet by the agency of fire. The destruction of Jerusalem, and the calamities attendant upon it were evidently predicted as a "coming of the Son of Man." Special seasons of spiritual revival are also designated thus.

We find, it is granted, that the Christian dispensation is frequently called a kingdom, and (which serves to elucidate this) it is also spoken of, in its beginning, as if it were a kingdom already in existence, and not to become such after a time. Isaiah had declared that a king should come, who "should reign in righteousness" (chap. xxxii. 1). Jeremiah announced that a "king shall reign and prosper, and execute judgment and justice" (chap. xxiii. 5). Daniel predicted that "the God of heaven should set up a kingdom" (chap. ii. 44). Similar testimony was borne by other prophets. Amongst the earliest utterances of our Lord, we find one which startles the Jewish ear by its assertion that the "kingdom of heaven" was near at hand. This is elsewhere called the "kingdom of God;" it is said to be actually come (Matt. xii. 28), though it was not to "come with power" until after the death of Christ (Matt. x. 34). Those who believed in Christ became at once children of that kingdom—a kingdom then present and not remote (Matt. xxiii. 38; Mark x. 34); and Paul also speaks of an immediate entrance into God's kingdom which is attainable (Col. i. 12). In some passages of Scripture, also, the eternal inheritance of believers is called a kingdom (as in Matt. xxv. 34), but the phrase is not applied to any temporal kingdom over which Christ was to reign.

CRRS.

## Literature.

---

### IS PULPIT INFLUENCE ON THE WANE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

WE should be glad to be able to take the negative side of this question. Even our interests make us desire that we could do so. But not withstanding the wish that we could believe that pulpit influence is not on the wane, and that it would be to our interests to be able to adduce evidence that the influence of the pulpit is not diminishing, we are compelled to believe that pulpit influence has long been, and still is, *decreasing*.

For the belief that pulpit influence is on the wane, we adduce the following reasons:—

I. The spirit of inquiry which has been roused in the minds of the educated classes, together with the scepticism which this has given rise to, leads us to believe that pulpit influence is waning. By the more intelligent portion of the community no doctrine is now taken for granted. Every tenet, and the grounds for believing it, are examined. The disposition to which we here refer is growing. We think, whatever religious doctrines may be held by our readers, this must be admitted by them. And must not this admission be necessarily followed by the further admission that the influence of the pulpit, which once was sufficient to cause whatever was advanced from it to be received as true, is a waning influence?

II. The prevailing and increasing infidelity of the lower classes, leading them to treat sacred subjects, preaching and preachers, with scorn and ridicule, which contempt has come in the place of the deference and veneration formerly shown by the same classes to the same persons and things, yet further shows that pulpit influence is waning. The growing disposition of the labouring portions of the community to spend the Sabbath day wholly as a day of physical recreation, and their expressed wish to have places of amusement



opened on that day, is further evidence of the diminishing influence of the pulpit.

III. The *increase* of wickedness—of certain kinds especially—in home-life and in the streets, together with the continual coming to light of gross wickedness that has been perpetrated in secret, many of which wickednesses we think a careful observer must admit would half a century ago have caused in this country a degree of shame which they do not now produce, is evidence of the decreasing influence of the pulpit, great crimes being now common in all classes of the community, and amongst those who regularly attend church or chapel, as well as amongst those who do not.

IV. The immoral conduct of a large number of persons who publicly profess religion, and the increasing number of such, as well as the increase of the absence of a sense of shame, and of boldness and hardihood in crime manifested by such persons, is clear evidence that the influence of the pulpit over *them* is a *decreasing* influence. The evident formalism—and nothing beyond it—of many regular attendants on preaching, and the small amount of good fruit brought forth by such—that amount being in many cases a lessening one—shows the influence of the pulpit to be diminishing.

V. This is an intensely busy age; the whirl of trade is constant, and competition in all occupations and professions is great and tense. To a close observer it is evident that the minds of many constant church and chapel-goers are filled with secular affairs, even on the Sabbath day. The attention is, in a measure, drawn therefrom during the short space of time which is allotted to public worship; but only to revert thereto with renewed vigour immediately after that worship is concluded. Our own observation leads us to believe that this secular spirit is increasing, and consequently that pulpit influence is increasing.

VI. The increasing rage for ritualism, diversity, and richness of vestments, incense, music, a variety of postures during worship, &c., shows the *diminishing* influence of the pulpit.

VII. The lack at the present time of preachers of great abilities and eloquence shows that the influence of the pulpit is waning. We think that whatever religious denomination our readers may belong to, they must admit the deficiency of the present period—when compared with former ones—in preachers of great ability. There being thus a lack of powerful preaching, the pulpit has necessarily lost influence.

M. D. R., while attempting to prove the negative of the question now being discussed, establishes our own argument; for he confesses "the influence of the world over our souls is on the increase. We blame the pulpit for the fault of the pew." As then, according to both our own showing and that of M. D. R., the influence of the world over us is on the increase, the influence of the pulpit is necessarily on the decrease; for the influence exerted by the pulpit—when a legitimate one—is certainly antagonistic to the influence of the world. As to blaming the pulpit for the fault of the pew, it is not necessary for proving the affirmative of the question before us, to show that it is the hearers, not the preachers, who are in fault. The terms of the question relate to a simple fact, but do not at all respect the causes thereof. Pulpit influence may be waning from the want of ability and power in preachers, or from worldliness and indifference in their hearers. The fault being in the pew is no evidence that pulpit influence is not waning. Of the seven reasons which we have given for believing that pulpit influence is waning, six of them attribute fault to the hearers. It would be possible for pulpit influence to be waning without any fault in preachers. M. D. R. unintentionally admits that which we contend for—that pulpit influence is on the wane.

S. S.

## NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

WHEN demand exceeds supply we may be pretty sure that that which is so demanded is not unpopular; and whatever there is a demand for is sure, in the long run, to be improved and bettered, because competition is increased, and a larger measure of thought and effort is given to the production of the desired article. Now it is a fact, that in the ministry of every one of our churches there is a complaint that men do not devote themselves in sufficient numbers to the work of preparing to occupy the pulpit; and in almost all, the aid of pious laymen is called into requisition to supply, in part, the deficiency felt, and often complained of. This paucity in the numerical force of preachers is taking place in despite of the highly favourable terms now offered, not only in the Church but among Dissenters, to men of thought and pulpit power. Influence—which is moral, social, and political supremacy—is undoubtedly an object of ambition to many, and pulpit influence is perhaps the most direct and effective of any; yet so great is the

demand for the exercise over them of pulpit influence among men, that the supply falls short of the demand. There can be no proof so patent as this, that pulpit influence is not on the wane—that it is yet the mightiest moral lever in the world—that it is the very chosen instrument of God for the overthrow of wickedness, the conversion of men, and the building up of saints.

I note as another fact showing that "Pulpit influence is not on the wane," the popularity and extensive sale of sermon-literature. It must be recollected, in regard to this matter, that a sermon is a spoken discourse. Its essence is that it is oratorical. In this way it increases its effectiveness to the hearer, but its power is commensurately decreased to the reader. It loses all the charm of delivery, all the personal element, all the fire, passion, and enthusiasm, and yet it is a well-known fact that sermons of merit sell excellently. It is not an unusual thing to see sermons by Spurgeon selling in tens of thousands. Millions of them have already been sold. I have noticed volumes of sermons by Caird, Guthrie, Vaughan, Dale, Kerr, Macleod, Trench, Mansel, Liddon, Melville, Beesher, announced as having attained a circulation of many thousands. Even the sermons of inferior men generally pay their expenses, and often afford profits devoted to charitable objects. Magazines, too, frequently include in their pages sermons as a portion of their contents; while not a few periodicals are almost entirely devoted to the reproduction of sermons delivered by clergymen belonging to different sections of the Christian church.

To gain an idea of the real force of this fact the reader should bethink himself of the difference between read and spoken discourses, and he may get a pretty fair analogical notion of its worth; by comparing, if he has the opportunity, the infrequency with which stage-plays, for instance, are exposed for general sale, and how seldom they are purchased. They are made to be performed as sermons are intended to be delivered. Read, both lose much, but the percentage of plays bought would bear no comparison with that of sermons. Even music-hall songs, popular as these often are for a time, do not attract many purchasers compared to those who hear them. Sermons, therefore, may be said to have a vitality in them, which enables them to survive in power that kind of trial which is most fatal to delivered matter. Besides all this, is it not a fact that even newspapers have taken to reporting sermons as

matters of interest to the general reader, and likely to secure the good-will of their customers and to extend their sale? Looked at in this light, it seems that pulpit literature has a peculiar charm for people, and moves them to purchase it readily, even when divested of one of its special elements—personal delivery.

Or take again another fact which tells powerfully in behalf of the negative of this question. Let the reader note for how short a time a theatrical star can keep up the attendance of a full house—even with all the cunning puffery the stage can employ, and compare that with the regularity and fulness of attendance voluntarily given to the ministrations of even ordinary preachers. How frequently must even our music-hall favourites run off into the provinces to get a hearing and give breathing-time to their admirers, as compared with those who labour from the pulpit to affect men.

Let me try again to bring this idea home. Number our theatres, music-halls, &c., which are devoted to the amusement—as distinguished, let us say, from the absolute besotment—of the people, and it will be found that our tabernacles call together greater crowds and attract them more regularly, too, than these, notwithstanding their pomp of advertising and their plentiful use of the critic and the reporter. No, the pulpit is not on the wane, or such facts would not be patent. The preacher is still a power in the land and still wields a special influence over the minds of the people—an influence too before which all other influence pales and fades.

A higher and holier argument yet remains. The influence of the pulpit is the influence which has changed society and indoctrinated it with the very spirit of its civilization. It has suffused the very soul and conscience of man with the aims and aspirations of the gospel, so that many who imagine that they are free from the influence of the pulpit, and deny all reverence for and to it, are yet under the dominion of that public opinion which the pulpit has formed, and those historical impulses which the pulpit has set in motion. Even the wicked feel restraints that issue from the pulpit, though they withhold their feet from the sanctuary; and the infidel, who doubts the teaching of the pulpit, prides himself in practising the morality which the pulpit has so promulgated as to make a habit of the soul. M. S. A. may say what he chooses in depreciation of the pulpit and its occupiers, but the intelligent

reader will concede that facts are yet in favour of the advocates of the efficacy of the pulpit to affect men's lives and arouse their consciences, to quicken their moral feelings, and to lead them to seek the regeneration of their hearts.

F. C. A.

---

**ALCHEMY.**—Alchemy is the art of changing, by means of a secret chemical process, base metals into precious. Probably the ancient nations, in their first attempts to melt metals, observing that the composition of different metals produced masses of different colour unlike either—for instance, a mixture like gold resulted from the melting together of copper and zinc,—arrived at the conclusion that one metal could be changed into another. At an early period the desire for gold and silver grew strong, as luxury increased, and men indulged the hope of obtaining these rare metals from the more common. At the same time the love of life led to the idea of finding a remedy against all diseases, a means of lessening the infirmities of age, of renewing youth, and repelling death. The hope of realizing these ideas prompted the efforts of several men, who taught their doctrines through mystical images and symbols. To transmute metals, they thought it necessary to find a substance which, containing the original principle of all matter, should possess the power of dissolving all into its elements. This general solvent, or *menstruum universale*, which, at the same time, was to possess the power of removing all the seeds of disease out of the human body, and renewing life, was called the philosopher's stone, *lapis philosophorum*, and its pretended possessors adepts. The more obscure the ideas which the alchemists themselves had of the appearance occurring in their experiments, the more they endeavoured to express themselves by symbolical language. Afterwards they retained this phraseology to conceal their secrets from the uninitiated. It is certain that the ancient Egyptians possessed particular chemical and metallurgical knowledge, although the origin of alchemy cannot with certainty be attributed to them. Several Grecians became acquainted with the writings of the Egyptians, and initiated in their chemical knowledge. The fondness for magic, and for alchemy more particularly, spread afterwards among the Romans also. When true science was persecuted under the Roman tyrants, superstitions and false philosophy flourished the more. The prodigality of the Romans excited the desire for gold, and led them to pursue the art which promised it instantaneously and abundantly. At a later period chemistry and alchemy were cultivated among the Arabians. In the eighth century the first chemist, commonly called Geber, flourished among them, in whose works rules were given for preparing quicksilver and other metals. In the Middle Ages the monks devoted themselves to alchemy, although they were afterwards prohibited from studying it by the Popes.

## Politics.

---

### OUGHT THE TENURE OF LAND TO BE RADICALLY CHANGED?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"HE [Mr. Cobden] saw, for example, that no ultimate benefit would ensue to the mass of the people by the abolition of all taxes on food, unless what he called, by a pardonable metaphor, free trade in land were also established. By this he meant the removal of that artificial scarcity of marketable land which is directly traceable to certain usurpations in the real or presumed interest of the aristocracy, by which the devolution of land is regulated according to the custom of primogeniture, and by which estates are restrained under the covenants of a strict settlement. Thus, in the last year of his life, and in the last speech which he made, he regretted his age and failing physical energies, since he was now debarred from entering on an agitation for the abolition of those customs and privileges which make land the monopoly of the rich and condemn the English peasantry to hopeless labour."—*Preface to "Speeches of Richard Cobden,"* vol. i.

For the purpose of opening this question in the affirmative, I do not now touch the article of D. A., reserving for myself the treat of overturning his illogical statements in my reply. I only make this remark, viz., that he has directed his attacks against the excellent explanatory statement of Mr. Mill appended to the programme of the Land Tenure Reform Association, and has overlooked the question at issue here. I hope, however, to apply myself to the real question for debate, viz., whether or not the present system of land tenure should be radically changed.

In the first place, it will be necessary to ascertain some of the leading features of the present system of land tenure—a system which results in the pauperizing of a large proportion of the population, and keeping in the chains of ignorance and servitude those human beings who, in consequence of the natural working of this system, are raised but little above the animal creation.

I start with these two propositions,—(1) That the land of the nation belongs to the nation; and (2) that it exists for the national

good, and not for the purpose of being monopolized by one class of persons.

The system of land tenure under which we live was made by landholders—the class who are even now the strongest in the House of Commons—to swell their own dignity and pride, and without the slightest intention to benefit the great mass of the people; and not only so, but to this Juggernaut they even sacrifice the interests and wishes of some landholders themselves, in order, if possible, still to prop up a landed aristocracy.

It would be worse than useless to say much about the system of land tenures which existed before the reign of Charles II., because that monarch destroyed all kinds of tenure except that which is called free socage, or, in other words, freehold. This monarch, however, did not effect this improvement out of any regard to the mass of his subjects, who were then, and are now, deprived of their interest in the land. On the contrary, in order to make up the deficiency which would accrue to him by the abolition of those antiquated tenures to which I have referred, he imposed upon his subjects a tax upon beer, &c. (our first excise), thus making the mass pay for the benefit of the few; for the advantage derived from the measure was an advantage to the few and not to the many. But the Revolution of 1688 came on, and this was essentially a revolution by the towns against the country gentlemen. One result of it was that a tax was imposed on the land of 4s. in the pound. But the land was rated for the tax at a *fixed valuation made by the landlords themselves*. The sum may have represented a proper amount at that time, but notwithstanding the enormous increase in the value of land—especially where immense towns have sprung up upon it—this valuation has never been raised, so that the nominal 4s. in the pound does not now actually represent 1s. at the highest; while in those vast towns built on the land the real valuation is something less than 1d. in the pound. This fact, which is unquestionable, ought of itself to be sufficient to warrant a readjustment of our present system, in order to place the heaviest burden on the shoulders of those best able to bear it. While all other monopolies have been swept away, this monopoly in land—the greatest of all—still remains.

It will be understood that the rights of the landed proprietors were, in times past, legally limited by what are called “rights of

common" enjoyed by the neighbouring inhabitants. Little by little, however, have the inhabitants allowed their rights of common to cease; but now even commoners have come to their senses, seeing, as the facts are, that these rights of common have been absorbed by the landowners, in many instances by nothing less than downright usurpation. But also to a great extent by the favourite and insidious methods of private Acts of Parliament, of which no one hears anything until they are passed, and often by taking refuge with the Enclosure Commissioners; and the latter are now pursuing the same course on their own account, and dividing amongst themselves every year thousands of acres which ought to be left open for the enjoyment, or cultivated for the benefit, of those who are thus being dispossessed of their rights. A celebrated speaker has said,—“While this process of absorption has been going on a set of laws has been in force, made by landlords, and intended to make sure that no land which once got within their grip should ever get out of it.”

Although some relaxations of the restraints against alienation have been made, yet it may still be truly said that “the laws of the landed tenure have been contrived for the purpose of keeping together the largest possible landed possessions in the families which already hold the lands.”

Of the rule of descent of land by primogeniture it is only necessary to state what the rule is, the Government having almost undertaken to destroy it. This rule operates as follows,—Whenever a man dies intestate leaving real estate his eldest son is entitled by law to the whole; and if the other brothers and sisters be not otherwise provided for out of the personalty they are left destitute. If the eldest son is dead, but has left an eldest son, such grandson of the deceased in like manner succeeds to the whole lands exclusively; and so on following in succession the eldest sons of eldest sons, and their next eldest one by one in their order of seniority. But when the male line is exhausted, their females do not succeed in the same way singly and by seniority, but altogether succeed jointly.

This custom has only to be stated to be condemned for the flagrant injustice it works.

The usual method of buying up land is by putting it into what is called strict settlement, and this is accomplished by the following juggle;—The peer or head of the family being tenant for life,



and the inheritance being entailed upon his eldest son, who is about to marry, the father and son take the necessary legal steps (which they can always do jointly) for unsettling the estate, and obtaining the absolute dominion over it. They then proceed to resettle it, making the father, as before, tenant for life; then the son is reduced in his turn to a tenant for life also, after the father, instead of, as before, being tenant in tail or full proprietor. Thus the landowner has only a life interest in what is called his property; he can neither sell it, nor bequeath it, nor even grant leases for more than twenty-one years. The landlord himself is denied the full use of the land, for fear that some of it should go out of the family.

The time has come when this mode of dealing with landed property should cease. There is no other legitimate end of landed property than the interest we should all have in the proper application of the land to the wants of the human race. The mode of dealing with the question is not a difficult one. There are laws forbidding restraint of trade and restraint of matrimony, and why should there not also be laws restraining this power of tying up lands for generations? The laws by which land can be settled on a series of persons one after another, ending with one who is perhaps unborn, and until this unborn child comes of age the land cannot be sold, nor any change be made in the order of descent, are iniquitous. Now whether any other kind of property—in the funds, for instance—should be allowed to be bequeathed in this manner need not now be considered; but the land is too precious to the whole community to be detained by legal fetters in the hands of those who cannot make the least use of it. Land tied up from alienation stagnates in the hands of the idler, the spendthrift, the incapable. Allow it to be sold, and they are soon obliged to part with it to the skilful, the energetic, the enterprising. If the law allows land to be private property, it should be as marketable a commodity, sold and bought with as little restriction as any article of commerce.

We now come to the question of the waste lands and their administration. I shall use the language of a man who is more capable of stating the matter than myself. After adverting to the question whether the whole of the landed property should be taken by the State, and be by the State managed, he says,—

“The administration of the waste lands is as much, I think, as 1871.

we are equal to. At all events, I think we had better make a beginning with that, and give a thorough trial to collective before we substitute for it individual management. And since I have been led to speak of the waste lands, I will explain what concerns them. The greatest stickler for the rights of property will hardly deny that if land be gift of nature to us all, and is allowed to be the private property of some of us, it is in order that it may be cultivated. Every defence of the institution of landed property I have met with, declares that to be its object. Why, then, should any land be appropriated that is not cultivated? Observe, by cultivated, I do not mean ploughed up. Pasturage is as necessary in the country, even more necessary, than corn land; and woodland is necessary too. I do not make war against parks, they are already very productive pasturage, almost the best sheep pastures we have; and the extreme beauty of many of them, a kind of beauty found in no country but this, and which is our chief compensation for the paleness of our sun and sky, should make us prize them as a national benefit. I should be sorry to see the trees cut down and the ground laid out, as farms are laid out now, in ugly squares of cornfield without even hedgerows to separate them. I own, however, that I do not think the possessors should have power to bar out the public from the sight and enjoyment of this beauty. With reasonable reservation for privacy, I think that parks should be open to the public as, to the credit of the owners, many are now."

But now as to the really waste lands. I do not say that all ought at once to be put into cultivation, but it is perfectly certain that, cultivated or not, they ought to belong to the nation. If a waste is not to be cultivated, no man in the world should be allowed to enclose it, and keep the rest of the world out. But if it be allowed to be cultivated, then it ought not to be divided among landowners, but it ought to be cultivated for the nation. Suppose that some landowners had at one time a legal right to cultivate some common, but have not exercised that right for two or three centuries, then the right has lapsed.

But it so happens that no one has this right of cultivation, and that in general any landowner who wishes to cultivate must go to Parliament; but before he can do so, it is necessary for him to get the consent of all the commoners—those who have rights of common, such as the use of spontaneous produce, &c., and it is to the public spirit of some of these commoners who have refused to assent to the landowners' proposition, that several of our commons are still unenclosed. But suppose the commoners do not consent, then the landowners have recourse to another plan, viz., they apply to the

Enclosure Commissioners, and the latter put that common into their annual bill, and divide it among the landowners, so that the 30,000 families who own the cultivated part of this kingdom, have, notwithstanding that they have no right to it, more land forced upon them by the operation of these Enclosure Commissioners, to the extent of thousands of acres every year, thus overriding the rights of the commoners. The actual cost of this to the commoners is very great. Consider the condition of the present generation of rural labourers; they had once a substantial benefit from the waste lands, the majority occupied cottages by the side of, or near to, some common or green, and could feed a cow or a few geese upon it. True it was but little, but the man could call it his own, he did not absolutely depend for daily food on daily wages or parish assistance. He was something; this right and consequent partial independence was wrenched from him, and he is nothing, his moral status is gone. He is ultimately forced to migrate into large towns, and from the fact of his being driven there, he helps to pauperize it. Or, when his common was taken away he had to sell his cow or geese, and sink into the dependent degraded condition of an English agricultural labourer. He often got no compensation at all for being thus roughly deprived of his rights; "when he did, if it were even a little bit of the land, he was soon cheated out of it, or persuaded to sell it. The money was quickly spent, and his children were no better for it. They would have been much better for the cow and the geese. In modern Enclosure Bills there are sometimes, though by no means always, a few wretched acres reserved for recreation and garden allotments, by which last phrase are meant small patches of ground, not *given* to the labourers, but which they are *allowed* to hire at enormous rents." Here a radical change is clearly necessary, but there was before the House of Commons a Bill brought in by Government this session, and which was considered a great reform on the system just alluded to. This Act provides that when a common is enclosed a tenth-part shall be reserved for recreation and allotments, provided that this tenth does not *exceed* 50 acres. Thus out of a common waste of 2,000 or 3,000 acres, fifty are to be devoted to the people (to whom certain rights in the *whole* belong), and the remainder to go to the 30 000 families. Surely a more iniquitous provision was never made; a provision, the exact converse of that named would be nearer to justice. No improvement must be asked

here, but a radical change demanded. There must be no more enclosures *unless for the benefit of the people*.

This latter state of things is quite capable of accomplishment, there need be no injustice to lords of manors; let them be paid a just compensation for their rights as lords of manors, let the commoners also receive just compensation for their rights, and then let the land itself be vested in some public body in trust for the nation.

The first thing to be done would be a general survey of all waste lands, when it has been reported what they are; the quantity, quality, and situation; authorize a competent person to consider and report what portion of them should be kept open for the enjoyment of lovers of natural freedom and beauty, and what part should be cultivated *for the benefit of the poor*; and let the first thought be for the most depressed part of our working population, the wretchedly paid, down-trodden, semi-pauperized, agricultural labourers. "The experience of allotments has shown how much the occupation of land, even on the most extortionate terms, can do for these neglected creatures. Up to the present time the allotments have generally been the worst land in the parish, but the produce they raise from it is prodigious, and enables them to pay exorbitant rents. Let them have it at rents that are not exorbitant, and when they have had it long enough to show that they are capable of managing it properly, let them have long leases at fixed rents; and when a labourer has shown that he knows how to make good use of a little land give him more. When possible, make the engagements with associations of labourers, combining their labour, that the great principle of co-operative industry may have a fair trial on the land. By these improvements, honestly conducted by persons who desire their success, a new life may be breathed into our unfortunate agricultural population, while a fair share of the value given to the lands by reclamation would go in relief of the general taxation of the country.

But another branch of the subject now arises. Land is limited in quantity, while the demand for it in a prosperous country is constantly increasing progressively; and its value rises, not through the exertion or expenditure of the owners, to which no objection could be made, but by the mere wealth and population. The incomes of the landowners are growing while they are sleeping, through the general prosperity produced by the labour and outlay of other people. But the question comes, Does not all property, whether

land or not, rise in value with the increase of property? "No," answers a great political economist; "all other property fluctuates in value, now up, now down. *I defy any one to show any kind of property not partaking of the soil*, and sufficiently important to be worth considering, which tends steadily upwards without anything being done by the owners to give it increased value. So far from it, that the other of the two kinds of property which yield income, viz., capital, instead of increasing actually diminishes in value as society advances. The poorer the country, or the further back we go back in history, the higher we find the interest of money to be. *Land alone*—using land as a general term for the whole material of the earth—has the privilege of steadily rising in value from natural causes, and the reason is that land is strictly limited in quantity, the supply does not increase to meet the constant increase of the demand."

It is unjust to the utmost that this increase in value should be abandoned to the landowners. It is the height of injustice that "because certain families or their progenitors two or three generations ago happened to own land over which this great capital, or other large towns, have since extended themselves, the estates of those families should now be worth millions of money, to which they have contributed nothing, either by work or expenditure, except signing leases. . . . Let us prevent any more gigantic fortunes from being built up in a similar manner." The public has, therefore, the right to impose special taxation on the land equivalent to its special advantage. Of course to those landowners who object, I admit that the nation should have the power of taking the land off his hands at its *present* selling value. If this be, as no doubt it will be said to be, "confiscation," a favourite word in the mouths of the Tories, then every railway act is a gross confiscation. There is no doubt that the landowners would prefer to retain their lands even on these altered conditions, but should they not be content the original offer will still be open to them; they can accept the sum first tendered with any additions for improvements since made by themselves. By this means, if the country remain prosperous, a considerable revenue would in time be obtained by the State, from the increasing value of land. No doubt it would not begin to come in immediately, time must be left for the increased value to accrue. But the State might grant to any landowner who should desire it, a lease of its prospective rights, for life or for a term of years, from the claim of the State on the increase of his rental, either at a fixed

## 198 OUGHT THE TENURE OF LAND TO BE RADICALLY CHANGED?

annual rent, which would give to the State a part of the pecuniary benefit at once, or the landholder might commute the claim for an extra succession duly payable on any vacancy occurring during the term agreed on.

Another branch of the subject relates to the great estates held by public bodies and endowed institutions. Of all the abuses in this country the abuses of endowed institutions are perhaps the greatest. It is to be seen on every hand, and the nation begins to feel—and justly so,—that all of them ought to be taken to by the nation and radically changed. "This means that their lands should be either managed for them by the State, or taken away altogether; such of them as are fit to be continued receiving money endowments instead. If this were done a great extent of landed possessions would be at the disposal of the nation, and with all the defects of State management, management by endowed institutions is generally so much worse, that even after giving them full compensation, to which many of them are by no means entitled, a considerable surplus would be probably realized for the State. . . . One may walk for several miles across London without once taking his foot off the property of some endowed institution. I have seen it estimated that a fifth part of London belongs to them. It is well known how great a hindrance the obstinate selfishness of the owners of house property opposes to that most urgent reform—the improvement of the dwellings of the working classes. If those lands were assumed what facilities would be afforded for that, as well as for open spaces, public gardens, co-operative buildings, and sanitary measures generally, for all improvements that are beneficial to the poorer classes."

The above constitute a few of the reasons which have convinced me that a great radical change in the tenure of land is necessary, and must come sooner or later.

The nation ought to be thankful that the question is now fairly set afloat by the Land Tenure Reformed Association. It is to be hoped that this Association will commence an agitation throughout the country like that initiated by Richard Cobden on another question; and that it will not let the subject drop until it meet with a success similar to that obtained by its predecessor, the Anti-Corn-Law League,—freedom of land being the necessary supplement of freedom of food.

There can be no doubt that this Land League, if it take a decided course, will be thoroughly supported throughout the country. H.K.

## *Science.*

---

### HAS MAN DEVELOPED FROM THE SAVAGE STATE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

THIS discussion does not lead us quite so far back as the Ascidian origin of man. We may or may not accept of Darwinism pure and simple on this side of the debate ; but we only require to commence with man, not with the Ascidian, solitary or social. How man developed into the human form, through what stages he passed in this course of development we are not called upon either to determine or interpret. Whether he was an ape before he took his present shape, or had begun in lower form, is no part of this question. In the question he is given as man. Was he, as man, in his original state savage or civilized ? In what condition does man appear to us in the prehistoric age ?

Take first his religion. That, according to all reports, is in the earliest dawn of the race a very sad and savage thing. It is a blood-thirsty and self-torturing issue of fear. The haggard rites of immolation and destruction which are practised in worship—or what is called worship—in savage lands, are woeful evidences of a disposition quite at variance with every idea of civilized life. This Fetish-worship, which to imaginary gods sacrifices all the realities of love and friendship, appears on the surface of the shadowy traditions which precede history, and the peculiarities of it reappear frequently on the earlier pages of history, or those which detail the entrance of a new region into the historic group. As, for instance, the revelations made in Livingstone's recent explorations in Africa. Of course I might readily harrow the feelings of the reader were I writing for rhetorical effect, by quotations from writers of works of travel about lands—

“ Where damned rights are done,  
That bathe the rocks in blood and veil the sun.”

But that is not at all required in this case, for we are reasoning out the question, and the fact of what I have stated cannot be doubted.

We can trace in religion the Fetish worship of the olden times through many gradations and many varying forms, and we see the same or similar acts of worship done in the savage tribes of our own day. Hence we reason, that if now and passing beyond the historic boundary in space, going into the unhistoric lands of uncivilized races, we see Fetishism and savageism invariable concomitants—that when we pass beyond the historic boundary in time, going into the prehistoric lands of uncivilized races we see Fetishism in active operation, and hear of little that shows the prevalence of higher influences—we cannot but assume that savageism reigned there, and that man developed from the savage state of a Fetish-worshipper into that of a mythologist when triumphant thought investigated the sky,—

“And wheeled in triumph through the signs of heaven ;”

and when the epithets of the rude science of the time, being figurative came to be regarded, as the names of beings, and legends began to be framed for combining science with religion.

The marvellous affluence of human speech, and yet its inherent infirmity as being an issue and representative of sense, entailed on mankind a long period of transitional worship—as polytheism—before the idea of a supreme personality was attained and developed into that of an Omniscient and Omnipotent One. Then man,—

“Under a cope of variegated sky  
Could find commodious place for every god.”

As we see in the case of “the unenlightened swains of pagan Greece” :—

“In that fair clime, the lonely herdsman, stretched  
On the soft grass through half a summer’s day,  
With music lulled his indolent repose :  
And, in some fit of weariness, if he  
When his own breath was silent, chanced to hear  
A distant strain, far sweeter than the sounds  
Which his poor skill could make, his fancy fetched,  
Even from the blazing chariot of the sun,  
A beardless youth, who touched a golden lute,  
And filled the illumined groves with ravishment.  
The nightly hunter, lifting up his eyes  
Towards the crescent moon, with grateful heart



Called on the lonely wanderer who bestowed  
 That timely light to share his joyous sport.  
 And hence, a beaming goddess, with her nymphs,  
 Across the lawn and through the darksome grove  
 (Not unaccompanied with tuneful notes  
 By echo multiplied from rock or cave),  
 Swept in the storm of chase, as moon and stars  
 Glance rapidly along the crowded heavens  
 When winds are blowing strong. The traveller slaked  
 His thirst from rill or gushing fount, and thanked  
 The Naiad. Sunbeams, upon distant hills  
 Gliding apace, with shadows in their train,  
 Might, with small help from fancy, be transformed  
 Into fleet Oreads sporting visibly.  
 The zephyrs fanning, as they passed, their wings,  
 Lacking not, for love, fair objects whom they wooed  
 With gentle whisper. Withered boughs grotesque,  
 Stripped of their leaves and twigs by hoary age,  
 From deep or shaggy covert peeping forth  
 In the low vale or on steep mountain side;  
 And, sometimes, intermixed with stirring horns  
 Of the live deer or goat's depending beard,—  
 These were the lurking satyrs, a wild brood  
 Of gamesome deities; or Pan himself,  
 The simple shepherd's awe-inspiring god!"

This exquisite piece of verse gives us a glimpse into the manner in which religion develops, and the sensations of men get transformed into myths, and polytheism gains entrance into the spirit. The striking similarity of all myths which the study of this topic by Bryant, Grote, Muller, Cox, &c., has revealed, goes clearly to show that the savage man has developed into the civilized mythist, and that in the religion of the race there has been such a progress as shows that man has developed from the savage state.

Science proves our thesis still more plainly. What a progress is revealed in astronomy since the Chaldean shepherds saw in the heavens the shadows of fate!—in geology, since no man knew aught of the earth but as a subject for tillage; and fossils—those miracles of prehistoric epochs—seemed by us strange toys manufactured by the gods in their play hours; of electricity, since the thunder appeared to echo forth the wrath of Jove, till now that it is used to convey "cotton quotations" and columns of "Reuter." Then notice

the growth of the sciences, how they have all passed through the age of guess and supposition, of rude theory and rough hypothesis, into that of close induction, clear investigation, measured experiment and ultimate prevision. Ethnology was impossible, for instance, until ages of travel and locomotion, noticing explorers, and observant noters of facts; physiology is only as yet in its growth, and the details of its progress are among the triumphs of our own time and land; geology, almost the youngest of "the new births of time,"—though already showing the thews and sinews of a giant—is only a great infant engaged in the school-work of studying the object-lessons of the universe: these are all signs of progress in man—they issue from man's reflective nature in questions and return to him as discoveries, and then they go forth in invention and art, utilizing nature for man's behoof and adding to the amenities of civilization.

Knowledge is the great distinguishing characteristic between barbarism and civilization. Barbarism is human nature in its most rude and degraded condition; civilization is human nature educated, elevated; and, as it progresses, education necessarily differs in kind and degree as new elements arise requiring such cultivation of the mind as will suit its possessor for the right discharge of the various duties of the improved order of things, such cultivation as may unfold and improve those faculties with which man is endowed, and shall lead to the right employment of discovery and invention for the glory of God and the good of man's estate.

As in the tillage of the earth we employ now a better chemistry than in former years, so in the culture of the spirit we use a noble education—and this education, in fact, is the root of civilization. Savageism is man uncultured; civilization man cultured. The fact that man requires to be educated, proves that ignorance is his natural condition; that there are certain latent powers and principles possessed by him, which it is the object of education to develop and regulate—that is, in fact, to civilize. Did man not develop, education would be a farce, progress a name, and civilization a dream. It is because man is educable that savageism ceases and civilization begins. Man must have developed from the savage state. P. O. S. thinks that circumstances have been developed, but that man has not (p. 121). But circumstances are the educators of man, and man is the changer of circumstances. They act and react mutually on each other, and alterations imply or beget change

in the other. Every development "of invention, trade, commerce, luxury," science, &c. (p. 121), issues from man's thought, and hence involves a new development therein; so that, in reality—quite in opposition to the opinion of P. O. S.—"the development of the elements of civilized life" is a consequence of the development of man, and is, in fact, the measure of his development. Savageism has few arts, conveniences, or luxuries, because the necessities of the savage are few, and his mind has not opened to feel the want of "the elements of civilized life."

P. O. S. cannot possibly be right in his distinction between the civilization of nature and the civilization of man; they are concomitants, and go on step by step, nature encouraging man to thought and effort, man gaining from nature new resources and subjecting nature to fresh speculation and experiments. People of every degree are "better off," as the phrase is, now than they were in any previous time. From peasant to peer the conditions of life are improving, the forms of thinking are marked by many improvements, and in the sympathies of men great changes for the better are taking place. This improvement of condition has not only resulted from fresh-grown thoughts and newly developed desires in the minds of men, but has caused new impulses and inspirations to be felt in men. One thing in regard to this matter is very evident, the standard of comfort is very much altered, and men are not contented to live in the vile and comfortless conditions of savageism. Every age has elevated, so to speak, the platform of existence. We are now sensibly engaged in a conflict with ignorance and sin. In the savage state men know little of such conflicts. We are not only learning but unlearning; we are throwing off the slough of savagery, and are donning the garb of civilization, as the hut and the wigwam are going out, cottage and mansion are coming in, and along with them are coming the feelings of home-life and social sympathy and co-operation which constitute civilization.

The reply to S. S. is short and easy. Scripture supplies us with a notice of the creation of man; but the Edenic man Adam was only *one*, and his help-meet was provided for him for his Edenic life. Of the race created by God, male and female, we hear in the early Scriptures only incidentally; as when Cain went forth and took a wife of the common race; and when we find "the sons of God," the Adamic race distinguished from "the children of men," the non-Adamitic tribes. He speaks of Adamic man, as if he alone were man,

as *mankind*. But the Scriptures obviously imply other and outer families. The fall of Adam was not necessarily the fall of the race only of his race or descendants. He had special privileges which others had not, but he kept not his first estate, and being in honour did not abide therein. Other races have toiled upward, and from their coeval creation on the sixth day with the creatures of the earth, and has risen to the power of his nature so far. S. S. seems to imply that an agricultural life is a civilized one. He has only to look at Devonshire, Suffolk, and other agricultural or pastoral counties of England, and compare them with the great manufacturing districts of England, to see how progress comes in with all the civilizing influences of commerce and the arts, and falls away among those who are contented to remain *adscripti glebe*, bondsmen to the soil. These, as they are nearer to the savage state, are inferior to those who toil in the service of civilization.

Even were the premises of S. S. granted to their fullest, they would not bear out his theory of the primary civilization of mankind. He would only have succeeded in proving that Adam was possessed of a civilized nature, and he would require to concede that all mankind, having fallen in and with Adam, had lapsed into savagery and gone astray. Hence mankind required to be raised from this savageism to the newness of life of civilization, or, as S. S. might say, Christian civilization." "Cris" takes a similar view to that of S. S., and endeavours to get out of this difficulty by asserting that Christianity is civilization. This it may be, as a pattern and an aim towards which civilization may require to toil, or as he calls it, a possible "life-influence," to elevate his nature. That Christianity is civilization will not stand the test of history. That all mankind were at creation Adams in their intelligence, moral nature and specific qualities, is nowhere noted in Scripture. In fact, we are led rather to believe that the race had gone on in a savage state for a long period, until at length the Divine Being thought fit to bring a form of moral culture into operation, and so to induce civilization among men. But man relapsed into sin, and sunk till the Deluge swept away those who had "taken no good" from the exceptional civilizing circumstances in which they had been placed. Human progress is a fact to which Scripture and history alike testify, and hence we must conclude that man has developed from the savage state.

F. Y.

## NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

MUCH has already been said in support of our position in this debate, and in continuing the discussion we will endeavour, as far as possible, to avoid going over the same ground as that traversed by our predecessors, who have already so ably and so appropriately advocated the negative of this question. Revelation, history, experience, observation, and reason are all witnesses capable of giving evidence in this case. We must consider the credibility of these witnesses, and examine, cross-examine, and re-examine them, that we may learn what testimony they give upon the subject before us.

There is but one Being from whom we can derive any authoritative declaration of the way in which man was first called into existence, or of the state in which he lived during the time that immediately followed his first entrance upon the stage of life. That being is the Creator Himself. He has left us a document, the whole of which was written by His own direction, under His own Divine guidance and teaching (2 Tim. iii. 6; 2 Peter i. 21). The Darwinians may put forward scientific speculation as a witness to testify in favour of their senses; but we will produce this document—this Divine revelation—which contains an authoritative account of the creation of the first human being, and a concise narrative of the life of mankind during the earliest ages of man's existence. The authenticity and credibility of this document cannot be disproved by our opponents, and we will briefly notice some portions of the testimony which it gives upon this question. "So God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him" (Gen. i. 27); and can we believe that a creature made "in the image of God" was created in a savage state? If our opponents can believe it, we cannot for one moment do so. Whatever be the precise idea attached to the expression "in the image of God," we cannot believe that the ignoble savage represents the state of the man who was created "in the image of" "the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity." J. S. Mill, in the paragraph quoted by B. E. C., says that,—“In savage life . . . every one trusts to his own strength or cunning, and where that fails he is generally without resource.” What! the creature made “in the image of God” created such a man as that? Surely this is a *reductio ad absurdum*. “And the Lord God took the man, and put

him into the garden of Eden, to dress it and to keep it" (Gen. ii. 15). This verse shows that in the state in which man was created he was not intended to live a nomadic life; he was to live in Eden, to stay there, and to cultivate the garden. "And Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to every beast of the field" (Gen. ii. 20), "and whatsoever Adam called *every living creature* that was the name thereof" (ver. 19). Would an undeveloped savage have had the ability to do this? We think not. "And he builded a city, and called the city, after the name of his son, Enoch" (Gen. iv. 17): From this verse we infer that even in the earliest period of human life upon the earth mankind was disposed to settle down in fixed habitations, congregating together as citizens, many families residing together continuously in the same neighbourhood. Cain migrated from the land of his nativity (and why did he thus migrate?), but he did not continue a wanderer from place to place all his days; he provided for himself a home, and built not merely a house, but a city, that he and others might live together in one place. This affords evidence that the human race was not then living in a savage state. We may also trace in the Bible narrative many signs of a life unlike that of a savage state soon after the deluge. Nimrod had a kingdom (Gen. x. 10); Ashur built cities, one of which—Resen—was "a great city" (Gen. x. 12); and a multitude who migrated together to the land of Shinar, probably because the rapid increase of the population necessitated their removal from their former abode—joined together in the construction of one work, viz., the erection of a city and a tower (Gen. xi. 4). We also read that Tubal-cain was "an instructor of every artificer in brass and iron" (Gen. iv. 22); from which it appears that even in those early days there were workmen employed in manufacturing implements made of metals such as "brass and iron." These things are inconsistent with the idea of a savage state, as described by B. E. C. and J. S. Mill; and we think that every sincere and candid believer in the authenticity and credibility of the Bible must admit that man has not developed from the savage state.

History affords instances of nations degenerating from a civilized into a barbaric state; but it gives no example of a nation *spontaneously* developing from a savage into a civilized state. All such developments have been produced, not by any innate tendency towards a mounting upwards in the scale of civilisation, but by the

influence of a fusion with a more civilized race, or by the power exerted by revealed religion. Experience and observation cannot detect in the barbaric tribes now dwelling on this earth any innate tendency towards a progressive development from a savage to a civilized state. Intercommunication between savage tribes and civilized nations, and the communication of Christianity to the former, exert a powerful interest in raising the savage tribes into a more civilized state. True religion in the heart—religion as revealed by God to man, is of such a nature that it cannot coexist with a living in an absolutely savage state. The effect we have referred to as being produced upon the savage nations of the earth by the introduction of Christianity, and by intercourse with civilized people (how slowly this effect is produced, how many a relapse there has been, and how many tribes seem not to be susceptible of such a development!) would not have been produced if those civilizing influences had not been brought to bear upon them. If all mankind had been originally in a savage state there would have been none to bring them under the influence of these civilizing agencies, and this we think affords a strong argument in support of the assertion that man has not developed from a savage state.

History, experience, observation, and reason, each testify that there is in all created life an inherent tendency towards degeneracy and deterioration. This tendency may be neutralized by the power exerted by the working of other influences; nevertheless this inherent tendency is still there, an essential attribute of things created in so far as they are known to us. Geological facts confirm the Mosaic account of creation, and not the theory of progressive development. The geologist finds vestiges of vegetable life deeper in the crust of the earth than the first trace of animal life, and it appears from his researches that whilst the work of creation was going on the lower orders of animal life were formed first, and man, the highest of all, was created last. This confirms the Mosaic narrative. But do we find evidence of any similar progression taking place after the work of creation was complete? No! Compare the fossil creatures of the geologist with their representatives of the same order as found on the earth at the present day. The tallest ferns and pines now to be found are but diminutive specimens compared with those which the geologist exhumes from the bowels of the earth; the mammoth has degenerated to the elephant, the megatherium is now represented by the sloth; the ichthyosaurus

and the plesiosaurus, where are they? In like manner the human race has degenerated in longevity, stature, prowess, &c. The accumulated stores of centuries gathered together by experience, observation, and history, have vastly added to the materials upon which the mind of man may operate, have greatly increased the number and brilliancy of the beacons by which the course of thought may be directed; and taking cognizance of the experience, &c., of our forefathers, we may apply the lessons of their lives to our benefit; but we do not think that the human mind, as it is at the present day, in the most highly civilized society, is, *per se*, a more capable workman than it was in bygone days. Which had the greatest intellectual ability—Socrates or Comte? Which had the more powerful mind—Plato or J. S. Mill? Which had the stouter mental constitution—Aristotle or Sir William Hamilton? Which had the greater capacity for intellectual labour—Pythagoras or Descartes? In estimating the amount of labour performed we must not merely look at the amount of work accomplished, but must also consider the difficulties surmounted. The ancients were like the Hebrews to whom the task was assigned of making bricks without the straw being provided for them; whilst moderns are like labourers with the straw provided for them, ready at hand for their use; the ancients were like mariners traversing unknown seas without compass or chart—the moderns are like sailors with a compass by which to steer the vessel, and a chart to point out the rocks and quicksands in the route. But there were giants in those days, and we believe that the vigour, capacity, and prowess of the individual mind has degenerated since then. The accumulated stores of science and art, history and experience, which are common property, have vastly increased; but the power of the workman has diminished. The abundance and accessibility of the materials upon which the workman operates enable him to produce greater results, although his own capacity for work has decreased.

The moral nature of man has not now developed to a higher state of excellence than that of the early ages of society. The diffusion of knowledge, the more general cultivation of the arts of peace, and the more strict enforcement of discipline and legal restraint, have added a little outer polish to civilized society, and diverted the channel in which vice runs, but the moral nature of man is no better now than it was centuries ago. "Georgius" refers to the days of Noah, and the equation of man at that time, but



when we review the history of Paris since 1790, or consider the revelations of criminal life in our own country in recent times—the Eltham murder, the Bayswater tragedy, and the mode of life thereby brought to light; the fearful immorality just disclosed at Wigan, &c.,—we cannot find any evidence to warrant the conclusion that the moral nature of man was any worse then than it is now. When were dishonest practices so prevalent in business transactions as at the present time? When was there so little confidence in the mercantile world? Was there ever such a lack of fairness, straightforwardness, integrity, and consideration for the interests of others, in the dealings of man with man, as there is at the present day? We think not. Hundreds of men are known to make money by confessedly dishonourable practices, many habitually indulge their lusts, and unlawfully gratify their licentious desires, yet pass through society without a stigma being attached to their character, but this is itself a deep stain and a foul blot upon the honour of the social circle in which they move. The world at large commonly maintains an association with such persons instead of branding them with infamy, and thus shows the extreme impurity of the moral nature which lurks beneath the outer garb of refinement. The words of Jesus recorded in Matt. xxiii. 25—33 are strictly applicable to civilized society in the present day. We believe, although there is now a greater outer polish in the manners of civilized nations, that the inner moral nature of man has grown more depraved; and we maintain that mankind has degenerated and deteriorated with the progress of time, instead of having developed from the savage state.

There are not many salient points in the two articles that have appeared on the affirmative of this debate, that we can lay hold of for the purpose of criticism, but it appears that both our opponents fail to observe that the accumulation of observations, experiences, and facts does not constitute human development. The stores of man's learning have improved in accuracy and quantity, but the man himself has deteriorated physically, mentally, and morally. B. E. C. remarks: "It is quite evident that man as a human being was not in the early ages the social and civilized being he is now," and this we freely admit. There is much that is artificial in the civilization of the present day; the civilized state in which man originally lived was natural, not artificial; real, not assumed. We may with equal confidence assert, that "It is quite evident that man as a human

being was not in the early ages," living in the same state of existence as the Aborigines of Australia or New Zealand, the Negroes of Africa, or the Red Indians of America. There are the accidentals and the essentials of civilization; a large proportion of the accidentals of civilization by which we are now surrounded are of a comparatively modern origin, but the essentials of civilization were found in the earliest ages of society.

The argument of B. E. C. from the terms indicating progress, &c. does not count for much, because they are far from being words of modern origin. We would direct attention to the fact that savage tribes are spoken of as being *debased*, *degraded* people, a *degenerate* race, *i. e.*, they are not considered as corresponding to the primeval type of man, they are not looked upon as those who have stood still during the progressive development of those around them, but are by common consent regarded as those who have sunk down lower than the original standard of humanity. They are not looked upon as those who have retained their primitive condition, but, as the aforementioned words imply, they are considered to be a people who have descended from the base upon which they originally stood to a lower place in the ranks of humanity; a race who have taken a step downwards in the scale of existence, and a class who have declined from the position occupied by their ancestors.

"Georgius" criticises L. T. B. for arguing as though the question were, "Is man self-civilized?" and maintains that man may have developed from the savage state without being self-civilized, but he does not inform us how that could have been accomplished. We have taken up the position that contact with more civilized nations, and the influence of true religion, are the agents by means of which barbaric races have been civilized; that if man had been originally in a savage state, true religion would have been incompatible with such a state of life, and as there would have been no more civilized race to influence the savage tribes, these civilizing influences would have been absent; and thus, if man had been originally in a savage state, he would either have been self-civilized, or would have continued in that savage condition. If our opponents would maintain the affirmative of this debate, let them overthrow the preceding outline of one of our leading arguments, or else show that the conclusion is not logically deducible from the premises.

"Georgius," writing on the subject of ancient as compared with modern morality, refers to the iniquity in the days of Noah and of

Paul, but we must remind him that both those periods were far remote from the era of man's first existence, and even if the state of society be considered in comparison with its condition in the present day, we fear that, as previously maintained, there is no real improvement in the inner moral nature of man, though there be a great difference in the circumstances under which human immorality manifests itself. The quotation given by "Georgius" from F. von Schlegel tells against his own position. In it Schlegel says that "The licentiousness of Roman manners, too, was really gigantic, so that the moral corruption of the Greeks appears in comparison a mere infant essay in the school of vice." The Greeks were a nation more ancient than the Romans, and their immorality was less than that of the Romans who came after them. It seems evident, that the more remote of the heathen nations were not so fearfully sunk in gross immorality as those which were of more recent origin; and Schlegel, as quoted by "Georgius," gives a testimony which supports this assertion in the case of the Greeks and Romans, and thus affords evidence of that inherent tendency in our humanity to deterioration which we have previously spoken of. Christianity has exerted a mighty power in restraining the open practice of immorality, but in heathen nations, where its power has not been felt, the tendency of man to sink lower and lower in the depths of moral depravity is clearly seen. And also where revealed religion is unknown the systems of religion are found to decline more and more from the truth as contained in the Scriptures. The most ancient forms of heathenism contained more points of similarity to the truths of revealed religion than the pagan systems of comparatively modern origin. The Persian religion was more like that of the Bible than the Greek; the Greek mythology was not so debased as the Roman; and that of India, when Sanscrit was the language of the people, was not so degraded as the Brahminism of the present day.

Some of the arguments of "Georgius," which we have not directly noticed, are met by the previous portions of this article. We think we have said sufficient to show that we have good reasons for maintaining that man has not developed from the savage state.

SAMUEL.

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—VI.

L. T. B. strives to jest at Comte and Darwin's (*ante*, p. 361) progress and positivism, but these have really nothing to do with the

question before us. As an introduction to the paper the remarks may pass, but as argument they are futile. I doubt much if his history of the debate is more valuable than his jesting. "The Origin of Man" has been a topic of philosophical inquiry from the earliest time; and, if I remember rightly, forms a theme for the reflection of Job and his friends, the pious ecstasies of the psalmist, and the sermonizing of his ecclesiastical son, as well as for the guesses of the wise men of Greece, and the thoughtful among the Romans. Indeed, Horace, Ovid, and Juvenal, give us some rather curious notices of the origin of the human race. The schoolmen, of course, took their history and philosophy from the Bible—as they understood it; and drew thence a most amazing tissue of "old wives' fables," which they incorporated into creeds and systems, and handed down as strictly bound round the souls of believers, as the tradition of the elders among the Jews in the days of Jesus of Nazareth. L. T. B. takes the old-fashioned theme under his care, and will recall us to the age of scholastic quilllets, and exorcise the science of the present day. So he thinks to frighten us from pursuing the question by references to the *Contrat Social*, the French Revolution, and all the old bug-bears of the conservative anti-socialist party, as if a search into "the descent of man" would cause the descent of nations.

The theory of a "Descent of Man," in L. T. B.'s jocular sense, is under the designation, the Fall, supported by S. S. Of course, then, if we accept the doctrine of the Fall, with all its disastrous consequences, we come at once to mankind in a savage state, from which he would require to progress and develop, and I do not see that this does anything at all to disprove the development of man from savagism to civilization. If sin is savagery, then men who have fallen into sin—however this has occurred—are in a savage state; and if Christianity is civilization, those who, from a consciousness of sin or any other cause, have accepted Christianity, have developed from the savage into the civilized state.

S. S.'s further argument, that degradation is as possible as progression, is of as little avail; for if degradation is possible, and men have become degraded, and have subsequently advanced from the degradation of savagism to the position of civilization in which we now find men, the proof is ours, that man has developed from the savage state.

I am not an original observer myself, but I have read with interest

some of the most trustworthy works on the subject; and I think that if any one takes a survey of the evidence adducible on this point, he will not long hesitate to accept the affirmative of this question.

The following is a brief outline of the facts regarding pre-historic man bearing on this question.

*Savans*, who have investigated the pre-historic evidences of human existence have come to some very determinate conclusions upon this subject. They have, for instance, arranged the evidences of man's condition drawn from the museum of creation into four great divisions, as follows:—I. The Palæolithic Period or era of drift, when man shared the earth with mammoths, cave-bears, wool-haired rhinoceroses and other extinct animals. II. The Neolithic Period, or era of polished stone, weapons made of flint, and instruments of various sorts beautifully polished and formed for use in different circumstances. III. The Bronze Age, in which the metallic arts took their rise, and ingenuity and industry were employed in the production of arms and cutting instruments of various kinds. IV. The Iron Age, when metallurgy had so advanced that articles of necessity were framed of iron, and those of ornament were made of bronze; when to the sense of need there had been added the sense of show and ornament. The conclusions which these *savans* have reached, and which we have now enumerated, are established by an array of facts, many in number, and of high importance, and showing traces of pre-historic times, and giving rise to a well-grounded hope that in the course of time the archæology of man may be as perfectly surveyed as the archæology of mammals and of monoliths.

In Kent's hole, in the caves of Liège, and in the valley of the Somme, the rudely chipped implements of flint that lie beside the remains of extinct mammals gives indubitable evidence of the existence of palæolithic man; and the river-gravels of France and England give witness to the same fact. That palæolithic man was a savage of a very low order is seen from the rudeness of these implements, and the little skill in adapting them to different uses they display. But by and by we find traces of grinding, which do not appear in those weapons which are found in the lower drift-gravel, but are palpable in those of the upper level-drift. These weapons are seen along with the remains of animals which we have no historic evidence for supposing to have been denizens of Europe except in a very remote antiquity. The numerical inferiority of man as com-

pared to the animals among whose remains his relics are found, supports the conclusion of his being of a low, savage type. The absence of the remains of any domestic animal, as the dog and the horse, among the *débris* of the valleys of Vézère, Dordogne, and other localities explored by Lartet and Christy; the entire absence of potsherds or spinning-wheels gives testimony to the want of domesticity and of the industries connected with comfort, and prove that the early inhabitants of Europe—where civilization now reaches its highest marks, were savage men.

"The earliest traces of man of which we have authentic record prove" that men dwelt in caves, lived by hunting and fishing, had gained a knowledge of the use of the bow, the spear and fire, and that they had as yet not trained the dog to aid them, nor subdued the horse to their service.

The users of polished stone made a step in advance. They made beautiful stone axes and implements of bone. The revelations of the kitchen-middens of Denmark show us that they had widened their range of food, and therefore had increased both their knowledge of their neighbour denizens, and their skill in capturing them. This perhaps is the period of Lacustrine abodes, and was probably an era of cannibalism, of which traces are met with in Scotland, Scandinavia, Belgium, and Greece. Then come the periods of grave-galleries and *tumuli*, which show the rise of affection and perhaps some glimmering of a hope of immortality; at any rate, give token of a sense of superiority to the creatures on whom they fed and whom they hunted. These were probably herdsmen and farmers, and had made decided development from their rude progenitors.

The Bronze Age brings us into a different set of life forms and sort of civilization. The men of that period produced axes, adzes, knives, articles of ornament, spear and arrow-heads, and even swords. Their bronze sickles show that they cut their corn instead of plucking the ears, and it is known that they cultivated the bean as well as oats. It must have been an age of some luxury, for the long hair-pins prove that they dressed their hair; razors indicate that they shaved; and ornaments for personal decoration indicate that they were not insensible to the charm of beauty, and were probably alive to the delights of love in other than a gross sense. Pottery and stone-cutting begin to prove domesticity and industry, and their wrought sword-handles are not unfrequently

highly decorated. Gold, glass, amber, &c., are also known to have been employed by them in the heightening of their personal charms. They burnt the bodies of their dead and probably preserved the ashes in urns.

Bronze consists of nine parts of copper to one of tin. Tin is not a widely-spread metal, so that bronze implies commerce and metallurgy. "Bars of tin have been found in the lake-dwellings of Switzerland and Savoy, and moulds for making various implements have been found in Ireland, where bronze articles are frequently found—in the South of England, and in Norway. Commerce implies either barter or coinage, and metallurgy implies mastership and workmen. It is not a little singular that tomb-carving gives evidence not only of the growth of taste and the increase of skill, but also gives token of lasting affection—the wish to perpetuate the memory of the dead."

When we reach the Iron Age we touch on the hem of the garment of Clio. History may be said to be written at first with "an iron pen and lead in the rock." Coins appear in this age and weapons of war and husbandry. We have improved much since then, but iron wedded to steam affords hope of even greater civilization than has preceded this time of invention, art, manufacture, and trade.

If we read aright the prehistoric records of the immeasurable past, we think they distinctly prove that man appeared on the stage of European life at least as an uncultured savage, having a keen struggle for existence among the other animals by the hunting of which he for the most part subsisted. We find that as they subdued the wild creatures they took to the domestication of some, and thus were led to engage in pastoral pursuits. To this they subsequently added agriculture. Then there would be alternate peace and war, for property invites attack and impels to defence. Metallic industries were brought to the aid of war and agriculture, and barter as the agency of exchange led to the development of commerce, and the introduction of many forms of manufacture. To bronze iron succeeded, and the speed of commerce made barter difficult and coinage necessary. Industry and commerce occasioned other necessities, and the recording pen was taken up by the hand of history.

The foregoing outline of the evidence for the progress of man from the rude savage state of the contender for life, with the wild

creatures of the ice-plain and the forest, as a huntsman very imperfectly armed and exposed to many dangers, and then passing onwards through the various grades of pastoral and agricultural life till manufactures arose, industry began, commerce was instituted, and competition, which commerce evokes, set men on the way to go onward to the institution of law, legislation and civilization—may serve to show on what grounds the affirmative may be maintained. But besides and beyond all this, there is the great proof contained in the very word *progress*. Who have progressed? Mankind—and from what have they progressed? From what else than an inferior condition? That inferior condition must have been one in which civilization did not exist, or else the distinction between savagery and civilization would be obliterated. The proof therefore, seems to be conclusive that man has developed from the savage state.

E. C.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—VI.

THIS question is important, inasmuch as it will influence our reflections on the events that may happen, and the results that may be arrived at, during our lifetime. If we can so far discriminate as to know the signs of the times and anticipate the results of the future without the aid of those professing prophetic editors of almanacks, then we will be in a position to grapple with the visible around us, and consequently as the thing affects us get a taste of the pleasant or the melancholy side of human life. The question under consideration, fully understood, is one that will also influence us very much in judging the signs of the times. But we object to the form in which it has already been taken up. It gives no substantial groundwork for debate, as it supposes man really to have existed in a savage state. Had it been, Has that portion of mankind which has sunk to the savage state developed from it? then it would have been obvious to all, as few will dare to deny, that there are savages now living on the earth that have been savages since shortly after the creation. The question is also apt to confuse in its present form; and that is to be seen on page 47, where "Georgius" accuses L. T. B. of having grounded his arguments on the question, Is man *self*-civilized? We do not wish to reflect on the conductors of the magazine for allowing the question



to come before their readers in such a loose state. The able discharge of their duty in times past is sufficient proof that they possess discrimination, quite able to justify their leadership in thought; and the reputation of a man, it has been said, should at times sustain him as previously he has sustained it. However, to the question, if possible.

At the very start we are brought up sharp by the difficulty already referred to, namely, the supposition that man has in times past really been savage. But the Bible comes here to our aid, as we find recorded in the first chapter of the Book of Genesis, "And God said, let us make man in our image after our likeness." With this before us that question really sinks out of existence. For if we call man savage at that early period of the world's history then we impute a state of savagism to God. We not only are guilty of falling into such an error, but we break in pieces the primary foundation, the head corner-stone of all spiritual faith; as God is *no more* love, he is cruel, brutal, a being of like passions to ours; one unfit to rule the earth, one unfit to be the centre of all existence. Had God been savage he would not have "so loved the world as to sacrifice his only begotten and well beloved Son." He would have let sinners perish without a needed intercessor, for we cannot be brought to believe that the savage heart is capable of showing such magnanimous mercy as that which, if the Bible is trustworthy, God has displayed from the creation of the world.

But to a later period; even immediately preceding the flood, we find that the entire race of men were not savages. Noah lived then. Impute savagism to that patriarch, and deduce proof if you can. And even after the flood, instead of being savage the entire population of the earth (Noah and his family) were civilized; not in such a degree of social civilization as exists in some countries in the present day, but in a state of civilized morality that but precedes the social. This we may advance as a proposition to L. T. B. when he says, "neither reason nor history supports the idea that all mankind were originally savage" (p. 370). In fact, as we have shown, it is the very opposite; and we ask "Georgius" or any other to prove from historical records that the entire population of the earth has, at any time, been completely in a savage state.

We admit that there are savages on the earth, that there have been savages since the days of Cain, if brutality, cruelty, the mastery of the soul by the evil passions, constitute a state of

savagism. But though it has been shown that these must have degenerated from a civilized state, the entire population of the earth was never in a state of complete savagism. This, therefore, brings us to the real question at issue; namely, has that portion of mankind which has sunk to the savage state developed from it? We say decidedly not. We have seen it stated somewhere that when a nation, not man entire, was verging from a state of savagism those who could read and write were looked upon as wonders; but as civilization advanced, and the arts and sciences became known, the primary step was taken by many, so that those who could read and write when others could not, to retain their position had to ascend to the higher branches of education; and thus it has been in all times, one part of mankind has been in a better condition than another. The children of Seth were better than those of Cain; the ancient Romans were more civilized than the Gauls, the Piets, or the Scots; and the modern European can boast that his civilization is not the same as those tribes which exist in central Africa and Polynesia.

"Georgius" says (page 48) that the sciences, &c., of past ages, compared with those of modern, show an "unquestionable advance of civilization in recent times." Is that true if we look at architecture? We find it is not. The moderns have no style of architecture which they can call their own. Architects wonder at this. But their wondering brings no result; as when a building of any magnificence or substantiality is about to be erected, the style chosen is generally one that has existed for ages. Surely, then, the modern age has developed nothing for the science, and still less for the art of architecture; and if the originators of those styles, having shown such intellectual power, such beautiful conception of forms, be called savages, that designation being given them proves the people of the present day to be much lower in intellectual ability. Our modern faiths, what are they? "They have been known for thousands of years." Our laws, are they better than those delivered to the children of Israel? Do they tend more to an advanced morality? Are they such that the people know and practice? And with all our modern mechanism for the detection of crime, and the enforcing of the laws of the country, are we in advance of the Hebrews, or has man entire such laws and such moral and civil forces as the European nations possess? No. There are the tribes of Central Africa and Polynesia in a savage state.

In regard to an inference Professor Maine draws from a comparison of ancient Roman and modern British laws, we think it no proof that the laws of the present time are in advance of the then Roman laws, nor is it regarding the higher morality. Such insurance companies as now exist necessitate special laws of the strictest kind, from the fact that there seldom exists one of these offices without having one or two defaulting directors connected with it. If such offices did not exist in the compared time what would be the use of looking for laws to regulate the working of them. Laws are generally laid down for the time, for the necessities of the State; and if law as a whole is to be taken as an "index of the practical morals of the people" the non-existence of certain laws is no proof that these laws were required; rather does it give us an argument in our favour by showing that craft and cunning had not gained such a hold upon the people, whose morality, as a matter of course, must be considered to have been higher.

The "improvement of the international law" we think, proves only that had rogues and vagabonds not exercised their mode of trading, &c., the improvement, not being necessary, would never have been made.

Turn to the political question under discussion in these pages. Look at France and Germany, consider the Russian menaces of a few months since, and believe "Georgius" to speak the truth when he says (page 50), "the increasing aversion to war and love of peace show the moral superiority of the present over the past," and you will have a *savage's* idea of consistency. Did "Georgius" when he asserted that the "greater respect for life and property, and the toleration of diverse opinions, show the moral superiority of the present over the past?" Consider that not long ago reason sufficient was given to disprove the first of the two assertions by the agrarian outrages in Ireland; and still further by the readiness with which a man or woman in America points a revolver at a fellow-creature, and shoots him or her with as little humanity and just as naturally as they would partake of one of their meals. Regarding the "toleration of diverse opinions," let "Georgius" play "Boyne Water" in the hearing of an Irish Roman Catholic, and see if that will be tolerated. These things suggest to us that if we look into the bone of life we will see the flesh around it in a lacerated and ghastly state; or, to quote "Georgius" slightly altered (page 53), "we feel convinced that few who strip *modern*

society of the rhetorical tinsel with which some poets and historians have gilded it and then gaze upon it in all its naked deformity will be inclined to *deny* 'the former times were better than these.'

Again (page 53), "Georgius" says, "We cannot indeed trace with certainty the history of all European nations. . . . But we do know that they were once very far beneath the present standard of civilization, and therefore it does not seem unreasonable to infer that even the most cultivated nations which now or ever have peopled the earth, arrived at their high civilization by a gradual process of development from the savage state." Here he leaves man and takes up particular nations, thus aiding in giving us another argument in our favour, that only a portion of mankind has fallen to the savage state while the remainder were enjoying, perhaps not the *high* civilization of our day, but a condition that placed them ever above those whom we call savage.

Further down he would like it to appear that the triumphs of modern science and engineering skill give an argument in favour of their side of the question; but he forgets that with all our governmental mechanism, &c., that constitute a civilized state there still exists a portion of mankind in a savage condition; and, as a matter of course, the only conclusion we can come to on this point is, that man as a whole has not developed from the savage state; that the state of society remains as it was in every age of the world's history; that is, the land still gives place to wise and foolish, savage and civilized.

"Georgius" again says (page 54), such nations as the tribes of Central Africa and Polynesia are savage. Well, if they are savage, and he maintains that *man* has developed from the savage state he leads us to suppose that those men are not human and come under the term *man*. But what are they if they are not human? They have surely man's body; the breath of life and the soul to be saved; yet the conclusion "Georgius" drives us to is that they are not a part of those whom he designates *man*. They are *savages*, merely savages. No more, and nothing else, than perhaps objects to illustrate the theory of Darwin.

In another place "Georgius" says the scanty records of the early history of the world all go to prove that at one time the whole human race were in the condition of those nations of Africa and Polynesia. He quotes from the Bible to suit his views, and when the Bible does not suit his views he throws it aside; but he is

surely well enough acquainted with the contents of the sacred book to know that if the record of man's early moral and social condition does not fill volumes, yet we have the essence of man's history, and that goes to prove, and clearly too, that man—a portion of mankind—was no more savage than “Georgius” is himself; and though sins and superstitions did exist pretty largely in the first part of the world's history, that has nothing to do with the development of man from a savage state. The sins and superstitions then prevalent “Georgius” would try to make us believe clearly indicate the savage condition of man in the ages succeeding the flood; but the nations that people the earth in the nineteenth century are not free themselves from sins as revolting and superstitious, as childish, as those which existed among the fathers of the present inhabitants. The police reports, the newspaper press, and the *popular* literature tell us this, while they drive us to a conclusion we would fain never have arrived at; as that conclusion is, that such sins and superstitions as are prevalent among the people of the world at the present day, and of which we have daily records, go to establish man is not developed from the savage state; or, according to the reasoning of “Georgius” the nation to which he himself belongs is savage. Though the sins which are prevalent in the present day—“Georgius” perhaps is happy in the thought, are not *savage* sins but *civilized* sins. What is the difference?

On page 57 he contends that Europe has really developed out of this savage condition. We agree with him so far as to say that those who now possess a knowledge of the higher branches of education are above those who can only read and write, and hold that only a small part of the inhabitants of Europe are really in what we might call a civilized state, that is, so far as morality is concerned.

But now we must close this already too lengthened paper. Before doing so, however, let us point out that we have shown:—

(I.) That by imputing savagism to man at the creation the foundation of all spiritual faith is thrown down by taking away love, the chief characteristic of the Creator.

(II.) That man entire has never been in a complete state of savagism, and therefore it is impossible for him to have developed from a state in which he never was.

(III.) That through the ages a portion only of mankind has been in a more advanced state than that which we call savagism.

(IV.) That the arts, taking architecture as an example, have not developed further in "these latter times."

(V.) That our faiths have still the same foundation.

(VI.) That our laws are not in advance of the ancient laws; and, taken as a whole, do not show the practical morals of the people of bygone ages to be less pure than those of the people of the present day.

(VII.) That, though engineering skill has done a great deal to bring man and men together, yet there still exist savages.

(VIII.) That the sins and superstitions of former ages do not prove a state of savagism; or, if they do and be compared with those which are prevalent in the nineteenth century, they only go to establish those boasted civilized nations as being in a much lower condition.

These proofs we consider are quite sufficient to establish the fact that man *has not* developed from the savage state. N. R.

## JOHN HOWARD,

AS SEEN BY BENTHAM AND CARLYLE.

### A CONTRAST.

"Look upon this picture and on that."

"HOWARD abated the jail fever; but it seems to me he has been the cause of a far more distressing fever which rages just now—what one may call the benevolent platform fever. Howard is to be regarded as the unlucky fountain of that tumultuous, frothy, ocean-tide of benevolent sentimentality, 'abolition of punishment,' all-absorbing 'prison discipline,' and general morbid sympathy, instead of hearty hatred for scoundrels, which is threatening to drown human society, as in deluges, and leave, instead of an edifice of society fit for the habitation of men, a continent of fetid ooze, inhabitable only by mud gods and creatures that walk upon their belly."—"*Model Prisons: The Latter Day Pamphlets.*" By Thomas Carlyle.

"My venerable friend (John Howard) was much better employed than in arranging words and sentences. Instead of doing what so many could do if they would, what he did for the service of mankind was what scarce any man could have done, and no man would do but himself. In the scale of moral desert, the labours of the legislator and the writer are as far below his, as earth is below heaven. His was the truly Christian choice; the lot in which is to be found the least of that which selfish nature covets, and the most of what it shrinks from. His kingdom was of a better world. He died a martyr after living an apostle."—"The Panopticon; or the Inspection (a System of Prison Discipline)." By Jeremy Bentham.

## The Essayist.

---

### THE POETRY OF JOHN HENRY NEWMAN.

#### "THE DREAM OF GERONTIUS."

*(Continued from p. 382.)*

WE give the following analysis of "The Dream of Gerontius," from the pen of the present Professor of Poetry in the University of Oxford:—"Gerontius" is a religious drama which describes a dying Catholic, not apparently a man of any special or exceptional holiness, but one who has struggled worthily through a long series of years, and is now before the gates of death. He still is, as he ever has been, a dutiful and pious son of his mother Church; but his senses are shaken by pain, and by his human terror of the grave; his senses, moreover, half spiritualized as the strength of the flesh ebbs away from them, detect on the air around and in the soul within, hostile and malignant emanations bent to poison his latest breathings, and to beat down that sacred hope which falters more and more as it approaches its fulfilment. Still he is supported against these unseen enemies by faith; and when his earthly destiny has accomplished itself, departs in peace. Immediately he finds that he is borne along by some protecting power, through sneering demons and sympathizing angels, up to the Throne of Judgment itself. The dramatic element is made up of a colloquy between him and this glorious creature to whom he has been entrusted. In order, however, to make head against the monotony which would ensue if this were all, the dialogue, as it proceeds, is from time to time relieved by the choral hymns of the seraphs whom they pass, interrupted by the malevolent utterances howled at them by demons who would fain impede their progress; and solemnly closes with a lyrical valediction sung by that immortal guide over the awe-stricken soul; which then is left, after having been at once cheered and blasted by a single glimpse of the Most High, to cleanse itself from those disfiguring stains which forbid its immediate entrance into heaven. Of the doctrines involved in this striking production it is unnecessary to say more than that there is nothing except the bare idea of Purgatory (a theological and not a poetical blemish), which need prevent any Christian, or, indeed, any

one who believes in the providence of God, from valuing it according to its deserts.\* It is built mainly upon those noble foundations which were laid eighteen hundred years ago, and which are still the common inheritance of Christendom, the common centre of our European civilization."†

Let us now proceed to examine the poem in detail. As a picture of vague, shadowy, overwhelming horror, nothing can be more finely conceived than the opening scene. Gerontius is there introduced awaiting in fearful and anguished expectancy, the coming of man's last inevitable foe:—

"Jesu ! Maria !—I am near to death,  
 And Thou art calling me ; I know it now.  
 Not by the token of this faltering breath,  
 This chill at heart, this dampness on my brow,  
 (Jesu, have mercy ! Mary pray for me !)  
 'Tis this new feeling, never felt before,  
 (Be with me, Lord, in my extremity !)  
 That I am going, that I am no more.  
 'Tis this strange innermost abandonment,  
 (Lover of souls ! Great God ! I look to Thee)  
 This emptying out of each constituent  
 And natural force, by which I come to be.  
 Pray for me, O my friends ! a visitant  
 Is knocking his dire summons at my door,  
 The like of whom, to scare me and to daunt,  
 Has never, never come to me before ; 'tis he !  
 'Tis death,—O loving friends, your prayers !  
 . . . . As though my very being had given way,  
 As though I were no more a substance now,  
 And could fall back on nought to be my stay,

---

\* "To appreciate the poetic beauty and the surprising imaginative power of this short drama, it is not at all necessary to accept the distinctively Roman doctrine on Purgatory ; and, saving a few occasional expressions, and setting aside the grotesque and gratuitous machinery of 'demons,' I suspect that in substance this 'Dream' only puts into shape the conviction of innumerable men and women who are as fervently Protestant as can be conceived, but who find in some such belief as is here embodied the only possible solution of the mystery of life and death. And the same may be said of the whole volume (of Dr. Newman's Poetry) itself. It is only occasionally Roman, or even Athanasian. Everywhere else it is simply the expression of thoughts and emotions common alike to Anglican and Roman ; to Jew, to Christian, and to Hindoo. Only the Mahomedan, looking forward to a sensual Paradise, would find little or nothing in common between Dr. Newman and himself."—*J. M. Capes*, in "*Fortnightly Review*," March 1, 1868.

† "Lectures on Poetry," by Sir F. H. Doyle.



(Help, loving Lord! Thou my sole Refuge, Thou,)
 And turn no whither, but must needs decay  
 And drop from out this universal frame  
 Into that shapeless, scopeless, blank abyss,  
 That utter nothingness, of which I came;  
 This is it that has come to pass in me:  
 Oh horror! this it is, my dearest, this;  
 So pray for me, my friends, who have not strength to pray."

The "assistants" ministering around the bed then offer up their prayers for the dying, according to the prescribed Roman formulary. Gerontius himself, also, during the brief interval of calm that succeeds this inward wrack and tempest, prays fervently and recites his creed; thereafter he exclaims:—

"Rouse thee, my fainting soul, and play the man;  
 And through such waning span  
 Of life and thought as still has to be trod,  
 Prepare to meet thy God.  
 And while the storm of that bewilderment  
 Is for a season spent,  
 And ere afresh the ruin on me fall,  
 Use well the interval."

Then again, his prayers and confession of faith scarce ended, the agony with redoubled force seizes upon him, the mental horror of annihilation, as at the first, being now aggravated by physical sensations of the most appalling nature, and by apparitions in baleful guise:—

"I can no more; for now it comes again,  
 That sense of ruin which is worse than pain,  
 That masterful negation and collapse  
 Of all that makes me man; as though I beat  
     Over the dizzy brink  
     Of some sheer infinite descent;  
     Or worse, as though  
 Down, down for ever I was falling through  
 The solid framework of created things,  
 And needs must sink and sink  
 Into the vast abyss. And, crueller still,  
 A fierce and restless fright begins to fill  
 The mansion of my soul. And, worse and worse,  
 Some bodily form of ill  
 Floats on the wind, with many a loathsome curse  
 Tainting the hallowed air, and laughs, and flaps  
 Its hideous wings,  
 And makes me wild with horror and dismay.  
 O Jesu, help! pray for me, Mary, pray!  
 Some angel, Jesu; such as came to Thee

In Thine own agony . . .  
 Mary, pray for me! Joseph, pray for me!  
 Mary, pray for me!"\*

The "assistants" pray and intercede again, recounting the deliverances wrought by God for His suffering saints of old, as related in the Scriptures. Finally, Gerontius, worn out with the long-protracted agony, calmly resigns his soul into the hands of his Maker. In faint and broken accents he murmurs,—

"*Novissima hora est*: and I fain would sleep.  
 The pain has wearied me. . . . Into Thy hands,  
 O Lord, into Thy hands" . . .

And so with this last act of resigned faith, he departs. Amid the deep stillness that now reigns after that stormy death-bed scene, the voice of the priest is heard toning forth the solemn words, "*Proficiscere, anima Christiana, de hoc mundo*;" the sentence beginning that sublime prayer with which the Church of Rome commends the departing soul to its creating, redeeming, and sanctifying God, which bids it speed upon its way "unto Mount Zion, unto the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem; and to an innumerable company of angels; to the general assembly and church of the firstborn, whose names are written in heaven." The prayer is ended; "the bitterness of death is past," and hereupon the second and most original part of the poem commences. Gerontius again appears upon the scene, waking up suddenly, as from a trance, in the disembodied state; in awe and wonderment at the change which has come over him; a change, the stupendous nature of which, scarce realized at the moment, begins slowly to dawn upon his intelligence, not as yet wholly freed from the dominion of the world of sense, but still vaguely haunted by certain material impressions derived from that world, so long the sphere of its exercise, impressions lingering on in the memory and consciousness even after the stroke of death! The soliloquy in which Gerontius indulges on finding himself, as he believes at first, all alone in the vast, myste-

\* The whole death-scene of Gerontius, as here depicted, bears, we may remark, a strikingly suggestive resemblance, as regards its primary conception, to the picture drawn in the apocryphal gospels of the death-scene of "Joseph the Just," the husband of Mary, who is there in like manner represented as overwhelmed with dread and anguish in his last hour.

rious region of infinity, is in our estimation the finest and most striking conception in the whole poem ; bringing out most fully, as it does, Dr. Newman's peculiar power as the daring and subtle speculator, no less than as the man of high poetic imagination. In regard to this soliloquy of Gerontius, thus commanding, a disembodied soul, with his own awful personality, the Oxford Professor of Poetry remarks :—

"The whole of this speech is so real and so plausible, that we accept it at once as the natural continuation of his earthly career, and seem to feel with him that his actual position, however new and previously unimagined, has nothing in it to awaken either surprise or confusion."

"I went to sleep, and now I am refresh'd—  
A strange refreshment, for I feel in me  
An inexpressive lightness, and a sense  
Of freedom, as I were at length myself,  
And ne'er had been before. How still it is!  
I hear no more the busy beat of time—  
No, nor my fluttering breath, nor struggling pulse ;  
Nor does one moment differ from the next.  
I had a dream ; yes, some one softly said,  
'He's gone,' and then a sigh went round the room ;  
And then I surely heard a priestly voice  
Cry '*Subvenite* ;' and they knelt in prayer ;  
I seem to hear them still ; but thin and low,  
And fainter and more faint the accents come,  
As at an ever-widening interval.  
Ah ! whence is this ? What is this severance ?  
This silence pours a solitariness  
Into the very essence of my soul ;  
And the deep rest, so soothing and so sweet,  
Hath something too of sternness and of pain ;  
For it drives back my thoughts upon their spring  
By a strange introversion ; and perforce  
I now begin to feed upon myself,  
Because I have nought else to feed upon.

"Am I alive or dead ? I am not dead,  
But in the body still ; for I possess  
A sort of confidence, which clings to me.  
That each particular organ \* holds its place

---

\* This theory of a latent semi-consciousness in the case here supposed, Dr. Newman afterwards proceeds to support and illustrate analogically by the example of a notable physical phenomenon, as in the passage where the angel asks Gerontius,—

"Hast thou not heard of those who after loss  
Of hand or foot still cried that they had pains  
In hand or foot, as though they had it still ?"

As heretofore, combining with the rest  
 Into one symmetry, that warps me round  
 And makes me man; and surely I could move,  
 Did I but will it, every part of me:  
 And yet I cannot to my sense bring home,  
 By very trial, that I have the power.  
 'Tis strange; I cannot stir a hand or foot,  
 I cannot make my fingers or my lips  
 By mutual pressure witness each to each,  
 Nor by the eyelid's instantaneous stroke  
 Assure myself I have a body still.  
 Nor do I know my very attitude,  
 Nor if I stand, or lie, or sit, or kneel."

Even while in the act of uttering this soliloquy, Gerontius waken to the perception that he is not alone, but is held fast in the embrace of his guardian-angel, by whom he is borne at lightning speed straight upward to the throne of Judgment; amid the harmonious hymning of the heavenly choirs, with their triumphant hallelujahs heralding the way, and the harsh, hellish howling of demons, storming in impotent rage and malice at being balked of their looked and longed for prey—the soul now delivered for ever from all the wiles and machinations of the powers of darkness. The fiendish outcry, the "fierce hubbub,"† strikes upon the inward sense of Gerontius, to whom the angel thus explains the cause of the tumult:

---

And then goes on to explain,—

"So is it now with thee, who hast not lost  
 Thy hand or foot, but *all* which made up man.  
 So will it be until the joyous day  
 Of resurrection, when thou wilt regain  
 All thou hast lost, new-made and glorified."

\* "When the veil is rent and the prison doors are open at the presence of God's angel, the soul goes forth full of hope, sometimes with evidence, but always with certainty in the thing, and instantly it passes into the throngs of spirits, where angels meet it singing, and the devils flock with malicious and vile purposes, desiring to lead it away with them into their houses of sorrow; there they see things which they never saw, and hear voices which they never heard. There the devils charge them with many sins, and the angels remember that themselves rejoiced when they were repented of. Then the devils aggravate and describe all the circumstances of the sin, and add calumnies; and the angels bear the sword forward still, because their Lord doth answer for them. Then the devils rage and gnash their teeth; they see the soul chaste and pure, and they are

"We are now arrived  
 Close on the judgment court; that sullen howl  
 Is from the demons who assemble there.  
 It is the middle region, where of old  
 Satan appeared among the sons of God,  
 To cast his jibes and scoffs at holy Job.  
 So now his legions throng the vestibule,  
 Hungry and wild, to claim their property,  
 And gather souls for hell. Hist to their cry!"

To the wondering exclamation thereupon of Gerontius,—

"How sour and how uncouth a dissonance!"

the angel rejoins:—

"It is the restless panting of their being;  
 Like beasts of prey, who caged within their bars,  
 In a deep hideous purring have their life,  
 And an incessant pacing to and fro."

This demoniac chorus, with its hideous music, as onomatopœically represented by the jarring and jangling rhymes, is, in our opinion, the least admirable part of the poem, bordering, as it does, too closely on the grotesque, perchance even on the ludicrous, and degenerating at times into a coarseness\* and offensiveness of language little to be expected in the refined scholar and poet—though possibly such language may be justified to his own mind as the appropriate utterance of the characters represented. What, for instance, can be less worthy or to be expected of Dr. Newman than the following?

"The mind bold  
 And independent,  
 The purpose free,  
 So we are told,

Must not think  
 To have the ascendant.  
 What's a saint?  
 One whose breath

named; they see it penitent, and they despair; they perceive that the tongue was restrained and sanctified, and then hold their peace. Then the soul passes forth and rejoices, passing by the devils in scorn and triumph, being securely carried into the bosom of the Lord, where they shall rest till their crowns are finished, and their mansions are prepared; and then they shall feast and sing, rejoice and worship, for ever and ever."—(*Bishop Jeremy Taylor, "Holy Dying."*)

\* "The songs of the demons are yet more coarse than blasphemous; and remind us somewhat in style and spirit of those parts of "*Paradise Lost*" in which Milton has so far degraded his majesty, and lowered his genius, as to put coarse witticisms and low slang into the mouth of the rebel angels."—*London Quarterly Review*, July, 1868, "*Newman's Poems.*"

Doth the air taint  
 Before his death ;  
 A bundle of bones  
 Which fools adore,  
     Ha ! ha !  
 When life is o'er ;  
 Which rattle and stink,  
 E'en in the flesh.  
 We cry his pardon !  
 No flesh hath he ;  
     Ha ! ha !  
 For it hath died,  
 'Tis crucified

Day by day,  
 Afresh, afresh,  
     Ha ! ha !  
 And such fadge,  
 As priestlings prate,  
 Is his guerdon,  
     Ha ! ha !  
 Before the Judge,  
 And pleads and atones  
 For spite and grudge,  
 And bigot mood,  
 And envy and hate,  
 And greed of blood."

The repulsiveness, however, of these diabolical creations of the poet's fancy is redeemed by the passage wherein the guardian angel explains to Gerontius why the hellish outcries by which they are assailed are now ineffective and contemptible—a passage finely conceived and vigorously expressed :—

" In thy trial state  
 Thou hadst a traitor nestling close at home,  
 Connatural, who with the powers of hell  
 Was leagued, and of thy senses kept the keys,  
 And to that deadliest foe unlocked thy heart.  
 And therefore is it, in respect of man,  
 Those fallen ones show so majestic.  
 But when some child of grace, angel or saint,  
 Pure and upright in his integrity  
 Of nature, meets the demons on their raid,  
 They scud away as cowards from the fight.  
 Yea, oft hath holy hermit in his cell,  
 Not yet disburdened of mortality,  
 Mocked at their threats and warlike overtures ;  
 Or dying, when they swarmed like flies,  
 Defied them, and departed to his Judge."

In striking contrast to the demoniac howling is the angelic hymning, and here, with all due deference to so high an authority, we cannot, we confess, agree with the judgment of the Oxford professor of poetry, who finds little or no poetic merit therein.

\* A Latinism. Cf. Horace, " Odes," book i., 22 :

" *Integer vitæ scelerisque purus.*"

Milton, " Paradise Lost," book ix., 292 :—

" *From sin and blame entire.*"

(To be continued.)

## The Reviewer.

---

*The Fuller Worthies' Library.* Edited by the Rev. ALEXANDER BALLOCH GROSART, Blackburn. (*Printed for private circulation only.*) II. *The Poems of Thomas Washbourne, D.D.* With Memorial-Introduction and Notes.

"THE Fuller Worthies' Library" consists of rare works of intrinsic worth and interest, privately printed, and strictly limited in their issue, carefully and worthily edited, with introductions combining biographical research and informing criticism, all done as "a labour of love," and not for the general market. This fact gives, of course, the turn our review-notice is to take. We wish to describe the works, to note their worth, to give some idea of their authors, to snatch here and there a good thing out of the editor's prefaces, and by a specimen of what they contain, supply just such an amount of information as might be got by having a peep into the books for a night, in a friend's study, when the talk was going round about the rarities it contained. Slight as they may be, they may take the reader into districts of literature he may not readily be able to visit; and they will afford a knowledge of facts in letters not within everybody's reach. A chance-occurring copy of Washbourne's "Divine Poems," has almost always been readily picked up by bibliophiliasts of the right sort, at prices varying from two to three guineas, because they are full of quaint touches and tender fancies, melody of phrase and felicity of epithet, and a fresh, rich substantiveness of thought. Mr. Grosart, in his reprints, has put these songs of Zion, sung in Charles's time, within reach of 100 subscribers to his quarto edition, and of 150 to those of his small paper copy; and has opened up an opportunity to readers and lovers of sacred poetry, to give the memory of the singer the recognition of which it is worthy. Our notice cannot add to the number of the copies procurable, but it may add to the reader's acquaintance with the history of the literature of his country, and bring

before him an addition to the holy lyrics of our land. Even, therefore, though they should never purchase, procure, or see these poems in their substantive form as a volume, they will owe to Mr. Grosart's kindly-affectioned sympathy with letters all they may learn regarding him, or peruse of his poems here.

Thomas Washbourne, D.D., son of John Washbourne, Esq., of Wychenford Court, Worcestershire, and Elinor Lygon, of Madresfield, was born 1606. He was probably educated at the free school, Worcester, and went thence to Baliol College, Oxford. He took his degrees B.A. 1625, M.A. 1628, and B.D. 1636. In 1640 he became rector of Dumbleton, in Gloucestershire; in 1643 he was presented, by Charles I. it is said, to a prebendaryship in Gloucester cathedral, but was kept out of possession for some time, and was presented to it again in 1660, in which year he was created D.D., and became vicar of the mother-church in Gloucester, St. Mary de Lode's, which he held till 1668.

Dr. Washbourne married a daughter of the celebrated Dr. Fell, the dean of Christ Church, who became the mother of many children to the royalist preacher-poet,—for royalist he was. As the editor says, "The 'Divine Poems' reveal that Dr. Thomas Washbourne was out-and-out a royalist and a churchman. His was the fine loyalty to principle that transfigured the monarch with its radiance, and made sacred the man in the king. He was none of your hungry, greedy, self-seeking abjects who crawled to the foot of the throne on the Restoration, and magnified their own deserts at the cost of truer, if less loud men." In 1650 he submitted to Isaac Walton's "Bishop Sanderson" a case of conscience, as to whether he might subscribe the "New Engagement," which he was required to do, or risk the resignation of his living—"the main subsistence" of his "family, a wife, and five or six small children." He signed the engagement apparently, and remained at Dumbleton. In 1654 he issued "Divine Poems," written by Thomas Washbourne, B.D., not from "any itching to be in print," "but a very jealous affection to be doing good," "in the hope that the reading of them may make some pious impressions." He is no pretender to extraordinary "gifts of the Spirit;" "yet he is modestly confident that as these, his meditation, now running in verse, streamed for the most part from the sanctuary, the fountain of the sacred Scriptures, so, in some measure, they derive a tincture from these holy waters:" and "he believes they will not displease the charitable and the



conscientious Christian." In 1655 he printed a "Funeral Sermon," preached on the death of Charles Cocks, Esq., a member of the family to whom he owed the living at Dumbleton. In 1661 he published a Sermon "preached at the cathedral church of Gloucester, May 29th, 1661, being the anniversary of His Majesty's birthday" and restoration; it is entitled "The Repairer of the Breach." Dr. Washbourne died 6th May, 1687, aged 80.

The following extract contains the summing up, by the editor, of the estimate of his life and works, from the closing pages of the "Memorial introduction."

"A shadow lay across his life: a soft, tender melancholy touched his 'spirit.' Fallen on 'evil days,' he shrank from, not faced or wrestled with, difficulty. He was stronger on his knees than on his feet. It was meet that it should be so: for . . .

" 'Times so dire,  
Bent knees, not lifted arms, require.'

"He was superbly true to 'the king' as he 'feared God.' That he was penetrative enough to discern the sham loyalty of many of his associates, his 'Epistle Dedicatory' shows; none the less did he abide faithful. And yet you do not come on him among the 'intriguers' of the palace: you do not find even the 'gossip' of the day bandying his name: you do not hear his voice in the clash and clangour of ecclesiastico-political controversy: you look in vain for 'Thomas Washbourne,' on any of the old, venal, sycophantic pamphlets on 'Divine rights' of kings to 'govern wrong.' He looks to me as fine a specimen of the class royalist as you meet with.

" 'Constant as the northern star,  
Of whose true-fixed and resting quality,  
There is no fellow in the firmament.'

"It only remains to say of the 'Divine Poems,' now happily reprinted, that while it were absurd to claim for them the highest inspiration of the true 'Makar,' the ineffable light of the poetic faculty, whereby the highest things are glorified—they yet deserve recognition and acceptance as a small but definite and actual addition to the treasury of England's sacred verse. The careful and loving student will come on quaint touches and tender-coloured fancies, and occasional melody of wording, and felicity of epithet, that remind of 'The Silurist,' and place Washbourne in a niche with the 'singers' of 'The Temple' and 'The Synagogue.'"

This extract taken alone, eloquent though it is, however, would

but ill show the point of view from which the Editor looks. We must glance back for this to the opening sentences, so finely generous in tone, so exquisitely touched with Elizabethaniam, and bring these before the reader, who, on perusing them, will surely greet Mr. Grosart with loud thanks.

"If it be true—and few who really know the facts will be found to dispute it—that many generations had to pass before either biographic justice or historic recognition was rendered to the mighty and true men of the Commonwealth of England—who were as really as 'of old' the 'sword of God' for stern and terrible work—equally must it be admitted, that names of kindred greatness and venerableness and trueness, on 'the other side,' have partaken of the tarnish and the shame indelibly belonging to that sorrowful period of the Restoration of 1660. It is well that at this "later day' . . .

'When time hath furled

The skirts of mist, and to our vision cleared,  
In luminous distinction, all unsphered,  
The adverse circles of the church and world.'

The foremost thinkers and writers, irrespective of party, have come to recognize what of brain-power and heart-worth were on either side: and to concede to each the usual mixture of lo'ty and mean, pure and stained, single-eyed and self-seeking. 'Puritan'—applied earlier and later—has long been emptied of its scorn and cleansed of its opprobrium; and, in turn, the generalization of 'the royalists' no longer hides from us that there were within their ranks, in State and Church, men,—ay, and women—if 'lady' were more honouring I should give it freely, of fine patriotism, and beautiful allegiance to conviction and peerless integrity, and heroic self-sacrifice:—

'Who dreamed of honour, and had heart to die,  
For their own brave and glorious dream.'

"That they loved 'not wisely' but 'too well'—that the objects of their splendid loyalty were false and so base, than ever heathen knee bowed to—abates nothing of our homage, if it thrill to wonder and deepen our sorrow."

Of the "Divine Poems" we shall now quote the under-given specimens, founded on Isaiah lvii. 15, and on Malachi iii. 17 respec-

tively. These will show how this sacred singer drew from the fountain of Scripture as from wells of living water, springing up unto everlasting life.

**"God's Two DWELLINGS.**

"Lord, Thou hast told us that there be,  
Two dwellings which belong to Thee,  
And those two—that's the wonder—  
Are far asunder.

"The one the highest heaven is,  
The mansions of eternal bliss;  
The other's the contrite  
And humble sprite.

"Not like the princes of the earth,  
Who think it much below their birth,  
To come within the door  
Of people poor.

"No, such is thy humility,  
That though Thy dwelling be on high,  
'Thou dost Thyself abase  
To the lowest place.

"Where ere Thou seest a sinful soul  
Deploring his offences foul,  
To him Thou wilt descend,  
And be his friend.

"Thou wilt come in, and with him sup,  
And from a low state raise him up,  
Till Thou hast made him eat  
Blest angel's meat.

"Thus Thou wilt him with honour crown,  
Who in himself is first cast down,  
And humbled for his sins,  
That Thy love wins.

"*Though Heaven be high the gate is low,  
And he that comes in there must bow.*  
The lofty looks shall ne'er  
Have entrance there.

"O God, since Thou delight'st to rest  
In the humble contrite breast.  
First make me so to be,  
Then dwell with me."

## "GOD'S JEWELS.

"You that of Godliness do make mock,  
 And those that are religious, jeere,  
 As if they were your laughing-stock,  
 Know that ere long God will appear  
 To judge this wicked world ; and then  
 They will be found to be the only men.

"Though now you tread them underneath your feet,  
 And no more reckoning of them make.  
 Than of the dust that's in the street,  
 The time shall come when God will take  
 Them, for His richest jewels, and  
*Prize them, as t'were the signet on's right hand.*

"Yea, to your shame and wonder He will raise  
 The value of them above all  
 That ye can think is worthy praise,  
 Or whatsoe'er thou precious call :  
*Gold is but drosse, pearls pebbles are*  
*To what they shall be : there is no compare.*

"How can it be otherwise when they  
 Derive their luster from His face?  
 Not Sol himself shines at midday  
 With so illustrious a grace!  
 For every grace which they have here  
 Shal be a glory in the highest sphere.

"I care not then how I am vilified,  
 Or what the world doth make of me ;  
 Let men at pleasure me deride,  
 So that I may God's jewel be :  
 For though I now am trampled down,  
 Hee'll make me up a *diamond in His crown.*"

"TO THE COMMON DRUNKARD, FALSELY CALLED A GOOD  
 FELLOW.

"Cannot friends meet but they must drink t' excess?  
 Must all your mirth conclude in drunkenness?  
 Accurst be he brought it in fashion first,  
 Before you were content to quench your thirst,  
 And not exceed three or four cups at most ;  
 Now you carouse till all your reason's lost,  
 And like to over-heated Dutchmen, yee  
 Drink till ye fight, and fall to *snicker-snee.*"

---

\* *Snicker-snee* means a combat with small knives ; it is a sort of Dutchified phrase for cut and thrust. From the Dutch we derived a large proportion of our drinking-terms. In Tom Nash's "*Pierce Penniless*" it is said "*Superfluity in drink is a sin that ever since we have mixed ourselves with the Low Countries is counted honourable.*" The reader may see this fertile topic illustrated in a paper entitled "*The Old Dramatists on Drink,*" in *Meliora*, April, 1867.

He that invites his friend t'a drunken feast  
 Keeps out the man and entertains the beast :  
 A feast 'tis not, but a base Bacchanal,  
 Where the beast, man a sacrifice doth fall  
 Worse than a beast he is, for no beast will  
 Be made to drink a drop more than his fill ;  
 But man his belly makes a tun, his brain  
 A bog, and drinks till up he comes again,  
 Vile man, whom God next t'angels did create,  
 Below a Bruit thus degenerate !  
 For shame, give o'er this unmanlike sin,  
 Which too long hath thy daily practise bin ;  
 Redeem thine honor drowned in ale and wine,  
 And thy soul settled on the lees refine ;  
 When thy debauched life thou shalt correct,  
 Thou happier daies in England maist expect.

---

## The Topic.

---

### HAVE THE MINISTRY RIGHTLY EMPLOYED THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE IN THE ABOLITION OF PURCHASE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE.

PUTTING aside the question of politics, Liberal or Conservative, and looking at the matter fairly, I say that, in my judgment, the step taken by the Ministry was not only right, according to the ordinary meaning of that term, but quite justifiable ; and, as one of the public, I highly approve of the conduct of the Ministry under the circumstances. The House of Commons having approved of the abolition of purchase by passing the Bill in its original shape, the House of Lords ought to, as I think, have, as a matter of course, approved of the scheme, as one to which their consent was asked more on the ground of etiquette than absolute necessity. Besides, the House of Lords ought, as it appears to me, to have known the power which the Ministry possessed of employing the Royal prerogative if necessary ; for, no doubt, it was

their want of that knowledge which induced them to act as they did in rejecting the measure, and thus of assuming a power which it afterwards turned out was useless. I have well thought about this, and can come to no other conclusion. There will, however, be writers on the negative side of this topic, whose opinions I shall be glad to read.—  
 R. D. ROBERT.

The Royal Prerogative has not been unjustly employed in the case of the Abolition of Purchase. It has been used to do nothing new. It has only reproclaimed the supremacy of law over bad custom. Purchase in the army is illegal ; has always been so. However much it may have been winked at, even connived at by persons of position, the act was a violation of the law. The Royal Prerogative has merely been used to reiterate and rehearse the law, to announce its obligations,

and the determination of the Crown to see that the law should no longer be allowed to remain a dead letter to the detriment of public business. The House of Commons was not really asked to abolish purchase, but to condone the offence of purchase, and to provide that those who had acted on the custom of purchase without personal sense of its illegality, should suffer no pecuniary loss. They were asked, in short, to provide ways and means for the exercise of the Royal Prerogative without undue hurt, to present holders of what might be called the nominally transferable stock of the army. Even though the Act had passed both Houses, the Royal Prerogative would have been necessary to give effect to so much of the Act as implied the abolition of purchase. It could not have been dispensed with, for the Sovereign is the chief of the armed force of the country.—P. G.

#### NEGATIVE.

Very far from it. Sovereignty in our day has been gradually declining into a glittering cipher before the prominent figures among the factors of the State; and this audacious act of bringing forward a nullity as an entity, and galvanizing into a sudden spasm of political energy the Prerogative of the Crown, was one of a most reprehensible kind in a minister; for either 1st, it was betraying the country by evoking the superiority of the Crown to Parliament and the nation; or 2nd, it was bringing the Crown into jeopardy by causing invidious comparisons to be instituted between this and other occasions on which the Royal Prerogative might have been exercised, or by exciting the jealousy of the nation against the exercise of a long disused power at a time when it might be used as a dangerous precedent for the personal action of the Crown in politics. It had also the

appearance of a political trick—an underhand proceeding; as if the Ministry had said, If Parliament wills the abolition of purchase, our scheme will carry; but if Parliament does not will it, still our scheme will carry either way; "will ye, nill ye," the Cabinet shall not be frustrated. As a high exercise of political tyranny, the action of the Ministry ought to be condemned, and as a low exercise of political trickery, it ought to be condemned, not condoned. The reputation of our Ministers ought to be such that trick and tyranny ought to be unfeared for from them.—S. J. D.

This affair of the Royal Prerogative has been sadly mismanaged. On the best view I can form of the proper course of procedure I should say that, on the rejection of the Bill by the Lords it ought to have been proposed in the Commons, "That seeing the custom of purchase in the army which, though originally and even yet illegal, has grown into a use and wont prejudicial to the interests of the Crown, the members of the House of Commons do consider it advisable, and do hereby recommend, that a Royal Proclamation of the law as it at present exists should be made, that all acts of purchase should be hereafter declared to be null and void, and an offence against the Crown; and this House pledges itself, on effect being given to this its recommendation, to make such provision as is just and reasonable for the relief of those who may be exposed to loss or injury by the step taken." Had this been done, and the House had carried the motion, the action of the Cabinet would have been brought into conformity with the constitution. As it is, the country, because the exercise of the prerogative thus has enabled it to gain its ends, applauds the deed; but a similar use might be made of this old-fashioned prerogative.

tive for ends not in conformity with the wishes of the country, and then we should have reason to repent

our gladness at the resurrection of this prerogative of Sovereignty.—D. R.

## The Inquirer.

### QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

954. Which are the four books which have been described as "the four most influential books of modern times?"—S. S.

955. Which is "the most influential newspaper in Scotland?"—S. S.

### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

955. The *Scotsman*, established in 1817 by Charles MacLaren, one of Scotland's many self-taught heroes

in the toil of thought, who edited the paper, with the exception of two years when it was under the management of J. R. MacCulloch, the shrewd political economist of Galloway, for thirty years. Thereafter the editorship was passed on to Alexander Russell, the ablest of Scotland's politicians. The best sub-editing probably of any paper in the country is supplied to it by W. R. Findlay. P. H.

## Literary Notes.

There is in the press to be issued in October, an interesting work, "Anthropology, or Science of Man," by Charles Bray (of whom a Memoir appeared in the *British Connoisseur*, October, 1867.)

"A Glossary of Ecclesiastical Terms," by the Rev. Orby Shipley, is in preparation.

John Milton's copy of Benediot's edition of "Pindar," published 1620, bought by him in 1629 and diligently annotated, indexed, &c., during 1680, when Cambridge University was dismissed on account of the plague, has been recently sold. When are we likely to hear of his first folio of Shakspeare, that which

he had been reading just before he took up this Pindar, which brought £41?

A catalogue of 10,000 Educational Works has been published.

A Sketch of English Literature for Schools, by Prof. Henry Morley, is announced for November.

"Anthropometry" is the title of a new work on Man, issued by A. Quetelet, the Belgian statistician.

"A Life of St. Chrysostom: a Sketch of the Church and the Empire in the Fourth Century," by the Rev. W. R. W. Stephens, is about to be published.

Lieut.-Col. Francis Cunningham, editor of "Massinger" and "Mar-

lowe," has in the press three volumes of a handbook for London, an enlargement and continuation of the well-known book by the late Mr. Peter Cunningham.

Earl Russell is about to publish "A Sketch of our Military Power during Three Centuries, 1570—1870.

A Memoir on Bernardino Telesio, and the Cosentine Academy and the reform of natural science, is in the press, by Prof. Francisco Fiorentino, of Florence.

"Papers on Electricity" are in preparation, being selections from the contributions of Sir William Thomson, D.C.L. It is announced that a "Life of George Grote" will shortly appear.

Scotland is about to test its literary calibre again by issuing the *St. James's Magazine*, in celebration of the Scott Centenary, of which No. 1 will contain a record.

The Government of Bavaria have issued eight volumes of "A History of Science," and yet another dozen are in preparation.

A new volume of poems, by Jas. Ballantyne, author of "The Gabelunzie's Wallet," and the biographer of Roberts, the artist, is in the press.

A reprint of a review of "The Life of John Wesley," with a new introduction by the author, Count C. F. M. de Remusat, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in France, is to be issued by the Wesleyan Book-room, from the *Revue des Deux Mondes*.

"A History of Jerusalem," from the days of Herod until now, by Walter Besant and E. H. Palmer, is among the promised fruit.

Canon Kingsley's "Poems," revised and enlarged, are in the press.

Deutsch von Benno Tschischwitz has sought to rival Bodenstadt and Gildemeister by the issue of a German translation of "Shakspeare's Sonnets."

"Historical Essays," from the magazines, by B. A. Freeman, are reprinting.

A complete uniform edition—including unpublished MSS.—of Hawthorne's works is in preparation.

A. C. Swinburne has in the printer's hands a classical novel.

"A Dictionary of Typography and its Accessory Arts" will soon be published.

Readers of our recent articles on the "Metaphysics of Theism" may like to pursue the theme in an able paper, contributed by the Rev. W. Knight, of Dundee, to the *British Quarterly Review*.

M. Edwin Tross, of Paris, has just published the first part of a very interesting collection of Huguenot songs of the sixteenth century, between 1525 and 1597, edited by M. Henri Bordier, and prove the existence of a really fine and vigorous school of Protestant religious poetry in France.

Dr. Thomas Nicholas has in the press a volume on the "Annals and Antiquities of the Counties and Families of Wales," with illustrations of the castles, &c.

A work on Mary Stuart, of Scotland, by Professor Petit, of Beauvais, is nearly ready. It is intended to prove a complete justification of the Queen. M. Charles de Flandre, of Edinburgh, is translating it.

George Grote on "Aristotle" will be seen through the press just as he left it by Prof. Alex. Bain.

"Centenarians" is the subject of a work by W. J. Mans, now nearly ready.

E. F. Hughes, of Portland, Victoria, Australia, has written an epic poem on "The Millennium," in ten books.

The works of Thomas Love Peacock, author of "Headlong Hall," "Crochet Castle," &c., are to be republished under the editorship of Lord Houghton and Mr. Cole, C.B.



## Modern Metaphysicians.

---

GEORGE BERKELEY, D.D., BISHOP OF CLOYNE.

### *Ideal Realism.*

"Ancient learning, exact science, polished society, modern literature, and the fine arts, contributed to adorn and enrich the mind of this accomplished man. All his contemporaries agreed with the Satirist [Pope] in ascribing—

"'To Berkeley every virtue under Heaven.'"

*Sir James Mackintosh.*

"TRUTH is not to be vindicated or attained by repressing any of the elements of the philosophical spirit—its candour—its doubt in order that it may know—its faith and many doubts—and its deep conviction of the metaphysical ignorance that underlies all our practical knowledge. Faith and patience are needed amid the variety and discord which are the natural issues of all inquiry by intelligent beings who are in the circumstances and endowed with the limited faculties of man. This variety and discord necessarily accompany those approximations to truth, at opposite angles by individuals, which seem to be the divinely appointed means for its gradual disclosure to society. The orthodoxy that is true cannot lose, but must gain, by this trustful patience; and by a recognition of the plain historical fact that, in like manner as civil governments, recognising that the period of compulsory obedience to the rational instincts is of the past have gradually been relaxing their central authority over individuals, encouraging personal energy and the activity of voluntary associations, and supplying the conditions for their free development—so, an analogous gradual relaxation in the matters of opinion on which good and wise men

\* "The works of George Berkeley, D.D.," by A. C. Fraser. "The Life and Letters of George Berkeley, D.D.," by A. C. Fraser. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.

1871.

R

differ may be required, in the regulation of opinion on the part of those various communions of the Church Catholic, which seek to pervade with Christian life the active and educated mind of these times."

Professor Alex. C. Fraser in the foregoing quotation expresses a great and valuable verity. The advantages of free thought have never been more thoroughly borne witness to than in "The History of the Netherlands." There the principle of toleration, or rather the higher and nobler "right of private judgment," was first practically realized, so that Holland became, under the impulse of William the Silent, the nursery of intellectual freedom in Europe. Hence it was honoured by being the birth-place of modern philosophic thought—that thought on whose early pages are written the names of Descartes, Spinoza, and Bayle. We quote from Professor Fraser the following epitome of the progress of metaphysical speculation from the time of Descartes to the days of Berkeley :—

"That same country of Holland, afterwards the refuge of Locke and Bayle, was, about the very time of Spinoza's birth in 1632, the retreat of Rene Descartes, the son of a gentleman of Tourraine, and heir of an easy fortune, who had quitted France and his friends in order that, without disturbance, he might meditate in the Netherlands on the deepest and truest meaning of this strange life in which he found himself. This votary of philosophy was a voluntary exile there, in the course of metaphysical speculation, for twenty years. The traditional studies of the universities in his youth had repelled Descartes from the old philosophy of the schools. He was dissatisfied with the common foundations of current opinion, and the common methods of constructing science. His mind revolted against authority. The spirit of the age was favourable to his project of conducting an intellectual reformation: and his 'Methode,' 'Meditations,' and 'Principia' were successively discharged upon the world, during the boyhood of Spinoza. They produced a profound sensation, and were the chief causes of the favourite modes of thought at the time when the young Jew was passing into manhood. There would be no end of illustrations if we were to mention all the instances of men, and women, too, in the seventeenth century, who were introduced to a new world by those revelations of his reflective discoveries, which Descartes issued from Holland. For instance, one of his books, soon after its appearance, fell into the hands of Nicole Malebranche, then a youth not known to himself or others for speculative genius, though he became the greatest intellectual light of France in the last part of that century. To Malebranche Descartes opened a

new world, awakening in him so great an enthusiasm that he was obliged, from time to time, to lay the book aside, on account of the nervous agitation and palpitation which it induced. Queen Christina of Sweden was another intellectual conquest of the illustrious Frenchman. She allured him from Holland to Stockholm that she might enjoy the light of his personal presence—a movement fatal to Descartes, whose constitution was unfitted for the cold air of Scandinavia, in which he died a few months after. It was under the influence of Descartes that Spinoza became absorbed in philosophical study, being charmed by the manner in which he claimed scientific insight, instead of blind deference to traditional authority, as the only ground for reasonable belief.

“M. Saisset finds the seeds of unconscious Spinozism in Descartes. The intrepid Frenchman, after denuding himself of all his beliefs except one—for the sake of intellectual discipline implied in doing so, and as the means of eliminating errors which had grown up in his education—professed to reconstruct his knowledge, by means of demonstration, in a system of necessary truth. Now, an intellectual construction by absolute demonstration must be a scheme of purely abstract notions manufactured by the mind out of its own resources, and is not a systematic apprehension of real facts. The relations of abstract notions only can be demonstrated; those of facts we are induced by probable reasons to believe. Cartesianism represented a shadowy universe—a universe of extension and thought, void of finite powers and substances, and was thus a scheme of fatalism in germ. It put the human mind on that weary, endless round of reflex demonstration, in which so many have since followed, always busy in fruitless toil. The agency of secondary causes, in things and persons, is hardly recognisable in the Cartesian manner of conceiving things, and an easy and almost inevitable step, M. Saisset would say, must conduct an ardent disciple of the French master to the conception of a universe consisting of only one substance and power.

“That step was virtually taken by his greatest disciple—Malebranche, who combined essential Spinozism in thought with deep mystical Christianity in heart. Malebranche could find no resting place for his beliefs, as long as the objects of consciousness were viewed either as representations emanating from without, or as merely transient states of consciousness within; and he sought by attributing ideas to God Himself, the ‘place of spirits,’ to find a sure ground for science. In this Divine Ideal or intellectual world, he seemed to himself to discern the true meaning of things; and his piety was gratified by the conviction, that in so doing he was holding communion with God, in complete abstraction from the misleading appearances of sense and imagination. It was in this way that reason and religion were reconciled by Malebranche. Deity, to whom all real causation is referred on his system, is thus revealed in the universal reason, and constitutes science. He anticipates Berkeley in his philosophical annihilation of matter,

and Spinoza in his resolution of all causes in the infinite. Science, with Malebranche, is seeing in God; willing is God acting in us. Many readers must recollect the tragical end of this great spiritual philosopher in France in 1715, Berkeley, then becoming famous for his system of immaterialism, which he had given to the world a few years before, visited Malebranche at Paris. He found the aged father in his cell, cooking in a pipkin a medicine for an inflammation of the lungs, from which he was suffering. The conversation naturally turned on the new system. The issue was fatal to poor Malebranche. In the heat of the debate he raised his voice so high, and gave way so freely to the 'natural impetuosity of a man of genius and a Frenchman,' that he brought on a violent increase of his disorder, which carried him off a few days after. . . . . The doctrine of the 'Ethics' is the scientific side of that eternal religion of love, which on its practical or devotional side, Spinoza traces in the 'Tractatus,' as a golden thread, all through the marvels of sense and imagination with which he thought he found it blended in the sacred books of the Jews and of Christians. Perennial religion is with him, simply love to God and man, and love to man through the love of God. . . . . The 'Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, in answer to Spinoza,' etc., by Dr. Samuel Clarke, is widely known among theological students. The theological thought of England at this time is to be found, in one of its phases, in that book, and in the remarkable 'Correspondence' of its author, at one time with the author of the 'Analogy,' and afterwards with Leibnitz; and in another phase, a few years later in the 'Analogy' itself, in the 'Divine Analogy' of Bishop Brown, and in the 'Dialogues' of Bishop Berkeley. . . . . The metaphysical philosophy of Bishop Berkeley is professedly a system of experimental theology, in which, by the elimination of the material world, as a secondary cause hypothetically assumed, without warrant from facts, the presence and agency of God is alleged to be brought as near to us as the presence and power of our fellow men. At the Berkeleyan point of view, we all find ourselves continually in the very presence of God, who gives reality to the world of sense, of which He is the cause and substance, and in a manner the soul; while we are not ourselves lost in Deity, as we seem to be, when we keep company with Spinoza, or even with Malebranche. We live and move and have our being with God, who is the animating spirit of matter, and whose mind and meaning are expressed throughout the cosmical order; but we are not ourselves essentially Divine. Berkeleyanism, in the deep intention of its author, is not the paradox of an idle hour, but a system of practical theological thought, professedly founded on common sense. In its largest view it is a science of religion, based on what its author supposed to be the true metaphysical interpretation of what we experience in sense."\*

\* *North British Review*, May, 1863, article "M. Sainet and Spinoza."

"Descartes produced his great philosophical writings soon after he was forty. Spinoza announced his philosophy still earlier, and died when he was forty. Hume's greatest work of speculation appeared when he was twenty-seven. Berkeley offered his philosophy at an earlier age than any of these. In fact his is the most extraordinary instance of original reflective precocity on record. Locke, in contrast with this, was hardly known as an author till he was almost sixty. Kant was almost the same age when he published the first of the three great critical works which contain his philosophy." Hobbes was nearly sixty when his "De Cive" was published, and Reid was considerably over fifty when his "Inquiry" appeared. Hegel, on the other hand, had laid the foundation of his system when he was thirty, and Dr. Thomas Brown's earliest book is characterized as "the perhaps unmatched work of a boy in the eighteenth year of his age." Hamilton's estimate of Cousin appeared in his forty-first year, and Fraser's critique on Leibnitz when he was twenty-seven. "The qualities of the precocious philosophers are obviously different from those of the others. If ardent, precocity has succeeded in burning its way more into the heart of things, the more tardy, phlegmatic, and sober are usually more attentive in their reasonings to the limitations and compromises of our human condition."

The biography of Bishop Berkeley, besides affording "a pleasant excursion into some of the dimly discernible society of that older time,—in Ireland, England, France, Italy, and America—in the days of William and Anne, and the first two Georges;" and being the narrative of one whose heart was noble and whose life was pure, introduces us to a thinker of notable influence in the progress of philosophy, not only in the excitement of Hume, and Reid, and Kant, but even in the stir of the first speculations in American metaphysics, through Dr. Samuel Johnson of Stratford, Connecticut, and Jonathan Edwards, and not at all wanting in power over the thinkers of our own time.

"The ingenious and acute metaphysical works of the late Professor Ferrier may be referred to as an example. . . . The strikingly candid speculations of the late Professor Grote of Cambridge, which contain some of the most interesting English contributions to the higher philosophy of this generation, have also a tendency to Berkeley's point of view. Dean Mansel's learned and closely reasoned works in philosophy, besides reviving metaphysical discussion in England, have occasionally approached the specula-

tion of Berkeley, bringing valuable critical light. The assiduous zeal and subtlety of Mr. Collins Simon, his book on "The Nature and Elements of the Material World," and his various essays since, have drawn attention to the subject, not only in these islands but also in Germany. Some chapters in Mr. J. S. Mill's "Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy," and passages in his other writings, show how much in the new conception of the sensible world is appreciated by a fair and able thinker of phenomenalist tendencies. Dr. J. H. Stirling, by directing reflection to fresh aspects of questions which Berkeley raised by implication, has prepared some for looking at the perennial philosophical problem with a fresh eye. Nor must Berkeley's own universality be forgotten, where philosophy is now cultivated by men who are not unworthy of its fame, and who, either as expositors or as adverse critics, have not forgotten its greatest name in metaphysics."

A competent authority says on this same topic:—

"It is needless to enumerate the number of English essays and books upon Berkeley and his philosophy which have recently appeared. It may not be so well known to our readers that Berkeley's doctrines are at present very widely discussed in Germany. A great deal of the discussion is doubtless due to the exertions of that fervid Berkeleian, Dr. T. Collins Simon, who according to a German critic, 'reist in Deutschland umher, um mit allen Mitteln des Worts und der Schrift, Propaganda für seinen Meister zu machen,' [endeavours on all sides in Germany, by all means of speech and script, to excite a propaganda for his master]; but the interest shown on the subject must rest on a deeper basis. Of German dissertations on Berkeley we have seen the following; M. Hoppe in Bergman's 'Zeitschrift,' v. Heft, 2, 1870; Frieherr, v. Reichlin-Meldegge, in Fichte's 'Zeitschrift,' lvi. Heft. 2, 1870; T. Collins Simon and H. Ulrici, in Fichte's 'Zeitschrift,' lvii. Heft. 1, and F. Friederich's 'Ueber Berkeley's Idealismus,' 1870. To these must be added, as the most important of all, Prof. F. Ueberweg's translation of Berkeley's 'Principles of Human Knowledge,' with a short preface and some very valuable notes, published in Heimann's cheap series of philosophical works, Berlin, 1869. The growing interest felt in Berkeley is also to be seen in the larger amount of space given to the criticisms of his doctrines in the more recent works on the history of philosophy, such as Freiherr v. Reichlin.—*Meldegge's Einleitung zur Philosophie, Wien, 1870.*"\*

Regarding the annotated translation into German of Berkeley's "Principles of Human Knowledge," by (alas, that we should have

\* *British Quarterly Review*, April, 1871. Article on "Professor Fraser's edition of Bishop Berkeley's Works," note, p. 485.

to say the late !) Dr. Friedrich Ueberweg, the learned historian of philosophy and Kant's successor in the chair at Konigsberg, we may state that it has not only had a wide circulation in Germany, but has also elicited a large amount of critical discussion in that country on the philosophy of the natural realism of the Irish philosopher. The issue of Dr. Fraser's edition of the complete works of Berkeley, accompanied by a careful and thorough biography, has already excited great interest in philosophical circles in this country and in America. It engaged some of the last days of Ueberweg. Ulrici has already given it a welcome, and there is great likelihood that it will occupy a considerable share of interest among the lovers of metaphysical speculation. On these and other grounds we think our readers will be glad to have some account of the philosopher, of his times, and of his writings.

"It is curious that a life so good and beautiful in its devotion to a few great designs, so powerful in modern thought, and every way so uncommon as Bishop Berkeley's, should have been allowed by his contemporaries to pass away without any tolerable interpretation or even record of it." It is almost as curious that after the lapse of nearly a century and a quarter, the professor of philosophy in a Scottish university should have been selected to meet, as far as it could be met, the want "which neglected opportunities have made it difficult, if not impossible, to supply," and should have acquitted himself in such a masterly manner of the arduous task; and that the delegates of the Clarendon Press at Oxford should have been the first to risk the issue of a complete edition of the works of the subtle philosophical Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin. Here is a rare union in the region of intelligence of the three universities in a good work—a literary intertwining of the shamrock, the rose, and the thistle, which is alike honourable to all the countries and universities concerned. Great credit is due to the Oxonian Syndics for their judgment and enterprise, and it would be difficult to praise sufficiently the painstaking perseverance, the indomitable persistency and thoroughness of the editor and biographer of the Plato of Ireland, who has read and written, and travelled in the elucidation of the great theme with a most praiseworthy and valuable diligence. If his great predecessor illustrated Reid and his writings, he, on his part, has given to Berkeley the fresh immortality of a copious biography, and to his philosophy a new lease of influence and popularity. An ingenious reader of

these two publications—containing as they do, memoirs, text, and annotations of epoch-making thinkers—might easily draw out comparisons and contrasts of much delicacy of equipoise, after the fashion of Dryden and Addison, or Jeffrey and Hallam. He might say that while Hamilton accepted Stewart's "Memoir of Reid," Fraser has given a fresh biography of Berkeley; that if the notes of Hamilton are more original and forth-reaching, those of Fraser are more expository and less ambitious; that if the references quoted by Hamilton are more numerous and recondite, they are less germane to the matter, and more showily given than those by Fraser; and that if Fraser's Dissertations are only introductory, they are helpful and consistent with the designs and philosophy of his author, while Hamilton's not unfrequently bewilder the reader, and often contradict the system of thought to which they are attached as supplements. Hamilton's is much more the work of a scholarly recluse, to whom philosophy was all in all; Fraser's that of one to whom life has interests, and for whom personal character has charms; Fraser's has a wider human, Hamilton's a closer philosophical attractiveness; Hamilton's is more compactly and expressly academical than Fraser's, which has claims on the general reader as well as on the inquiring student. Both, however, are confessedly great achievements, and supply, by two successive occupants of the same chair, the history of two closely related chapters of metaphysical speculation with a fulness and comprehensiveness not often given to the lives and thoughts of men whose chief claim to notice is that of investigators of human thought, its reach, and its power.

George Berkeley, son of William Berkeley, of Thomastown, in the county of Kilkenny, was born, according to tradition, in Dyser Castle or tower, about two miles below Thomastown, on the banks of the Nore, 12th March, 1686. His father seems to have been an immigrant to Ireland in the suite of Lord Berkeley of Stratton, who became Lord Lieutenant in 1672. He served at first in the Customs, and afterwards held a military office. His mother, who seems to have been Irish, was related to Archbishop Usher and to General Wolfe. "George Berkeley, gent., aged eleven years, entered the second class" [of his Grace, the Duke of Ormond's Free School or College, of Kilkenny] "July 17, 1696," then under Dr. Hinton, subsequently Archdeacon of Cashel; and "Mr. George Berkeley left the first class, January, 1700.



and was entered in the university of Dublin, 21st March, aged fifteen." The university was then under the Provostry of Dr. Peter Browne, afterwards a man of philosophical note, as author of 'The Procedure and Limits of the Understanding,' an antagonist of Berkeley and a precursor of Hume and Butler. During his early years at Trinity our precocious youth was under the tutelage of Vice-Provost Dr. John Hall, professor of Hebrew, &c., of whose teaching Berkeley retained grateful remembrance.

At school and at college he had the companionship of his life-friend, Thomas Prior—one of the founders of the Dublin (afterwards the Royal Irish) Society, and among his competers were Samuel Madden—afterwards editor of *The Quenist*, author of "Memoirs of the Twentieth Century," the good uncle of Oliver Goldsmith—Thomas Conterini; William, the only son of Archbishop Palliser, of Cashel, a youth of great promise, Edward Syngs, subsequently Berkeley's predecessor in the bishopric of Cloyne, &c.

From his childhood Berkeley had "a remarkable turn of thought." Ordinary people did not understand him and laughed at him. Soon after his entrance he began to be looked upon as either the greatest genius or the greatest dunce at college. Those who were slightly acquainted with him took him for a fool; but those who shared his intimate friendship thought him a prodigy of learning and a marvel of goodness of heart." "He pursued his studies with extraordinary ardour, full of simplicity and enthusiasm." He was made a scholar in 1702. In the spring of 1704 (the year Locke died), he became B.A. He took his Master's degree in the spring of 1707, and after a severe examination, passed with unprecedented applause, in presence of nobility, gentry, and high officials, he attained a fellowship, 9th June, 1707. He first appeared in print in a modest way, a short time before he took his M.A. degree. Early in 1707 two tracts—one, an attempt to demonstrate arithmetic without the help of Euclid or of Algebra: and the other consisting of thoughts on some questions in mathematics, both written in Latin, and published in London—were attributed on the title-page to a Bachelor of Arts in Trinity College, Dublin. Ever since, and without dispute, they have been assigned to Berkeley." Though published in 1707, they were written, as the preface informs us, nearly three years before—perhaps at an early stage in his studies for a fellowship. The allusions to Bacon,

Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, Newton, Sir W. Temple, and the philosophical transactions, confirm what we now know from other sources of the direction of his early reading. The "Arithmetica," is dedicated to William Palliser, and the "Miscellanea Mathematica" to his young friend, Samuel Molyneux, the son of Locke's "friend and disciple."

Partly through the influence of William Molyneux, the correspondent of Locke, and one of the intellectual forces of that age, the "Essay on the Human Understanding" was early brought under the notice of thoughtful men. Ezekiel Burridge, a native of Cork and a member of Trinity College, Dublin, author of a "History of the Recent Changes in Affairs in England in 1697," in 1701, issued a translation of Locke's "Essay" in Latin; Molyneux had in 1680 published a translation of Descartes', "Meditations," Hobbes' objections to them, Descartes' rejoinder, and a memoir of the French philosopher. Malebranche's "Recherche de la Verite," issued in 1674, was known by most of the students of Locke. Norris's "Ideal or Intelligible World, 1701-4," was probably in the hands of reading men early. The controversy on natural philosophy, originating in the rival systems of Descartes, and Newton was throwing Aristotle into the shade. Newton's "Fluxions," and Leibnitz's "Calculus," Molyneux's "Dioptrics," and Newton's "Optics," were engaging attention. The mathematical controversies of Hobbes and the "Oxonians," the early efforts of the Royal Society, and the attacks of Bayle and Leibnitz on the "De Origine Mali" of William King, Archbishop of Dublin, must have engaged the academic circles of the Irish capital, while Swift had brought over to Ireland echoes of the wit and interests in the literature of the era of Addison, Prior, and Pope.

In a commonplace book, which Professor Fraser publishes from "The Berkeley Papers," a small quarto volume in Berkeley's handwriting, in which he seems to have set down, often as if for further private consideration, stray thoughts which occurred to him in the course of his mathematical and metaphysical studies at Trinity College, Dublin, "apparently in 1705 and some following years," we find notes on, and notices of, some of the most important questions agitated by the thinkers of his day. "It is a biographical document, of great value to those whose conception of biography comprehends analysis of the progressively unfolding of individual human minds. It contains thoughts self-originated, or

immediately occasioned by reading partly in natural philosophy and mathematics, chiefly in psychology, metaphysics, ethics, and theology." In it we feel that Berkeley's mind labours under the inspiration of a new thought, with which it is evidently charged, and the consciousness of which calls out ever and anon the flush of philosophical enthusiasm—"the spirit of scientific independence, the parent of all discovery," that "which moves all who leave their mark on the course of human thought." This commonplace book helps us also to trace some of Berkeley's reading in his early years at college.

"The promotion of societies, literary and philosophical, was a work in which through life Berkeley seemed fond of engaging." One such academical enterprise which the Berkeley papers record deserves to be mentioned: "Early in 1705 it seems that Berkeley and some of his college friends formed a society to promote their investigations in the new philosophy of Boyle, Newton, and Locke." The MS. commences with these words in Berkeley's own handwriting: "*Mem.* The following statutes were agreed to and signed by a society consisting of eight persons, Jan. 10, A.D. 1705." The statutes are then given in the handwriting of another, but unfortunately we are left in the dark about Berkeley's associates at these Thursday evening meetings for the discussion of the New Philosophy, and also very much as to the questions they discussed, and the conclusions (if any) which they reached.

Three other years elapsed before Berkeley was prepared to announce to the world the great thought which his commonplace book proves to us he had been labouring with for years. "He presented it, at first, under cover, in a one-sided way—unsatisfactory so far as it went. The "*Essay towards a new Theory of Vision*," with Berkeley's name on the title-page, appeared early in 1709, when he was about twenty-five years of age. The second edition, with a few alterations (not subsequently reprinted, but which reappears in Fraser's collection of his works), followed before the end of that year. Both were issued in Dublin. The work was re-issued annexed to "*Alciphron*" on its first appearance at Dublin and London in March, 1732—the latest issue of the essay in Berkeley's lifetime. "It is virtually an inquiry into the nature and origin of our conception of extension in space." It was also the first elaborate attempt to demonstrate that our apparently immediate visual perceptions of space, and of bodies existing in it apart

from our organism, are actually suggestions induced by the constant associations of visible ideas, and of certain organic sensations which accompany vision with objects presented to our actual experience." "The 'Essay' is a professed appeal to pure consciousness." It is "an analysis, immediately of what we are conscious of in seeing, and by suggestion of what we are conscious of in touch." It is, "in short, a professed account of the facts, the whole facts, and nothing but the facts of which which we are visually conscious." "It is a contribution to the *psychological* analysis of the facts of vision, and *not* a deduction from merely physical experiments in optics, or the physiology of the eye." That visible objects are a system of arbitrary signs of tangible matter is the conclusion of this essay." "Nothing in the compass of inductive reasoning" (remarks Sir William Hamilton, "Reid's Works," p. 184, note) "appears more satisfactory than Berkeley's demonstration of the necessity and manner of our learning, by a slow process of observation and comparison alone, the connexion between the perceptions of vision and touch, and, in general, all that relates to the distance and magnitude of external things."

This essay is a rare instance of what Ferrier called the true function of speculation as "the power of seeing *true* facts and of *unseeing* false ones." The question of the essay comes to this: What is really meant by our *seeing* things in ambient space? Berkeley's answer, when developed, may be put thus: "What, before we reflected, we had supposed to be a seeing of real things, is not seeing really extended things at all, but only seeing something that is constantly connected with their extension; what is vulgarly called seeing them is in fact reading about them; when we are every day using our eyes, we are virtually interpreting a book; when by sight we are determining for ourselves the actual distances, sizes, shapes, and situation of things, we are translating the words of the universal and divine language of the senses." "When we seem to be seeing, we are really reading an illuminated Book of God, which, in literal truth, is a book of prophecy."

"It is worthy of remark that the "New Theory" has been generally accepted, so far as it was understood alike by the followers of Hartley and by the associates and successors of Reid. Among British psychologists it has recommended itself to metaphysical rationalists and sensualists, to the advocates of innate principles, and to those who would explain, by the laws of mental

association what their rivals attribute to the absolute constitution of intelligence. "This one doctrine," as Mr. J. S. Mill remarks, "has been recognised and upheld with singular unanimity by the readers of all schools of philosophical thought."

"That the essay towards a new theory of vision attracted some attention on its appearance, we may infer from its reaching a second edition before the end of the year." With this pioneer in 1709, in 1710 Berkeley, in a "Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge," boldly announced the great conception of which for years he had been full. This book is a systematic assault upon scholastic abstraction, especially in abstract or unperceived matter, space and time." "He finds philosophers all taking for granted the existence of a dead, unperceived, and unimaginable something of indefinite power and capability." "Then to this unknown something—under the name of matter—they attributed indefinite powers [as space, time, and number], and under cover of *its* powers, some of them pretend to explain the human mind, and supposed that all the conscious life in the universe might be accounted for by the dark abstraction." "They imagined an abstract substance as thing-in-itself, which they regarded as the real thing, and what they felt and saw they assumed to be the substitutes of that reality which we could never reach to a knowledge of in itself. Reason, Berkeley asserts, is at war with these assumptions. They are empty words (*vana imagines*). Reason requires us to return to what is concrete, and to abide there. Beyond this we can find nothing, because beyond this nothing exists. All that exists, or can exist, is the experience of persons. The actual universe must be made up of that, whatever is not so resolvable must be an abstraction and therefore a delusion. The universe regarded as a congeries of effects, and in its ultimate cause, consists and can consist only of living persons, the ideas or phenomena which they have, and the voluntary activity which they exercise. It follows that the universally acknowledged ultimate cause cannot be the empty abstraction called matter. There must be living mind at the root of things. Mind must be the very substance and consistence and cause of whatever is." "But how do we know that it is true? This Berkeley plainly supposes, is not so much to be argued from premises as accepted through inspiration—through its own intuitive light. 'Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind,' he says, "that a man need only open his eyes to see them." "Such,"

he adds, "I take this important one to be—that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind; that their *esse* is to be perceived or known, that consequently, so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind, or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit; it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the mystery of abstraction to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit. That the universe must be the personal experience of living mind is thus proclaimed with all the light and evidence of an axiom"—an intuition of reason which flashes upon us by inspiration. "Berkeley's 'Principles of Human Knowledge' is the most systematically reasoned exposition of his peculiar philosophy which his works contain." "It is the fullest explanation of substance and power—the two central conceptions of Berkeley's philosophy—which he has given," and yet it bears the marks of an unfinished work. As first published it was called "Part First," but part second never appeared, nor does any other work of his enable us to conjecture what form his speculations would have taken. There is indeed philosophical room for a supplement, though it would be hazardous to attempt to conjure up even in fancy a continuation of the "principles."

Our own notion is, that the theory of Berkeley is much less intricate and far-fetched, much more forthright and simple than is usually supposed. I apprehend that the skeletonic logic of it would run somewhat thus: God envisages his ideas in creation as reality—the universe; man perceives, by ideas, creation as reality. The Deific ideas are reality, reality impresses man as ideas; ideas—as envisagements of reality—are, therefore, all man knows; they are man's perceptions of realities. Hence to man *esse est percipi*, but in God *percipi est esse*, and ideas are the common terms in which the creative will and purpose of God are written, and in which man's experiences are registered. Ideas are the forms of reality to man, but they are the forms of reality in Deity. There is no *matter*, however diaphanous or coloured, between the works of God and the soul of man. As ideas creation is (*esse*), as ideas creation is seen (*percipi*). Ideas are the direct issue of the power of God, and God is the Supreme Cause—the creative because ideative, all-involving, all-evolving One.

"The contents and language of the 'Principles of Human Knowledge' prove that Berkeley had been a diligent student of Locke's essay, published twenty years previously, and dedicated to the same Thomas, Earl of Pembroke and Montgomery, as Berkeley's treatise. It is, in fact, mainly intended as a refutation of the leading doctrines of Locke's work. The term *idea* is a characteristic of Locke as of Berkeley, in both it stands for *the immediate object of consciousness*, alike in external and internal intention, in memory, imagination, and generalization. With both the only objective universe of which we are directly aware consists of the *ideas* that we are conscious of, and by both this is assumed as a self-evident truth. Berkeley's whole theory of substance and cause, matter and mind, space and time, is a bold and subtle modification of Locke's theory of ideas. He saw the total of the world as cause. This is a point on which Professor Fraser is convincing and instructive, as has been acknowledged in the following terms by a learned critic:—

"The philosophy of Berkeley is not so much a theory of matter as a philosophy of causality; and the great service which Professor Fraser has done to the history of philosophy is that he has so far made it clear that the one important criticism which Berkeley has brought to the stock of knowledge, the one doctrine of his which has been most fruitful and most pregnant with results to after-philosophy, is his explanation of the word cause, and the place which he assigns to causality. Berkeley's polemic against abstract ideas, his theories of vision, and his discussions about the nature of ideas, are all subsidiary to this one great doctrine of the meaning and place of causality. . . . His philosophical writings, containing new and striking thoughts, some of them only now bearing fruit, upon the great metaphysical problems of universals, substance, causality, and the organism of the universe, cannot, without danger of misconception, be compared at length with a system which thinks itself competent to classify all metaphysical systems according as they contain some one or other theory of perception. We repeat, then, Berkeley's philosophy is by no means merely a theory of matter or a doctrine of sense-perception—it is a philosophy of causality—of substance and causality if you will, but of substance as subordinate to causality. . . . Berkeley's whole philosophy is a combination of two currents of speculation—that of Locke on the one hand, and that of the English mystics on the other. In his earlier writings the influence of Locke is predominant, but gradually loses power until at last it almost succumbs to the influence of the Platonists; but, from first to last, we have the attempt to combine what is real and deep and true in the old spiritual philosophy with the clearness, consistency, and relation to physical science which nominalism and the Baconian method can bring. Berkeley seeks in metaphysics direct

spiritual intuition; in physics to abolish what would prevent this intuition. . . . He wished to keep to the spiritual intuition which was the one good thing in these mystical doctrines, but he wished to bring it out of dreamland, and make it serviceable for every-day work and endeavour . . . . He wishes to conserve and give value to the fundamental truths which he unshaped in the scholastic realism, by applying to them the clearness and methods of nominalism.\*

In exact accordance with this view, Dr. Fraser remarks, "Berkeley's theory of physical causation anticipates Hume while it consummates Bacon, and opens the way to the true conception of physical induction. In his account of sense-perceptions he anticipates the spirit of the presentative psychology of Reid and Hamilton; and in his new central conception itself he more than anticipates the Copernican point of view of Kant."

The year in which the *Essay on Vision* was published was that in which its author first appeared in a new character. On 1st Feb., 1709, Berkeley received ordination as deacon in the old chapel of Trinity College. He was ordained by Dr. St. George Ashe, then Bishop of Clogher, who had been Professor of Mathematics in, and Provost of, the University of Dublin, was a member of the Royal Society, and a contributor to its transactions; he had issued a volume of "Sermons," and had been Bishop of Cloyne. Berkeley was presented by Nicholas Forster, a Senior Fellow, afterwards Bishop of Raphoe, and the uncle, as it happened, of Berkeley's future wife, who vouched for his learning and good character. Where he received priest's orders has not been discovered, Berkeley's ecclesiastical services about this time were confined to an occasional sermon in the college chapel. As a preacher his discourses were carefully reasoned, and in beautifully simple language they occasionally present great thoughts without any marked theological bias.

In 1711 he preached three characteristic commonplaces, as the discourses delivered in Trinity College chapel are called, from Rom. xiii. 2, on "Passive Obedience, or the Christian Doctrine of not Resisting the Supreme Power, Proved and Vindicated." Some false accounts of their purport induced him to publish them in 1712. They passed into a second edition in the same year, and were re-issued, corrected, and enlarged in 1713. On the death of Queen Anne these discourses were quoted against his interests to the members

\* Article—"Professor Fraser's Edition of Bishop Berkeley's Works" in the *British Quarterly Review*, April, 1871.



of the House of Hanover, and proving that he was a Jacobite, but his friend, Mr. Molyneux, set the matter in a different light.

This was very necessary. Two years previously Dr. Henry Sacheverell had preached those two sermons which led to his impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanours; sermons which had excited hot controversy, and turned out a Whig ministry. The opinions expressed in Berkeley's discourses practically amount very much to what Hobbes had formerly taught—that the supreme civil power, wheresoever placed, ought not to be forcibly resisted, but he bases this inference on the idea that government is of divine right. He had been brought to consider this topic by the perusal of Locke's "Treatise on Government," yet the argument is so conducted as to show "a philosophical field above Toryism and Liberalism, where those superior to party on either side may meet"—the field of reason and conscience. Professor A. C. Fraser supplies us with this brief epitome of the main idea.

"The discourse is interesting for its ingeniously-argued defence of non-resistance as a duty opposed to the sin of lawlessness, but especially for the most distinct and reasoned account in Berkeley's writings of his general theory of moral obligation. 'Self-love,' he represented (sect. 5), 'as the deepest and most universal motive of human action. We call actions good or evil as they are fitted to promote or hinder our own happiness. For distinguishing eternal good from present enjoyment, we must refer them by means of reason to universal law. Now it is a truth, evident by the light of nature, that there is a sovereign omniscient spirit who alone can make us for ever happy or for ever miserable (sect. 6). The universal laws of nature must accordingly be referred to the nature of God, and the end which He designs to accomplish by human actions. This end must be the good of men (sect. 7), who are thus commanded to promote, by the concurring actions of each individual, the general well-being of all men of all nations, of all ages of the world. The rational deduction of the goodness of actions is thus founded on their essential fitness to promote the well-being of mankind. Submission to the supreme authority is afterwards deduced as one of the most important consequences from these principles. The chief divisions are unfolded in sect. 2, 3.

"The same theory of the duty of absolute unlimited submission to supreme civil authority as a fundamental article of ethics is enforced in Berkeley's 'Discourse to Magistrates,' published nearly a quarter of a century later, which should be compared with this Discourse."

In 1710 Berkeley was nominated Sub-Lecturer in Trinity College. In this office his chief duty was to teach, expound, and examine upon Porphyry's "Introduction to the Categories of 1871.

Aristotle," in which the opinions of Plato are brought into conformity with and are made explanatory of the Dialectic of the Staggyrite; and to lecture on logic to such pupils as were placed in his charge. In November of the same year he was chosen junior dean of the College; an honourable office, to which he was re-appointed in November, 1711. He was chosen junior lecturer in Greek in November, 1712—during which latter year he paid a short visit to England, where, though really—

"Passing rich on *forty pounds a-year*,"

he probably superintended the issue of the work soon to be noted.

In 1713 Berkeley was again in London. In Dean Swift's "Journal to Stella," we find him reporting that on Sunday, 12th April, 1713, he "went to Court on purpose to present Mr. Berkeley," one of the "men of worth in the world." To Lord Berkeley of Stratton, he notes "that Mr. Berkeley is a very ingenious man and a great philosopher," whom he has mentioned and whose books he has presented to all the ministers. On 16th April, Swift "went and dined with Dr. Arbuthnot" (author of "The History of John Bull,") "and with Mr. Berkeley," and on the 21st April, he "dined in an Alehouse with Thomas Parnell, author of 'The Hermit,' and Mr. Berkeley, just about the time when he the most gigantic power in literature in that age was to be banished from the London of his adoration to the Dublin of his abhorrence. He had been in London, however, earlier than April, for he had got acquainted with Steele, and had promised his aid in *The Guardian*, which was commenced on 12th March, 1713, and on 14th March, the first of fourteen Essays contributed to it (by Berkeley appeared, "the rate of pay being a guinea and a dinner." In these Berkeley claims to be "a free-thinking anti-Free-thinker," not feeling it necessary to admit that all free-thinking is confined to what were then regarded as negative not positive thinkers. At this time too he became acquainted with Pope, Addison, Atterbury, Gay, and Prior. By Addison Berkeley was introduced to Dr. Clarke, who was then engaged in the parish church of St. James', Westminster, in the philosophical exposition of truth and virtue. An unsatisfactory metaphysical debate took place between Berkeley and the author of the argument, *a priori*, the correspondent of Leibnitz and Butler. It is highly probable that this visit to England had, among its other purposes, the issue from the press of a new work of much importance, which, during 1713, was given to the

light, viz., "Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous." The design of which is plainly to demonstrate the reality and perfection of human knowledge, the incorporeal nature of the soul, and the immediate providence of a Deity in opposition to sceptics and atheists. Also to open a method of rendering the science more easy, useful, and compendious." We quote from Professor Fraser some remarks and facts regarding this work :—

"This work is the gem of British metaphysical literature. Berkeley's claim to be the great modern master of Socratic dialogue rests, indeed, upon 'Alciphron,' which surpasses the conversations between Hylas and Philonous, in expression of individual character, and in general dramatic effect. Here the conversational form is adopted merely as a convenient way of treating the chief objections to the theory of matter which is contained in the 'Principles of Human Knowledge.' But the clearness of thought and language, the occasional colouring of fancy, and the glow of practical human sympathy and earnestness that pervade the subtle reasonings by which the fallacies of metaphysics are inexorably pursued through these discussions, place the following dialogues almost alone in the modern metaphysical library. Among those who have employed the English language, except, perhaps, Hume and Ferrier, none approach Berkeley in the art of uniting deep metaphysical thought and ingenious speculation with an easy, graceful, and transparent style. Our surprise and admiration are increased when we recollect that this charming production of reason and imagination came from Ireland, at a time when that country was scarcely known in the world of letters and philosophy.

"The essay on 'Vision,' and the treatise on the 'Principles of Human Knowledge,' may be said to comprehend between them the early metaphysical doctrine of Berkeley. . . . According to Berkeley, the popular and philosophical conception of matter are both absurd—the former because adulterated by the latter. . . . Berkeley argues against both; against the former for assuming the absolute existence of which we are conscious, which, so far as we know, must be ideas, inasmuch as they can be known to exist only while they are perceived or imagined; against the latter for assuming the abstract or absolute reality of unintelligible material substance, existing, as it were, behind the immediate objects or ideas of our conscious experience. . . . Our sense-consciousness is, on Berkeley's principles, the only material world to which our actions have any reference, or with which either practically or speculatively we can have any concern. . . . This was the philosophy of substance and power which Berkeley had proposed in his 'Principles' instead of the old materialism—the latent scepticism and atheism of which last left the sentiments of reverence and love, along with faith and imagination, unsatisfied, deeply rooted as all these are in the nature of man.

"The 'Dialogues' discuss what Berkeley regarded as the most plausible objections, popular and philosophical, to his doctrine of sensible things.

"A curious circumstance connected with the first publication of the 'Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous,' was the appearance, in this same year, of the 'Clavis Universalis, or Demonstration of the Impossibility of Matter,' of Arthur Collier, in which a theory is maintained similar to Berkeley's as regards the merely ideal or phenomenal existence of the sensible world. A more curious coincidence is not to be found in the history of speculative thought, than the production, simultaneously, without concert or apparently even knowledge on the part of either author of the opinions of the other, of a theory which implies so great a revolution in the philosophical point of view for such questions. It goes to prove that the intellectual atmosphere of the Lockian epoch in England contained elements favourable to such a result. . . . Berkeley's philosophy, owing to its own comprehensiveness, not less than to the humanity of his sympathies and the beauty of his style, is now recognised as a striking expression or solution of the problems of modern thought, while Collier is condemned to the obscurity of a mere reasoner of the schools."

The "Three Dialogues" were dedicated "to the Right Honourable the Lord Berkeley of Stratton," a "cousin" of the author's by *natural* relationship, according to report, as to a person worthy of respect as having added to his other distinctions "the knowledge and relish of Philosophy." The second edition, which is simply a reprint, appeared in 1725, and a third, with important additions—the last in the author's life-time—"printed by Jacob Touson" in 1734, conjointly with a new edition of "The Principles of Human Knowledge."

Berkeley had been introduced by Swift to Mordaunt, Earl of Peterborough, the hero of the War of the Succession in Spain, and the most restlessly versatile of diplomatists. The Earl having been appointed Ambassador-extraordinary to Victor Amadeus, King of Sicily, took Berkeley with him as chaplain and secretary. "Ten months in France and Italy with Lord Peterborough must have been life in a new world to the subtle analyst who had so lately been introduced to the wits of London." Being a Fellow of the College he required a Queen's letter to enable him to reside abroad, and on Nov. 6th, 1713, this leave was granted in accordance with the letter sent, signed Bolingbroke. During a month spent in Paris he was present at a disputation in the Sorbonne, visited and discoursed with Malebranche, and saw the body of the late King

James II. He passed on to Sicily, crossing Mount Cenis, carried in open chairs by men, life often depending on a single step, on New Year's day, 1714. He stayed at Turin a few days, resided three months at Leghorn, where he preached several times in the Factory Chapel. The death of the Queen on the 1st of Aug., 1714, suddenly transformed the whole aspect of things in England. Peterborough was recalled, and Berkeley, with his chance of Church preferment considerably lessened by the fall of the Tories, returned to England in Aug., 1714. In 1715 he accompanied St. George Ashe, son of the Bishop of Clogher, to the Continent as travelling tutor, and while at Paris, as the story goes, he was the occasioning cause of the death of his illustrious rival in metaphysical sagacity, Malebranche. Here is the amusing (and rhetorically heightened, we may well suppose), version of the story, given by De Quincey in his "Essay on Murder Considered as one of the Fine Arts."

"Malebranche, it will give you pleasure to hear, was murdered. The man who murdered him is well known; it was Bishop Berkeley. The story is familiar, though hitherto not put in a proper light. Berkeley, when a young man, went to Paris and called on Père Malebranche. He found him in his cell cooking. Cooks have ever been a *genus irritabile*, authors still more so; Malebranche was both: a dispute arose; the old father, warm already, became still warmer; culinary and metaphysical irritation united to derange his liver; he took to his bed and died. Such is the common version of the story; 'so the whole ear of Denmark is abused.' The fact is, that the matter was hushed up out of consideration for Berkeley, who (as Pope remarked) had 'every virtue under heaven,' else it was well known that Berkeley, feeling himself nettled by the waspishness of the old Frenchman, squared at him; a *turn-up* was the consequence; Malebranche was floored in the first round, the conceit was wholly taken out of him, and he would perhaps have given in; but Berkeley's blood was up now, and he insisted on the old Frenchman's retracting his doctrine of Occasional Causes. The vanity of the man was too great for this, and he fell a sacrifice to the impetuosity of Irish youth, combined with his own absurd obstinacy."

At this time Berkeley travelled over "most parts of Europe," but no special information gleams out of the darkness about this and the next year. He was at Rome Jan., 1717, and on the 7th examined the Vatican Library, and a record of his sojourn in Italy in 1717-18 is partially given in four small volumes of note-books, from which Professor Fraser reprints. "The Itinerary" displays careful observation, wide reading, and a considerable and exact

scholarship, but it is too lengthy even for epitomizing here. In April, 1717, he communicated, through Dr. Arbuthnot, to the Royal Society, some "Observations and Remarks on the Eruption of Fire and Smoke from Mount Vesuvius." At the close of 1717 a Royal Letter, signed by Joseph Addison, then Secretary of State, procured a renewal of his leave to travel and remain abroad; though he had, in his absence, been chosen Senior Fellow of his college; and this leave was again extended in 1719. In 1720 the Academy of Sciences at Paris, proposed, as a subject for a prize essay, "The Nature, Principle, and Import of Motion." At Lyons Berkeley wrote upon this subject, but it is not known that he presented his Essay in competition. The Academy prize was gained by Jean Pierre de Crousas, subsequently a pretty distinguished French philosopher and logician. Berkeley published his tract shortly after his return to England—in 1721—and republished it in 1733.

. . . "The *De Motu* contains a theory of causation—efficient and physical. Abstractions and misuse of language are accused of mystifying our notion of Power. The notion is referred to our consciousness of personal activity or volition—the only example in our experience of a cause properly so called. Throughout this tract, Berkeley reiterates and applies the favourite doctrine of his *Principles* and *Dialogues*—that activity belongs to *minds* or *persons* exclusively; and that the supposed relation of causation among sensible things is really one of sign and signification, not of cause and effect. The movements of the material world are thus a natural language, originating in, and inspired by, supreme mind. . . . If we remember that physical causation means only the order according to which sensible changes take place—that it is only natural language—we may speak of motions transmitted by mechanical causes. But causation, properly so called, belongs to metaphysics or primary philosophy, and active causes can be drawn forth from the shades in which they are involved only by contemplation and reasoning."

On Berkeley's return to England he found himself in the midst of the national turmoil, agitation, and misery, consequent upon the failure of the South Sea Scheme, and the extravagant expectations of a secular millennium founded on it, and his ardent thoughts found vent in the "Essay towards preventing the ruin of Great Britain," which was published anonymously in London, in 1721 but reissued with acknowledgment in 1732. In this pamphlet he enlarges on "Religion, Industry, Frugality, and Public Spirit," and inveighs against fashionable infidelity, selfishness, sensuality, and extravagance, in a bold and striking manner. Shortly after

his return Berkeley renewed his intercourse with Clarke, became acquainted with Secker and his old school-fellow Butler, and was brought into personal contact with Thomas, Earl of Pembroke, to whom he had dedicated the "Principles." Pope, too, introduced him to Boyle, Earl of Burlington and Cork—the architectural Earl, who inherited the ancestral love of science and of art, who being appointed Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, took Berkeley in his suite as one of his chaplains, Aug., 1721. On 14th Nov., 1721, Mr. Berkeley had the Grace of the House for the degree of Bachelor and Doctor of Divinity, and on 20th Nov. he was nominated Divinity Lecturer and appointed University Preacher. In Feb. 1722 he was nominated Dean of Dromore, a non-resident appointment; and on 4th June he was chosen Hebrew Lecturer, and so seemed to be making his way in his native land.

A romantic incident, with which Swift is closely connected, belongs to Berkeley's history in 1723. Swift's Vanessa died in 1723, leaving to Berkeley (whom, introduced by Swift, she had only seen once), and Mr. Marshall, the reversion of her fortune; having revoked for this purpose a will made in Swift's favour. This unexpected trust, though it made Berkeley rich, involved him in annoyances which lasted many years.

In April, 1724, the Duke of Grafton nominated Berkeley to the living of Ardtree and Arboe, and almost simultaneously Dean of Derry—a deanery this in which residence and ecclesiastical work were required, and one of the best pieces of preferment in the Irish Church. But scarcely had he held it a year when this "one of the first men in the kingdom for learning and virtue," as Swift says, absorbed in a project for the civilization of America by the institution of a Christian university, sought to resign his deanery and went off to London to have it taken from him. His immediate purpose there was to gather associates and money, and to obtain a Royal Charter, and one of his first acts was to publish "A Proposal for the better supplying Churches in our Foreign Plantations, and for Converting the Savage Americans to Christianity," by a College to be erected in the Summer Islands, otherwise called the Isles of Bermuda"—Shakspeare's "still-vexed Bermoothes." In this, his plan for a great western university, was clearly unfolded and eloquently enforced. And so, at the close of his fortieth year, with the self-sacrifice of a new life-enthusiasm in his heart, we may shut up the story of his past years—and part with him for the present.

## Religion.

---

### IS CHRIST'S REIGN UPON EARTH TO BE A SPIRITUAL OR A TEMPORAL ONE—OR BOTH?

#### TEMPORAL.—I.

LORD BACON speaks deprecatingly of "that fury of controversy which raises such tumults in the Churches." Fury, however, is not necessarily a concomitant of controversy; nor is controversy that alone which raises tumults in the Churches. In calmly-conducted controversy there is great advantage. Vague and unguarded phrases are noted, incorrect premises are pointed out, flaws in reasoning are exposed, conclusions that are more sweeping than the grounds on which they are built are shown to be partially baseless; and assertions which take the form of reasoning are, in general, detected as fallacies; and thus the ideas of each party become clearer, their premises receive more attention, their reasoning is brought into closer harmony with the facts or grounds afforded by the subject, and truth is seen more clearly by having been placed under the double light of search and research. It is seldom, indeed, that the "fury of controversy" arises, unless through folly on some one's part. A man of one idea, who has convinced himself by a frequent treading of the same course of argument, that he cannot be mistaken as to his opinion being that alone to which argument can lead, finds himself suddenly shown to be in error, feels his self-esteem chastised, and then blurts out his rage as if it came from a love of truth instead of the idolatry of self and sect. Another, who has boasted of the irrefragability of his reasonings discovers that the impregnability of his stronghold has been assumed rather than provided for, and when the antagonist breaks through the serried file of his defences, he lacks nobility of spirit to confess his error and admit his mistake; and, smarting under painful personal impressions, employs the fury of controversy to raise a dust in which he may escape from the ignominy brought on him by his rashness. Many other illustrations might be given of the proneness of men to complicate investiga-



tions into speculative opinions by their self-love and their adherence to creeds and forms; and their readiness to accuse others of a design to disparage truth when they merely feel that they have been found in a false position, or have been assuming instead of proving their confession of faith. But we must forbear from such a theme, as it lies with us only to notice this that we may remark that many read controversies on religious questions with the prejudice about the fury of controversy and tumults in churches, quite groundlessly misleading them. Controversy is, in fact, the shaking of the lamp of reason so that it may shine out and blaze more brightly for the disclosure and the revealing of the truth visible in the clear light so raised. Properly conducted, controversy is the friend not the foe of faith.

I have introduced the foregoing remarks to indicate the necessity of taking care not to confound together the vital and the accidental, the real and the imaginary in controversy, and so to lead those who read to look at the thoughts submitted to them in the light of reason, not in the off-grated twilight and gloom of mere creeds. To the Scriptures read thoughtfully we appeal. We have no connexion with any special sect which upholds the dogma of a personal reign; we have no acquaintance even with the books in which such a doctrine is expounded. We believe it is written in the Bible so plainly that he who runs may read, and reading may understand. To reasoning and the Scripture we trust in our effort to prove that the reign of our Lord Jesus Christ upon earth will be a personal one, and not merely a spiritual but impersonal one.

That it shall be spiritual we do not deny, nay rather we believe it profoundly; but we believe that besides reigning and ruling in the hearts of men by His Spirit, He will reign in person upon the earth in the latter day to the joy of all the righteous and the dismay of the impenitent.

The first matter to be thought of on this subject is this,—Is it possible that our Lord Jesus Christ can reign personally on the earth?

We reply in the affirmative? It is possible that our Lord may personally reign on the earth, because he has already blessed the earth with His presence, and been a dweller in the home of man. He came then to His own, though His own received Him not. He came then to this world of wickedness and sin as One whose kingdom was not of this world. He came then to draw all men

unto Him, to bring them to love and fear God, and to practise righteousness. He came then as: a messenger from His Father, taking on Himself "the form of a servant." He came then to suffer and to die. He came then to be subject to the woes of life and the pains of death, but also to show forth His power over death and the grave. He came then to seek and to save. If the great Son of God, even the first-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth, could condescend to forego the glories of the heavens, and to take unto Himself the fashion of a man, it cannot be impossible for Him to come to reign in glory and triumph over His people and among His saints. If He could so humble Himself to the death of the cross, it cannot be impossible that He, having drawn men's hearts unto Him, will consent to sit on the throne prepared for Him by the Father. We argue, then, that it is possible that Jesus Christ may reign upon the earth in glory and greatness over those who have been redeemed by His grace and made new creatures by His power, and we add besides, this consummate reason, "with God all things are possible."

God, in the ever-present prospect of the earth, which He as all-seeing and knowing is alone able to take, says, "I have set my king upon my holy hill of Zion." He has promised to give to Jesus "the heathen for thine inheritance and the uttermost parts of the earth for a possession." The pious soul may well exclaim, "Will God in very deed dwell with man upon the earth?" and call upon his spirit to "behold, heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain Him"! But God Himself gives the reply, "Hath He said, and will He not do it; hath He spoken and shall He not make it good?" Therefore it is true that the time approaches when Jesus Christ shall be exalted "far above all principality and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is named in this world and in that which is to come." Then shall He reign over the house of Jacob (the faithful) for ever, and of His kingdom there shall be no end." The angels promised that He should be seen in great glory, returning as He had departed, that He might take unto Himself His great power and reign. Everything in Scripture seems, when read reasonably, to induce us to receive it as highly probable that the Lord Jesus will come and reign in the earth in power and great glory, in a world renewed and refashioned for the great King.

The second query which suggests itself is,—Is it probable that

Jesus Christ shall come to reign upon the earth in person? To this likewise we answer in the affirmative. We say it is probable, first, because the purpose of Christ's coming to the earth at all would not be served if He did not come to reign upon the earth. He came to defeat the principalities and powers of the earth, to overcome the prince of this world, to reut, ruin, and destroy the enemy of man and the rebel against God. He came to do this in the very earth where the fall had been brought on, where the wickedness of man had increased and risen up before Him as an abomination, where the evil had been done. It is probable, therefore, that He will complete and perfect here the glorious work He began at His First Advent, and at His Second Advent will glorify Himself upon the earth. For this He has Himself taught us to pray in these beautifully touching and simple words, "Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done on earth as it is done in heaven." Could He Himself teach us to pray for that which was never to be, never likely to be? Would He lead us to pray for what He never intended to fulfil? Surely no! Then it is probable that Jesus Christ shall personally reign upon the earth.

Then they would by force have taken Him and made Him a king in a sudden and short-lived fit of enthusiasm; but hereafter they will with a sustained and enduring spirit of gladness welcome Jesus with joy to His kingdom. In this probability we may rejoice, especially as He permits, nay enjoins us to pray, Come quickly, Lord Jesus.

It is probable, in the second place, that our Lord will personally reign upon the earth, because the Scriptures inform us that He shall do so. In the Scriptures men are exhorted: "Repent ye, therefore, and be converted, *that* your sins may be blotted out *when* the times of refreshing shall come from the presence of the Lord; and he shall send Jesus Christ, which *before* was preached unto you; whom the Heavens must receive *until the times* of the restitution of all things, which God hath spoken by the mouth of all his holy prophets since the world began (Acts iii. 19—21). Here it is evident that Jesus, who had beforetime been resident in the earth, will come again from heaven to earth to be present at and to superintend the restitution or restoration of all things—the complete triumph of good over evil, of holiness over sin, and the perfect triumph of the Captain of our salvation and the sovereign of the saints.

I would be inclined to say, in the third place,—It is certain that Jesus Christ will reign personally on the earth. Job believed, you know, that he would stand before his Redeemer in his flesh upon the earth, and this is expressly given to us as a revelation from God in the vision of John at Patmos. I dare not attempt an exposition of that holy and sublime vision here, but read as it appeared to me to be intended to be read, it is of a renewed earth John speaks as being the place of Christ's personal reign. There, in the last book of the New Testament of salvation, as in the last discourses delivered to His disciples after His passion, God seems to be speaking of "the things pertaining to His kingdom." There he appears to be seen sitting upon the throne of His glory in resplendent personal majesty, "when the kindreds of the nations shall worship before Him." It is a glorious vision of the King, eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise, the only true God, gracing with His ineffable presence the earth as its Lord, and dwelling in the midst of the righteous as their exceeding joy. It is a glorious hope that is thus offered to those who regard God as the joy of the whole earth, that they shall see Him and be with Him and be like Him.

In some rough, crude fashion, I have shown in the face of these objections which would represent it as impossible that Christ should reign upon the earth, that good reason may be entertained that it is not so doubtful as they seem to think. I have endeavoured to prove the likelihood or probability of such a manifestation of the great power of our Lord and Saviour; and I have appealed to the Scriptures as the evidence for the certainty of that second coming in glory to reign over the just on the earth.

I have written out of the fulness of my own feeling, and not from book-lore or creed forms. I have attempted to keep before my mind the words and meaning of the Scriptures. I presume that they are the final appeal in this case. "To the law and to the testimony" let us go in our researches in no vain effort to read our creed into them, but in an honest endeavour to see the truth that is in them, and let us each make it the aim of his soul to hasten the coming of the kingdom of grace in our own hearts now, assured that if we do so, the kingdom of glory will be made ours in the City of the Great King.

G. J. C.

## Literature.

---

### IS PULPIT INFLUENCE ON THE WANE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THE phenomenon which we call reaction is as well-known in the moral as in the physical world. Each one of us is well aware that if he is in particularly good spirits one day, he is very likely—all but certain to feel rather flat upon the next. Individuals, communities, modes of life, and forms of work, all testify in turn to the power exerted by the law of reaction, which is one of the necessary concomitants of the vicissitude which attaches itself to all that this planet holds. In asserting that pulpit influence is at present on the wane, there is no implication that other phases which are fuller will not again show themselves. During the revolution of ages, and the onflow of farther changes on the condition of humanity, the preacher's voice, now too often monotonous, or utterly impotent to reach the ear, far less the heart of man, may ring through the air with a new force and energy; nay, so great may be its potency, that the very rocks and stones may send up echoes which seem as if even inanimate matter was not insensible, and shook with a responsive thrill. This may be, or, we might rather say, this must be in the future, and through the present decadence and prostration in religious life there breathes a whisper of a more eloquent, and therefore a life-influencing era, which will place the preacher, let his stand be the platform, pulpit, tree-stump, or even chair, in a position of prominence very different from that which he now occupies. The depression is but temporary, and still there remains much power in the pulpit, though it is manifestly inadequate to grapple as it should with the difficulties which present themselves, and which check the growth of vital Christianity amongst us. We have sufficient proofs extant amongst us, in the case of men whom it would be invidious, perhaps, to single out by name, which indicate that a sudden resuscitation of the too generally dormant vigour which ought to characterize pulpit ministrations, may be nearer at hand than we should suppose. The interval (if interval it be called, for, throughout it there has not been lacking a succession of men of

earnestness and devotion, who might, with reason, like Paul, "magnify their office") which separates us from those days when last in our land the influences of the pulpit were very conspicuous; the interval is not a wide one. Those days—say, that we reckon back eighty or a hundred years to the times of Whitefield and Wesley, and their friends and followers—had been preceded by a period of darkness, and evangelical light shone forth, largely if not entirely indebted for its existence to the new energy which was divinely infused into the pulpit. There has followed this period another which cannot be said to be characterized by torpor, for never were the religious world so active, but amidst all this activity we find with regret that the ministrations of the pulpit touch men's hearts very little, and do not notably influence their heads. We have not fallen into a period of darkness; no, there is an abundance of light which is shed upon every department of life. Therefore in that respect we are placed in an anomalous position, differing from our ancestors, because the progress of humanity generally has seemingly rendered impossible such a reaction as occurred, for instance, after the Puritan ardour had evaporated throughout our land. Much of the light which irradiates us is, to borrow a simile, either of the phosphorescent sort, beautiful, but indicative of decay, or it is merely artificial, dependent like the lamp, for instance, upon its oil and wick, and either of these failing suddenly plunges us in unexpected gloom. We are very apt to be deceived, therefore, in our judgment of the religious condition of our nation, and in our judgment also regarding what should be one of the chief well-springs of Christian life, that is, the pulpit. Many a church (understanding here by "church" an aggregate of Christians of any denomination), would point triumphantly at this or that exterior circumstance as a proof that its condition was really most "healthy." Possibly, above all, one may hear triumphantly extolled the "wonderful" sermons which are there delivered, at the rate of 100 to 150 annually. But, listening to this, one recalls the story of the old dame, who, when asked by some one as she left the church if the sermon was "done," replied that "it had not begun to be done." A resultless sermon does an injury to the man who preaches it, even though he be sincere, and solicitous to do his best, for he fails to obtain his due fruition; to the listener surely the injury is not merely negative but positive. People go away, as is often said, "pleased with the sermon." Pleased with the sermon!

and why? because they are pleased and therefore quite satisfied with themselves—nothing has been touched upon in the discourse which could strike a barb into the “impassive conscience, awakening memories of past good or evil, and stimulating the listener to resolves or future efforts. Alas! alas! is it not true, that “the heart which said to itself, ‘How healthy am I!’ had already fallen into the fatallest form of disease.”

Some there are who cannot see, when they compare our age with those which have preceded it, that the influence of the pulpit has markedly declined. Any opinion in the matter, which should be based to any extent upon what remains in the form of printed sermons, would be certainly a partial one. Though the preachers of other times, the majority at least, might even in this respect be under no apprehensions when pitted against their successors, and the fact is too well-known, that the reproduction and modernization of certain discourses obtainable on the book-shelf, has given more repute to the nineteenth century divine, nay perhaps enabled him to do more good, than his best arranged original thoughts. But, nevertheless, the practice is scarcely one which should be recommended, and its prevalence, it may be remarked in passing, has somewhat to do with the decline of pulpit influence. Here and there a man is found who can use judiciously the armour and the weapons of another, but most by the transference spoil what they borrow, or if they endeavour to re-animate the relics of the past with superadded fire, remind one painfully in the pulpit of the ass who habited himself in the lion's skin. But as to the pulpit vigour of the past, who can doubt it who has read, not religious, but even ordinary history? Take, as an example, the seventeenth century in Great Britain, especially the middle of it, and we see what the influence of the pulpit led men to do; men, too, of all conditions, from the peer to the clown. Whether this influence was in any measure harmful is another question, which does not concern us here. We have several descriptions of the efforts of preaching in those days; none more able than that proceeding from the pen of Carlyle. Like much that he writes, it must be conceded even by an admirer that the argument he bases on the facts spreads too far. Because Puritanism of that particular type passed away, it does not necessarily follow that Puritanism is extinct, and incapable under some new form of working much for the worldly good.

“Yes,” he says; “the sermons of St. Margaret's, Westminster,

in spite of printers, are all grown dumb. In long rows of little dumpy quartos, gathered from the book-stalls, they indeed stand here bodily before us; by human volition they can be read, but not by any human memory remembered. Yet, did not the honourable Houses of Parliament listen to them with rapt earnestness as to an indisputable message from Heaven itself? No most astonishing review-article, or tenth-edition-pamphlet, of our day can have half such brilliancy, such spirit-eloquence, such virtue to produce belief, which is the highest and in reality the only literary success, as these poor little dumpy quartos had. All Puritanism has grown inarticulate, its fervent preachings and prayings are sunk into one indiscriminate moaning hum. So much falls silent, human speech, unless by rare chance it touch on the eternal melodies and harmonize with them, human action, interest, if divorced from the eternal melodies, sinks all silent." Yes, most assuredly, it was their contact with the "Eternal Melodies" which gave these preachers their power.

The imaginative mind can easily call up a vision of those days, contrasting most singularly with the scene which meets the eye now in most places of public worship. The Puritan preacher stands in plain black gown, or with no gown at all—that he has deeply pondered his theme we may feel sure, yet it is unlikely that he has even a scrap of a note. The people, taking little note of each other, listen with rapt attention, many of them standing, while occasionally there rises the deep hum of approbation which was not an unfrequent accompaniment to a discourse; perhaps there may be now and then a slight murmur of dissent. The voice ceases, but the audience disperse but slowly, and, scattering, as they leave the portal, the service from which they have just departed is, if not the general topic of conversation, at least the most prominent one. Again and again, during the following six days, will that sermon be not only spoken of, but actually embodied in human life. It is a sermon, whatever may have been its errors, which has, at least, effected something—it is not a mere flood of words, for what the preacher felt he spoke, and those who heard believed that he said true things.

But how is it with us now? Unless the preacher is very popular indeed, standing to hear him is not to be thought of. We need to have a cushion to sit upon, a comfortable support for our feet, and we inquire minutely whether in our particular position we have secured due ventilation, with an absence of "draughts." The sermon is a part, with most modern church-goers,—a very proper part



of the routine of the service, affording some slight interest, or it may be a good deal if the preacher is a man of mark, or at all eccentric or original ; possibly there may be contained in it some reference to passing events, a "skit" upon the peculiarities of some neighbouring preacher, or remarks upon recent scientific discoveries which elucidate, or are thought to obscure, Bible facts. That each listener has, whether he will or not, an intensely personal interest in the utterances of the pulpit would be perhaps conceded by the majority as a sufficiently well-known truism ; yet how few there are impressed with any feeling of responsibility in the hearing, or leave the edifice with any resolve induced by the sermon. Tedious it may have been, and in that case the listener (if the name be not a misnomer), slept or thought of other things ; if it actually contained, as some sermons really do, sound, practical truths, why, then, it is too common for the individual either to quarrel with the manner in which they were set forth, or to apply them to the case of some other person amongst the audience. Indifference, or a temporary feeling which is almost as unfavourable to the preacher's success as stolidity, is becoming the nearly universal response to the words which flow from the pulpit. Even more emphatically than the Israelites of old, it may be said of our people, that the Divine messenger comes, and his discourse is as a "pleasant song" to some, while others are totally insensible to the "voice of the charmer," skilful though he be.

And yet if, as we have said, the hearers have changed, so has the speaker. Too often we see too plainly that he is speaking against time, filling out as best he can the space, varying from twenty to fifty minutes, which the custom of his sect requires that he should take. His discourse, or his essay—the latter would be a fitter phrase frequently—may have been carefully prepared, and neatly written ; yet though this practice is not to be condemned, for such a composition coming from some men is better than their crude off-hand thoughts, there must, at times, be a lack of freshness and vigour. Modern preaching, too, is speculative enough, yea, dogmatic, but only occasionally practical. We have heard of the consternation which spread through a fashionable assemblage when a strange preacher announced as his text : "Putting away lying, speak every man truth with his neighbour ;" and a large portion of Scripture is systematically tabooed by most, for fear lest the sermon should be thought personal, or old-fashioned. The poet's observation of a

century ago has many exemplifications in modern pulpits, where we now see, not only the matter, but the manner of the preacher, very different from what we desire. There are still—

“Beings that mount the rostrum with a skip,  
And then skip down again, pronounce a text,  
Ory hem; and reading what they never wrote,  
Just fifteen minutes, huddle up their work,  
And with a well-bred whisper close the scene.”

And we have also those—

“Who, decent in demeanour while they preach,  
That task perform’d, relapse into themselves;  
And having spoken wisely, at the close  
Grow wanton, and give proof to every eye,  
Whose’er was edified, themselves were not.”

The four particulars which M. D. R. begins by insisting upon, as a proof that pulpit influence is not on the wane, do merely, as I think, transfer the fault from the preacher to the hearer. They do not disprove the statement that sermons fall with little effect on modern ears, but explain, with some truth, why this is so. Unquestionably there is no man who has considered the subject at all carefully who would not be prepared to grant that the pew is in fault as well as the pulpit, and the adjustment of the share of blame due to each is a matter of nicety. And I would remark finally, we should be adding grave error if we, as some recent writers, explained the cause of the wane of pulpit influence by attributing it to anything effete in Christianity, or an inapplicability in its system to the needs of an enlightened age. The Author of the mighty plan for the salvation of man has chosen to work by human instruments, and their successes and failures must alternate at times. Other agencies are extensively in operation; agencies which do not displace or nullify the task of the preacher, and which yet demonstrate that Christianity is fully adequate to all the requirements of modern times. I look confidently, at no very distant day, for an infusion of new vigour into the ministrations of the pulpit, though, for the time, I am convinced that we are in a state of depression.      AUDITOR.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

I CANNOT understand for my part how this question arose. If it has its origin in the spread of infidelity—infidelity has prevailed in all ages in some form or other—if it is to be debated because formalism abounds in our churches, that might have been objected at any time as a fault and an error: if it is to be brought under

consideration because the criticism of Strauss, Renan, Colenso, Rowland Williams, Bunsen, &c., have been agitating the churches, it might be shown that in all ages criticism has acted as a stimulant to the life and energy of the Church; if it is to be raised into a controversy because Darwin, Huxley, Tyndall, &c., have brought the doctrines of religion face to face with the *dicta* of science, it might be affirmed that the contest between knowledge and faith has been perennial in the Church; if it is to be made a matter of question because Mormonism and Positivism have arisen amongst us, it might be shown that error is no new manifestation among men; and hence none of these would give us the reason for such a discussion.

I question very much if the very fact that such a topic has been proposed for debate, and brought before the members of Christian churches, is not the very best proof that could be given that pulpit influence is not declining. Men are not jealous about what they care nothing for. Men do not anxiously inquire about the probable causes of circumstances which they regard as inevitable, and have no felt interest in keeping from occurring or recurring. It is only of things that are important in their estimation that they seek to gain certain knowledge. The very interest taken in Christian life and work in the churches is exciting the minds of the clergy to ask, Can it be that our pulpit ministrations are failing in their efficacy and deteriorating in their character? and is urging the laymen of the churches to ask if their souls are growing callous under the ministry of the word? I should myself regard this eager questioning upon the subject as one of the best proofs that due importance was being attached to pulpit influence, both on the part of the clergy and the laity. This wise questioning and prudent interrogation ought not to be interpreted into a doubt of the value and efficacy of the pulpit influence of the day, any more than an experimental testing of the phenomena of gravitation ought to be thought of as a scepticism of Newton's wondrous demonstration. Disbelievers or unbelievers should not quote this debate as if it indicated any thing like progress towards the cold domains of doubt; it is a query originating in Christian earnestness, and indicates a godly jealousy against human infirmity in the doing of the work of the gospel ministry.

I should deny that the influence of the pulpit is waning, from the most patent facts of human life. No questions excite more interest than those which refer to religion; no topic can bring and keep together large classes of people regularly so well as those

which Church life touches upon. There are no centres of action so constantly and so successfully engaged in work as those [which are indebted to the Church for their organization. To no forms of association do men cleave as strongly; in none do they work more harmoniously; in none do they more persistently continue as to Church organizations. To no work do men give less hesitatingly in labour and in money than to the means of usefulness managed by the churches. It is true that it is necessary for the various agents for the carrying out of the schemes of the various sections of the Church to plead for greater earnestness, zeal, and contributions, and to call attention to the smallness of the contributions in comparison to the work to be accomplished; but there is really no Christian work of importance undertaken by the churches in which *progress* is not marked. Funds are rising, agents are increasing, facilities are becoming greater, encouragements are becoming more numerous, and even the number of schemes undertaken are getting more and more in number, and while each thrives the others lose little or nothing.

I cannot agree therefore with the desponding view taken by S. S. "The spirit of inquiry," I think, is a great advantage to the Church, and likely to give greater, not less, influence to the pulpit, if rightly used; the spread of "infidelity" I deplore, but I trace it rather to the growth of population and to the unsettled state of men's home-life, than to any diminution of pulpit influence. I question much "the increase of wickedness." We know more of it; for the newspaper's correspondents are now every where about, and always on the alert, and we are made acquainted with the sins and shames of every locality. How much more "immoral conduct" would abound among the people who profess religion and attend our churches if they did neither, it would be hard to tell. The whirl of trade is very intense; but it might be more selfish if pulpit influence, direct or indirect, did not restrain it. Ritualism has its good points as well as its bad ones; and some, at least, of its advocates practise it as a sign of their homage to their Maker. The outcry of the lack of good preachers is a common one in every age, and is pre-eminently false of ours, for we have a large catalogue of good preachers in every denomination. The reasonings of S. S. are far from conclusive, and we maintain that on a full and fair review of the whole of the facts of Christian life, it will be found that the influence of the pulpit is *gaining, not waning*.

K. W. J.

## Politics.

---

### OUGHT THE TENURE OF LAND TO BE RADICALLY CHANGED?

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE courtesy of controversy has not been very knightlily observed by H. K. in his paper on land tenure. He has altogether, in so far as argument is concerned, ignored the paper published on the affirmative side by D. A. He has sneered at that article, it is true; but a sneer is not a reply, still less is it an argument. That paper by D. A. took up the principles of the Land Tenure Reform Association, as expounded by the greatest political economist of the age, J. S. Mill; principles of which H. K. approves, and with which he sympathises; and yet he refuses to regard that paper as an element in the controversy, and waves aside D. A. with a superlatively haughty sweep of his sword-arm, reserving to himself as a treat the delight of making mincemeat of his antagonist, after he has made show of his prowess and trotted himself out a bit. I do not know that it adds anything to the courtesy of this mode of doing things that in the same breath he sets aside the advocacy of the Land Tenure League, advanced by J. S. Mill, with equal hauteur, as seemingly quite unequal to that which H. K. is able to present to the reader in his line of exposition and defence. As one who feels along with D. A. the impolicy of any radical change in the tenure of land, I think it right to express my opinion that the papers of opponents ought to receive respectful attention from their antagonists.

However, discourtesy need not dismay truth, nor disconcert her advocates; and those who seek to maintain the right, may pass on their way through the fray of controversy "without fear and with a manly heart," notwithstanding the neglect of the etiquette of debate by those who think to weaken the weight of argument by a show of contempt for it.

If Mr. Mill's is an "excellent explanatory statement" of that question which "is now fairly set afloat by the Land Tenure Reform

Association "on account of the raising of which, in H. K.'s opinion, the nation ought to be thankful"—and that question is this very one which we are discussing—Ought the tenure of land to be radically changed? I do not see how H. K. can assert that D. A. "has overlooked the question at issue here!" It is quite evident that the debate now inaugurated has taken its rise from the programme of the Land Tenure Reform Association, and that it was meant to discuss the principles that league propounded in regard to land and property in land; and, therefore, in commencing a discussion on such a subject it was a very appropriate and honest form of debate, to take confessedly the best statement of the views of the Land Tenure Reform Association available, and found on that the objections to any radical change in land tenure.

I attach some importance to this observation, because I notice, in debate, it is a very frequent course adopted to depreciate the adversary in the eyes of the reader by a sort of assumption of superiority, and so to put the mind of the reader in the way of accepting as truths the statements made by persons who arrogate to themselves so happy an immunity from error, and such a capacity for seeing the proper state of the question. Had it not been for this I might easily have left H. K. to be disposed of by D. A. But it operates on the whole argument, and it becomes me, as the next to step into the arena, to assert the right of every one in this knightly encounter of wits to consideration and courtesy for himself and his arguments. Brow-beating lawyers and contemptuous advocates may adopt such practices when they know they have a bad case, but such a Rupert of debate as H. K. should have been above the pettifogger's makeshift; and should not only don a clear panoply, but do good doughty deeds of prowess in the conflict of reason in a straightforward and honourable fashion, not condescending to the trickeries of the cross-examiner or the Old Bailey practitioner.

Here we close our preliminary objection to H. K.'s article; but more remains to be said; and first let us examine the first of H. K.'s two starting and startling propositions:—

"I. That the land of the nation belongs to the nation."

Is not this ambiguous as a lawyer's opinion? What is meant by "the land of the nation?" Does it signify the nation's land? If so this recondite proposition becomes the very harmless assertion, The nation's land is the nation's land. The preposition *of* is transmutable into the possessive case, and this case, whether

expressed by 's or by of, signifies belonging to. But where is the nation's land, or the land of the nation? Will H. K. kindly point it out? Before he does this perhaps he will define "the nation" of proprietors of which he speaks, for nation is a vague and fluctuating term, and those who form the nation of to-day shall certainly not form the nation of to-morrow, any more than it is the nation of yesterday. If H. K. means literally that the land in which a people resides is the property of those who dwell on it, then, as there are every day changes in the persons forming the people, so also must there be constant divisions occurring in the property of the nation, and no two days would the same quantity of property be one's own.

"A nation," Sir William Temple says, "properly signifies a great number of families, derived from the same blood, born in the same country, and living under the same government," but he does not say possessing the same property, or sharing among them the same land. If the nation signifies in H. K.'s idea all the inhabitants of a land, can he rightfully maintain, even as a theory, that all the land on which any number of people are born and dwell, belongs to all those who are born and dwell on it? If the nation merely signifies the landowners, then the land of the nation (of landowners) belongs to the nation (of landowners) is both true and trite, but what does it mean? It is singular that unmeaning phrases like these can be bandied about as pure issues of good sense, and be mouthed as if they were indisputably full of most cogent and irrefragable truth. It is true that "All A is All A"—only where the "All A" of the subject is the "All A" of the predicate, and we cannot get beyond that assertion. If the proposition, "The land of the nation belongs to," that is, is the land of "the nation" is to be accepted, it must mean that the land which belongs to the whole nation belongs to the whole nation; but we still want to know if it means *all* the land that belongs to the nation belongs to all together, or each separately, of the nation; and, again, what does nation mean, and what does belongs signify?

Oh, these glib aphorisms often thus melt away in the glance of the sunlight of reason; and H. K.'s aphorisms make us feel with Byron:—

"I wish he would explain his explanation."

That the land of the nation belongs to the nation is by no means a historic fact. The land has been conquered and reconquered;

the land has been gifted, and willed, and sold. The land has had the capital, energy, industry, and thought of thousands used upon it to make it useful, profitable, and productive. The land has changed not only its owners but its very nature. The land, as the soil, has never, even in fiction, belonged to the people; but that the land cultured and laid out as it now is belongs to the people is as palpable a mis-statement as could well be made. The land that has been conquered, or gifted, or improved into profitableness by the effort and forethought of others cannot belong to all the people; not even although we should consent to the sheerest Red Communism as the basis of society. Before the nation could rightfully even then possess the land each would require to guarantee that he could and would use for the best behoof of all every inch of land committed to his charge, and would need to give surety that none of the usufruct should be lost or misapplied. The first proposition of H. K.'s political economy of the land question will not stand.

How fares it with proposition second?

That stands thus,—“II. It (the land) exists for the national good, and not for the purpose of being monopolized by one class of persons.”

Here we have two single propositions rolled into one: 1. The land exists for the national good. 2. The land does not exist for the purpose of being monopolized by one class of persons. These two are conjoined by H. K. apparently to heighten the contrast between the right and the wrong of things. Neither singly nor unitedly do we feel inclined to take exception to the meaning they ought to convey; but we must point out the oracularity of H. K. and object to *it*. “The land exists for the national good.” Here is a revelation! Does every land exist for some national good? How great a benefactor H. K. would be if he could point out the national good for which many parts of the land, nay many lands, exist. Again, what is the national good for which the land exists? Many men have reasoned anxiously regarding the national good, and many good men have differed about it. Will H. K. make the mystery plain? As it is settled that the national good is the purpose for which the land exists, the national good must be a known item, and we should all be so happy to find a solution of that vexed question from H. K.'s highly-favoured and fertile brain.

These two things, it appears from H. K.'s statement, were pre-



ordained together, the land and the national good, and he ought certainly to aid in the accomplishment of the preordination.

We notice that no one ever attempted to say that the land exists for the purpose of being monopolized by one class of persons, nor even for one class of persons. His statement of this in the negative form is evidently so done to imply that some one has affirmed that the land does exist for the purpose of being monopolized by one class of persons, and so is a *suggestio falsi*. He does not require to prove that the land ought not to be monopolized by one class of persons; for, first, no one has affirmed that it should be; and, second, as a matter of fact the land is not monopolized by any one class of persons. In the first place, it may be denied of the land of Britain that it is in reality monopolized at all in any other way than that in which all property, even H. K.'s own body is monopolized, that is, possessed exclusively until a value in exchange has been given for it or its products or results; and, in the second place, it may be affirmed that in no country whatever do a greater number of differing classes possess an interest in the land. Hence we object to H. K.'s form of arguing from the untrue as if it were the true.

H. K. next proceeds to say that "the system of land tenure under which we live was made by landowners" (p. 191). History gives quite a different version of the affair. History shows that the original charter of almost all lands is written on a sword's edge. That these swords have been possessed and used by a better people than those whom they displaced, that they had the skill of mastery and employed it upon those who could not make proper use of the land that lay around them; and, therefore, that hardihood and enterprise in olden times, as now, acquired land and the right to see to its culture. But as the developments of enterprise and hardihood have changed, so have also the methods of acquiring lands; and hence the constant passing of land from the old inheritors from the sword of conquest, or the gift of a Sovereign, to the captain of industry and the leader of men. Land is not in general used "to swell the dignity and pride of a landed aristocracy without the slightest intention to benefit the great mass of the people" (p. 191). Land, like everything else in this country, is put to usury, is made profit of, is compelled to be productive. This advantages the people by giving them employment and food; and thus enables many by labour, effort, and thought, to pass into the

class of landowners, and so serves to displace, not "prop up a landed aristocracy."

H. K. becomes oracular again at p. 193, thus:—"There is no other legitimate end of landed property than the interest we should all have in the proper application of the land to the wants of the human race." Formerly he was only national and anti-class, now he is cosmopolitan and anti-national. There is, as he phrases it, one and one legitimate end only of landed property, and when we ask what that is we find our reply in the word *Interest*. Yes! the interest we should all have, which *may* mean either—the interest which we all morally ought to feel in and about—or—the interest which we all legally ought to possess and exercise so as to take part "in the proper application of the land to the wants of the human race." H. K. probably meant to say that land ought to be applied to the benefit of the human race, that we all had our interest in its being so, and that this gave us a clue to the proper administration of land. If he did, we all say much the same. We say that the land tenure of the present time is advisable, because it secures the best administration of land for the public good. If H. K. did not mean this, he suggests a fallacy—that each person has an equal interest in the land, interest being used in the sense of original possessory right.

H. K. has a panacea, of course, for all the ills the land laws make men heirs to. He says "if the law allows land to be private property, it should be as marketable a commodity—sold and bought with as little restriction as any article of commerce." This seems plausible, but is entirely fallacious. The law allows, nay constitutes, land to be private property; the law also allows it to be a marketable commodity under certain regulations, which have been found to be requisite for the proper use of it; but there is no possible form of law by which land could be "sold and bought with as little restriction as any article of commerce."

If H. K. wishes to purchase a pound of cheese or sugar, he goes into the shop, pays the price, takes personal possession of the goods, and walks away. But if he wishes to buy a gold watch, he would most probably like some certainty that it was good gold, and he would insist upon its bearing the "Hall mark," and, besides, he would most probably seek a guarantee for the workmanship. Why is not the one article sold and bought with as little restriction as the other? Is it not because the characters of the articles differ

in their nature and circumstances, not that the mere act of purchase is different? If a man purchases a landed property he cannot carry it away and secure its possession by personal seizure of the thing purchased. Hence he requires the boundaries to be named, the rights of it to be defined, the burdens on it to be specified, and all the other matters on which security of tenure depends. Again, it is of importance to the State who has tax liens on the property to know exactly to whom it must look for the settlement of these claims, and hence there arise other restrictions of registration, &c., on the disposal of landed property. The necessity for being able, in any case of disputed ownership, of trespass, exchange, &c., to know precisely what are the limits of estates, and what rights in them have been passed by purchase, make it advisable that written statements of the particulars of purchase should be had in such a way as to be easily referred to; and, therefore, on all these, as well as on many other grounds, it is impossible that H. K.'s fine scheme that land should be sold and bought with as little restriction as any article of commerce could be consummated.

Let us suppose that a grocer had a cheese which could not be removed from his shop, which was sold in lots to suit purchasers, and which required to be used for the various purposes of its various purchasers at various times and in various ways; does H. K. think that the purchase and enjoyment of a pound of cheese would be had under such circumstances as they may be had now. But the case of the land is even much more complex; and in proportion to the complexity and the value of the rights attached by purchase or possession, so do the restrictions on their passage from one to another increase. H. K. will merit the thanks of the world when he forwards to Parliament a bill by which land may be sold and bought with as little restriction as a penny roll or a pineapple.

In a large proportion of his paper, H. K. proceeds (see pp. 193—6) as if the question had been "Ought the tenure of [*waste*] lands to be radically changed?" This is by no means the question at issue; that is, ought the tenure (that is the terms on which possessory rights are held or transferred) of land to be radically changed? Here the two specific terms are *tenure* and *radically*. Land must be held on some terms, and that constitutes tenure, and the tenure of land must be changed with the changing times; but we are asked ought these to be changed from their base or foundation, ought they to be fundamentally altered?

We contend that the tenure of land should be retained in opposition to Communistic tendencies and designs; and that no radical or fundamental change should be made in them because all other forms of property follow as far as possible the analogy of property in land, and any interference with the model form of property-right would unsettle and destroy far more than it could put right. If the increase in the value of land in the process of time may be confiscated by the nation, what good reason can be given why the rise in the price of provisions, in consequence of the excess of demand over supply enhancing it, should not be intercepted and be transferred into the coffers of the State. If wheat is bought at 63s., and rises by scarcity to 72s., why should the wheat speculator retain his gain, and the land possessor be mulcted of the increase in the value of his property from the same cause? Similarly with all property. There can be no radical change in the tenure of land made except upon principles involving Communistic views, and these are all summed up in Proudhon's aphorism, "Property is theft"—not landed property alone, but all property. Are we prepared for this? We think not. Then H. K. cannot be our guide.

B. G. C.

---

SHAKSPEARE AND TOBACCO.—Goethe did not smoke, neither did Shakspeare. I cannot recall a single allusion to tobacco in all his plays; even Sir Toby Belch does not add the pipe to his burnt sack. But Shakspeare hated every form of debauchery. The penitence of Cassio is more prominent than was his fun. "What! drunk? and talk fustian and speak parrot, and discourse with one's shadow." Shakspeare held drunkenness in disgust. Even Falstaff is more an intellectual wag than a sot. What actor could play Falstaff after riding forty miles and being well thrashed? Yet, when Falstaff sustains the evening at the Boar's Head, he has ridden to Gadshill and back, forty-four miles! No palsied sot he. Hamlet's disgust at his countrymen is well known. "Grim death, how foul and loathsome is thine image," is the comment on the drunken Kit Sly. In short, when you look at the smooth, happy, half-feminine face of Shakspeare, you see one to whom all forms of debauchery were ungenial. A courtier certainly, and a lover of money. The king had written against tobacco, and Will Shakspeare set his watch to the time. Raleigh and Caliban Jonson might smoke at the Mermaid—Will kept his head clear and his doublet sweet.—*Cope's Tobacco Plant.*

## Science.

---

### HAS MAN DEVELOPED FROM THE SAVAGE STATE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—VII.

ON the earliest pages of history man emerges upon our view as a savage being. History is not written until a certain amount of civilization has been attained, and hence we may be sure that history being only a late achievement of our race, man was not civilized before the era of history. History is a record of man's doings and his progress; so that if we trace the progress made by man, step by step, back to the un-historic period, we shall see how little civilization has advanced when history had begun her records. Here and there a little civilization shines out of the great darkness—like lighthouses at night set on and pouring forth their rays from some few islands in the sea—but the very brightness of these rays gives evidence of the intensity of gloom in which the rest of humanity lay. The historian looks round upon the scene of the nations, communities, or tribes, which meet his views and observations regarding them, shows us only a succession of acts of cruelty, rapine, and plunder; of marauding forays, in which neither popular discipline nor commanding skill is displayed; of improvident self-indulgence and debauchery followed by the grim endurance of famine; the former being pursued with dexterous cunning and unprincipled disregard for others, and the latter by passive, if not stupid, immobility of feeling rather than nobility or hardihood of spirit. They have no history, they are moved by no past beyond that which the memory of the passions retains a notice of; and only contemporary events stir or move them; they form a community not by compact or law, but by passion and need. They appear before us in the pages of the early historians like spectres wandering in the dim darkness in a confused intermixture of war, famine, fire, and revelry; and the photograph which he is able to take of them is blurred by movement and indistinct from defect of light; so that the picture rather resembles the wild extravaganza of a fever-dream than any definite reality.

They have no annals, and but few traditions, and the various generations of men pass away as Homer represents them, like the leaves of a tree, leaving no mark and tracing no memory, but only leaving a vacancy for the new comers; or, as some one else has remarked, the successive generations of savage races vanish from the earth, leaving as little trace of their having existed on it as the track of a ship upon the great waters. "In nations where there is hardly the use of letters," Dr. Samuel Johnson, in his "Journey to the Hebrides," remarks, "what is once out of sight is lost for ever. They think but little, and of their few thoughts none are wasted on the past, in which they are neither interested by fear nor hope. Their only registers are stated observances and practical representations. For this reason, an age of ignorance is an age of ceremony. Pageants, and processions, and commemorations gradually shrink away as better methods came into use of recording events and preserving rights. The lessons of time and the experience of ages do not exist for savage nations, hence the evidence of the uprise of history is proof that "man has developed from the savage state."

All the notices which history gives us of man in his early or pre-historic condition, as far as regards his moral and social condition, their manners and customs, the state of their intelligence, their knowledge of the arts, their modes of procuring and employing food, the way in which they treated their wives and children, the plans on which they built their dwellings, and the forms in which they waged war, made treaties, and indulged in their festivities, agree in showing us man in a savage state, and every one of these notices links in, with perfect accuracy, to the discoveries made by explorers of geological *débris*, &c., in such a way as to afford no other conclusion than that in pre-historic times man was what he has been for many ages after history began—a being in process of development from a savage state. These facts, not only of geology, but of history—mutually corroborative of each other—are also farther supported by the facts brought before us in our own day by travellers among the African and Indian savages, the Bedouin Arabs, the nomadic Tartars, &c., the statements made on the best authorities regarding the comparatively fixed and unprogressive social state of the Chinese, the Japanese, the Hindoos, the Persians, the Turks, &c.; and all that we have learned of the deadening effects of absolutism and despotism as compared with

civilization, freedom, and law. Science, history, and observation are therefore at one in their common declaration of the fact that man has developed from the savage state at the very least, though perhaps, not the very lowest.

Had man been created and had he continued in a civilized condition, it would have been quite impossible for him to have been so long without developing inventions. He must have desired to record his ideas, to register his doings, to emblazon what was famous, and to praise the worthy. He must, therefore, early have been in possession of letters and literature, of arts and sciences, and man would not now have been driven hither and thither by every wind of doctrine about the alleged discoveries of the present day. The non-progress of civilized man is therefore a difficulty our opponents require to explain. It seems to be impossible that man in a civilized condition could have failed to reproduce ideas and record facts, when we find that even now the greatest desire of man is to commemorate the dead and the deeds he did. When we combine this negative proof of man's non-civilization with the facts unexplained, and inexplicable on the hypothesis of man's civilization, of the evidences of savagery and barbaric taste, habits, customs, &c., revealed in the strata of the earth—as described by Lubbock, Lyell, &c., plainly prove that man could not have been created and continued in a civilized state, and that so far as we are concerned, our ancestors must have developed from a savage state.

P. O. S. thinks this question concerns man, not his circumstances. True, in a certain sense; but it is only through man's circumstances that we get a knowledge of what he is. History and science only tell us the circumstances of man, that we may infer what he is; and we cannot suppose history-less and science-less man to have been civilized.

"Samuel" thinks that the moral nature of man is little changed, and argues thence that man's civilization is little affected by outward circumstances; but the same argument applies here as refers to P. O. S.; we can only know these things by the proofs afforded to us. Our laws are growing more mild and just; our habits are improving; our condition is undergoing great changes for the better; every such change is an evidence that man is only even now rising from the savage state; that he has not already attained to civilization, nor is he yet perfect. On the whole, then, the affirmatives have it.

D. M. S.

## NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—VII.

THE researches and achievements of science are undoubtedly great and glorious, and the revelations disclosed to the mind of man through its study, have heightened his aspirations and illuminated his nature. The field of mental speculation which science presents to us is so infinitely wide that one discovery of its wonders only "marshals the way" to the discovery of wonders more intricate and marvellous, consequently the pursuits of the votaries of science can never become exhausted. But though such laudable expressions can be truthfully bestowed on this important branch of education, yet it is, like every other accompaniment of human progression, subject to lamentable abuse. The attitude science has taken in respect to the origin of man cannot, therefore, be considered as a matter of wonder or surprise.

The question under discussion unavoidably leads to the mingling of arguments taken from sacred history and divine revelation, with facts which have checkered the fluctuating course of humanity. To avoid the testimony of the Bible in this debate would simply bring the question to an unsatisfactory conclusion, for there is no other source of reliable information given relative to the creation of man; besides, the truth of the Bible has been proved unmistakably in so many ways, both human and divine, and its close relation to the national and individual prosperity of man at the present day, that any comment upon its influence and veracity in this place is quite needless.

One important leading fact, which forms, we may say, the key-revelation in solving the question under discussion is notably portrayed in the tendency of his nature. Man is far more prone to decline into error than to rise from error into truth. For example of this fact we do not require to look any further than around our own fair isle. Do we not find men, brought up under the purest influences of religion relaxing from their high position, and falling into the most sensual and degrading state? Our lists of mortality, our prisons, our literature, our asylums, our hospitals, all too painfully bear proof of the mighty load of GUILT man labours under. We find even men, long noted for their piety and Christian consistency, subsequently becoming morally sick under the baneful atmosphere of sin, and adopting the strangest ideas of God and religion. We also find men distinguished for their genius and



learning leading most incompatible and infamous lives. On the other hand we see men almost totally ignorant of the very rudiments of education strenuously following the dictates of morality and religion. When such varied traits can be seen in the nature of man, we are naturally led to inquire, What was the primary cause of such moral degradation? Without any other assistance than that of our own consciences we receive a conclusive answer. The cause of man's depravity must have been the committal of an act contrary to the established laws of purity and obedience. Man must have possessed a TRUE idea of morality before he could possibly become conscious of the presence of disobedience and guilt. Ignorance (in the sense necessarily assumed in this debate) could not have been an attribute of man's primeval condition, because a KNOWLEDGE of what is right must be had and felt too before what is wrong can be committed. . Certainly ignorance is one of the results of disobedience to the laws of truth; but it is surely an outrageous syllogism to maintain that ignorance developed in man's original state, because that would constitute it a PRINCIPLE in the nature of man, and consequently could not be RADICALLY forced into subordination. We see that man can be blinded, misled, and deluded, through the agency of error, when possessed of the full grasp of the intellect, so much so that it can launch its victim into irremediable despair. If sin can cause such a blasting effect over man, even when in the full power of his mental faculties, how is it possible that man ever could have raised himself from a condition the very principles of which darken his understanding and corrupt his nature? To maintain that man was originally under the total influence of a power which can exercise such terrible feats on his ENLIGHTENED nature, and to believe that man raised himself from such a state is, perhaps, the most profound stretch of the imagination ever accomplished.

Savagism is a state consisting of pure ignorance, possessing the most gross ideas of the existence of a Deity, and utterly foreign to a sense of responsibility. Therefore a savage is a being that knows no laws of truth and consistency, and is accordingly capable of falling into a state of degradation more loathsome than that of the brute; for while brutes are led and restrained by an unerring law, a savage being in the possession of a free-will, but without the true powers of reason, knows no limits of degradation. Man, therefore, could not raise himself from such a condition into his present state. We

cannot discover any such inconsistency in any other exhibition of God's creative hand, and it is repugnant to our feelings to harbour such an idea of the development of the more glorious master-piece of creation.

The supporters of the affirmative, by maintaining that man has developed from the savage state affirm that he has developed into a moral and accountable creature. Then, we ask, in what respect do the "moral and accountable beings" of the present day differ from their savage predecessors that lived in the first ages? Man in his present state has certainly an advantage over man in his primeval state in possessing a knowledge of the experiences of the past. But so far as his NATURE is concerned, we must admit there is no visible change. The modern man labours under the same pernicious influences, and cherishes the same impure thoughts, as the ancient. Accordingly, the only difference between the modern nation and the ancient is, that the one possesses *knowledge acquired from experience*, an acquisition the other could not possibly obtain. If, then, primeval man was in a state of savagism, the civilized nation has developed from pure ignorance. How knowledge can be the offspring of ignorance is a mystery which mental philosophy has still to unravel.

The supporters of the affirmative lay the stress of their arguments on the fact of progression man has made in LEARNING. But has this advancement been purely owing to the gradual improvement in his mind and life? or has it been the means of changing his degraded propensities? To both of these questions we unhesitatingly reply in the negative. We could, for illustrations of the sameness in the nature of man civilized and man savage, point to hundreds of inventions which have originated through no other, nor possibly could, than through the medium of man's absolute depravity. Workmanship of the most ingenious nature has been executed to no other purpose than to satisfy the cravings of vanity, superstition, and cruelty. As the human family increased, divine history informs us crime, sensuality, and idolatry advanced; and ultimately the wickedness of man became so great, that the anger of God was so kindled against man that it roused Him to destroy the world with a flood. How many civilized nations of the present day could we put forward to substantiate the fact that civilization and degradation go hand in hand together. There are nations considered to be the very heights of progression and fashion, that cannot be said to have emerged into the childhood of religion. The whole aspect of

humanity impresses us with this truth,—man is not capable of raising himself into a civilized state, the ideal of his mind. His endeavours in acquiescing to the admonitions of morality vividly portray his utter inability to accomplish that which he aspires to ; proving that both his nature and mind are obscured from the desired manifestations of God. It has been well said : “ Give earthly immortality to sinners, and this fair world is instantly converted into a Pandemonium ; remove the fear of death, and there would be no need of any other hell than this earth : even now the thoughts and imaginations of the hearts of worldly men are evil continually, prone to mere animal gratifications, averse to all spiritual contemplation, bent on encroachment, intent on aggrandizement, mortally hating all and sundry who present any obstacle to headlong indulgence. These are genuine and characteristic features of unrenewed human nature, and all the restraints arising from fear of punishment, poverty, and disgrace, are daily found to be insufficient to repress the ebullition of these fiendish and beastly propensities ! Such being man’s present state, under a true knowledge of himself, and of the nature of his Maker, where is the consistency of God creating man in darkness and ignorance, then subsequently to bestow on his mind a knowledge of his depraved state ? If man has developed from a savage state, he affords an exception to the wonderful consistency of God unfolded throughout the whole world.

Of the creation of man, and the cause of his exile from the state in which he was created, we have a record given in the Bible. The words spoken by our all-wise and powerful Creator after He had finished His six days work of creation,—“ Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.” Being created in the image of God man was a pure, moral, responsible creature, free from every deformity and imperfection. Man’s influence on nature, his power, his reason, the variations he displays in the exercise of his faculties, bear sufficient evidence of the truth of the language of Scripture—man being the crowning act of transcendent power.

To hold that man was created in a savage state, is to deny that man ever possessed power to exercise his reason aright, and to assume that he has raised himself out of a labyrinth of interminable barriers to the attainment of perfection. To maintain that man was created with reason, yet in a state of savagism, thereby depriving him of the power to exercise his reason, is simply to believe an impossibility. Of what use is reason to man if he be not free to

exercise it? Man in a savage state can scarcely be called FREE, for he is placed under absolute DELUSION. Why was reason given to man? Undoubtedly because man is a RESPONSIBLE being—the object of divine goodness—reason is essential, both in directing his actions and in possessing a true idea of the nature of his Maker. Now it is notorious that all savage nations possess an IDEA (the egress of reason) of a Deity, but invariably the idea is erroneous. God, in bestowing reason on man consequently created him accountable. To argue, then, that man developed from the savage state, is certainly to assume that God has failed in attaining from man the object desired—a true idea of Himself and subservience to His will. Without exception, savages possess an idea of a Deity, but their ideas, like their worship, are most illiterate and obscene. How, then, since we can discover not even one solitary instance of a TRUE idea of God in all the savage world, can man have developed from the savage state? We can produce example over example how man can fall into a state of savagism, but we can find no example of how man can emerge from such a state by his own power. Such a fact is conclusive that man could not have developed from the savage state.

Man being the OBJECT of God's spiritual GOODNESS must have been created in a manner consistent with the character of God. The fact of God creating man RESPONSIBLE confutes the bare possibility that man in his primeval state worshipped FALSE gods. Nothing that is foul and despicable can be the handiwork of the Creator of man, in whose sight "even the heavens are impure." The cause, therefore, of man's degradation is not through any influence wrought by God. All the imperfections that blight, darken, and obscure the beauties of his nature, are the results of his disobedience to the laws of God. To study the structure of man, the power he possesses, the works he accomplishes in his FALLEN state, clearly shows that his nature has been tainted by HIMSELF. For look at man in his present state; is not every sin he commits purely owing to his own actions? Accordingly man in his present state affords a clear and elaborate commentary on the question how he was created, and how he became what he now is.

Consulting our heart only, we believe that man is more than salines and ammonia; and short as his term upon earth is decreed to be, he yet achieves enough during his career to prove that the alliance between his soul and the elements of the inorganic world is

no more than incidental: we therefore believe that the one shall survive the form of the other, and, listening to the voice of nature, we declare that within the prison of clay he now inhabits there dwells a true individuality—a spirit indeed, of which physical force is only a faint emblem—harder than the strong rock; stronger than the winds; speedier in flight than the lightning's flash, and yet, withal, gentler than the dove,—a spirit, in short, which, as it is not of earth, is from heaven.

"Immortality and responsibility are necessary to each other; they form the opposite ends of a pole, balanced on man's life. Responsibility points to immortality, and immortality completes what responsibility begins.

"Let science pursue her course, illuminating with her splendours the darkness of our earthly home. To science belong matter and form, however diversified—time and space, however extended; but the mystery of existence is wrapped up within the impenetrable folds of the infinite. Science can test the properties of all earthly substances—analyse and combine them with ever-recurring wonders. God, eternity, and spirit, are words not to be found in her nomenclature. To science God is simply a force, man a phenomenon, while eternity is unknown."\*

Man, in his present state, may be compared to the ruins of an ancient edifice. Though the moss of time has concealed the architectural beauties of the structure, and though ivy has grown over its windows, obscuring the light of day, yet in its very ruins it points back to a time when it stood in the completeness of its grandeur. So it is with man. Though the corrupting influence of disobedience has deformed his frame and chequered his soul with impurity, yet what remains of the glory of his nature surely discloses that he once lived in the sunny regions of bliss, and smiled under the breath of Heaven.

C. R.

---

\* "Development or Creation," p. 63.

## The Essayist.

---

### THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION.\*

THE English Constitution is anomalous and unique. Yet, the long continuance, the regularity, and the smoothness of the working of this singular machine prove it to be well adapted to the ends for which it is intended. On paper a machine might be drawn the plan of which would lead us to think it better than the one of which we have so long experienced the advantages. But the length of time during which our constitutional machine has stood, and in which period so many other governing machines have fallen to ruin (some of them being in appearance more promising than our own) and the fact of its having performed its work so well, are proofs of its good quality. We propose briefly to point out some of its excellences and advantages, hoping that our readers will feel as much interest in, and derive as much advantage from studying the structure and workings of this curious piece of mechanism, as we ourselves have.

I. *The Legislature.* This is not the Sovereign alone, but the Sovereign, Lords, and Commons combined. Each of the houses has the power of either affirming or negating the decisions of the other. The Sovereign can affirm or negative the decisions of both. Any question may be considered and deliberated upon by the Houses of Parliament. Any member in each house may propose what he thinks proper. Though the Sovereign has the exclusive right of assembling parliament, yet the period is fixed beyond which the head of the State cannot refuse to convene it. And as very injurious consequences might follow if laws that greatly affect public liberty could be enacted in parliaments abruptly summoned, it is established that the writs for assembling a parliament must be

---

\* The writer of this essay has not scrupled in many places to use the very words of a well-known writer on our constitution, those words being more expressive than any which he could himself change them for. After the introductory remarks his work has been little more than to select, abridge, and arrange matter made ready to hand. Yet he flatters himself that even this slight task with so interesting and important a subject may not be without its value.

issued at least forty days before its first meeting. It is also enacted that the Sovereign cannot abridge the term of prorogation that has been fixed, except in the case of a rebellion, or of danger from foreign invasion, and even then a notice of fourteen days must be given.

No member of either house can be questioned, or called to account in any place out of parliament for anything said in it. And as interest as well as fear might impose silence, it is enacted that clerks in the revenue offices, crown pensioners, and others cannot be elected members, while persons accepting office under the Crown thereby vacate their seat, though they may be re-elected.

The effect of the division of the English legislature into three Parts, is that those parts are a mutual restraint on each other. Instances of this restraint having been exercised may be given. Thus, in the reign of Charles II., the Commons tacked certain bills which they particularly wanted to have passed to their money-bills. The forcible use thus made of their privilege of granting money would have destroyed the equilibrium between them and the Crown. The Lords undertook to maintain that equilibrium, and made it a standing order of their house to reject on the sight of them, all bills that are tacked to money-bills.

Again, in the reign of William III., a strong party in the House of Lords framed and carried a bill abridging the prerogative of the Crown in calling parliaments, and judging themselves of the proper times of doing it. The bill was rejected by the Commons.

II. *The Sovereign.* 1. The prerogatives of the Sovereign. The sovereign is the source of all judicial power. The judges are his or her substitutes. Everything is transacted in his or her name. The Sovereign can pardon offences, that is, remit the punishment that has been awarded to those offences. The Sovereign is the fountain of honour, the distributor of titles and dignities, the creator of peers, baronets, and knights, and the disposer of offices in the courts of law and elsewhere. The Sovereign alone can coin money, has the prerogative of regulating weights and measures, is the supreme head of the Church, appoints the bishops, is the generalissimo of all the sea and land forces, levies troops, equips fleets, builds fortresses, sends and receives ambassadors, contracts alliances, declares war, and makes peace.

It is a fundamental maxim that the Sovereign can do no wrong, which signifies that his or her person is above the reach of all

courts of law, and is sacred and inviolable. As a counterbalance to the prerogative of the Commons of exclusively granting supplies, it is customary with them at the commencement of a new reign to grant the Sovereign a revenue for life. This enables him or her to support the dignity of the Crown, and affords all necessary independence, while it does not abridge the influence of the Commons with respect to any great exertions of the sovereign power.

Again, parliament can establish as numerous a standing army as it pleases, but immediately another power comes forward to take the absolute command of it, fill all the parts in it, and direct all its motions. Parliament may lay new taxes, but immediately another power seizes on the produce of them.

When parliament is dissolved, the laws passed by it continue in force. The Sovereign is supplied with the power necessary for executing them, but is bound by the laws equally with the subjects.

2. The restraints placed by the constitution on the Sovereign. The Sovereign is head of the Church, but can neither alter the established religion, call individuals to an account for their religious opinions, nor profess the Roman Catholic religion. Any prince professing this religion is declared incapable of inheriting, possessing, or enjoying the British Crown. The Sovereign is the first magistrate, but can neither make any change in the maxims and forms that are established by law or custom, nor influence in any case the decision of causes between subject and subject.

The Sovereign alone has the privilege of coining money, but cannot alter the standard. The Sovereign has the military power, but cannot raise troops without the consent of parliament. This consent is given only for a year at a time, and the taxes for their payment are allowed for only the same period. Even military offences and desertion can be punished only by the annual renewal of the Mutiny Act.

Though the Sovereign cannot be arraigned before judges, yet the advisers of the Crown can be impeached by the Commons for the employment of the public money in a way contrary to the declared intention of those who granted it, for an abuse of power, or for anything done contrary to the public welfare.

III. *The Lords.* The peers of Great Britain bear in real weight and numbers no proportion to the body of the people, but as a compensation they have the advantage of personal honours, and of an hereditary title. Also by established ceremonial the House of



Lords has a pre-eminence over the House of Commons, the latter being the lower, while the former is the upper house. In the upper house the throne of the Sovereign is placed. Here the Sovereign meets the parliament, the Commons being at such a time required to appear at the bar of the Lords. The peers also act as judges in case of impeachments brought by the Commons. When the latter having passed a bill send it to the Lords, a number of their members accompany it, but the Lords send bills to the Commons by some of their assistants only. In a conference between members of the two houses, the Commons are uncovered. All bills that have passed both houses remain in the House of Lords till the royal pleasure is signified. The Lords are members of the legislature by virtue of a right inherent in their persons, and sit in parliament on their own account, and for the support of their own interests. On this account they have the privilege of giving their votes by proxies, which privilege the Commons have not, they being themselves proxies for the people. When any of the Lords dissent from the resolutions of their house, they may enter a protest against them in the journals of the house, containing the reasons of their dissent.

#### IV. *The House of Commons.*

1. Its freedom of election. The writ sent under the great seal of the sheriffs of the counties, directing them to take the necessary steps for the election of members, being received by them, they must three days after its reception send their precept to the proper officers of the boroughs, ordering them to make the election within eight days after the reception of the precept, giving four days notice thereof. Candidates practising bribery are punishable. No peer or lord-lieutenant has any right to interfere in the election, neither are the electors allowed to be overawed by the army.

2. Its privileges. All bills for granting money must have their beginning in this house. The Lords cannot take such into consideration but from a bill being presented to them by the Commons. The latter are so tenacious of this privilege that they do not allow any alteration to be made by the Lords in money bills. The Lords must either accept them as they are or reject them. The privilege possessed exclusively by the Commons of originating money bills, and granting supplies counterbalances the extensive prerogatives of the Sovereign. The latter can command armies and equip fleets, but cannot maintain them without the will of the Commons. The Sovereign can bestow places and emoluments, but cannot pay the

salaries attached to them without the Commons. The Sovereign can declare war, but cannot carry it on without the Commons. As has been justly remarked, "The royal prerogative destitute of the power of imposing taxes, is like a ship completely equipped, but from which the parliament can at pleasure draw off the water, and leave it aground, and also set it again afloat by granting subsidies." It being customary to grant a revenue for the life of the present Sovereign only, each successor to the kingly station finds a throne, a sceptre, and a crown, but neither power nor dignity, and before an actual possession of these is given, the parliament have the power of taking a thorough review of the State, of correcting abuses that may have crept in, and thus of bringing back the constitution to its first principles.

The Commons are the sole judges of the amount of subsidies to be raised, and also of the ways and means of raising them. They need not come to any resolution whatever regarding them until the safety of the subject is fully provided for, and in the exercise of their privilege of having the sole right of taxation, have in process of time applied it to a nobler use than the mere preservation of property. They have succeeded in converting it into a regular and constitutional means of influencing the motions of the executive. By means of this right, they have gained the advantage of being constantly called to concur in the measures of the Sovereign, of having the greatest attention shown by the latter to their requests, and of having the highest regard paid by the same to engagements made with them.

V. *The people.* The people have the right of property, of personal security, and of locomotion. These rights are every Englishman's inheritance—his birthright. As a consequence the Sovereign can take from his subjects nothing of what they possess, nor can any individual take aught from another individual. When any person is charged with a crime a magistrate issues a warrant to apprehend him, but this warrant is simply an order for the party to be brought before him. The magistrate must then hear the case, and take it down in writing. If on this examination it appears that the crime laid to the person's charge was not committed by him he must be set at liberty. If the contrary appears, he is in cases of great importance committed to prison for trial at the next sessions or assizes. In less serious cases he must give bail for his appearance to answer to the charge. At the trial a grand jury is composed of

more than twelve, and less than twenty-four of the most considerable persons in the county or town. The function of this jury is to examine the evidence given before the magistrates in support of every charge. If twelve of the number do not concur in the opinion that the charge is well-grounded the accused is at once set at liberty. If twelve of the jury do concur in this opinion the prisoner is detained for trial. When brought to the bar, the bill of indictment is read in his presence. A petty jury is composed of twelve men, who are chosen to hear the evidence for and against the prisoner, and decide upon his guilt or innocence. The fate of the prisoner being thus in the hands of this jury, it is exceedingly desirable that he should have a share in the choice of them. This the English law allows him, by granting him the privilege of challenging or objecting to those of them whom he may think exceptionable. He has the privilege of challenging the jury in two ways. First, if he has reason to think that the officer who formed the panel is not indifferent in the cause, that he has an interest in the prosecution, or that he is related to the prosecutor, or to the injured party, he may request to have the whole panel set aside. Secondly, he may object to any individuals of the jury on the ground of their being legally incapable of serving, on the ground of their having been convicted of crime, or on that of their having an interest in the conviction of the prisoner, or of their being related to either the prosecutor, or his attorney, or counsel, or of their being of the same society or corporation with him. Farther, the law allows the prisoner, independently of these grounds of challenge, to object, without shewing any cause, to twenty jurors successively, and when the prisoner is an alien, one half of the jurors must also be aliens.

When the jury is formed, and the jurors have taken their oath, the prosecutor produces the proofs of his accusation, when the prisoner may question the witnesses for the prosecution, and also produce witnesses for his defence. He is also allowed the assistance of counsel to discuss any point of law as well as to investigate the fact itself. When the prosecutor and the prisoner have closed their evidence, and the witnesses have answered to the questions put by their own party in the case, by the opposite party, by the bench, and by the jury, the judge in an address to the jury sums up the evidence that has been advanced on each side. He shows what is the hinge of the question under consideration, and gives his

opinion both as to the evidence given, and as the point of law which is to guide them in their decision. This done, the jury withdraw to consider their verdict in which they must be unanimous. The opinion which the judge delivers has no weight but such as the jury choose to give it, and their verdict must decide both on the fact and on the criminality of it. If the verdict of the jury is Not Guilty the prisoner is liberated, and cannot on any plea be tried again for the same offence. If the verdict is Guilty the judge pronounces the punishment which the law appoints. He must not judge according to his own discretion, he must adhere strictly to the letter of the law, and however criminal in itself a fact may be, it passes unpunished if it be not a case provided for by the laws.

The trial of every prisoner must be public. The judge cannot change either the place or the kind of punishment prescribed by the sentence ; and should even the sheriff take away the life of a prisoner in a way different from that prescribed by the law he would be guilty of murder.

The judges cannot be deprived of their office but on an accusation by parliament, therefore the effect of interest with the Sovereign, or with those who surround that exalted personage can scarcely influence their decisions. Their commissions continue in force notwithstanding the demise of the Crown, which has the effect of preventing their being influenced by the heir to the throne. As they have no power to pass sentence till the matter of fact has been settled by a jury nominated in effect by the common choice of the parties, private views and respect of persons are banished from our courts of justice. The admirable institution of trial by jury places the judicial authority out of the hands of the government. It is even placed out of the hands of the judge himself. Those who are entrusted with the public power cannot exert it till they have, as it were, received the permission of the administrators of the laws, and these cannot administer the law till they have received permission from the jury. The consequence is that no man in England meets the individual who has power to decide on his death or life, juries being not a permanent body, and therefore having had no time to study how their power may be used to promote their private ends. They are selected from the people for the occasion, perhaps never before filled the position, and do not know that they ever will again. Torture is not lawful in England.

and though no man can under any pretence be tried a second time for the same offence, yet if any one has been found guilty on proofs which are strongly suspected of being false, a new trial is granted. The law of *habeas corpus* requires that every prisoner shall either be brought to trial or be set at liberty, thus preventing a continuous imprisonment.

The very fact of the government of England being a monarchy, and that an hereditary one, is eminently conducive to the liberties of the people. The whole mass of the executive power is placed in the hands of one individual. One person in the state being made very great, and far above all others, an effectual check is put to the struggles and pretensions which are common in republics; and no individual has the slightest ground for supposing that by way of intrigues, by favours conferred on the people, services rendered to them, or by any other means he can raise himself to the head of the State. The very greatness of the English monarch is therefore a preservative of the liberties of the people. All competition with, or rivalling of that exalted personage is hopeless, and therefore not attempted.

In most of the ancient free states, the share of the people in the business of legislation, was simply to approve or reject the propositions made to them, and give the final sanction to them. It was a function of the executive to prepare and frame the laws, and propose them to the people. They thus possessed that branch of the legislative power which may be called the initiative, or the prerogative of putting that power in action. In England, on the contrary, the people, through their representatives, possess the initiative in legislation. The necessities of the state, and the wants of the Sovereign, put that exalted personage under the necessity of frequently having recourse to parliament, and as we have seen the parliament is not bound to wait for such propositions as the executive may choose to propose to them. Any member is at liberty to propose the introduction of a bill, an inquiry into real or supposed abuses, or the production of papers and correspondence to throw light on the proceedings of the executive. The greatness of this privilege will be seen when we remember that even in Scotland previous to its union with England, all propositions laid before parliament were made by persons called Lords of the Articles. In Ireland, again, previous to its union with Britain, all bills were prepared by the Sovereign in council, and laid before the Irish parliament by the Lord-Lieutenant, for their assent or dissent.

When the time has arrived at which the commission given by the people to their delegates expires, they exercise the power of re-electing those of their representatives whose conduct they approve of, and of rejecting those of whom they have cause to complain. Every subject in England has the right of presenting petitions to the Sovereign, and to both Houses of Parliament. He has also the privilege of bringing his complaints and observations before the public by means of a free press. The English laws do not allow a man to be deemed guilty of a crime for merely publishing something which is disagreeable to another. Punishment is appointed only for him who has printed that which is criminal in its nature, and that punishment can be awarded only on the verdict of a jury. Neither the courts of justice, nor any judges whatever, are authorized to take any notice of writings intended for the press. They are confined to those which are actually printed. Thus both the governors and governed are sensible that their actions are liable to be exposed to public view. Governors, therefore, dare not venture on those acts of partiality, those secret connivances at the acts of particular persons, or those vexatious and illegal practices which they are too apt to be guilty of when acting out of the public sight. They are conscious that their wrong-doings would be immediately divulged.

There is a reciprocal interaction between the privilege of a free press and the right of ultimate resistance to unconstitutional government. Thus the press might be free to defend the rights of the people, but without the right of a resistance which would overawe those who attempt to violate the constitution that freedom would be a mere shadow. So, again, the right of resistance would be deprived of much of its efficacy if the means afforded by a free press for effecting with celebrity a general union amongst the people did not exist.

Both the throne, the parliament, and the people of England, have powerful safeguards. And as a compensation-balance or pendulum in a watch or clock ensures accuracy of movement in the time-keeper, so the principle of compensation which is to be found in the English Constitution causes that venerable and valuable machine to work with regularity and with comfort unspeakable to those to whom it belongs.

S. S.

## Toiling Upward.

GEORGE DANIEL,

SATIRIST, CRITIC, ANTIQUARIAN, DRAMATIST, &c.

IF, towards the latter end of July, 1864, a man with any literary taste or curiosity had been walking down the Strand, in all probability he would have turned his steps in the direction of Waterloo Bridge, and, entering the well-known literary auction-rooms of Messrs. Sotheby and Company, would have witnessed the sale of one of the best libraries of rare books then in existence—the library of George Daniel, the intelligent antiquarian and diligent dramatic author. All sections of the literary world were represented at that ten days sale. That great depository of literature—the British Museum—which is from time to time drawing to itself all the valuable relics of the past, was eager to select some gold from this private mine, and exhibit it in the public literary mint. Several wealthy English merchants, whose early love for learning had not been altogether lost in the all-absorbing enterprises of commercial life; and some English ladies, wishful to possess original copies of books which have done so much to establish our national literary fame, had sent their representatives; and the Americans, always eager to promote their own education by the study of our literature, crossed the Atlantic, to enrich their museums and colleges with some literary gems from the land of their fathers. Never, perhaps, had a single private individual succeeded in collecting so curious and valuable a library as George Daniel had done; and to the soundness of his judgment, and the long-continued perseverance of his researches, the world is indebted for the knowledge of the existence of many singular and useful works which might still have been secreted from public view.

The time at which his library was sold was very opportune—the Tercentenary of Shakspeare's birthday had just been celebrated at Stratford-upon-Avon; and the public had shown, by the interest it had taken in doing honour to one of England's greatest sons, that true genius and diligent working are valued by an intelligent people in all future time.

George Daniel had looked forward with no small amount of pleasure to the opportunity he hoped would have been afforded him of taking part in honouring his favourite bard and teacher at this great festival; but, while the *litterati* were celebrating Shakspeare's

memory, his genial spirit had passed away from his companions. In July, three months after the national celebration, George Daniel's collection of books (the result of long and anxious labour), were dispersed far and wide among the wealthy and the learned. Looking over the voluminous catalogue, the eye rests on a vast number of literary jewels, many of them unique. Here is a collection of seventy black-letter ballads, telling us of the manner in which men thought and acted in the golden days of Queen Elizabeth, describing the tournaments in the times of James I., or expressing the joys and sorrows of the exemplary Edward VI. And there is no literature that places our ancestors so vividly before the student of history as their national ballads. This singular collection was sold for £750.

Here is a French missal, as valuable as it is beautiful, commencing with a calendar, in which are depicted in twelve miniatures the principal occupations of the month, executed in the highest style of art; each page, like the offices themselves, decorated with an admirable border, upon a lilac-tinted ground, composed into robes and ribbons, twisted into love-knots and fanciful shapes, ornamented in the best taste, with the devices and mottoes of the family for whom it was executed." This was one of the finest specimens of French art ever submitted for sale by auction; it sold for £250. The early folio editions of Shakspeare's works were George Daniel's very highly-prized and valuable relics. Miss Burdett Coutts purchased one edition for £716, and several others were sold for sums ranging from £300 to £400.

The whole amount realised by this remarkable sale was between £15,000 and £16,000. Of the sedulous and devoted accumulator of these treasured stores, few, we think, would be unsolicitous of knowing something, for that he was not only a lover but a maker of books, a man of strong, original, and varied genius.

While the French Revolution was raging, and the English nation was anxious and disturbed; George Daniel was born 1789, in London. He was descended from Paul Daniell, the head of a distinguished family of those noble Huguenots, who were the French apostles of freedom, and he certainly inherited no small share of their spirit. When he was eight years old his father, a man of some ability, died. The legacy he left his son was a library, and among these streams of "life-blood" George passed his early years. He was not forced to read, he took to learning, and this early love of study was a prominent feature in his character throughout life. He had not the benefit of a university education; he was self-educated



He valued learning not because it was a means of subsistence, but as being the best promoter of happiness. His early years were spent in that field which must, hereafter, bring the richest harvest—the field of thought. He followed the path of his favourite authors; “fancy’s own child,” Shakspeare, was best known to the world during his lifetime as a proprietor in the Globe Theatre, Blackfriars; Milton’s genius, though it budded early, blossomed late; it burst not out into the fruit of “Paradise Lost” till fifty-seven winters had clouded his brow. It was beneath the feet of our great poets that George Daniel sat; knowing that from them some of the best lessons are to be learnt. Genius is often awakened by some great public event, generally affected more or less by it.

It was the death of Lord Nelson that first called his poetic talent into action; and when once the fountain had begun to flow it continued gaining strength; until the youth who wrote the naval hero’s elegy became the dramatic author, the critic, and the poet. Love lightens work, takes the sting out of labour, and we are not surprised to find this lover of literature become an earnest worker in a difficult literary path. In 1812 he produced “The Times, a Prophecy,” and a small volume of “Miscellaneous Poems.” In 1815 George Daniel produced “The Modern Dunciad,” a clever satirical poem, and a work of which a critic remarked that “This modern Pope—whoever he may be—has produced a “Dunciad” which the stinging bard of Twickenham would not be ashamed to own. The bard spares neither poet nor courtier; and in the office of a satirist he speaks with the boldness of a Juvenal;” it passed through five editions in a year. Shortly afterwards two farces of his were performed respectively at the Lyceum and Drury Lane Theatres; in the year 1833, however, he discontinued writing dramatic works. For a long period the readers of “Cumberland’s Minor Theatre” were entertained by the smart and witty prefaces which appeared before the several plays published in that series, and some of the finest, briefest, incisive, and decisive theatrical and dramatic criticisms which have been written, combining the acumen of Hazlitt, the perceptiveness of Lamb, the taste of Leigh Hunt, and the epigrammatic skill of Horne—they are, indeed, criticisms in essences, and were signed “D. G.” (which are his initials reversed). Besides these, he also wrote the annual orations for Mr. Harley, the comedian, to deliver at the anniversaries of the Drury Lane Theatrical Fund. His “Merrie England in the 1871.

Olden Times," which appeared in two vols., 8vo., in 1842, is a book full of instructive interest to the antiquarian, and sparkles with amusement and wit for the curious. Here he describes to us the fairs of bygone days; takes us to the old inns, and unfolds the long scroll of histories and mysteries connected with them; relates to us how old customs rose and then fell into disuse; so pleasantly does he tell the story of the past, that we sometimes wish old Time would roll us backward rather than forward. In this work the good-humoured antiquarian shows himself to be a warm-hearted philanthropist. George Daniel had an intense love for the English dramatists and the British stage; he knew that the every-day life of our ancestors—their manners and customs in a word, *themselves*, are depicted—not in the wars that they fought or the dogmas they upheld—but in their social gatherings and festive sports: for if we would judge of the character of a people we must enter their homes, and observe their actions there, and not number the thousands who fight in their battles, or the courtiers who buzz, like so many flies, round their king. When George Daniel would write us the social history of two centuries he takes us, not to palaces and parks, but to the old inns at Southwark and Holborn, or strays with us into country fairs; pictures Sir Walter Raleigh sitting with his pipe under the shade of the Queen's Head Tavern, in the Lower Road, in merrie Islington; or to the old Hornsey Wood Tavern where Queen Elizabeth was wont to hunt in the days of yore. We ourselves, in these days of civilisation, borne on by hurry and bustle, cannot but look back with an inward sigh to those good old times when "Queen Bess" sported in the fields of Hornsey, and occasionally rode through the pretty village of "Iseldune."

Though most of his writings tell of bygone times, some of them have reference to himself and his family. "The Missionary," a poem—a small quarto issued in 1847—refers to his second son, who, in early life, left his native country for America, and after a prosperous commercial career, was appointed an adjutant-general in the Confederate army, and lost his life in promoting the interests of the Southern cause, which he strongly espoused. He also issued "Virgil in London and other Poems," in 1835, and "Democritus in London," in 1852.

In his habits George Daniel was the ideal of a literary man. In the house in which he lived in Canonbury Square there was a little

room, overlooking the garden. Sitting here, surrounded by some of his favourite books, and a bust or two of some celebrity in the world of thought, he was wont to pore over his well-loved Shakspeare, and draw from the ever-flowing fountain which emanates from those immortal pages the vivid representations of human character, which, while they are full of interest and attraction, contain precious gold found in no other human literature. Here, too, he wrote his books, edited editions of old ballads, and stored his mind with singular facts; and when tired of these things strolled, as Francis Bacon and Abraham Cowley did, round his garden.

He was the companion of many literary men; for years the well-proportioned figure and merry face, the ready wit and instructive stories of the old gentleman were welcomed by the members of the Urban Club; and those who could spare an hour in the evening were often to be seen about six o'clock listening to his tales of the past, as he sat taking his chop and half a pint of sherry in the Sir Hugh Myddleton Tavern, adjoining Sadler's Wells. How well do we ourselves remember those evenings, when, in the later years of his life, he would make our fireside bright with stories of the *literati* and political leaders of the past, or describe his interviews with Charles Lamb and his associates, or entering the field of politics would give his judgment on the events of fifty years ago!

He had many friends at the British Museum; and, in grateful acknowledgment of services rendered, he bequeathed to it a valuable casket, made of Shakspeare's mulberry tree, which was originally presented to Garrick, the actor, by the town of Stratford-on-Avon.

Towards the latter end of his life, we are inclined to think George Daniel's interest in the drama somewhat decreased. The stage was not what it used to be, at least not to him.

In a private work, published for his family, he has appended a collection of original hymns, evidently the production of a mind which, if it had been trained to this style of writing, might have enriched the song books of the Christian church. They breathe an evangelical spirit, tell of a large acquaintance with Scripture facts and doctrines, and no doubt they are the fruit of much patient thought and study.

While dining one Sunday, in April, 1864, at the house of his son, Dr. Daniel, in Stoke Newington, he was seized with a fit of apoplexy, and died a few days thereafter. His remains lie in Highgate Cemetery, his memory lingers with us still. A. C. T.

## The Reviewer.

---

*A New View of Causation*, by Thomas Squire Barrett.

*Examination of Gillespie's Argument, à priori*, by T. S. Barrett.  
London: Provost & Co.

THE publication of the "New View of Causation," though not suggested has been determined by the controversy in the course of which the "Examination of Gillespie's Argument" was issued. "A circumstance, of recent date, has helped to determine me," says the author, "to risk publication without farther hesitation. Last year (1869), I was drawn into a controversy with Mr. W. H. Gillespie, on the subject of his 'Argument *à priori* for the existence of a Great First Cause,' and it resulted in my publishing [semi-] anonymously an examination of that gentleman's positions. My stand-point was not that of an assailer of all possible theology, but merely that of a demurrer to the *à priori* method of proof which I hold to be radically inconclusive." "There is Intelligence in the Universe," argues Mr. Gillespie; "and it must either have existed from eternity, or have begun to be. And if it begun to be it must have had a cause; for *whatever begins to be must have a cause*." This Mr. Barrett believes to be an error, and "the only effectual method of showing its error is to make a thorough inquiry into the nature of causation in general;" which, in this work, he proceeds in his own fashion to do.

Mr. Barrett appears to have devoted much *study* to the topic, although it does not seem that he has given much individual thought to the solution of the difficult problem he has undertaken to supply a new view of. We admire his diligence, patience, and acuteness as a *reader*, and as a collector of those brief, telling, striking sentences which hold in themselves the essences of volumes; but as a *reasoner* we have failed to find any "new view of Causation" in the book—anything that is not contained in

"Hamilton's Law of the Conditioned or Spencer's 'Universal Postulate.'" The work, which is "Dedicated to Alexander Bain, George Henry Lewes, and John Stuart Mill, whose writings eminently have contributed to the right method for philosophical inquiries," consists of three chapters, prefaced by a careful syllabus; each chapter is followed by an appendix containing a *catena* of authorities on the points discussed, and the book is furnished with a careful index, and is altogether exceedingly carefully got up with cross-references of the most unexceptionable sort. Indeed, the work is quite a model of what a philosophical publication ought to be in all that concerns ease of reference and readiness of consultation.

Of the three chapters the *first* comprises "The Introduction;" the *second* supplies an "Historical Epitome," and the *third* presents "The Problem Solved." The introduction is brief and straightforward, and has attached to it, as a note, a pretty exhaustive catalogue of works having reference to the theory of causation, and a few other references. The "Historical Epitome" commences only with the theory of causation in modern times, and takes no notice of the elaborate doctrines of the ancient philosophical sects, concerning the relation of causation. Of course, these may be regarded as the obsolete and crude hypotheses of speculative philosophers; but yet, as carefully thought out distinctions between principles, causes, and conditions, the notions of Plato and Aristotle are, even yet, not unworthy of attention. Baconian causation does not include all causes, and Hume's "Theory of Causation" does not exhaust even human causation—the causative force, for instance, of the will. A good account of the older views on causation is to be found in an "Inquiry into the Nature of causation," by R. E. Scott, of Aberdeen, 1810; and a very valuable and remarkable contribution to the proper understanding of this subject is contained in Maine de Biran's "New Thoughts on the Relations between the Bodily Powers and the Moral Nature of Man," 1834. Jouffry and Cousin are also writers of merit on this special topic—a topic which lies at the root alike of physical and of metaphysical science.

The notes which follow chapter second are well-chosen and informing; and a "Synopsis of Opinions on Causation" is valuable as a condensed bird's-eye view of a large amount of reading.

Of course, the great interest to a student of thought is aroused

by chapter third, which encourages us to find there "the problem solved." The mind, we believe, though it yearns for, very seldom gains, finalities; and if this topic of topics in science—whether of mind or matter, is herein distinctly solved, Mr. Barrett has claims on human love which words dare hardly estimate. We shall not forestall a verdict. We shall place before the reader the most important portions of this the most important portion of the work; and we solicit for them the reader's most painstaking study.

"Necessity may, perhaps, be the key to the difficulty. . . . Between events no necessary connection can be perceived. Yet; nevertheless, the prevailing belief is, that there is such a necessity in every case of causation. . . . The idea of necessity is an essential portion—a *sine qua non*—of the causal notion. As necessity cannot be perceived in phenomena, it is plain that the idea cannot have originated from the contemplation of physical events. . . . This primary mental idea of necessity which must be developed before the notion of causality can arise, is what is called by metaphysicians 'logical necessity.' It is a perception of what Professor Bain calls the 'Law of Consistency.' It is seen that certain things *must* accompany certain other things; otherwise there would be involved an inconsistency or contradiction. . . . This once possessed, its transference to phenomena is easy. . . . Are we justified in transferring the attribute of necessity from axioms and demonstrated propositions to the relation between natural events? . . . We are so used to witness certain combinations of phenomena, that habit induces the conviction of certainty. . . . If we divest ourselves of our acquired knowledge and beliefs, and imagine ourselves observing, for the first time, any succession or correlation of events, we shall see that there is nothing in them or their conjunction to tell us of power or necessity. It is only by witnessing the same combination of phenomena several times, that we get the idea of invariability, and thence that of necessity. . . . We do not know the efficient cause of anything, we only know secondary or conditional causes, which properly speaking, are not efficient causes at all. . . . 'Law is merely the name we give to generalizations—or in logical language, to universal propositions which we believe to be true.' . . . law, as *law*, does not involve necessity, whatever the popular opinion on the point may be. . . . There is, however, a necessity flowing from a law—the necessity of implication or consistency—the necessity that if a law is true every instance coming under or included in it, must be in agreement with it. . . . This logical or conditional necessity is the necessity by which cause and effect are connected in our minds. If a law is true, every instance under it is necessarily in accordance with it. . . . In short, the inferring of effects from laws, or of laws from phenomena,

bears a close resemblance to the working out of an equation in algebra—the steps of which process are connected together by the necessity of implication or consistency. Laws and phenomena, causes and effects, are bound together in our minds by precisely the same subjective necessity. Nor can we imagine any other sort of necessity. . . . A true and scientific analysis of causation ought to consist rather of an exhibition of what the idea *should* be than of what it actually is. . . . The simplest idea of causation, and probably the first arising in the mind, is that of mere invariability and conjunction. . . . The real cause is the sum of all the necessary antecedents. . . . At this point the idea of causation enters a higher phase. The original popular notion of one cause to one effect passes into the correcter and more scientific theory of every effect being the result of many causes. This may be considered the view more generally prevalent among men of science. Indeed, the word cause, at this stage of progress, generally disappears altogether. . . . Men of science, as a rule, now prefer the term ‘conditions’ instead of ‘causes.’ . . . There is a latent feeling in our minds, on contemplating the operations of nature, that if we only knew *all* the essential conditions or causes of a phenomenon, we should be able to see the connection—the necessity of the connection—as clearly as we see the connection between the premises and the conclusion of a syllogism. . . . The necessity connecting the cause and the effect is logical, and at the same time conditional. . . . The further this process can go, the greater is the satisfaction to our minds—the firmer is our idea of the stability and invariableness of the phenomenon. This is the true ‘necessary connection’ between cause and effect. It is the logical necessity—the necessity of implication. Of any other kind of necessity we have no knowledge; and, indeed, not the slightest conception.”

These passages are terse and pertinent, clearly expressed and plain; but they do not seem to us to touch *the* point. They to a certain extent explain our *idea* of causation, but not causation itself. We must be logically consistent in thought, and therefore necessarily believe in causes; but is Nature also logical in act, and does it exert causes? Is our idea the image or the interpretation of causation? Is it *Knowledge*? Or is it merely a faith which enables us to co-ordinate and reconcile thought and experience? Mr. Barrett does not seem to believe with G. H. Lewes that “Science disclaims *all* attempts to penetrate the secrets of causation,” or whence this book? but he eliminates cause from nature, and assigns it to mind, at least to logical thought. Our notion of science is different, we think that the supreme aim of science is to know causes—immediate and remote; that it inves-

tigates the properties of things for the purpose of being able to regulate the transference of influences by which change is effected, or by bringing those things which we know to be changeable under certain influences that are known, within the range of influences unknown, that we may learn thence the nature of the unknown influences which are thus tested. The fact is, as we believe, that we think causes and laws because we have intelligence, and we assume intelligence in the universe, and we find the true causes and laws of the universe exactly in proportion as our thoughts coincide in the Divine designs of the intelligence who is the cause and law of all.

The entire universe of experienced sensation which constitutes the realm of nature is a panorama of change. The influence which changes an antecedent into a consequent state is not sensationally experienced, the cause is not seen. Is then that change an illusion, or is it causeless? The physical philosopher will not admit that all science is illusion; nor will the metaphysical philosopher accept the statement that changes have no cause. He asserts that science is the mind's interpretation of sensation, and that cause is the essence of that interpretation; that if you eliminate cause from science you destroy it, and that if you accept science as the interpreter of nature, you must grant cause, not as a necessity of thought only, but as an indispensable operative energy constantly at work amid Nature's changes. Thought interprets nature, *to* thought, *through* thought, *by* thought. "*Mens agitat molem,*"—mind moves the mass of existence. The permanent permeation of nature by an intelligence which has settled the characteristics of things, fixed the conditions of sequence, and arranged their variabilities and their invariabilities, though striven hard against is, and must be, assumed in science as an interpretation of nature. Otherwise sensation is a surface of foreign letters, chance-strewn, on the page of experiments, which cannot be read, because it expresses nothing. Only as issues of mind are sensations capable of being transformed into science, and the idea of cause is indispensable.

"Cause," as we apprehend it, is not sequence, but consequence, consecutive co-linking of issues with origination, of result with effective impulse; eventuation or the outcoming of one or more consequents from one or more correlated antecedents, what Browning calls "*a chain of consequence.*" It is true that we do



not *perceive* in causation anything more than the change caused, but it is equally true that we irresistibly *believe* that the change caused originates in and takes place on account of the exercise of some potency in the antecedent, bringing about the consequent. We have, in fact, in Causation these following conceptions:—1st, An *Antecedent* or antecedents; 2nd, The properties of that antecedent or those antecedents as possibilities of influence; 3rd, The act of change called the effect; 4th, The consequent or consequence; 5th, The possibilities of change implicit in them, on a connection being established between these and the antecedent; and 6th, The operant energy of the preceding on the succeeding. Given, the non-conduction of the properties of the changing element into that of the changeable element, these elements would remain unchanged. They might exist in co-equal simultaneity, or even come before the mind in sequence, but not in consequence, in correlated causative succession. This co-operant interaction of properties in antecedent and consequent, though we cannot *perceive* we must *believe*. We cannot imagine a *connection* without a *nexus*. *Uniform antecedence and consequence* is not a full registration of all that the idea of causation implies. We require to introduce an omitted particular, and say causation is *uniform correlated antecedence and consequence*. Our perceiving of sequence is not the reason of our forming the idea of cause. The sequences are many, which we perceive and to which we never attribute causative efficiency. We only regard causative consequence when we *believe* that an interpenetration of power from one to another has taken place. The casual *nexus* is the action of the properties in each case of the agent on the patient in transitive operancy. Cause is conceivable in thought, it is not perceivable in sensation; but we always do feel that there is involved in cause an issue and a reception, a forthgoing and a receiving, a dependence of a change effected on an *à priori* impulse effecting the change. Consecution differs in kind altogether from succession; the latter being mere following in form, number, &c., while the former is following after an impulse, from an antecedent by which change is brought about. Succession gives statics, but consecution gives dynamics. The inference that we make of an *effe*rence from the antecedent is the only possible explanation of the *diff*erence in the consequent. We know that there is a moment of non-action, a moment of action, a moment of reaction, and a moment after the reaction, and that the

result is change—that collision or sympathy of properties we name *cause*.

We think the book before us is a handy compend of striking definitions of, remarks upon, and thoughts regarding causation; we think the author's own share of the work clever, clear, and pertinent, as an exposition of the theory of causation now striving for mastery among what are regarded as positive thinkers; and we commend the book as a good contribution towards the farther discussion of the question. But remembering Dr. Thomas Brown's youthful "Enquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect," and G. H. Lewes's denials of the sensational *perception*, not the intellectual conception of cause, we do not think Mr. Barrett has reached or given any new clue to the solution of the problem. If we are not greatly at fault in our perceptions, the conclusion intended to be deduced from his work has been reached long before in these words—"The truth is that *power* is merely a term for human ignorance; the mind feels uneasy and dissatisfied in contemplating the unaccountable gap between an antecedent and a consequent, and readily adopts any hypothesis that will put a bridge over it." This we quote from *The Penny Cyclopædia* under the word "Causation" where an able notice of the subject occurs. The writer urges the query—"Is there a third co-efficient in causation?" To this we reply there is no third sensationally perceived co-efficient in it, but there is a distinct intellectually conceived one that is indispensable because it is real; in fact, that *alone* is cause—the effluence and influence of change.

The great interest of any view of causation is its relation to the greatest problem of being, the Being of God. Hence the connection between the new view of causation and the examination of Gillespie's argument *à priori* for a Great First Cause—God. The examination is acute and telling, but the acceptance of his theory of causation seems to us to set before us an endless chain of causeless causation, inconsequent consequence. We, on the contrary, think that a law divine links things together in constant causative activity; and we regard intuition, experience, science, and faith, as

"The world's great altar-stairs  
That slope, through darkness, up to God."

## The Inquirer.

### QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

956. Can any of your readers inform me what would be the proper course of study for a person desirous of entering the legal profession as a barrister? What are the best books to read, and such other information concerning this matter as might be useful?

A. P. D.

### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

949. Thomas Erskine, Esq., of Linlathen, Forfarshire, N.B., was educated in Edinburgh, where he was a member of the Speculative Society, both ordinary in 1812 and extraordinary in 1815. Here he delivered two memorable essays on "The Effects of Opinion," and on "The Great Reign of Henry IV." (of Navarre), and opened in the affirmative the questions, "Was Napoleon Justified in Executing the Incendiaries of Moscow?" "Ought Unanimity to be Required of Juries in Civil Cases?" He was called to the Scottish Bar as an Advocate in 1810. It is, however, not as a lawyer, however, but as a theologian that he has exerted influence on man. He was profoundly versed in Greek and Biblical literature, and was an earnest believer in the personal millennial reign of Jesus Christ. A few years after his admission by the Faculty of Advocates, he issued a small work entitled "Remarks on the Internal Evidences of the Truth of Revealed Religion," a treatise which is cogent in reasoning, and powerful in statement, and remarkable for the untechnical character of its diction and illustration. To this succeeded an "Essay on Faith," an

able work having striking merits as a religious book. Then came "The Unconditional Freeness of the Gospel," a treatise which contains opinions which are held to be unscriptural and dangerous by many of the Scottish clergy. It excited an animated controversy, and ultimately led to what has been variously called the Row and the Gairloch Heresy. "The Brazen Serpent, or Life coming through Death," "The Doctrine of Election Illustrated," are others of his works which have affected many powerfully. He was an old and valued friend of Thomas Carlyle, on whose nomination as Lord Rector of the University of Edinburgh the degree of LL.D. was conferred on Erskine in 1868. His chief disciples were J.A. Scott and F. D. Maurice, Campbell of "Row," Story of "Roseneath," Dow of "Irongray," E. Irving, &c., but many now uphold as the true gospel of Jesus Christ the doctrine which was adjudged strange and heretical in and about the years 1825—1835, when Erskine was in the heyday of authorship. He subsequently drew off from active interest in the public proceedings of religious bodies, and though he retained his opinions in their essence, he altered them somewhat in their form. He died early in the present year. His works are in process of re-publication by Messrs. Edmonstone and Douglass, Edinburgh, in a uniform (and not very expensive) edition.—F. Y.

950. An account of the Gairloch or Row heresy is contained in the *Eclectic Review*, July, 1830; notices of it will also be found in the memoirs of Edward Irving, Henry

Story, &c. I am not sure that there is not an "Account of the Row Movement" separately published. In the records of the Church of Scotland about 1828—1832 notices of this strange, eventful episode, will be found in its darker shades.—F. Y.

951 (No. 2). Richard Winter Hamilton, D.D., LL.D., was born in London July 6th, 1794. His early education he got in several of the abounding schools in the metropolis—not noteworthy for much. He became latterly a pupil of Mill Hill Grammar School, whence he proceeded as a student to the dissenting college at Hoxton. After undergoing the prescribed course of study he received a call from the Albion Independent Chapel, Leeds, and was ordained pastor thereof January, 1815. Of Congregationalism in Leeds he soon became the master-spirit, the most noted dissenting clergyman in England. And yet, curiously enough, we have been told, in his first year of ministerial life he almost suffered shipwreck. He had acquired a great reputation, crowds flocked to hear him, he was young, eager, earnest, and he was gratified at the influence exerted by his pulpit power. On occasion of an execution in Leeds he preached an open air sermon, to which 10,000 listened. He was asked to publish it, and did; when the critics fastened upon it and with bitter carping almost "snuffed him out." The crowds ceased to flock, the regular frequenters faltered, and the pews had great gaping vacancies in them. It seemed as if his splendidly-begun career would end in smoke and darkness. But he was made of other material than that which accepts failure as possible. He bore, he aspired, he studied, he worked, he dutifully did what came to him, and he conquered—exchanging the day of small things for a

fame not easily equalled—both as preacher and author.

But he was long before he ventured again to yield to the fascination of type. His first sermon was published when he was twenty-one, he was thirty-nine when his first volume of sermons was given to the press. "They are not," a competent authority informs us, "commonplace sermons. They display a vigorous mind and original manner of thought and expression, well calculated to arrest attention." Meanwhile he gained the esteem and admiration of the town of Leeds "by mingling wisely in its public matters, and in the encouragement of its literary and other institutions," and had gathered around him "an excellent, select, and attached congregation." Thereafter he issued "*Nugæ Literariæ*," or *Literary Trifles*—infelicitously suggesting the diversions of idle hours—though the essays in the volume exhibit research, speculation, satire, disquisition, and criticism of such a sort as to quicken and sharpen the intelligence of the reader. A Scotch gentleman had placed at the disposal of an association in Scotland a sum of money to be given in prizes for the best essay on missions. To Dr. Harris the first prize was awarded, and R. W. Hamilton gained the second. For "grasp of intellect, beauty and energy of style, extent of knowledge, and for eloquence kindling into poetry" it is a remarkable work; while the philosophy of missions, expressed in the peculiar phraseology of the Scriptures, is so interwoven with the tissues of inspiration as to glow in divine radiance. The authority, scope, and encouragement of missions are dilated on with comprehensiveness and power. In 1844 a patriotic churchman of Manchester offered the sum of one hundred guineas for the most valuable essay on "The Best Method

of extending the Benefits of Education to the People of England, consistently with the principles of civil and religious liberty." The adjudicators unanimously awarded the prize to R. W. Hamilton—who had by this time attained the double doctorate of LL.D., D.D., unsolicitedly. This is a highly valuable and complete consideration of the topic, notable, as the adjudicators say, for intellectual power, practical and sound sentiment, and compactness of argument. It is a far-seeing, human-hearted treatise, to which, after more than a quarter of a century's agitation England has, at last, given some heed. Following close on this, in 1845, he issued a second volume of sermons of an eloquent and impressive character, though George Gilfillan speaks of their "irregular gorgeousness." He calls him, however, "the Hazlitt of the pulpit." In 1846 he was appointed Congregational Lecturer, and delivered an elaborate series of discourses on "The Revealed Doctrine of Future Rewards and Punishments." He published "Pastoral Appeals" and a series of domestic prayers entitled "The Little Sanctuary." He also wrote a biography of his friend the Rev. John Ely, author of "Winter Lectures," &c., a preacher of considerable pith and eloquence, and a man of great worth and ability. Dr. Hamilton was an advocate for the "Intercommunity of Churches," on which subject he delivered a remarkable discourse. A memoir of Dr. Richard Winter Hamilton, who died 18th July, 1848, was published by Rev. W. H. Stowell in 1850. This, however, we have not read. If we have not forgotten our reading, a good article appeared not long after Hamilton's death in the *Eclectic Review*, and from this a good deal of our impression of the man is taken, though we have not read it since the time of its publication.

He was "rather above than under the middle size in stature," as an eye witness describes him, "dressed very carefully in clerical costume, with a brow not at all remarkable for either height, breadth, or expression; with eyes completely sunk in spectacles, pale faced, and corpulent; making altogether an odd sort of composite figure." He had quite a pulpit genius, his quick, short, imagination-fringed sentences struck the mind with the glow and heat of enthusiasm and fervour. He seems to have been a finely-touched spirit who taught that self-reliance is the soul of virtue and the talisman of success. He taught a full and free orthodoxy, but was a man of genuine toleration. He had humour and poetry in him, and a fine spirit of independence. The only objection, perhaps, to which in style, R. W. Hamilton's sermons are open is that they are *asthmatic*—too full of short, terse sentences, difficult to link together in thought. R. M. A.

951. (No. 3). Benjamin Beddome, M.A., son of the Rev. J. Beddome, of Bristol, was born at Harley in 1717; was educated for the medical profession, became the subject of deep, religious impressions during his apprenticeship, and under Mr. Foskett, of Bristol, studied divinity. In 1740 he was called to the Baptist ministry at Bourton, where (though he was invited frequently to remove, once to Goodman's Fields, the most influential, independent congregation in London) he spent a ministry of fifty-five years, beloved and honoured. He excelled in catechetical teaching, and is the author of "A Catechism of Divinity (1752)," of great value, and many of his hymns have acquired a valued place among our collections of poetry for use in public worship. He died at Bourton in 1795, his sermons, published after his death, are the most popular of village ser-

mons belonging to the eighteenth century. They are practical and evangelical. The Rev. Robert Hall, no mean judge of pulpit eloquence, says, "As a preacher Mr. Beddome was universally admired for the piety and unction of his sentiments, the facility of his arrangement, and the purity, force, and simplicity of his language, all which was recommended by a delivery perfectly natural and graceful." A notice of Beddome will be found in "Rippon's Register," vol. i.

Jabez Bunting, D.D., who has been called the Hercules of Methodism, and is generally regarded as the most distinguished of the successors of John Wesley, was born in Manchester 1778. He devoted himself early to the ministry, and was elected president of the annual conference in 1820. To this post of honour he was again appointed in 1828, 1836, and 1844. He became the great authority in all matters relating to the government and polity of Wesleyanism. In 1834 he was chosen president of the Theological Institution for the training of ministers for the pulpits of the Methodist body; and for upwards of twenty years he was one of the secretaries of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society. He retired from official and ministerial duty in 1857. His admirers then provided for him an annuity of £200 per annum. This kindly and forethoughtful provision he did not long live to enjoy, as he died in June, 1858. His published works were few, and consisted mainly of sermons; as "A Great Work Described and Recommended," 1805, "Justification by Faith," 1812, which went through many editions; "Memoirs of Rev. Rich. Watson, with a Funeral Sermon," 1833, &c. He was an eloquent preacher and public speaker. In the causes of religion and philanthropy, he was energetic

and wise. As an administrator he did much for the improvement, prosperity, and consolidation of the various schemes of the denomination to which he belonged. He was enthusiastic in stimulating among the ministry of that body a zeal in the attainment of high professional education, and in many other ways he advantaged the religious life, social condition, and educational progress of the country. Men of all parties and sects respected him, and attended his remains to their resting-place in the burial ground near the City Road Chapel, in London, in admiration of his long, pure, consistent, and beneficial efforts for the evangelization of mankind.—E. F. M.

954. I do not know the special books specially referred to in the instructive and interesting paper on Professor Fraser (p. 82), on which this question is founded; but I may give my reply as regards this matter, and if any ground of difference exists, some other contributor may set the question at rest. Of "the four most influential books of modern times we must name, I should think, as the first, Bacon's "Novum Organon." This is one of the books which have moved the intellects that have moved the world. On its issue it drew forth "the warmest expressions of admiration from the ablest men in Europe." It was the first (effective) attempt "to systematize the true method of discovery," and on it rests the reputation of the "Father of Modern Philosophy." The second, I should suppose, is Newton's "Principia" (1687), "the publication of which is the most remarkable epoch in the history of (modern) science." The third, of course, is that named, Smith's "Wealth of Nations" (1776), one of the greatest works on political philosophy which the world has produced, that work indeed which laid the foundation of the science of political economy. It

"produced," says Sir James Mackintosh, "an immediate, general, and irrevocable change in some of the most important parts of the legislation of all civilized states." The fourth, we presume, is Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," the greatest work of the most influential metaphysician of all time. That work

has transformed philosophy, and has given such a force to intellectual speculations as to have changed the entire aspect of all the questions on which metaphysics has employed itself. I know of no four works to be compared with these in power and worth.—R. M. A.

## Literary Notes.

Messrs. Hodder and Stoughton have just issued "The Bridge of History over the Gulf of Time," by Thomas Cooper the Chartist, who urged on by the interest taken in the sketch of him in our "Toiling Upward," has commenced an "Autobiography," which, in nineteen chapters, is brought down to 1849.

"Psalms of Life," by Miss S. Doudney, are in the press.

Professor Ewald has nearly ready Vol. I. of "The Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments." The same learned critic has issued a review of the first Vol. of "The Speaker's Commentary," which is something less than favourable.

George Elliot is again to give us a story of English provincial life to lighten the days of December.

Lamartine's "Unpublished Memoirs" are in process of being translated by Lady Herbert of Lea.

Chaucer's "Canterbury Tales" have received large accessions of interest from the discoveries and researches of the Old English Text Society and their coadjutors.

"Past and Present," or social and religious life in Scotland, by H. G. Reid, will soon appear.

Mr. Chorley is editing a second series of the "Letters of Miss Mitford."

A monograph on the "Pensionary,

De Witt," has just been issued by M. L. Brine.

Max. Moltke, of Leipsic, is issuing a Shakspeare Library for the people.

A companion work to "Self-help," on "Character," by Samuel Smiles, is announced.

R. H. L. Palgrave is engaged on a work on the local taxation of Great Britain.

Biographical essays on Gray, Sterne, Goldsmith, Fielding, Cowper, Samuel Johnson, Boswell, the Napiers, Sir Joshua Reynolds—contributed by the Rev. Whitwell Elwin, B.A., to the *Quarterly Review*—are to be published in two volumes.

A memoir of the late Professor A. De Morgan is in preparation by his widow.

"A History of the Birmingham Free Libraries," by Dr. J. A. Langford, has been published by the Library Committee.

Kossuth, it is said, has forsaken politics for science, and has just made as his first offering at the shrine of the latter, a contribution on "The Changes in the Colours of the Stars." Does he wish to hint thereby that—

"It is not in our stars, but in ourselves,

That we are underlings" ?

The historian of Henry of Navarre, the hero of Ivry, is dead.

Bibliography and MSS. are to have a literary organ, entitled the *Librarian*.

Hensleigh Wedgwood's "Dictionary of English Etymology" is to be issued in a revised and extended form.

A volume of the Sermons of the late Rev. T. Toke Lynch has just been published this autumn.

A contribution in the negative of the question, "Do Classics Train the Mind better than Studies in Modern Literature?" is to appear in a series of essays, by Henry Sweet.

"A History of the Ballantyne Press and its Connexion with Sir Walter Scott, Bart.," has been published.

The Scott Centenary celebration is to have its history written, and the proceedings thereof fully recorded, under the care of Thomas Usher, Secretary to the Edinburgh Committee.

Charles Buxton, M.P., author of "Questions of the Day," "Lectures read at a Mechanic's Institute in the Country," died 9th August.

W. M. Rosetti is preparing the volumes of Select Poetry (1) from American poetry; (2) from English poets, beginning with 1600 and coming down to our copyright period; (3) from humorous poetry.

An American antiquarian quarterly journal has been commenced.

A German translation, under the auspices of Drastan, of Berlin, of Mr. E. B. Tylor's recently published work on primitive culture, is proposed.

Messrs. C. and A. de Rothschild have nearly ready "The History and Literature of the Israelites."

The Chancellor's Gold Medal at Cambridge has been gained by H. E. Madden, of Trinity Hall, for the best poem in Heroic verse, on

"Sedan." H. R. Phillips gained the Porson Prize, though a non-collegiate.

Dickens' "Works" are to be issued in penny numbers weekly, and in parts, having the old green covers, monthly.

Selections from the writings of John Quincy Adams are about to be issued by his son.

The death of Dr. Friedrich Ueberweg, Professor of Philosophy in (Kant's) University of Konigsberg, author of "A System of Logic," "A History of Philosophy," &c., translator of Berkeley, &c., is announced. He is, like Schwegler, too early lost to us by a premature death.

Mr. James Grant has "A History of the Newspaper Press" nearly ready.

"Hospitalism," by the late Sir James Simpson, is to be edited by Mr. L. Tait, Birmingham.

Mr. G. H. Lewes is far advanced with a book on "The Philosophy of Scientific Method."

Mr. Herbert Spencer will shortly issue a work, prepared under his direction, "On the Laws, Manners, and Customs of Primitive Races, Ancient and Modern."

It is reported from Greenock that Allan Park Paton, novelist and poet, librarian of the Watt Monument, has discovered that an old folio copy of "North's Translation of Plutarch's Lives"—which has been recently presented to the library—is the book which Shakspeare used in the composition of his Roman plays. It has the initials "W. S.," with the motto, *Vive et vivas*, on the top of the title-page. The places, apparently, most read are those which form the groundwork of these plays. The only marginal note is "Brute—Brutus"—a suggestion of the exclamation of Cæsar while he fell, of which no mention is made in "Plutarch."



## Modern Metaphysicians.

---

GEORGE BERKELEY, D.D., BISHOP OF CLOYNE.\*

### *Ideal Realism.*

"LIFE is rich almost in proportion to the fulness of its emotional activity." Emotion has various intensities, and is subject, in general, to modifications of elation and depression. Sustained emotion, especially at its loftier heights, is rare; as the pulse and the throb of the blood vary with the varying complexities of human interest, so also do the emotions quicken and glow, or slacken and cool as the interests of life change, and the purposes of the soul alter. An emotional state, which is at once fixed and high, sympathetic and intense, is called enthusiasm—that is in spiritment with a divine and passionate impulse to effect some great purpose in a noble manner.

Enthusiasm is the very light and life of a noble spirit. That, much more even than love of fame inclines, and enables its possessor—

"To scorn delights and live laborious days."

When the energies of a great soul are sublimed to the rapture and enthusiastic heat of an intense desire to accomplish any lofty purpose, or to fulfil any object on which the entire love of the heart is fixed, the extraordinary fervour of the emotion suffuses the whole prospect of life with an enchantment that is unspeakable. A vivid imagination and a generous heart, a high trust and a holy sympathy distil their potent charms through all the activities of an enthusiast's nature. Objections vanish and obstacles disappear, valleys are exalted and high places are made plain, before the eye of an earnest and determined character, in whom the vision and the faculty divine has originated a distinct plan of effort and of life. Genuine enthusiasm is moral as well as intellectual: and "without it, Seneca says, "nothing truly great was ever achieved." The rapture

\* "The works of George Berkeley, D.D.," by A. C. Fraser. "The Life and Letters of George Berkeley, D.D.," by A. C. Fraser. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.

of the poet, the heroism of the warrior, the devotedness of the martyr, the ardour of the patriot, the exalted meditations of the philosopher are all modes in which enthusiasm manifests itself. The enthusiasm of Berkeley partook of almost all these, and was at once romantic, ennobling, sympathetic, and thoughtful.

"It is difficult for us now to see the halo of romance with which America was at first invested in the minds of many, or to feel as a sensitive, poetical nature, full of ardent philanthropy might have felt amid the coarseness and corruption of European society, when a fair virgin soil, and ample resources for a simple, virtuous people, were seen across the ocean. America was in Berkeley's days partly what India is in ours, full of attractions to benevolence. The Christian associations of the early part of last century sent their missions to America. The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel was founded in 1701 with this immediately in view. Berkeley's verses on the 'Prospect of Planting Arts and Learning in America,' express his own feeling of the contrast between the 'decay of Europe,' and the—

"—— happy climes, the seat of innocence,  
Where nature guides, and virtue rules,  
Where men shall not impose for truth and sense  
The pedantry of courts and schools."

It was to Berkeley, "a land of blue skies, rich fruits, coral strands, and a virtuous, innocent race. Bermuda's summer isles—

" 'Where Ariel has warbled and Waller has strayed,'

"He imagined to be well-situated as a place of meeting for students, colonial and native Indian, both from the continent and from the islands of America, being distant only about 580 miles from Cape Hatteras, the nearest point on the mainland, and nearly as far from the isles of the Caribbean Sea.

"He was at first disposed to trust to voluntary liberality." Upwards of £25,000 were thus raised, and a great deal more might have been so gained. But he at last depended on the Government. "Berkeley's endeavour, from the first, was to obtain a charter." He found a way, by the aid of a distinguished Venetian friend, the Abbe Guafteri, to the ear of George I., and "as early as June, 1725, a patent passed the seals for erecting a College in the Island of Bermudes for the propagation of the gospel among the Indians and other heathens on the continents of America, and constituting Dr. Berkeley, Dean of Londonderry, Principal of the said College."

"On the 11th of May, 1726, with only two dissentient voices, the

House of Commons addressed the King in favour of such a grant for St. Paul's College, in Bermudas, as might seem to his Majesty sufficient for the purpose. Sir Robert Walpole accordingly promised £20,000. The charter authorised the erection of a college to be governed by a president and nine fellows, who were to form the corporation. Berkeley was named the first president, and his Dublin associates—William Thompson, Jonathan Rogers, and James King—the first fellows. They were all allowed to keep their preferments at home for eighteen months after their arrival in the island. Berkeley spent the four years, 1724—8, in preparation for his new emigration scheme. It was in these years that he occasionally attended the court of Caroline at Leicester Fields, when she was Princess of Wales, and afterwards at St. James's, or at Kensington, not because he loved courts, but because he loved America. Clarke was still officiating in his parish church in London, and Butler did not, until 1725, go into the seclusion of his Durham rectory. Sherlock was Master of the Temple, and Hoadley was Bishop of Salisbury. Caroline liked now and then to hear a theological debate. She had a philosophical interest in theological questions, and a political interest in the Universities and the Church. Years before, when Princess of Wales, she had acted as a royal go-between in the famous controversial correspondence of Clarke and Leibnitz. And now, when Berkeley was staying in London, she was glad to include Clarke, Hoadley, along with Sherlock and himself, in her weekly gatherings, and to hear Hoadley supporting Clarke, and Sherlock supporting Berkeley. It was from a hope of advancing the interests of his college that Berkeley was persuaded to what he thought the drudgery of bearing part in these fruitless debates with Clarke."

During these years Berkeley occasionally rambled in the rural parts of England. On his visit to Lord Pembroke at Wilton, his company was so agreeable that he had to leave the place by stratagem. A good many business embarrassments in making provision for his absence required time and thought, skill and legal arrangements. Another change threatened his scheme:—

"In the writings of Pope, Swift, Arbuthnot, about this time, we meet occasional playful allusions to Bermuda, in prose and verse. In September Pope exults with Swift, that they may live where they please, 'in Wales, Dublin, or Bermudas.' In November, Arbuthnot refers to the cry for war in London, produced by the

stoppage of trade, and proposes to rig out a privateer for the West Indies. 'Will you be concerned? We will build her at Bermudas, and get Mr. Dean Berkeley to be our manager.' The proposed 'manager' was as bent as ever upon his enterprise, through all the discouragements of 1727, and the vexatious embarrassments of the Vanhomrigh business. George I. died, and George II. was proclaimed in June. He has again *la mer à boire*. But within a month he had a new warrant for his grant, signed by the young King, and the lost ground was then recovered."

After this unravelment of his affairs, he hoped to be able to begin his missionary voyage over the Atlantic in May. Causes of delay again occurred, the nature of which may be guessed from the fact that on the 1st Aug., 1728, he married Anne, daughter of John Forster, who had been Recorder of Dublin, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, and Speaker of the Irish House of Commons; niece of Nicholas Forster, Bishop of Raphoe, who had admitted Berkeley to Holy Orders, a lady, her husband says, "whose humour and tone of mind pleases me beyond anything that I know in her whole sex." "All that one can now discover of Mrs. Berkeley makes her worthy of her husband. She shared his fortunes when he was about to engage in one of the most romantic moral movements of modern times, and when in love with an ideal academic life in the Bermudas he was prepared to surrender preferment and social position at home, in order to devote the remainder of his life to the great continents of the West. Report bears that she was herself of the school of the Mystics or Quietists; and that her favourite writers were Fénelon, Madame Guyon, and their English disciple, Hooke, the historian of Rome."

On 6th Sept., 1728, Dr. Berkeley set sail from Gravesend as a pioneer of human civilization. None of the intended fellows of the proposed college were in the party which consisted of his wife and her friend, Miss Handcock, John James, an Englishman of good family, afterwards Sir John James, Richard Dalton of Lincolnshire, the common friend of Berkeley, Benson, Secker, and Smibert, an English artist, whom Berkeley met in Italy.

"He bought land in America, but he never arrived in Bermuda." "On the 23rd of January, 1729, the 'hired ship of 250 tons,' in which Berkeley and his party sailed from Gravesend, was visible in the Narragansett waters, on the western side of Rhode Island. It was making for the secure and beautiful harbour of Newport, after

a voyage of rather more than four months from the Thames . . . Newport was then a flourishing town, nearly a century old, of the first importance, and an emporium of American commerce. It was in those days the maritime and commercial rival of New York and Boston. Narragansett Bay formed its outer harbour; and the inner harbour, on which the town was built, was well protected from the ocean. . . . One lingers over the picture of the pious philanthropist (who aimed at establishing the American civilization of the future on the basis of the university and the Church); his newly-married wife, her friend, and their three companions, wending their way from the ferry-wharf of Newport, with their colonial escort, on that far-off winter day in the beginning of 1729. . . . The island in which Newport is situated is about fifteen miles long, and from three to four in breadth, and it was Berkeley's home for nearly three years—years of waiting for the fulfilment of the promise, on the faith of which he left England . . . The island contained about eighteen thousand inhabitants when Berkeley landed in 1729. Of these fifteen hundred were negroes, freemen, and slaves; for many of the Newport merchants then engaged in the slave trade. A few native Indians, too, might still be seen in the island, and a larger number on the opposite or Narragansett shore. This little state was colonised by Roger Williams in 1636. . . . At the time of Berkeley's arrival the population of Newport was, accordingly, a motley one. The slave trade brought negroes to the place. The white inhabitants were of many religious sects—Quakers, Moravians, Jews, Episcopalians, Congregationalists, Presbyterians, sixth principle and seventh principle Baptists, and as many others besides. . . . Berkeley and his wife seem to have lived in the town of Newport for the first five or six months after their arrival. . . . In July or August, 1729, Berkeley, with his wife and child, removed from Newport to the pleasant valley in the interior of the island, where he had bought a farm and built a house. His three friends, James, Dalton, and Smibert, soon afterwards went to live in Boston. Berkeley's farm was a tract of land of about ninety-six acres. He bought it from Captain John Anthony, a native of Wales, then a wealthy grazier in Rhode Island, whose daughter afterwards married Gilbert Stuart father of the American artist. It adjoined a farm which belonged to the missionary Honeyman, from whom Honeyman's Hill in the neighbourhood takes its name. In this sequestered spot Berkeley

planned and built a commodious house. He named his island-home Whitehall, in loyal remembrance of the palace of the English kings from Henry VIII. to James II. It was in the farm-house of Whitehall that, at the age of forty-four he began domestic life, the father of a family. . . . The house at Whitehall may still be seen, in its green valley, near a hill which commands a wide view of land and ocean, and neighbouring islands. It stands a little off the road that runs eastward from Newport, about three miles from the town . . . The tradition is that much of "Alciphron" was studied in the open air, at a favourite retreat, below a projecting rock, commanding a view of the beach and the ocean, with some shady elms not far off . . . Soon after Berkeley settled at Whitehall, he took an active share in forming a philosophical society in Newport, where he found persons not unqualified to consider questions which had long occupied his thoughts, and who could see that his philosophical system implied no distrust of the senses, nor disregard of reason in the conduct of life. Among the members were Col. Updike, Judge Scott (a grand-uncle of Sir Walter Scott), Nathaniel Kay, Henry Collins, Nathan Townsend, the Rev. James Honeyman, and the Rev. Jeremiah Condry, Johnson of Stratford, and Mr. Sparrow of Narragansett, were occasional members. The society seems to have been very successful. One of its objects was to collect books. It originated, in 1747, the Redwood Library, one of the most useful institutions in Newport at the present day. . . . In the delightful seclusion of his studious life, the recluse in Rhode Island was not forgotten by his friends in England. He continued to correspond with Prior in Dublin, and also with friends about Court in London, praying for a settlement of the Bermuda claims. . . . Shortly after his arrival in Newport Berkeley was visited by the Rev. Samuel Johnson, the episcopal missionary at Stratford, one of the most learned scholars and acute thinkers of his time in America. His name must always be associated with Berkeley. . . . The "Principles of Human Knowledge" had early fallen into Johnson's hands, and he had in consequence formed a high notion of Berkeley's philosophical genius and aims. He hastened to wait upon him as soon as he heard of his arrival in Rhode Island. A correspondence and a succession of visits followed. . . . He was a convert to the new principle, which he regarded, when rightly understood, as the true philosophical support of faith. . . . In his own works he

adopted and applied this philosophy with a force and clearness which entitle him to an eminent place among the thinkers of America."

"New England at this time possessed in Jonathan Edwards the most subtle reasoner that America has produced, and what is not generally known, an able defender of Berkeley's great philosophical conception in its application to the material world. Edwards was born in 1703, at Windsor, in Connecticut, and he spent a youth of devout meditation there, and on the banks of the Hudson river. He was one of Johnson's pupils at Yale College, and when Berkeley was at Rhode Island Edwards was a pastor at Northampton in Massachusetts. The wonderful power of subtle ratiocination, and the sublimely fervid if confined piety of this extraordinary man have left their mark upon successive generations of American theologians. His celebrated "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will" did not appear until 1754; but it is in his earlier writings that he unfolds his views about the nature of sensible things. He does not name Berkeley, and it is not likely that they ever met."

But we must return from the consideration of philosophy and the philosophers of transatlantic repute, to note the progress of the enterprise which had brought Berkeley to Rhode Island. That had come to a crisis. The estate had been purchased, and the money was due; but Sir R. Walpole had never entered into the project with heartiness. He had political rather than religious aims. When pressed about the money by Dr. Edmund Gibson, Bishop of London, he replied: "If you put this question to me as a minister, I must and can assure you, that the money shall most assuredly be paid as soon as it suits the public convenience; but if you ask me as a friend, whether Dean Berkeley should continue in America, expecting the payment of £20,000, I advise him by all means to return to Europe, and to give up his present expectations." So were the hopes and aspirations of ten years blighted and crushed by the cash-question, which is so omnipotent in England, and he was taught that "events are not in our power; but it always is, to make a good use even of the very worst." "Far beyond the verge of that great whirlpool of business, faction, and pleasure, which is called the world," he was led to think; and to these reflections we owe his best work, "Alciphron." It "was written, as it seems, in 1731. Its first pages represent Berkeley in the last year of his family life at Whitehall. The whole book represents his studies

there, in the library, in the field, and on the sea-shore. About October or November he and his family sailed from Boston, and Dean Berkeley reappeared in London in Feb., 1732—the romance of his life dashed, and the memory of it only left to brighten his imagination, yet sober his expectations in and from this world.

“The vision of the America of the future, civilized and enlightened by a Christian university, which had filled his imagination during the best years of middle life, were dissolved.” “The failure affected the whole following period of his life. After his return from America one sees signs of a less buoyant spirit. There are soon not unfrequent complaints of failing health. And a greater disposition to recluse study is shown than since he left Trinity College in the spring of 1713; the tranquil and domestic influences of Rhode Island were favourable to this.” Still “Berkeley’s practical interest in religious learning in New England ceased but with his life. . . . In the summer of 1732, accordingly, we find Berkeley employed in providing for Yale College, at Newhaven, a rising seminary of learning in America. As one part of the fruits of his liberality, he made over to it his farm of ninety-six acres at Whitehall, for the encouragement of Greek and Latin scholarship.”

Two instruments of the conveyance are preserved in the archives of the College.

The rent of the farm was appropriated to three scholarships which have had no inconsiderable influence in promoting Greek and Roman learning in America. “A great incitement,” says President Class, “to a laudable ambition to excel in a knowledge of the classics.”

Besides the conveyance of Whitehall, Berkeley made a donation of books to the library of Yale College, with the help of some of the Bermuda subscribers. They were sent from London in May of 1733. This was, according to President Class, the best collection of books which had ever been brought, at one time, to America, consisting of nearly a thousand volumes, valued at about five hundred pounds.”

Berkeley also presented to Harvard College a collection of books in 1733, for which the thanks of the president and fellows were voted. That collection, however, was unfortunately destroyed by fire in 1784. To Trinity Church at Newport he also gave a handsome valuable organ, which still holds its place in the sacred edifice. An offer of a similar instrument to the church at Berkeley



in Massachusetts, was rejected, as the people of that Puritanic place regarded the organ, as many of the Scotch do still, as "an invention of the Devil to entrap the souls of men."

"On Friday, the 18th of February, he preached the sermon at the anniversary meeting of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, in the church of St. Mary-le-Bow. The office was usually confined to bishops, but it was on this occasion appropriately offered to the Dean of Derry. The sermon was published by desire of the Society in 1732, and re-published in the "Miscellany," 1752.

"The Christian knowledge of God, and the moral obligation of diffusing it, is the subject of this missionary sermon. . . . Berkeley saw in the Christian religion something meant for the mass of mankind, and which therefore could not consist in subtle and nice notions.' The time when divinity began to be treated as an abstract science, marked, he thought, the beginning of its loss of spiritual power over its professors. Doubtless the making religion a notional thing hath been of infinite disservice. Its holy mysteries are rather to be received with the humility of faith than defined with the accuracy of human reason. He recommended religion in the broad spirit of the New Testament, according to the sober and reverent tone of the Anglican Church, without theological leaning towards a particular school.

The following excerpt from this sermon will show the style of discourse which he used in the pulpit:—

"That human kind were not designed merely to sojourn a few days upon this earth; that a being of such excellence as the soul of man, so capable of a nobler life, and having such a high sense of things, moral and intellectual, was not created in the sole view of being imprisoned in an earthly tabernacle, and partaking of few pains and pleasures which chequer this mortal life, without aspiring to anything, either above or beyond it, is a fundamental doctrine as well of natural religion as of the Christian. It comes at once recommended by the authority of philosophers and evangelists. And that there actually is in the mind of man a strong instinct and desire, an appetite and tendency towards another and a better state, incomparably superior to the present, both in point of happiness and duration, is no more than every one's experience and inward feeling may inform him. The satiety and disrelish attending sensual enjoyments, the relish for things of a more pure and spiritual kind, the restless notion of the mind from one terrene object or pursuit to another, and often a flight or endeavour above

them all towards something unknown, and perfective of its nature, are so many signs and tokens of this better state, which in the style of the gospel is termed eternal life. . . . What this eternal life was, or how to come to it, were points unknown to the heathen world. . . . But when life and immortality were brought to light by the Gospel, there could remain no dispute about the chief end and felicity of man, no more than there could about the means of obtaining it, after the express declaration of our blessed Lord in the words of my text,—‘This is life eternal, that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent.’ . . . The metaphysical knowledge of God, considered in his absolute nature or essence, is one thing, and to know Him as He stands related to us as Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier, is another. The former kind of knowledge (whatever it amounts to) hath been, and may be, in Gentiles as well as Christians, but not the latter, which is life eternal. . . . Whosoever is a sincere Christian cannot be indifferent about bringing over other men to the knowledge of God and Christ; but every one of us, who hath any claim to that title, is indispensably obliged in duty to God, and in charity to his neighbour, to desire and promote, as far as there is opportunity, the conversion of heathens and infidels, that so they may become partakers of life and immortality. . . . In my present discourse I shall, first, consider in general the obligation that Christians lie under, of bringing other men to the knowledge of the only true God, and of Jesus Christ. And,

“Secondly, I shall consider it in reference to this laudable Society, instituted for the propagation of the gospel.

“And under each head I propose to obviate such difficulties as may seem to retard, and intermix such remarks as shall appear proper to forward so good a work. . . . The Christian religion was calculated for the bulk of mankind, and therefore cannot be supposed to consist in subtle and nice notions. From the time that divinity was considered as a science, and human reason enthroned in the sanctuary of God, the hearts of its professors seem to have been less under the influence of grace. From that time have grown many unchristian dissensions and controversies of men knowing nothing but doting about questions, and strifes of words, whereof cometh envy, strife, railings, evil surmises, perverse disputings of men of corrupt minds and destitute of truth’ (1 Tim. vi. 4, 5.) Doubtless the making religion a notional thing hath been of infinite disservice. And whereas its holy mysteries are rather to be received with humility of faith than defined and measured by the accuracy of human reason; all attempts of this kind, however well-intended, have visibly failed in the event; and instead of reconciling infidels, have, by creating disputes and heats among the professors of Christianity, given no small advantage to its enemies.

“To conclude; if we proportioned our zeal to the importance of things; if we could love men whose opinions we do not approve; if

we knew the world more, and liked it less; if we had a due sense of the divine perfection and our own defects; if our chief study was the wisdom from above, described by St. Paul; and if, in order to all this, that were done in places of education which cannot be done so well out of them,—I say, if these steps were taken at home, while proper measures are carrying on abroad, the one would very much forward or facilitate the other. As it is not meant so it must not be understood that foreign attempts should wait for domestic success, but only that it is to be wished they may co-operate. Certainly, if a just and rational, a genuine and sincere, a warm vigorous piety animated the mother-country, the influence thereof would soon reach our foreign plantations, and extend throughout our borders. We should soon see religion shine forth with new lustre and force, to the conversion of infidels, both at home and abroad, and to the ‘casting down imaginations, and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ.’” (2 Cor. x. 5.)

Berkeley had, during his sojourn at Rhode Island, given himself diligently to those studies and reflections which were suitable to his aim as the introducer of a scholarly and christianized civilization into America, in order that he might be able to perform his part aright in the realization of his magnificent moral scheme. His studies and thoughts, however, were not to be utilised there. He brought back to Europe the fruits of calm reflection and imper-turbed study, and immediately placed before the reading world, “perhaps,” as Boswell said, “the most ingenious and excellent performance of the kind in the English language.” This was “Alciphron, the Minute Philosopher,” a defence of religion against the systems of the atheist, the fatalist, and the sceptic, in the form of a dialogue, modelled after Plato, and written far away from the movements of the world in his leisurely seclusion of Rhode Island. Dr. Hurd, our earliest philosophical critic, regarded it as in style one of the three works in the English language, written in the dialogue form, which deserved praise:—the other two being Shaftesbury’s “Moralists,” and Addison’s “Treatise on Medals.” Though the work rapidly obtained recognition and approval, yet as it is based on the author’s “Principles of Human Knowledge,” and requires an acquaintance with his peculiar theory, it was greatly misunderstood, not only by friends but foes. We select from Professor Fraser’s prefatory introduction these few passages, illustrative of the nature of its contents and the history of its reception among the learned and the religious:—

“‘ALCIPHRON; or, the Minute Philosopher,’ published in 1732, is the largest and probably the most popular of Berkeley’s works. Its popularity is due at once to its matter and its form. . . . Dialogues that are better fitted than any in our language to enable the English reader to realize the charm of Cicero and Plato. . . . Alciphron should be studied in the light of English Deism, from the time of Hobbes; but with more particular reference to what was said or written by Collins, Mandeville, and Shaftesbury, as well as to the explanation and defence of theological knowledge by Bishop Brown [Browne]. . . . In March, 1732, very soon after Berkeley’s return from America, the first edition of ‘Alciphron’ was published in Dublin—with the ‘Essay towards a new theory of Vision’ annexed, printed for G. Risk, G. Ewing, and W. Smith, booksellers, in Dame Street; and a second followed in London, ‘printed for J. Tonson, in the Strand,’ some months later in the same year. . . . A French version appeared at the Hague in 1734. . . .

“The first of the seven dialogues is introductory; the two next are ethical; the fourth is a defence of the presence and providence of God, as the foundation of practical morals; and in the three last, the spiritual and civilizing advantages of Christianity, with other proofs of its being divine, as well as objections to its evidence and mysteries, are discussed. Berkeley’s ingenuity and fancy are employed here in defending practical morality and moral order, against ethical theories founded on selfishness, like Mandeville’s, or on enthusiastic sentiment, as he regarded Shaftesbury’s; while his metaphysical philosophy is engaged for the support of theism, and in the refutation of objections to its development in the Christian form. The social utility of faith in virtue and in a future life; the supreme Intelligence and goodness which governs the existence in which we participate when we become conscious; the sufficiency of the Christian evidence for the reasonable demands of faith or action; and the possibility and practical value of the mysteries of theology, are all argued in the light of ethical or metaphysical philosophy, and of experience of the world. . . . In the discussion, Alciphron and Lysicles represent ‘minute philosophy,’ or free-thinking; the former in its more intellectual and generous aspect, and the latter as adopted by shallow men of the world who live for pleasure. Euphranor and Crito advocate morality and religion. Dion, who personates Berkeley, is mostly a spectator in the controversy. . . . Berkeley’s ‘Alciphron’ may rank with the ‘Analogy’ of Butler, and the ‘Pensees’ of Pascal, as the most remarkable works of the last and preceding century in religious philosophy. The ‘Minute Philosopher’ was the object of various attacks soon after its appearance.

“The fourth dialogue, along with the new theory of vision which it involves, occasioned the ‘Letter from an Anonymous Writer,’ in *The Daily Post Boy*, to which Berkeley’s vindication and explanation of that theory is a reply.

"The attack upon the 'Fable of the Bees,' in the second dialogue called out Mandeville, whose 'Letter to Dion,' occasioned by his book called 'Alciphron' (1732), complains of misrepresentation, and takes refuge under cover of its own ambiguous principles.

"A flippant attack upon the whole performance followed, in a tract entitled 'Remarks on the Minute Philosopher; in a Letter from a Country Clergyman to his friend in London.' The so-called 'Country Clergyman' was John, Lord Hervev, the 'Sporus' of Pope, and a familiar figure at the court of Queen Caroline, the inner life of which has been disclosed in his curious and sagacious memoirs. . . . Among other tracts due to the publication of 'Alciphron,' there is a curious one dated 'near Inverness, August, 1732.' It is in the form of a letter to a friend in Edinburgh, and is entitled 'A Vindication of the Reverend D—B—y, from the scandalous imputation of being the author of a late book entitled 'Alciphron, or, the Minute Philosopher.' To the vindication are subjoined 'the predictions of the late Earl of Shaftesbury concerning the book, together with an appendix and an advertisement; which is a squib occasioned by Dial. v. sect. 22.'"

To the "Alciphron" (from Greek ἀλή, might, and φρονις, Understanding) Berkeley had appended his "Essay towards a new theory of Vision," and in the fourth dialogue of his new book he had explained and applied that theory in vindication of the constant immediate presence of God as the Providence of the Universe." On the 9th of Sept., 1732, an anonymous critical letter appeared in *The Dublin Daily Post Boy*. This letter alone, among the criticisms to which "Alciphron" gave rise, moved Berkeley to reply. We owe to it his "Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained," which appeared in Jan., 1733. Though ostensibly a defence and restatement of his "Theory of Vision," it is substantially a summary of the principles on which Berkeley's earlier metaphysical and theological system was based. This tract was at first misunderstood, then overlooked, and next omitted from the collected editions of the Bishop's works. For nearly a century it was scarcely ever referred to, and yet as a brief, explicit, synthetical exposition of that theory which was, at first, analytically presented to the philosophical public, it is of high interest, great value and notable importance. "The ultimate aim," as Professor Fraser points out, "of the 'Theory of Vision,' as here vindicated, is to restore belief in the divine—by teaching us that even the sensible forms of nature are the expressions of Deity; that man is so con-

stituted that he cannot help interpreting them ; and that he may, by reflection, find in them a perpetual reminder of that divine essence in existence of which he is always apt otherwise to lose the consciousness. A similar aim is manifested in 'Siris' (as we shall see anon). This philosophy virtually implies that the sensible world is, for each of us, the phenomenal expression of an external *Will* and absolute intelligence." The work exhibits a considerable amount of intelligent reading, carefully reflected on, and a keen, clear vision in regard to the proper consequences of the speculations prevalent at that time.

During the year immediately subsequent to Berkeley's return from Rhode Island, he seems to have made his chief residence in London, though he probably visited Dublin, and perhaps went to Oxford to see his friend Secker receive the degree of LL.D. Queen Caroline commanded (as the phrase is) his attendance at the palace to discourse with him on his transatlantic experiences. Hoadly seemed scarcely to like this and decried him as a man of disordered intellect, but Sherlock rebutted this accusation, and presented to her Majesty a copy of "*Alciphron*" as a proof that he was no mere visionary. Recollecting the pleasant conversations she had held with him, charmed with the book, and amicably disposed towards him from her high appreciation of his character, the Queen, when she heard that the rich deanery of Down had fallen vacant, sought the place for him and secured the nomination. But this result of the royal influence offended the Duke of Dorset, then lord-lieutenant, and it was thought prudent to forego the claim of priority and patronage.

In Jan., 1734, Berkeley was nominated in succession to his old college friend, Dr. Edward Synge, Bishop of Cloyne—"where he shone as a star amid the comparative darkness of the Irish Church in the eighteenth century." The Duke of Dorset had recommended this, the Duke of Newcastle approved of it, and the Queen "had expressly enjoined" Bishop Hoadley of Dublin "not to oppose" Berkeley. The King assented to the advancement proposed, and those who had opposed his being Dean of Down thereby made him a bishop. Gout intervened and delayed his consecration. This being an aristocratic disease quite befitting, if it neither fitted nor benefited, the episcopal dignity he had attained.

Objections began now to be taken to the doctrines of Berkeley. In the eighth chapter of the Bishop of Cork, Dr. Peter Brown's

"Divine Analogy of Things Natural and Human," Berkeley's opinions are controverted. In another work entitled "An Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul," by Andrew Baxter, a native of Old Aberdeen in Scotland, a section is devoted to a consideration of Dean Berkeley's "Scheme against the Existence of Matter and a Material World," in which, after having been examined, it is stated to be shown to be inconclusive. Thus "Berkeley," as Professor Fraser says, "through Baxter, Hume, and Reid, first awakened reflection in Scotland." Not that this was really the first critical examination given in Scotland to the theories of Berkeley; for in the early days of his authorship the members of the Rankenian Club, the immediate antecessor of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, took an interest in his views and corresponded with him; and he was accustomed to say that his reasonings had been nowhere better understood than by this club of young Scotchmen; and the present paper is written within 150 yards from the place where one of the members of this literary club first studied long ago the thought-compelling sentences of Berkeley's "Alciphron."

In the spring of 1734 Berkeley became involved in a controversy which in its intention, so far as he was concerned, was to have been one with free-thinkers, but which became in the end a contest against the mathematicians, Baxter had objected that his conceptions of matter and space must lead the author "to suspect that even mathematics may not be very sound knowledge at the bottom;" and mathematics, being the essence of certainty, any theory which induced such an idea must itself be false. This caused Berkeley, for amusement, to employ some of his early hours "in thinking of certain mathematical matters" which might aid him in combating a form of religious scepticism, reputedly prevalent among mathematicians founded on the existence of incomprehensibilities in religion. The thoughts suggested to him in these reflective hours are of high interest at this time. He takes objection at the first outset to man's notions of incomprehensibility as a ground for religious doubts by contending that the main idea of science—"Force"—is as incomprehensible as *Grace*—the chief idea in religion. We cannot sensibly image either of them. "Fluxions are regulative, not speculative (just) as the first principles of religion are;" and "reasoners who can accept mysteries, and even what seem to be contradictions, in their own province are inconsistent in rejecting religion merely because it makes a similar

demand upon them." These ideas were broached in the "Analyst." "The Analyst," by the author of the "Minute Philosopher," was first published by J. Tonson in the Strand, in March, 1734—the month in which its author was promoted to the bishopric of Cloyne, and within the period of his residence in London, after his return from America. He was then engaged with the freethinkers. The Analyst, addressed to Dr. Halley, belongs to that discussion. It is an *argumentum ad hominem*, as regards the mathematician, but virtually an analogical vindication of the mysteries of religious faith. Mathematicians, so Berkeley argues, unreasonably complain of the scientific incomprehensibility of religion—seeing that their own science is itself ultimately incomprehensible, and contains conclusions supported by reasonings which are speculatively insufficient." "Mathematicians, in short, accept in their own science what they reject in Christianity: fluxions, like Christianity, when resolved into their first principles, involve concessions which transcend human understanding; and, as expounded by Newton, contain reasonings which cannot be reconciled with logic, although mathematicians are ready to receive them on his authority!"

"The publication of the 'Analyst' was the signal for a mathematico-metaphysical or mathematico-theological controversy which lasted for years, which gave rise to more than thirty pamphlets and articles, and in which some of the chief of British mathematicians of the time were involved." James Jurin, M.D., under the name of Philalethes Cantabrigiensis was the first to reply, in his "Geometry no Friend to Infidelity," to Berkeley's analogical reasoning, and *argumentum ad homines*. Berkeley rejoined in a "Defence of Free-thinking in Mathematics," which appeared early in 1735. Dr. Jurin parried the blow in the same year in his "Freethinker no Just Thinker." While Berkeley was thus engaged with Jurin, he had also to meet an attack by a professor and mathematician of Dublin, Mr. Walton, to whom Berkeley replied in an appendix to his defence against Jurin, and afterwards in a combination of reasoning and sarcasm, called "Reasons for not Replying to Mr. Walton's full Answer," in which he affects to treat his opponent as a convert in disguise. This "Analyst" controversy, in which Berkeley was engaged, was afterwards prolonged by the mathematicians among themselves. It engaged Pemberton and Benjamin Robins. The world owes one of the best productions of Colin MacLaurin, the Edinburgh Mathematical Professor, to the "Analyst," viz., his



"Treatise of Fluxions," 1742; a work in which the principles of the method which had previously been developed in an obscure and concise manner, was developed after the manner of the ancient geometers. To this controversy also—a fact not noticed by any of Reid's biographers—we owe the first published work of Dr. Thomas Reid, "An Essay on Quantity," 1748.

After launching the "Analyst" on the sea of speculation, Berkeley set off to his new bishopric in Ireland. On Sunday, 19th May, 1734, Berkeley was consecrated to the Bishopric of Cloyne, in St. Paul's Church, Dublin, by Dr. Theophilus Bolton, Archbishop of Cashel, assisted by Dr. Nicholas Forster [his wife's uncle], Bishop of Raphoe; and Dr. Charles Carr, Bishop of Killaloe. Cloyne is upwards of 150 miles from Dublin; and before autumn had set in he had settled down in the manse-house there to his duties and his studies. The diocese occupies the eastern and northern parts of the county of Cork. It contained then forty-four churches, and about 14,000 Protestants. There were nearly twice as many Catholics. The cathedral and the bishop's residence were in the village of Cloyne, in the barony of Imokilly, and contained about 1,500 inhabitants. It consisted of four streets which met together in the centre about three miles east of Cork harbour. The cathedral is large but not handsome; the residence is a large irregular building in the east portion of the village, from which it is screened off by a close growth of shrubs and trees; annexed to this was a large garden and about 400 acres of farm land, 50 of which Berkeley retained for culture in his own hands.

Berkeley was a recluse student, and the retirement of Cloyne suited him well in this respect. He was far from all the great centres, and having leisure and inclination for meditation, he began to interest himself in the social condition of Ireland. Ecclesiastically he was perhaps the first among the holders of the episcopate to propose the admission of Catholics to Trinity College, Dublin, without being obliged to attend chapel or divinity lectures. Politically he abstained from partizan politics, but devoted a great deal of thought to social economics; hence Sir James Mackintosh justly says, "Berkeley, though of English extraction, was a true Irishman, and the first eminent Protestant, after the unhappy contest of the Revolution, who avowed his love for all his countrymen."

The "Querist" is the first in chronological order of Berkeley's tracts on the "Social and Economical Condition of Ireland," written 1871.

when he was Bishop of Cloyne.—These tracts show his extensive acquaintance with trade, agriculture, finance, and the arts of life. The first edition was issued anonymously, under the editorship of his college friend Dr. Madden, at Dublin, in three successive parts, in 1735, 6, and 7. It was written with the design of encouraging the improvement of Ireland in co-operation with the Dublin Society for Promoting Useful Arts and Sciences, which had recently been founded by Prior, Madden, &c., in Dublin; and “it appears to have had no small effect that way.” It was one of the tracts reprinted in 1751, by R. and A. Foulis, in Glasgow, under the advice of Francis Hutcheson, and formed one of the books read by the students of Adam Smith. There was an appreciable amendment in the social condition of Ireland about the middle of last century, which was greatly due to “the manly patriotism of Swift,” and the thoughtful philanthropy of his friend Bishop Berkeley.

In 1736 Berkeley issued a “Discourse Addressed to Magistrates and Men in Authority, occasioned by the Enormous Licences and Irreligion of the Times.” This discourse, which was first printed by Falkner at Dublin, and republished in 1738, is a defence of a national religion. In it the bishop argues that one great duty of the magistrate is the regulation of the opinions of society, because by these opinions the actions of men are determined. When “License is taken for the end of Government and popular humour for its origin,” men are apt to transgress all precepts human and divine in their self-conceit and self-indulgence. Hence though thought should, nay must, be free, yet a system of religious belief which has been tested by ages and found useful in promoting the happiness of the race, ought to be steadily maintained by the supreme power in society. Freedom of thought does not infer a boundless freedom of speech, an open contempt of laws, and a prescribing from private judgment against public authority, things never borne in any well-ordered state, and which form the crying distemper of our times.”

The immediate occasion of this discourse, which seems to have been delivered in Dublin, as well as the stimulant to the only speech which Berkeley delivered in the Irish House of Lords, was the institution in Dublin of a society, of which he had heard among the rumours and echoes of things, called blasters, established for the popularising of blasphemy, impiety, and profaneness; but we think Berkeley must have been greatly misinformed on this point, and

that his denunciation was perhaps too hasty, if not also a little too hot. It is a contribution, however, to the debate on the formation and publication of opinion which deserves perusal and requires consideration.

About the time when Berkeley was introduced to the House of Lords in the Parliament of Ireland, a romance, written it is now known by Simon Berington, a Catholic priest, bearing the title of "*Gaudentio di Lucca*," and advocating a purer civilization than Europe afforded, appeared, and was for some time attributed to Bishop Berkeley, whose amiability of character somewhat answered to that of the hero and the Utopian traveller.

For some time Berkeley had been failing in health, being afflicted with an almost habitual colic, and while he was himself thus suffering, there fell upon Ireland a terrible time of famine and disease. Death was frightfully busy around him in 1739-42. Study of Greek lore and eastern literature, medical trusts, and philosophical treatises, alternated with philanthropic efforts to reduce disease and induce self-help among the Irish; and "the Cork frost of 1739-40" was the occasion of a chain of thought the most curious of any even in the experience of Berkeley.

In 1744 Berkeley comes more prominently into the light than he has done since he had settled in his "serene corner at Cloyne. His medical experiments [and experience] in Imokilly determined the course of his reading in a way very characteristic of him. He had been devoted to tar-water for years." He had heard of it from the Indians in Narragansett, and he had employed it successfully in Cloyne. But the most lasting effect of Berkeley's tar-water enthusiasm has been the curious and beautiful work of speculation, which in the spring of 1744 he offered to the world—"A Chain of Philosophical Reflections and Inquiries concerning the virtues of tar-water, and divers other subjects connected together and arising one from another." This work cost him more thought and research, he used to say, than any other he ever undertook. No one who examines its contents can be surprised to hear this. The book is full of fruit gathered in the remote byeways of science and philosophy. Berkeley's growing inclination towards Platonism, and his affectionate study of Greek philosophy, partly shown in "*Alciphron*," is much more conspicuous in these philosophical reflections. "A second edition, in which the name '*Siris*' [from Greek *Sieris*, a chain] was given to it by its author, appeared a few

weeks after the first ;" so great was its popularity, not, however, from its philosophical tenets, but because of its medicinal promise—its suggestion of the discovery of a new and yet a true elixir of life.

" 'SIRIS'.—Berkeley's 'Chain of Philosophical Reflections and Inquiries' presents his metaphysical philosophy in its latest form, as it was when he was about sixty years of age. . . . It proclaims that sensible existence, and indeed existence as such, centres in conscious intelligence. . . . In one view 'Siris' may be looked at as a gracefully contrived commonplace-book, into which the learned meditation of Berkeley's whole previous life, regarding the sensible world and its spiritual cause were gathered, and in which, with earnest and eloquent reiteration, they are expressed. more in a contemplative than in an argumentative spirit and form. It is a chain of aphorisms, in which the connection is produced by the quaintest and most subtle associations. The speculations of the deepest thinkers, ancient and modern, blend themselves with the successive links, and the whole forms a series of studies, as well in physical science as in Greek and Eastern philosophy. . . . During the sixteen years which preceded its publication, Berkeley lived much alone among his books, first in Rhode Island, and afterwards in his secluded diocese of Cloyne; for the most part too in indifferent health. In his study Plato and the Neoplatonists became his favourite companions; while out of doors, among the poor of his diocese, he was, in these early years of his residence, as we gather from his correspondence, surrounded in an usual degree by suffering and disease. . . . At Cloyne the sufferings of his neighbours suggested the remedy of tar-water, of which he had heard on the other side of the Atlantic, and which, as he tried it in different kinds of disease, seemed to grow under his hand into a universal medicine. 'I do not,' he modestly conjectures, 'I do not say that it is a panacea; I only suspect it to be so—time and trial will show.' The mere suspicion of a discovery so wonderful—sustained by many alleged facts and by ingenious reasoning—was enough to set Berkeley's thoughts agoing about the probable physical cause of tar-water being the cure for our corporeal ills in this prison of the body. Tar, to begin with, is produced from the vegetable world, in modes described (sect. 10-28). This leads him on to an inquiry into vegetable life, especially in those organisms, such as pines and firs, from which chiefly tar is produced (sect. 26-32). We are thus in the opening part of 'Siris,' conducted through the region of vegetable physiology and botany, in company with Theophrastus and Pliny, Jonstonus, John Evelyn, and that 'curious anatomist of plants,' Dr. Nehemiah Grew. . . . Meditation upon the acid, spirit, or vegetable soul, sheathed in its thin volatile oil, so readily withdrawn from tar by water, opens the way to more general questions about acids or volatile salts. . . .

As the acid spirit or salt, that mighty instrument in the hand of nature,' is supposed to reside in air, and to be diffused through that whole element, the train of thought next passes through the atmosphere. . . . We pass accordingly (sect. 152) from the physical examination of air to the physical and semi-metaphysical speculation of this invisible fire or æther—the vital spirit of the whole sensible universe, the principle which corresponds in nature—the *macrocosm*, to the animal spirit in man—the *microcosm*. . . . Vital fire is the physical chain by which all sensible changes are concentrated. This fire or æther—this 'luminous spirit'—is corporeal and physical, not incorporeal and metaphysical (sect. 206-213), although it is all-pervading, and governed by wonderful laws. . . . Sir Isaac Newton's elastic æther is not to be confounded with this invisible animated fire or æther. . . . Thus far Berkeley's chain is physical. . . . All sensible phenomena, with all their merely physical or instrumental causes, presupposes the perpetual operation of intelligence (sect. 231-238; see also sect. 153, 155, 160, 161). Philosophy, properly so called, must be spiritual and not mechanical: the facts and laws of physical science are but the sensible or contingent expression of divine thoughts (sect. 251-264). Active intelligence is, in short, with Berkeley, the only summary or metaphysical explanation of the universe. Supreme mind alone is the 'golden chain' of a Catholic philosophy. . . . The last hundred sections of 'Siris' are probably the nearest approach by native British mind in the last century to philosophy according to a conception of these ancient and modern sages. In each section a grain of gold may be found, and the grains multiply as we advance. . . . God, or Supreme Mind, is thus, (as it were) the intelligible soul of the world, by whose perpetual and pervading activity all things are connected in the unity of a golden chain—the complicated links of which human science, with weak and faltering hand, tries to display in their true order. . . . Thus, by a chain of many links, we pass from the one extreme of gross sense to the other extreme of pure intelligence: the relations or truths of which last are a new and really divine object of contemplation. . . . Theology and philosophy gently unbind the ligaments that chain the soul down to the earth, and assist her flight toward the sovereign good. Let us then rise from our fallen state by meditating with the theological philosopher on that contrast, and yet correlation of sense and intelligence, being and knowing, the many and the one, changes and the permanent, the individual and the universal, which lies at the root of whatever is, and which in these and like modes of conception, has engaged the deepest thinkers in distant ages and countries.

"What then is God? This is the next question which the train of thought suggests. It leads to a restatement of the theory of power and causation which runs through and is the very essence of Berkeley's philosophy. A cause is to be distinguished from its effects, and the supreme mind, how closely connected soever with

the universe of sensible phenomena in which His ideas are expressed, is not to be confounded with those phenomena. He is a really existing spirit, distinct or separate from all corporeal and sensible things. . . . In the remaining sections of 'Siris' he moves throughout in company with Parmenides and Plato, Plotinus and Proclus, and not without many allusions to the curious Hermitic lore which seemed somehow to have a fascination for him in his old age. In the ideas of Plato he thinks he discerns the beginning of a course of thought which reconciles Philosophy with Theology.' . . . 'The Platonic ideas are not like those of Locke, or like Berkeley's own ideas or phenomena of sense whose *esse* is *percipi* inert, inactive objects of perception. They are self-existent, necessary uncreated principles. Nor are they abstract general ideas.' Plato's universals are the most real beings intellectual and unchangeable; and therefore more real than the fleeting, transient objects of sense, which, wanting stability, cannot be objects of science, much less of intellectual knowledge.' 'We are asked to try in this manner, to rise even above the thought of a Universal Spirit, the supreme cause of life and motion, or of a universal mind, enlightening and ordering all things; and to enter into the meaning of the ancient tenet of *τὸ εἷς* or *τὸ ἀγένητον*—the *fons Deitatis*—the first hypostasis in the Divinity—by participation in which all besides was supposed to exist, the finite spirits of men included.' 'What is *τὸ εἷς*, thus, in a manner common to ourselves and God? Is it not personality? It seems that personality is the indivisible centre of the soul or mind, which is unical, so far forth as she is a *person*. Here we find ourselves returning into Berkeley's early philosophy of spiritual or personal phenomenalism—a universe of ideas or phenomena ultimately dependent upon persons. But *τὸ εἷς* THE ONE—the abstract personality seems to exclude intellect or mind, to which it is assumed to be prior.' . . . 'Intellect abstracted from life, is, however, as barren as personality abstracted from intellect. Both must participate in life. The supreme substance and cause must be a living or conscious spirit.' 'Supreme being must be divine thought in a living person.' With this trinity in the very essence of being 'Siris' concludes. The closing paragraph is noble and worthy. 'The eye by long use comes to see, even in the darkest cavern; and there is no subject so obscure but we may discern some glimpses of truth by long poring on it. Truth is the cry of all; but the game of a few. Certainly, where it is the chief passion, it doth not give way to vulgar cares and views; nor is it contented with a little ardour in the early time of life; active perhaps to pursue, but not so fit to weigh and revise. He that would make a real progress in knowledge must dedicate his age as well as youth, the latter growth as well as first-fruits, at the altar of truth.

"*Cujusvis est errare; nullius nisi insipientis in errore perseverare.*"

("Any one may err; none but a fool perseveres in error.")

Immediately after the publication of "Siris," a tar-water controversy ensued, productive of writings, not less numerous or bulky than those yielded by the "Analyst" controversy some years before. The infection spread to other countries. "Siris" was soon translated, in whole or in part, into French, German, Dutch, and Portuguese; its doctrines were discussed, and tar-water establishments were set agoing in various parts of Europe and America. Fielding, who speaks of its discoverer as "one of the greatest of scholars and best of men," tried tar-water, with good results, for his dropsy; and many others found, or believed they derived benefit from the medicinal uses of tar-water. Berkeley himself was so confident that he sung of it, averring that he "who drinks tar-water will drink it again" in despite of those who endeavoured—

"To furnish the revolving moons  
With pamphlets, epigrams, lampoons,  
Against tar-water."

In 1745 the Jacobite rebellion under Prince Charles Stuart excited Ireland almost as much as it stirred Scotland, though Ireland has not so embalmed that adventurer in song as Scotland has. This induced Berkeley to write a "Letter to the Roman Catholics of Cloyne," dissuading them from revolt. The Earl of Chesterfield, who had become Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, gratified at the kindly and patriotic act, "made an offer to the Doctor of changing his bishopric of Cloyne for that of Clogher, which was of much greater value," but he declined the preferment, and even when the primacy had become vacant and he was offered the supreme seat he refused to accept of it, being anxious to show an example of one churchman who could see without envy mitres given to others, and preferments bestowed on them without discontent. Among the changes in the church he remained quite devoted to art and music, to the education of his children, and the fulfilment of his pastoral and episcopal duties. Now and again he gleams in on one with a paper on Lough Neagh, or on earthquakes, a note to a friend or a letter to a fellow prelate; or we hear of his own, his wife's, or his children's health, but we know of no part he took in the public life of the country or of any prominent action he took a share in till in 1749 he issued one of his most characteristic productions—"A Word to the Wise," in which he condenses the spirit

of the *Querist*, in an appeal to the Roman Catholic Clergy of Ireland to preach the gospel of work and self-reliance to the people of that country. For this he received the public thanks of the clergy whom he had so paternally addressed, in which they undertook to comply with his advice as that of "the good man, the polite gentleman, and the true patriot." In 1750 he published "*Maxims of Patriotism*" in the *Dublin Journal*, they were republished in a small tract as if by a lady—probably Mrs. Berkeley; and subsequently reprinted in 1752 in "*A Miscellany, containing several tracts on various Subjects*," by the Bishop of Cloyne. This contained all his minor productions and farther thoughts on tar-water; and to it was prefixed "*An Ode to the Author of Siris*," by the R[ight] R[evd.] T[he] L[ord] B[ishop] O[f] N[orwich], Dr. Hayter, which also appeared in the *Gentleman's Magazine*, in Oct., 1752, in the original Latin, with an English translation. In it Berkeley is spoken of as one who, like Hippocrates and Sydenham, Newton and Boyle—

"Displayed

The laws which heaven, earth, air, and seas obeyed;  
Hast taught what quickening flame, what active soul,  
Pervading nature, animates the whole."

Before this, however, he had left Cloyne, where he had so long enjoyed the consciousness of dutifulness, in which he had reared and educated such children as had been spared to him; for death had visited his family cradle and nursery frequently. In Feb. 1751 his favourite son, a young and promising artist died, and two sons and a daughter alone were left to him. Ill health was gaining on him, and friend after friend began to be summoned from life. He determined on taking his son Henry to Oxford and to spend his closing days there in learned retirement. He proposed to exchange Cloyne for an Oxford principalship, and not succeeding in this he offered his resignation to the Secretary of State. George II. declared that he should die a bishop, whether he liked it or not. He put the living in commission under his brother, Rev. Robert Berkeley, as vicar-general, and left Cloyne, Aug. 4th, 1752. He passed from Cork to Bristol and was conveyed thence on a horse-litter to Oxford, where he had taken a house in Holywell Street. Here, diseased and suffering, he shrank from society, though here probably he revised his "*Miscellany*" and read the proofs. Of



his mode of life we have little record. One scene is vivid and marked. On the evening of 14th Jan., 1753, Berkeley was resting on a couch, surrounded by his family. His wife, at his request, had been reading aloud the lesson on the Burial Service, and Berkeley had been interjecting remarks upon it. He had lapsed into silence. His daughter began to bestir herself to make the tea, She went to offer him some. He did not stir. By a sudden palsy of the heart he had been taken away, as it were, with the triumphant exclamation of St. Paul in his ear, "O Death, where is thy sting! O Grave, where is thy victory?" and in the sublime aspiration for adoption into the family of God with which the collect closes, in his heart.

On Jan. 20th he was buried in the chapel of Christ Church, where a suitable inscription marks the spot. His body rests in Oxford, and now Oxford has produced his noblest monument, the works of Berkeley, edited by Professor Fraser.

This work—of which we frankly confess the previous pages are but, as it were, a shadowy abstract and epitome, because the main passages of it are but abridged from the learned professor's volume—is three, yea, four times worthy of the amiable, reflective, patriotic, philosophic, and holy thinker, whose memory illustrates the history of metaphysical research in Ireland; of the Clarendon Press, whence it issues so beautifully and perfectly printed as a work which the Syndicate has sanctioned, arranged for and provided as a lasting memorial of one whose very dust is dear to the speculative thinker; and of the great university, who, as curators of the memory of Berkeley, have had it so embalmed; of the philosophical literature of the British Islands, of which it is so conspicuous and remarkable a part; and of the worthy and erudite professor who has devoted so large a portion of his life, thought, travel, toil, correspondence, and acquirements to set this volume forth lovingly, to be lovingly studied. The Scottish professor's edition of the famous Irish philosopher produced by the wealthiest university in England—*tria juncta in uno*—merits the best thanks of the reflective world, diligent and appreciative study.

## Religion.

---

### IS CHRIST'S REIGN UPON EARTH TO BE A SPIRITUAL OR A TEMPORAL ONE—OR BOTH?

#### SPIRITUAL.—II.

G. J. C. EMPLOYS three arguments in his attempt to show that Christ's reign upon earth will be a temporal one. First, he argues that it is possible that our Lord Jesus Christ can reign personally on the earth. Now as to the *possibility* of Christ's reigning personally on the earth, there is not much likelihood of a difference of opinion on that point, between G. J. C. and his opponents. But we cannot see that the *possibility* of an occurrence affords the slightest evidence of either the certainty or the probability of such an occurrence being a reality. There are things innumerable which our Lord Jesus Christ *can* do, which things nevertheless it is certain He never will do. It is a *possibility* for the Lord to save devils, yet that they never will be saved is a certainty.

It is *possible* for the Lord to bring forth from the earth abundant crops of corn, without any seed having been sown, but we believe not only that such an occurrence is extremely improbable, but that "it is certain that it will not take place, notwithstanding its *possibility*. It is *possible* for one half of the buildings in London to fall to the ground in one night, but it is neither certain nor probable that they will do so. It is indeed true that what is not possible cannot take place, yet from the possibility of an occurrence no argument can be drawn for either the certainty or the probability of that occurrence. We might adduce instances, *ad infinitum*, of the possibility of occurrences which are neither certain nor probable. The argument in favour of Christ's personal reign upon the earth, drawn from the possibility thereof, is but an imponderable in the scale, and therefore adds to the weight of evidence—nothing.

The second argument of G. J. C. for the personal reign of Christ is its *probability*. He argues that "the purpose of Christ's coming to the earth at all would not be served if He did not come to reign upon the earth." "He came," G. J. C. tells us, "to defeat the

principalities and powers of the earth, to overcome the prince of this world, to rout, ruin, and destroy the enemy of man and the rebel against God." It is true that Christ came to do this, and He has already done it. "For this purpose," the apostle John tells us, "the Son of God was manifested, that He might destroy the works of the devil" (1 John iii. 8). "For this purpose the Son of God *was* manifested," not—*is to be* manifested. The Son of God has destroyed the works of the devil. The works of the devil were the deprivation of man of his innocency, the making of him a sinner, the bringing of him under the power of iniquity, and thereby rendering him deserving of, and liable to, eternal misery. These works of the devil the Son of God has destroyed by working out a righteousness for the sinner's justification, by delivering him from the power of iniquity, by saving him from hell, and eventually by eradicating sin from his nature. Having thus at His first coming destroyed the works of the devil, it is not necessary for Christ to reign personally for the destruction of those works, and therefore *not* probable that He will do so.

For the probability of Christ's personal reign, G. J. C. adduces Acts iii. 19—21; and Psalm ii. 8.

The signification of the Scripture here first named we take to be this. Peter was exhorting the Jews to repent of the sin of crucifying Christ—which sin he had just been charging them with—that this sin might be blotted out, that is, that when ruin came on the nation, those who repented might be delivered from the general calamity which was sure to be terrible to the impenitent, thus the penitent would have times of refreshment, or of ease and rest from persecution, as was actually the case with those who believed in Christ at the destruction of Jerusalem, they were not only saved from that ruin, but also delivered from the wrath of their implacable enemies. The sending of Jesus Christ which is spoken of in verse 20, does not respect the coming of Christ personally, but His coming by His Spirit in the ministration of His word, and "the times of the restitution of all things," we believe refers to the accomplishment of Scripture promises and prophecies in the conversion of both Jews and Gentiles.

And this sense is confirmed by the Syriac and Arabic versions, the former of which renders the words "until the fulfilling of the times of all things," and the latter renders them—"until the times which will confirm the perfection of all the words which God hath spoken."

And some lexicographers translate the word *teleiosis*—*perfection* or *fulfilling*. This scripture therefore affords no evidence of a temporal reign of Christ. Neither does Psalm ii. 8 furnish any such evidence. This promise of the Father to Christ is already to a great extent fulfilled. The inhabitants of this country and of other countries where Christ has had a people for his inheritance were once heathen, and we believe that in those lands which are still heathen, Christ will, without a temporal reign, have a people for his inheritance, a people to serve him, a people whose obedience and whose praises he will inherit, and in whose hearts he will reign. G. J. C. remarks that "the time approaches when Jesus Christ shall be exalted far above all principality and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is named in this world, and in that which is to come." But this exaltation of Christ has already taken place. The very scripture quoted by G. J. C. shows this to be the case, for in that scripture the apostle Paul is evidently speaking, not of the future but of the past, not of what God will do but of what he has already done, even of what he did when he raised Christ from the dead, and exalted Him in heaven, far above all angels, both good and bad, as well as far above all earthly rulers, as kings, princes, &c. "And *kath*," says the apostle, not *he will*, no, but He "*kath* put all things under his feet."

G. J. C. tells us that Christ has taught us to pray for a spiritual reign in the words, "Thy kingdom come, thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven." Christ here teaches us to pray for his reign, but *personal* is G. J. C.'s own addition. Christ has even now a spiritual kingdom in the hearts of his subjects, for the coming, that is, for the increase and completion of which his people are taught to pray, and that His will may be done in earth, as it is done in heaven, that is, voluntarily and cheerfully. The third argument of G. J. C., for the personal reign of Christ, is its *certainly*, for evidence of which he adduces the language of Job, "For I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that He shall stand at the latter day upon the earth. And though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God." But what evidence these words furnish of a temporal reign of Christ we are at a loss to see. Christ will indeed stand at the latter day upon the earth, as the judge of all mankind, but not to carry on a temporal reign, which kind of government never was in accordance with the spirit of Jesus Christ. When he was upon earth, men would have made him a

king, but he refused all honour of that nature, and told Pilate—"My kingdom is not of this world," that is, Christ meant it to be understood that his kingdom was not one of worldly pomp and splendour, nor a kingdom having respect to the outward estates of men as a temporal one has; and as Christ's kingdom was then of a spiritual nature, so we believe it now is and ever will be; and Acts iv. 11., which G. J. C. quotes as evidence in his favour, makes nothing for his argument, but simply teaches that as Christ went to heaven in human nature, in the clouds of heaven, and attended with mighty angels, so he will come to judgment in the same nature, in the clouds of heaven, and attended with the same mighty angels.

It appears to us that the idea of a temporal kingdom, and a personal reign of Christ on the earth, is one which is altogether contrary to the general tenour of the word of God. We believe that the reign of Christ will be *spiritual*. We believe that the time will come when the power of Satan will be greatly restrained, and that this is what is signified in Rev. xx. by Satan being shut up for a season. We believe that the gospel will yet be carried into all the world, and that out of all nations God will take a people for himself. Thus, "the knowledge of the Lord shall cover the earth as the waters cover the sea." We believe that a much greater blessing will before the end comes, attend the preaching of the gospel, and that much more good will be done by it, than is now done. We believe that there will be a much greater agreement in judgment, as well as much more love and union amongst the followers of Christ than there now is. We believe that darkness and error will be to a much greater degree dispersed by the light of truth. And we believe that the Church will enjoy a far greater measure of liveliness and prosperity than she now enjoys. And when these things take place, there will indeed be a glorious *spiritual* reign of Christ. S. S.

#### TEMPORAL.—II.

It is with profound emotions and with strong convictions that we approach the consideration of this great question. From the early Christian fathers down to the present time the churches of Christendom have blindly accepted as orthodox the doctrine of the spiritual reign of Christ on earth. *Per contra*, a small band of

devout, and learned, and thoughtful divines have rejected the dogma as a cobweb of Catholicism. With that view we firmly coincide, sincerely believing that a spiritual issue of human history and man's destiny has no warranty in Scripture, and is utterly opposed to reason as well as to the Divine purposes as revealed in His word.

We, therefore, accept the doctrine of the personal reign of Christ on earth as absolutely certain, and believe it is the only possible solution of the great historical and providential drama which all the inspired writers foreshadowed "till the times of the Gentiles be fulfilled."

In all departments of human progress and effort our age is a marvellous and very exhaustive one. In ecclesiastical as well as in other domains of thought, there are evidences of rigid inquiry and great searchings after truth. We question old beliefs, and rudely set them aside as the appanages of a dark age and an effete Church. Anon we resuscitate ecclesiastical fashions and dogmas which have been entombed for thousands of years—set them up in our high places, and our priests cry out: "These be thy gods, O Israel!" Again other old lines of thought, revered as canons of faith by myriads of devotees cumbering their minds and consciences, are being gathered into heaps and buried in oblivion. In uprooting the tares of error, let us beware not to injure the ripened wheat. We cannot, however, prevent the old dogma and the new sciences coming constantly into collision. Then are all astir, "ringing out the old and ringing in the new." The harvest-time is approaching, and it behoves the Church of Christ in the midst of all this shaking and heaving to take sides and make a firm and bold stand. The wise virgins will be sure to trim their lamps, and make ready to meet the bridegroom. Let the foolish ones, therefore, take heed, and buy oil before the market gates are closed. Again, and we do not regret it, the profoundest thinkers of our age have burst through the common barriers of conventional belief to tread new fields of thought, interrogate the laws of creation, and bring to light her secret mysteries. Will it not be in the end all the better for truth? In matters spiritual this strong perturbed disposition has been happily evoked, and the wisdom of the old dogmas which have flowed down the stream of time unchallenged to our shores are now accepted—for what they are worth. And when any doctrine is preached, or principle enunciated in our hearing, professing

to come from the Divine hand, is it not our solemn duty to examine with due reverence, but with all the faculties of our being the superscription which it bears? It is surely high time, therefore, that our compromises with every form of error be laid in the dust, and that much of the theology of the so-called fathers of the Church be showed as moth-eaten and unscriptural. Tertullian, and Origen, and Eusebius, and Chrysostom, and Augustine, and Gregory, must give place to the psalms and the prophets, to Christ and His apostles. The Athanasian Creed must give place to the Pauline. Once more, we glory in the names of Melancthon and Luther, of Calvin and Knox. They awoke as from a long dream, and emerging from the valley and shadow of death they looked back, and saw with horror the thick incrustations of Papal error which shrouded God's ways, and beclouded His truth, and like giants refreshed with wine they battled with priestly tyranny, and wrestled manfully to overthrow the arch enemy. These grand old thinkers saw through a glass darkly, they never attained to the highest beacons, and though their minds failed to compass the whole circle of inspiration, nevertheless they successfully worked to emancipate thought from the trammels and toils which the blackness and darkness of Roman Catholicism had held in its grip fifteen long centuries. Our reformers gazed on the mighty ocean of Holy Writ, and described it after their fashion in tomes of thought,—they explored slowly and laboriously whole continents of biblical lore; but sometimes they did their work hastily and crudely—the deep mines of His law and testimony produced much rich ore; but they scanned the domains of the prophets, and that which they explored is to us still enveloped in the fog and dank atmosphere of the harlot and apostate church. Even their mighty minds were too beclouded to throw off entirely the nightmare of ignorance and error which had dazed all the Christian ages, and still sat astride like a mighty harlot on the vitals of apostolic teaching. But thank God we are nearing the solid land, and can already descry the haven. For three centuries past the pillars of the ecclesiastical earth have been shaking to their very basement, and at last we behold with joy the temporal power of the Antichrist overthrown. The old patched fabric of theology is disjointed, and the blasphemy of the utterances of the vicar of Christ will soon be entombed in the bottomless pit. The nations are angry—we live in the midst of troublous times. These are sure signs that we are approaching the beginning of the

end, the great harvest-time of the world's history ; the moment is, therefore, opportune to consider dispassionately the question of the spiritual versus the temporal and personal reign of Christ on the earth.

To understand the scope of the prophetic writings we must have a clear conception of what is meant by prophecy. Prophecy, then, is history written beforehand. Apply that principle to every prophetic utterance, and we get the key to unlock all the mysteries which the prescience of the prophets unfolded. Isaiah and Jeremiah, Ezekiel and Daniel, especially sketched on canvas a vast array of pictorial delineations having reference to the several political and social organizations which would rise and fall during the history of the world. The pictures and hieroglyphics of the prophet Daniel are so sequential and so simple that we shall attempt to decipher one of his inspired sketches.

"The whole of the second chapter of Daniel relates to a remarkable dream which Nebuchadnezzar had seen, and the wonderful and marvellous manner in which Daniel had recalled the vision and its meaning to the King's mind. He had beheld "a vast metallic image" of enormous stature, whose brightness was excellent, and the form thereof terrible. The image's head was of fine gold, his breast and his arms of silver, his belly and his thighs of brass, his legs of iron, his feet part of iron and part of clay. He beheld till a stone was cut out without hands, which smote the image upon his feet and brake them to pieces, the whole structure falling to the ground, and the *debris* becoming like the chaff of the summer threshing-floors. Then the wind carried all away, and no place was found to contain the residue. Daniel thereupon explained that the image represented four great universal monarchies, and that after the fourth had ceased its power, ten kingdoms, represented by the ten toes, would arise out of the fall of the fourth monarchy, and would continue their reign until the time should come when "the stone kingdom" would utterly destroy all preceding ones, and fill the whole earth with its glory. Daniel stated that this stone kingdom would be set up during the lifetime of the ten toe kingdoms, and would never be destroyed, and declared that its administration and civil polity would no longer be left in the hands of men. The dream was really a panoramic view of the great historical and political events which would happen during the existence of the several empires and kingdoms



of the earth, and the whole of Daniel's writings were devoted to the rendering of those great events more clear to the Church of God. The four great monarchies which had existed were the Assyrio-Babylonian, the Medo-Persian, the Grecian, and the Imperial Roman empires, the first three lasting about 200 years each, and the last just 700 years. At the fall of the Roman Empire, about the beginning of the sixth century, when the Goths and Vandals and Germans of the North subjected Rome to their pleasure, the several Roman provinces, one after the other, became distinct kingdoms, and their consolidation resulted in the establishment of ten European monarchies which remained intact for a long period. What the issue of the late horrible conflict would be no one could presume to say, but all the grave commotions of the past fifty years pointed to the speedy break up of the whole of the ten toe kingdoms. Was it not a marvellous fact that Daniel, who lived six centuries before Christ, had actually forecast the grand drama of human destiny to the end of the stream of time? His vast intellect, aided by the Spirit of God, had compassed the whole series of events which had followed in succession, and he warns us that 'the autocratic, kingly, presidential, and priestly governments and tyrannies of men will come to an end in the course of the present generation, and that the several tabernacles of human iniquity will not only fall to rise no more, but that a totally and absolutely new kingdom will be set up in their place; a grand and universal theocracy, when conflicts and civil strife shall for ever cease, and when He shall reign whose right it is, whose kingdom will come in all its glory, and whose will or law will be observed on earth as in heaven.'

Did Daniel make a mistake when he described the origin of the stone kingdom? the conquests of the stone kingdom? the glory of the stone kingdom? the temporal and universal power of the stone kingdom? the eternal duration of the stone kingdom? Daniel's picture brings to the front, as we have seen, four universal monarchies, and how the one should succeed the other, by might, and by power, and by conquest. His picture also fully, but succinctly, describes the kings or ten kingdoms built upon the *débris* of the fourth monarchy, viz., the fate of the Roman power. Daniel distinctly says that "in the days of these kings shall the God of heaven rear up a kingdom that shall never be destroyed," viz., the stone kingdom. He distinctly declares that the stone cut out of

the mountain should smite the image and destroy it for ever, and that the little stone should grow into a huge mountain and fill the whole earth. Can we possibly, by any process of reasoning, spiritualize this stone kingdom. Was the first monarchy he described spiritual in its nature? Was the second? Was the third? Was the fourth? Were the ten toe kingdoms to be spiritual in their conception? And why should we spiritualize the fifth universal monarchy? The spiritual view describes the stone to be a spiritual stone, the work of destruction which it has to accomplish a spiritual work, the kingdom to be set up a spiritual kingdom above the stars, the king on the throne to be a spiritual king, and the subjects who shall acknowledge fealty to him spiritual beings; and that this kingdom was set up eighteen centuries ago. But all this mere assertion really seems very airy and very unsubstantial. Daniel's ken brought into view a real, personal, active, tangible, substantial king and kingdom and subjects. The platform on which the stone king was to commence his work was on the earth. The conquests which the stone king should make was on the earth; the destruction which the stone power should accomplish was on the earth, and the spread of its power and the glory of its mighty acts, and the utter destruction of all human governments and all human errors, concerned the earth and the inhabitants thereof. Most commentators declare the gospel of Christ to be the little stone. Then, again, they say Christ and His first advent means the revelation of the little stone; but Daniel, who certainly is as wise as most commentators, declares that the time of the setting up of the stone power would be contemporaneous with the reigning of the ten toe kings. Now human governments, and the European alliances and polity, still prevail and flourish, in their decay even, and we conclude, therefore, that "THE STONE" has not yet been cut out of the mountain; for directly it is cut out of the quarry it is described as falling like a mighty aerolite on the old image, smiting it with an irresistible force, and grinding to powder all things that are merely human. Man's attempt to set up kingdoms on his own account has had a rather long lease, and the end is approaching when "the kingdom of God" will take the place of "the kingdom of man." All human efforts to concrete and cohere into form and shape and longevity the government of man on a human basis has constantly failed. The Assyrio-Babylonian failed to establish "government" on a

firm basis; the Persian tried his hand and failed. Then the Asian autocracy, "the ruling power" which had sprung into existence on the banks of the Euphrates, flapped its dark pinions and lighted on the Ægean Sea, and from that hour to this the nations of the world have been worried and beaten down and trampled upon. Eighteen centuries have rolled away since the Redeemer of the world visited the house of Jacob. He came unto His own, but His own received Him not. They scorned His mission, and hung Him on a tree, but God raised Him from the dead; and forty-seven times in the epistles of the several apostles Christ's second Advent is spoken of, when the times of restitution shall be accomplished, and foreshadowed by all His holy prophets, when the glory of the latter day shall be ushered in with the shout of ten thousand times ten thousand angels, and He shall sit on the throne of His father David, wear the golden crown, and reign before His ancients gloriously. Then shall Daniel's vision be realised,—"The kingdom, and the dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven, shall be given to the saints of the Most High 'for AN EVERLASTING POSSESSION,' and they shall reign with Him for ever and ever." The kingdom will be a temporal one, the reign will be a personal one, the saints will dwell on this planet, the kingdom will cover the whole earth, the inhabitants thereof will be all righteous, and holy, and pure, and undefiled, and dwell in immortal bodies glorified and sanctified, and infinitely exalted above all gods, speaking a pure language, and dwelling securely under the shadow of His mighty supremacy. He shall reign, whose right it is to reign, "King of kings, and Lord of lords." E. B. R.

#### BOTH.—I.

It is generally admitted by Christians to be a Scriptural doctrine, that Christ will reign upon earth. They, however, differ as to when it is to take place, and as to its character. Some place it at the millennium, and regard it as a spiritual and temporal reign; others differ, and consider that it will be a spiritual reign only. We cannot at present call to mind any section of Christians who supposed the reign will be *merely* a temporal one.

We dismiss the point as to the time, it being irrelevant to the question at issue. As to the other point, we believe that Christ's reign will be both spiritual and temporal. In connection with this reign Scripture predicts certain benefits to the human race, and changes which are to occur in the world.

Some of them are—The cessation for a period of the powers and influences of the evil one (Rev. xx. 3). The rebuking, and judging, and ruling of people and nations by Christ (Isaiah ii. 4; Micah iv. 3; and Rev. xii. 5). The destruction of the destroying and corrupting principle (Isaiah xi. 8—9). Wars are to cease, implements of war are to be changed into utensils of husbandry, and the art of war is not to be learnt any more. Peace, truth, and righteousness are to prevail on the earth (Isaiah ii. 3, 4; Micah iv. 3—7). “The Lord shall reign in Mount Zion henceforth and for ever.” Jerusalem will then be the metropolis of the world—there Christ will reign as King of kings and Lord of lords, whence will be issued the law and His word for the government of the world (Isaiah xxiv. 23; Isaiah lx. 14, 19, 20, and 21; and Isaiah ii. 3).

We shall doubtless be told that these are spiritual blessings attending the spiritual reign of Christ. But Christ reigns spiritually at present in the hearts of his people, and as a matter of fact we know the world does not enjoy these blessings, we therefore conclude they are not those blessings which are the fruits of the spiritual reign only of Christ. In other words, in order that these prophecies may be consummated in this world, it will be necessary that Christ should reign temporally as well as spiritually on the earth.

Besides, the blessings are not all spiritual. Certainly, the cessation of wars is a temporal blessing very much to be desired. That this promise is to be taken literally there is no doubt—do what we will, we cannot spiritualize it. And so also is the promise regarding the change in the natures of wild beasts.

If we allow that the former of these promises shall be literally fulfilled, upon what ground can it be urged that the other part of the verse which says “that He shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people,” is to be taken spiritually? And if we say that the latter is a spiritual promise, what right have we to take the words “for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea” literally? If we take one part of a verse literally, in all fairness let us take the other also; and if we spiritualise a part let us spiritualise the whole of a context. Here we may remark that the curses foretold against the Jews have been literally fulfilled, surely it must be wrong to deny them their blessings by spiritualising these and similar passages which promise the spiritual and temporal reign of Christ over them and the Gentiles. If some of the blessings attending Christ’s reign will

be temporal—if Christ is to rule, judge, and rebuke the nations—then we say that partly His reign will be temporal.

But it will also be spiritual. There will be a change wrought in the hearts of men. Each will know the Lord. It will be unnecessary for men to teach each other about God, for all shall know Him from the least in intelligence to the greatest. Christ will reign over them—in their hearts and over their affections. They will acknowledge Christ, and Christ only, as their temporal as well as their spiritual Ruler and King.

The reign of Christ will be a development of the Jewish theocracy, the latter being a type of the former. The whole of the prophecies relating to the resumption of God's favour to the Jews point to a time when Christ will be their temporal and spiritual ruler. The Jewish people even now are earnestly expecting a prince and a Saviour who shall restore them to their ancient theocratic privileges—and the earnest expectation of a whole people, for hundreds of years, is not to be treated as an illusion never to be realized. The fact that they cling so tenaciously to that hope, combined with the old testament prophecies respecting them, are proofs that they will not be disappointed.

The great mistake which they made in rejecting Christ at his first coming was a very natural one after all, and one that was in character with all their past errors. They never understood the spiritual nature of the theocratic government, nor the spiritual mission of Christ. Hence they conceived He would appear as an earthly king to release them from a foreign yoke, and to restore them to their former glory. They were correct in supposing He would appear in this manner and for this purpose, but they mistook the time. Christians are liable to the opposite error, of believing Christ's second coming will be purely spiritual.

Possibly it may be necessary for the purpose of asserting the Divine authority, and of revealing the Divine conquest over sin and Satan, that Christ should reign temporally as well as spiritually in the world. It would indeed be a glorious thing to show practically to Heaven and earth that Christ's reign on earth is not, as it is supposed to be by some, incompatible with a temporal government, and that nothing but His reign, temporally and spiritually, will give to humanity what it has so long thirsted after, and what every conceivable form of government has failed to give, namely, perfect happiness temporally and spiritually.

## Literature.

## IS PULPIT INFLUENCE ON THE WANE?

## AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

M. D. R. makes a good introductory point, which we wonder he did not improve by the quotation of the saying of the irate modern and egotistical poet, when a critical friend suggested that such and such pretty and elegant things in his verses had been said by the poets of previous times—"Confound these ancients, they have stolen all our good things." He evidently thinks that all who differ from him belong to the class *detractores*, not *laudatores*. We deny the implication. We are called upon to discuss a theme having special interests in regard to the present; and we are naturally cast upon the past for our comparisons. The question is, "Is pulpit influence on the wane?" Well, how can that question be answered but by reference to the past. Wane is to decrease after having waxed or increased, and we must therefore refer to the past for our comparisons; and we cannot accept the affirmative of this question without being involved in the assertion that the pulpit had done a great work in the past. Had it not done so it could not be the degenerate thing we require to affirm that it is. But we take no pride in affirming its degeneracy; we speak in sorrow of it. But to be faithful we must speak the truth; and the truth is that "the influence of the pulpit is on the wane." In this assertion there is no fallacy, the appeal is to facts, Peter the Hermit, and Luther, Whitefield and Wesley, Hall and Chalmers, &c., bear witness against the pulpit of the present day.

Facts are all against the pulpit. Why have we so many secular and semi-secular agencies for doing expressly what the pulpit should do—affect the spiritual condition of the people? Is it not because the pulpit has failed to keep the gospel and the truths of the gospel fairly, fully, and faithfully before the minds of the people, that we have need of the Religious Tract Society, the Society for the Promoting of Christian Knowledge, Young Men's Christian Associations, the Religious Book Association, the Victoria Institute, the Christian Evidence Society, Home Mission Funds, Leagues, &c.?

The people have escaped from the influence of the pulpit. The pulpit has forfeited the confidence of the people. There are forms of unbelief current in all classes of society, and even among those who formally attend on pulpit ministrations. The pulpit is afraid to cope with *sin* and is content to prophesy smooth things; the pulpit does not even cope with the inner irregularities of life—temper, habits, speech, dress, drink, food, and sanitary errors. That which should criticise and affect the whole life of man has crept into a corner, and dawdles over doctrine, or drivels about church furniture and modes of worship. The pulpit is one of the respectable shams of social life; is like the parlour prayer-book, got up for show. It preaches the impracticable and ignores the most potent and patent of the passions of men.

Again, what are our Church Congresses and Conferences for? with their numerous inquiries into the cause of the absence of the masses from the churches, their proposals for the inbringing of the absentees, that almost always end in disappointment, because they only talk about the externals and do not touch on the great central defect—the pulpit, which no longer proclaims and urges the whole counsels of God, but pettifogs and special pleads in the very place which is set up for the speaking of the truth—"Speaking the truth in love."

Still again, may we ask what is the meaning of the revivalism movement in our day? Does it not give evidence of a vast lapsed multitude almost every where? But what is "a lapsed multitude" in reality but a crowd of home heathen, who have been uninfluenced by the pulpit—over whom the pulpit has ceased to have effect, and who are now sought to be wrought upon by sensational converted clowns, coal-heavers, and clod-hoppers, thieves turned theologians, bruisers rebaptized, convicts on ticket-of-leave airing their new convictions, and all sorts of other forms of attractive programmes copied from the concert-room cliques. What does this "fast" life introduced into religion mean? Is it not a confession that the legitimate pulpit is like the legitimate drama, growing effete, and is taking on to some new form of refurbishing its power. The lapsed masses are evidence of a paralysed pulpit.

R. M. D., in regard to the pulpit, reminds us that preaching implies fellowship, thought, and sympathy. But so does all public speaking. The advocate requires to set himself to undo the antagonism of his hearers; the political agitator does the same.

They never claim that the hearer should come prepared to be convinced; they accept it as the condition under which they speak, that they shall find the minds and interests of men opposed to them. They overcome that latent antagonism frequently; why not the pulpit orator as well? They also require to set their faces against and must undergo criticism. Nay, in their case matters are greatly worse; for they must face criticism at the moment—whereas the courtesies of the church allow the parson to say his say without even the gainsay of a whistle or a hiss. It is far more correct in regard to political orators to say that people have far more floating knowledge than they had in bygone days; for hundreds of political newspapers discuss these questions daily, and yet political oratory flourishes and pulpit oratory falls flat upon hearers, and does not even excite an interest about hearing. Why is all this? Because parliament and the platform have risen with the occasion, and call out the best men to occupy the attention of hearers, whereas the pulpit is the very paradise of mediocre minds and small talkers.

The pulpit has become a place for twaddle rather than talk, and talk rather than composed reflection, and composed matter committed to memory rather than eloquence, and eloquence rather than preaching. That which ought to be highest and noblest among the offices of man has degenerated into wordy platitude which is almost complimented when it is called twaddle—weak, spiritless, senseless, frothy speech, which is good for nothing, not even for whiling away the time. St. Paul once spoke “of the foolishness of preaching;” but he did not use the phrase as a justification either of foolish preaching or foolishness in preaching, still less for preaching the foolishness which so many of our modern parsons of all sects do. It would be better for both the church and the world were they to say to themselves and their hearers:—

“We do remember that our argument  
Is all too weighty to admit much talk.”

and give that serious heed to the exposition of their divine theme which should make it touch the heart, affect the life. So long as pulpiteers themselves hold low ideas of their duties and high notions of their privileges, they cannot fail to be uninfluential. It is quite preposterous to see how eagerly any one who has showed a fluency of the talking faculties hurries on towards the pulpit, and



while his opinions are in their rudest and crudest state, undertakes the spiritual guidance of a congregation as the cure of souls in a parish, his own soul being much more deficient in culture and experience than those to whom he assumes to break the bread of intellectual, moral, and religious life. The true and truly effective preacher must have the faculty of thinking, and of thinking well, of thinking on his legs; the resolute self-command to keep all associations inconsistent with his own aim from affecting him; the compact logical coherency of reflection which will not stray from the point at issue, the ability to utter in rich, brilliant, and ornate speech the matter which has exercised his mind. Moral earnestness must coincide with mental power, and emotional sympathy must be mated with verbal facility and felicity, that thought should spring out with all the freshness of a new creation, and all the attractiveness of a living issue from the soul.

Paul reasoned and persuaded; he employed intellect and emotion; Paul kept his text before him, but wove into the texture of his discourse every available matter which could affect men towards righteousness, temperance, and a judgment to come. He never dogmatised or egotised; he preached Christ and Him crucified. He used the proper means to affect, and he was effective—modern preachers do not, and they are ineffective.

I think M. D. R. has made a fallacious argument when he says that there is a greater amount of pulpit oratory now than formerly (p. 132); for, 1st, The demand arises for sectarian teachers, not for religious orators; and 2nd, If there was a greater amount of pulpit eloquence we should hear more of it, and not less. Yet it is a fact that the present age of good preaching does not keep pace with steeples and pulpits. The fact that high premiums are offered for pulpit excellence (p. 132 which M. D. R. asserts, will only prove against him, for the law of supply is not following the demand—as indeed in things spiritual is not too often the case. A very large amount of the height of place granted to the pulpit orator now-a-days is only the lingering tradition of what is due to the pulpit as a noble Christian agency.

M. D. R.'s assertion that "the pulpit exerts a greater moral effect on men's minds" than any other form of instruction (p. 133) is exactly the matter in dispute. Were this assented to this debate could not have even been suggested. But it is notorious that this is not so, that men have taken to all sorts of subsidiary

arts to fill the churches, and so make an appearance of success for pulpit ministrations that they have not been able to keep up. In ever so many forms there are attempts made to cover the defects of the pulpit, and there can be no doubt that the fact is admitted and deplored by all churches in their ecclesiastical reports.

It will not do to blink this question. The pulpit must be, like every other agency, brought to book and compared with facts. Reality and not rhetoric must be the standard of comparisons. In our time, the newspaper goes into every parish and gets from each parish news regarding its doings. The pulpit must have its share of investigation and criticism. Preachers no more than other people put their light under a bushel. It must be asked, if all the inducements of extensive influence, large incomes, and considerable social position, offered to preachers in large towns can secure such an inferior supply, what must the preaching be in parishes small and obscure be? The reply cannot be that there the pulpit is brilliant and powerful, for then we should be sure that the towns would draft off from these nooks and corners the best men in this as in all other occupations. But the anxiety felt everywhere—and almost everywhere ungratified, as our many empty and half-empty churches prove—for good preaching is so express that if men full of the preacher's gifts were numerous they would be discovered. They are not. Great preachers, in any sect, may pretty readily be counted on one's fingers; and the quantity of mediocre preaching is immense. If we would revive religion in the people we must revive eloquence in the pulpit—for eloquence is certainly on the wane there.

E. C.

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

It is an undeniable fact that eloquence exerts a greater power and influence over the human mind than any other form of expression. It is equally undeniable that there have been more opportunities afforded for the employment of eloquence in preaching than in any other form. And it is, I hold, equally undeniable, that there are higher specimens of eloquence to be found in every other form of its use than in its pulpit form. I put a case in point, and that not a far-fetched one. Take our House of Commons, consisting of, at the utmost, 658 members, many of whom make no pretensions at all to be public speakers; and take the thousands of

modern pulpiteers, each of whom makes some profession of being able to affect by speech ; compare the interest felt in the eloquence of the two sets by comparing the reports they elicit, and the interest felt in these reports, and there will be no doubt left on any reasonable mind that pulpit eloquence is on the wane. It cannot keep up to the mark of other forms,—the law courts and the benches of the legislature, even the popular public platform, outstrip the pulpit in this power.

One great reason for this doubtless is that the pulpit has made little or no effort to conform to the wants of the times, has remained in its old traditional place, and has failed to appropriate the growing experiences of the ages. When the press and the platform were unknown, the pulpit was the centre of intellectual light, and the occupier of that "coigne of vantage" was the thinker for the parish—if he was a dutiful pastor. From him the people received the principles of guidance in social, moral, and personal life and instruction in the mysteries of the kingdom of the Invisible Majesty. He had the whole field of moral, social, political, and spiritual life before him ; and he had the whole region to himself. Now the press and the platform have invaded the preacher's province, and the preacher has not held his own against these competitors, but has confined himself within narrower limits, and become more doctrinal and more dogmatic. He has not even concentrated his efforts on the sphere left to him ; but has made it a point, it would seem, 'to give the minimum of thought in the maximum of words, to those who listen to his harangues. Why should we listen to a disquisition when the matter can be settled in an epigram, and why should we have the form of syllogistic reasoning, not only without its reality, but with all its prolixity ?

One great reason, we believe, for the waning condition of pulpit eloquence is the persistent formality to which most preachers adhere. Poetry, novels, styles of law proceeding, modes of parliamentary address, letter-writing, &c., have all undergone changes in harmony with the changes of the times ; but our clergy still persist in cramping up their expositions of Scripture-texts into heads, divisions, distributions, &c., in accordance with the old models of orderly doctrinal discourses which were set up in the days of scholastic logic, and suited well enough the untrained attentions and memories to which they were addressed. It does seem strange that, as a general rule, in following suit to an old-

fashioned form, almost the whole clergy of a nation such as ours should, despite the diversities of gifts, tastes, and powers among them, be seen slavishly following an effete form of composing sermons, and congeal under a frostwork of logical division the flow of thought and reason which the perusal and study of the Scriptures should excite. Surely the Scriptures themselves, with their variety of poetry and prophecy, biography and parable, miracle and apologue, statute and epistle, hortation and song, threatening and promise, history and philosophy, ought to be a witness against the sameness of form into which sermons are cast; but no! just as the division of our Bible-books into chapters and verses, though they interrupt the sequence, and destroy the sense, are acquiesced in and allowed to so do, the most of the preachers of our day practise still the old complicated skeletonic fashion of constructing sermons like the syllogisms in our logic-books. So it cultivates narrowness, exclusiveness, restraint, fastidiousness, in the speaker, and excites weariness, impatience, constraint, and disregard in the hearer. Who can be otherwise than dissatisfied to hear a text given out—now from a prophet's glowing strain, again from a poet's burning ode, now from a historian's quiet narrative, then from a shrewd collection of proverbial wisdom, and at another time from a compactly reasoned theological epistle—and then whipped into the formalizing machine which adjusts, lines, squares off, and arranges the sermon, whatever be its subject or its style, in the same fashion and of the same kind, no matter how unlike the seed of thought out of which the sermon is represented as growing, all must branch and flower alike, throw out their stems in the same mode, hold their flower of illustration in the same place, and bear their fruit of personal application always after the same pattern. Is it wonderful that artifice does not succeed, and that men grow weary of it?

M. D. R. endeavours to explain away the fact of the decline of the pulpit by the suggestion that people read more. They read far more politics than they read of anything else, but that instead of lessening the interest of a public meeting heightens and intensifies it. Why should it be otherwise with preachers? Ought not the appetite to grow with what it feeds on in sermons as in speeches? And why do the able leaders in newspapers not destroy among us the influence of public speaking?

M. D. R. must be aware that all public speaking consists in

exciting a relationship of thought, sympathy, &c., and that this is not an exclusive characteristic of preaching. Indeed, in the means of securing this the pulpit orator, from his peculiar relation to the hearers has far less to overcome than any ordinary speaker. The great defect in pulpit ministrations is just this want of sympathy with the thoughts and feelings of the present time. The preacher does not seem to speak with the heart, and from the heart. He talks in the traditionary style of bygone days and stultifies common sense by so doing. Unless the pulpit devotes more earnestness to the comprehension of the ideas and feelings prevalent in our day, and endeavours to address men in sympathy with their common experiences, it cannot be but it must fail and wane. No criticism, we may remind M. D. R., is so fatal as the criticism of the heart that is panting after the water-brooks of salvation, and is led up to broken and empty cisterns; that revulsion of heart which affects men when they seek peace and find tawdry rhetoric, creates the worst infidelity, the infidelity of despair.

F. C. A. calls attention to the popularity and extensive sale of sermon literature. But he takes a very limited view of the matter. Take the entire number of sermons written, and estimate the percentage of them printed, deduct those that are still-born, those that are condemned, and those that never pay the paper they are printed on still less the printing,—and then compare with that the amount of magazine contributors, see the large percentage of these that is re-published and the many that pay, and then recollect that the magazine-writer has no personal position or pastoral relation to induce men to buy, even when they will not read, and he will see that his argument is not quite so irrefragable as he fancies it is.

On the whole we think it is impossible to doubt that pulpit influence is on the wane, and that great need exists for earnest efforts for its regeneration.

H. C. G.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

Those who have written on the affirmative of the question now before us, and who are therefore inclined to maintain that pulpit influence is on the wane, appear to argue from so many points of view that it is difficult to bring the divergent rays of their reasonings into any distinct focus. If we are to argue upon each separate

and individual matter asserted or brought forward, our counter papers would be too long and would be very desultory. But we may take a sort of generalised view of some of the most prominent, taking them under such headings as seem to bring them distinctly into arguable form. A good many of the more common arguments used to prove that pulpit influence is on the wane may be included under the assertion which is implied in the phrase "Scepticism is on the increase!"

Now I shall grant, for argument sake, that scepticism is on the increase; though I don't myself think so, for (1) the publicity allowed for its advocacy is greater now than it ever was before, and this makes it seem more extensive than it is; (2) the organs of scepticism are all high priced and in difficulties of circulation which imply small sales and a restricted constituency; (3) scepticism has built no good institutes for giving publicity to its teachings, and this argues an incapacity to do so either in enthusiasm, self-denial, or numbers, and perhaps in all combined. But as I have said, I shall even grant *pro tem.* that it is so, and I affirm that that does not prove that the influence of the pulpit is on the wane. It is to be observed that the scepticism of our age is an *inquiring* scepticism in general, and is not dogmatic infidelity. In former days infidelity was downright stolid unbelief. It had not been awakened to a belief which had been found to be false and had passed into disbelief. It had not known, had not sought to know belief. It had no faith because it was content to walk by sight and sense. Now scepticism is inquiring, it seeks reasons and it endeavours to get hold of arguments. It seeks to know and it strives to get a view of both sides of the question. Scepticism now is more the result of not being able to hold in relation two ideas which seem to be at variance with each other—as for example the efficacy of prayer and the reign of law; or not being able to bring into harmony the different parts of a creed which appear to be at opposition to each other—as the infinite fore-knowledge of God and the responsibility of man; or not being able to hold science and religion together in the mind as a unity, the former seeming to teach the operation of blind and irresistible mechanical forces in contradiction to the teaching of the other of a Divine Father, a lover of purity and a favourer of truth; or not being able to bring the theory of Christianity into association with the experiences of every day social life, or the dogmas of political economy which is prevalent among those

with whom they usually come into contact while at work. This change in the nature of scepticism has doubtless a cause. Education has been spreading, but it has not gone deeply enough into common life to enable men to think either in line or in parallel, to pursue thought to its issues, or to pass along the railway of speculation holding the wheels of reflection on a double line. One cause of this change in scepticism I hold to be the consciousness that the pulpit has made out a good case in all arguments yet undertaken on behalf of Christianity. This has induced the thoughtfulness of modern scepticism—this has led to the more respectful form of scepticism towards Christianity; this has compelled scepticism to attempt to explain away rather than to deny the matter of the Holy Scriptures. Instead, therefore, of pulpit influence being proved by the present state of scepticism to be on the wane, this forms one of the noblest evidences that can be given to the efficacy of the pulpit that scepticism has changed its nature and its tactics. More than this a large proportion of the scepticism of the day is a sorrowing scepticism; those who are unbelievers would fain be believers, and many admit the moral beauty of the faith of Christ though they cannot attain unto faith in Christ. For this change of the relationship of the sceptic to Christianity, the pulpit has worked a great deal, and that not unsuccessfully, and therefore I do not believe that the influence of the pulpit is on the wane.

Another series of the arguments of those who object to our opinion that the pulpit is not deteriorating may be summed up in the terms "Sectarianism is increasing." I again so far—but mainly even here for the sake of argument—will admit that sectarianism is increasing; but that only in a certain sense. I am not for instance in a position to deny that there may not be new sects springing up here and there in Britain and elsewhere, which so far divide the flock of God into different folds. Dawsonianism in Birmingham, Voyseyism in London, Beecherism in Boston, Hyacintheism in Paris, Dollingerism in Berlin, &c.; broad-churchism and narrow-churchism, high-churchism and low-churchism in conforming and non-conforming churches may be on the increase. But I do not recognize these things as really proving that the influence of the pulpit is on the wane. Quite the contrary. There could be no greater sign of the influence of the pulpit. Sects do not spring up of themselves. Men of power start them, and unless there is pith in them they soon perish and are forgotten. It can only be because there is power in the

pulpit, that the natural conservatism of men is stirred to set about the formation of new societies, the building of new churches, the acceptance of new burdens. In so far as the existence of sects is a fact, the fact must be owing to the influence of the pulpit. How can men believe, and be influenced to cast their lot into a new religious movement—unless they hear, and how can they hear without a preacher? Thus far sectarianism is shown to be proof of pulpit influence; but so also is the fact that toleration is growing among the sectaries, and that men are not now made aliens to each other by the holding of a differing creed. Men are being taught to see that men can no more be all brought to believe in the same creed than they are able to be fed by the same selection of food from the storehouse of his providence—Nature; and they are learning that the infinity of God's truth is such that men may appropriate much of it and flourish and grow holy on it, though it is taken into the heart in differing terms and in differing proportions. The Christian zeal of sects is greatly owing to the influence of the pulpit, and the favourable changes in the loving relations and co-operation of churches and members of churches, is also not a little due to the pulpit influences existing in our day.

And here we might call attention to the fact that a large proportion of the meditations of our best clergy and ministers has been given of late to the promotion of union and communion among the churches. Here pulpit influence is being exerted in submission to the higher leadings of Divine grace, in opposition to what might be supposed to be the personal and sectarian interests of those who are moving towards this end. Let us not be told then that the influence of the pulpit is on the wane—that can never wane which is employed for the glory of God and the relief of man's estate. Almost the whole of the objections may be summed up in this—that the pulpit is less efficiently filled now than it used to be. We think this is a great mistake, and that for many reasons:—(1) The greater competition which exists between sects, and the earnest rivalry of churches, makes this all but impossible to be true. (2) The greater publicity given to pulpit efforts on special occasions makes this impossible. (3) The increased demand for and anxiety regarding able pulpit services is unlikely to leave unstirred the ambition of those who are in the ministry, or to call for the good ability to supply it. (4) The greater care taken in training, examination, &c., and the publicity and frequency of the trials prior to appointment candidates



have to undergo, make it very unlikely that incompetent persons should be able to pass the ordeal necessary. (5) The fairer field there is now for ability independent of private friendship supplies encouragement which was formerly not to be had. (6) The higher expectations of the people naturally tends to induce higher aims in those who seek to answer to the demands of their flocks. (7) The higher modern standard prevalent among the clergy themselves. And (8) the political condition of our age: when the clergy are stirred by fear of disestablishment, and those of the nonconformist party are spurred on by the hope that they may accomplish that event.

In regard to individual shortcomings we agree with the able remarks made by Rev. Thomas Jones, of Walter's Road, Swansea, as president of the Congregational Union this year:—

"All ministers are not endued with great intellectual power; the education of many has been very imperfect; the gift of eloquence is not possessed by all; the careless and the indolent may be among them; and some may be wanting in the piety, the sincerity, and the earnestness which their noble work demands. No doubt, I say, there are ministers in the pulpit who ought to have been content to sit and listen, and learn in the pew; and we are sure that there are many in the pews who ought to have sacrificed their worldly prospects of wealth to preach the Gospel of Jesus Christ. But there is nothing in the imperfection of ministers of religion to excite our surprise. It is very human, for is it not the same in other professions? All members of the medical profession are not characterized by special ability. All who paint are not great artists. There are feeble members in the great guild of literature. Every poet who begins the ascent of "fame's dread mountain" does not reach the summit—some are obliged to spend their days on the mountain side, not far from the plain from which they first started, while others become giddy with the first breath of fame, and fall, and are crushed among the rocks below. And it is said by those who ought to know, because they are obliged to listen, that the spirit of dulness is oftentimes present in the speeches of some of our senators, producing pleasant somniferous effects, and causing "deep sleep to fall upon man." But while we acknowledge the imperfection of ministers, we should also consider that as a body, they are faithful and earnest men, who fear God, love Christ, and do their duty in a brave and manly way. And there are among them men whose hearts are large enough to embrace the world, clasp it in their bosom, and make and keep it warm by the fire of their own love."

The social influence of the clergy now alone remains to be considered. Is that on the wane? We trow not. In former times 1871.

it is true the clergy in many parishes were the sole observable workers, for all others shrank from public appearances, and there was a graceful reticence among those who were found doing good by stealth, and yet seldom required to blush to find it fame. In our day publicity is current; and a regular hunting for news takes place in every parish. Every worker gets his meed of publicity, and often the parson or minister, by the very fact of the modesty enjoined on his cloth, delicately flatters others by getting them put in the foreground that they may be enticed to do more good still. Thus the clergy, in the hot push for notoriety going on, often neglect opportunities of showing the efficiency of the pulpit when they ought not properly to do so; and the pew in such cases unjustly crows over the pulpit.

I remark, *en passant*, that our recent educational contentions curiously prove the power of the pulpit not to be on the wane. The great contention is to keep out of the School-board if possible, certain classes of clergy unless they are confronted by their acknowledged parochial rivals. The clergy evidently fear each other's power, and have taught their people to fear it, and therefore the education contentions show that the clergy are powerful—not only to excite jealousy between each other, but to be considered by their people as possessors and depositaries of power.

The growth of sectarianism does not imply the diminution of the influence of the clergy; neither does the progress of scepticism; nor the transition phenomena of social life. Individual influence is not waning, and politics seem to give evidence that parsonry is still efficient and effectual. Independent therefore of the arguments of opponents, we believe we may affirm that pulpit influence is *not* on the wane.

E. M. S.

**NICKNAMED PARLIAMENTS.**—We read of the "Merciless Parliament" of 1388, of the "Wonderful Parliament" of the same year, of the "Lack-learning Parliament" of 1406, of those known as "Short," in 1640; "Little," in 1653; and "Pensionary," in 1661; and every schoolboy knows of the "Long," the "Rump," and the "Barebone" Parliaments. Perhaps the name which, of all others, will cleave to the session now ending is the "Match-tax Session." Not that this was by any means the only abortive measure, or that it was the most mischievous and unworthy; but it appeals to an instinctive sense of ridicule, and furnishes a sort of grim joke, with Mr. Lowe's suggested motto of "*Ex luce lucellum*," the *dis* for which was actually struck, and the stamps prepared, at a cost of upwards of \$1,000.—*Advertiser*.

## Politics.

---

### OUGHT THE TENURE OF LAND TO BE RADICALLY CHANGED?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

I AM most decidedly of opinion that if a political and social revolution is to be prevented in this country; if we are to prevent the middle class (which has been aptly designated the *backbone* of the country) from sinking lower and lower, diminishing in numbers and influence as it degrades: if we are to establish at least a semblance of good feeling between the rich and the poor; if we are to sustain our reputation as a great commercial and industrial nation, we must make such considerable changes in the law of land tenure as will abolish, or nearly extinguish at least, those distinctions which now separate the landowners from the other inhabitants of Britain. We cannot expect to return to days when the "villains" and even the "serfs" had small holdings of their own, for at that time the laws of property were loose, and scarcely defined. Nor would we wish to recall the times when so much of Britain lay unenclosed, and over the extensive districts of common and waste land, men used to go here and there, and having selected a spot to suit their fancy, proceeded to cultivate or plant it as best they liked; or turned out upon these without molestation each one his cow, his pig, or it may be, his sheep. The course of events knows no retrogression, and in very few, if any, particulars can we return to practices which prevailed in an era when our country was sparsely peopled, and only slightly brought under cultivation; when our science, literature, and commerce were still in their noviciate. The idea is no doubt a delightful one; that of every man being his own landlord, in so far as he has a heritage of his own, which cannot be alienated against his will, a solid interest in the ground on which he treads; but it is Utopian to expect such a division of landed property in the second half of the nineteenth century. But, despite modern progress, it is evident that, keen-sighted as we are, as a nation we have erred here, and have suffered our legislators to rivet the chains of our error upon us. The growth of old towns,

and the formation of new ones ; the pressure of the difficulties attendant upon the acquisition of a competent income in an agricultural life as compared with those which accompany the employment of capital in business pursuits ; the complications which have grown up, century after century, occasioned by political changes, and frequent transfers of land from one proprietor to another through choice or necessity ; all these things have rendered the tenure of land so expensive, inconvenient, and even hazardous, that it is no wonder men of moderate means have so often recoiled from meddling with a freehold, and if inclined to purchase property have preferred to hold it temporarily on a leasehold tenure. Even as in trades and manufactures, the small masters and isolated workers are fast diminishing, and in their stead have arisen "firms" and "establishments," often of huge proportions, unsympathetic, mercenary, and even cruel ; not so much from the fault of individuals perhaps, as from the nature of the circumstances which have brought them into being and foster their existence ; thus it has also been to a great extent with regard to landed estates. The larger have had, of late years, a constant tendency to absorb the lesser ; and though I cannot assert that our landed proprietors are free from blame, in various proceedings which occasionally tend to bring much odium upon them, I hold that the system which has grown up about them and entangles them is a palliation, though not an excuse for their conduct. For men have talked and argued about the "rights of property," about protecting a "family inheritance," until they have almost forgotten that there are many rights which are stronger than the "rights of property," and that there are other things besides a "family inheritance" which need protection.

Unquestionably, whether you are dealing with land as vendor or as purchaser, the multiform difficulties you have in getting a good title, in keeping it when you have got it, and in proving to others that it is indefeasible, almost excite laughter at times, though generally the tragic prevails over the comic.

If the land has, as is most likely, passed from hand to hand by different processes, if it has been broken up into portions, has been under joint ownership or been leased for fixed periods,—a goodly array of documents has accumulated, of indentures of leases, assignments, appointments ; release, trust, and mortgage deeds ; and you are fortunate indeed if, when making your purchase, or transferring what is now yours to another, you find that there is no link missing

in the curious chain of connecting circumstances, which join the modern possessor to some shadowy owner hundreds of years ago. Or, if there is no document missing, or no proof lacking that a document which you are not supposed to possess, does exist somewhere, and could be seen; as you read over the long "recitals," you are painfully conscious that endless contingencies may arise on various points named therein, where the evidence has to be circumstantial as to fact. That such and such a mortgage at some period was really paid off; that some unlawful holder, who was ejected, had really no right to what he claimed; that different individuals who are named really died at a certain time stated, and leaving or not leaving such testamentary documents as are set forth; that another who is thought to have died unmarried, had not really left some lawful heir now unknown, but liable to turn up at some awkward moment—these and other contingencies are the things which plant thorns in the pillows of small holders of land, and furnish agreeable fees and sufficient employment for gentlemen of the legal profession, whose opportunity arises in man's necessities. And no doubt a very considerable obstacle in the way of any radical alteration being made, is the fact that a numerous, powerful, wealthy, and generally respected body of individuals have an immediate interest in keeping matters just as they are. And the confidence which many persons of education (as well as those of no education comparatively, for these will mostly follow without much demur the course of proceeding which a lawyer suggests) have learned by the force of custom to place in a lawyer's opinion, makes him a very dangerous interpreter of the law, especially in those cases where some latitude is allowed as to the method to be pursued. This has been shown in the operation of various Acts of Parliament; such as the special Acts of 1835-6, designed to facilitate the conveyance of land, and also in that known as the Land Clauses Consolidation Act, and in the Act to facilitate the Conveyance of Real Property; these being passed in 1845. For, as a writer on this subject observes, no measure of this kind will be of any utility unless it is made not only compulsory, but so drawn that as few loopholes for escape from its minor provisions shall be left as is possible, though it is scarcely to be hoped that anything can be made so clear that a legal investigator will find no chance of a quibble or an evasion. The above Acts were passed; and what ensued? In the words of the writer to whom I allude: "the lawyers generally discouraged,

and refused to adopt the alterations. The same lengthy documents as of old were still drawn out; or if the statutes were occasionally adopted, the ordinary number of words was made up by 'recitals,' which, but for the purpose of giving an expensive narrative of prior dealings with the property conveyed, are really so much waste parchment. A purely marketable title to property is still the exception, and vexatious technicalities, trouble, and costs, the rule." And it is quite clear that the battles which will have to be fought with the lawyers before a sweeping and decisive measure of reform can be carried out, are likely to be almost as desperate as those which must be waged against those who are at present holding so extensive a monopoly of the land. With resolution almost indomitable, the gentlemen of the long robe contest the proposition that land should be as marketable, and as easily transferable, as tables and chairs, or sheep and oxen. The "Registration of Titles Act" was passed in 1862; by compliance with which, on certain easy terms, the owners of land can obtain certificates, and establish for their property an indisputable title in the future. Registrars and clerks have been duly appointed, and an establishment opened, but there is scarcely anything for them to do. They sit expectant-crying, not like Othello, that their "occupation's gone;" but that it will not come as yet. And why is this? Partly, it is granted, through the slowness with which the English mind moves in a new direction; the principal reason, however, is the prejudice against it which fills the legal breast—a prejudice quite comprehensible. But is it not astonishing how we patiently tolerate those abuses which, centuries ago, our ancestors complained of, and strove to abolish? The condition of the law was amongst the things which occupied the attention of Cromwell, and other great men in the days of the English Commonwealth; and they were fully agreed that some effectual measures should be taken to simplify those transactions between men, in which legal intervention must frequently be employed. Cromwell himself, who had had dealings with the lawyers in various transactions connected with his estates, and could doubtless speak from experience, called the English law a "tortuous, ungodly jungle;" and there was a talk of abolishing the Court of Chancery. These schemes were quashed by the Restoration, and the Court of Chancery flourishes yet, though certainly it has been slightly improved in its mode of procedure since then.

I forbear to amplify upon another branch of the subject which has been already discussed, namely, the methods by which men now contrive to tie up land in certain families, irrespective of the just claims of tenants or occupiers, the rights of the nation, and the wishes of those who may hereafter become the inheritors; these practices should surely be interfered with, and if not prohibited, only allowed in exceptional cases. No argument can be drawn, with any fairness, in favour of these selfish plans from the domestic history of the Israelites, under an economy which had unquestionably the Divine sanctions, and in many of its particulars was expressly of Divine appointment. The Jews were cautioned to guard strictly, each man, the inheritance which had descended to them from their fathers, but it is quite evident that the mode of division which was carried out amongst them when they became the possessors, was intended to provide, and did almost universally provide, each man with an inheritance. Those resident in cities, and who did not care to own or to cultivate land, received some equivalent, which made their position as good as that of their brethren. And yet there were free labourers amongst the Israelites, besides the slaves they acquired from foreign nations, and these had also their own portions, but they were able, in addition, to work upon the land of others, because from its limited extent, or its peculiarities, their proper allotment did not require the whole of their toil.

No sensible man advocates anything approaching to communism in regard to the division and appropriation of land; but still I think the following changes are desirable:—1. A law by which the quantity of land one individual may hold should be limited, according to its value or extent. 2. A measure which, if not abolishing entail, should put it upon another footing. 3. Such a modification of the laws of title as shall render conveyancing as simple a matter to the ordinary individual, as it may be now to those who have made it their special study. And 4. Some modification of the laws which define the position of lessors and lessees; so that it may no longer happen that at the expiration of a term the freeholder reaps enormous gain, and the outgoer suffers not only the loss of the property, but has to meet heavy claims for dilapidations.

J. R. S. G.

## Science.

---

### HAS MAN DEVELOPED FROM THE SAVAGE STATE?

#### NEGATIVE REPLY.

THE supposed connection between advancement in civilization and improvement in morals has, by this time, come to be recognized as nothing more than a rhetorical commonplace. It is only wonderful that the patent contradiction between this theory and the facts of history should ever have escaped notice.— *Saturday Review*.

"MAN," we have asserted, as we believe, has *not* "developed from a savage state." For entertaining this belief we offered such reasons as appeared to us to show that man could not have been formed by a beneficent Creator in a savage state; not only because that would have been an unbeneficent form of existence to give, but also because we have no instances of human progress being made unless through some influence being exerted from a higher source than that of the race by whom civilization is attained. Besides the direct teaching of the Holy Scriptures, that man was originally formed in the image of God, and was at first divinely endowed with the breath of the Deity's own life, we have the general belief of man in a golden age to support our view that civilization, in that signification of it which refers to the *character* of man, rather than to the accidents of human life, is the original condition of our race, and that savagery or barbarism is a deterioration rather than an elevation of the human family. No history at all reveals man to us in the state of depravity and loathsome sensuality in which savages exist. There is always some race or family of higher nature and nurture, whose influence and action exercises an elevating power over the darkest nations, and incites them to accept some of the civilization of which they are the possessors or exemplars.

Scarcely any history at all gives information of the development of man. Indeed, development is quite a modern idea. The culture of individuals, and the subduing of masses, was considered enough



in the ages of the past. We speak of the civilization of India, Ethiopia, Egypt, Greece, Rome, &c., but that is certainly not the civilization which we now seek. Civilization in that sense meant only wealth, grandeur, pomp, luxury, and power; it did not imply culture or pure joy, lawful and conscious submission to rules of duty known to be best. The grandeur was allied to tyranny, the submission to slavery; the luxury was purchased by helot-labour, and the offices of toil were performed under the taskmaster's lash. The spirit of all the laws of the ancient world was coercion, not conviction. There was no provision for development, and hence all these nations have sunk, have degenerated. They are proofs of the ability of man to degenerate; but not of his readiness to be civilized. In civilization man approaches more nearly to the normal condition of his existence; in so far as he nears that he becomes civilized, in so far as he recedes from that he is called wild, barbarous, savage. Were savagery the normal state of man, nobody would be surprised at barbarous conduct; but we call that inhumane, nay, even inhuman, evidently showing that we do not think it is a kind of action which belongs to man.

It is to be observed that all our superfine histories of the progress of man are based upon suppositions; and yet most people talk of these suppositions as if they were facts. The convenient savage, who can never be brought into the witness-box, and of whom almost anything can be asserted, has been so popularized in political economy and social economy, in picturesque history and travels, in treatises on politics and morals, in questions regarding the origin of society and of cities, that people are apt to forget that he is little else than a lay-figure, like a painter's model, or a fashionable milliner's wire-boddy, for fitting on whatever garb may be desired. It is a very remarkable fact that the only history of early man, which seems to be consistent in itself, starts from a very different point of view, and presents us with man, in the beginning, as formed in the image and after the likeness of God; while the opposite idea came in with the originators of the French Revolution, and has continued popular chiefly with those who think that the abstract proposition "all men are by nature free and equal" requires the idea of the originally savage man and his gradual civilization as a basis and support. But it is really a very sad as well as bad basis; for all that we know of real savages is quite opposed to the notion that they are all free and equal, enjoying in common the good

bounties of gracious nature in noble contentment, rising by degrees to mastery and power, to civic community of effort, and statesmanly endeavour after justice, morality, and truth.

B. E. C. in his opening paragraph says, that on the rising of the curtain at the commencement of the drama of history, "kingdoms are seen, but no one can tell who founded them" (p. 454 *ante*); in his second he defines civilization, and in the third he quotes from J. S. Mill's paper on civilization, a definition, or to speak more correctly, a description of an [imaginary] savage tribe, as contrasted with a civilized community. The former are dissociated and unsocial, selfish, and self-willed, so that "every one trusts in his own strength or cunning, and where that fails he is generally without resource." In the fourth paragraph he affirms that "man, in the earlier periods of history, appears just in that condition which is here described by Mr. Mill as savage" (p. 455). In the first and fourth paragraphs, therefore, there is a manifest contradiction. "Kingdoms are seen" and "cities appear" at the dawn of history, but yet men are dissociated and unsocial, each one looking to and trusting in himself. I cannot comprehend a dissociated kingdom, nor can I understand a selfish savagery associated in dissociation. It is, I doubt, only when we get into the dark ages of ancient history that we can lay hold of a savage, that can be so manipulated as to give even a slight semblance of truth to the idea of the early savage condition of man. The developing savage in history is very difficult to find. Christian civilization in America, in New Zealand, and in Australia, to a large extent also in Africa, has mostly gone in the direction of civilizing the savage out of existence.

Civilization is not a simple matter: it is the co-active exercise of several separate and independent forces—1, Knowledge or culture; 2, religion; 3, skill in control; 4, power to discipline; 5, wealth; 6, numbers. The highest civilization is that which incorporates, in the best balanced style, the largest number of these elements of social life. Savagery is destitute of nearly all these, and consequently there is a want of cohesion in savage life. The antagonism of savagery is a selfish, one-sided one; civilization is a balance of antagonisms, so arranged as at once to secure and promote stability and progress. Among savages everything is unsystematic; in civilization system is everything. It is evident that man, if he developed from the savage state, must have had a hard struggle

upwards, and his progress must have been remarkably slow. If he had to acquire the use of his bodily and mental faculties, if he had to learn the properties and qualities of everything around him in relation to himself and his necessities; if he had all his information to acquire, to store, and to employ, as well as to discover a means of handing it down, if he was under the necessity of collecting, by his own experience, or from tradition, a knowledge of the past, and if he felt compelled not only to learn but to register these things, it must have been a dreary, dreadful time before he learned much, could make much use of his knowledge, or make much progress in communicating it.

The same remarks would have to be made regarding all the other elements of civilization, singly and collectively, and so the period of the existence of the human race would be indefinitely thrown back, so as to afford millions of revolving ages to bring man to his present state of being. If this were so, why has neither tradition nor history treasured the doings of these extended spaces. We are aware that science, evoking the remains of animals in the *drift*, has sought to run back to a time long anterior to history, and preceding tradition—an idea which E. C. has illustrated in a condensed form very ably in the debate; but it should be remarked that this notion is brought forward to bolster up foregone conclusions, and science itself warns us to be wary in adopting hypotheses which have for their aim the establishment of theories which look fair, and are thought of favourably. The drift theory would send us quite adrift. It would give us man without manliness, coherding with the brutes, and would still leave the initial processes of civilization unaccounted for. But while it seems to render the retrospective history of man somewhat plainer, it has the great fault of making the prospective of human life far less hopeful; for if the progress of humanity is so slow in its course as to have brought us in millions of ages only to our present state, how long in the future will it be before the golden age of science and positivism can be effectively introduced—even if progress should now proceed, like our coal consumption, in geometrical ratio, as compared with the vast past of savagery behind us.

Hear what Professor Masson says on the speed of human progress from Greece to Great Britain:—

“True, their cosmology was in a muddle (perhaps ours is in a muddle too, for as little as we think so); but somehow they con-

trived to be such that the world doubts to this day whether, on the whole, at any time since, it has exhibited, in such close grouping, such a constellation of spirits of the highest magnitude. And the lesson enforced by this Greek instance may be enforced, less blazingly perhaps, but still clearly, as by the light of scattered stars, by instances from the whole course of historic time. . . . I limit myself to the assertion that within historic time we find what we are obliged to call an intrinsic co-equality of some minds at various successive points, and at long separated intervals; and that consequently, if the human race is gradually acquiring a power of producing individuals more able than their ablest predecessors, the rate of its law in this respect is so slow that 2,500 years have not made the advance appreciable."

What we hold is, that civilization is the natural state of man; that all his instincts and aptitudes are formed for civilization, and find their full activity only in a civilized state of life; that civilization has been in a condition of constant fluctuation, one or other of its factors acquiring predominance, and claiming chief power. We deny that man was formed for or in the savage state. We hold that savagery is a fallen condition, a state of declension, that had man been formed a savage he would have remained so, as there is no apparent power in savagery to get out of that state of itself, and without external agency; and hence that even though it were to be proved that man was absolutely created a savage, we could not admit that he has developed, but that he has been developed from that state. Man has not been the agent of his own progress. Man, when left to himself, stagnates and degenerates. It is only when efforts are exerted on him that he can be moved upward. The spirit of civilization is not an issue from human nature, but has a higher origin, and is imparted to him.

We maintain besides, as P. O. S. has ably brought out, that civilization is in man as a ruling and controlling influence; that it does not consist of or exist in circumstances, but that it constitutes a power which, seizing on circumstances, subdues them to the purposes of man, and penetrates them with his intelligence. Man, as a civilized creature, stands in quite a different relation to his surroundings, from any other animal. It is a civilized nature that produces the circumstances of civilized life in law, letters, and inventions.

The triumphs of steam in manufactures and in locomotion; of science in the interpretation of the chemical constitution of the sun, or the elements of aerolites; the perfection attained by art in

metallurgy, dyeing, navigation, or warfare, makes no real impression on the great primitive passions of humanity, which act swiftly, vividly, directly, and form the basis of character; works little alteration in those motives which all men feel, and know, and act upon; influences in a very slight degree the great principles of life which everybody can comprehend and be moved by; and which are the materials of civilization. The constitution of man is not materially changed by civilization; its applications and its movements may be changed, but its passions, energies, feelings, and capacities retain their functions, and perform their part, whatever be the forms and conveniencies among which they are exercised. Man is man alike in the savage and in the civilized state; but in his savage state he is man depraved, degraded, fallen, not stirred to noble issues, not moved to the higher harmonies of sympathetic life. A savage is unruly and brutal, if not embruted. Civilization is life, according to rule. It is the guidance and control of the heart, not the mere use of metal, the invention of luxurious modes of living, and the general strife to forget one's self and his duties, in the number and amount of pleasurable sensations in which one can enwrap himself.

L. E. X. admits this, the main element in our argument, when he speaks of Scripture as giving a history of the agencies employed to secure a *moral* civilization in the world (p. 116); for civilization is expressly moral. A so-called civilization, which is material only, has in it the very seeds of dissolution, because it has the seeds of savagery, selfishness, and cunning within itself. All great material civilizations have declined and fallen. They have not had the true principle of progress in them—self-reliance and morality. As man becomes selfish he becomes savage, and disorganization begins. We see this in Egypt, Greece, Rome, France, Spain, &c. These have retrogressed, not progressed. Progress is only possible where morality lies at the root of social life.

C. H., Hereford, says, that civilization is the result of *art*, and cannot be *innate* (p. 118). We do not deny that art concurs in and completes the arrangements of civilization: but we affirm that the spirit to which civilization is due, of which civilization is the manifestation, is innate. Hence we deny that man developed from a savage state. "Do men gather figs from thorns, or grapes from thistles?" Unless man had in him, in his original state, the civil desires and aspirations, he would never have been civilized. His

arguments against language, as a measure of civilization as well as a necessity to its commencement and expansion, do not seem to us to meet the points brought forward in behalf of the thesis, that man did not develop from a savage state.

It is to be observed that we do not affirm that man has never sunk to—never been in, a savagestate. Our idea is, that wherever this has happened it has been by relapse, by fall, by self-indulgence, and sin. In his original state he possessed all those high desires and pure notions which form and constitute true civilization. Ever as he grew and developed in the proper path of his life's design—the glory of God and the benefit of man—he rose in civilization. Ever as he declined from and strayed away from the right way of life he became savage and debased. He has never yet reached the height of his destiny, because he has never fully lived the life for which he was formed. Had man been created a savage he could never have formed the idea of civilization. Civilization is the bright ideal of human life in holiness and happiness. We see no signs of those creatures who were formed in subservience to instinct and self-indulgence progressing. Even the horse, the dog, the cat, the ass, the song-bird, &c., progress merely because they are trained and kept to their training. The ideal of their training, however, is that man is sovereign over them and of the earth—sovereign because he is intellectual and moral, and therefore civilized; not sovereign because he is savage. The sovereignty of the savage is cruelty and sorrow, not civilization. We cannot believe that man was given being to as a savage, and therefore we cannot assent to the doctrine that man has developed from the savage state.

L. T. B.

---

IN every man there is a certain inevitable connection of opinion. We hold our views by sets and series. If we espouse one, we have unconsciously let in along with this a little, or it may be a long, train of others. A man comes to a certain conclusion upon some greatly controverted point of science. His eye has possibly never turned aside from the straitened bounds of scientific matter, and yet his single conclusion here leads him insensibly to a whole parcel of conclusions in religious matter or in ethical matter.—*John Morley.*

## The Reviewer.

---

*Balaustion's Adventure; including a Transcript from Euripides.*

By ROBERT BROWNING.

London: Smith, Elder & Co.

"Poetry is power," but it is also beauty. Browning's poetry is the poetry of power. It is Herakleidan, and generally shows—

"The great vein-cordage on the fret-worked brow "

of the writer. He labours under and with, he struggles and strives for, that power by which he may wreak his thought into expression. The might of strength is here, but it has scarcely yet been composed into beauty, though it is "lovely in its strength." This is a poem of the heart, in which his "late espoused saint" seems ever to beam up into presence. It is a conception worthy of the mated twain, who not by "the book and the ring" alone were "hearted" into mutual happiness, but by the entwining tendrils of poetic passion made one and indivisible. A lay of wedded love and wedded bereavement, wedded fidelity and wedded reunion, word-woven enchantment wrought into the eternal fabric of true poesy out of the heart-grief and soul-sorrow of one who laments death's triumph in this world, beyond which he beholds one high "enskied and sainted." If we are not sadly mistaken the poem now before us is due to a half-unconscious longing to reperuse the fine fable of the Euripidean tragedy, which contains the most exquisite scene probably in the whole range of the Greek drama, a favourite play with Milton. This done, and all the solace and the sweet-thrilling painfulness of its touching pathos having sunk into his soul, the author appears to have been stirred by a hunger of the heart to reproduce this story of a wife's resurrection. And what a wonderful energy of thought has been given to this "Transcript from Euripides"! Transcript it is, and not translation. The old world poem is reproduced, with all its spirit of life in it so faithfully rendered,

that the scholar can hear the very whisper of the Greek through the modern English—and feels it to be truer to the tones of the singer of Salamis, “writ in remembrance,” than the closest verse in words could give; and yet withal, it has the freshened full look into things which marks our modern life—soul within soul is so enclasped as to be one. It is a unique picture. The old Greek play of “Euripides the Human”—*Alkestis*—stands like a stately pillar in the Parthenon around which the English writer has wreathed whorls of the wild pomegranate flower, Balaustion, with exquisite skill and delicate fancifulness. It is a drama within a story, with a chorus-comment; showing the red calyx, the scarlet petals, and the rough-rinded but delicate fruit of just such a pomegranate-tree as might be seen from the Casa Guidi windows in that fair Florence where *Aurora Leigh* was born by her who wrote therein her highest convictions, her who is the *Alkestis* of the English poet’s sorrow—Elizabeth Barrett Browning.

The Greek setting of the transcript is beautifully appropriate. Nikias, the famous Athenian statesman, had in the autumn of B.C. 415 laid siege to Syracuse, and been at first successful, but subsequently the victim of a series of disasters, had failed and fled, been forced to surrender, and been put to death B.C. 414. The power of Athens was utterly crushed, and new masters lorded it over the life of Greece. Rhodes, “the rosy island,” had long acknowledged the supremacy of the city of Minerva, as then to them

“The life and light  
Of the whole world worth calling world at all.”

The new Spartan *regime* at Athens was acquiesced in by many, and those who were unwilling to resign their fidelity to the city of the olive required to make choice of exile. Balaustion, a girl of fourteen, lived in Kameiros, in Rhodes, and she inspired some of her townfolk to take ship and set sail for the mainland and their heart’s home. This “lyric girl” is the heroine of the prelude and the epilogue, and as the darling of the village bore a pet name—

“Although she has some other name,  
We only call her Wild-pomegranate-flower,  
Balaustion; since, where’er the red bloom burns  
I’ the dull dark verdure of the bounteous tree,  
Dethroning in the Rosy Isle, the rose,  
You shall find food, drink, odour, all at once;  
Cool leaves to bind about an aching brow,  
And, never much away, the nightingale.”



Their galley is blown out of its course, the reckoning of the master is quite lost, a pirate-vessel gives them chase, they fly before it and sight land, hoping it is Crete they make strenuous efforts under the encouraging songs of Balaustion to gain the shore :—

"I sprang upon the altar by the mast  
And sang aloft—some genius prompting me—  
That song of ours which saved at Salamis :  
'O sons of Greeks, go, set your country free,  
Free your wives, free your children, free the fanes  
O' the Gods, your fathers founded—sepulchres  
They sleep in! Or save all, or all be lost!'  
Then, in a frenzy, so the noble oars  
Churned the black water white, that well away  
We drew, soon saw land rise, saw hills grow up,  
Saw spread itself a sea-wide town with towers,  
Not fifty stadia distant; and, betwixt  
A large bay and a small, the islet-bar,  
Even Ortugia's self—oh, luckless we!  
For here was Sicily and Syracuse."

Here was the pirate in the rear, and Spartan Syracuse in front; they had run "upon the lion from the wolf." The Syracusans had heard Balaustion's singing, and insisted on their sailing back right in the pirate's teeth :—

"And we were just about  
To turn and face the foe, as some tired bird  
Barbarians pelt at, drive with shouts away  
From shelter in what rocks, however rude,  
She makes for, to escape the kindled eye,  
Split beak, crook'd claw o' the creature, cormorant  
Or ossifrage, that, hardly baffled, hangs  
Afloat i' the foam, to take her if she turn."

When, under the genuine Greek sympathy for letters, a Syracusan sage asked if they who sang the old songs of Aischulos knew aught of the new poet, the sentimental and human Euripides, should that be so they would listen to the same, and accept that as a ransom. Great was the joy of the Rhodians! Their heroine has almost all these plays by heart :—

"Why, fast as snow in Thrace, the voyage through,  
Has she been falling thick in flakes of him!  
Frequent as figs at Kaunos, Kaunians said.  
Balaustion, stand forth and confirm my speech!  
Now it was some whole passion of a play;  
Now, peradventure, but a honey-drop  
That slipt its comb i' the chorus. If there rose  
A star, before I could determine steer  
Southward or northward—if a cloud surprised

Heaven, ere I fairly hollaed 'Furl the sail!—'  
 She had at finger's end both cloud and star :  
 Some thought that perched there, tame and tuneable,  
 Fitted with wings ; and still, as off it flew,  
 'So sang Euripides,' she said, 'so sang  
 The meteoric poet of air and sea,  
 Planets and the pale populace of heaven,  
 The mind of man, and all that's made to soar!'"

"Balaustion is ready to accept the task!" she exclaims in joy:—

"Save us, and I have courage to recite  
*The main of a whole play* from first to last ;  
 That strangest, saddest, sweetest song of his—  
 '*Alkestis*.'"

Acclamations of gladness arose on every side, and—

"Then, because Greeks are Greeks, and hearts are hearts,  
 And poetry is power—they all outbroke  
 In a great joyous laughter, with mirth love ;  
 Thank Herakles for the good holiday !  
 Make for the harbour ! Row and let voice ring,  
 'In we row, bringing more Euripides !'  
 All the crowd, as they lined the harbour now  
 'More of Euripides!' took up the cry.  
 We landed ; the whole city, soon astir,  
 Came rushing out of gates in common joy  
 To the suburb temple ; there they stationed me  
 O' the topmost step ; and plain I told the play,  
 Just as I saw it ; what the actors said,  
 And what I saw, or thought I saw the while,  
 At our Kamairos theatre clean-scooped  
 Out of a hill-side, with the sky above  
 And sea before our seats in marble row :  
 Told it, and, two days more, repeated it,  
 Until they sent us on our way again  
 With good words and great wishes."

Great is the admiration she won, as her repeated encore shows ; a wealthy Syracusan sends her a whole talent of gold in token of his delight. This she left on the tripod of the fane of Herakles, for she gloried not in golden gifts, but her heart was touched to saddened love when the Athenian captives in their penal quarry servitude, those—

"Whom their lord grew kinder to  
 Because they called the poet countryman,  
 Sent me a crown of *wild pomegranate flower*."

Oh, exquisite gift ! full of the fragrance of soul-thanks ! But there was yet another reward, a sweeter, nearer and dearer one—so it is

told with a maiden blush on the cheek, hesitance in the speech, a lowe-light in the eye, and such hope in the heart, thus:—

“One man—one youth, three days, each day  
(If, ere I lifted up my voice to speak,  
I gave a downward glance by accident),  
Was found at foot o’ the temple. When we sailed,  
There, in the ship too, was he found as well,  
Haying a hunger to see Athens too.  
We reached Peiræus : when I landed—lo !  
He was beside me. Anthesterion-month\*  
Is just commencing : when, its moon rounds full,  
We are to marry. O Euripides !”

Ah, there is in these last two words what a heart-leap of hope, gratitude, and admiration, to the saviour of her friends, and the cause of the good-gift which but a moon hence is to be hers ! Such is the bye-play-outline, the framework in which the transcript is set : a famous Greek graven rim, the curtain and the proscenium in which the grand old play of the latest in birth of the famous Greek tragedians, who was—

“The setting sun, with music at the close ;—  
Like the last taste of sweets is sweetest last.”

The plot of *Alkestis* is familiar in our ears as household words. Apollo tended the flocks of Admetos, King of Thessaly, during the nine years he was obliged to serve as mortal for having slain the Cyclops. He had prevailed upon the Fates to grant to his mortal master deliverance from death, if father, mother, or wife would die for him. The scene of the play opens—

“Where slept a silent palace in the sun,  
With plains adjacent, and Thessalian peace,  
Phærai, where King Admetos ruled the land.”

Apollo is standing at the portico. He is to leave, and death is that day to enter the palace. *Alkestis*, wife of Admetos, is—

“Willing to die instead of him and watch  
Never a sunrise nor a sunset more :  
And she is even now within the house.  
Uphorne by pitying hands, the feeble frame  
Gasping its last of life out ; since to-day  
Destiny is accomplished, and she dies.”

---

\* *Anthesterion-month*, answers to the latter half of February and the former half of March, in which *The Feast of the Flowers* was held during three days at Athens.

Death confronts Apollo in the portico, and the contrast between the sun-god and the god of the drear darkness of Hades' hall is thus touched on the canvas of imagination by Browning :—

"Out from the portico there gleamed a God,  
Apollon; for the bow was in his hand,  
The quiver at his shoulder, all his shape  
One dreadful beauty. And he hailed the house,  
As if he knew it well, and loved it much.

\* \* \*

And we observed another Deity,  
Half in, half out the portal—watch and ward—  
Eyeing his fellow : formidably fixed,  
Yet faltering too at who affronted him,  
As somehow disadvantaged, should they strive.  
Like some dread harpy blackness, ruffled wing,  
Convulsed and cowering head that is all eye,  
Which proves a ruined eagle who, too blind  
Swooping in quest o' the quarry, fawn or kid,  
Descried deep down the chasm 'twixt rock and rock,  
Has wedged and mortised, into either wall  
O' the mountain, the pent earthquake of his power;  
So lies, half hurtless yet still terrible,  
Just when who stalks up, who stands front to front,  
But the great lion-guarder of the gorge,  
Lord of the ground, a stationed glory there !  
Yet he too pauses ere he try the worst  
O' the frightful unfamiliar nature, new  
To the chasm, indeed, but elsewhere known enough,  
Among the shadows and the silences  
Above i' the sky."

"So each antagonist  
Silently faced his fellow, and forbore.  
Till Death thrilled, hard and quick, in spite and fear."

Apollo jeers at death, and forewarns him that Herakles will rescue the prey, and bring her back; Death replies, and a comment by Browning follows the lines of Euripides thus :—

" ' Having talked much, thou wilt not gain the more!  
This woman, then descends to Hades' hall  
Now that I rush on her, begin the rites  
O' the sword; for sacred to us gods below  
That head whose hair this sword shall sanctify ! ' "

And, in the fire-flash of the appalling sword,  
The uprush and the outburst, the onslaught  
Of Death's portentous passage through the door,  
Apollon stood a pitying moment-space:  
I caught one last gold gaze upon the night

Nearing the world now : and the god was gone,  
 And mortals left to deal with misery ;  
 And in came stealing slow, now this, now that  
 Old sojourner throughout the country-side,  
 Servants grown friends to those unhappy here."

A matron, issuing from the house, thus describes Alkestis on this supreme day :—

"For, when she felt the crowning day was come,  
 She washed with river-waters her white skin,  
 And, taking from the cedar closets forth  
 Vesture and ornament, bedecked herself  
 Nobly, and stood before the hearth, and prayed :  
 'Mistress, because I now depart the world,  
 Falling before thee the last time, I ask—  
 Be mother to my orphans !'

"And every altar through Admetos's house  
 She visited and crowned and prayed before,  
 Stripping the myrtle-foliage from the boughs,  
 Without a tear, without a groan—no change  
 At all to that skin's nature, fair to see,  
 Caused by the imminent evil. But this done—  
 Reaching her chamber, falling on her bed,  
 There, truly burst she into tears and spoke :  
 'O bride-bed, where I loosened from my life  
 Virginity for that same husband's sake  
 Because of whom I die now—fare thee well !  
 Since nowise do I hate thee : me alone  
 Hast thou destroyed ; for, shrinking to betray  
 Thee and my spouse, I die : but thee, O bed,  
 Some other woman shall possess as wife—  
 Truer, no ! but of better fortune, say !'"

We next see as if brought on the stage before us :—

"Alkestis' self,  
 The consecrated lady, borne to look  
 Her last—and let the living look their last—  
 She at the sun, we at Alkestis."

As she gazed on the blue sky, the green earth, the home, the friends, the children of her living life, she—

"Saw, with a new sense, all her death would do,  
 And which of her survivors had the right,  
 And which the less right, to survive thereby  
 For, you shall note, she uttered no one word  
 Of love more to her husband, though he wept  
 Plenteously, waxed importunate in prayer—  
 Folly's old fashion when its seed bears fruit.

I think she judged that she had bought the ware  
 O' the seller at its value,—nor praised him .  
 Nor blamed herself, but, with indifferent eye  
 Saw him purse money up, prepare to leave.  
 The buyer, with a solitary bale—  
 True purple—but in place of all that coin,  
 Had made a hundred others happy too  
 If so willed fate or fortune! What remained  
 To give away, should rather go to these  
 Than one with coin to clink and contemplate.  
 Admetos had his share and might depart,  
 The rest was for her children and for herself."

Alkestis feels little of the romance of death, the passionate bliss of self-sacrifice, but Euripides gives the death-scene with great dramatic power:—

"Then a shiver ran :  
 'He has me—seest not?—hales me,—who is it?—  
 To the hall o' the Dead—ah, who but Hades' self,  
 He, with the wings there, glares at me, one gaze  
 All that blue brilliance, under the eye-brow!  
 What wilt thou do? Unhand me! Such a way  
 I have to traverse, all unhappy one!'"

Admetos protests infinite love for her:—

"She waved away  
 The blue-eyed black-wing'd phantom, held in check  
 The advancing pageantry of Hades there,  
 And, with no change in her own countenance,  
 She fixed her eyes on the protesting man,  
 And let her lips unlock their sentence,—so!"

She dwells most on her little daughter's future fate thus finely—

"For neither shall thy mother watch thee wed,  
 Nor hearten thee in childbirth, standing by,  
 Just when a mother's presence helps the most!  
 No, for I have to die: and this my ill  
 Comes to me, nor to-morrow, no, nor yet  
 The third day of the month, but now, even now,  
 I shall be reckoned among those no more.  
 Farewell, be happy!"

Admetos assures her he will not marry another, he will make a statue of her, and make it his bride-bed comrade; he will, on his death, be buried beside her, he will do all manner of impossibilities; only the possibilities he will not do, and renouncing her self-sacrifice, die as he ought, seeing this is the time. So sobbing by the bedside he stood, Browning says:—

"Nowise insincere,  
 But somehow child-like, like his children, like  
 Childishness the world over. What was new  
 In this announcement that his wife must die?  
 What particle of pain beyond the pact  
 He made with eyes wide open, long ago—  
 Made and was, if not glad, content to make?  
 Now that the sorrow he had called for came,  
 He sorrowed to the height: none heard him say,  
 However, what would seem so pertinent,  
 'To keep this pact I find surpass my power:  
 Rescind it, Moirai! Give me back her life,  
 And take the life I kept by base exchange!'"

Euripides proceeds :—

"'Raise thy face nor forsake thy children thus!'  
 'Ah, willingly indeed I leave them not!  
 But—fare ye well, my children!  
 "Look on them—  
 Look!'  
 "'I am nothingness.'  
 "'What dost thou? Leav'st . . .  
 "'Farewell!'"

"And in the breath she passed away  
 'Undone—me miserable!' moaned the king,  
 While friends released the long suspended sigh  
 'Gone is she: no wife for Admetos more!'"

Alkestis is gone, Admetos has his dead taken into the house, and the chorus sings commonplaces of comfort. Herakles comes in intending to be Admetos' guest. They tell him nothing of the death, and Admetos conceals the nearness of the grief in his heart, and the closeness of the bereavement, so that Herakles goes and enjoys himself at a capital dinner, all unwitting of the tragedy of the house. The strength-god is a favourite of Browning's. He describes him thus :—

"There smiled the mighty presence, all one smile  
 And no touch more of the world-weary god,  
 Through the brief respite! Just a garland's grace  
 About the brow, a song to satisfy  
 Head, heart, and breast, and trumpet-lips at once,  
 A solemn draught of true religious wine,  
 And,—how should I know?—half a mountain goat  
 Torn up and swallowed down,—the feast was fierce  
 But brief; all cares and pains took wing and flew,  
 Leaving the hero ready to begin  
 And help mankind, whatever woe came next."

The funeral procession comes out of the house, and a very pretty quarrel as it stands falls out between Admetos and his father Pheres, each accusing each of selfishness, and showing much of it, and ample justice is done to the Euripidian humanness of this scene. The funeral marches on to the grave, and we have a heart-beat of the poet's own in these words :—

“Wherewith the sad procession wound away,  
Made slowly for the suburb sepulchre.  
And lo—while still one's heart, in time and tune,  
Paced after that symmetric step of Death  
Mute marching, to the mind's eye, at the head  
O' the mourners—one hand pointing out their path  
With the long pale terrific sword we saw,  
The other leading, with grim tender grace,  
Alkestis quieted and consecrate.”

Herakles learns from a servant the true state of the matter, and—

“He plucked the chaplet from his forehead, dashed  
The myrtle sprays down, trod them underfoot!  
And all the joy and wonder of the wine  
Withered away, like fire from off a brand  
The wind blows over—beacon though it be,  
Whose merry ardour only meant to make  
Somebody all the better for its blaze,  
And save lost people in the dark ; quenched now !

“Not long quenched ! As the flame, just hurried off  
The brand's edge, suddenly renews its bite,  
Tasting some richness caked i' the core o' the tree—  
Pine, with a blood that's oil—and triumphs up  
Pillar-wise to the sky, and saves the world :  
So, in a spasm and splendour of resolve,  
All at once did the God surmount the man.

He determines at once :—

“I will go lie in wait for Death, black-stoled  
King of the corpses ! I shall find him, sure,  
Drinking, beside the tomb, o' the sacrifice :  
And if I lie in ambuscade, and leap  
Out of my lair, and seize—encircle him  
Till one hand join the other round about—  
There lives not who shall pull him out from me.

“Bib-mauled, before he let the woman go !  
But even say I miss the booty—say,  
Death comes not to the bouldered blood—why then,  
Down go I, to the unsunned dwelling-place



Of Koré and the king there—make demand,  
 Confident I shall bring Alkestis back,  
 So as to put her in the hands of him  
 My host, that housed me, never drove me off :  
 Though stricken with sorrow, hid the stroke,  
 Being a noble heart and honouring me !

He departs, and Mr. Browning—or Balaustion—speaks :—

“ Gladness be with thee, Helper of our world !  
 I think this is the authentic sign and seal  
 Of godship, that it ever waxes glad,  
 And more glad, until gladness blossoms, bursts  
 Into a rage to suffer for mankind,  
 And recommence at sorrow : drops like seed  
 After the blossom, ultimate of all.  
 Say, does the seed scorn earth and seek the sun ?  
 Surely it has no other end and aim  
 Than to drop, once more die into the ground,  
 Taste cold and darkness and oblivion there :  
 And thence rise, tree-like grow through pain to joy.  
 More joy and most joy—do man good again.”

Here again is a tone from the poet's own feeling of the heaviness of the heart when the vacancy made by Death is made palpable on the return from the sepulchre of “ dear dust ” :—

“ Now he was made aware how dear is death,  
 How lovable the dead are, how the heart  
 Yearns in us to go hide where they repose.  
 When we find sunbeams do no good to see,  
 Nor earth rests rightly where our footsteps fall.  
 His wife had been to him the very pledge,  
 Sun should be sun, earth—earth ; the pledge was robbed,  
 Pact broken, and the world was left no world.”

Strong self-abasement enters into the conscience of Admetos as he reflects on Alkestis' sacrifice, his own selfish cowardice, and he begins to feel and to fear himself worthy of the scorn of Thessaly, and repentance creeps into his soul. The self-upbraiding soliloquy of Admetos is rendered with a splendid efficacy by Browning. At length, while the chorus is detailing the sad necessity of death, Herakles appears leading a veiled female by his side, whom he says he has won in a prize-fight. Those who have seen the bas-reliefs of Hercules and the bull at the Vatican may find the full-muscled, rich-blooded deity reproduced for them in this word-picture :—

"That friend looked rough with fighting. Had he strained  
 Worst brute to breast was ever strangled yet?  
 Somehow, a victory—for there stood the strength,  
 Happy, as always; sometimes grave, perhaps;  
 The great-vein cordage on the fret-worked brow,  
 Black-swollen, beaded yet with battle-drops  
 The yellow hair o' the hero!—his big frame  
 A-quiver with each muscle sinking back  
 Into the sleepy smooth it leaped from late,  
 Under the great guard of one arm there leant  
 A shrouded something, live and woman-like,  
 Propped by the heart-beats 'neath the lion-coat.  
 When he had finished his survey, it seemed,  
 The heavings of the heart began subside,  
 The helping breath returned, and last the smile  
 Shone out, all Herakles was back again,  
 As the words followed the saluting hand."

(*To be continued.*)

---

*The Best of all Good Company.* Edited by BLANCHARD JERROLD.  
 London: Houlston & Sons.

HERE is a capital idea. This is a series which has been projected to bring to us as "Daily Companions" all the highest and noblest thinkers, writers, and poets, who have illustrated the past. "Half-hours with the Best Authors" was a splendid scheme, and well was it carried out by the Nestor of the cheap press—Charles Knight. But those seasons of communion were all too short, they only made us long for more. In that to a certain extent lay their value. This series of "Days" with the best company is a development for the better of that scheme. It is to consist of introductions to the companion of the day, giving us so much of information about him as shall enable us to feel "at home" in our companionship, and then Mr. Jerrold, like a dextrous host, sets us beside the great guest of the heart, contrives to turn towards us the finest side of our friend, and induces him to bring out for us all these salient traits for which he is remarkable.

We have before us two of this series of royal octavo pamphlets, each containing about sixty-four pages of excellently written or selected matter, nicely printed and well-arranged. Part I. consists of "A Day with Charles Dickens." The cover contains a capital likeness (which ought to have been reproduced in the work itself). The frontispiece is a quarto specimen in facsimile of the penman-

ship of Charles Dickens. The work contains *seven parts*: I. Charles Dickens, *In memoriam*; II. His Life and Works; III. Dickens, the Speaker; IV. Charles Dickens and Douglas Jerrold; V. June 9th, 1870 (the death-day); VI. The Moral of his Life, and VII. His Bequest to Posterity. The whole forms a capital epitome of Dicken's life, including criticisms and specimens of his works, and some remarks of value on the nature of the novelist's task and place. Part I. supplies us with "A Day with Sir Walter Scott," well suited to this year—the centennial one. We have, I., Scott's Cradle, *i. e.* Birth-place, Edinburgh; II. The Lands of Scott, the border lands of his native country; III. A life of Work, such as few but Scott could show; IV. A Visit to Abbotsford, taken under excellent guidance; V. Scott, as seen by his friends; VI. Specimens of his Works, &c.

These two *brochures* have a present interest, and they have higher qualities than belong to the mere *ephemera* of literature. The idea is good, and seems to be in process of being well carried out.

*The Child and the Book: a Manual of Method for Sunday School Teachers and others.* By ROBERT DUNNING and JOSEPH HASSELL, A.K.C. London: Sunday School Union.

THE Sunday school is growing in importance, and as the education of England develops it will hold a higher place than it has yet done. The drill and perceptive training of the young intellect will quicken the mind; but there will still be required a drill and preparation for the training and the restraining of the heart. The day school will make children "wise;" the Sunday school will still be required to make them "wise unto salvation" by communicating to them a knowledge of the Scriptures in their power upon the character and conduct. If it be the duty of man to "train up a child in the way he should go," he must bring the heart of that child to love this Book, and to love it as the work of his God and Father. In "The Child and the Book" many excellent and valuable aids will be given to those who read it with applying hearts. It takes up in four parts the Child, the Bible, the Teacher, and the Class. On each of these topics it speaks wise words, gives kindly hints, and supplies Scriptural instruction. It is a loving book and one to be loved, which it is sure to be if once diligently read.

## The Societies' Section.

### CHURCH OF IRELAND YOUNG MEN'S ASSOCIATION.

A *soirée* in connection with this association was held, 13th Oct., in the rooms, Dawson-street, on the opening of session 1871-72. The large room was crowded. After tea the chair was taken by the Right Hon. Sir Joseph Napier, Bart.

The hon. sec. read letters of apology from the Dean of the Chapel Royal and Rev. Dr. Stanford.

"Jerusalem the golden" was sung, a portion of Scripture was read, and prayer offered up.

The Rev. R. S. Gregg, of Cork, addressed the meeting. He said: An opening meeting of such a society was of great importance, and he hoped that all the young men who came there were really in earnest, determined to take an active part in the business of the society, sharing its advantages, and also, he hoped, in its honours. There was nothing more important for young men than to form good companionships. Some of the strongest friendships formed in life began about that time. There was a strength, a freshness, and a power about them such as did not characterise the friendships of any after period. They were all dependent upon one another. They were constantly influencing others, and others were influencing them; and the history of that and kindred societies could tell many a tale of the noble power which companionships formed within them had wielded in moulding the good man's character for life, while in too many cases in the world it was proved that to evil companionship could be traced the blighted youth, the blasted life, and the sinking to an early and degraded grave. He congratulated the society on having the patronage of

their present chairman, who took a warm interest in the association, and encouraged the studies of the members by offering prizes. The great secret of all work was to do one thing at a time, and to do it with all their energy and might; and he recommended them, when they wanted rest and recreation, to change their occupation, instead of doing nothing. He hoped the young men of the association were determined to set before them some nobler purpose in life than killing time, and that instead of floating lazily like wrecks, they should, like the gallant ship ploughing her way through the sea, go manfully forward through life. The reverend gentleman concluded by appealing in eloquent language to young men to improve their opportunities, so as to strengthen their characters, but, above all, to study the character of the God-man, and imitate His example throughout their lives.

An hour was agreeably occupied by songs and resuscitations. Professor O'Donoghue presided at the piano.

Mr. W. Battersby moved "That the best thanks of the members of this association are due, and hereby presented to the Rev. Robert S. Gregg for the excellent address with which he favoured them, and that this association welcomes to its rooms the son of the honoured and beloved Lord Bishop of Cork."

Mr. W. H. Drennen seconded the resolution, which was carried with acclamation.

The Rev. Mr. Gregg returned thanks, and assured the members that the Lord Bishop of Cork still took great interest in their association.

Mr. J. Frazer next moved "That

the members of this association, gratefully remembering the deep interest which Sir Joseph Napier has always taken in their progress, hereby tender to him the most cordial expression of their thanks, not only for the past, but for his most dignified conduct in the chair." (Applause.) Their president had always taken a deep interest in the prosperity of their association—he had always been a most active, industrious, hard-working, indefatigable supporter. His conduct there, however, had only been in consonance with the tenor of a long and brilliant career at the bar, in the senate, on the bench, and in the graceful retirement which he had so well and worthily won. It had been a pleasure to him in that leisure to work for their benefit—to expound the subtle argument and golden truths of that admirable work, "Butler's Analogy," and many present knew with what unwavering devotion he had carried through the noble undertaking.

Mr. Gamble, Q.O., in seconding the resolution, observed that having been a member of the Society since its establishment, he had had an opportunity of watching their progress, and could testify to the great assistance which they had derived from their right hon. president.

Sir Joseph Napier said he had always taken a very warm interest in the welfare of the association. Allusion had been made to his lectures on "Butler's Analogy," and it was gratifying to him to know that they had been fruitful to a large degree. As Vice-Chancellor of their time-honoured University, he had awarded gold medals to two of the young gentlemen who went through that course with him, and to others academic distinctions of a lesser degree. The labour had stimulated the energies of many, and had proved a work of no little benefit and pleasure

to himself. He would say to the young men, that while they cherished evangelical truth, they should be large-hearted and liberal, remembering that the best and wisest of them might take different views of important truths; and so when the veteran battalions should have passed away the young men of the present day would continue to preserve the deposit of the faith entrusted to their charge. Again, he believed they would yet have to encounter subtle enemies in growing scepticism and in social changes. Against that they must prepare all their defences, and above all, it was important for them to cultivate the truth within themselves, to be prepared at every point and corner to fortify themselves. It had been his privilege to help them to understand what would prove a great bulwark in the coming struggle; and the many evidences of their Christianity comprised within that volume, "Butler's Analogy." In conclusion, he alluded to friends of the society departed this life since he last addressed them—Sir Joseph Preston, always there in his work of quiet, unobtrusive usefulness; Mr. Gresham, the constant friend and supporter of the Society; Mr. Collins, one of their most earnest and active friends; Mr. Alexander Norman, everywhere a Christian soldier; and Mr. Geo. Alexander Hamilton, honoured and respected by all who knew him—and exhorted the young to follow their footsteps, guarding against the bitter animosities of political and polemical controversies which distracted and divided them, remembering after all that Christianity was a religion of love and saving grace, with few doctrines to be believed, but many duties to be performed.

The doxology was sung, the benediction pronounced, and the meeting separated.

## The Inquirer.

---

### QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

957. What is the best method of reading a volume of didactic essays (on subjects not particularly related to each other), so as to collect materials for a critical essay thereon; and what is the best method of arranging (in the form of an essay), such materials when collected?—A. M. C.

958. Could you give me information as to where I could procure a good, cheap work on the "Pronunciation of Geographical Names." Also, what course of study would you advise for a young man, and what books would you recommend?—W. F.

### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

945. A. D. will find full information on all points relating to the material portions of his inquiry, in "The Civil Service Guide," by R. Johnson, principal of the academy, 29, Gardiner's Place, Dublin. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., price 8s. 6d., new edition, corrected to September, 1871. It contains full particulars regarding every Government office in England, Scotland, and Ireland; the New Regulations as to open competitions, entrance salaries, and recent examination papers on every subject on which candidates are tested. It is much better to refer to a work of this description than to give brief and unsatisfactory notices, which are necessarily liable

to be misunderstood. It would be a good thing if young men, members of mutual improvement societies, would supply themselves with copies of such works for perusal. They would then, at a small expense, often open the door to higher progress to many of their members.—G. H.

951. I am under the impression that "The Literary World" was one of the numerous periodicals edited by Mr. John Timbs, and that it had but a short existence among a number of the early contemporaries of the *British Centinelist*.—R. M. A.

956. A satisfactory answer to the questions of A. P. D. would fill a whole number of this magazine. The nature and number of the books he should read depends greatly on the ideal standard of legal knowledge to which he desires to attain. If he have a soul which can rise above the mere details of the law, his course of reading must be very extensive. It must embrace not only English law, but constitutional history, international and Roman law, and general jurisprudence. In the short space necessarily allotted to these replies, it would be impossible to give a list of the best books on these various topics. I would therefore recommend A. P. D. to purchase "The Advocate" (Cox, 10, Wellington Street, Strand), or, perhaps better still, Warren's well-known "Law Studies."—GROWSON.

## Literary Notes.

Henry W. Beecher's "Life of Jesus the Christ," is to be published by subscription as a *livre de luxe*.

"The Parks of London" have found a topographer and historian.

With the month of fogs, November, we are to be gratified by the appearance in the literary firmament of *Freelight*.

An excellent and able series of papers, which appeared in *The Scotsman*, have been republished with the title, "A Survey of Political Economy," by J. W. Macdonell, M.A.

Rev. Justin Doolittle has a considerable part of a Chinese Vocabulary in type, and his MS. is completed.

M. Moltke—not the great strategist, but the poet and publisher of Leipzig,—has just issued "Shakespeare's Hamlet, English and German" the most complete edition of this tragedy yet issued, containing as it does the texts of 1603 and 1604, all the sources of the play, all the various readings, notes, commentary, the whole literature "Hamlet" has called forth, and a glossary.

Dr. D. F. Strauss has reproduced his Monograph on Ulrich von Hutten, in an enlarged and revised form.

Herr Arnold Ruge is engaged in translating Lord Dalling (Henry Bulwer's) "Life of Lord Palmerston."

Mr. Darwin is employed on a work on "Animal Physiognomy."

"The Life and Times of Daniel Manin"—a history of the progress of the unity of Italy, is nearly ready.

Mr. Friewall has revived *The Critic*, of which he manages the consular staff.

"The Literary Life of Rev. W. Harness" is just out.

"A Page of History before the National Assembly," has been written by General Trochu.

The late Thomas Ballantyne, editor of *The Statesman*, has left a fragment of an autobiography which he had been encouraged by Thomas Carlyle to write.

The committee of the Lord's Day Observance Society, have determined to offer prizes for excellence in the knowledge of the teaching of the word of God concerning the history of that holy day, as tested by examination. The examination will be open to persons between the ages of sixteen and twenty-five. The examination papers will be sent out early in October, 1872. Prizes of money from £3 to £1, books, and certificates of merit, will be awarded according to results. Communications addressed to Rev. John Gritton, 20, John Street, Adelphi, London, W.C., will meet every attention.

To Mr. F. Griffiths, of Mangollen College, has been awarded a prize for an excellent essay on "The Atonement Viewed in Relation to Modern Theories." Some of our readers may recognize in the name given a contributor whose initials has frequently appeared in the *British Controversialist*.

Sebastian Brandt's "Warrenschiffen," translated by Alex. Barclay as "The Ship of Fools," and published in 1506, is to be reprinted from the first German edition, 1494.

George T. Thomason, author of a poem, "Memories," and "Tales for the Chimney Corner," for twenty-three years editor of *Deane's Almanack*, and editor and proprietor of the *Middlesex Chronicle* and the *Farmer's Club*, died 16th Oct.

"Ancient and Modern Philosophy," by F. D. Maurice, is to be reissued in a new and complete edition; his "Theological Essays" are also to be revised and republished.

Miss M. F. Rossetti has published an Essay, entitled "A Shadow of Dante."

The Miscellaneous Writings of John Conington, with a Memoir, are in preparation.

W. H. Lecky, under the title of "The Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland," will issue sketches of the lives of Swift, Flood, Grattan, and D. O'Connell.

A translation of Ueberweg's "History of Philosophy" will shortly be published.

Murray, of Albemarle Street, is about to issue a School Board Series of Lesson Books, edited by Dr. W. Smith, the lexicographer.

George Grote's "Aristotle," containing an Analysis of the "Organon," &c., is in the press, in 2 vols.

The Early English Text Society will issue, under the editorship of Mr. H. Sweet, of Balliol, King Alfred's translation of "Orosius," from five contemporary MSS., belonging to J. Tollemache, Esq., M.P.

William Smith Edinburgh is to add to his other translations "Fichte's Select Works."

T. W. Levin's "Six Lectures on the Philosophical Writings of Cicero," have been added to our literature:

Andrew Bissett has ready for issue "Essays on Historical Truth."

"The Collected Works of Theodore Parker" are now completed, in 14 vols.

Part VI. of "Bishop Colenso on The Pentateuch and Joshua" is nearly ready.

A poetical handbook for schools, by B. W. Emerson, is announced.

"Memories of the British Museum," [by Robert Cowtan, are likely to furnish pleasant reading.

Mr. Edward Arber, the editor of the admirable series of "English Reprints," has made a bibliographical discovery which entitles him to much credit. In the very rare volume of Protestant tracts of the Reformation time, which Lord Arthur Hervey, now Bishop of Bath and Wells, found in 1861, which the British Museum bought in 1865 for £120, and has been in the hands of all the best bibliographers of the nation, Mr. Arber has for the first time identified the second tract with the lost work of the author of the celebrated "Supplicacyon for the Beggars" (1536), the famous Simon Fish, namely, the "Summe of Scripture," translated out of the Dutch, referred to by John Fox in his "Actes and Monumentes," leaf 987, ed. 1576. The "Supplicacyon" was reprinted last year for the Early English Text Society, and it is presumed that they will complete their "Reprint" by reissuing this work of the zealous promoter of the English Reformation; though he latterly reverted to the old church.

The new volume of Edward A. Freeman's "History of the Norman Conquest," is entirely taken up with the reign of William the Conqueror. The fifth and last volume will carry on the sketch to the period originally designed, that of the reign of Edward I.



## Modern Logicians.

---

HENRY ALDRICH, D.D., DEAN OF CHRIST CHURCH,  
OXFORD.

"Among the Latin *Compendia* [of Logic] that of Aldrich has long reigned almost exclusively in Oxford."—*The late Dean Mansel.*

IN a notice of a work, of which we intend to give a thorough analytical review—"The System of Logic and History of Logical Doctrine" by the late Dr. Friedrich Ueberweg, translated by Thomas M. Lindsay, M.A.,—we read, apparently on good authority, the following account of the condition of logical study among University scholars at the present time:—

"Nothing can be more deplorable than the ignorance that prevails, among people who ought to know better, of any other logical theories than those which may be said to be represented by Archbishop Whately, Sir W. Hamilton, and Mr. J. S. Mill. If, for instance, we take up Mr. Garden's "Manual of Logic"—by no means a bad little book—we find that the author is obviously unacquainted with any works on the subject except the ordinary English text-books. When in addition to the three philosophers already named, Mr. Garden has mentioned Archbishop Thomson, Mr. Chretien, Dr. Mansel, and one or two others, it is clear that he has pretty well got to the end of his reading on logical matters. Mr. Garden's state of mind may be said to represent the state of mind of too many of those who in this country teach or study logic."

This work of wide and varied reading in the history of logic, and of a scholarly and critical acquaintance with the main elements which differentiate one treatise from another, has been frequently mourned over and complained of. This is all the more singular since logic, under the impulse of Whately, 1826, and Sir William Hamilton, 1833; of William Thomson (now Archbishop of York), 1842, and the late H. L. Mansel, Dean of St. Paul's, 1849, had been brought into greater prominence in the examinations at Oxford and at Cambridge; and an agitation had been made by Augustus de Morgan, 1847, and continued by C. M. Ingleby, LL.D., 1852, for the restoration of logic to a proper place among the subjects of study

1871.

in that University. Not to speak of the academical writers on logic, *e.g.*, Garden, Fowler, Venn, Shedden, Turrell, Karlslake, Poste, Jevons, &c., to mention only a few as they occur to memory—who have of late treated the subject in one form or another, we might refer to the extra-academical logical influence of J. S. Mill—a most influential agency in exciting to the renewal of the study of the science of reflective thought. Nor need we scruple to note the efforts made in this magazine since 1850, in bringing the culture of the thinking faculty within the reach of the extra-academical student in a Treatise on “The Art of Reasoning,” which won the favourable opinion of many of the best authorities on that topic on its appearance in these pages, and attained, on its republication in 1853, a considerable amount of highly flattering recognition from the chief reviews, and the more notable of those who hold the leadership in that department of thought. But besides the concise though comprehensive “History of Logic,”—extending to upwards of 60 pages—which that work contains, we may refer to the numerous additions to the history and bibliography of that science contained in our series of papers on “Modern Logicians,” many of which bring before the reader memoirs from original sources of important thinkers, the incidents of whose lives had not been recorded elsewhere, as well as supplied analyses and criticisms of works, sometimes scarce, frequently expensive, and always deserving of reflective and attentive perusal. Our readers have had the opportunity of extending their knowledge of logical theories pretty considerably beyond the bounded number to which the *Athenæum* refers as forming the general average quantity of information possessed on the subject even by the writers of our ordinary English text-books on Logic: as may be seen from the subjoined list of the more important of the papers submitted for their perusal and study. The logic of style, of study, of criticism, of debate, of conversation, of novel writing, of speculative thought, of definition, of opinion, of law; biographies of W. G. Hamilton, Peter Bayle, Thomas Hobbes, and papers on Zeno the eclectic, and dialectic; the Socratic dialogue, the Platonic dialectic, the logic of Aristotle, reviews of Professor Veitch’s “Life of Sir William Hamilton,” of Neale’s “Analogy of Thought and Nature,” of Richard Lownde’s “Theory of Belief,” of Shirley’s “Scholasticism,” &c., besides the specific series of articles on “Modern Logicians,” which treats of Samuel Bailey (of Sheffield), 1868; Alexander Bain, LL.D., 1868; George Boole.

D.C.L., 1865; Bishop (Joseph) Butler, 1864; William Cairns LL.D., 1865; Augustus de Morgan, 1867; A. C. Fraser, 1871; Sir William Hamilton, 1861; G. F. Hegel, 1862, 1866, 1867; Dr. George Jardine, 1866; Emanuel Kant, 1863; Sir G. C. Lewis, 1863; J. S. Mill, 1864; Professor William Spalding, 1863; Dr. Edward Tatham, 1866; Archbishop Thomson (of York), 1865; Archbishop Whately, 1862; John Woolley, D.C.L., 1866, &c.

It is alleged on all hands that this unhistorical and narrow method of studying logic among Oxford men, has arisen from their almost exclusive adherence to the "Compendium of the Art of Logic," compiled for his own purposes as a college tutor, by Henry Aldrich, D.D., Dean of Christ Church. "This treatise," says J. S. Mill, "the whole of which, except the mere technical account of the rules of the syllogism, is utterly contemptible, has been for many years the text book in use at the only academical institution in England at which logic forms any part of the established course of education—the university of Oxford." . . . This treatise of Aldrich is almost the only work professing to be an exposition of the Aristotelian logic with which Dr. Whately appears to be acquainted.\* Similarly, Sir William Hamilton (1826) observes that Dr. Whately "unfortunately wrote his 'Elements of Logic' in singular unacquaintance with all that had been written on the science in ancient and in modern times, with the exception, apparently, of two works of two Oxford logicians, the "Institutio" of Wallis, and the "Compendium" of Aldrich, both written above a century ago, and neither of them rising above a humble mediocrity at the date of its composition; and Aldrich, whom Whately unfortunately regards as a safe and learned guide, had himself written his book in ignorance of Aristotle, and of all the principal authors on the science."†

In the late Dr. John Woolley's logic (1840) it is said that the logic "of Aldrich, addressed to an age practically versed in the dialectic art, and familiarly acquainted with terms and modes of thought now too little understood, is necessarily obscure to an inexperienced reader; and most of his younger readers, it is to be feared, content themselves with learning his definitions by heart, without ever thinking about their meaning; on the other hand, it may perhaps be said, that for a very young mind the elegant intro-

\* *Westminster Review*, January, 1828, p. 156.

† "Lectures on Logic," vol. i., p. 29.

duction of Archbishop Whately is hardly technical enough. His logic is the logic of the nineteenth century, divested of the formality and precision of the old school, very attractive and engaging; but in his anxiety to avoid obscurity, he sometimes appears to forget the necessity of discipline. To be read with advantage, he seems to require a previous cultivation of thought, seldom to be expected in those who are commencing their logical studies in this place [Oxford]."

The Rev. John Huiyshe's "Treatise on Logic" is confessedly written to conserve the idol of Oxford, being intended "to assist those who wish to study Aldrich's "Logic" in order to pass their examination in the Oxford Schools." To render the study of the science as easy as possible, Aldrich's "Rudiments of the Art of Logic" have been literally translated from the Latin text of the author, and liberally annotated, as in the case of the Rev. Thomas Smythe Hill's edition of the "Artis Logicæ Rudimenta," with illustrative observations on each section; Questions on Aldrich's Logic have been published, with references to the most popular treatises (1829), and a key to these questions has been issued, reducing the intellectual labour required for the mastery of the art of syllogizing to a minimum, that an easy pass may be secured: abridgments of it have been made, commentaries on it have been prepared, and various tractates—like C. E. Moberley's, &c., have been got up in "the hope that the Latin manual may still be retained in our University without much actual alteration of the text, but vivified and made practical by continual increase of knowledge as to both the form of reasonings and their matter." On the other hand supplementary matter has been aggregated round the original treatise, in order that it may be brought up more nearly to the level of scholarly study, as in the late Dean Mansel's edition, the object of which is thus stated in the preface to the edition 1849, from which we quote:—

"Whatever variety of opinion may exist as to the absolute merits of Aldrich's "Logic," there are many considerations which recommend a new edition of that work, as by far the most convenient mode of supplying an acknowledged deficiency in the studies of the University. The majority of teachers will probably agree with me in regarding the dry skeleton of a Latin manual as better adapted to the discipline of beginners than any of the more elegant, but somewhat diluted, essays of the present day: to which must be added the consideration that Latin is the original language of

many of the technicalities of the subject, which cannot be so conveniently learned through the medium of a translation. But among the Latin compendia, that of Aldrich has long reigned almost exclusively in Oxford; nor would it be easy to select any rival manual of such decided superiority as to counterbalance the evils necessarily attendant on all violent changes in a long-established system. Deficient as the work undeniably is in many of the prominent features of the scholastic logic, its very deficiencies render it in some respects preferable to a more faithful exponent."

"On the other hand, it must be confessed that there is much to be added to this or any other compendium, to enable it to meet the demands of the existing University examinations. This will at once be admitted by all who have had recent practice in tuition: it may be easily ascertained by any who will take the trouble of comparing the contents of the book with those of any of the present examination papers. To this deficiency, the increasing study of the original writings of Aristotle has not a little contributed. But the transition from the bare text of Aldrich to that of Aristotle is far too abrupt to be beneficial to the student. Occasionally, indeed, he may recognise an old friend in a new dress; but the difference of language, order, and manner of treatment will conceal from the unpractised eye most of the passages in which his Latin successors have attempted anything more than a bare translation of the words of the Stagyræ."

The preceding passages show the hold which Aldrich's work has taken of Oxford and Oxford men; and might well justify the inquiry—Why, seeing so many papers have appeared on logic and modern logicians, have we not yet had a paper on this man of men among the logicians of Oxford? Who?—what?—is Aldrich? This is a question—or these are questions—a good deal more easily asked than answered—as indeed most questions are. We might, if we were inclined to air a personal feeling of our own in these pages, admit and confess that we have never been able to hold in high esteem the "Compendium," which has had so lengthy an influence, and such a powerful and tenacious grasp upon the minds of the guiding Oxonians. We had read long ago, in the dedication to the "Introduction to Logic," of Edward Bentham, D.D., Fellow of Oriel and Prebendary of Hereford, 1770, the following opinion—"The learned Bishop Fell, the elegant Dean Aldrich, both of them successively the glory of their times, thought they saw, and endeavoured to remedy, the defects of preceding logical institutions. But their performances too are antiquated—'Stant magni nominis umbræ,' and we were quite prepared, after perusal of these works, to acquiesce much more in the verdict of their effete-ness than

in the verdict of commendation herein contained. Bentham, Kirwan and Kejt had been in vain presented to charm the Oxonians from their infatuation, and we had the best authority for believing that 'the minimum of Aldrich remained the maximum of the schools.' It had been even affirmed by Sir Wm. Hamilton, that 'The Compendium,' a meagre 12mo. of 180 pages, to be read in a day and easily mastered in a week, was found too ponderous a volume for pupil and tutor and examiner. It was accordingly subjected to a process of extenuation, out of which it emerged reduced to a little more than a third of its original grandeur—a skeleton without marrow or substance."

In the article on Logic, contributed to Knight's "English Cyclopædia," by the late able and erudite mathematician and philosophical thinker Augustus, De Morgan, a remark is made which considerably corroborates the statement made by the writer in the *Athenæum*. "So bare are the books on logic of all account of its history, that a mere list of the names which would be most prominent in such a history, by which the student may resort to biographical dictionaries or general histories of philosophy, is a valuable addition to such an article as the present. And yet it is not a little strange that on turning to such a *multum in parvo* compendium of knowledge as 'The Penny Cyclopædia,' on which so many 'University pens' were engaged; or looking into its immediate successor, which, though abridged, has also been revised, 'The National Cyclopædia;' or even in, that highly elaborated dictionary of universal knowledge, 'Chambers' Encyclopædia'—not to mention at all 'The Popular Encyclopædia,' which is in a great measure a mere adaptation from the German—the name of the author of a text-book which has held its place for 180 years in Oxford, and has had the sanction of the heads of that University too during all that time—is not to be found. Even in the 'Encyclopædia Metropolitana,' over the methodical plan of which Logic was to bear imperious rulership, Henry Aldrich holds no place among the moving mighty minds of benefactive men."

Even in other quarters, likely to give the Oxford Don whose memory the Peckwater Quadrangle of Christ Church had embalmed for nearly two centuries, we sought the name. In Robert Blakey's "Historical Sketch of Logic," 1851—except in a quotation from Sir W. Hamilton's article on Logic in the *Edinburgh Review*, the only notices we find of the many-generationed text-book are in

these terms:—"About this time appeared Aldrich's '*Compendium Artis Logicæ*,'" p. 263, and '*Aldrich's Logic*' appeared in 1691." In the Historical Introduction to Joseph Devey's "*Logic, or the Science of Inference*" (1854), Aldrich's receives no mention; nor does he figure at all in J. D. Morell's "*History of Modern Philosophy*" (1849). Archbishop Thomson merely cites him to give force to remarks regarding "the tenacious vitality of error;" George Bentham thinks that "upon the whole the commendations given to Aldrich's '*Compendium*' are probably greater than the work is deserving of," and the learned and judicious Hallam, after noticing Wallis's "*Institutio Logicæ*," says "A smaller treatise, still much used in Oxford, by Aldrich, '*Compendium Artis Logicæ*,' 1691, is clear and concise, but seems to contain nothing very important."\* One cannot help wondering how, in the midst of so many evidences of insignificance a treatise on logic should have held its place so long, in the chief seat of scholarly training in which that science was professedly taught, of such a character by such an author. We want to know who he was, how this state of matters came about, and any other items of intelligence which can gratify our awakened curiosity in regard to a text-book of such singular longevity, and an author who has held for such a length of time the position of the Aristotle of modern Oxford. This will lead us to turn our attention to the history of logic in relation to the City of Colleges on the Isis. This we shall now, for a brief space, do.

At the Reformation, the Aristotelian logic and the scholastic metaphysics became involved in the doubt which darkened the thoughts of men, concerning all they had held dear in the past. That is at all times a difficult and dangerous period of history in which men have to guide public opinion to proper thought while the cross currents of a transitory state of things are active and flowing. To distinguish between what must and ought to pass away, and what is permanent and ought to be held to abidingly, requires calmness, consideration, balance of mind and passion, a clear judgment, and a sound discretion. Most of the theologians of the Roman Church maintained the doctrines of Aristotle as they did the dogmas of the creeds and sacraments because they were old, sacred in their associations and much accepted; and not a few of the more ardent of the Protestants declaimed against the old

\* "*Literature of Europe*," vol. iii., p. 302.

logic as they did against the old faith, because it had been elevated to a false height and had acquired a tyrannous power over human thought and life. Naturally enough the emancipation of the soul led to the employment of the eager activity of the spirit in all new paths and courses, and thereupon, in speculation, many novelties came flashing into the mind. Of these the two main forms developed into the Baconian philosophy and the Cartesian system of scientific research.

"Those who clung," as Hallam observes, "to the ancient philosophy, believed that Bacon and Descartes were the idols of a transitory fashion, and that the wisdom of long ages would regain its ascendancy;" hence they opposed the introduction of any novelties in philosophizing, and forbade any swerving from the method of logical teaching which had been matured under the Aristotelian influences of scholasticism. The logic of Peter Ramus was greatly favoured by many of the Reformers. Melancthon taught the Ramean dialectic in Germany, Andrew Melville introduced it into Scotland, and it was prelected on in Cambridge as early as 1590. He was, in fact, the Luther of the Reform of Logic of which Bacon became the Calvin and Descartes the Zwingli. His system was expanded and methodized a century after his death by Milton. In the Visitation of Oxford under Henry VIII. scholastic logic is reported as having fallen into disrepute. After the writings of Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes and Gassendi became familiarized among thinkers, and had affected the course of their reflections, logical science became greatly modified, and assumed many changing phases. Lord Herbert's (of Cherbury) "*De Veritate*," (1624), shows this in one direction, and the "*Port Royal Logic*" (1662), in another. Before,—intermediate to these, however, many notable treatises appeared. Edward Brerewood's "*Elementa Logica*," issued from the holder of the Astronomical Chair of Gresham College in 1614; Dr. Richard Crakanthorpe's "*Logica*" in 1622. Franciscus Burgersdicius in 1647 published, at Cambridge, his "*Logical Institutes connected with the Precepts of Aristotle*."\* The "*Logic*" of Smiglecius,—who gained no inconsiderable reputation in the literature of the sciences by his work, was published at Oxford, 1658. Thomas White's translation of the *Peripatetical Institutions* of Sir Kenelm Digby—whose grandfather, Edward Digby, in 1589 had written a *Refutation of Ramus*—appeared in 1656, the version being made from the Latin edition of 1651. This



Thomas White (Albius, or Thomas de Albi) opposed Joseph Glanvil's "Vanity of Dogmatizing," 1661—published four years later as "Sceptsis Scientifica,"—in a work entitled "An Exclusion of Sceptics from all Title of Dispute;" and therein argues for the supremacy of the syllogistic theory. But Glanvil, in his "Plus Ultra; or, the Progress and Advancement of Knowledge since Aristotle," 1668, stigmatizes the system of the Stagyrte in no measured terms, though Philip du Trieu's defensive exposition of Aristotelian logic ("Manductio ad Logicam") had been published at Oxford in 1662, and Daniel Stahl's "Regulæ Philosophicæ" appeared in the same year. Louis de la Forge, in his "Treatise on the Human Intelligence," 1666, introduced Cartesianism into logic: while Samuel Smith's "Additus ad Logicam," 1668, reverted to Aristotelianism. After the death of the celebrated logician, Dr. Robert Sanderson, in 1663, the treatise he had composed while he was Canon of Christ Church, "a monument of his industry and judgment," attained great popularity, as he himself had acquired much renown. Dr. John Fell, also a Canon of Christ Church, in 1673 put forth his "Grammatica Rationis sive Institutiones Logica," and in 1687 Hobbes's opponent, Dr. John Wallis, published his "Institutio Logicæ ad Communis usus Accommodata." This "Logic," adapted to the weakest capacity in order that it might get into general use, all but brought the study of logic to its lowest stage. In the variety of forms and methods proposed, and of the competing treatise presented, the knowledge of the old logic faded into an indistinct memory, and little more than the shadow of its stern systematization of thought was cast upon the minds of the pupils of the modern schools; and that "energetic and improving exercise of mind [which is gained] from the intelligent study of the most remarkable monument of philosophical genius" was superseded by a slight and superficial analysis of some of the more trivial portions of the science of thinking. There is little or no exhibition of the fundamental principles of the science, no deduction of the details from these principles; the parts are agglutinated rather than aggregated, and aggregated rather than co-ordinated. The science does not grow or develop from thought to thought, from origin to result, but the portions are put together by compact and joiner-work. Everything is laid aside which might in any way be regarded as superfluous; it is a dry *memoria technica* of the more salient points of the logic of the olden time;

but the whole is sapless and sere—a *hortus siccus* of elements whose connection is mechanically, not vitally, still less intellectually arranged. But Sir William Hamilton has spoken on this subject. Hear him:—

“The original treatises of Aristotle were now found to transcend the college complement of erudition and intellect. They were accordingly abandoned; and with these the various logical works previously in academical use, which supposed any reach of thought, or an original acquaintance with the ‘Organon.’ The ‘Compendium’ of Sanderson stood its ground for a season, when the more elaborate treatises (erst in academical use) of Brerewood, Crackanthorpe, and Smiglecius were forgotten. But this little treatise, the excellent work of an accomplished logician, was too closely relative to the books of the ‘Organon,’ and demanded too frequently an inconvenient explanation to retain its place, so soon as another text-book could be introduced, more accommodated to the fallen and falling standard of tutorial competency. Such a text-book was soon found in the ‘Compendium’ of Aldrich. The dignity of its author, as Dean of Christ Church, and his reputation as an ingenious, even a learned, writer in other branches of knowledge, ensured it a favourable recommendation: it was yet shorter than Sanderson’s; written in a less scholastic Latin; adopted an order wholly independent of the ‘Organon,’ and made no awkward demands upon the tutor, as comprising only what was either plain in itself, or could without difficulty be expounded. The book—which, in justice to the Dean, we ought to mention was not originally written for the public—is undoubtedly a work of no inconsiderable talent; but the talent is perhaps principally shown in the author having performed so cleverly a task for which he was so indifferently prepared. Absolutely considered, it has little or no value. It is but a slight eclectic epitome of one or two logical treatises in common use (that it is exclusively abridged from Wallis is incorrect); and when the compiler wanders from, or mistakes his authorities, he displays a want of information to be expected, perhaps, in our generation, but altogether marvellous in his. It is clear that he knew nothing of the ancient, and very little of the modern, logicians. The treatise likewise omits a large proportion of the most important matters; and those it does not exclude are treated with a truly unedifying brevity. As a slender introduction to the after-study of logic (were there not a hundred better), it is not to be despised; as a full course of instruction, as an independent system of the science, it is utterly contemptible. Yet, strange to say, the compend of Aldrich having gradually supplanted the compend of Sanderson, has furnished, for above a century, the little all of logic doled out in these latter days by the University of Bradwardin and Scotus [Occam and Thomas Wilson].” \*

\* “Discussions in Philosophy,” art. Logic, pp. 123-4.

In the appendix to the same work he returns to the same charge:—

“There was no gradation from the easy to the difficult, from the new to the old. Philosophy was taught; philosophy was learned more by rote than by reason. . . . Logic alone was studied in a modern summary. But here too the unphilosophical character of the Oxford philosophical discipline is apparent. That University having formerly adopted, still adheres to, the compendium of Aldrich, not because Aldrich was a learned dialectician, but an academical dignitary; and the book, not overvalued by its able author, after leading and misleading Oxford logicians during former generations, at last affords a more appropriate text for their correction during the present.”\*

Henry Aldrich, the logician *par excellence* of the “Schools” at Oxford, who has won for himself fame as the possessor of an able and versatile mind, being distinguished as a scholar, a divine, a musical composer, an architect, and a controversialist, was the son of a gentleman bearing the same name, resident in Westminster, where the future dean was born in 1647. He was educated in the Collegiate School of Westminster, under that wonderful pedagogue who wielded the ferule over the destinies of the Westminsterians for more than half a century, and has become the type and exemplar in tradition and proverb of the diligent, learned, assiduous, and severe trainer of the young—Richard Busby, 1606—1696. Here Aldrich had many illustrious competitors. He was selected, after examination, by the heads of Christ Church, Oxford, and Trinity College, Cambridge, to be one of four Queen’s Scholars at the college of his master—Christ Church, 1662, being then but fifteen years of age. He was elected Fellow of his college, and took his degree of Master of Arts in 1669. Shortly afterwards he took holy orders, and was appointed to the living of Wem, in Shropshire, about nine miles N.E. of Shrewsbury. He continued, however, to reside for the most part at his college, of which he became one of the most eminent tutors, and was speedily and specially recognised as one of the distinguished ornaments of the University. Here he endeavoured to foster and encourage a love of classical learning and literature among the students. He printed annually an edition of some Greek author, and presented it to his students for study, and he is said to have carried all Dr. Busby’s thoroughness into the readings he held with his pupils.

\* “Discussions in Philosophy,” Appendix iii., c., p. 718.

On 15th February, 1681, he was installed a Canon of Christ Church, and in the following May he passed his degrees as Bachelor and Doctor of Divinity. As Canon, one of his notable tastes was exercised to the full. He took great care in advancing the study and progress of music. The choir received a large amount of his regard, and all its appointments were up to the highest mark. He insisted on the aid of every one being given to the utmost to its efficiency. His musical taste is spoken of highly as being formed on the purest models. His chief favourites were G. P. Palestrina, Master of the Chapel to several Popes, whose Mass performed during the Council of Trent determined the form of Catholic music. Palestrina's melodies are learned and grave, and affect with irresistible force every sensitive mind; he was an enthusiast in sounds: and Giacomo Carissimi, Master of the German Chapel at Rome, a first-rate oratorio composer, who introduced stringed instruments into ecclesiastical music. To many of the best performances of these great artists in melody Aldrich adapted English words, and so added to the variety and excellence of the cathedral music of England. Upwards of forty of our finest church-anthems we owe to the taste, skill, judgment, and enthusiasm of this earnest student of the tuneful arts. In the collections of Boyce and Arnold these hold no inconspicuous place, and the service of song in our Christian congregations has been made more rich and soul-stirring by his efforts.

At his death he bequeathed a valuable classical and musical library to the University, and he enriched the memory of Oxford by the well-known catch, "Hark the bonny Christ Church Bells."

An "ambiguous syncretism" distinguished a considerable portion of the Stuart Dynasty. Timid counsels and temporizing policy actuated a good many of those who held the leading places in the Church. Jeremy Taylor's "Dissuasive from Popery," in 1664, gave a sound of some certainty concerning the Protestant aversion to tradition, and reverence for Scripture, as an authoritative standard of truth. Isaac Barrow in many of his sermons maintained, with reasoning, close-knit and strong, the warfare against the errors of Rome. Stillingfleet, Wake, Tillotson, and others, also acted as leaders on the Protestant side. During the critical reign of James II. there was great need for stern and able protests for Protestantism. Not only in writing and in preaching, but in action, Aldrich took the side of the opposers of the Romanizing

policy of the King and many of his advisers. Macaulay mentions among the clergy of the English Church distinguished for abilities and learning South and Pococke, Jane and Aldrich, at Oxford. "At this time the tranquil and majestic city [in which they held office], so long the stronghold of monarchical principles, was agitated by passions which it had never before known." "The Deanery of Christ Church became vacant [by the demise of the epigram-famous logician, Dr. John Fell.] That office was, both in dignity and in emolument, one of the highest in the University of Oxford. The Dean was charged with the government of a greater number of youths of high connections and of great hopes than could be found in any other college. He was also the head of a cathedral. In both characters it was necessary that he should be a member of the Church of England. Nevertheless, John Massey, who was notoriously a member of the Church of Rome, and who had not one single recommendation, except that he was a member of the Church of Rome, was appointed by virtue of the dispensing power [by which the King could free from the penalties incurred for breach of the law]; and soon within the walls of Christ Church an altar was decked, at which Mass was daily celebrated."\* "It seemed but too probable that the whole government of the Anglican Church would shortly pass into the hands of her deadliest enemies." This was scarcely to be tolerated. Opposition was aroused in the pulpit, and religious controversy waxed warm. Bishop Burnet places Aldrich among the chief of those distinguished divines who, as disputants, "managed and directed this controversial war." Among his works, in this connection, appears a "Reply to Two Discourses concerning the Adoration of our Blessed Saviour in the Holy Eucharist," 1687-8.

At John Massey's Deanery, Christ Church, James II. lodged, while he was endeavouring to reduce refractory Magdalen to receive his nominee, the Bishop of Oxford, on resistance to which order the Fellows, were condemned to expulsion. The warfare so waged and waged between James and his subjects brought matters to a crisis. King James fled from his throne amid the contempt of his people, and John Massey, following the example of his royal master, decamped from Christ Church. On the accession of William and Mary, Aldrich was appointed to the deanery from

\* Macaulay's "History of England," People's Edition, vol. i., p. 360.

which Massey had fled, and was installed 17th June, 1689, as Dean of Christ Church, where not only himself but his schoolmaster had been students. Over this triple-founded cathedral and collegiate charge Dean Aldrich, during the remainder of his life presided, it is said, with dignity, urbanity, and assiduity; discharging the duties of his office with zeal and earnestness. "He was zealous to improve and adorn his college, to increase its usefulness, to extend its resources, and perpetuate its reputation." "Three sides of what is called Peckwater Quadrangle in Christ Church College, and the Church and Campanile of All Saints, in High Street, Oxford," have been erected after designs by him; and he is also said to have furnished the plan and a main portion of the monumental design of Trinity College, Oxford, of which his friend, Ralph Bathurst, the eulogist of Hobbes, was at that time president. In this connection we may note that he left behind him a work, in Latin, on the principles of architecture, which was published at Oxford in 1789, with the title—"Elementa Architecturæ Civilis ad Vitruvii Veterumque Disciplinam et recentiorum præsertim ad Paladii exemplum probatione concinnata."

At the suggestion of Tillotson, the chief of what was known as the Low Church Party, William III. issued a Commission to certain eminent divines "to examine the Liturgy, the Canons, and the whole system of Jurisprudence administered by the Courts Christian, and to report on the alterations which it might be desirable to make. Most of the bishops who had taken the oaths were in the Commission, and with them were joined twenty priests of great note." Among these were "some divines who belonged to the High Church party. Conspicuous among these were two of the rulers of Oxford, Aldrich and [William] Jane, D.D., Dean of Gloucester, and Regius Professor of Divinity." Macaulay describes the dean as "a polite though not a profound scholar; and a jovial hospitable gentleman. He was the author of some theological tracts which have long been forgotten, and of a 'Compendium of Logic,' which is still used; but the best works which he has bequeathed to posterity are his catches." At the first meeting of the Commission a sharp altercation arose, at the instance of Sprat, Bishop of Rochester, regarding the legality of such a commission. Lloyd, of St. Asaph, irritably ridiculed the doubt. "Sprat withdrew, and came no more. His example was soon followed by Jane and Aldrich." The latter continued, along with his coadjutor, to

act rigorously on the High Church side. In 1712 he was chosen Prolocutor of the Lower House of Convocation.

We have no desire to drag the reader through the interminable wastes of the controversial theology of that time, the mysteries of Whiggery and Toryism, or the disputations of High and Low Church, and their relation to the rising Nonconformity of the age of William the Silent; and therefore we prefer to return to more congenial themes, for us, than the recording of the ebullitions of religious sectarianism, or the intrigues of Church parties for Church power.

In 1691 he issued that "*Artis Logicæ Compendium*" which he had prepared for his students during his years of tutorship in his college. The work was meant to be a "Logic made Easy," a student's handbook of the technical details of the logic of the schools, containing, in the most elementary forms just so much of the material of that science as would, if thoroughly got up, satisfy the conditions of an examination. It aims at giving the dogmatic portion of the art of reasoning in a brief, concise, available form, free from the prolixities of criticism and the perplexities of controversy. We propose to give our readers a slight epitome of its matter and form, using for this purpose the Oxford edition of 1844, which professes to be a reprint of the original edition of 1692, along with a translation which was issued in 1827 as a literal one, comparing the latter with Hills's 1828 illustratively annotated edition, and with the late Dean Mansel's annotated edition of 1849.

#### I. Of the Operations of the Mind.

The operations of the mind are in all three: 1. *Simple apprehension*; 2. *Judgment*; 3. *Discourse*.

1. *Simple apprehension* is the bare intellectual conception of a thing—and it is either *incomplex* or *complex*.

*Simple incomplex apprehension* is that of one object, also of several confusedly [taken without any order or grammatical reference to each other]. *Simple complex apprehension* is that of several objects, but with a certain order and reference, as of a *pen in the hand*.

2. *Judgment* is that by which the mind not only perceives two objects, but expressly pronounces within itself that they agree with or differ from each other.

For judgment is either *affirmative*, which is also called *composition*; or *negative*, which is also called *division*.

The particle *is*, which by affirming expresses agreement,—*is not*, which by denying expresses disagreement,—is called copula: and by determining this copula, judgment differs from complex apprehension.

3. *Discourse* is the motion or progress of the mind from one judgment to another; which is also termed ratiocination. To each of the operations is incident its own peculiar defect. To apprehension, indistinctness; to judgment, falsity; to discourse, an erroneous mode of inferring. . . . Logic, therefore, is an instrumental art directing the mind in the knowledge of things; and its parts are three, according to the operations of the mind which it directs. . . .

But, since in teaching and disputing, neither a thing itself, nor the conception of which it is the subject, can conveniently be brought forward; it is necessary to substitute vicarious signs for both; by teaching the proper use of which logic at the same time instructs the mind how to operate properly.

The signs of this kind, received amongst men, are words; for a *word* is "the sign of a thing or conception, holding by appointment the place of that thing or conception;" and by its signification it first makes known the conception, and then acts as a substitute for the thing. . . . Now that which expresses simple apprehension is a *simple word*; judgment is a *complex word*; discourse is a *decomplex word*. For every argument is resolvable into three propositions or sentences, and every proposition in sense always, though not always in number, three words; 1. The subject, or that of which some other thing is said; 2. The predicate or that which is said; 3. The copula which comes between both; for the subject and predicate, as far as the sense goes, are always extremes, and are therefore called the terms of the proposition.

And hence, therefore, the first part of logic is said to treat of simple terms;—the second concerning propositions;—and the third concerning *syllogism*,—by which argumentation or discourse is expressed.

Simple terms can alone be the subject or predicate in a proposition; and are therefore called *categorematic*, as *man*, *stone*. Some words are only syncategorematic, or accompanying parts of the subject or predicate, as *all*, *no* one; some also are *mixed*, as *always*, that is *at all times*. . . . The *logical* (or *pure*) *verb*, therefore is nothing but the copula; all others are unions of the participle and the copula.

¶ The *logical noun* is a simple term, significative, without time.



Thereafter there follows a division of nouns as of three primary and five secondary sorts :—

1. Singular, as *Socrates*, and common to many, as *man*.
2. Definite, [as *man*]; and indefinite, as [not *man*].
3. Positive and present, as *observant*; privative absent, in one capable of having, as *blind*; and negative, as absent through incapability of presence, as, *non-seeing*.
4. Univocal, having one meaning applicable to many, as, *man*; and equivocal, *lark* (a bird), and *lark* (mischief); besides analogous, as *foot* (of a man), [of any material.]
5. Concrete existent, like *just*; and abstract, thought of as *justice*.
6. Absolute, taken by itself, as *father*; and relative, implied in another, as *son*.
7. Agreeing, able to be said of the same thing at the same time, as *learned*, and *pious*; and repugnant or opposite, as, *black* and *white*.
8. First intention, or in its common acceptation, and second intention specially adapted to a particular purpose [as, *attraction* in general, and *attraction* in its grammatical sense].

In sequence to this we have a chapter on the Formation of Predicables, or words fit to be predicated univocally of many : of predicables there are five, viz. : Genus, Species, Difference, Property, and Accident. These are, however, explained in a way which is scarcely either that of Porphyry's *Isagoge* or Aristotle's *Topics*; but agrees more nearly with the language of Albertus Magnus, who was a Realist. The "*Predicabilia*" of Aldrich imply a realistic logic, while in a large portion of his treatise besides he is a conceptualist, if not a nominalist.\*

\* It may not be amiss to insert as a note here a few words on this topic in relation to a question of high import in our times : *The Origin of Species*. Are Genera and Species mere conceptions of the human mind, or are they independent forms existing in Nature? If Species are forms in Nature, substantial essences having a real existence independent of us, but recognizable by us when we employ perception properly, then it is probable that Nature may have so formed all things in species or sorts, each of which possesses a characteristic peculiar to itself by which it is marked off and known. Hence we must take the world as we find it, and accept the Species which facts and natural experience bring before us, and we cannot help ourselves, the origin and nature of species are fixed, we cannot alter though we may mistake them. If, however, Genera and Species are mere notions formed by the mind from observing certain points of similarity in different individuals, and denoting these by a given common name, this would not be the case. If they are conceptions formed in our minds and expressive of the sum of the similarities observable in those objects which

These are respectively defined thus : 1. Genus, that which is predicable of many things as the material or common part of their essence, as animal. 2. Difference, the formal or characteristic part of their essence, as rational. 3. Species, the whole of their essence, as man. 4. Property, what is necessarily joined to their essence, as risibility. 5. Accident, what is contingently joined to their essence, white, black, sitting, &c. Whence, 1st, a predicable is said of things in which a universal nature exists ; 2nd, Genus is a logical whole, having species as its subjective parts ; species, a metaphysical whole, having Genus as an essential part, and Genus added to difference constitute the species. Genus is either highest or subaltern ; Species, subaltern and lowest ; Difference, generic and specific ; so also is property, but it is, besides, said to be—1, what may be said of one species only, but not of all its individuals ; 2, what may be said of all the species, but not of it alone ; 3, what may be said of all the species and of it alone, but not at all times ; and 4 (which alone is the predicable), what applies to all the species, alone and at all times.\* Accident is separable or inseparable, as (1) French-speaking (2) Englishman.

are included under our notion, Genera and Species are not fixed, and there is nothing to hinder us from forming any number of complex notions marked by peculiar characteristics which may yet overlap and interclude to some extent each other. In both cases Species may be defined as real agreement in characters possessed in common, but as our notions of realities out of which our ideas of Species are formed may not coincide with the realities formed as species in Nature, there arises a possibility of fallacy in discussing "the Origin of Species" by an ambiguous employment of the term Species. Logic here sets both teleologic and theologic thought on their guard.

\* "The distinction between property and difference Aldrich leaves untouched. Wallis (whose view is *partially* countenanced by Whately) describes property as that 'quod ab essentiali seu forma rei immediati fluit', as risibility is 'a rationabili fluens immediati.' Now not only do we think it metaphysically incorrect to speak of one quality as 'flowing' from another, (and, by the way, the instance generally chosen is a very bad one, for risibility, or at least *lachrymability*, seems to be an earlier possession of our species than rationality,) but admitting it to be correct, we cannot see what it has to do with the science of logic. Logic, as it is applicable to subjects of every description, regards all qualities as equal and independent till it is called upon for a *definition*. It then selects the quality most important for its purpose, that which gives a distinct and appropriate view of the object with respect to the subject before us, and this quality immediately assumes the character of a *difference* ; all others being thrown into the subordinate class of properties. So that, as various definitions of the same thing will be required in various subjects, the same quality will alternately be difference and property. For example, the definition of prop-

Division is the distinct enumeration of the several things which are signified by a common noun; Definition is to assign conceptions and words by which things which we wish to know or to be known distinctly, may be marked out and so explained. It is either (1) nominal or (2) real, the former giving the meaning of a term, the latter declaring the nature of the thing. Definition should be (1) adequate, (2) clear, and (3) concisely appropriate.

Chapter Second informs us of Propositions. A legitimate proposition is (1) a sentence affirming or denying; (2) signifying something true or false; and (3) free from ambiguity. Its divisions are various; (1) *Categorical*, or declarative absolutely; (2) *Hypothetical*, declarative conditionally. Categoricals are pure or modal, the former predicating simply the latter after a manner. 1, *Affirmative*, or assertive. 2, *Negative*, or denying; 3, a true proposition asserts what a thing is, and 4, a false one asserts the contrary: 5, *Universal*, or relating to all. 6, *Particular*, referring to some. 7, *Singular*, referring to one. Indefinite, of doubtful extent:—as in the following table:—

Propositions are as to substance,	{ Categorical, Hypothetical, }	Pure Modul.	As to Quality,	{ Affirm- ative, Neg- ative, True, False.	As to Quan- tity,	{ Universal, Particular, Infinite, Singular.
--------------------------------------	-----------------------------------	----------------	-------------------	--	-------------------------	---

The connection between the extremes of a proposition is (1) Necessary; (2) Contingent; (3) Impossible. "In laying down the laws of propositions, *that* only must be regarded which the structure requires, and not what the sense admits; for the former is essential and perpetual, the latter variable and uncertain." The opposition and conversion of propositions is then treated of in much the usual way. Chapter third relates to Syllogism, *i. e.* "discourse or ratiocination expressed in Propositions." "Since discourse is the progress of the mind from one judgment to another, there are required in it (1) something whence discourse may arise; (2) something else to which it may tend; and (3) that these two things should so depend upon each other that the one may be known by and through the force of the other: for otherwise, to know one thing after another is nothing more than to judge repeatedly. Now that

---

sition is *oratio indicativa*. The being *true or false* (*i. e.*, the alternative of being one or the other) belongs as universally to propositions as the difference here expressed, but still it is a quality that does not affect the conclusiveness of a syllogism, while affirmation or negation essentially does."

whence another thing is to be known, ought certainly itself to be first perfectly known; and therefore, being, as it were, known without discourse, is said to antecede, to be laid down, to be premised; and the rest is thence said to be concluded, collected, inferred and deduced. But consequence is of two kinds: 1st, *Material*; 2nd, *Formal*. "If the terms be changed, and their disposition (or arrangement) be preserved, the *material* will often deceive; the *formal* consequence always holds good; and therefore this latter only is regarded in Logic; the former, as being changeable and deceptive, is neglected." Hence a Syllogism is "a sentence in which certain things (premises) being laid down and granted, it is necessary that some other thing (conclusion) should result; besides and on account of those things which were laid down and granted." "The Syllogistic Canons" are next given, "the General Rules of Syllogism" are noted, "the Modes of Syllogisms" are explained, and "the Figures of Syllogisms" are enumerated and exemplified. "Of the Demonstration of the moods" a few illustrations are supplied, "the Validity of Reduction" is shown, "the special rules of the Figures" are detailed, and a few observations on such "other species of argument" as the Enthymeme, the Induction, the Example, the Sorites, and the prosyllogism are added. In a passage often omitted in reprints, Aldrich's criticises illicit forms of syllogistic inference. He then proceeds to treat "of Hypothetical Syllogisms," "of Syllogisms as to their matter," and "of Method." To this follows an Appendix on "Fallacies."

Of course very harsh criticism is possible on such a treatise as this in respect to its (1) adequacy as an exposition of Logic; (2) *formal consistency* of parts; (3) *material correctness* in statement; (4) philosophic completeness of view; (5) *interpretative expressiveness* of language; and (6) *fitness* for being adopted as a student's class book. On all these points it is justly exposed to animadversion: and yet most of the objections taken by Sir Wm. Hamilton and others are really objections *ab extra*—they are derived from considerations arising not from the book itself, but from its position as the traditionary epitome of the schools. Specific criticism has been employed in opposition to Aldrich's definition of first and second intentions, and of the distinction between difference and property to many of his statements regarding the history of logic, to his teaching concerning the figures, especially the fourth, and charges of serious ignorance of facts and errors in exposition are laid against him. A large number of these have given occasion to learned notes

and excellent *excursus* by the late Dean Mansel, in relation to which Sir Wm. Hamilton has quoted the proverb,—“The sauce is preferable to the fish.” We are of opinion, however, that these almost frantic acerbities of criticism arise from a misconception of Aldrich and his times and his purposes: and from his book having been put in a false position by the successive tutors of the University. His work was evidently a makeshift in a transitional age, and was not expected by him to be consecrated by tradition. When it had served its generation, and its credit had become exhausted, it ought to have been quietly superseded and placed among the treatises *emeriti* of the past. Iconoclastic zeal has been expended on the idol when the lash should have been laid on the idolaters. It seems strange to us that such a man as Aldrich should have allowed himself to speak disrespectfully of “the Port Royal Logic,” a work which had appeared in 1664, and from which he might have learned much. But his times and circumstances were not favourable to accepting unprejudicedly the tenets of a treatise emanating from Romanist authors.

Upon this point Hallam is particularly moved. Aldrich “alludes,” he says, “to the ‘Art de Penser’ in a tone of insolence, which must rouse indignation in those who are acquainted with that excellent work. Aldrich’s censures are in many instances mere cavil and misrepresentation; I do not know that they are right in any.” And in a note he adds, “One of Aldrich’s charges against the author of the ‘Art de Penser,’ is that he brings forward as a great discovery the equality of the angles of a chiliagon of 1,996 right angles; and another is, that he gives as an example of a regular syllogism one that has obviously five terms; thus expecting the Oxford students, for whom he wrote, to believe that Anthony Arnauld neither knew the first book of Euclid nor the mere rudiments of common logic.” Dean Mansel admits that “the character of the book by no means warrants the contemptuous opinion of it . . . expressed by Aldrich;” and in reference to the last accusation states “that the Port Royalists are right and Aldrich is wrong.” On the same authority it is admitted that in his account of the principle of certitude Aldrich is not only wavering and vague, but incorrect.

Such is a glimpse of the Aldrichian “Compendium;” a work which has been justly judged harshly when looked at as a chief and prince of text-books, which it has been injudiciously made; but which is not altogether undeserving of praise as a popular, easy, readable,

and concise tract on the subject for young students and men seeking but moderate culture.

Among the palatial grandeurs of Oxford the Clarendon Press possesses many claims to regard. It was while perusing the splendid edition of Berkeley's works issued thence that we had this present paper suggested to us. The publication of such works was made, to a certain extent, possible by the bequeathment to Oxford University of the copyright of Lord Chancellor Clarendon's "*History of the Rebellion*;" by the profits derived from the sale of which that building was erected, and the Clarendon Press established. Bishop Sprat and Dean Aldrich were the Editors of that *History* for the University. The book so edited—though the responsible parties made many alterations, omissions, &c., some of which were scarcely justifiable, was issued in 1702, reissued in 1704, and the building due to the revenue thence derived was completed in 1712. Its purpose has been since changed, but the occasion of it remains a fact in history, and Oxford owes much to Dean Aldrich for his editorial labour and its results.

In 1702 Dean Aldrich was chosen Prolocutor of the Convocation called on the accession of Queen Anne, and did useful work as the ruler of this Clerical Parliament in the performance of its somewhat anomalous duties. He received no farther promotion, but closed an exemplary and laborious career, in which he had done much to illustrate his University, 14th December, 1710, just when his party seemed to be rising into the ascendant, and shortly after completing his grand climacteric.

Dean Aldrich seems, from all the accounts that have reached us, to have been a man of singular penetration and versatility; of popular talent and enlarged views; of wide attainments and varied accomplishments; of great pith of character and potency of mind; of unexceptionable ecclesiastical demeanour, and yet of a joyous temperament; of admirable industry and rare modesty; of pertinent capacity and consummate sagacity. He appears to have striven worthily to fulfil every office to which he was called, and to discharge the trust imposed upon him honestly. Though we dare not assert for him an exceedingly high position as one of our modern logicians, we may at least affirm that his tractate kept alive the possibilities of logical culture in Oxford while it was dying out in the sister University of Cambridge, and we hold the opinion that Oxford may venerate though it need not idolize the name and memory of Dean Aldrich.

## Literature.

---

### IS PULPIT INFLUENCE ON THE WANE?

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

It is not to be expected that the pulpit should have in these times the varied and extensive influence it once enjoyed. Not to go back to the time of the revival of learning, or to the days of the supremacy of Latin as the tongue of the learned, we find causes in operation in much more recent times tending to enhance and extend the influence of the pulpit which are now gone or fast disappearing. Not to particularise too minutely, we may merely mention the rapid growth of literature for the people, and the equally rapid increase in the number of readers. Formerly, almost all that an average Englishman knew was learned from the parson at church on Sunday, and with his weekly supply of mental provender, and the consciousness of the discharge of some mysteriously-solemn and laudable duty, this enlightened individual entered on the duties of the week with the easy assurance induced by the conviction that he was wound-up, and could keep going till the following Sunday.

It is not for us to affirm that this class is now defunct, or that its extant representatives are few and rare; our present business is to demand the admission of the fact of the multiplied stores of information, not only available, but actually in use. Every labourer may have his weekly paper at least, and many actually have that and more. Hence the pulpit has ceased to enjoy the monopoly of instruction which it so long held.

Nor is this true of one class only. Instead of the one weekly sermon from the pulpit of the parish church, the British public is now treated to the thousand, not weekly only, but daily. Every newspaper editor, every newspaper correspondent, every magazine contributor, every reviewer and novelist, every writer of every description has his pulpit, and delivers his sermon in many cases to an audience not computable by the hundred thousand, and not conditioned by the unities of place or time. And thus facts, opinions,

theories, are given forth in endless form and variety, to the enlightenment, bewilderment, and (speaking generally) to the no small affliction of the reading public. In this way the teaching which formerly emanated from the pulpit alone, now finds a vent through a thousand rival channels—rivals with more or less success in all their results.

But has the pulpit, therefore, lost? Has each one of these channels acted as a drain, conveying the influence—the very life-blood of the pulpit, away from that institution? We think not. It is certainly not a self-evident fact that the rise and growth of a rival weakens an existing institution. Still less is it self-evident that such an institution is weakened by the rise and growth of what is only a rival in the sense of a fellow-worker. The original institution may, though occupying a less conspicuous position, be really more influential than before. For as the development of one source of industry only stimulates the growth of others, so the opening of a new font of instruction often incites its predecessors and contemporaries to a more active and healthy vitality. And so the growth of readers and reading material has both raised the standard of pulpit teaching and increased the receptive and appreciative power of the hearers.

And this is not all. Though it is open to every journalist to write to influence the moral and religious life of the people, this task is still admittedly the peculiar function of the pulpit. It is, so to speak, the special province of the pulpit—a province which neither press nor platform has sought to monopolise. Their office undoubtedly brings them into this ground, but their presence there is not the presence of the rival or opponent, but of the co-operator. And whereas formerly the task of educating and imparting general knowledge was either neglected or left to the pulpit, the various agencies above-mentioned have assumed this responsibility, and present to the pulpit the results of their labours, thereby opening a readier and wider channel to the ingress of the instruction which it is the duty of the latter institution more peculiarly to impart. Hence we conclude generally that the increase of so-called rival instructors, instead of diminishing has added to the usefulness and power of the pulpit. And they are the friends of neither the one institution nor the other who, by word or deed, represent them as mutually antagonistic, or severally conducive to ends not virtually coincident.



With regard to the respect paid to the teaching of the pulpit in these times, how stands it? Men now living can remember what may in these so-called degenerate times be called the golden days of the clerical office, and the corresponding influence of its public instruction. Days when Goldsmith's pastor and learned school-master in one were embodied in the clergyman of their acquaintance; concerning whom it would be treason to entertain the thought that there might be anything revealed or unrevealed which he might not disclose and explain, were he only to take the trouble; and about whom the wonder was, if wonder was lawful regarding such a preternatural individual, "that one small head could carry all he knew." So much was this the case that we know not with what class of conceptions to rank that staggering sentiment uttered by the Northern farmer, "Parson, a' knows nowt." The parson was in fact looked up to in all matters civil, ecclesiastical, and domestic, and no Chinese emperor or Mahomedan sultan, in wielding the knife of the executioner, or in converting a bowstring into a cravat, met with less resistance to his *fiat*, than did the omniscient pastor of former days in administering his little affairs of state. It is not so now. The majority of people have begun to learn that the occupant of the pulpit is not after all a miraculous phenomenon incapable of wrong, or possessed of all knowledge, but a man of like passions with themselves, and born as ignorant. Hence the superstitious reverence paid to the pulpit of former days is now yielding to rational respect, wherever the respect is due; and wherever it is not due, then there are to be found men who so persist in seeing things as they are as to withhold their reverence. And is this not well? If the pulpit has lost in superstitious awe, it has gained in rational respect; if it has lost in unquestioning assent, it has gained in honest endeavour to receive what is true, and to practise it, and we repeat our query, What well-meaning person can regret the change?

But all transitions are more or less painful, and especially so to the subjects of them. We are told that the eagle dashes its beak off against the rocks in angry torture, and that the chrysalis is in indescribable disquiet till it gains the freedom of the air on wings. So it is with individuals in life. The growing boy, in spite of the exertions of tailors, will display a large amount of ankle, and an elongation of wrists, and the youth, in this, is only having prefigured in a feeble way the pain experienced by the thinking man in his

progressive stages. And it often happens that when the truths that once filled his mind (as clothes clad his body), seem to grow too small, and fall off or burst asunder, he feels as if the firm earth were creaking underneath him, and the experiences of Korah were repeating themselves with interest on himself. If he does not feel himself sinking, he at least feels as if chaos were taking possession of him, ready to hurl him into the regions of old night with scant ceremony. Painful to all men is a period of personal transition. And to a nation it is the violent wrenching asunder of its former life, leaving behind it only apparent blackness and darkness. And yet not only progress, but often continued existence itself dates from such a period, and all the pain is more than repaid by its beneficial results.

Now, without maintaining that any violent transition is taking place, or has taken place, in the relations between the people and the pulpit, we are yet justified in affirming that a decided modification of them has arisen. And hence we infer arose the question at present under discussion. The consequences of such a modification manifest themselves in such a way as to give a colour of plausibility to the out-cry "Pulpit influence is on the wane." It is seen that brisk young men prefer walking on Sunday to going to church; that fair readers of sensational novels give sure if not elegant expression to their feelings of boredom under the sermon; that debilitated gentlemen exhaust their vocabulary of its riches to impress their friends with a feeble and inadequate sense of its dulness, or, as an amiable alternative, abuse its length with the view of introducing a discussion on the absorbing topics of luxuriant ringlets, killing eyelashes, dimpled cheeks, and pouting and inviting lips, contemplated with philosophic resignation under the alleged infliction. To such individuals a sermon is as good as any other excuse for a promiscuous public meeting, and as for its influence over them, we trust we do them no injustice when we place it at 32° Fahr. For what good influence can either a sermon or any sensible production have over persons to whom devotion is not even a dream, and thinking something as unreal as a centaur? It would be difficult to induce them to undergo the pain of transition from thoughtlessness to thought.

But some have actually been at the pains. This we indicated when we spoke of diminished superstition and increased intelligent regard. And, in a word, the state of the matter seems to be that the

pulpit, as the pulpit, has actually lost, is losing, and it is hoped with all humility, will lose in these ; but as a medium of sensible, sound instruction, fitting living men and women for the better discharge of their duties to one another, and for the great business of their being, we maintain that the very reverse is the fact—that it has gained, is gaining, and promises to gain more and more in influence. For how stand the facts ? Frivolous people either withdraw themselves from it or go to be bored, and with laudable and exemplary composure, submit to the respectable process. Persons who, on the other hand, feel life to be something more than the possession of a sensitive, nervous system, and a digestive apparatus, turn as readily as ever to its teaching for food to their religious and moral appetite. As yet we have said nothing of pulpit supply. Here a remark on that subject may not be irrelevant. It is with this as with every thing else for which there is demand—the supply accommodates itself to the demand. Hence in an age of enlightenment and intellectual advance, when things and beliefs are tested less by the Shibboleths of their party than by their intrinsic and absolute value, it becomes necessary that matters treated of in the pulpit should be brought to a similar test. It never could be the intention of Providence that the facts of His universe should in one department be investigated, and in another received without any investigation, or that, after a primary investigation, they should be held as for ever settled and placed beyond the possibility of question. If anything should occur to-morrow to insinuate a doubt as to the truth of the great law of gravitation, we are enlightened enough to permit, and even to encourage an investigation, though it has been enunciated with fulness and received as true by many generations of men. Why, then, should we consider it true wisdom to forbid a similar investigation into any circumstance suggestive of doubt regarding a volume purporting to be a Divine revelation ? The intellectual world has put this question, and it demands, and has a right to demand and receive, a common-sense answer. There are now occupants of pulpits, therefore, who have come to see that whatever loss such an inquiry may bring to the extent of our belief, that loss will be more than compensated by the intensity which must result from the investigation. It is not affirmed that they are anything but rare. We are aware we have taken an extreme case, but it is chosen as an illustration of how the pulpit is really trying to meet the demands of the present time. And as it

is with the intensity of faith, so is it with the character of the hearers. Religion is more honoured by the earnest faith,—yea, by the earnest doubt of ten—than by the unthinking assent of a million. And the pulpit has a more real and more abiding influence in thus meeting the wants of the earnest few, than in embracing with calm satisfaction the indifferent many who honour it with a formal reverence and attention. An ounce of gold is to be preferred to a pound of lead, whatever reverent or irreverent imbecility may be pleased to say to the contrary.

And here let it be affirmed once for all, that of pulpit efficiency, as of everything else in this short-sighted and forgetful world, when the present state is brought into comparison with the past, the former is, of course, found wanting. It is not merely that “far-off fowls have fair feathers,” we could not see their blemishes at a distance, even if we would, but it is the wilful blindness of advocates of the past to what is really matter of history and of fact. Did the pulpit of the eighteenth century exert a greater influence than does that of the nineteenth? We believe not! and mental telescopes are not needed to confirm the belief. If ever there was a time when men went to sleep in theological and ecclesiastical beliefs, that time was the “second-hand” eighteenth century. The clothes made in the seventeenth century were not only large enough for its successor to walk in, that worthy individual went to bed, and found them large enough for all practical purposes in the extended posture that act induced. It would not be easy to find a declension of pulpit influence from that level.

The disposition on the part of the clergy to advance and keep in sympathy with their time is not apparent from the public or official statements of their views and sentiments. All corporate bodies are of necessity unwieldy, and move with difficulty, not unattended with pain. A subtle thing like thought, or feeling, or sympathy, is not easily formulated, and hence the apparent absence of advancement in matters relating to them. The real advance takes place in the individual mind of each member of the corporation, and finds practical outlet in the discharge of his daily round of duty. The very crudeness of all such incipient changes renders their formal recognition difficult, and there is no one who has not experienced an entire revolution of thought and feeling taking place within himself, and yet refusing to put itself into verbal expression. Nay, such a change may, and often does, take place

without the knowledge of the individual in whose experience it is wrought. What happens to the individual happens to the corporation. The change must be fully matured and understood before it can be dressed and openly paraded. Hence the slowness of the public recognition of a new principle. In the case of preaching, when the language as well as the strain of pulpit orations, perfectly appropriate in their time, are beginning to look hoary and to sound of the past, it has not been deemed necessary, perhaps it was not possible, to make a public and formal declaration of the fact. But individual preachers have not been slow to recognise it, and to adopt a style and manner more in accordance with the spirit and wants of their time. When this has been fully recognised by clergy and people, and the principle of accommodation to existing circumstances has been all but universally adopted, then we may expect a formal recognition of the fact in the standards of churches. Whether or not this recognition is ever given will matter little for pulpit influence, for the real influence in this world is not the influence of abstract principles, but of living men. And thus in one sense theory always limps behind practice. But since this change is rapidly, though unobtrusively going on amongst us, the really earnest spirits of the time are found to hail it, and on all such the pulpit has a stronger hold than it ever had. On such as refuse to think, or who shut their eyes to all that does not accord with their own opinions, the pulpit may not have the hold it had, and we have seen that this is no loss, but a gain. But all who can appreciate real influence will not readily affirm that the pulpit or any other similar institution can be in a state of declension so long as the earnest few acknowledge its power, and the cry of inefficiency is raised on the ground of curtailed extent, even if that were in accordance with fact. But in a time when church-extension is the rule everywhere, and the demand for preachers daily on the increase, we fail to see that the public is on the side of our opponents to any greater extent than are the principles of truth and sound reason.

D. S.

#### AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

UNLESS that it were in accordance with the use and wont of this magazine to give the right of reply to the openers—which is, in general, a right and proper thing—a paper from me is almost a

work of supererogation. The debate in my opinion has been very effectively argued already, and with a very decided predominance of argumentative matter on our side. It is worthy of remark that many of the writers of the affirmative had no sympathy with infidelity, no antipathy to the pulpit, but spoke with sorrow what they felt in truth. Now, that itself is a very great matter in a question like this; for a fact must be very striking before it subdues a prejudice, and must be very flagrant if not all but undeniable when it is admitted by those who are really disinclined to believe it. The fact is that most people feel the listening to sermons a grievance, an exercise of long-suffering, and a plague to patience, which is only made bearable by the so-called respectability of the thing. This debate has brought the fact fairly before the consciences of some, and they have been compelled to admit that the influence of the pulpit is waning. The fact is, the clergy have been stationary, while everything else has been going on. They have got stereotyped, while newspapers and magazines are putting them out of date. They are as much behind the time as an old stage-coach in the age of steam-engines.

Pulpit traditions, ceremonies, and forms have entangled them in their meshes, and they make void the commandments of God by their vain traditions. Conventional idioms, stereotyped phrases, outworn forms of composition, and commonplaces out of which all the sap has gone, like the dried ferns of half a century ago. People have heard them till they have become as familiar to them as the ticking of a clock, or the rippling of water, and concern or impress them as little. "Good phrases are surely and ever were commendable," saith Shakspeare's Justice Shallow, and worse even than Justice Shallow are the parsons More Shallow, who dilate in the commendable phrases of the last century in the pulpits of this. By right of immemorial possession they reappear in every sermon, until the language in which sermons are preached have become almost as dead as the Latin and Greek that used to be in vogue from the pulpit. A sermon is the handiest, safest, and surest soporific many people can find. Of course it is quite right to make a sermon *sound*—but ought it to be nothing else? It was not to soothe men's souls to slumber, but to awake them out of their sleep, that the pulpit was instituted. Not to save men from thinking, but to set them in earnest a-thinking, is the object of its being among the means of grace. But the remorseless energy with which

preachers thresh thrice-threshen straw is something altogether beyond the comprehension of any one who goes to church in "lucid intervals."

If preachers, as a rule, spoke to the hearts of their people about the marvellous love of the Saviour, and taught them to believe in and act upon the duties which Christ enjoins, as well as to love and serve Him, who in His love came to save them, the influence of the pulpit could never wane. But they make disquisitions on points of creeds, and cram the phraseology of the schools into their expositions of articles of faith; they deal in long statements about church holidays, or chapel peculiarities, that in fact their talk obscures the blessed light of heaven God's book contains, and would bleach the very beauty from the rainbow. They will state, restate, demonstrate, investigate, ruminate upon, expatiate over, perorate and orate, about matters that are as plain and as indisputable, as undebatable and as conclusively admitted, as the multiplication-table, and they will dogmatize and anathematize about matters of most dubious Scripturality, as if they were as plain as the sun in a summer's midday sky, and as palpable as the pain of a broken limb, and yet, though they aver that reasons for these beliefs are as plentiful as blackberries, never one do they produce. They would like to transform *saiith* into *faith*. But such things will not do in our day. The pulpit has too long isolated itself from life and popular sympathy; if it is to *war* it must work, think, stir, change, subdue. The preacher must lay aside his old-manufactured "skeletons;" and give us vital thought—something with the life of Christ in it.

In this debate a good part of the tactics of the opposition has been to admit the failure, but charge the fault upon the people. But the question before us is not, Are the people attentive to pulpit ministrations? or are the hearers as docile, pliable, sycophantic, and formal as they were? The question is about the pulpit, and not about the people; about the sermons and the influence of the pulpit, not about books and the influence of the press—nor about songs and the characteristics of theatricals. These things, Messrs. E. C. and E. M. S., are away from the theme. Stick to that, and tell us, Is the influence of the pulpit on the increase, or is it standing still, or is it on the wane? You assert it is not waning because many people go to church. But is it not confessed by all that many frequenters of churches and chapels are formalists and respec-

tability-hunters? Is it not a lamentation among good and pious people that they do not get, as they were wont, the sincere milk of the Word? Is it not true that the seeker is sent empty away, that the doubter is not convinced but scolded, and that the man of science and of thought gains only or chiefly a sense of contrast from his attendance on the pulpit and his own special studies?

F. C. A. quotes against us the popularity of sermon literature. But he has neither told us why this is bought, nor why it is proffered. It is bought in many cases to supply to the heart and mind of the hearer what is not to be had under the pulpit ministrations of the purchaser; it is bought in many cases as an ease to the heart that is crying out, "Oh, who will show us any good?" and in not a few cases it is bought, like many other kinds of books, because the authors have gained a name or hit a taste. They are manufactured in some instances, because there have always been men in the Church of literary and philosophical leanings, who are not contented to be merely preachers and aspire to be teachers; and this they seek to do by books; not a few of our finest sermons are products which are actually got up as so many testimonials of fitness for the higher offices of the Church, or as means of acquiring a leadership in the councils of the Christian bodies with which their authors are connected. It is no less true that very many books of sermons and of Scripture exposition are made to sell—made to suit a given taste and temper of the time, not to instruct or influence, but to gratify and cause to buy.

K. W. J. ingeniously, and with good fence, regards this debate as proof of the influence of the pulpit, and says, "Men are not jealous about what they care nothing for." But has he not forgotten what Dryden says:—

"Small jealousies, 'tis true, inflame desire,  
Too great, not fan, but quite put out the fire"?

The truth is that when jealousy begins, there has been a waning of something on both sides; of guarded dutifulness on the one side, and of loving regard on the other. It is thus with the pulpit and the people. The pulpit has not dutifully fitted itself to the times and necessities of a changeable intellectuality, and the people, seeing no care or anxiety evinced for increasing the closeness and community of the preacher's spirit with their hearts, have become callous, and supine, and soporific.



We are glad that this debate has taken place, it should make us all more careful concerning those important matters with which the pulpit deals. Perhaps it may recall some of us from our regardlessness for the pulpit, and perhaps it may show to those who have hitherto thought that the pulpit was above, or independent of, criticism, that that is not the case. It will have done little for us if it has not induced us to mourn over the loss of a great power over the human spirit, and the neglect of a form of influence which has many ties to the heart, and perhaps it may lead us to see to it that though the influence of the pulpit is on the wane, the spirit of piety die not within our hearts, and that we seek all the more earnestly the influence of the Spirit to make us what we should be.

M. S. A.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

THE ministry of the gospel of the grace of God can never fail to be a subject of deep interest to man. It is a divine institution, and it has a promise of the Divine power, not only whensoever it is exerted, but wheresoever it is properly employed. It cannot therefore truly wane. It is a power of perilous import to wield; but it is also one which brings a terrible responsibility on those on whom it has no effect. If the sower must sow on the hard and stony heart of the careless or the censorious; if he must sow among the thorny cares and deceits of the worldly and the carnal, how can it be fruitful, and how is it possible that it can prove effective?

"The kingdom of God cometh not, with observation." It is silent in its work, and secret in its operation, like the growth of oaks, or the speedy journeys of the light. It sprang as a vital influence into the corrupt universe, and it renewed the spirit in downcast Judea, in self-opinionated Greece, in haughty Rome. It went into the recesses of ancient Germany, and put new might into the soul; it entered France, and gave fresh joy to the human heart; it moved into Spain, and awoke a grander spirit among its masses, and it crossed the sea into the Isles of Britain, when instantly the vigour of a previously unfelt power shot into society, and civilization became a giant in might, building cathedrals and reorganizing society—filling the spirit with new aspirations, leading to new endeavours, and resulting in ever-increasing success.

When it came it brought the ruling of the tongue, the restraining of the evil eye, the controlling of the temper, the subduing of the

1871.

passions to purity, and of the spirit to prayer; it brought patience, forbearance, faithfulness, hope; it brought comfort, and gladness, and worship, and love. It is even yet effecting good daily; and the change which the world has undergone since the pulpit has spread before men the principles of a Divine life have been great indeed.

I have followed with much interest the numerous writers who have taken part in this debate; and from the sustained animation of the several articles as they have successively appeared, I have gleaned many admirable thoughts, expressed with point and full of suggestiveness. On either side there has been a more than ordinary brevity of speech, and yet there has been a more than ordinary keenness of discussion exhibited; writer after writer tackling, as it were, the arguments of his opponents with much pertinence and ability. When I compare the papers on this topic with those which have been prepared on the other questions under debate, I think I can see abundant proof that the influence of the pulpit is *not* on the wane; for it has led to our having a good long series of papers of good quality, and much inter-active disquisition. It cannot but be admitted that on either side the weapons of warfare have been used ably and yet kindly.

The closeness with which each writer has replied to and engaged himself with the arguments of his predecessor in the debate, leaves little to be done by him to whom the reply formally falls. M. S. A.'s paper begins a little too flippantly, perhaps, on so serious a subject. Such quotations have no relevancy in this debate, unless the balance of dispraise and depreciation is shown to be on the side of him who claims the award, and I will only ask him to remember that the sneer against parsons is, in fact, a sign of their power, for people do not sneer at and revile what is already at so low an ebb as he affirms preaching to be. So, again, the observation of non-church-goers is only available on his side of the question, when it is shown that *all* absentees from church or chapel are so because of a failure of influence in the pulpit. Besides that, many non-church goers are really under pulpit influence; for its influence is not only exerted in the pulpit, there must also be deducted from those whom he claims as adverse, all those who are, under necessity or restraint, absent from the house of God. Still again his windmill argument may be turned against himself. No influence can be properly measured unless the opposition to which it is exposed is calculated—how if against all the warring influences of worldliness, tempta-

tion, weakness of heart, sin, evil habits, indolence, spendthriftness, leading to unfitness for appearing in the house of God, &c., the pulpit holds the power it does, can its influence be truly said to be on the wane?

The spread of vice, however hardly it may appear to press against the advocates of the power of the pulpit is, in reality, not to be wondered at. It is still true that "the world is too much with us;" but the pulpit has only the power of persuasion. God requires that that only shall be used to bring men to Him, and when we reflect that the natural man is at enmity with God, we may feel humbled but we cannot be surprised, that the pulpit is not all-powerful in its efforts. M. S. A. confines the question too much to mere assemblies of people to hear sermons. Is it not a fact that the pulpit is the little leaven which leaveneth the whole lump of modern society; and that our moral agencies, charities, reforms, &c., are due to influences first awakened in the spirit by the preaching of the word?

I am sorry to find S. S. on this question—it must be only in a transient fit of despondency—on the opposite side. There is much to bewail and bemoan in social life, but surely he might have considered this, that, judged by almost the same reasonings as he has used regarding the pulpit, the life of our Lord might have been adjudged to be a failure. F. C. A.'s argument, we hope, reassured him. It is a very concise but telling one. K. W. J. may also bring him comfort. "Auditor's" paper wanders very widely from its theme.

We notice in the affirmative papers a general tendency to depreciate the clergy. I recall the words of Robert Southey for their comfort and our solace:—

"Nor when the war is waged  
With error, and the brood  
Of darkness, will your aid  
Be wanting in the cause of light and love,  
Ye ministers of that most holy Church,  
Whose firm foundation on the rock  
Of Scripture rests secure.

"Clad in your panoply will ye be found,  
Wielding the spear of reason; with the sword  
Of Scripture girt; and from your shield of trash

Such radiance shall go forth  
 As when, unable to sustain its beams,  
 On Arthur's arm unveiled,  
 Earth-born Orgoglio reeled, as if with wine,  
 And from her many-headed breast cast down  
 Duesa fell, her cup of sorcery spilt,  
 Her three-crowned mitre in the dust devolved,  
 And all her secret filthiness exposed!"

On the whole, we think that this debate will have a good effect in quickened reflection, and bringing us, as E. C. says, to look realities in the face. The pulpit must, like other agencies, be criticised; but that is quite a different thing from being condemned. I am confident that the pulpit has done great good, and that it will still do more. I have no idea that the time shall ever truly come when its influence shall wane.

I would suggest that those who find the ministrations of the word from the pulpit ineffective, as a topic for self-examination, Do you go to the pulpit in the proper frame of mind? Do you thirst spiritually after a knowledge of God's ways in regard to salvation? The Messianic prophet long ago exclaimed, "Ho! every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters," and the Messiah of whom he spake, carrying back our thoughts over the waste of time which had elapsed between the prophetic utterance and its realization, reiterates that old invitation thus—"If any man thirst, let him come unto Me and drink." To the ordinances of the sanctuary we should bring a thirsting soul—then the seeker will find the longings of his spirit gladdened at the wells, conduits, and channels of holy culture and refreshment provided in the Zion to which he rightly repairs, and it can scarcely be that, by the blessing of the Most High, the pulpit influences shall become agencies to those dispensations of spiritual grace which shall be "as wells of water springing up into everlasting life." "Take heed, therefore, how ye hear!" (Luke viii. 18); "for it is not a vain thing for you; for it is your life" (Deut. xxxii. 47). The sower soweth from the pulpit the good seed of the good husbandman, into what sort of hearts do ye receive it? Does the fault of the failure lie with the seed, with the sower, or with you? As ye hear, so must ye answer. Be therefore, we beseech you, less critical and more open to receive the ingrafted word; yea, hear the word of God and do it; then the influence of the pulpit shall never, never wane. M. D. R.

## Politics.

---

### OUGHT THE TENURE OF LAND TO BE RADICALLY CHANGED?

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

SHAKSPERE long ago had his good-humoured gibe at those who—

“Here and there  
Sharked up a lot of landless resolutees.”

He knew that these were easily caught by any one who would give them fair promises of mighty changes. No popularity is gained so easily as that of the man who decries things as they are, and advocates change. Change excites hope and cherishes expectation, and in the transition men always calculate that advantage shall accrue to them. In our country the law has allotted property rights, and by landmarks has limited each right of possession. Those who propose to make the land as common as the light, are either purposely misleading their hearers,—for what is perfectly common would never be cultured, and would consequently become worthless; or else they must be woefully misled in their notion, that equal labour would be willingly bestowed by each one on that which belonged equally to each one, or that any method of distribution is possible which would make all men equal. Either way they are blind leaders of the blind. The question has been raised by the possessors of hard cash in opposition to the protectionism of high class; but neither of these have any true sympathy with the endurers of hard commons. Commercial money-getters are anxious to participate in the “barbarous splendour” of feudalism, and hence their feud against the land laws. The purse-proud scorner of the ten hours bill, invites the man who has not the wherewithal to buy an acre of land, though the whole acreage in Britain were in the auction mart, to a crusade against land tenure, not because he wants the poor man to get a share of the land, but because he wants his help to get him a share of it. Cash has already employed labour to lift it into the House of Commons,

now it wishes labour to give it a lift among the landed aristocracy. But labour will surely open its weather eye before it commits such an egregious folly! Not content with being man-lords, mammonists desire to become landlords, that they may add to their monopolies, and gain the power to grind the faces of the poor with greater profit and to greater self-glorification. It is, in fact, a contest of cash against caste.

We contend, quite in opposition to H. K., that the levellers ought not to be aided in pulling the aristocracy down, but ought to be induced to aid in lifting up the proletariat. Instead of adding to their already insatiate thirst for gain, the other great greed of soul, the attainment of rank and importance by possession of the land, we should lessen as much as possible the mere money-power in its proposals to buy and sell everything, civil or sacred, by money. We are much more in need of an aristocracy than a cashocracy.

Our present land laws as they are well-fitted for the maintaining in the country of a powerful, widely-ramified, dignified, historic aristocracy, who have the accumulated fame and name of centuries to influence them in their public conduct; and so to keep alive among men a high and noble emulation, and to inspire in every other class the full spirit of industry and enterprise, the strongest interests, and the closest imitation, ought to be retained as they are. We require to have as leaders and thinkers among us men of leisure and education, who are out of the whirl and eddy and change of the every-day life of man, who have aspirations, and a sense of duty and fame, to whom as depositaries, we may intrust political power. The influences which affect legislation ought not all to be those of mere immediate interest. We should have some settledness, unless we wish to give full rein to the growing and eager greed of the moneyed classes to subdue all things to marketableness, and make human life a whole round of barter and sale, conducted on commercial principles, inkhorn in hand, and ready-reckoner in pocket, to gain the utmost fraction of a farthing in all our transactions. Unless we regard it as good—yes, the supreme good, to exile love, charity, faith, neighbourliness, courage, constancy, principle, family reputation, for the far-better way of “buying in the cheapest and selling in the dearest market.”

H. K. asserts that “the land of the nation belongs to the nation;” but what does he really mean? This we think from the

context of his paper—that the land of the nation ought to be passed over to those who have the purchasing power in the nation. He does not seem to be going to inaugurate Communism; he is only going in for commercialism. If any person can make more—more in the mere sense of a greater quantity of produce out of the land, or if any one is willing to give more—more in the mere sense of a greater quantity of given gold for the land he, it seems, according to H. K., should get it. This, instead of advantaging the poor man, would only make him more wretched. It would turn the whole greed of man to the acquisition of land as a mark of aristocratic position, and would fill the country with the upstarts of speculations, of no matter what iniquitous sort, provided they were profitable. He would blot out the word *heritage* from life and civilization. We can think of no proposal more fatal to the best interests of the country. If we were to make land, as H. K. proposes, a mere chattel, saleable, exchangeable, disposable without restraint, guardedness, care, or properly prepared conveyances, an object of constant sale and resale by the plutocrats, we would fall into a sad way of life; we would unsettle society and we would get into a whirl and fever of competition for land, which would further and beget schemes far wilder than those of the “South Sea Bubble,” and more destructive in its effects than the “railway mania.”

An obvious evil is easily seen. Landed estates would become looked upon as securities, as so much realized capital. As its price fluctuated, so it would change hands, and whenever a profit could be acquired a new “squire” would step in, whose will and wish would be supreme and peremptory so long as he held it, and that would be till the quotations rose so as to make it advisable to sell out. The owners of land would have little interest in, little connexion with the people who lived on these estates. The leading men in a district would be those who could speculate most freely, and rack out of the estate the largest profit. Wealth would be the sole requisite, and rank and influence, historic name and family intercourse, would be but a thing of the past. Gentry and gentility would be swept away with feudalism. The grace of civilization would fail; a leisure-class with the statemanly faculties trained under the influence of the memories of the ancestry of the forefathers of the land could not exist. Hear Shakspeare on the necessity of having for national prosperity a scale of degrees:—

“ O, when degree is shaken  
 Which is the ladder to all high designs,  
 Then enterprise is sick ! How could communities,  
 Degrees in schools, and brotherhoods in cities  
 Peaceful commerce from dividable shores  
*Primogeniture and due of birth,*  
 Prerogative of age, crowns, sceptres, laurels ;  
 But, by degrees, stand in authentic place,  
 Take but degree away, untune that string,  
 And hark what discord follows ; each thing meets  
 In mere oppugnancy. . . . .  
 Force would be right, or rather right and wrong  
 (Between whose endless jar justice resides)  
 Should lose their names, and so should justice too.”

H. K. objects to primogeniture ; but we do not see it according to his notion. The right of primogeniture—the preference of the oldest son is incorporated with the earliest historic regulations, we know, for succession and inheritance—the Mosaic law. It agrees with the instincts of humanity to acknowledge “the right of the first-born son as the beginning of the father’s strength, as the first bearer and continuator of the name. Besides, like the eminent political economist, J. R. MacCulloch, “we are well convinced that much of the industry, and of the superior wealth and civilization of modern Europe may be ascribed to the influence of the law of primogeniture in determining the law of succession to estates ; and that, were it abolished, or superseded by the opposite custom of equally dividing landed property among all the children, or even among all the sons, they would suffer universally by the change, the youngest as well as the oldest ; while it would most seriously compromise the interests of every other class.”\*

J. R. S. C. is afraid of “Social Revolution ;” but he does not think every man can become his own landlord. We do not think any possible plan of hastening a social revolution could be devised so good as that of so altering the tenure of land that it would be impossible to have an aristocracy to stand in the widening breach between the plutocracy and the labourocracy. We think that the best way to precipitate the ruin of all classes is to make mammon

\* “A Treatise on the Succession of Property vacant by Death,” by J. R. MacCulloch, Esq., 1846, p. 28.



the god of this world, and profit his prime minister. The fact is, that land can never be advantageously exposed to the sale and exchange that other things are liable to. For landlordism carries personal and moral, besides pecuniary relations with it, and your cash-lord is worse than the greatest tyrant of the fields. Money has no bowels of compassion; it has no historic and ancestral fame, gathering around it regulative influences over the hearts of men as landlords and as tenants. Besides, why should we not advocate for (1) a law by which the quantity of money (or any other commodity) which one individual may hold should be limited; (2) a measure, which if not abolishing property, should put it on another footing. In short, why ought there not to be a law that those who have not should share with those who have, *ad infinitum*, and so save the trouble of changing the law of land tenure by securing its general worthlessness?

Land differs from every other commodity in requiring culture expended on itself to make it profitable. To be cultured it must be free from trespass, and to be free from trespass it must be possessed, and so possessed that the right to it is clear and indisputable. If it were otherwise, no one would culture it. There is no form of land tenure possible that does not imply its possession in some form or other as affording guarantee for the usufruct. It must be admitted, then, that land must be tenanted, and so held from some one or some authority. Were land the possession of the community, it would form a great temptation to jobbery, as we see in the case of corporations possessing rights in land for common interests, or it would go to waste and mire, as was found to be the case with the commons of old. H. K. would resume the land, and either take or buy it back; but he would only do so to dispose of it again—for a larger profit; unless he were to do so, the reform of land tenure would be of no service. But H. K. forgets that while the money-wealth of the capitalist can be concealed, devised, or transferred from the country, the land in the last resort is the security of the State for the means of maintaining the rights, freedom, and prosperity of the country. We should leave the land in its safe condition, and not sacrifice all to carping capitalists. L. M.

## Science.

---

### HAS MAN DEVELOPED FROM THE SAVAGE STATE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

It is, of course, very unlucky to have this side of the question to maintain, as the *odium theologicum* is dead against those who advocate it; and, what is only one step less vindictive, egotism is outraged by the notion that refined, civilized, erect bipeds of the humanistic sort, could have their descent from savages, or something far worse for which Darwinism is, it seems, the terrific but brief name. It is not so much that "it degrades God"—to quote their own phrase—for these foolish people always speak as if God was in constant danger of degradation—that they object to this idea as that it, as they fancy, degrades themselves, though nothing could be farther from being the case. The love of noble birth and a high ancestry, and an anxiety to be thought at least of decent descent, is strong within those who estimate their worth, not by what they do, as by what has been done by their forefathers, and been given them to enjoy. It strikes such people with consternation to be told that they have had a savage, rather than a pseudo-angelic ancestry. They have an adamant faith in Adam, and they believe in Eve. They cannot assent to pre-Adamites, and think Eve must have been their first mother. As if *that* would make any real difference in *them*, or elevate them in the least. But they may rest assured that every endeavour to "deracinate their savagery" will end in failure—themselves being witnesses.

L. T. B. has been so trenchantly dealt with by "Georgius," that it would be gratuitous cruelty to renew consideration of his paper; though we notice that after six months' time for reflection he is apparently unconscious of the most complete and thorough handling he has had from our coadjutant. He has indeed written a fairly thoughtful article; and his notion about Rousseau is not so bad. But how he came to get the idea that savageness implied degeneracy I cannot comprehend. Has he been confounding *savage* with *salvage*, because they have, apparently, the same derivation from

the French. If so, let us note to him that *savage* comes to us from *silvicola*, an inhabitant of the woods; while *salvage* is derived from *salvo*, I save or secure. The latter is the name given to the compensation conferred on those who save property from the dangers of the sea, fire, pirates, or enemies; and is sometimes incorrectly used to denote the things so saved. But *savage* is employed to signify "A human being in his native state of rudeness;" while civilized people are those who have succeeded in "casting their savagery aside." Still just as,—

"Vaulting ambition doth o'erleap herself,  
And falls o' the other side."

So does inaccurate and fallacious reasoning, when properly probed, fail its user in the hour of trial. If *savage* were synonymous with *salvage*, then man, being only now that which has escaped the wreck of sin—on our opponent's showing—he can have done nothing else, if he has developed at all, but done so from the savage state!

"Cris" has very mistakenly assumed that we deny that "man had within him immense powers of self-improvement" (*ante*, p. 457). That is expressly what we affirm, and we also admit that "he requires a *locus standi* from which to start" (*Ibid*). The *savage state* is the *locus standi*, and all the ample civilization he has achieved is the result of "the immense powers of self-improvement" within him, when properly employed and "developed."

Again, "Cris," mistaking the question, as if it were one specifically opposed to Christianity, asks, in effect, a question which has been put before by "E. D. Griffin," "What nation, since the commencement of the Christian era, ever rose from savage to civilized without Christianity?" "Man," "Cris" affirms, "is civilized just in the degree in which he recognises Christianity;" and again, "Remove him from Christianity, or let his Christianity become dead, and you ensure his degradation." Here, then, are two noticeable faults in the reasoning:—first it mistakes concomitancy for causation, and argues that as Christianity has been present in modern civilization, it has been the efficient agent in it—which may be a misapprehension in so far as Christianity might have been acceptable, as consonant to the civilization in progress in the world at that time; and second, it implies that there had been no civilization prior to the advent of Christianity, as the cause being absent

the effect could not be present. But this is obviously opposed to facts. There was a civilization prior to Christianity. We need only name Nineveh, Athens, Rome, Carthage, &c., to make that plain so far as civilization refers to external magnificence and grandeur. If we name Zoroaster, Confucius, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Cato, we shall have done enough to prove that civilization, as an intellectual and moral power, existed precedently to Christianity. Either, therefore, he must aver that Christianity causes civilization, and declare that all prior progress was only savageness,—and then we shall reply, that being so, “man has developed from the savage state,” seeing that his state was a savage one prior to the introduction of Christianity,—or if he recoils from that task he must admit that civilization is possible without Christianity, and hence he will throw doubt upon his proposition, that man is civilized just in proportion as he recognises Christianity.

The absurdity of all this arises from coming to the debate with a prejudice in the mind. If this is answered in the affirmative, what will become of Christianity? We must uphold Christianity, and therefore we must negative this question. In this crisis “Cris” comes forward and orates thus :—“Accepting the Scriptural account as the true narrative of the origin of man, as I heartily do, I see that the first human pair were not savages” (*ante*, p. 459); then follows S. S. with the assertion, “respecting the condition in which man was created there is but one source of information—the Bible.” Now supposing this were granted, S. S. would obviously not have gained his case. For the Bible is a revelation; every revelation requires interpretation; and it may not be quite the fact that the interpretation adopted or advanced by S. S., is exactly so infallible as he is inclined to believe it is. Unless there is no other possible interpretation than that which S. S. thinks he finds of the teaching of the Bible, we have to decide,—What is the meaning of the Scriptures? But S. S. put his argument thus, knowing the power of prejudice over the human mind. This will make it appear that those who write on the affirmative are sceptics, and they will not be listened to. We shall brand them as infidels, and then we shall be secure that their reasonings shall be misread. It is not at all necessary, in maintaining the affirmative, to doubt the Holy Book. We may accept of its statements, and turn them like cannon taken from an enemy, against the battlements they were intended to defend. “All have sinned, and come short of the glory of God; there is

none righteous, no, not one," are pretty clear intimations of a savage state being universal; and when we are told that "every imagination of man's heart was only evil, and that continually," there was not much room for civilization in it. S. S. is thus "hoist with his own petard."

May we ask S. S. this simple question? Has the topic of debate been put down thus:—Was man created in a savage state? Not at all. We have no concern with the question of creation at all. The development theory may be true or false, so far as our question is implicated; equally so may the theory of creation be. If the former is believed in, we have to determine whether man, having reached the savage state, has since developed still farther; or if the latter is accepted, we have to determine whether, having in any way got into the savage state, he has since got out of it. So far as this debate is concerned, S. S. has quite confounded its implication. Can he deny that man ever occupied the savage state—can he affirm that civilization has always been found upon the globe—can he make it clear that man has not developed? If he cannot, all that he says about Adam and Eve, Noah and his descendants, &c., is entirely away from the question, and requires no more argument from us than is enough to set it aside. He has failed, therefore, in making out his argument in prejudice of his opponents, who are hereby shown to be under no absolute necessity of denying or decrying the Holy Scriptures. The question may be argued without committing oneself either to commendation or condemnation.

S. S. overstrains the Scripture statement that man was created in the image of God, by making it signify that man was formed a perfect being. Had he been so he could not have fallen; neither could he have progressed. He would have required no knowledge, no teaching in morality.

"No government, no laws, no gentle manners mild."

As all the facts go the other way, it must follow that S. S.'s interpretation of the Bible is incorrect; but it does not necessarily follow that the Bible is wrong, or that those who reject S. S.'s misunderstanding of the meaning of the Bible are to be branded as infidels, who would throw aside the word of God as worse than old wives' fables.

P. O. S. understands that the question "refers to man, not to his circumstances." So do we. It is only by a figure of speech that

we can talk of "savage circumstances." Man's savage state cannot mean his savage circumstances. Nobody speaks of the development of circumstances as if they were active rather than passive. He thinks man's nature was developed not exercised. But what is the meaning of *develop*? Is it not to make progress from an inferior, immature, or less perfect state, to a more perfect, higher, and better one? How, then, could man at his creation be developed, seeing he had had no opportunity of making progress? But with a savage you may—

"Take him to develop if you can,

And hew the block off, and get out the man."

F. Y. has, however, replied so fully and excellently to the article by P. O. S. that he has left little to be desired. "Samuel's" argument requires not only that we should accept the one man creation theory; but also that the eldest son, Cain, of this one man, found a wife neither created nor born, among some men neither created nor born. For if Adam was the one man, and Cain the first-born of Adam and Eve, how he came to take a wife of the daughters of men is a mystery. I prefer my history without mystery, unless where it is absolutely necessary; and I prefer, therefore, supposing that man was created or brought into being, according to the will of the Creator, and in such way as He thought fit—having capabilities of progress in him, and, having these, was left to make that progress as the nature of circumstances, and the nature of man permitted, that is, that he had all his capabilities in him, but had not these developed, in other words that he was uncivilized. E. C.'s exposition of prehistoric man is excellent and appropriate, and brings the evidence of fact into the question very pertinently.

N. R. thinks that the believing that man was originally formed in a savage state would destroy love and faith. Why so? Everything is made so that under culture it grows, refines, and improves. We do not suppose that less love and faith are to be induced by nature, when we compare the cultured with the uncultured parts of the earth, than if we had no such opportunity of comparing the effects of culture with those of non-culture.

To his second point we reply that if "man entire has never been in a complete stage of savageism," neither has he ever been in a complete state of civilization, so that even this will just make his argument of no worth at all; and his number three (p. 231), comes to much the same conclusion. We assert, in opposition to his

number four, that all the arts—and the sciences as well, have improved—even architecture in these later times. There may be special applications of the arts, but there are no arts in which man has of late made no progress. As opposed to number five, we maintain that not only have our faiths not the same foundation, but that our faiths themselves are changing. Even when we hold most firmly to the terms of our creeds, we have altered the elements of our beliefs; and the grounds or reasons for which creeds are accepted, and on which they are maintained, change from age to age. Let anybody who wishes to see this demonstrated by irrefragable fact, peruse the Bampton Lectures, and he will see how strangely creeds and their implications and creeds and their defences, change with the changing times. Surely no one except R. N., will affirm that our laws are not in advance of the ancient laws. If there is any point upon which superiority is certain, it is in the fact that our laws are wiser, more humane, more just, and better administered than in any former age.

C. R. sermonizes rather than debates. He too, like S. S., will have us accept the interpretation of the Bible which he adopts as tantamount to the Bible, and as included in that truth of the Bible which he avers is unmistakably proved. The Bible may be perfectly true, and yet not one word of the capital ideas of C. R. be anything but nonsense. He confounds savageism with idioey (p. 289), affirming that "it is a state of pure ignorance." It is no such thing. It is a state in which man, with all his bodily senses and instincts keenly alive and in exercise, seeks their gratification in their rudest and most imperious forms, giving way mainly to those which most nearly press and most closely urge him; a state in which man's intellect has not yet got the idea of law and reason as guides to conscientious dealing. In this state of sensational, or sensible being, we suppose man to have made his appearance on the earth; his nature all alive to, and quivering with the intensity of the delights around him. In this state many evils might arise consequence of his indulgence in immediate delights; and this, giving him experience, furnished the means of correcting error laying wisdom, of gradually becoming more and more improved and so developing his nature from savagery to civilization. not require to deny, as C. R. seems to suppose we do, either fatality or responsibility. We can hold both these, and yet that man developed from a savage state.

It would, of course, be wrong in us closing a controversy which has, on the whole, been so thoroughly debated, to introduce new matter, and hence we shall close our strictures on our opponents—to whom we would offer the following remarks:—(1) The goodness, wisdom, and power of the Deity are really in no danger at the hand of scientific, moral, or religious inquiry; and their alarm on that ground is quite misplaced; (2) Truth is the most certain evidence of anything, and facts are the nearest approaches to truth that man can reach; (3) Whatever Scripture may be supposed to teach, it cannot teach what is opposed to truth if it is the word of God; hence the interpretation of Scripture, in accordance with fact, is always possible; (4) Man can neither be injured, nor demoralized, nor degraded by learning the truth about himself. These being held to be correct, we may now add, in special reference to the question before us (1) That the development of man from the savage state, by the exercise of the powers within him and the providences around him, is quite compatible with the glory of God; and (2) That the development of man from the savage state is in accordance with the powers lodged in him, gives such a full proof of the progressiveness and nobleness of man, that it cannot be degrading to think that he possesses such a nature. While these things are to be maintained, and facts go to prove that man has so developed, we cannot refrain from accepting the affirmative as the true state of the matter.

It is greatly to be regretted that men are so easily terrified by names as bugbears. Were that not so we might much more readily get at the truth. We would not be so convulsed by the words Monboddism, Darwinism, Huxleyism, Comteism, and so on. In regard to this matter I would recall to the reader's mind this quotation from Archbishop Whately's remarks on Bacon's "Essays:—

"He who propagates a delusion, and he who connives at it, when already existing, both alike tamper with truth. We must neither lead nor leave men to mistake falsehood for truth. Not to undeceive is to deceive. The giving, or not correcting, false reasons for right conclusions, false grounds for right belief, false principles for right practice—the holding forth, or fostering, false consolations, false encouragements, or false sanctions, or conniving at their being held forth or believed—are all pious frauds. This springs from, and it will foster and increase, a want of veneration for truth; it is an affront put on the 'Spirit of Truth.'"

B. R. C.



## The Essayist.

### THE POETRY OF JOHN HENRY NEWMAN.

(Concluded from p. 230.)

"The strains," he observes, "as they flow forth from the various ranks of angels are not, if I may use a somewhat pedantic word, *differentiated* by any intelligible gradations of feeling and of style, and, indeed, do not move me much more than those average hymns which people, who certainly are not angels yet, sing weekly in church." On the contrary, without, perchance, going quite so far in our admiration, we upon the whole incline rather to the opinion of Gerontius, who, ravished with the heavenly music, exclaims,—

"The sound is like the rushing of the wind—  
The summer wind—among the lofty pines;  
Swelling and dying, echoing round about,  
Now here, now distant, wild and beautiful;  
While, scatter'd from the branches it has stirred,  
Descend ecstatic odours."

Here the poet, speaking in the person of Gerontius—one to whom time is now no more—travels back in memory to those far off days of his earthly life, when he wandered beneath—

"The deep glowing blue of Italy's skies,"

and listened, it may be, amid the pine-wood shades to the fitful murmuring of the summer breeze, like spirit-music haunting the lonely ear. Let us listen awhile to these angel-voices echoing through the depths of space. In a melodious hymn, an outpoured tribute of praise, the guardian angel sings the wonders of redemption and grace:—

"O Lord, how wonderful in depth and height,  
But most in man, how wonderful Thou art!  
With what a love, what soft, persuasive might,  
Victorious o'er the stubborn, fleshly heart.  
Thy tale complete of saints Thou dost provide,  
To fill the throne which angels lost through pride.

"He lay a grovelling babe upon the ground,  
Polluted in the blood\* of his first sire,  
With his whole essence shattered and unsound,  
And coiled around his heart a demon dire,  
Which was not of his nature, but had skill  
To bind and form his op'ning mind to ill.

---

\* Of Ezekiel xvi. 5, 6.

"Then was I sent from heaven to set a-right  
The balance in his soul of truth and sin,  
And I have waged a long relentless fight,  
Resolved that death-environed spirit to win,  
Which from its fallen state, when all was lost,  
Had been repurchased at so dread a cost.

"O, what a shifting, parti-coloured scene  
Of hope and fear, of triumph and dismay,  
Of recklessness and penitence, has been  
The history of that dreary, life-long fray!  
And O, the grace to nerve him and to lead,  
How patient, prompt, and lavish at his need!

"O man, strange composite of heaven and earth!  
Majesty dwarfed to baseness! fragrant flower  
Burning to poisonous seed! and seeming worth  
Cloaking corruption! weakness mastering power!  
Who never art so near to crime and shame  
As when thou hast achieved some deed of name.

"How should ethereal natures comprehend  
A thing made up of spirit and of clay,  
Were we not tasked to nurse it and to tend,  
Linked one to one throughout its mortal day?  
More than the seraph in his height of place  
The angel-guardian knows and loves the ransomed race."

In like strains is this hymn, sung by one of the angelic choirs:—

"Father, whose goodness none can know but they  
Who see Thee face to face.  
By man hath come the infinite display  
Of Thine all-loving grace;  
But fallen man, the creature of a day,  
Skills not Thy love to trace.  
It needs, to tell the triumph Thou hast wrought,  
An angel's deathless fire, an angel's reach of thought.

"It needs that very angel,\* who with awe,  
Amid the garden shade,  
The great Creator in His sickness saw,  
Soothed by a creature's aid,  
And agonized, as victim of the law  
Which He Himself had made;  
For who can praise Him in His depth and height  
But he who saw him reel in that victorious fight?†

Another choir of angelic beings takes up and repeats the strain of heavenly harmony:—

\* *Vide* St. Luke xxii. 48. Called elsewhere in the poem, "the great angel of the agony."

† In a later version this line stands,—

"But he who saw him reel amid that solitary fight."

"Praise to the Holiest in the height,  
And in the depths be praise :  
In all His words most wonderful ;  
Most sure in all His ways.

"O loving wisdom of our God !  
When all was sin and shame,  
A second Adam to the fight  
And to the rescue came.

"O wisest love ! that flesh and blood  
Which did in Adam fail,  
Should strive afresh against the foe,  
Should strive and should prevail ;

"And that a higher gift than grace  
Should flesh and blood refine,  
God's presence and His very self,  
And essence all-divine.

"O generous love ! that He who smote  
In man for man the foe,  
The double agony in man  
For man should undergo ;

"And in the garden secretly,  
And on the cross on high,  
Should teach His brethren, and inspire  
To suffer and to die."

We have before adverted to Dr. Newman's conception of Purgatory as more spiritual by far than that of vulgar Romanism, with its material flames and coarsely painted torments, exceeding in intensity a thousandfold the whole accumulated weight of earthly suffering.\* This, the more spiritual view of that doctrine, is very beautifully brought out in the following passage :—

"When then—if such thy lot—thou seest thy Judge,  
The sight of Him will kindle in thy heart  
All tender, gracious, reverential thoughts.

---

\* "The Romish writers use no reserve in describing the pains of the purgatorial state ; and as they have in the doctrine itself supplied to the Church an article on which Scripture is silent ; so, in furnishing the particulars have they drawn largely upon that knowledge of the infernal regions which their privileged commerce with invisibles has supplied. 'A soul,' says the Rev. Alban Butler, 'for one venial sin, shall suffer more than all the pains of distempers, the most violent colics, gout, and stone, joined in complication ; more than all the most cruel torments undergone by malefactors, or invented by the most barbarous tyrants ; more than all the tortures of the martyrs summed up together. This is the idea which the fathers give of purgatory, and how long many souls may have to suffer there we know not.'"—*Lives of the Saints*, Novem. 2.

Thou wilt be sick with love, and yearn for Him,  
 And feel as though thou couldst but pity Him,  
 That one so sweet should e'er have placed Himself  
 At disadvantage such, as to be used  
 So vilely by a being so vile as thee.  
 There is a pleading in His pensive eyes  
 Will pierce thee to the quick, and trouble thee.  
 And thou wilt hate and loathe thyself; for, though  
 Now sinless, thou wilt feel that thou hast sinned,  
 As never thou didst feel; and wilt desire  
 To slink away, and hide thee from His sight;  
 And yet wilt have a longing eye to dwell  
 Within the beauty of His countenance.  
 And these two pains, so counter and so keen,  
 —The longing for Him when thou seest Him not;  
 Thought of the shame of self at seeing Him,—  
 Will be Thy veriest, sharpest purgatory."

One of the finest and most striking scenes presented in the whole drama, is where Gerontius is brought before the throne of judgment, and thereupon flies in loving eagerness to the feet of his crucified Lord, but as yet unpurged of his earthly stains, is scorched and blasted by the soul-searching light of purity which emanates from the Divine Presence. The guardian-angel, rapt in adoration at the sight, exclaims:—

. . . . . "Praise to His name!  
 The eager spirit has darted from my hold,  
 And, with the intemperate energy of love,  
 Flies to the dear feet of Emmanuel;  
 But, ere it reach them, the keen sanctity,  
 Which, with its effluence, like a glory clothes  
 And circles round the Crucified, has seised  
 And scorched and shrivelled it; and now it lies  
 Passive and still before the awful throne.  
 O happy, suffering soul! for it is safe,  
 Consumed, yet quickened, by the glance of God."

The idea of this scene appears to have been suggested by the celebrated legend of that visionary enthusiast, St. Francis of Assisi,\* a legend which is, indeed, expressly referred to in a preceding part of the poem:—

"There was a mortal, who is now above  
 In the mid glory: he, when near to die,  
 Was given communion with the Crucified,  
 Such that the Master's very wounds were stamped  
 Upon his flesh; and from the agony  
 Which thrilled through body and soul in that embrace,  
 Know that the flame of the everlasting love  
 Doth burn, ere it transform." . . .

---

\* The Founder of the Franciscan Order.

After his momentary glimpse of the beatific vision, Gerontius, strengthened and solaced by that life-giving ray, willingly resigns himself to his appointed purgation. The feelings of his soul find utterance in a lyrical effusion full of a sad and yearning melody:—

“Take me away,” he exclaims,—

“Take me away, and in the lowest deep  
There let me be,  
And there in hope the lone night-watches keep,  
Told out for me.  
There, motionless and happy in my pain,  
Lone, not forlorn,—  
There will I sing my sad perpetual strain,  
Until the morn.  
There will I sing and soothe my stricken breast,  
Which ne’er can cease  
To throb, and pine, and languish, till possess  
Of its sole peace.  
There will I sing my absent Lord and love,  
—Take me away,  
—That sooner I may rise, and go above,  
And see Him in the truth of everlasting day.”

At the invocation of the angel, the gates of purgatory unfold:—

“Now let the golden prison open its gates,  
Making sweet music, as each fold revolves  
Upon its ready hinge.”

And the souls there confined are heard chanting the 90th psalm, that song of mingled sorrow and hope, wherein the fleetingness of man, “the creature of a day,” is contrasted with the unchangeableness of Him, who, Lord of eternity’s domain, has been from age to age the refuge of all the dwellers upon the shore of time. Finally, the guardian-angel consigns his charge to purgatory, with a farewell address of tender and pensive solemnity, as in the following hymn, which fitly closes the drama:—

“Softly and gently, dearly ransomed soul,  
In my most loving arms I now enfold thee,  
And o’er the penal waters, as they roll,  
I poise thee, and I lower thee, and hold thee.  
“And carefully I dip thee in the lake,  
And thou, without a sob or a resistance,  
Dost through the flood thy rapid passage take,  
Sinking, deep, deeper, into the dim distance.  
“Angels, to whom the willing task is given,  
Shall tend, and nurse, and lull thee as thou liest;  
And masses on the earth, and prayers in heaven,  
Shall aid thee at the throne of the Most Highest.

"Farewell, but not for ever! brother dear,  
 Be brave and patient on thy bed of sorrow;  
 Swiftly shall pass thy night of trial here,  
 And I will come and wake thee on the morrow."

We have now passed in review the poetry of one who played a prominent part in the great ecclesiastical movement of a bygone day. Of that movement,—ever memorable in the annals of the Church of England,—where it has left deep and abiding traces,—the poetry of John Henry Newman is the reflex. Over it a brooding melancholy, a Dantesque\* sternness and gloom reigns almost unbroken throughout. This may have been due in part to the source of its inspiration—the struggle and agony of a great religious crisis—but still more, probably, to the poet's own peculiar turn of mind,—his self-introspectiveness and habit of lonely musing.† Such is the poet of the oratory, one to whose eyes, as to the Florentine, have been unveiled the mysteries of the spirit world, to him the only living reality—who of the angels could say:—"Every breath of air, and ray of light and heat, every beautiful prospect is, as it were, the skirts of their garments, the waving of the robes of those whose faces see God."‡ Such is this lonely musér, even such a one is he who conceived that wondrous effort of creative imagination, "The Dream of Gerontius."

B. C. H.

\* "Those who are familiar with the less known poems which he (Dr. Newman) contributed to the 'Lyra Apostolica,' or with the more recent 'Dream of Gerontius,' can scarcely fail to see in them touches for which no other word than Dantesque can well be found. Tender affection and prophetic sternness, subtle thought and vivid speech, the mingling of beauty, horror, grotesqueness, in his vision of the unseen world—these all remind us of the great poem in which the Florentine portrayed what 'lies behind the veil.'"—*The Quarterly Review*, "April, 1869," "Dante Alighieri."

† "Earth must fade away from our eyes, and we must anticipate that great and solemn truth, which we shall not fully understand until we stand before God in judgment, that to us there are but two beings in the whole world, God and ourselves."—*J. H. Newman's "Sermons on Subjects of the Day."* Sermon iii., "Our Lord's Last Supper and His First."

‡ "History of My Religious Opinions."

## The Reviewer.

---

*Balaustion's Adventure; including a Transcript from Euripides.*  
By ROBERT BROWNING.

London: Smith, Elder & Co.

(Concluded from p. 394.)

Herakles asks Admetos to keep this woman till he returns from the slaughter of the man-eating horses of Diomedes. But Admetos recoiled from the temptation, and urged all he could against being brought into the peril of dishonouring the memory of his wife, and exclaimed,—

“‘When I betray her, though she is no more,  
May I die!’

And the thing he said was true :  
For out of Herakles a great glow broke.  
There stood a victor worthy of a prize ;  
The violet-crown that withers on the brow  
Of the half-hearted claimant. Oh, he knew  
The signs of battle hard fought and well won,  
This queller of the monsters !—knew his friend  
Planted firm foot, now, on the loathly thing  
That was Admetos late ! ‘would die,’ he knew,  
Ere yet the reptile raise its crest again.  
If that was truth, why try the true friend more ?”

The veil is lifted, and Alkestis stands before him,—

“Brought from the grave,  
Rescued from death by force, though pale and faint.  
And vested all in white, pure as her mind.”

Admetos is bewildered at the gift-wife, so rescued from the gripe of death:—

“And Herakles said little, but enough—  
How he engaged in combat with that king  
O’ the demons: how the field of contest lay  
By the tomb’s self: how he sprang from ambushade,  
Captured death, caught him in that pair of hands.”

Alkestis stands silent, and to her husband’s queries—

"Herakles solemnly replied, 'Not yet  
Is it allowable thou hear the things  
She has to tell thee : let evanish quite  
That consecration to the lower gods,  
And on our upper world the third day rise!  
Lead her in meanwhile ; good and true thou art,  
Good, true, remain thou ! Practise piety  
To stranger guests the old way ! So, farewell !'"

And thereafter, as is so common,—

"All the friendly moralists  
Drew this conclusion : chirped, each beard to each :  
'Manifold are thy shapings, providence !  
Many a hopeless matter gods arrange.  
What we expected, never came to pass :  
What we did not expect, gods brought to bear ;  
So have things gone this whole experience through !'"

But Browning has his moralization, too ; he thinks some higher philosophy might have been distilled from the olden myth ; that much of truth might have been gained, even if the other side of the possibilities had been taken. Here are some of the might-be's of the modern poet's thoughts :—

"It were unseemly if they aped us Gods,  
And mindful of our chain of consequence,  
Lost care of the immediate earthly link :  
Forewent the comfort of life's little hour,  
Alien eternity—unlike the timed  
In prospect of some cold, abysmal blank  
They know, and understand to practise with—  
No—our eternity—no heart's blood, bright  
And warm, outpoured in its behoof, would tinge  
Never so palely, warm a whit the more :  
Whereas retained and treasured—left to beat  
Joyously on, a life's length, in the breast  
O' the loved and loving—it would throb itself  
Through, and suffuse the earthly tenement,  
Transform it, even as your mansion here  
Is love-transformed, into a temple home,—  
Where I, a God, forget the Olympian glow,  
In the feel of human richness like the rose :  
Your hopes and fears, so blind and yet so sweet,  
With death about them. Therefore, well in thee  
To look, not on eternity, but time :  
To apprehend that, should Admetos die,  
All we gods purposed in him dies as sure :  
That life's link snapping, all our chain is lost.  
And yet a mortal glance might pierce, methinks,  
Deeper into the seeming dark of things,



And learn, no fruit man's life can bear, will fade:  
 Learn, if Admetos die now, so much more  
 Will pity for the frailness found in flesh,  
 Will terror at the earthly chance and change  
 Frustrating wisest scheme of noblest soul,  
 Will these go wake the seeds of good asleep  
 Throughout the world : as oft a rough wind sheds  
 The unripe promise of some field flower—true!  
 But loosens, too, the level, and lets breathe  
 A thousand captives for the year to come.  
 Nevertheless, obtain thy prayer, stay fate!  
 Admetos lives—if thou wilt die for him !”

But the mystery of the world, and especially of death, is great, and human hope and effort are strangely exposed to checks and checkers ; hence, after all, this struggle of passion and purpose,—

“ So, the two lived together long and well.  
 But never could I learn, by word of scribe  
 Or voice of poet, rumour wafts our way,  
 That—of the scheme of rule in righteousness,  
 The bringing back again the Golden Age,  
 Our couple, rather than renounce, would die—  
 Ever one first faint particle came true,  
 With both alive to bring it to effect :  
 Such is the envy gods still bear mankind ! ”

The old, old story of the Inscrutable, of the Divine sanctification of sorrow, of the heart-yearning that is unappeasable, and of the hardness of the pathway to contentment of soul. Oh ! the strange mystery of our birth, of our life, of our destiny ! How unfathomable by any line of man's contriving to fathom the infinite depths of destiny and death ! The human soul cannot pry into these things ; nor with all its peering can it find them out unto perfection. It requires, however, the imagination of the poet to see some shadowy form of the realities of the life of man, the purpose of being, the forthgoings of the future, and the outburst of life from death in the eternal round of being. Hence our debt—our large debt to the poets—perhaps expressible for all readers of this poem in these words of its author :—

“ Ah, that brave  
 Bounty of poet's, the one royal race  
 That ever was, or will be, in this world !  
 They give no gift that bounds itself and ends  
 I' the giving and the taking : theirs so breeds  
 I' the heart and soul o' the taker, so transmutes  
 The man who only was a man before,

That he grows god-like in his turn, can give—  
 He also: share the poets' privilege,  
 Bring forth new good, new beauty, from the old.  
 As though the cup that gave the wine, gave, too,  
 The God's prolific giver of the grape,  
 That vine, was wont to find out, fawn around  
 His footstep, springing still to bless the dearth,  
 At bidding of a Menad. So with me:  
 For I have drunk this poem, quenched my thirst,  
 Satisfied heart and soul—yet more remains!  
 Could we, too, make a poem? Try at least,  
 Inside the head, what shape the rose-mists take!"

*The Bridge of History over the Gulf of Time: a Popular View  
 of the Historical Evidence for the Truth of Christianity.* By  
 Thomas Cooper. Hodder and Stoughton.

LONG before he had the pleasure of personal acquaintance with Mr. Cooper, the writer had formed a strong desire that the author of the grand Spenserian poem of the "Purgatory of Suicides" might be able to accomplish three things: to write his intended companion poem, "The Paradise of Martyrs," to tell the story of his own life of effort, change, and influence, and to publish his various lectures on the evidences of the Christian religion. That desire is in part realized,—four books of the new "Paradise" have been composed, an autobiography is prepared for the press, and the lectures on the "Bridge of History" are now placed permanently on record.

In the sketch of Thomas Cooper's career which appeared in this magazine last year, his historical study of the gospels and of the early Christian writings, in the interests of the mythical theories of the Tübingen school, was cited as having probably led onwards to an abandonment of those theories as not sufficient to afford a reliable and common-sense explanation of the indisputable facts connected with the subject.

This supposition is fully borne out by the published lectures which trace the manifest presence of a fully-developed Christian belief from century to century, until the times of the immediate disciples of the Lord Jesus. We are thus "led back to the very birth-hour, with all its supernatural splendours, of the Redeemer of the world."

The lectures have been characterized in the biographical sketch referred to (*British Controversialist*, November, 1870, pages 394-5).

and it need now only be further said that the perusal of them in their book form has fully confirmed the high opinion of their intellectual and popular value therein expressed.

The colloquial form of the lectures has been fully retained, with all the divergences from the main topic, which are necessary to keep alive the attention of a miscellaneous audience. These "asides" are usually allusions, suggested during the course of the inquiry, to subjects of present agitation and interest, often throwing a reflex light upon the questions immediately under consideration. Now and then exclamatory phraseology is employed in them, scarcely befitting the seriousness and importance of the theme, but even a severe taste will not often be by these offended, and will in the end adopt much of the Rev. Paxton Hood's estimate of Mr. Cooper's ability and vocation as a lecturer.

We have spoken of the book as composed of "Lectures;" but in point of fact the series has been thrown into the form of one long lecture of 160 pages. It would, we think, have been better to preserve the division into two or more discourses, if not to have separated the stages of the argument still more distinctly into sections. But this is only a minor matter, and we pass on to indicate briefly the course of the inquiry, and the results to which it leads.

The leading idea of the book is thus detailed by the lecturer:—

"Let me invite you to accompany me, in a march or journey over the Bridge of History, which we will conceive as spanning the Gulf of Time. Not time to come, but time past. Time is the great oblivious gulf in which all men's past deeds, words, and thoughts are alike entombed, save the slight thread of them that memory has recorded. And this slight thread is, in reality, the slender "Bridge of History over the Gulf of Time" of which we are speaking, and over which we propose to travel. Our journey will be a retrogressive and retrospective one. And this "Bridge" of which I speak will have to be composed of nineteen arches, representing the nineteen centuries of Christianity. And we will call each of these arches by some distinguishing name, to render it memorable, and to aid the process of fixing the names of the events and actors of the different centuries in our minds."

Our own century is represented by Mr. Cooper as the arch of science. Three hundred and thirty-five millions hold the life and death and doctrine of Jesus Christ to be indisputable facts. Manifestly such a wide-spread belief cannot have originated in the century itself. We seek also in vain for its beginnings on the

"Arch of the French Revolution." It was a mighty power in the eighteenth century, undiminished by the vast influence brought to bear upon it for its overthrow.

The seventeenth century—"the Arch of Oliver Cromwell"—was distinguished as a Christian century, and it is equally in vain to seek for the origin of our faith upon "the Arch of Martin Luther."

In like manner we pass over the arches of "the Invention of Printing," of "John Wyckliffe," of "Magna Charta," of "the Crusades," and of "William the Conqueror,"—all showing the marked presence and power of faith in the historical accuracy of the gospel records.

The tenth century is "the Arch of Darkness," but amidst all its relic-mongering the Waldenses clung to the story of the cross, and to the veracity of the New Testament histories, and proved the strength of their faith in martyrdom and suffering.

"The Arch of King Alfred" shows a Christian king himself, and learned men whom he appointed—translating the Bible into the Saxon tongue.

In the eighth century—on "the Arch of Charlemagne"—the same work was done for the French people, the temporal power of the Pope was established, and Bulgarian Christians fled from Eastern persecution to the valleys of the Alps and the borders of the Pyrenees: all facts manifestly due to something stronger than a mere belief in an old fable about the sun.

On "the Arch of Mahommed"—that great founder of a new religion, himself testifies to the historical fact of the existence of Jesus Christ, as a prophet sent into the world before himself, and living and dying according to the Scripture histories. The venerable Bede, and Lady Hilda, the abbess of Whitby, and Cuthbert of Lindisfarne, testify to the prevalence of Christian belief in England so long ago.

The sixth century is "the Arch of Augustine," and of the Christianization of England through the pious and charitable zeal of Gregory the Great—when certainly the history of Jesus Christ was held to be far other than the refashioning of an old fable about the sun.

The fifth century—"the Arch of Earthquake"—shows fierce theological disputes, yet all turning upon the interpretation of the words of Jesus, and so testifying—thus far at least—to His historical existence.

The fourth century is "the Arch of Constantine." His historical existence cannot be disputed, nor the fact of His acceptance of, or conversion to, the Christian faith: while even Gibbon estimates that out of 120 millions, the population of the Roman Empire, six millions were actual professors of Christianity.

On the "Arch of Persecution" we find that hundreds suffered death rather than deny their faith in Christ, or part with the records of His life, and the writings of His apostles: an unlikely fact were Jesus a myth, the Bible a fabrication, the whole Christian story a new version of the ancient myth concerning the sun.

The inquiry is thus carried up to the second and first centuries—"the Arches of the Fathers" and "the Apostles"—to the consideration of which more than one half of the book is devoted.

From the second and third centuries numbers of Christian writings, of undisputed authorship and date, have come down to us, some perfect, some in a fragmentary condition. From these all but eleven verses of the New Testament can be gathered—being either quoted, or distinctly referred to, or unmistakably implied in them,

In the year 175, Tertullian, Irenæus, and Clement of Alexandria, three of the most eminent of the "fathers," were living—and by them "the four gospels" were evidently known, accepted, and attributed to Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, as they are now and by us.

Who these four writers were is known—and we find their personal and acquired characteristics so revealed in each history, as fully to corroborate the association respecting their authorship of the books called by their names.

Here summing up the results of the inquiry so far, Mr. Cooper says,—and the quotation has an autobiographical as well as an argumentative interest:—

"We have now brought out the *circumstantial evidence* for the authenticity, genuineness, and authorship of the four gospels, for the historical identity and real human existence of their authors, and above all, for the competence of the Evangelists to write the gospels that bear their names. . . .

My own conscientious conviction is, that Strauss has not an inch of ground to stand upon, when he denies that we know who wrote the gospels, when they were written, and where they were written. His "mythical System," which held me in bondage for twelve years, I feel has utterly lost its hold upon me,—and I say it thankfully."

The alleged gradual growth of simple facts connected with a pure, and noble, and loving human life, into the supernatural story of the Son of God, which constitutes the essential principle of the theory of Strauss and Renan, is met by the fact that in the year 175 there were in existence, according to a moderate computation, 15,000 copies of the Greek gospels. Clearly no miraculous narratives, not originally in the books, could have then been introduced. Take the instance, for example, of the raising of Lazarus from the dead. Could that at any time have been admitted, without detection and exposure, into the histories of Christ. The gospels as at present known were in the hands of Irenæus in 175 A. D. He learned his Christianity from Polycarp, who was the pupil and friend of the apostle John himself. In the lifetime of John such a mythical story could not possibly have been introduced into the gospel which he wrote. Polycarp would have discovered the interpolation and denied its truth had it been made in his days, nor could it have been made in the time of the active and travelled Irenæus, who was familiar with many distant sections of the Christian Church and their beliefs. For true histories believers could die, but for histories known to be false—as such a story, were it newly fabricated or developed, would be—no one would dare or care to die.

The testimony of pagan witnesses to the Christian belief and its widespread diffusion, is cited; the facts of Paul's career, undisputed by any scholars, however sceptical, and the sufferings of the early Christians and the apostles, are inquired into; and the whole is shown to leave no room for any other common-sense conclusion, than that the Christian histories are true records of facts, and that the character of these facts is such as to prove that in Jesus Christ there was, in plain reality, "God manifest in the flesh, reconciling the world unto Himself."

The argument is addressed to the broad, sturdy common-sense of inquirers after truth, whom it invites to the closest examination of the subject without misgiving as to the result. To all such we heartily commend Mr. Cooper's little work, which we shall be glad to see followed by others containing his lectures on "Design in the Animal World and in the Celestial Spaces," and on the "*A Priori* Argument," &c., by which, equally with those on the "Bridge of History," so many thousands of his hearers throughout the country have been at once instructed and delighted. Our readers may

ably aid in such a consummation; for in the preface to this excellent work the author says:—

“The ‘Historical evidence’ has only formed part of my work as a lecturer during these last fourteen years. The miracles, the resurrection, the perfect moral teaching, and the unique excellence of the character of Christ, have also been repeatedly taken up and treated in my lectures. And being deeply aware of the tendency to Atheistic questioning in our day, I have also dealt with the arguments for natural as well as revealed religion. Thus I have treated familiarly, and in popular terms, not only the “Design Argument,” so finely expounded by Paley, but also the “Argument a Priori;”—now, at length, after all the partial successes of Clarke, and Howe, and Locke, and a host of lesser names, so perfectly and irrefutably established by my highly intelligent friend, Mr. [W. H.] Gillespie. The argument for God’s existence from the fact of our own moral nature; the arguments against materialism, and for a future state of rewards and punishments, have had also to be taken up and treated with such poor ability as I possess in order to complete the full course of evidence. If the sample of my lecturing, which I now publish, meets with acceptance, I may try to put the rest—all, as yet, only *spoken*—into writing for publication.”

*A Letter to the Rev. Samuel Davidson, D.D., LL.D., in answer to his Essay against the Johannine authorship of the fourth Gospel. By Kentish Bache. London: F. B. Kitto.*

THE Rev. S. Davidson, D.D., LL.D., was born near Ballymena, in Antrim, Ireland, in 1808, and was educated in Belfast College, 1825—1832. In 1835 he was appointed to the chair of Biblical Criticism in the Presbyterian Church; becoming Congregational in his views on church government he resigned in 1842, but was almost immediately adopted by the Independents as a theological professor in Manchester College. Marischal College, Aberdeen, conferred on him the title of LL.D. in 1838. In 1848, on the recommendation of Hupfield and Tholuck, he was made doctor of theology of the University of Halle. In 1857 doubts of his orthodoxy arose, and he resigned his chair; and he has since been in disgrace among those who were dissatisfied with his Congregational lecture; and though a voluminous author in theological literature, he has been regarded as having gone over to the Broad Church. It seems that in July, 1870, he contributed an Essay to the *Theological Review*—an organ of advanced liberal religious opinions, we believe, on “The Fourth Gospel and its Advocates.” To the discussion of this contribution to the criticism of the New Testament, this letter by

Kentish Bache is devoted. Of the writer we know nothing ; but we have little hesitation in saying that he is a clear, pointed, forcible, and keen antagonist. We confess that we do not find our sympathy with him increased by the curt and hostile manner he assumes towards his antagonist, whom he pursues throughout the letter as if he had intentionally, and of *malice prepense*, gone to the wrong side, and charges home upon him as a heterodox heretic, who is knowingly and persistently in error. We should like to have seen more of the chivalrous courtesy of controversy, and somewhat more of Christian suavity. Waiving this, however, without judging as between him and his opponent, whose contribution we have not read, we must say that Mr. Kentish Bache has supplied a concise, condensed, pithy, able, and informing epitome of the evidences for the authenticity and the reasonings in favour of the genuineness of John's Gospel. In a very brief but effective way he marshals the evidence and considers the testimony or silence of Papias, Irenæus, Hegesippus, Polycarp, Barnabas, Tertullian, Justin Martyr, Serapion, the Muratorian Canonist, and so establishes a *catena* of authorities on his side ; and he thereafter proceeds to consider the Gospel in its teachings and its tenets, its consistency in itself, and its harmony with the other Gospels, acutely and clearly. The whole may be read as an abridgment of the best works on the authenticity of the canons, and forms a valuable addition to cheap and available evidences of Christianity. We would suggest that the value of the work would have been enhanced by attaching the dates at which the several authorities quoted flourished. This may not have been necessary in addressing scholars ; in a book appealing to the people it is indispensable.

---

THE HUMAN WILL AS AN AGENT IN HUMAN IMPROVEMENT.—The idea once conceived and verified that great and noble ends are to be achieved, by which the condition of the whole human species shall be permanently benefited, by bringing into exercise a sufficient quantity of sober thought, and by a proper adaptation of means, is of itself sufficient to set us earnestly on reflecting what ends are truly great and noble, either in themselves, or as conducive to others of a still loftier character. It is not now equally harmless and insignificant whether we are right or wrong ; since we feel ourselves capable of buffeting at least with its waves, and perhaps riding triumphantly over them ; for why should we despair that the reason which has enabled us to subdue all nature to our purposes should achieve far more difficult conquest, and ultimately find some means of enabling the collective wisdom of mankind to bear down those obstacles which individual shortsightedness, selfishness, and passion oppose to all improvements.—*Sir John Herschel.*



## The Societies' Section.

### BIRMINGHAM DEBATING SOCIETIES.

*Birmingham and Edgbaston Debating Societies.*—Rather more than a year ago we presented to our readers in our extract from Dr. J. A. Langford's "Century of Birmingham Life," an account of the debating societies of Birmingham nearly a century ago. Since then, Dr. Langford taking a hint given him by one of our contributors, has continued his researches in the same line, and has brought together a considerable amount of interesting information regarding the more recent debating societies of his birth city. These he brought under the notice of the Birmingham and Edgbaston Society, at their sixteenth annual united meeting, in an address from the President's chair; and we select such portions as seem most interesting, in continuation of what we have already published on this topic in the *British Controversialist*, August, 1870, p. 157.

In 1835 the "Literary Institute" was established. Many of its members are still living, and are good debaters. In 1845 the Eclectic Debating Society was formed, with Mr. George Dawson for its first president. The first general meeting was held Nov. 17. Mr. Dawson, as president, delivered an address, which was afterwards published. Speaking of the new society, he said:—

"Its primary design is expressed in the words of Marcus Antoninus, '*I seek after truth, by which no man ever yet was injured.*' This search we would make in the mode best adapted to find; taking warning by

the errors of the past and the present, we claim and give full freedom of thought and speech. Having nothing to fear we would not banish from our discussions religion and politics; believing, that when they are excluded, little is left worthy of serious attention.

"Of the conditions necessary to the discovery of truth we hold freedom to be one of the chief. We watch nature; we mark that full development is not attained where restraint is used; that most beautiful things are the freest. We have seen, too, that freest nations have been the noblest; that an unfettered press, with all its faults, is yet the truest; and we learn that freedom, even though trembling on the verge of license, is the condition of the attainment of full mental stature and manly dignity."

Mr. Dawson concluded thus:—

"We weep not over difference of opinion, for we know it to be needful to progress; we sigh not for unity of opinion now, for it were to us a stale, flat, and unprofitable state of things, reminding us of Bishop Burnet's notion of paradise, that 'it was a level plain, from which he forgot that, necessarily, glad some streams, and the verdure and fruitfulness thereby produced, must be absent. We cannot quarrel with another for differing, when that very difference is what we expect and wish, for he who would surround himself with those only who agree with him, does but in things mental repeat the conceit of him who surrounds his chamber with

mirrors, that every turn may reveal to him the admired contour of his figure, the grace of his ambrosial curls, the dignity of his port, or, perchance, the adornment bestowed upon him by the tailor's skilful hand.

"Courteous, we would honour all men; earnest, we would search ever; kindly, we will bear all things, and think no evil. Let us adopt as our motto that of a celebrated German—

'Frisch, frei, fröhlich, und fromm.'

"Let us come with those limbs of truth which we have kept so carefully embalmed; let us lay them together, and who knows but that the sublime words of the old prophecy may be fulfilled:—'Then said he unto me, Prophecy unto the wind; prophecy, son of man, and say to the wind, Thus saith the Lord God, come from the four winds, oh breath, and breathe upon these slain that they may live. So I prophesied as he commanded me, and the breath came into them, and they lived and stood up upon their feet.' That it may be so is my earnest prayer."

The Birmingham Debating Society was founded on Dec. 3, 1846, with Mr. George Jabet for its hon. sec. There was also in existence at this time the energetic and flourishing Edgbaston Debating Society; and they continued as separate and independent societies till the year 1855. The Birmingham Society held a public debate in Jan., 1853, on the then exciting question, "Whether it is probable that the late re-establishment of the Empire in France, under Louis Napoleon, will be beneficial to that country?" the Ven. Archdeacon Sandford was in the chair; and the affirmative was supported by Dr. Heslop, Mr. T. P. Salt, and Mr. Buckton; and the negative by Mr. George Dixon

and Mr. J. A. Langford. The debate was adjourned till Feb. 10, and was carried in the negative. The same society had another public debate on May 13, on the question, "Whether it is probable that Hungary will shortly achieve her independence?" Mr. J. P. Turner opening in the affirmative, and Mr. T. J. Buckton in the negative. At the adjourned debate, Mr. W. Harris opened in the affirmative, and Mr. E. Wright in the negative. The Edgbaston Debating Society held a public debate on June 2, on the subject, "That the present condition of Ireland is mainly attributable to the misgovernment of England;" Mr. T. Martineau opening in the affirmative, and Mr. W. Mathews in the negative.

The two societies held a joint social meeting on June 30, 1853, at the New Inn, Handsworth. The president of the Birmingham Society, Mr. G. Jabet, occupied the chair, and the same officer of the Edgbaston Society, Mr. S. Timmins, the vice-chair. At this meeting the union of the two societies was advocated by Mr. Jabet.

The Birmingham Society held public debate on Nov. 11. Subject, "Whether a diplomatic compromise of the differences between Turkey and Russia would be preferable to war?" and on April 7, 1854, the same society publicly debated "Whether the establishment of a Republican form of Government in Italy is desirable?" The Edgbaston Society held a public debate on May 4, Subject, "Whether the Norman invasion had been prejudicial to the best interests of England?" The Birmingham Society held one on May 25, Subject, "Ought England to have taken up arms in the present war in defence of Turkey against Russia?"

The two societies held a joint public debate on June 1, 1855.

The subject discussed was, "Is it the duty of England, at the present crisis, to take active measures in aid of the resuscitation of Poland?" The affirmative was carried by a large majority.

The separate existence of the two societies was a matter of regret with some of the best friends of both, and the advisability of an amalgamation was frequently mentioned and discussed. At a meeting of the Edgbaston Society, held Oct. 31, 1856, the committee reported that in accordance with the resolution passed at the last annual meeting requesting them to consider the best means of carrying out the amalgamation of the two societies, the secretary had communicated with the secretary of the Birmingham Society on the subject. It was afterwards arranged that such an amalgamation should be made forthwith, and that the united society should be the *Birmingham and Edgbaston Debating Society*. The last meeting of the Edgbaston Society was held on Nov. 14; the subject discussed was, "That it is probable that the present war will further the progress of civilization in Europe," which was carried by a majority of fifteen to three. The first meeting of the united societies was held on Nov. 28, and the subject discussed was, "That the Bank Charter of 1844 is most vicious in principle, and ought not to be renewed." This debate was adjourned to Dec. 12, when the affirmative of the proposition was carried by the casting vote of the chairman.

The members for the first year were 121, and the number of meetings held was 11, and the number of subjects discussed was 9. One public debate was given this session on May 3, on the subject, "That it is the duty of the Government of this country to establish a National

System of Secular Education." The affirmative was opened by Mr. S. Timmins, supported by Dr. C. M. Ingleby and Mr. J. A. Langford; and the negative was opened by Mr. Matthew, jun., supported by Mr. W. Hudson and Mr. W. Reynolds. The majority was in favour of the affirmative.

The President's address was "On Language as the Instrument of Debate."

From the report presented at the annual meeting Oct. 21, 1857, I make the following extract:—

"One of the most striking features of the debates of the last year is the manner in which they reflect and represent the political and social questions which have engaged public attention during the period of your society's meetings. The first discussion was upon the important topic of our interference in Neapolitan affairs, which was followed at intervals by discussions on the career of Lord Palmerston, the Chinese War, and the spread of Democracy. Of the social topics, the important question of marriage with a deceased wife's sister, of the transportation of criminals, of national education, and of strikes, were the subjects of very animated debates. The character of Henry VIII., as newly set forth in Mr. Froude's recent work, was an interesting subject to all students of history; nor will the Shaksperian members of the society soon forget the scholarly debate on the character of Hamlet. The two remaining questions, 'Whether creed has a greater influence than climate on the character of man, and whether it is a sufficient argument for a future state that there are irregularities in this life which may be redressed in another,' produced debates which fully sustained the society's credit."

The members were now 116; and

the President's (Mr. C. M. Ingleby) address was on "Clothes."

During the session of 1858-9 there were 134 members, the number of debates was 11, one of them being a public one, on the subject, "Ought the future Government of India to be vested in the Crown?" The affirmative was carried almost unanimously. The President, Mr. T. C. Sanders, delivered the annual address Oct. 6, 1858; and Mr. J. T. Bunce was elected president for the ensuing year.

The next session was a very successful one; at the annual meeting held on Oct. 4, 1859, it was reported that the society numbered 160 members. The number of meetings was 14, and 11 subjects were discussed, but there was no public debate this session. Mr. G. J. Johnson was elected president.

The society had hitherto held its meetings at the Hen and Chickens, New Street; but an arrangement was made for transferring them to the Midland Institute. The first meeting was held Nov., 1859. The annual meeting was held on Oct. 2, at which it was reported that the number of members was 150. There were eleven debates, 4 political, 1 politico-economical, 4 literary, and 1 moral. A public debate was held on April 25, on the subject, "That it is the Policy and Duty of England to assist, even by arms, if necessary, the efforts of Switzerland to prevent the Annexation of Savoy to France." The debate was adjourned to May 9, when the negative was agreed to by a majority of 7.

Mr. C. E. Matthews was elected president.

During 1860 the members had increased from 150 to 162. Ten subjects were discussed; 5 political, 1 artistic, 1 scientific, 1 philosophical, 1 historical, and 1 of general interest. There was also a public debate Jan. 30, 1861, "That the

Works of the English Novelists since the days of Scott are superior to those of their Predecessors." The affirmative was carried by a majority of 31.

At the annual meeting, Oct. 3, 1861, Mr. C. E. Matthews, the retiring president, delivered an address on "Eloquence and Oratory, and the difference between the two." Mr. J. H. Chamberlain was elected president.

In session 1861-2, the society numbered 155 members, and had 9 private debates and 1 public; of these, 4 were political, 2 social, 1 philosophical, 1 politico-economical, and 1 personal. The public debate was held on Jan. 30, 1862; subject, "That Lord Bacon was the 'brightest, wisest, meanest of Mankind.'" The negative was carried by a majority of 17.

The annual meeting was held Oct. 29, 1862, when the retiring president delivered his address on "Provincialism;" and Mr. J. Chamberlain was elected president.

The number of members for 1862-3 was 159. There were 8 private debates and 1 public, of which 3 were political, 2 politico-economical, 1 social, 1 theological, 1 moral, and 1 personal. The public debate was held on May 31, 1863, and the subject was, "That Mr. Kinglake shows an utter want of historic judgment in his indication of the Causes of the Crimean War, and betrays a petty and malicious prejudice in his estimate of the character and Conduct of Louis Napoleon." The negative was carried by a majority of 4.

The annual meeting was held on Oct. 14, 1863, when the retiring president delivered an address on "Difference of Opinion." Mr. Sebastian Evans, M.A., was elected president.

In the session of 1863-4 the number of members had increased

to 175. Six subjects were discussed; 2 political, 2 social, 1 judicial, and 1 theological. There was no public debate.

The annual meeting was held on Oct. 19, 1864, at which the retiring president delivered an address on "The General Politics of England, the Causes of our Present Position, and the Duties of the various Members of our State." Mr. W. Harris was elected president.

The first debate of the session 1864-5 was a public one, on the subject, "That Robert Browning is a greater poet than Alfred Tennyson." The negative was carried by a majority of 29.

The number of members now was 174, and there were 8 debates; 4 political, 3 social, and 1 theological. The annual meeting was held on Oct. 18, 1866, when the retiring president delivered an address on "The Objects and Duties of our Society, and against the Economy of Truth." Mr. G. S. Matthews was elected president.

The first debate of the next session was a public and a literary one, "That Byron is the greatest Poet of the present Century." The affirmative was carried by a majority of 31. A second was held Dec. 20, and the subject discussed was, "That the Proceedings of Governor Eyre, in the Suppression of the alleged Rebellion in Jamaica have been hasty, tyrannical, and unjust." The affirmative was carried by a majority of 2. A third was held on Jan. 24, 1866, on the subject, "That the present Mania for Alpine Climbing ought to be discontinued by all sensible men." The negative was carried by a large majority. On May 2 a fourth was held, subject, "That the Ancient Jews believed in a Future State of Rewards and Punishments." This was affirmed by Dr. C. M. Ingleby and the Rev. G. J. Emanuel; and

denied by Messrs. J. P. Turner and G. J. Johnson. The affirmative was carried by a majority of 28.

This was one of the most successful years of the society's existence. The number of members was 195, and eleven subjects were discussed—2 political, 2 social, 2 theological, 1 literary, 3 commercial, and 1 "comico-scientific." The annual meeting was held on Oct. 24, 1866, at which the retiring president delivered an address on "Induction," and Mr. W. Kenrick was elected president.

In the session of 1866-7 there were three public debates; the first Nov. 7, "That Ritualism is injurious to the cause of true Religion." The debate was adjourned, and resumed on Nov. 21, when a large majority decided in favour of the affirmative. The second was held Feb. 20, 1867, on the subject, "That the present Government are qualified to deal with the question of Reform in such a manner as to satisfy the requirements of the people, and ensure the support of the present House of Commons." The negative was carried by a majority of two. The third was held March 20, to discuss the question, "That (excluding the drama) English Poetry, from the time of Cowper downwards, is equal to any in the Language." The negative was carried by a majority of two.

This session the number of members was 226; 8 subjects were discussed—5 political, 1 theological, 1 literary, and 1 general. The annual meeting was held on Oct. 2, 1867, when the retiring president delivered an address upon "Debatable Ground." Mr. J. P. Turner was elected president.

There were three public debates in the session of 1867-8; the first was held Nov. 13, and the question was, "That the course recently pursued by Garibaldi in re-

lation to the Papal States is impolitic and unjust." It was carried in the affirmative by a majority of 4. The second was held on Jan. 15, 1868, on the subject, "That the mode of Observing the Sabbath, as enforced in this country, is anti-Christian." The debate was adjourned, and on its resumption on the 22nd, the negative was carried by a majority of 18. The third public debate was held on April 22, on the question "That Female Suffrage is a Fallacy." A majority of 8 were in favour of the negative.

The number of members this session was 213. Ten subjects were discussed—6 being political, 1 theological, 1 philosophical, 1 social, and 1 politico-economical. The annual meeting was held Oct. 8. The retiring president delivered an address on "Home Aspects," and Mr. R. F. Martineau was elected president.

The public debates for the session 1868-9 were, first, on Dec. 8, "That a National System of Compulsory Education will be productive of greater good if secular than if denominational." The affirmative was carried by a majority of 40. Secondly, on Jan. 20, 1869, when the question was, "That England will not long retain her Present Position among nations." The negative was carried by a majority of 21.

The number of members this session was 240. Nine subjects were discussed—4 political, 2 politico-economic, 2 social, and 1 on education. The annual meeting was held on Oct. 20, 1869, and the retiring president delivered an address on "A Secular View of the Sunday Question." Mr. Alfred Caddick was elected president.

There was one public debate in the session of 1869-70, on the subject, "That Variation of Species is due to Development rather than

to special Acts of Creation." The affirmative obtained a majority of one.

The number of members this session was 255. Seven subjects were discussed—1 social, 2 theological, 1 literary, 1 scientific, 1 factious, and 1 "spiritual." The annual meeting was held Nov. 2. The retiring president delivered an address on "The State of Europe;" and J. A. Langford, LL.D., was elected president.

The society has kept up the good custom of having every year a summer meeting in the country; nor are these the least pleasant and enjoyable gatherings of its members. A large number of "pleasant spots and famous places" in the neighbourhood of Birmingham have thus been visited during the existence of the society, adding to their historical and topographical knowledge, as well as supplying the members with joyous remembrances which cannot fail to be registered among the highest and purest of their lives.

Since the amalgamation of the two societies sixteen years have elapsed—years of great importance in the history of the world, as well as in the history of Birmingham. During that period the society has held 170 meetings, and debated 138 questions. It has witnessed the growth and development of the Midland Institute, the establishment of the free libraries and reading-rooms, the extension of popular education, and the enormous advance of political freedom; nor can there be the slightest doubt that the free discussion of all the questions which affect human progress and interests, which is the principle of this society, has enabled its members to take a prominent and useful part in bringing about that change in popular opinion which is necessary for the establishment of

all reforms, moral, social, intellectual, physical, political, and spiritual. This society has proved a training school in which the intellectual athlete has prepared himself for the more vigorous, if not the more difficult, contests of public life; and it is a most gratifying fact that in every department of the

public life of this town, its members are bearing an honourable and active part.

May the Birmingham and Edgbaston Debating Society long continue to be what it now is—one of the most flourishing literary societies of the town!

## The Inquirer.

### QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

959. It is said that the Hebrew word translated "Harlot" in Joshua vi. 17, likewise signifies one who keeps a place where refreshment is provided. Does the Greek word translated "harlot;" in Hebrews xi. 31 and James ii. 25, also bear the same signification?—SAMUEL.

960. Who is the author of the lines:—

"We live in deeds, not years; in thoughts not breaths;

In feelings, not in figures on a dial?"

S. L.

### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

949. A notice in the book list of new works issued by Messrs. Edmonston and Douglas, Edinburgh, may interest T. F. It runs thus:—"Thomas Erskine, of Linlathen's, 'Posthumous Papers: 'The Spiritual Order,' 5s. 'The Unconditional Freeness of the Gospel,' 3s. 6d. 'The Purpose of God in the Creation of Man,' 6d." I have heard it stated that he projected the issue, and edited the first volume of the works of Prof. A. J. Scott, of Manchester, but this I only give as hearsay.—O. P.

957. I would suggest the following as the best method of proceeding

with such a volume as described. After carefully reading the series of essays through, form some calculation as to the length of the essay which is to be written upon them. I would then proceed a second time through the book, noting down those passages which it might be well to quote, those parts of each essay which require particular treatment, and those also which might be summarized in brief. Having, then, determined as to how much space in the critique should be given to each essay, the writer can give his views, taking the essays in their published order, or in another, if that appears more natural to him. But if his critical essay is to be fully analytical, he must, in writing, produce first of all an epitome of each essay, and fill up and expand the outline thereafter.—J. R. S. C.

958. Beeton's "Dictionary of Geography" supplies the pronunciation of all the names of places, ancient, biblical, and modern, mentioned in it. It costs 7s. 6d. London: Ward, Lock, and Tyler.—C. H. S.

959. The word in both places is *porné*, and signifies a female hiring; and as the most frequent instances of hiring were for lewd purposes the word became rapidly deteriorated to its worst association. It is probable

that the earlier use of the word was the purer one, and contained none of the polluting and polluted significance it afterwards attained. The English term has been similarly demoralized.—R. M. A.

960. James Philip Bailey, born at Nottingham, April 22nd, 1816; studied at Glasgow 1831-4; afterwards studied law. The lines occur in "Festus," third edition, page 12.—R. M. A.

## Literary Notes.

The autobiography of Thomas Cooper, the Chartist, with steel engraving of the writer, is in the press, and is nearly ready. Mr. Cooper is proceeding with his "Paradise of Martyrs."

Derwent Coleridge is engaged on a "Literary Biography of Samuel Taylor Coleridge."

Dr. Drysdale has prepared an able paper on "Life, and the Equivalence of Force."

The prize of £100, offered for the best essay on "The Nature and Contents of Scripture Revelation, as compared with other forms of Truth," and open to the competition of students in the Scottish Universities, and Trinity College, Glenalmond, has been awarded to Mr. William Horne, M.A., Dunfermline. Mr. Horne has been a student at the United College, and at St. Mary's College, St. Andrew's, and obtained the Rector's prize (value £25), given by Mr. John Stuart Mill in 1869, for the best essay on "The Principle of Inseparable Association." Mr. Horne has also studied at the Independent Theological Hall in Edinburgh, in which he holds a Baxter Scholarship.

Tyerman's "Life and Times of John Wesley" is to be reissued in twelve parts, price half-a-crown.

The *Philadelphia Ledger* says that:—"The Princess Alice of

Hesse-Darmstadt, Queen Victoria's daughter, has written a novel, called "Ways of Life," which depicts social life among the higher classes of Southern Germany.

"A Book of Parliamentary Anecdote," compiled from authentic sources, by Messrs. G. H. Jennings and W. S. Johnstone, is about to appear. The work is designed to illustrate, in an anecdotal form, the parliamentary history of the country and of distinguished statesmen.

Dr. Margoliouth has undertaken to translate and edit Aaron Pesaro's "Concordance to the Babylonian Talmud," "Jacob Sasportas," "Index to the Passages of Scripture mentioned or commented on in the Jerusalem Talmud," &c., so as to form a guide to the study of the theology of the Talmud.

The Wesleyan Conference Office has begun the issue of "The Lives of Early Wesleyan Preachers," which will form a valuable repository of matters relating to the Religion of Dissent.

A posthumous story, by the late Nathaniel Hawthorne, is promised.

Miss Sarah S. Hennel has just issued the second part of her singularly able, interesting, and original work, "Comparative Metaphysics,"—on mental "Sex."

"The Uncollected Writings, Essays, and Lectures" of R. W. Emerson are in the press.



Hensleigh Wedgwood's "Dictionary of English Etymology" is to be reissued, revised, in five crown parts.

Dr. J. H. Newman, as a protective measure, has published his Critical and Historical Essays (1829-46) in a collected form, with annotations.

Rev. Alex. Balloch Grosart, of St. George's, Blackburn, has just distributed among his subscribers "The Poems of John Norris," of Bemerton, the famous philosophic Norris, disciple of Plato, and Malebranche, antagonist of Locke, and precursor of Berkeley, with a critical introduction, showing strange coincidences of thought between, if not appropriation of, his verses and those of subsequent writers; "The Licia" and other Love poems, and "Rising to the Crowne of Richard the Third," by Giles Fletcher, LL.D., with Memoir, and "New Facts" in the biographies of the poetical brotherhood of the Fletchers; and the "Poems of Lucius Carey, Viscount Falkland," highly interesting in their additions to the amenities of literature. He expects to be able next year to supply a complete edition of the works of Richard Crashaw, the complete poems of Andrew Marvell, and the complete poems of Robert Southwell, besides some interesting Miscellanies.

The fifth and sixth parts of the Supplement to the "Conversations Lexicon," published by Brockhaus, of Leipzig, bring the eleventh edition down to our own times. In the fifth part are articles on the Vatican Council, the "Commune of Paris," and "Darwinism;" while the sixth contains articles on the "German Empire," the "Franco-German War," and full accounts of the German army, navy, people, and literature. Why should we not have annual supplements to our Encyclopædias, bringing certified knowledge within attainable reach,

at the earliest period, in trustworthy and accessible forms?

A Russian version of Mr. Charles Darwin's "Descent of Man" has been published at St. Petersburg, by Mr. E. Blagacvietlof.

The novel, "A Visit to my Discontented Cousin," is said to be written by the Right Hon. J. Moncreiff (b. 1811), formerly M.P. for Edinburgh, Lord Advocate for Scotland, for some time editor of the *North British Review*, and now Lord Justice Clerk.

Dr. C. Rogers has in preparation a new annotated edition of Sir John Scott, of Scotstarvet's "Staggering State of Scottish Statesmen," which is founded on a comparison of the best and oldest MSS.

Mrs. Oliphant is engaged upon a "Life of the Comte de Montalembert," of whom and of whose works she wrote numerous notes in *Blackwood's Magazine*.

A library edition of R. H. Horne's excellent modern epic "Orion," originally issued in "sarcasm at the low estimation into which poetry had fallen" in 1843, at *one farthing*, is announced by Messrs. Ellis and Green.

Mr. T. P. Barkas, F.G.S., the learned bookseller of Newcastle-on-Tyne, is preparing "A Popular Manual of Coal Measure Palæontology; being a popular illustrated guide to the fish, reptile, and (supposed) mammalian remains of the Northumberland carboniferous strata, with 233 excellent illustrations, and with reference to the chief fish and reptile-bearing carboniferous formations in various parts of the world."

Wm. Paterson, Edinburgh, is about to issue, in two vols., crown 4to., containing 600 pp. of letter-press and 112 wood engravings from the cuts in the Basle edition, in Latin, Alexander Barclay's translation of Sebastian Brandt's "Shyp

of Fools ; " an extremely interesting, curious, and once widely-popular satire, which, under the allegory of a ship freighted with fools of all kinds, held the mirror up to the prevailing follies and vices of the period immediately preceding the Reformation. Barclay largely increased the matter of the original. The work is to be edited by T. J. Jamieson, Keeper of the Advocates' Library, Edinburgh, who is to provide a glossary, a biography, and annotations.

Mr. John Pearson, of York Street, is to follow up his excellent reprint of the scarce old historical ballads by a less praiseworthy, though, as possessed of a literary value, requisite reproduction of the now very scarce plays, histories, and novels of Mrs. Aphra Behn, with life and memoir.

Edward Bond, the Keeper of the MSS. in the British Museum, will edit next year for the Chaucer Society the fragments of the manuscript household book of Elizabeth, wife of Prince Lionel, which contain the earliest known mention of the name of Geoffrey Chaucer, and possibly of the Phillippa whom he afterwards married.

Gerald Massey is about to issue his romantic but able book on "The Shakspeare Sonnets" in a second and considerably enlarged edition, to consist of 100 copies, and to be sold to subscribers only.

The memoirs of Prince Talleyrand, often regarded as the genius of unscrupulosity, are at last to be given to the world. They were long withheld, from fear lest the revelations they contain damaging to the First Empire might lead to their seizure by the Second.

"A Life of Sir Henry Lawrence" is in preparation.

The versatile J. S. Blackie has

just issued "The Four Phases of Morals—Socrates, Aristotle, Christianity, and Utilitarianism."

The life and miscellaneous essays of Henry T. Colebrooke, one of the great lights of the Royal Asiatic Society, are to be published; the essays edited by Professor Cowell, and the biography by the author's son.

Mr. Weston James Hatfield, proprietor and editor of the *Cambridge Independent Press*, died Nov. 14, at the age of 41.

The Philosophical Society of Berlin has elected Dr. J. Hutchison, Stirling, a foreign member. This distinction has been conferred in consideration of Dr. Stirling's work, "The Secret of Hegel," and his exertions in this country in connection with the Hegel monument, in which the readers of the *British Controversialist* took some interest.

The *Preston Herald* announces that Mr. Hermon, M.P., has offered to give £200 to the authors of the two best essays on the prevention of colliery disasters.

Kinglake's "History of the Crimean War" is finished, but its publication is deferred for a time.

The earliest catalogue of the books of the New Testament, "the Muratorian Fragment," has been edited by Dr. S. P. Tregelles.

A biography of Robert Raikes, of Gloucester, with notices of the early progress of Sunday schools, is in preparation.

"A Manual of Anthropology," by Charles Bray, is published.

The English of Shakspeare has formed the subject of six lectures, delivered to ladies, at Cambridge, by W. G. Clark, editor of "The Cambridge Shakspeare."

Paul de Kock, French novelist, died 30th August.

# INDEX.

	PAGE
<b>LEADING ARTICLES.</b>	
<b>MODERN LOGICIANS:—</b>	
Aldrich, Henry, Dean of Christ Church .....	401
<b>MODERN METAPHYSICIANS:—</b>	
Berkeley, George, Lord Bishop of Cloyne .....	241, 321
Fraser, Prof. A. C. ....	1, 81
<b>THE PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICS:—</b>	
Legislative Representation .....	161
<b>DEBATES.</b>	
<b>LITERATURE:—</b>	
Is Pulpit Influence on the Wane?	
Affirmative Articles 127, 184, 269, 358, 429	
Negative Articles 130, 186, 274, 362, 385, 423, 433	
<b>POLITICS:—</b>	
A Professional or a Popular Army— which shall we have?	
Professional .....	30, 107
Popular .....	34, 111
Ought the Tenure of Land to be Radically Changed?	
Affirmative Articles .....	190, 371
Negative Articles .....	38, 277, 437
<b>RELIGION:—</b>	
Is Christ's Reign upon Earth to be a Spiritual or a Temporal one?	
Spiritual .....	177, 346
Temporal .....	364, 349
Both .....	355
<b>SCIENCE:—</b>	
Has Man developed from the Savage State?	
Affirmative Articles 47, 115, 117, 199, 211, 285, 442	
Negative Articles 57, 121, 305, 216, 288, 376	

	PAGE
<b>THE TOPIC:—</b>	
Have the Ministry rightly employed the Royal Prerogative in the Abolition of Purchase?	
Affirmative Articles .....	237
Negative Articles .....	236
<b>THE ESSAYIST:—</b>	
On Manuscript Magazines .....	145
Shakspeare as an Actor .....	134
The Poetry of John H. Newman .....	223, 449
The English Constitution .....	294
<b>THE REVIEWER:—</b>	
Bache's, Kentish, Letter to the Rev. S. Davidson, D.D., LL.D. ....	463
Barrett's, T. S., Causation, New View of .....	308
" Examination of Gillespie's Argument .....	308
Browning's, Robert, Balaustion's Adventure .....	383, 455
Cooper's, Thomas, Bridge of History .....	454
Dunning's, E., The Child and the Book .....	395
Fuller's, Thomas, D. D., Poems and Translations in Verse .....	151
Grosart, Rev. A. B., Fuller Worthies' Library .....	151, 231
Hassell's, Jos., The Child and the Book .....	395
Jerrold's, B., The Best of All Good Company .....	394
Lyly's, John, Euphuus .....	64
" Euphuus and his Eng-land .....	64
" Dramatic Works .....	64
Morley's, H., Euphuism .....	64
Neil's, S., The Byways of English .....	64
Rushton's, M. L., Shakspeare's Euphuism .....	64
Washbourne's, Thomas, D.D., Poems .....	231
Weymouth's, R. F., On Euphuism ..	64
<b>TOILING UPWARD:—</b>	
George Daniel .....	307

	PAGE		PAGE
<b>THE SOCIETIES' SECTION :—</b>		<b>THE INQUIRER, continued :—</b>	
Berlin Philosophical Society, Hegel's		Periodical, The Earliest Eng-	
Monument.....	75	lish .....	156
Birmingham, Debating Societies in	465	Poetical Quotation .....	960
Ireland Church of England Young		Reading and Arranging .....	398
Men's Association .....	396	Rivulet Controversy .....	78
		Row Heresy .....	78
		William Smith.....	136
<b>THE INQUIRER :—</b>	<b>Q. A.</b>	<b>LACONICS :—</b>	
Beddome, Benjamin .....	156	Alchemy.....	189
Books, Four Influential .....	239	The Human Will as an Agent in	
Bunting, Jabez .....	156	Human Improvement .....	464
Civil Service Appointments..	78	John Howard .....	222
Civil Service Examinations..	78	Moral Philosophy .....	136
Composition of a Sermon ..	78	Nicknamed Parliaments.....	372
Della Crusca .....	78	Opinion .....	380
De Quincey, The Works of	156	Paupers .....	29
Erskine of Linlathen.....	78	Shakspeare and Tobacco .....	264
Geographical Names .....	398	Shaksperian Biography.....	143
Hamilton, Dr. R. W. ....	156		
Harlot .....	959	<b>LITERARY NOTES :—79, 160, 239, 319,</b>	
Legal Profession, Studies for	315	<b>399, 472</b>	
Literary World, The.....	156		
Newspaper .....	239		

